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THE INDIAN NAVY 1951-65

Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh avsm. (Retd.)

L A N C E R IN T E R N A T IO N A L

© T H E IN DIA N NAVY 1992,

First published in India, 1992, Lancer International, B-3G ulm ohar Park, New Delhi-110049

AH rights reserved. No part of this publication m ay be reproduced, stored in retrieval system or transmitted by any mearis electrical, m echanical or otherv^ise without first seeking the written perm ission of the publisher.

Printed at Central Electric Press, New Delhi.

I S B N

8 1 - 7 0 6 2 - 1 4 8 - 8

FOREWORD

W e find early references to the seas not only in the Vedas but also in the Indian mythology of Samudramanthan - the Elixir of life, came from the churr\ing of the seas. The tradition of the Kumbh Mela is also a rem inder of the eternal linkage of the rivers and seas with the destiny of India. Geography has thrust upon India all the ingredients of a maritime nation. It had flourished when the seas and its resources were well utilised and by the sam e token it lost its independence when these were neglected. This is the lesson of history to remember.

We have to now once again look forward to the seas for solving many of our problems of meeting the demands of increasing population, development and economic prosperity. These are also intricately woven in many ways with security and defence of our nation.

It has indeed been fortunate that the leaders of Independent India were acutely aware of the dangers posed due to the neglect of our sea frontiers.

This set the foundation for a balanced growth of the Indian Navy from the very outset. In retrospect, therefore, we should be extremely grateful to the naval leadership for charting the correct course.

The decade following independence and especially the period between 1951-65 could be termed as the Golden era of Naval growth. Not only were a number of significant new acquisitions made but, for the first time an Aircraft Carrier was acquired to provide the long reach so necessary in m odem N aval warfare. It is indeed fortunate that we were one of the few Navies and the first and only developing country to acquire this capacity.

It is no coincidence therefore, that the growth of the m odem Indian NavywithaB/ueiuflfCT" capacity was realised under th eflagofthe first Indian Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral R.D. Katari. Many more actions were also set in m otion which laid the foundation and traditions of Espirit de corp, trairung and professionalism.

The India-China war in 1962 did cause a considerable slowing down of our maritim e growth due to diversion of funds. Despite these setbacks, we have come some way along our charted course since then, although m uch m ore needs to be still done. It is however, inevitable that as India's economic conditions improve, its focus towards maritime interests will also grow.

The dependence of human kind on the seas and their resources will un

IV / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUE W ATER

doubtedly raise the im portance of the seas. Indeed the next century could w ell becom e The Century o f the Seas. In this fast changing world lies a decade of opportunity for India to take its rightful place as a leading maritime nation in Asia in furtherance of international peace and security. This work w hich covers the N avy's history from 1951 to 1965 w ill help all lovers of H istory and the people at large of our glorious m aritim e past.

I am aware that a project like this takes a lot of painstaking researchand hard work. I would therefore like to extend our deep appreciation of the excellent work done by Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh (Retd) and all the others who have enabled the successful com pletion of this work.

N avy H ouse

L. RAMDAS

New D elhi

Admiral

Decem ber 4 ,1991

PREFACE

Soon after the publication of Under Two Ensigns (the Indian Nazn/1945-1950), it was conceived that work on the next volume should be undertaken to cover the period from 1951-65. However, progress on the project was a halting one, due to one reason or another.

I was fortunate when compiling this volume in so far as the availability of records and documents etc. Maintaining and preserving records, regrettably, is not our forte but as time has gone on, happily we are devoting more attention to this vital requirement and hopefully, future chroniclers will have more to fall back upon. Where records have not been available, I was fortuna te to be able to draw sustenance from the very valuable reminiscences of many stalwarts of our service - some of them are no more with us

- who were not only intimately associated with its progress and developm ent but were also participants in some of the very significant events during this period. There are some others, whose testimony has also been invaluable and here, I would particularly, like to mention the material I was able to obtain from the late Shri L.K. Jha, the then Principal Secretary to the late Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri, which sheds considerable light on the pre-1965 developments which led to the 1965 Indo-Pak conflict and the thinking at the highest level about the role the Navy was expected and indeed, directed to play in this conflict. Adetailed chapter on the subject has, therefore, been written, not orJy to draw lessons but for the benefit of posterity.

A l^ o u g h this period covers only 15 years in the development of the Indian Navy, it is a most significant one, which saw much progress and development from a truncated service at the time of Independence in 1947 to what it emerged as in 1965. Apart from two capital ships which were inducted during this period, Mysore which was conunissioned in 1957, the com m issioning of the first aircraft carrier Vikrant in 1961, not only ushered in the era of naval aviation in South East Asia after World War II but also com pleted the process of setting up a balanced naval force in the region for the first time.

A num ber of frigates were also inducted, some of which were prototype vessels constructed for thelndian Navy by the British Goverriment. Six minesweepers and the first Indian built survey ship Darshak, w hichcarried

VI / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUE W A TER

a helicopter, were also com m issioned.

Plans for the 3rd dim ension i.e. the subm arine arm which had been made earlier, also fructified and the first subm arine w as com m issioned two years later in 1967. It has been thought necessary to include introductory chapters on the subm arine arm and the evolution of naval aviation for readers to know the history and evolution of both these arms.

This period also saw the Indian Navy becom ing fully Indianised on April 26,1 9 5 8 when the first Indian Chief of the N aval Staff, Vice Admiral R.D. Katari, assum ed com m and of the service - nearly 11 years after Independence.

The Indian N avy has had a very long association w ith the Royal Navy and in fact, its evolution, in a way is taken from Septem ber 05,1612 when the Indian M arine was form ed on arrival of a squadron of ships in Swally, the roadstead off Surat on the W est Coast of India to shedding its Royal nom enclature w hen the country becam e a Republic on January 26,1950. The stage was now set for snipping the um bilical cord that had linked the Indian N avy to the British N avy for centuries; expanding the fleet to a size com m ensurate w ith the tasks and responsibilities o f free India, establishing a num ber o f training establishm ents and m aintenance facilities on both coasts of the peninsula, com m encing the process of indigenising the design and construction of m ajor and m inor w ar vessels along w ith the development of associated propulsion system s, w eapons and equipm ent, and restructuring its tactical doctrines to suit the requirem ents of the region.

The necessity of sw itching over to other sources for som e of our vital defence equipment also now becam e inevitable and happily, there was a speedy adjustm ent and absorption o f the new equipm ent.

SATYINDRA SINGH

Rear Admiral

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To Admiral L. Ramdas, the Chief of the Naval Staff and Vice Admiral S.P.

Govil, the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, my gratitude for approving the chapters and for steering this project through. Their guidance and interest has been a most fortifying factor. I am grateful to the review panel at various stages, particularly to Admiral J.G. Nadkami, Vice Admiral S.C. Chopra, Vice Admiral H. Johnson, Vice Admiral V.S. Shekhawat, Rear Admiral M.M. Chopra and Rear Admiral S.C. Gupta for their support and assistance.

I received invaluable assistance from Captain G.S. Sen and his consistent hard work and deep research were of immense help.

I

would also like to record the intrinsic assistance provided to m e by Commander R.S. Narang, Deputy Director of Naval Operations (Historical Cell) and for his indefatigable efforts which he put in very cheerfully.

My thanks are also due to Mrs B.K. Gomathi for the secretarial assistance and for painstakingly undertaking the laborious work of typing.

SATYINDRA SINGH

Rear Admiral

CONTENTS

Foreword

III

Preface

V

Acknowledgements

VII

Abbreoiations

X

A PEEP IN TO OU R M ARITIM E P A S T -

1

A Resiling of India's M aritim e H istory from H er H oary Past to 1950

A M ARITIM E RESURRECTION GETS UN DER W A Y -

35

Plans for the N avy's Developm ent and

Expansion of the N aval Squadron into a Fleet

NAVAL AVIATION FROM N ASCEN CY TO

GLOBAL PARAM OUN TCY

93

TH E NAVY GROW S W IN GS -

126

Birth of the Fleet Air Arm

RUN SILENT RUN DEEP -

181

The Evolution of the Subm arine

TH E NAVY ACQUIRES TH E THIRD D IM E N SIO N -

219

Birth of the Subm arine Arm

REINFORCING TH E CAISSON -

249

Evolution of Ships: Developm ent of Bombay Dockyard

TH E M EN BEHIND TH E M ACHINES

273

OF FUNDS AND FINANCES

302

The N aval Budget

DISCIPLINE A T S E A -

309

Evolution o f N aval Law

TH E LAW OF THE SEA

324

TH E SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL'S ASIAN EMPIRE -

335

Liberation of Goa, Dam an and Diu

CONTENTS / DC

THE BLUNTED SC IM ITA R-

414

The N avy's Trammels and Compulsions

During the 1965 Indo-Pak War

CHARTING TH E OCEANS

471

TH E N AVY'S VARIEGATED PEACETIME ACTTVITIES -

479

Goodwill Visits, Exercises, Rescue at

Sea, Aid to Civil Authorities, Disaster

Relief, Events at Sea, Reviews of the

Fleet and Adventure Activities.

NAVAL BATTLE HONOURS

521

List o f Ships

524

Bibliography

525

Index

531

X / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

ABBREVIATIONS

AA

Anti-Air

ABCD

Atomic Bacteriological and Chem ical Dam age Control

ACR

Aircraft Control Room

ADR

Aircraft Direction Room

AIO

Action Inform ation Organisation

A/S

Anti Subm arine

ASDIC

Allied Submarine Devices Investigation Committee

ASW

Anti Subm arine W arfare

C

Com m unication

CCA

Carrier-Controlled Approach

CAM

Catapult-Arm ed M erchantm an

CEE

Com m ander of the Order of the British Empire

CBR

Central Board of Revenue

C-in-C

Com m ander-in-Chief

CHO

Civilian Hydrographic Officer

CM E

College of M ilitary Engineering

COM INS

Com m odore-in-Charge Indian Naval Squadron

CONA

Chief of N aval Aviation

CRPF

Central Reserve Police Force

CW

Com m ission W orthy

C o f Y

Comrrumder of the Yard

D

Diving

DSC

Distinguished Service Cross

DSO

Distinguished Service Order

ETI

Educational Test One

FDEO

Flight Deck Engineer Officer

FDO

Flight Deck Officer

FLYCO

Flying Control

FOB

Flag Officer Bombay

FOCIF

Flag Officer Commanding the Indian Fleet

FOCINC W EST Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief W est

FOCRIN

Flag Officer Commanding Royal Indian Navy

FOFIF

Flag Officer Flotilla, Indian Fleet

FRU

Fleet Requirement Unit

G

Gunnery

ABBREVIATIONS / XI

GL

Gun Layer

HAL

Flindustan Aircraft Limited

HDZvfL

Harbour Defence Motor Launch

H E l

Higher Educational Test

HE/VT

High Explosive/Variable Time

HF/DF

High Frequency/Direction-Finding

HO

HostiJities Only

HMS

His/Her M ajesty's Ship

HMAS

His M ajesty's Australian Ship

HMCS

His M ajesty's Canadian Ship

HMI

Himalayan Mountaineering Institute

HMIS

His M ajesty's Indian Ship

HM NZS

His M ajesty's New Zealand Ship

H T

Hindustan Trainer

HRH

His Royal Highness

lA F

Indian Air Force

IAS

Institute of Armament Service

lA T

Institute of Armament Technology

IFF

Interrogation Friend and Foe

IH O

International Hydrographic Organisation

IMA

Indian Military Academy

m c o R

Indian National Committee for Ocean Research

IN

Indian Navy

INAS

Indian Naval Air Squadron

IN HS

Indian Naval Hospital Ship

INS

Indian Naval Ship

ISPCC

Inter Service Pre-Cadet College

ISW

Inter Service Wing

JAF

Judge Advocate of the Fleet

JAG

Judge Advocate General

JET

Joint Exercises off Trincomalee

JSW

Joint Service Wing

LCA

Landing Craft for Assault

LCM

Landing Craft Mechanised

LCPL

Landing Craft for Personnel

LCT

Landing Craft Tank

LR

Layer Rate

LSGL

Long Service Good M edal

LSI

Land Ship for Infantry

LST

Landing Ship for Tanks

M ATCH

Mediimi-range Anti submarine Torpedo Carrying

Helicopter

XII / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

MCO

Mirror Control Officer

MAD

M utual Assured Destruction

MET

Meteorology

ML

M otor Launch

MSM

M eritorious Service Medal

M l B

M otor Torpedo Boat

MMS

M otor M inesweeper

MV

M otor Vessel

N ARO

N aval Aircraft Repair Organisation

NATO

N orth Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NATS

N aval Air Technical School

NBCD

N uclear Bacteriological and Chem ical Dam age Control

NCM L

Naval Chem ical M etallurgical Laboratory

NDA

N ational Defence Academy

N D

Navigation and Direction

N M

Nao Sena Medal

N FC

N ational Productivity CouncU

NSOC

N aval Scientific Orientation Course

NW FP

N orth W est Frontier Province

OBE

Officer of the Order of the British Empire

PAF

Pakistan Air Force

PCH O

Principal Civil Hydrographic Officer

PCO

Principal Control Officer

PN S

Pakistan N aval Ship

POK

Pak Occupied Kashmir

P&O

Peninsular and Oriental

PSU

Public Sector Undertaking

QA

Quarter Armour

QR

Quarter Rate

RACINS

Rear Admiral Com m anding Indian Naval Squadron

RC

Radar Controller

RAF

Royal Air Force

RIFR

Royal Indian Fleet Reserve

RIM

Royal Indian Marine

RIN

Royal Indian Navy

RINR

Royal Indian Naval Reserve

RINVR

Royal Indian Naval Volunteer Reserve

RNAS

Royal N aval Air Station

RN R

Royal N aval Reserve

Royal Pakistan Navy

SAR

Search-and-Rescue

Sick Berth Attendant

ABBREVIATIONS

s e e

Sea Cadet Corps

SD

Special Duty

SDB

Seaward Defence Boat

SFNA

School for Naval Airmen

SLBM

Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile

SNOM

School of Naval Oceanology and Meteorology

SONAR

Sound-Aided Underwater Detection Device

SOS

Save our Soul

SS

Steam Ship

SSAC

Supply and Secretariat Advance Course

STOL

Short-Take-Off-Landing

SW ATH

Small W aterplane Area Tw in Hull

TAS

Torpedo Anti Submarine

TS

Training Ship

UNCLOS

United Nations Conference on the Law O f the Sea

UNO

United Nations Organisation

USNS

United States Naval Ship

USS

United States Ship

VCNS

Vice Chief of the Naval Staff

VGI

Very Good Indeed

VJP

Very Important Person

VTOL

Vertical Take O ff and Landing

W ACI

W om en's Auxiliary Corps India

W ECORS

Weapons and Control System Repair Shop

W RINS

W omen's Royal Indian Naval Service

1

A PEEP INTO OUR

MARITIME PAST

A Resume of India's Maritime History

from Her Hoary Past to 1950

On M arch 28,1958, standing on the quarterdeck of INS Mysore, the second cruiser to be acquired by independent India's Navy, Prime Mir\ister Jawaharlal Nehru said.

From this ship I look at India and think of our country and its geographic situation - on three sides there is the sea and on the fourth high mountains - in a sense our country may be said to be in the very lap of an ocean. In these circumstances I ponder over our close links with the sea and hov^ the sea has brought us together. From time im memorial the people of India have had very intimate connections with the sea. They had trade with other countries and they had also built ships. Later on the country became weak___Now that we are free, we have once again reiterated the importanceof the sea. We cannot afford to be weak at sea . . . history has shown that whatever power controls the Indian Ocean has, in the first instance, India's seaborne trade at her mercy, and in the second, India's very independence itself.

2 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLLIEWATER

N am ed after peninsular India which juts into its centre and occupies a unique position, the Indian Ocean washes the shores of the entire East Coast of Africa, the South Coast of Arabia, the Southern shores of Iran and Baluchistan, the M alaysian Peninsula and Indonesia's Sum atra. The Eastern and W estern waterways at the Straits of M alacca and Babel Mandeb control ingress into and egress out of the Ocean. The former leads to the Indonesian Archipelago, the South China Sea, the Far East and the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean, while the latter controls the entrance to the Red Sea. The 'chokepoint' controlling the landlocked Persian G ulf in the North W est is Hormuz, then known as Ormuz, while A1 Adan (Aden) at the Southern tip of Arabia, was the hom e and main base of the Arab corsairs for centuries. The Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, the two offshoots of the Ocean, wash the 5600-kilom etre-long shores of the Indian Peninsula and thoseof Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma and the island of Sri Lanka which is separated from India by the narrow Palk Strait.

The Indian Ocean has always been regarded as an area of great geopolitical significance because of its unique features and India as its centre of gravity. It was Sardar K.M. Panikkar who observed:

In spite o f the vastness of its surface and the oceanic character of its currents and winds, the Indian Ocean has som e of the features of a landlocked sea. The Arctic and the Antarctic, circling the Poles have but little connection with inhabited land. The Pacific and the Atlantic lie from the North to the South like gigantic highways. They have no land roof, no vast land area jutting out into their expanse. The Indian Ocean is walled off on three sides by land, with the Southern side of Asia forming a roof over it. The continent of Africa constitutes the W estern wall, while Burma, Malaya and the insular continuations protect the Eastern side. But the vital feature w hich differentiates the Indian O cean from the Pacific or the Atlantic is not the two sides but th esu bcontinen tofln d iaw hichju ts out far in tothesea forath ou san d miles to its tapering end at Kanyakum ari. It is the geographical position of India that changes the character of the Indian Ocean.

The m ajor islands in the Indian Ocean are neither as num erous nor as evenly spread out as those in the Pacific. The m ajor ones are Sri Lanka and M alagasy, while the minor ones are Socotra (near the Arab Coast, Zanzibar and Seychelles off Africa's Coast), Mauritius and Reunion (on the Tropic of Capricorn, the Lakshadweep group and the Maldives near the west coast of India), the Bahrain group (near the Persian Gulf, the Andam an an Nicobar group in the Bay of Bengal) and the Diego Garcia group

‘

Chagos Archipelago).

A PEEP INTO OUR MARITIME PAST / 3

The bays, gulfs and bights of the Indian Ocean have also assumed considerable geopolitical significance over the years. The Persian Gulf, virtuallya landlocked sea v^ithits only link v/ith the Ocean at Hormuz; the Arabian Sea which separates the Indian and Arabian peninsulas; the Gulf of A1 Adan, entry to which is controlled by the island of Socotra; the RedSea w hose gate-post is at Babel Mandeb; the Bay of Bengal separating the Indian and Malaysian peninsulas and the Gulf of Malacca, entry into which is commanded by Singapore, have all played a significant role in shaping the region's maritime history.

Oceanic activity and oceanic traditions developed in this region before any other part of theearthbecau seof the unique feature of the monsoons and the growth of the nucleus of civilisation around this ocean. Centuries before the development of seafaring activities in the Aegean Sea, oceanic traditions had been developed by the littoral states of peninsular India.

For centuries, politico-military thinkers have appreciated the naval and geopolitical importance of landlocked countries establishing links with the seas by acquiring sovereignty over waterways or even over land corridors. For instance, the potential of their presence in the Indian Ocean or even in its seas, bays and straits, had led some major powers to attempt to gain access to this ocean ovedand, even in the last century. The British appreciation of the balance of power in and around Asia after World War II and its future plans made during the 1940s also catered for these contingencies. What is most striking and not generally known is the fact that Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the greatruler of the Punjab, hadalso realised the importance of establishing a link with the sea after his victory over the Pathans and Afghans during the third decade of the last century. To quote a historian, " If the Punjabi empire was to expand any further, it could only be across the Sindh desert to the sea or across the Sutlej to India, (the portion of India then held by the British)". The British were clever enough to persuade the Maharaja to sign a commercial treaty in December 1832 and to make him abandon his plans to extend his empire to the sea. These facts and today's rivalry between superpowers to establish their presence in the Indian Ocean confirm the wisdom of the observation made centuries ago by KhairoddinBarbarosa, the Egyptian Admiral, "H e who rules on the sea will shortly rule on the land also."

A careful analysis of the sequence of events in our maritime past reveals the fact that during the last five millermia, those who came to India overland from other parts of the world mainly through the m ountainpasses in the North West, did rule some parts of the Indian sub-continent for a while. But they were eventually absorbed in the mainstreatn of Indian culture and traditions and, over thecenturies, became an integral part of the Indian milieu. Some of these were the Aryans, the Pathans, the Moghuls, the

4 / BLU EPRIN T T O BLUEW ATER

Afghans, the Sakas and even the Huns. But there were those who came by sea, - the Portuguese, Dutch, French, British, Germans, Danes, Flemish, Armenians and the Jew s - during the last two millennia, who m aintained their identity even though they stayed here for hundreds of years, som e of them holding sw ay over considerably larger areas and for longer periods than those who cam e overland.

There are five distinct periods in India's m aritim e history - the Hindu period extending from our hoary past to the middle of the 15th Century A.D.; the Portuguese period from the closing years of the 15th Century to the end of the 16th Century; two British periods, one from 1612 to 1830 and the other from 1830 to 1947; and the Indian period w hich com m enced on August 15, 1947. The British period is divided into two parts, because in 1830 the East India C om pany's Navy in India underwent two major changes; it was constituted as a com batant Service and given the name IndianN avyand the first ship of the Service to sail under steam , the 411-ton Hugh Lindsay, covered the distance from Bom bay to Suez in 21 days, thus ushering in the era of steam propulsion.

Ancient Indian literature such as the Vedas, Buddhist Jatakas, Sanskrit, Pali and Persian literature, Indian folklore and m ythology, and even the Old Testam ent, bear testimony to the fact that as far back as the days of M ohenjodaro, Lo thal and Harappa (3000 to 2000 B .C .), i.e., during the Indus ValleyCivilisation, there was considerable m aritim e activity betw eenlndia and the countries in Africa, Southern Europe, W estern Asia and the Far East. Seals and potsherds portraying anchors, tools and kitchen im plements made of coral and m usselshell found at these places and in Java, Sumatra, Indochina, Sri Lanka and Egypt, and a huge dry-dock recently unearthed at Lothal in Gujarat, further confirm the existence of India's seaborne trade not only with these countries, but also with Sum er, and Crete, and other countries in Central Asia and Persia at that time. The late Professor Buhler, the well- known German Orientalist, observed that passages in ancient Indian works indubitably establish the existence of navigationof the IndianO ceanby its littoral states inancient times and the subsequent trading voyages undertaken by Hindu m erchants to the shores of the Persian Gulf and its riverports.

Further evidence of such activities is available in the littoral linguistic works of the Indianpeninsula,viz., in Sindhi, Gujarati, Marathi, K oi^ an i, Kannada, Malayalam, Tam il, Telugu, Oriya and Bengali writings; in the writings of foreign travellers and historians - Chinese, Arabic and in the evidence available from archaeology-epigraphic, monumental a num ism atic; in Indian and foreign art, and in foreign literature - Eng is , Greek, Portuguese, French, Dutch, Persian, Chinese, Japanese, Ara ic, Thai, Malay, Burmese and Sinhalese.

A PEEP INTO OUR M ARITIME PAST / 5

The extent of the commercial and cultural influence of India and her seaborne trade using indigenously built ships during the Hindu period (pre-Christian era to the middle of the 15th Century AD) is evident from some little-known facts such as the existence of the Mflfsyn Yfldfra (the fish machine), a magnetised iron fish floating on oil and pointing to the North, serving as a primitive compass used by Indian seafarers for several millennia) Matsya w as the first incarnation of 'Vishnu' whose last incarnation was the Buddha; the similarity in the names of some of the places in Southern and South East Asia such as Socotra which is a derivative of the word Sukhadhara (container or island of happiness), Sri Lanka which originally was Sit'nr«n>l/fl«tor(goldornament),Nicobar which was derived hom N ak-D w eep (the island of the naked) and Calicut which originally was Kallikote (in Kannada, a stonefort); references to Indians as Klings in Thailand and Telangs in some parts of Burma because of the conquests of these countries by the Kalingas and Andhras millennia ago; the similarity between the Thai and Oriya scripts due to the long Kalinga rule over Thailand; the scriptures recited every morning by the monks, even today, in a Buddhist temple in Japan, are in the 6th Century A.D. Bengali script; and the fact that in323 B.C. eight hundred Indian-built sailing vessels were used for the transfer of the weary and demoralised army of Alexander the Great from the mouth of the Indus to the shores of the Persian Gulf.

While the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean were used during this period mainly for purposes of maritime trade, the Bay of Bengal provided a highway for the countries on the Eastern seaboard to embark on prose-lytisation, cultural and colonising missions toSri Lanka and countries as far as the Indonesian archipelago and Japan.

Considerable maritime activity took place in the waters around India during the Hindu period. As described by Megasthenes, the royal shipyards of the Mauryas built seagoing ships of various classes. The War Office of EmperorChandragupta h ad ,ason eofitssixboard s,aN avP arishad (Board of Admiralty) which controlled national shipping. During the days of Emperor Ashoka in the 3rd Century B.C., his sister. Princess Sanghamitra sailed from Tamralipta in Bengal to Sri Lanka on her historic mission of spreading Buddhism there. Ashoka also had a strong seagoing fleet and used it for regular commercial intercourse with Syria, Egypt, Cyrene, Macedonia and Epirus. Between200 B.C. and 250 A.D., for a period of nearly half a millennium, the Andhras carried out maritime trade with Western Asia, Greece, Rome, Egypt, China and some other Eastern countries and even set up embassies and consulates in some of these countries. Roman coins discovered in India, especially in the South, establish the existence of trade between these countries even before the dawn of the Christian era.

Persecution at the hands of the Romans forced some Jews to flee Rome and

6 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUEW ATER

take refuge in M alabar in 68 A.D. Large sailing vessels built by the Cholas, Pandyas and Keralas of South India and the Kalingas of Orissa were used for trade, passenger traffic and naval warfare. These ships were considered excellent for navigation across the oceans as their lower parts were reinforced w ith triple planks in order to enable them to withstand the force of gales and tem pests. Som e of the leading com m unities in organising seaborne com m erce were the M anigram m an Chetties, Nam dasis, Valangais and Elangais of South India. It is a well-know n fact of history that during the first decade of the seventh century, a ruler of Gujarat, who was faced w ith defeat at the hands of his enemy, sent his son with thousands of followers com prising cultivators, artisans, warriors, physicians and writers in over 100 vessels to Java. There they laid the foundation of a new civilisationw hose contribution to the world was Borobudur,a temple town of buildings and sculptures in the Indian style of that period, depicting the life of the enlightened one - a unique m onument to Lord Buddha.

A strong naval fleet was maintained on the Corom andel Coast by the Cholas (985-1054 A.D.). The Chola emperors, Rajaraja I and Rajendra I, had strong armadas which were used to capture Sri Lanka. In 1007 A.D. the Cholas launched an expedition against the Sri Vijayas, who at that time ruled the M alayan Peninsula, Java, Sumatra and some neighbouring islands and the sea areas contiguous to them, and defea ted them to bring the M alayan Peninsula under their sovereignty.

The existence of trade in various com m odities between India and Europe for at least three millennia has been confirm ed by evidence from various sources. India m aintained trade relations w ith the Phoenicians, Jews, Assyrians, Greeks, Egyptians and Rom ans during the earlier centuries and with the Turks, Venetians, Portuguese, Dutch and English during the later centuries of the period. W hile India im ported a limited number of item s such as tin, lead, glass, amber, steel for arm s, coral and medicinal drugs from Europe and W est Asia, Arabia supplied frankincense to India for use in her temples. The items exported to Europe, North Africa and West Asia included w ool from the fleece of sheep bred on India's north-w estern m ountain ranges, armour, on5oc, chalcedony, lapis lazuli, jasper, resinous gum, furs, asafetida, musk, balm , myrrh, em broidered w oollen fabrics, coloured carpets, silk which was considered m ost valuable and was exchanged by weight with gold, various types of cotton cloth ranging from coarse canvas and calico to muslins of the finest texture, peacocks, apes, oils, brassw are,ivory,ebony,pearls,sugarcane extracts,salt,indigo, rugs, dyes, rice, sandalwood, tim ber for building ships, arom atics, pepper, cinnamon and edible spices which were, during the later years, rnam y traded for precious metals, especially gold. T h e existence of trade re a ions is confirmed by the fact that the word for peacock is tuki\n Hebrew a

A PEEP INTO OUR MARITIME PAST / 7

inTam ilandby th efactof the adoptionofcertainTam ilw ordsby theGreeks and vice versa, for there was considerable sea-borne trade betv^een Greece and South India during the Hindu period. It is interesting to note that the words for rice, ginger, cinnamon and foreign merchants in Greek and Tamil resp ectiv ely aieory zaan d arisi,zin g iberan d w ch w er,karp ion and karava and laones and Yavana.

In April 800 A.D., as described in the 199th Chapter of the Japanese document Ruijukokushi an Indian was cast up on the shores of Japan and some seeds of the cotton- plant, which was so far unknown to that country, were found in his ship and sown in the provinces of Kii, Awaji, Sanuki, Jyo, Tosa and Kyushu. Thus, cotton was introduced into Japan. There is also the evidence of Herodotus {450 B.C.), who wrote that the Indian contingent of Xerxes' Army wore (cotton) garments which had been woven from the

"w o ol which certain mild trees in India bear instead of fruit that in beauty and quality excels that of sheep." It was India, therefore, that introduced the use of cotton in the Far East as well as in West Asia and Europe.

Thesensationaldiscoveryof the regularity of the seasonal winds of the South-W est Monsoon by a Greek named Hippalus in 45 A.D. helped maintain and develop trade between India and the West, as has been d e s c n h e d in The Periplus o f the Erythraean Sea. His discovery helped him in findinga direct route toM alabar which was far shorter than the older coast-hugging route. Towards the end of the summer months, "ships used to depart from the mouth of the Arabian Gulf or Kane on the coast of Arabia Felix and sail straight in 40 days to Muziris (modem Kodungallur) on the W est Coast of India. They began their homeward voyage in Decem ber by sailing with the N o rth -^ st Wind, entered the Arabian Gulf, m et w ith a South or South-W est Wind and thus completed the voyage by using the trade winds throughout the period." The discovery of the directions and regularity of the monsoon air currents was a major contributory factor towards the continuance of maritime trade over the centuries betw een India and the Western countries.

The existence of oceanic navigation during the earlier centuries of the Christian era is further bom e out by the writings of the celebrated Chinese monk. Fa Hien, who came to India overland to study Buddhism at Bud-dhagaya, Sam ath and Varanasi in 413 A.D. On his homeward journey he sailed from Tamralipta in Bengal and 14 days later reached Sri Lanka where he embarked for Java. He called at the Nicobars before passing through the Straits of Malacca and sailing back to China.

During the period from the 5th to the 12th centuries Hindu supremacy over the Eastern waters reacheditszenithw iththeSri Vijaya Empire ruling the entire sea area between India's eastern seaboard and the Far East. The cultural and colonising expeditions of the Sri Vijayas took them to such far-

8 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUEW ATER

flung areas as Sum atra, Burma< the Malayan Peninsula, Java, Thailand and the countries in Indochina. Besides spreading Hindu, culture, theSri Vijayas m aintained regular political and com m ercial intercourse with the Cholas, Pandyas and Keralas. H ow ever, as a result of rivalry between the Cholas, the Tam il Kings, and the Sri Vijayas, a series of sea battles were fought betw een their navies towards the end of the 10th century A.D., resulting in the weakening of these empires and opening the way for Arab suprem acy in the region. About the same time, the rulers o f Gujarat and Calicut also m aintained large fleets of sailing vessels for com m ercial purposes which sailed w ith carg oeso f silk carpets, precious stones,pearls, ivory, spices and other valuable goods to Europe and W est Asia. W ith the weakening of the Indian rulers, the seaborne trade routes betw een the two regions passed into the hands of the Arabs who becam e great intermediaries of maritime com m ercial intercourse.

The Arabs acted as a trade link between the East and Europe during this period. They used to transfer the Indian m erchandise to the Venetians who supplied the Indian goods to the European m arkets, where they were ingreatdem and.The Venetians soon becam e im m ensely prosperous which aroused the jealousy and cupidity of the seafarers of the Iberian nations, i.e., Spain and Portugal, and other M editerranean countries, which led to the beginning of a quest for establishing a direct route from Europe to India.

Ships had been traversing the Indian O cean for several millennia carrying valuable m erchandise and cultural em issaries between India and the W est. Cities that directly engaged in the m aritim e trade or stood on the ancient trade routes continued to grow in im portance and prosperity. Some of these centres of com m erce were ancient Chaldea, Babylon, Nineveh, Ophir, Tadm ore and the ports in the M editerranean, Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. The Phoenicians had for som e years arrogated to themselves a m ajor share in the M editerranean trade but were later driven out by the Assyrians, Greeks and Romans. The Arabs, how ever, continued to hold sway over the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Indian O cean and the Arabian Sea region.

Alexandria was developed by Egypt into the m ost im portant port in the world during the days of the Ptolem ies. Ptolemy Philadelphus planned to construct a canal betw een the Red Sea and the Nile, a hundred cubits wide and thirty cubits deep in order to transport Indiangoods to Alexandria wholly by water, but for reasons not known, this project was never undertaken and thereafter a new port called Berenike was developed on t W estern sh o reo fth eR ed S ea.Sh ip sfro m India carried m erchandise,sai mg from Tatta at the head of the lower delta of the Indus or other ports on west coast to the coast of Persia and, after follow ing the A rabians

°

Berenike. From Berenike the goods were carried overland to the ci y

A PEEP INTO OUR M ARITIM E PAST / 9

Koptos, whichwas very close to theNile, where they were loaded into ships which navigated along a canal to Alexandria. Carthegianmerchants carried Indian goods to all Mediterranean ports. During the period of Egyptian supremacy, the northern countries of Europe received Indian goods which were carried overland from India to Oxus from where they went to the regions bordering the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea.

The Roman Empire monopolised the trade with India for many years

afterits conquest of Carthage,EgyptandSyria while Alexandria continued to be the principal port for Indian merchandise. Later, however, the conquest of Persia and Egypt by the Mohammedans deprived the European countries of the use of Alexandria for trade and access to Indian merchandise. This led to the founding of Basra at the head of the Persian Gulf which controlled the movement of merchandise in both easterly and westerly directions and became as important a trading centre as Alexandria.

The Arabs, who later gained control of the trade routes, stopped supplying Indian goods to the Mediterranean sea-ports, but an alternative was found in the overland route to Constantinople and eventually Constantinople became the focal point for the movement of merchandise from India to European trade centres.

The movement of goods engendered a bitter struggle between Venice and Genoa over the Eastern trade and subsequently led to Venetian supremacy over this trade. With the annexation of Constantinople and the trading routes to India by the Turks towards the end of the ISth century and with the continued piracy on the Alexandrian trade route by the Egyptians, a new pattern of rivalry em erged,involvingSouthEuropean, North African and West Asian countries over trade with the East- Since mastery over these trade routes had a direct bearing on the power and prosperity of these nations, these countries had acquired adequate seafaring experience and expertise, an alternate route to India was now sought to be established by some of these countries.

Sailing down the West Coast of Africa in 1487, in quest of a different route skirting the African and Asian coasts, the Portuguese N avigator, Bartholomew Diaz, discovered the Cape of Tem pests, later to be renamed the Cape of Good Hope. To complete the work done by Diaz, Vasco-Da-G am aw as deputed byK in gM an oelof Portugal in July 1497, i.e., five years after the discovery of the West Indies by Columbus. The King's astrologer, Abraham Ben Zakut, having studied his horoscope, found it favourable for the discovery of the sea route to India, raising high hopes of success in the venture. Four ships, the Sao Gabriel (120 tons) commanded by Vasco-Da-Gama, the Sao Raphael (100 tons) commanded by his brother Paulo-Da-Gama, the Berrio (50 tons) under the command of Nicolas Coelho and a 200

10 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUEW ATER

ton storeship, set sail from Belem on March 25,1497. A violent storm was encountered while rounding the Cape and the crew, which wanted to go back, hatched a mutiny. But Vasco-Da-Gam a suppressed the mutiny by arresting the ring-leaders and threatening to throw them overboard. In M arch 1498, the Sao Gabriel and Sao Raphael, reached Mozambique, the storeship having returned to Portugal after transferring her stores and the Berrio having been found not sea-worthy was broken up and cannibalised to repair the other ships. Vasco-Da-Gam a now needed a pilot to take him to India by sailing across the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea and not by hugging the coast which the Arabs would resist. He found a seafarer from Gujarat, Davane, who was an experienced navigator and knew the seas contiguous to Africa, W est Asia and India very well. His expert pilotage not only provided security from the jealous Arabs but also helped Vasco-Da-Gama to proceed to Melinde from where the ships sailed on August 26, 1498. Had Davane not assisted Vasco-Da-Ga ma, the Portuguese would not have reached India for som e more decades and if this had happened, the coarse of India's m aritim e history could well have been different.

Com pared to the feats of Colum bus and M agellan, Da Gam a's discovery o f the sea route to India was of no great significance. The im portance of his achievement, how ever, lies in the fact that while the seas were regarded by the Arabs as a pathw ay for carrying out m aritim e trade, the Portuguese were the first to lay claim to sovereignty over these waters to project their national interests and influence. This claim was further sanctified by a bull of Pope Calixtus III which considered the seas they sailed to be their possession. The Portuguese thus began considering themselves to be lords of the seas which justified the confiscation of the m erchandise of all ships that sailed without their authority. Thus, " it may truly be said that India never lost her independence, till she lost command of the sea in the first decade of the 16th century," observed Panikkar.

Though the papal bull justified the Portuguese claim to sovereignty of the seas and Da G am a's stron gstan d at th eC o u rto fth eZ am o rin o f Calicut, it displeased the la tter, and the challenge to the ruler's limited sea power led to a series of indecisive skirmishes and sea battles off the coast of Malabar in the years that followed. The Portuguese intruders were detested by the Arab traders, who joined hands with the Zam orin and in 1500, the Portuguese Admiral, Pedro C abral,bom bardedC alicut. Eighty ships of the Zamorin, manned by 1500 intrepid sailors and reinforced by the ships of a rich Arab trader, Khoja Amber, pushed him back southw ards to Two indecisive battles w ere fought, one off Cochin i n 1503 and the ot ro

Chaul in 1508. In 1509 the next battle of importance was fought o tl u iu w h en sh ip sof the Zamorin, under the com m and of t h e courageous and reinforced by an Egyptian fleet under Adm iral M ir Hussain,

A PEEP INTO OUR M ARITIM E PAST / 11

against a strong Portuguese force led by Don Francesco d'Almeida. This battle also failed to produce a decisive resultbecauseof the treachery of the Sultanof G ujaratw hichledto the Egyptian fleet sailingaway in disgust. The IndianOcean was thereafter dom inatedbythePortuguese, with Albuquerque, the great commercial empire-builder and statesman, bringing the area under Portuguese supremacy.

Under the leadership of the AJi Marakkars, however, the Zamorin's fleet played an outstanding role by giving valiant battle to the Portuguese for well over ninety years. The Marakkars, who had their headquarters at Ponnani, a natural harbour South of Calicut, held sway over the waters around Calicut. The most illustrious name in the family of the Ali Marakkars was that of Kunjali Marakkar II, who sank a number of Portuguese ships (the tally in the particular year being as high as 50) and struck terror in the hearts of the Portuguese forces. For some reasons, however, M ohammed Kunjali Marakkar, the third Kunjali to command the Zamorin's fleet, was the last of the Kunjali Admirals. He won many a battle against the Portuguese, though eventually he fell out with the Zamorin leading to the gradual weakening of the Zamorin's fleet and eventually its capitulation to the Portuguese. The main contribution of the Kunjalis during the 16th century was that for over 90 years they prevented possible Portuguese incursions in the mainland by harassing their fleet and keeping them at bay.

In 1510, following his failure to defeat the Zamorin, Albuquerque seized Goa and its surroundingareas.Operatingthereafterfrom Goa which occupied a commanding position in the prevailing scenario on India's western seaboard, Albuquerque hounded the Arab traders out of their favourite haunt and subdued the Sultan of Hormuz relegating him to the level of a vassal of the Portuguese ruler. He also developed Socotra into a powerful naval base with a well-defended fort, established a stronggo vem -

ment in Cochin after bypassing the Zamorin. He brought immense power and wealth to his country by exercising mastery over the Arabian Sea. In 1513, he mustered a strong naval force and seized and fortified the Straits of Malacca. After prolonged negotiations, he also established am icable relations with the rulerofPegu, who controlled the A rakanC oastin Burma.

The Portuguese supremacy over the waters around India reachedits zenith during the days of Albuquerque.

In 1580, Portugal joined hands with Spain against the British but the Spanish Armada suffered a crushing defeat. This changed the course of events around the globe, one of its offshoots being the decline of Portuguese power in the Indian region. It is a moot point tha t if the Spanish Armada had triumphed, as some historians aver, India would in all probability have becom e a P ortu guese dominion and the United States, a Latin American

12 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUEWATER

country!

The Dutch first exploited this sudden change in the power equation by form ing the Dutch East India Com pany at Am sterdam in 1592. Their first m erchant fleet reached India in 1595 but they did not challenge Portuguese suprem acy. Instead, they occupied Java and established a naval base at Batavia. M eanwhile, the British and the French also decided to benefit from fishing in India's troubled waters and cam e to India during the earlier years of the 17th century.

It is thus apparent that while the Hindus controlled the trade routes until the beginning of the 15th century, the Arabs took over the main bulk of it from them for a while w ith a short period of overlap. But supremacy over these routes passed into Portuguesehands towards the end of the 15th century. The Portuguese then reigned suprem e for nearly a century but with the defeat of the Spanish Armada and their decline cam e the ascendance of British m aritim e power in India and the Indian Ocean.

T h em ain co m p on en tofth en avy of the Mughal ruler, Akbar was a fleet of ships and craft based at Dacca. These were used for operations in rivers and creeks for the protection of deltaic South Bengal from the Magh (Burmese) and Feringhee (half-caste) pirates who had the support of the Arakan rulers. Akbar had a full-fledged Admiralty which looked after the supply of ships and smaller craft, recruitm ent of suitable personnel for the ships and craft, security of rivers and waterw ays and collection of port revenue. The M ughals, how ever, did not appreciate the im portance of building up a bluewater navy and developing seaborne trade and com merce. Nevertheless, shipping and ship building, oceangoing and riverine, flourished during the Mughal days in various parts of India suchas Bengal, Kashmir, Lahore and Surat. There is evidence available to establish the high standard of technology maintained in the construction of these vessels.

W hile Akbar had a form idable and versatile navy, Aurangzeb's navy was superior in size and efficiency. Besides naval ships, he had four ships at Surat for carrying Haj pilgrims free o f cost to M ecca but he lost some of his larger ships to British pirates because of the lack of adequate seagoing naval ships to provide security.

The Honourable Com pany of the M erchants Trading to the Eas Indies,better known as the East India C om pany,w asfou ndedby the British on December 31,1600 by a Royal Charter of Q ueen Elizabeth I. A ship of the Com pany, the Hector, w ith Captain Hawkins as the Com m anding arrived in Surat bringing a letter to Em peror Jahangir

j

perm ission to tradew ithlndia. Hawkins reached Agra on April 16,1

perm ission for trade was duly granted and trading facilities

the Emperor. But the Portuguese did not appreciate the British

ment on their trade preserves. The British sensed this and sent a sq

A PEEP INTO OUR M ARITIM E RAST / 13

of warships, the Dragon, the Osiender, the James and the Solomon, under the overall command of Captain Thomas Best, which reached Swally, the roadstead of Surat, on September 5, 1612. This date is regarded by the British as the foundation day of the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) because on this day a squadron of their warships arrived in India for the first time and the Indian Marine was formed.

Since Portuguese monopoly over trade in the region had been challenged by the British, they attacked the ships of the Indian Marine on October 29,1612 off Surat with four galleons and forty other craft but had to admit defeat after a protracted battle. They withdrew, leaving the British as masters of the land and sea area around Surat. The British proceeded to set up factories and formed a fleet of Indian small craft known as Ghurabs (the British called them Grabs) and Galivats for the protection of their seaborne commerce from the Portuguese. The sobriquet'The Grab Service'by which the British Indian Navy was known for many years does not necessarily bracket it with the pirates of various nationalities who at that time had infested the waters around the Indian peninsula.

The Indian Marine at that time consisted mainly of some warships built in England and a larger number of smaller vessels built in India. The Ghurabs were heavy beamy vessels (about 300 tons) of shallow draft and were armed with six guns ranging from 9-pounders to 12-pounders while the Galivats were smaller craft (about 70 tons) mounting half a dozen guns comprising 2-pounders and4-pounders. Hindu fishermen from the Konkan Coast constituted the crews of these vessels.

The Jack of the Indian Marine has an interesting history. It was the late Commander (Special) G.E. Walker, the Judge Advocate General of the RIN

irrmnedia tely before Independence, who 'discovered' the fact that the Jack flown by the Indian Marine in 1612 was the flag worn by ships on the American side during the W ar of Independence when they rejected the Union Jack. The Jack of the Indian Marine was thus the first flag of the USA which over the years developed into the present 'stars and stripes'. The Indian Ma rine's Jack had seven red and six white stripes and, in the position occupied by the stars today, displayed the St. George's Cross. This flag forms a part of the insignia of the existing RIN Association, a society of British officers who had served in the RIN before Independence.

The second major battle with the Portuguese took place in 1614 with the Indian Marine emerging victorious. The East India Company was granted further trading rights by Emperor Jahangir. In the following years, Kine James I appointed Sir Thomas Roe his Ambassador to the Moghul Cou'rt M erchandisem anufacturedattheSuratfactoriesstartedm ovingby sea to the W est for trade with th eP ersian G u lfp o rtsin l6l 8.H avm ghadthe monopoly of trade in these ports for nearly a century, the Portuguese tried

14 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUEW ATER

to block the passage of these ships across the Arabian Sea but were successfully thwarted from doing so by the British who armexed Hormuz from the Portuguese in 1622 and thus began their uninterrupted trade with Persia.

This, how ever, did not deter the Portuguese from seeking another battle at Sw ally irv 1630 where they were defeated once again and a truce was declared, leading to the East India C om pany's ships being granted access to the Portuguese ports.

The change in the balance of power in this region didn't escape the notice o f the Dutch who, in their efforts to consolidate their base at Batavia (now known as Jakarta), captured the Strait of Malacca in 1641 and drove the Portuguese away from the Eastern gateway to the Indian Ocean.

Realising the strategic im portance of Colom bo as a naval base for launching operations for the annexation of the Indian mainland, the Dutch then befriended the ruler of Sri Lanka which helped in driving the Portuguese away from Colom bo also, in 1654. Soon thereafter, they made inroads into the Portuguese bastions on the M alabar Coast. This was rendered even more effective by the main base of the Dutch at Batavia, their control of the Strait of Malacca and the advanced operational base at Colom bo. Cochin was captured in 1663, this feat was further made possible by the British preoccupation with other problems but their friendly relations with Emperor Shahjahan prevented the Dutch from making any forays into the waters around Surat where the British factories were situated. However, a year later, Shivaji, the Maratha ruler, carried out an attack on Surat by land but this attack was repulsed by the British forces.

In 1662 Infanta Catherina of Braganza, the Portuguese princess, was given in marriage to King Charles II of England and Bom bay was ceded by the Portuguese to him as a part of his dowry. The official version of the transfer docum ent described the gift a s 'th e Port and Island of Bombay the East Indies, together with all the rights, profits, territories and appurtenances thereof w hatsoever.' Since, how ever, it was virtually im possible for King Charles II to adm inister Bombay successfully from England,he transferred it to the East India Com pany at an annual rental of 10 pounds in 1668

- one of the m ost significant events in Bom bay's variegated history.

In 1685 Sir John Child was appointed the Admiral o f the East In d ia Com pany's land and sea forces b e t w e e n the Persian Gulf and Kanyakumari and soon decided, despite his counsellors' advice to the contrary, to adop an aggressive policy towards the Moghuls. Having taken on a farsu ^ rio ^

force. Child suffered an ignominious defeat at the hands of the Moghu who, with the support of the Sidis' fleet, captured m ost of Bom bay islar^

and besieged Child in the Bombay Castle, which is now known as the Nava Barracks. Peace was, however, restored by redeemmg om

payment of 15,000 Pounds in 1690 and some kind of a reconciliation having

A PEEP INTO OUR M ARITIM E PAST / 15

been effected between Aurangzeb and the Company. Meanwhile, in 1685

the Indian Marine Headquarters was shifted to Bombay and the Service was rechristened the Bombay Marine in 1686.

The Danes appeared on the scene in 1698 and, after obtaining the permission of Prince Azim-us-shan, grandson of Emperor Aurangzeb, set up their trade. They set up a factory and hoisted the Danish flag in Serampore, Bengal, by 1755. The British authorities forcibly seized Seram-porein 1801 but restored it immediately. In 1808, however, a detachment of British troops from Barrackpore occupied Serampore once again. The Danish East India Company recovered it laterbut in 1844 the Danes left the country after transferring all their assets to the British Government.

The earlier decades of the 18th century witnessed the emergence of an Admiral of Shivaji's Maratha Fleet, the distinguished Kanhoji Angre, whose name became a legend during his own lifetime. His exploits are written in letters of gold in the annals of the navies of India. Shivaji was a firm believer in the doctrine 'Jalaim Jasya,V a!aim Tasya' (he who rules the sea is all- powerful) and his admiral, Tukoji Angre, and the other Angres that followed him, put this doctrine into practice. The fleet of Kanhoji, Tukoji's son, menaced and considerably reduced British trade betw een Bombay and the lower Malabar Coast and captured Colaba from the Sidis in 1706- A year later, maritime trade in the Indian Ocean was threatened by Arab pirates operating from Muscat who plundered a large number of ships. Equipped with a fleet of 10 Ghurabs and 50 Galivats, the Maratha Fleet, under the command of Kanhoji Angre, challenged the Arab fleet and drove it away from the Indian Ocean. Thereafter, Kanhoji established mastery over the Konkan Coast by fortifying his base a t Gheria (Vijaydurg).

The fortress at Gheria was manned by a specially trained garrison, armed and provisioned to withstand severe attacks from land and sea and prolonged periods of blockade. Behind the fortress, built on a river front was a dockyard, equipped to build larger and sturdier sea-going vessels than were in use at that time.

By this time the Portuguese had been reduced to an insignificant sea power and consequently the Sidis and then the British faced a strong challenge from the Maratha Fleet. The size, manoeuvrability and fire-Dower of the Maratha Fleet continued to grow. As a result the British C

o u n c i l w ere com pelled to build corvettes for the Bom bay M arine, to escort the merchant ships of the Company and prevent their capture by Angre's fleet In 1717 the Governor of Bombay, Charles Boone, decided to attack Ghena with a strong fleet under the command of Captain Barleu. A bitter enM^eement followed; the Marathas forced the Company's ships to beat a hastv retreat after inHicting severe damage on them and killing a large b

of the C o m p an y 's soldiers and sailors. Undeterred by the near

16 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUEW ATER

catastrophe, Charles Boor^e carried a surprise attack on Gheria on Novem ber 5, 1718 and silenced m any Maratha guns after a ship-shore artillery engagenr\ent. N ext day, how ever, when his forces landed, the Maratha guns which had been strategically positioned to cover the entire beachhead, m ow ed them dow^ and forced the few British survivors to withdraw from the scene.

The Governor of Bombay then m ade a petition to the King of England for naval reinforcem ents. Four wa rships under Com m odore Ma thews were sent to provide support to the fleet o f the Bombay Marine. The British fleet aided by Portuguese ships attacked Colaba, 5 miles from Gheria, in October 1722 but were successfully repulsed by the Mara thas who inflicted damage on the enemy, entailing losses of ships, men, guns and am munition and forcing them to retreat to Bombay.

Soon an attem pt to seize Gheria was made by the Dutch who appeared on the scene, having been angered by the capture of some of their ships by the M aratha Fleet. They attacked Gheria in 1724 with a powerful squadron of seven m en-of-war, each m ounting 30 to 50 guns, but were beaten back after suffering heavy losses.

The superiority of the Maratha Fleet over bigger and better equipped ships of England, Portugal and Holland and even those of the Moghuls and the Arabs stretching over several decades was mainly due to Kanhoji's tactics. He used a large number of adequately equipped light, strong and fast era ft which could surround thehea vier vessels of the enemy and simultaneously attack them from all sides, thus overw helm ing the crews of the enemy ships. Then they would board them and put them out of action by setting them on fire or by scuttling them.

K anhojiA ngre's career was cut short w ithhis death in 1729; he had had the unique distinction of m aintaining naval suprem acy over the sea area off the Konkan Coast for many years.

In 1733 the British and the Sidis signed a treaty of alliance to fight the Angres. Kanhoji's s o n Sambhaji captured som e British merchant ships on Decem ber 16,1735 inflicting a heavy blow on British trade. The Peshwas of Poona, who were not quite friendly with the Angres, w ere wooed by t e British and a treaty of alliance was signed in 1739 betw een the two. By this time the might o f the Maratha navy, whose control o f the seas now extended from Kutch to Cochin, severely ham pered British trade.

M eanwhile, in 1735, in order to build ships at a site closer to the sc o f action, the British transferred their

“ f ‘ nd

Bombay. Led by Admiral W atson w ith his 16 ships and 1400 sailors, S e ^ n t C o L e l R o b e,. Ciive w i.h his

com panyofar.m e,y,suppor,edby.heP«hw asw ,m ^

Ghurabs and forty Galivats, the combined force g

A PEEP INTO OUR M ARITIM E PAST / 17

Gheria in 1756, reducing Maratha sea power to naught. It may not be out of place to mention here that only a year later, the Battle of Flassey would see Admiral Watson and 50 sailors of the Marine assisting Clive in defeating Siraj-ud-Daula's forces.

In the second decade of the 18th century Ostend, Antwerp and other Flemish towns had deputed merchants to Bengal on board a ship laden with merchandise. The Ostend Company, set up in 1722 with the blessings of N aw abM urshidKuliKhan setupa factory in Banki Bazaar,south of Chandemagore. However, faced with considerable opposition from the other European trading communities, the Nawab's Charter was withdrawn in 1727. Soon thereafter, a naval engagement took place between the Flerrush and Nawab's forces which resulted in the defeat of the former and their withdrawal from India.

The French entered the scene in 1740 to challenge British sea power in the region. They began their operations by capturing Mauritius and converting it into a strong naval base and then sending a strong fleet into the Bay of Bengal to intercept and capture British merchant ships. The war of Austrian succession in Europe in 1744 saw the British and the French in opposing camps and Dupleix, the French Governor of Pondicherry, decided to act. Having already decided to capture the entire South Indian region, he used the French Fleet, which was under thecom m andof La Bourdonnais, to launch an attack on the British Fleet which was led by Captain Peyton. The French Fleet succeeded in driving the British FlePt up the Hooghly. In southern India, they captured Madras after neutralising the British forces in a brief encounter.

The importance of sea power as an essential factor in maintairung supremacy over land areas contiguous to the sea had not been appreciated by Dupleix. La Bourdonnais was thus allowed to return to France in 1747

and the British regained command of the seas around India once again.

They also brought six powerful ships and several small craft ofBoscaw en's Fleet to the Bay of Bengal in 1748 and besieged Pondicherry. This siege, however, was not successful but the British continued to make their presence felt by annexing strategic and important regions. One of these was Chandemagore, a French possession, which was captured by Admiral Watson, assisted by Clive, in 1756. Watson died in 1757 and the British Fleet, under the command of Admiral Pocock, attacked Madras. Despite some reverses suffered at the hands of the French, the British land forces took the offensive and defeated them in the Carnatic War. The British were left masters of the entire sea area around India after Admiral Pocock defeated the F r e n c h n a v a l f o r c e under D'Ache,and theFrench Fleet was driven a way from ^hj>Jnd^an wat^^^^^^^

presence felt a few years after the

18 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

British annexation of Pondicherry, when Admiral Suffren, a redoubtable naval tactician, appeared on the scene with a reinforced French Fleet and attacked the British Fleet which was at that tim e under the command of Admiral Sir Edward Hughes. A series of encounters ensued but, following a treaty between England and France, the Indian O cean was converted into a British lake when Admiral Suffren and his Fleet left the a rea. The la ter half of the 18th century saw the extinction of Portuguese pow er in India, the British seizure of the island of Salsette and other Portuguese holdings in India and the British victory over Haider Ali's navy at H onavar and Mangalore.

Haider Ali and his son,Tipu Sultan, were formidable adversaries who had inflicted a severe defeaton the British and cam e very close to wrecking the power of the East India Company. But their operations were confined to the south and did not directly affect the fortunes of India as a whole.

Haider Ali was a remarkable man and a notable figure in Indian history. He had some kind of a national ideal and possessed the qualities of a leader with vision. Continually suffering from a painful disease, his self-discipline and capacity for hard work were astonishing. He realized, long before others did, the im portance of sea power and the growing m enace of the British, based on their naval strength. He tried to organize a joint effort to drive them out and, for this purpose, sent envoys to the Marathas, the N izam and ShujaudDowla of Oudh but unsuccessfully. He started building his own navy and, capturing the Maldive Islands, made them his headquarters for shipbuilding and naval operations. He however, died soon after.

Haider Ali had lamented that he could beat the English forces on land but he could n otd ry up the oceans and could not prevail against them in naval operations. After him ,his son Tipu continued to strengthen the navy and in connection w ith this Tipu communicated with Napoleon and with the Sultan in Constantinople.

Nearly two and a half centuries ago, in 1753, the Germans too made an attem pt to establish a footing in Bengal. Some merchants from Emden, a tow n in Germany, founded a company, popularly known a t tha t time as the Bengal Com pany of Emden or the Royal Prussian Bengal Company. The British, French, Dutch and the Danes, who had already set up factories on the banks of the Hooghly, however, combined against the newcomers.

Orders were issued forbidding their pilots, m astersand mates to render any assistance to the Germans. Further, the setting up of a Germ an establishment was prevented by the Moghul Nawab who had allowed the other Europeans to do so. A fleet of German ships, however, soon arrived, the largest of them being the Prince Henry o f Prussia. The Germans set up a factory near Chandemagore and overcame the N aw ab's opposition after paying him Rs 5,000 as a'nazran a'(gift). The other European competitors

A PEEP INTO OUR MARITTME PAST / 19

continued to offer bitter resistance to the Germans who were unable to expand their trade norm akeanyheadw ay towards constructing buildings and warehouses for the purpose. By 1760, therefore, they decided to return to Germany and wound up their trade in India.

It is not generally known that Lord Nelson, when he was only 16, had visited Bombay and Calcutta while on board the Seahorse, a twenty gun ship, during its voyage to the 'East Indies' in 1775. The ship reached Bombay on the morning of August 17,1775 and later visited Calcutta when Nelson contracted some 'distressing illness and fevers.' He was sent home on board the Royal Navy (RN) frigate. Dolphin and completely recovered before reaching England. It was Carola Oman who recorded the details of Nelson's journey from the Hooghly to Portsmouth in the book Nelson.

In l6 3 5 theEast IndiaC om panysetupashipbuildingyardatSurat and during the first year this yard built four pinnaces and other larger vessels.

This was the first record of their shipbuilding activities in India. The shift to Bombay in 1735 was necessitated by its being safer and closer to the scenes of action. It was Lowjee Nusserwanjee Wadia, ancestor of a long line of famous Parsi master-builders of ships, naval and commercial, who selected the site for the Naval Dockyard. During the course of the next 100

years this yard proceeded to build not less than 115 war vessels and 144

merchant ships, including 84 gunships for the RN. The quality of construction of these ships was of such a high order that they were acclaimed by shipbuilding nations around the globe. The Wadias proved to the world that Indian-built Malabar-teak ships were far superior in seaworthiness and far more capable of withstanding the detrimental effects of the elements, than British-built oaken ships. One of these ships, HMS Trincomalee, which was built by the Bombay Naval Dockyard in 1817 for the RN and which saw many battles during the period of her commission, is still in use at Portsmouth as TSToudroyant, for training school and college students in seamanship and navigation. She is the oldest sail- driven warship afloat today. Her Malabar-teak hull and superstructure, despite several major modifications and damages suffered during battles and storms and inspite of continuous use for training purposes, is still as good as new and, according to a wellknown shipbuilder, she is likely to remain afloat for another three centuries.

In 1986 the Foudroyant Trust decided to dispose of the ship and arrangements were finalised to transfer her to India so that she could be preserved as a monument to the country's millennia-old shipbuilding traditions but the Trust later changed its decision and thus the ship contmues to be a training ship at Portsmouth.

.

A number of pirates belonging to an Arab tribe called the Joasmis arrived in the Indian waters during the earlier decades of the 19th century.

20 f BLUEPRIN T TO BLUEVVATER

They operated from the Arab side of the Persian Gulf covering the coast from Bahrain to Cape M ussendon and, with their headquarters at Ras-ul-Khymah, they held sway over the entire Persian Gulf. Originally merchants and pearl-fishers, they now took to piracy. For many years they left the ships of the East India Com pany alone and attacked and plundered only ships and craft belonging to the others but since the Company ships took no action against the Arab pirates, this was interpreted by the Joasmis as a sign of weakness and laterthey resorted toattacking theCom pany's ships as well.

To set things right a fleet of 12 ships of the Bombay Marine, led by CaptainSeaton, attacked Ras-uI-Khymah in 1809 and bombarded this focal point of the Joasm is' operations but were beaten back by the well-entrenched Joasm i forces. The squadron of ships had, therefore, to return to Bombay and the Arab pirates continued to seize and plunder the Com pany's ships. Under the command of Captain Collier, the Company later dispatched another fleet of 11 ships under M ajor General Sir William Grant Keir, they blockaded the town of Ras-ul-Khym ah for four days, as a result ofw hich SardarH asanBinR ehm an, the Joasmi Chief, gave him self up and admitted defeat. The Arabs then guaranteed safe passage to British ships in a treaty in 1820 and the East India Company was not subjected to any further harassment.

It is not generally known that the Punjab Regiment of the Indian Army is probably the only exam ple in the world of a landbased force having a naval craft as its cap badge with the motto Sthal-wa-Jal (earlier Khushki-wa-Tari). This regim ent was permitted to adopt the galley as an emblem because between 1796 and 1824 it took part in many military expeditions overseas.

In 1829 two important events took place - the Bombay M arine was assigned the new nom enclature, the Bombay Marine Corps, and a steam engine for ship propulsion was installed for the first lime on board theH ugli Lindsa]/, a ship of the East India Company. This 411-ton ship of the Bombay M arine Corps, steamed out of Bombay on Ma rch 20, 1830 and reached Suez after 21 days of actual steaming, averaging a trifle under six knots. Thus began the gradual conversion of the Com pany's ships from sail to steam which was com pleted during the next 15 years. In 1830, t h e r e w a s another change in the nam e o f the Service - the Bombay M arine Corps becam e the Indian Navy (IN).

.

The next seven years were relatively peaceful. But in 1837, a pilg^

sh ip o f th eEastln dia C om pan y, w h ilsto n passage to M ecca, w ith a n u m o fr ic h p ilg r im s o n b o a r d ,w a s s e iz e d a n d p l u n d e r e d n e a r A d e n . A s q u a d of the Indian N avy'sm en-of-w ar,led byCom m ander Haines, was

to attack Aden. H ow ever, since the Sultan of Aden was in a repentant nno

A PEEP INTO OUR MARITIME PAST / 21

and ready to pay an indemnity of Rs 3 lakh, the ships spared Aden and returned to Bombay in 1838. The indemnity promised w as,however,never paid by the Sultan and consequently the Company ships returned to Aden the same year and captured it once again.

During the Anglo-Sikh War of 1848, the Indian Navy provided a contingent of 100 sailors and seven officers with their guns to participate in the siege of Multan. The Company's Navy was thus employed for land operations for the second time.

Captain Lynch led a strong fleet of the Indian Navy to attack and capture Rangoon in 1852. The Raja of Burma had refused to be cowed down by the naval might of Lord Dalhousie, the Viceroy of India at that time and his defiance of British authority resulted in the loss of the strategic city of Rangoon. M eanw hi!e,Persianand Russian seafarers in thePersianG ulf began harassing the Company's ships while the latter were on passage for maritim e trade. A strong fleet of the Indian Navy under Sir Henry Leeks was sent to deal with the pirates and captured Bushire (Basra) after defeating the Persian Fleet in 1853. In 1860, during a war in-the Chinese waters, piracy was suppressed by ships of the Indian Navy working in tandem with those of the Royal Navy.

It was during the 1857 uprising that the two highest decorations ever to be awarded to the personnel of the Indian Navy before Independence were earned and on shore. An Indian Naval Brigade comprising 78 officers and 1740 men was assigned shore service during the uprising. Mister Midshipman Mayo of the 4th Detachment was awarded the Victoria Cross for his bravery at Dhaka (now in Bangladesh). This VC was later presented to the RIM (later RIN) Officers Mess at Bombay with a photograph of the young officer and is now on display at the Naval Museum at Bombay. The other recipient of the VC was Mister Acting Master G.B. Chicken of the 3rd Detachment in recognition of his desperate single-handed action in which he killed five out of a party of 20 armed men that attacked him Mariiied entirely by naval officers, a Marine Survey Department was started in India in 1863 which, during the course of the next century, has developed into a full-fledged Hydrographic Survey organisation of free India's Navy.

Hydrographic survey was being carried out by the Bombay Marine/

Indian Navy itself before the formation of the Marine Survey Department.

In fact, survey workhad started in 1772 andofficersof theServicesurveyed the coastal waters of not only India and the neighbouring countries and islands but also the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the East African Coast, the East Indies, the Philippines, the Pelew Islands in the Pacific, the Chusan Archipelago in the East China Sea and Tasmania in the Far South East. Considering the primitive instruments, the limitations of the ships used by

22 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUEW ATER

these officers and the dangers of venturing into the unknown, the feats of enunent hydrographers such as Captains M cCIuer, Ross and Blair would be com parable to the m ost daunting expeditions undertaken in any sphere.

The Indian N avy was reorganised as a non-com batant force in 1863

w ith two branches at Bom bay and Calcutta which were renamed the Bom bay M arine and the Bengal M arine, naval protection of Indian waters having been taken over by the Admiralty.

Their new role was the marine survey of India and the transport of troops and Governm ent stores, m aintenance of 'station ship' duties at Aden, the A ndam an Islands (Port Blair), Burma and Persian Gulf, m aintenance of gunboats on the Irrawaddy and Tigris, maintenance of all Governm ent light craft em ployed for military duties and the m aintenance of lightships and lighthouses around the coasts of India and Burma and in the Southern portion o f the Red Sea.

The nom enclature of the Service was to undergo several changes. In 1871 an Indian Defence Force with two ships was constituted and yet again in 1877 when the Governm ent restored the com batant status to the Service, it was called His M ajesty's Indian M arine once again with two divisions at Bom bay and Calcutta. The Service was rechristened the Royal Indian M arine (RIM) in 1892.

The RIM did not make any significant contribution to the maritime history o f this country from 1892 till the outbreak of World W ar I. Before the W ar, the main tasks assigned to the RIM were marine survey, m aintenance o f lighthouses and transportation of troops. During the war, how ever, there were notable exploits of the RIM in various theatres of naval operations. Its ships transported troops, arm s, am m unition and stores to Egypt, Iraq and East Africa. W hile on patrol in the Suez Canal, th e'R IM ship Hardinge' fought against the Turks and thwarted their efforts to block the canal. During the action she suffered severe dam age and lost one of her funnels but succeeded in preventing the blocking of the canal. RIM ships landed troops in M esopotamia and its smaller ships, designed for operations in inland w aters, rendered excellent service in the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. Three other ships, {heN orthbrooke,M intoar\d Dufferin, carried out patrolling duties in the Red Sea. W hile carrying out these duties, the M into called at Jeddah and transported som e Haj Pilgrims safely back to India. The RIM was once again reverted to its non-com batant role in 1918

after the end of the war.

A t the end o f W orld W ar I the R IM w as ad v ersely a ffected by the international situation, shortage of funds and extensive r e t r e n c h m e n t .

W ith the task of naval defence o f India once again entrusted to the Navy, the com batant status o f the RIM had been lost. For the servic ^

rendered by the Royal Navy, the Governm ent of India had to pay

A PEEP INTO OUR MARTITME PAST / 23

Staggering sum of 100,000 pounds annually to the British Government. The RIM had, therefore, to be reduced to a small force entrusted with minor coastal duties. Most of the World War I veterans were demobilised and no reservists were left for calling up during emergencies. This led to the m obilisation of Indian public opinion against the wilful eradication of the country s naval and maritime traditions and a number of committees were appointed to examine the future role of the Service and to make recommendations for suitable changes or expansion. The Rawlinson Committee, the last such committee to be appointed, recommended the formation of a small com batant force, which was to be controlled from a major port by a suitably constituted administrative authority.

Though recruitment to the RIM was open both to the Indians and the British, very few Indians joined the Service at that time. The first Indian to join the RIM as an officer was Engineer Sub- Lieutenant D.N. Mukerji, connmissioned on January 6,1928. He rose to the rank of Captain and took premature retirement from service in 1950. He emigrated to Eiigland where he died on January 3 1 , 1986.

One such officer was Lieutenant H.R. Bowers of the RIM. He had the distinctionof being chosen to accompany the great explorer. Captain Scott, on his expedition to the Antarctica, in 1910. Even though he was not an Indian, he was the first representative of this sub-continent to embark on an expedition to the South Pole. He died with Scott on his w ay back from the South Pole. In the words of Commander G.E. Walker, RIN VR, author of The Historical Background o f the Royal Indian Nat;y:

Lieutenant Bowers had the high honour of being selected as one of the party which made the last great journey to the South Pole itself. Scott wrote ofhim , I believe he is the hardiest traveller that ever undertook a Polar journey, as well as one of the most undaunted. N ever was seen such a sturdy, active, undefeatable little man.

Som e articles belonging to Lieutenant Dowers along with the piece of the Union Jack carried by him to the South Pole are now on display at the Naval M useum at Bombay.

The first Indian to set foot on Antarctica was also, by coincidence, a Naval Officer, Lieutenant Ram Charan,a specialistin meteorology, w ho accompanied an Australian expedition to the South Pole in 1960. After returning to India, Ram Charan prepared a valuable report on Ws expedition. Unfortunately, in 1961 he met a tragic death in a road accident.

Personnel from the Indian Navy also took p art in the first Indian e x p e

dition to Antarctica, E xp ed ition G an gotri, in 1 9 8 1 .T lie N a v y p la y e d a m ajor role in subsequent expeditions launched annually.

The indomitable spirit of adventure of Indian Naval personnel h.-

24 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUEW ATER

taken the Naval Ensign to th e to p o f the world's highest mountain, Everest.

The intrepid and renowned m ountaineer of the IN, Instructor Lieutenant Com m ander (later Captain) M anm ohan Singh Kohli has had the distinction of not only clim bing to the highest altitude withou t oxygen but also of putting nine men atop the peak and hoisting the Naval Ensign on it for the first time in its history.

The RIM was reconstituted as a com batant force in 1928 and the White Ensign was hoisted for the first time in its history on N ovem ber 11, 1928.

The Indian Navy Discipline Bill, based on the recom m endations of the Rawlinson Com m ittee, was also taken up by the Legislative Assembly in the sam e year and, after 6 years of deliberations, the bill was passed by the Assem bly and the Council of States on Septem ber 5,1934.

A m onth later, i.e., on October 2,1934, the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) cam e into being with the Naval Headquarters at Bombay under the Flag Officer Com m anding Royal Indian Navy (FOCRIN).

The RIN was developed into a small and efficient naval force by 1939

and by the time World W ar II broke out, the RIN fleet com prised five sloops, a survey vessel, a patrol ship, a depot ship and a large number of small craft.

Recom m endations were made by the Chatfield com m ittee in 1939 for assigning greater responsibility for the naval defence of India to the RIN.

M odernisation of the Service was also recommended in order to enable the RIN to carry out these duties.

The recom m endations made by the Chatfield Com m ittee in 1939 were based m ainly on the proposals p u tfo rw ard b y th eR lN for the expansion of the Service which was to be com pleted in five years. The main features of the C om m ittee's recom m endations were the construction of four Bittern class escort m inesw eepers, development of depots and training establishments and acquisition of local naval defence equipment. Even though the recom m endations were to be implemented over a period of five years, the outbreak o f the W ar in 1939 greatly hastened the process of expansion. The annual subvention of 100,000 pounds to be paid to the British Government along with m iscellaneous other charges ranging from 15,000 to 20,000

pounds was also discontinued on the condition that it would be utilised towards expanding the RIN fleet and m aintaining a squadron of six escort vessels which would carryout local naval defence duties, besides assisting the Royal Navy.

Before the com m encem ent of the War the authorities had resorted to the form ation of reserves for the RIN. TTie Royal Indian Naval Reserve (RINR) comprised serving officers of the Indian Mercantile Marine and ha two branches. Executive and Accountant, to which theEngineeririg

was also added on the outbreak of the War. The Royal Indian avy

Volunteer Reserve (RINVR) was constituted by inducting qualified mem

A PEEP INTO OUR MARITIME PAST / 25

bers of the general public as commissioned officers and giving them six m onths' intensive training at Bombay. This was also done for sailors who used to be called 'ratings' at that time. In addition to the regular service

'ratings', 'special service ratings' were recruited who served for five years before being transferred to the Fleet Reserve for 10 years.These'ratings'belonged to the cadre of the Royal Indian Fleet Reserve (RIFR). Personnel from the merchant marine were also recruited for service during the War as

'Hostilities Only (H.O.) ratings'.

During the early 1920s the Scindia Steam Navigation Company had been formed but its maritime activities were virtually limited to coastal trade as overseas contracts granted to the Company were very few. The training ship for cadets, 'SS Dufferin', was acquired by the Indian Mercantile Marine Department in 1926 and started trainingcadets for the merchant navy. A number of small shipping companies came into being during the early 1930s and these managed to capture a seizable chunk of coastal trade from foreign shipping companies but the tonnage under them was virtually negligible compared to the volume of exports and imports.

On October 1,1939 the personnel strength of the RIN was 114 officers and 1,732 ratings with the Naval Headquarters, located inside the Naval Dockyard at Bombay, and manned by only 16 officers.

When hostilities commenced, the Royal Navy undertook the task of building, commissioning and working up fast seagoing motorboats for coastal patrol and corvettes and minesweepers which were suitably armed and equipped for carrying out anti- submarine and escort duties in the waters around India. Magnetic mines posed a major threat to the merchant marine at that time and hence 263 merchant and naval ships were fitted with degaussing (demagnetising) cables by June 1941. The first Basset class trawler,HM IS Trf7i;n)7Core,wasbuiUat Calcutta and commissioned into the RIN in July 1941. This was followed by five more within a year and another six soon thereafter. The first Bangor class minesweeper built in India joined the RIN in 1943. To reinforce the RIN fleet, six sloops built in Great Britain and named after Indian rivers, the jiim m , Sutlej, Caiivenj, Kistna. Godavari and Narbada were also acquired soon.

New Delhi was the focal point for command and control for the RIN.

The Naval Headquarters, however, functioned from Bombay. In order, therefore, to maintain effective control over the operational and organisational aspects of the Service, the FOCRIN could pay only occasional visits to New Delhi. This led to considerable delay in obtaining New Delhi’s clearance on important matters as the bulk of the exchanges between the capital and Bombay had to be by correspondence or by signal. A Naval Liaison Office was positioned at New Delhi in October 1939 to reduce the time taken in processing important papers but even this proved unsatisfac-

26 / BLU EPRIN T T O BLUEW ATER

to ry a n d hence, in M arch 1941, the Naval Headquarters was transferred from Bom bay to New Delhi.

All training establishm ents of the RIN were concentrated inside the RIN Dockyard, Bom bay w hen the war broke out. These were the Seamanship School, the Signal School, the Gunnery School, the Mechanical Training Establishm ent, the Boys' Training Establishm ent and the Antisubm arine School. There were no schools for training in torpedo, radar and electrical disciplines. There were also no training facilities for officers who had to undergo their basic and advanced training in all disciplines at the Royal N aval establishm ents in the United Kingdom.

As the tasks assigned to the RIN multiplied and its size increased, several new naval establishm ents cam e up at Jam nagar, Cochin, Man-dapam , M adras, Coconada (Kakinada), Vishakhapatnam and Calcutta. To cope w ith the increased intake of sailors and the requirements of equipping the fleet, expansion and m odernisation of the existing naval bases at Karachi and Bombay was taken up.

In terms of the strength of the fleet and personnel, the RIN grew extrem ely rapidly and thus posed grave problems of training personnel in the specialist and general tasks. For exam ple, by June 1940 when Italy jum ped into the fray, the RIN had doubled its strength and by 1942 it had expanded to nearly six times its pre-war complement.

W hile the fleet continued to expand, so did the num ber of shore establishments. To augm ent training of Boys at HMIS D alhousie at Bombay, HMIS Bahadur was commissioned at Karachi. In addition, for training officers and ratings, two more establish men ts,HM/SH!;nfl/ni/o, the gunnery training establishm ent, and HMIS Chnmnk, the radar training establishm ent, were com m issioned at Karachi. The other naval bases that came up about this time were HMIS Shivaji, the m echanical training establishment at Lonavala, HMIS Akbar, the ratings' training establishm ent at Thane, HM IS Tfl/wflr, the Signal School at Bombay, and a mechanical training establishm ent at Pilani. At Karachi, Bom bay and Calcutta, ships were armed for defence and at Vishakhapatnam, Madras and Cochin, inspection organisations were set up.

The need was soon felt for a major m erchant shipbuilding yard in order to neutralise wartim e m ercantile marine losses. Accordingly, a site was located at Vishakhapatnam by the Scindia Steam Navigation Com pany but the first m ajor ship, a freighter, could only be launched w e l l after the W ar in 1948. The problem created by United K in gd om 's inability to send supplies to the Allied forces in sufficient quantities, was solved by t ^

Indian m ercantile marine which shouldered the responsibilityofdelivenng stores to places as far as Hongkong in the east and Malta in the

,

Sloops of the RIN took part in the operations in the Red Sea, _’U

A PEEP INTO OUR MARITIME PAST / 27

Aden and the Persian Gulf in 1940 under the overall command of the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. The Jumna and Sutlej took part in the Battle of the Atlantic in 1941. In the same year, reoccupation of Berbera in the Gulf of Aden was made possible by the first combined operations, i.e., amphibious operations, by the Indian Army and the Royal Indian Navy. The RIN

also played a vital role during the advance of the Allied forces in Sudan.

W hile HMIS Clive softened up the area between Port Sudan and Massawa w ithher arm am en t an d HMfS Hindustan, Indus, Parvati an d R atn agiriledthe attack, the port of Massawa was annexed from the Italians.

In the operations in the Persian Gulf, HMIS Lawrence and Lilavati earned distinction and two officers of the RIN were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC). These were Lieutenant (later Vice Admiral) N. Krishnan for his act of gallantry while boarding and overpowering the crew of an armed tug belonging to the Ax is during Operation Countenance for the capture of Abadan in 1941 and Engineer Lieutenant (later Vice Admiral) D. Shankar who, while boarding an Italian vessel, Cabote, during the Persian Gulf opera tion in the same year, captured the crew of the vessel after going through the blazing bridgedeck at considerable risk to his life.

a Bathurst class minesweeper of the RIN, covered herself

with glory o n N o v em b erll, 1942 when, whileescortinga Dutch tanker,M V

Ondina, from Fremantle in Australia to Diego Garcia, she was attacked by two Japanese 10,000 ton armed merchant raiders. The raiders opened fire with 4 inch and 5.5 inch long range guns but the 'Bengal' could defend herself with one 12 pounder gun and a few close-range anti-aircraft gtms.

However, instead of making an attempt to escape, the ‘Bengal’ instructed the Ondina to increase her distance from the raiders and herself pressed home an attack. The raiders opened fire once again at 3,500 yards and the Bengal retaliated with her small calibre armament. Her first salvo to hit one of the raiders fortuitously landed on the latter's magazine resulting in an inferno which caused the raider to blow up and sink within minutes. The second raider soon left the scene after causing considerable damage to the Ondina and killing a few members of her crew including the Commanding Officer. Though the Bengal suffered damage in the superstructure, no lives had been lost and the minesweeper was still operational. The Ondina was virtually immobilised but the Bengal, succeeded in escorting her back to Fremantle.

Lieutenant Commander W.J. Wilson, RINR, Commanding Officer of

'Bengal', w as awarded the DistinguishedServiceOrder.Two Indianratings also to be decorated were Leading Seaman Ismail Mohammed, one of the 12 pounder gun's crew, who was awarded the Indian Distinguished Service Medal for gallantry and devotion to duty and Petty CXfic«

Mohammed I b r a h i m , c a p t a i n o f t h e l 2 p o u n d e r g u n , w was awa

28 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUEVVATER

Indian Order of Merit Second Class for setting an excellent example of steadiness and resolution and using his weapon to the very best advantage even after the Bengal had been considerably damaged by the raiders.

Ships of the RIN carried out sustained attacks on the A rakanCoast of Burma while operating from Chittagong and Koronge Island. They also provided close support to troops that had been landed by the RIN landing craft for driving the Japanese away from the area. Despite its success in operations in various theatres of war around the globe, the losses suffered by the RIN were negligible and ships of the RIN and their men were still

'raring to go' w hen V] (Victory over Japan) Day arrived.

The nuclear holocaust perpetrated on the innocent residents of Hiroshima and N agasaki in Japan on August 15,1945 led to Emperor Hirohito's surrender, hastening the end of the War. At the time of cessation of hostilities, the RIN fleet comprised seven sloops, four frigates, four corvettes, 14 m inesw eepers, 16 trawlers, two depot ships, 30 harbour craft, several motor launches and harbourdefence m otor launches and a personnel strength of over 25,000.

World W ar II, which was a veritable catastrophe, ended on August 15, 1945, exactly two years before India was to gain Independence. The stage was set for carrying out the post war tasks, viz., sanitising, i.e., sweeping large areas for mines and other sunken hazards in and around Indian waters, preventing any further repetition of the traumatic experience, decom m issioning or assigning peace time roles to a large num ber of ships and craft with the RIN which had been rendered redundant and meeting the post-W orld War II requirements by refurbishing the RIN.

A Victory parade was held in London on June 8 ,1 9 4 6 in which representatives of the three Indian Armed Forces pa rticipated. The senior Indian Naval officerw asC om m ander(IaterR ear Admiral) A. Chakravarti and the Naval Contingent was led by Lieutenant (later Rear Admiral) P.S. Mahindroo. In keeping with the inter-Service seniority in which the Navy was the senior service, the parade was led by the Naval Contingent.

Rear Admiral Mahindroo, who later com m anded our first aircraft carrier Vikrant, reminisces on the occasion, "N eedless to say, that as a turbaned officer leading the Naval Contingent, I was most prominent and I must have given hundreds of autographs am ongst thousands of spectators who probably slept on the pavement for one or two nights to witness this historic parade."

W ith the end of World W arll th en eed w asfeltfo r,firstly ,assessin g t e requirement of future weapons and weapon platforms for the pe acet i me role of the RIN and to whittle the Navy down to a n appropriate size for t purpose. As mentioned earlier, at the outbreak of the W ar the comprised five sloops, a survey vessel, a patrol ship, a depot ship an

A PEEP INTO OUR MARITIME PAST / 29

number of small craft but by the time the W aren d ed jh e fleet consisted of seven sloops, four frigates, four corvettes, 14 minesweepers, 16 trawlers, two depot ships, 30 auxiliary vessels, 150 landing craft of various types, 200

harbour craft and several motor launches and harbour defence motor launches. Personnel wise the strength had risen during the course of six years from 1,850 in 1939 to over25,000 in 1945. These figures do not include the six ships that were lost during the W ai-H M JS Pa than {escort, patrol ship) by explosion off Bombay on June 23,1940, HMIS Paroati (auxiliary) mined off Massawa on April 3 0 , 1941, HMIS Prablwvati (auxiliary) sunk off Goa on December 8, 1941, HMIS Sophie Marie (auxiliary) mined in Macpherson Strait on March 1,1942 and HMIS Indus (sloop) sunk at Akyab on April 6, 1942 and HMIS Lady Craddock (auxiliary) sunk in the Hooghly river on October 16,1942 - and, the men who went down with these ships.The RIN

had in fact expanded by 1,800 per cent - an average annual growth rate of 300 per cent.

It was decided in 1944 to develop the peacetime RIN after due dem obilisation of personnel recruited for the duration of the hostilities and decommissioning the large number of vessels acquired for wartime operations at sea, in two stages. Stage I had a time frame of two years from 1945

to 1947 for replacing the 'existing inefficient ships' by frigates and m odem sloops, acquiring eight destroyers and training of personnel for cruisers that had been planned to be acquired. During Stage II, which was to be put into effect after the cessation of hostilities, the strength of the RIN would be raised to 1,500 officers and 15,000 sailors who would gradually replace the Royal Navy personnel then serving in the RIN. These plans were later modified to include aircraft carriers, cruisers and submarines.

The RIN was thus envisaged to develop into a full-fledged 'dom inion'

naval force towards the late 1940s and be deployed as a vanguard of Commonwealth interests. This, however, did not happen because, first, massive demobilisation undertaken after the war left only a small number of ships and trained personnel, both in the commissioned and lower-deck cadres, in the Service. Next, the scars of the mutiny which took place in February 1946 took a long time to disappear. Third, what was left of the RIN

was truncated to two-thirds of its size when British India was partitioned in August 1947. Fourth, the 'land-frontiers-only' concept continued to occupy Indian minds at the highest level for many years. And, last, thegross inadequacy of funds made available during the earlier decades of Independence for the development of India's maritime force prevented it from speedily expanding into a powerful entity.

Reducing the fleet strength, which was virtually bursting at the seams, entailed paying off aging ships to a reserve fleet, returning vessels commandeered from the merchant marine to tradeand consigning very old

30 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUEW ATER

ships to breakers' yards.

D em obilisation o f two categories of personnel, those who had been recruited for the duration o f the hostilities and those who had been retained till the end of the W ar despite the expiry of their contracted periods of service during the W ar, w as also taken up. N early 2,000 officers and 18,000

sailors w ere released by the beginning of 1947. In addition, over 700 officers and sailors of the W om en's Royal Indian Naval Service (W RINS) were released and 25 officers and 25 sailors transferred to the Army Wing, viz..

W om en's A uxiliaryC orps,India (WACI). As farasw as possible,personnel released received pre release and post release vocational training and assistance in resettlem ent.

In its w ake, dem obilisation brought about considerable set back in the m orale of the Service. Rejection of a large num ber of applications from serving officers for perm anent com m ission led to acute disappointment am ongst Indian officers. Sailors due for release faced the uncertainty of resettlem ent in civil life. To m ake matters worse, the existing scales of low pay and pension, inadequate travelling facilities, the poor quality of food and am enities and the ill treatment meted out to them by some of the British officers of the RIN , brought the situation to a flash point. The spark was provided by the political situation in the country which led some of the sailors to believe that the gerontocratic structure of the political parties led by M ahatm a Gandhi would not be able to force the British m asters to grant full freedom to the country and an armed dem onstration by the uniformed Services was called for.

The com bination o f these contributory factors led to a m utiny by RIN

personnel originating at the Tfl/wor, a shore establishm ent at Bombay, on February 18,1946. This soon spread to ten establishm ents, 56 ships and four flotillas at Bombay, K arachi,M adras,Calcutta, Cochin, Lonavla, Jamnagar, Vishakhapatnam , M andapam , Aden, Bahrain, the Andam an & Nicobar Islands and New Delhi.

Som e of the broad features of the mutiny were:

Bom bay - processions taken out by RIN sailors, shouting of slogaris, burning of the Am erican Stars and Stripes at the US Information Office, hoisting the Congress, 'Jai Hind' and M uslim League flags, low ering the N aval Ensign, acts o f violence and exchange of fire at Castle Barracks between mutineers and m ilitary personnel who had been called in to quell the mutiny.

.

Karachi - acts o f violence on the Bahadur an d the H im alaya, a procession from there to the radar training school, the

and an exc

nge

o f fire between the military and the m utineers of sloop, theHr us

At other places - generally non violent m easures such as re us

A PEEP INTO OUR MARITIME PAST / 31

work, defiance of orders and hunger strikes occurred. With rare exceptions, the behaviour of the mutineers towards their officers was courteous with the usual marks of respect.

The casualties suffered by the mutineers and the others included; Bombay - one sailor killed and six wounded, one RIN officer killed and one wounded, two British Other Ranks wounded.

Karachi - eight sailors killed and 33, including British soldiers, wounded.

Later, in response to appeals made by political leaders of eminence such as Shri Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the mutineers surrendered. The mutiny, however, had wide repercussions all over the country and the Central Legislative Council discussed it on February 22

and 23,1946. When it was taken up by the Defence Consultative Committee on March 8, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief of the three Services, recommended a high power com m ission of inquiry to go into 'the causes and origin of the recent mutiny in the Royal Indian Navy'.

Based on the recommendations made by the Commission of Inquiry

comprising three Indian Chief Justices, a Vice-Admiral of the RN and a BritishM ajor General of the Indian Army, the conditions of service, food, leave travel facilities and amenities for sailors were improved and short service commissions were offered to a large number of officers who were about to be released, thus allaying their fears about their immediate future.

One of the leaders of the mutiny. Leading Telegraphist B.C. Dutt, who was discharged after the mutiny in March 1946, has authored a book entitled Mutiny o f the Innocents, wherein he has stated that the mutiny was the penultimate, nay, ultimate, nail in the coffin of foreign rule and that the mutineers, the real freedom fighters, had been let down by the aging political leaders from whom they had sought advice and guidance -

mutineers who, he thought, were politically iruiocent. He said, "In India a new generation had grown by wearing the soldier's uniform and exulting in the sound of gunfire. Most of them wanted the total overthrow of the Raj.

The means did not much matter. Nor were they, at that point in Indian history, the only ones to feel the way they did. Other segments of society were also similarly i n c l i n e d . The leadership would not have it. They nipped what the young thought was the revolution in the bud.

The fact that the process of gaining independence was considerably accelerated by the RIN mutiny was further corroborated by the former C h i e f o f t h e N a v a l S t a f f , A d m i r a l S . N , K o h l i , w h o w a s s e r v . n g . n t h e T f l W

at the lime of .he mutiny. He said, "It is my view that the Naval Mutmy,

32 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUEW ATER

com ing as the culm ination of a num ber of similar incidents in the Indiar\ D efence Services, was largely instrum ental in convincing the British that holding India was no longer feasible without the use of large-scale British force and was, 'inter alia', responsible for ushering in freedom.

W hen independence was eventually ushered in on August 15, 1947, the Partition Council divided the RIN into two navies - the Royal Indian N avy and the Royal Pakistan Navy (R P N )-respectively for the dominions of India and Pakistan which cam e into being that day. The ships and craft allocated to the two Services were:

India - four sloops Sutlej, Jiimna, K istm , Cauvenj, two frigates Tir,Xi/^:n, one corvette Assam , 12 m inesweepers Orissa, Deccan, Bihar, Kitmaon, Rohilkhand, Khyber, Carnatic, Rajpiitana, Konkan, Bomba]/, Bengal, M adras, one hydrographic survey vessel Investigator, four trawlers Nasik, Calcutta, Cochin, Amritsar, four motor m inesweepers 130, 132, 152,154 one m otor lau nch'420', fourharbour defence m otor launches 1110,1112, 1117,1118 and all existing landing craft.

Pakistan - two sloops Narbada, Godavari, two frigates Shamsher, Dha-niish, four minesweepers Kathiaioar, Baluchistan, Oudh, Malwa, two trawlers Rampur, Baroda, two motor minesweepers 129, 131 and four harbour defence motor launches 1261,1262,1263, 1266.

Soon after Independence, negotiations were started with the British authorities for the acquisition of one cruiser, three destroyers and other craft for free India's navy. The number of ships that could be kept in com m ission in the truncated and reconstituted RIN was restricted by the shortageof personnel. Available trained personnel were inadequate for the num erous and varied duties that they could be called upon to perform. An easy solution to this problem could not be found as the training of personnel was handicapped by the lack of experienced instructors and the fact that a num ber of well equipped training establishments, which were located in Karachi, were no longer available.

However, before any concrete steps could be ta ken for the IN 's expansion, the Navy had to undertake an am phibious, op eration-Exercise Peace

- to land an army contingent off Junagadh in Gujarat on the Arabian Sea -

the first high-water mark in the history of Independent India's navy.

Unlike the other members of the Kathiawar states which, based on their geographical contiguity to India, had acceded en masse to India, t N awab of Junagadh, Sir M a h a b a t k h a n R asul kha nji, o n the advice o is

D e w a n , S i r S h a h N a w a 2 B h u t t o ( f a t h e r o f M r Z . A . B h u t t o , w h o laterbecarne the Prim e Minister of Pakistan), signed the instrum ent of Pakistan on August 15,1947 and ordered his troops to occupy t-

A PEEP INTO OUR MARITIME PAST / 33

states of Babariawad and Mangrol, which had already acceded to India.

After having waited for two months for the Nawab of Junagadh to rectify his mistakes, the Government of India issued instructions to the Navy on October 17,1947 to land an army task force on the Kathiawar Coast to help the Nawab change his mind. Accordingly, under the planning and control of Commodore M.H. S». L. Nott, Chief of Staff at Naval Headquarters, New Delhi, a naval force comprising three frigates Kistnn, Cauvery an d Jumna, three fleet minesweepers Konkan, Madras and Rohilkhand, three landing craft for tanks LCTs, 2370,2358 and 360 and one motor launch ML

420 was placed under the command of Commander (later Admiral and Chief of the Naval Staff) R.D. Katari. The task assigned to the force was the landing of three columns of troops with arms, equipment and armour at Porbandar, Jaffarabad and Mangrol on the Kathiawar Coast, the columns having been designated 'Namcol' (after Major Nambiar, the Commander of the troops) 'JaffcoF (after Jaffarabad) and 'Ratcol' (after Major Ratan).

After a hydrographic survey of the beach carriedoutby/z(mnn, thefirst column, Namcol, was landed at Porbandarby Kistna, Caiiveiy, Konkan and Madras, LCTs 2310, 1358 and 2360 and ML 420 on October 5, 1947. The second column, Jaffcol, was landed at Jaffarabad by Kistna, Jumna and Konkan an d LC Ts2358and 2360o n 0 cto b erl7 a n d thethird column, Ratcol, was landed at Mangrol by Kistna, Cauvery, Konkan and Rohilkhand an d ML

420 on, November 1. Immediately on the landing of these colurruis, the Junagadh Army surrendered unconditionally and the Nawab fled to Pakistan.

Soon after Independence, based on the recommendations of the first Plans Paper, the Navy's first cruiser, HMS/4c//i7/es (a Leander class cruiser of World W arll's Battle of the River Plate fame) was acquired from the UK.

It was rechristened HM/S De//ii with Captain H.N.S. Brown as the Com manding Officer and Commander R.D. Katari as the Executive Officer. Out of the four landing ships for tanks (LSTs) that had been borrowed from Britain during World W a rlI,o n e-H M S A v en g er-w a s acquired for the RIN

and rechristened HM/S

on April 11,1949. She was essentially a tank

landing ship but was also cr.,.. ble of carrying vehicles, landing craft, men and 2,000 tons of stores.

Also acquired in 1949 were three 'R' class destroyers, HMS Rotherham, Redoubt and RflidTer, w h i c h were respectively renamed HMIS Rajput, Rana and Ranjit, constituting the 11th Destroyer Squadron with the Rajput as the senior ship of the squadron.

In tune with the practice prevailing in the UK the RIN was traditionally the Senior Service in India during the pre independence period with the Indian Army and the Royal Indian AirForce in that order of seniority. Thus theorderoftheService C o lo u rs in the 1939-1945 star(w arnbbon) was navy

34 / BLUEPRIN T TO BLUEWATER

blue, red and air force blue. Even after Independence, since India continued to be a 'dom inion' until the form ation of the republic, the prefix 'Royal' to the nomenclature of the Navy and the Air Force continued to be used and the order of seniority of the three Services remained unaltered. The Indian authorities however, decided to revise theorder of seniority on the basis of relative size and historical background. Thus, on January 26, 1950 when India becam e a republic, the prefix 'Royal' was dropped to change the nomenclature of the N avy and the Air Force to the Indian N avy (IN) and the Indian Air Force (lAF), respectively. Along with that the order of seniority was altered to Army, N avy and Air Force.

In 1950, the stage was thus set for snipping the umbilical cord that had linked the IN to the British Navy for centuries, expanding the fleet to a size com m ensurate with the tasks and responsibilities of free India, establishing a num ber of training establishm ents and maintenance facilities on both coasts of the peninsula, com m encing the process of indigenising the design and construction of m ajor and minor war vessels along with the development of associated propulsion systems, weapons and equipment, and restructuring its strategic and tactical doctrine to suit the requirements of the region.

The Frigate Foudroyant built by W adias - Master builders o( the Bombay Dockyard - as

H M S Trincomaloe (a 46 gun ship) at Bombay in 1817. Foudroyant is the oldest warship still afloat.

\

The Royal Indian Naval contingent lor the Victory Parade being inspected by King George VI at Regent's Park, London in June 1946. Also seen in the picture are Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, Major General A.A. Rudra and Lieutenant PS Mahinriroo.

C ourtesy R e a r Admiral P S M ahindroo (R etd)

f% m

id

nv

w r

Viclory Parade in London 8 June 1946. Picture shows the Naval contingent led by LieLtenani PS Mahindroo, Also the senior Indian Naval officer, C om m ander (later Rear Admiral) A Chakraveni and Senior Army and Air Force Officers.

Courtesy Rear Admiral PS Mahindroo (Retd)

Sardar Vallabbhai Patel, then Deputy Prime Minister of India embarking on board Delhi Irom Gateway o1 India, Bombay. Also seen In the picture are Shri Morarji Desai, Shri V

Shankar, Commodore HR Inigo-Jones, then Com m odore-in-Charge, Bombay, Lieutenants RS Malia & MB Samuel

Chie( ol the Naval Staff's Exercises at sea in 1951. Admiral Sir Edward Parry, R ear Admiral G. Barnard, Captain

■ SG Karmarkar and Air Commodore Arjan Singh on the bridge ol Delhi

tl

uv<-

■> f*“ -:; .

I L . • r^ -.-'T '^ r . -\ i i « ’■'•■'‘ ''•

P re s e n ta tio n o f P re s id e n t's C o lo u rs to th e In d ia n N a v y b y P re s id e n t D r. R a je n d ra P ra s a d a t B o m b a y o n 2 7 M a y 1 9 5 1 . C o lo u rs b e in g re c e iv e d b y L ie u te n a n t M P A w a ti. T h e In d ian N a v y w a s th e first S e rv ic e to b e h o n o u re d w ith th e P re s id e n t s C o lo u rs .

First batch of Indian Naval Cadets-1951.

Courtesy Commodora TS Khurana (Retd)

Adm iral S ir E d w ard P arry with two ot our naval pilots, the pioneer aviator of the Indian N avy, C onnm ander Y N S ingh and L ieuten ant B D L a w in 1951.

M a rs h a l T ito on board Y ugoslave yacht in 1 9 5 2 afte r presentation ol the Y u g o s la v e A rm y 1 st class.Also seen in the picture are A dm iral S ir M a rk P iz e y and ap«

K R Nair.

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on board Delhi in a Sailor's mess in 1952. Also seen are Admiral Sir Mark Pizey and Commander J Cursatji.

Courtesy Admiral Sir Mark Pizey

I

• O L r'*^ '-J

Rear Admiral NV Dickinson Flag OHicer Commanding Indian Fleet with the Fleet Commanding Officers in 1953, Captains RD Katari. SG Karmarkar and MK H eble and Commanders St^ Nanda. KR Nair. KL Kulkarni and G Douglas,

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on the bridge of Delhi at Q ueen Elizabeth ll's Coronation Review ol the Fleet at Portsmouth in June 1953. Others in the picture are the Fleet Comm ander, Rear Admiral N.V. Dickinson, the StaH OHicer Operations, LI.

Cdr. D.R. Mehta and the author.

President's Yachi (P3110)

Com m ander JS M ehra IN

Lieut. A.W . Coelho IN

INS DELHI. Flagship of

Rear Admiral

Flag Officer (Flotilla)

N V Dickinson CB, DSO , DSC

Indian Fleet

Captain AK Chatterji, IN

INS R AJPUT

Captain RS David

IN S RAN JIT

LCdr GC Nahapiet, IN

INS RAN A

Com m ander JD Mody, IN

INS GOD A VA RI

Com m ander SN Kohli, IN

IN S G O M A TI

Lieut. Cdr. Inder Singh, IN

INS G A NG A

Lieut. Cdr. KK Sanjana, IN

INS JU M N A

Com m ander SM Nanda, IN

INS KISTNA

Lieut. Cdr. H. Sopher, IN

IN S C A U V E R Y

Lieut. Cdr. M.L. Barua, IN

IN S T IR

Com m ander N. Krishnan, DSC, IN

INS BOMBAY

Com m ander JB Simmons, IN.

INS KONKAN

Lieut. Cdr. U. Tekchand, IN.

INS RAJPUTANA

Lieut. Cdr. J. Chatterjee, IN.

INS BENGAL

Lieut. Cdr. R. Pinto, IN.

IN S M A D R A S

Lieut. Cdr. H .E . Dubash, IN

INS R O H ILK H A N D

Lieut. Cdr. B. Nag, IN.

IN S M A G A R

Lieut. Cdr. D H R Dadabhoy, IN.

IN S IN V E S T IG A T O R

Captain SJ Henessy O B E, RN

INS S UTLEJ

Lieut. Cdr. S. Rajendra, IN

S E A U N D S (NA VAL A IR C R A FT) Lieut. Cdr. Y.N. Singh, IN

C A C H E L O T (D R E D G E R ), C HILK A (O IL TA N K E R ), S A M B H A R (O IL TA N K E R ), N IR M A L (H O P P E R

BAR G E),

E LE P H A N TA (TU G ), A C Q U E D U C T

(W A TE R BOAT), P Y T H O N (FLO A TIN G C R A N E)

IM M TS D U F F E R IN

Captain G D Hazari

SS JA NETA

M aster Capl. HM Lande

SS JA LA M A Y U R

Master Capt. Rozario

M V JAG G A N G A

M aster Capl. Robson

SS B H A R A TK U M A R

M aster Capt. M o ria

A S H O K (F IS H IN G TR A W L E R )

Skipper Menon

Indian Naval Fleet Review by President Dr, Rajendra Prasad on 10 October 1953 al Bombay,

C o m m a n d in g O ftic e rs of th e 2 2 n d D e s tro y e r S q u a a ro n i9 3 3

C o m m a n d e r S N K o h li, L ie u te n a n t C o m m a n d e r s In d e r S in g h an d K K S a n ja n a - w ith G e n e ra l N e g u ib & S a rd a r K M Panikkcar C o m m a n d in g O ffic e r & O ffic e rs of G anga at L iverpool 1 9 5 3 . A lso s e e n are Lieutenant C o m m a n d e r K K S a n ja n a C o m m a n d in g O ffice r, L ie u te n a n t V E C B a rb o z a and S u b L ie u te n a n t J G N ad k arn i.

JtdiSI f

Inauguration of the new Electrical School, in s Valsura on 27 April 1955 by Lt Gen., His Highness, M aharaja Shri Digvijay Sinhji Ranjit Sinhji Jateja, Maharaja Jam Sahib o( Navanagar, Raj Pramukh of Saurashtra. Also seen in the picture are Admiral Sir Mark Pizey, Commodore AK Chatlerji. the then Commodore-in-Charge, Bombay and Captain N E W arner, Commanding Officer.

♦

1

, I

C o m m a n d e r J C h a tte rje e taking o v e r 149 M in e s w e e p in g S quadron on board K a rw a r in A ugust 1 9 5 6 .

C a p ta in S M N a n d a showing S hrim ati V ijay Lakshm i P andit, the then riigh of In dia in U K round the M yso re at the tim e of com m issioning of the ship in 1957

in the picture is C aptain S N Kohli, the then Indian N aval Advisor.

2

A MARITIME RESURRECTION

GETS UNDER WAY

Plans for the Navy's Development

and Expansion of

The Naval Squadron into a Fleet

T h e R I N 's R a is o n d 'E tre

The renowned theorist of sea power. Admiral A.T. Mahan (1840-1914), laid down six important factors contributing to the growth of a naval power; geographical position, physical conformation, extent of territory, population, national characteristics and Governmental institutions, besides scientific achievement and industrial strength. At the time of partition, India possessed nearly all these factors, barring perhaps the last two, in adequate measure. She was in a position to formulate and adopt a suitable policy to set up a number of national institutions, develop her industry and evolve a scientific temper conducive to designing and manufacturing state-of-the-art weapons, weapon systems and weapon delivery platfornis such as ships, smaller craft, aircraft and helicopters for the Indian Navy. In 1945

SardarK.M. Panikkar, the distinguished historian, wrote in h is India and the Indian Ocean:

In modem times no country can be a great naval power unless its

36 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUEWATER

science of nautical engineering is of the highest standards and is continuously keeping up with improvements elsewhere: if the industrial potential of the country is not large enough to produce not merely the necessary warships and auxiliary craft, but a hundred other things required for its efficient equipment and m aintenance. . . it will take her (India) many years before her industry can reasonably be expected to undertake the building, equipment and maintenance of a great navy.

Equally her scientific work will have to be improved and extended many times before it can shoulder independent responsibility in these m atters.. . . With these limitations it is obvious that India must have both a long-term and a short-term policy in regard to naval matters.

The long-term policy can easily be laid down. Its object will be to develop India as a naval power capable by herself, of defending her ix\terests in the seas vital to herand of maintaining a supremacy in the Indian Ocean area. This objective can be attained only when India has emerged as a major industrial power, with her scientific achievements and technological skill equal to those of other advanced countries...

The short-term policy (would be) the development of a balanced regional navy capable of, (a) operating as a task force within its own area, and (b)co-operating with the high sea fleets of friendly nations in the strategy of a global naval warfare. As a regional navy its purpose will be to keep inviolate and free from enemy action, the seas vital to India, the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, to protect the commercial routes, to deal with raiders, keep the sea clea r of sub ma rines and mines, and afford protection to shipping___There is no reason why a small, efficient and well-balanced Indian Navy should not secure control of the Bay of Bengal and of vital stretches of the Arabian Sea.

In order to achieve this aim within a reasonably short period, Panikkar recommended that the Indian Navy:

must, in the first place, develop her training institutions for all types of naval warfare. Without an adequate supply of trained personnel, no navy, big or small, can be created . . . The second step is the acquisition of light crafts, frigates, destroyers and light cruisers with ancillary vessels, which constitute the effectiveness of a small navy. If the navy is well-organised and amply supplied with these vessels, its expansion in times of war would present no difficulty. Thirdly, India must develop, as fast as she can, a merchant navy which would provide the necessary reserve of the skills and also vessels which could be con verted in times of war. Fourth, at all costs, she must develop h^r ow n shipbuilding industry, for a country which has to buy all her vesse s

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER WAY / 37

outside cannot be a naval power. The ground organisation of dockyard, repair establishments and other institutions which a navy implies has to develop side by side with this.

Equally important, especially for a country like India with a vast coastline, is the development of a naval air arm, as an integral part of the sea forces. The function of the air force should not be confused with that of the naval air arm. The air force is an independent service whose objectives are governed by other factors. The naval air arm has an important part to play in naval warfare, by patrolling the coasts, by keeping the sea clear and affording air cover to the navy. Its main duty is to sweep the air over the sea approaches and work in co-operation with the navy.

P o st-W o rld W a r II D e v e lo p m e n t Plans

In the changed circumstances prevailing at the time of the cessation of hostilities in 1945, the tasks and responsibilities of the then Royal Indian Navy, as envisaged by the Chiefs of Staff Committee in its Report on the Size and Composition o f the Post-War Forces in India which was prepared a year before the war was over, were significantly different from those postulated by Panikkar whose book was published in the same year. The differences in their points of view apparently arose from the fact that the Committee was deliberating on the future of a dominion navy, as the status of the Service then was, while Panikkar, after taking into account the winds of change blowing across the subject nations of Asia at that time, was attempting to concretise the shape of the navy that independent India should have.

The Committee conceded the fact that India's unique and strategically significant position in the Indian Ocean rendered her particularly sensitive to the need for an increased naval force with larger and more versatile warships than the RIN possessed as a defacto satellite of the RN. It felt that these ships would adequately represent India in other parts of the C om monwealth and foster better relations with the 'Empire'. The tasks and responsibilities of the RIN, the Committee felt, should be confined to those of a dominion navy, i.e., a navy mainly responsible for coastal defence.

Hence, the primary post-World War II responsibilities of India's navy would be the safety of Indian and 'Empire' shipping in the sea areas contiguous to India's coastline, their approaches and the trade routes in the Indian Ocean. The RIN, the Committee felt, would also be responsible for the combined operational training of the Indian Army's specialist amphibious formations and for providing escort and assault ships and craft for landing these formations on hostile shores, whenever necessary, for which a nucleus force of assault ships and craft as well as a training organisation

38 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUEWATER

was to be maintained. Besides these, the Navy, in conjunction with the Air Force, was to ensure neutralisation of any foreign invading force attempting a landing on the shores of India by timely interception and neutralisatio n of such threat. It was also essential for India's navy, the Committee felt, to have an adequate air component which was to be used for seaward reconnaissance and as a striking force to support surface forces.

The threat perception of the Committee was restricted to one country, viz., the USSR, since the launching of a war by Russia against Great Britain was considered a possibility at that time. It was assumed that the brunt of the at tack would have to be borne by India, even ifshe was granted freedom, because she was likely to continue as a member of the Commonwealth.

Based on the assumption that the RIN had a limited coastal defence capability and a modest seagoing strength with obsolescent ships, weapons and equipment, the Committee recommended the creation of a complet force comprising one squadron of three cruisers, a destroyer leader with a flotilla of eight destroyers, one eight-ship training flotilla of sloops, one eight-ship flotilla of frigates for miscellaneous duties, eight Bangor/Bathurst class minesweepers and eight motor minesweepers (MMSs). As regards smaller amphibious and auxiliary craft, a total strength of eight motor torpedo boats (MTBs), eight motor launches (MLs), eight harbour defence motor launches (HDMLs), two hydrographic survey vessels, along with auxiliaries, trawlers, assault ships and craft and one repair ship, was considered essential.

The case for the expansion of the RIN received support from various quarters. These included a detailed proposal submitted in 1944 by Vice Admiral J.H .Godfrey,FlagO fficerCom m anding the RIN (FOCRIN), to the Reorganisation Committee on the 'Future of the Royal Indian Navy', some papers and reports on the subject prepared immediately prior to and after World War II; communications from the then Viceroy of India, Viscount Wavell, to the then Secretary of State for India, Mr Amery; statements made by the Viceroy,Viscount Mountbatten, in 1947, at a meeting of the India and Burma Committeeand certain other papers prepared during this watershed phase in the chequered history of the Navy.

The recommendations made for the expansion of the service included weapon platforms operating in all three elements with aircraft carriers and submarines, for developing it into a viable dominion naval force. This force was to be deployed for India's coastal defence as a vanguard of Commonwealth interests, tied to the apron strings of the Royal Navy, with theBriti Admiralty continuing to exercise monopoly over the Indian Navy sjugu r by way of supplying ships, weapons, equipment, maintenance faci ities, training technology and even its tactical philosophy.

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER WAY / 39

T h e P o s t-In d e p e n d e n c e M e ta m o rp h o sis in S trateg ic P h ilo so p h y When, however. Independence came on August 15,1947, the threat perception underwent a metamorphosis and plans for the future Indian Navy consequently underwent considerable change. Undivided India's navy had in commission by mid 1947, six sloops, four frigates, one corvette, 16

minesweepers, six trawlers, one survey vessel^ six motor minesweepers, one motor Iriunch, eight harbour defence molor launches and a fleet of landing craft. But after partition India's fledgling naval fleet comprising roughly two- thirds of the strength of the RIN, consisted of four sloops, two frigates, one corvette, 12 minesweepers, four trawlers, one survey vessel, four motor minesweepers, one motor launch, four harbour defence motor launches and all existing landing craft. With a coastline exceeding 6,000

kilometres in length, to the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean, and proximity to countries which, if turned belligerent, could threaten her sea lanes and coastal waters, India needed to expand her navy quickly and tailor it to suit her requirements of maritime strategy.

Within a week of the country attaining Independence, therefore, an Outlitie Plan fo r the Reorganisation and Development o f the Ro\/aI Indian Navy was prepared by Naval Headquarters. In its preamble, the plan paper said; TheNavy and Army of India as united forces have existed for over 300

years. The Army at the date of partition numbered some 480,000 men and was fully equipped as a modern fighting machine. The RIAF has existed for 10 years and at the date of partition possessed some 11

squadrons. The Navy, by contrast, possessed but a handful of small ships.

The reason for this state of affairs is to be found in the fact that the Government of the past needed troops, and to a less extent aircraft^

bothfor the defenceof India and for its policies abroad whereas it relied entirely on the Royal Navy for its major naval defence.

India, till recently, has been little interested in her overseas trade nor has she appreciated her position in world strategy as the focal country of the Indian Ocean area.

Today all is changed. India intends to develop and probably to reserve her coastal trade; she has plans for the expansion of her overseas ocean-going shipping upto 2,000,000 tons within five years; s h e a s p i r e s to a position of pre-eminenceand leadership am ong the n a tions of South East Asia.

These plans and aspirations will entail obligations and commitments. Peace-loving India will never attain security or pre-eminence

4 0 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUEWATER

till she is in a position to maintain her position against every aggressor.

India stands at the threshold of a new era - an era of industrialisation, of contacts with foreign countries never dreamed of in the days that are past, and a fast expanding overseas trade. A Navy commanding the respect of the world is not a luxury for her but a vital necessity.

The ships that independent India's navy at that time had were the sloops Kislna, Cauvery, Jumna and Sutlej; frigates Kukri and TiV; corvette Assam-, minesweepers Orissa, Deccan, Bihar, Kumaon, Khyber, Rohilkhand, Carnatic, Rajputana, Konkan, Bombay, Bengal and M adras; survey ship Investigator; trawlers Nasik, Calcutta, Cochin and Amritsar; motor minesweepers M M S 130, MMS 2 32, M M S 151 and M M S 154; mo tor launch ML 420; harbour defence motor launches HDML 1110, HDML 1112, HDML 1117 an d HDML

1118 and a large number of landing craft. Out of these, the sloops and frigates had some small operational utility and two minesweepers, two motor minesweepers, the motor launch and the harbour defence motor launches could, if required, be used only as tenders to training establishments. The remaining 10 minesweepers were of no real value as they were already obsolescent and had been laid up a tTrombay near Bombay since the end of the War. Most of the landing craft too had very little potential left.

India's navy would have to be, therefore, virtually reconstructed from scratch.

As visualised at that time, the eventual role of the navy of India would be;

Tosafeguard hershippingon thehighseas from interference in war; to ensure that supplies can both reach and leave India by sea in all circumstances; to keep open her ports and coastal shipping routes; to prevent an enemy landing on her shores; and to support the Army in any operations which may be required in furtherance of the national policy.

So long as India remains within the British Commonwealth of Nations, her task will be very much lightened by the assistance she will receive from the Royal and other Dominion Navies. But even in these circumstances, she will be expected and indeed she will wish to contribute to the general Naval Defence of the Commonwealth in accordance with her status as the Principal sovereign state in the Indian Ocean.

The immediate task before us, therefore, is to build up, in the shortest time, a balanced naval task force, officered and manned by Indians, which is capable of exerting, when the need arises, a definite influence on Eastern waters. The minimum force which woul

e

likely to achieve this object would be two light fleet carriers (cost a ut

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER w a y / 41

3 million pounds or Rs 4 crore), three cruisers (cost about two million pounds or Rs 2.6 crores), eight destroyers (cost about 500,000 pounds orRs 66.7 lakh), four submarines (cost about 500,000 pounds or Rs 66.7

Lakhs) and such smaller ships as are necessary as tenders to training establishments and for auxiliary purposes. With this forceas a nucleus, it should be possible to develop rapidly in times of strained relations or war.

Our object should be to build up such a force within a definite period of time which it is suggested should be put at a maximum of 10

years. It may be that within that time great changes in naval warfare may occur due to the development of atomic power and guided missiles, but these we must deal with as they arise and be prepared to modify our plans to meet any new development.

India's Navy cannot for many yea rs be a large one, (mainly due to the prevailing financial constraints) - it can however, be efficient and it is important that it consists only of the most modem units armed with the latest weapons and supported by properly equipped training establishments on shore which will enable it to expand rapidly in emergency.

As regards the existing sloops and frigates, these should be retained for the present and used as tenders to training establishments.

For this purpose one sloop and one frigate are to be used as sea-going training ships for Boys, one sloop is to be used as a gunnery training and radar target ship, one frigate and two minesweepers are to be used as antisubmarine anci torpedo-firing ships and for training in minesweeping, one motor launch and one harbour defence motor launch are to be used as antisubmarine target and torpedo recovery vessels, three harbour defence motor launches are to be used as harbour training vessels for Boys, one sloop is to be used as an artificer apprentices training ship and one demilitarised sloop is to be used as a fleet tender to transfer ratings (sailors) for courses between Bombay and Cochin.

P lan s fo r E xp an sion

By September 1948, the plan for the expansion of India's navy had achieved considerable concretion and a fresh assessment of the navy's tasks and responsibilities was made. These were the destruction or neutralisation of the enemy's naval forces, protection of India's essential sea-borne trade on both coastal and ocean-trade routes, protection of the transfer by sea of Ir^dia's land and air forces and their supplies, destruction of the enemy's seaborne trade, prevention of the enemy from using the sea to transport his land or air forces, prevention of the enemy from landing by sea in India's

42 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUEWATER

own or adjacent territory and provision of assistance to India's army and air force in combined amphibious operations.

In order to determine the size of the navy that Independent India would require to fulfill these functions, the two possible forms of war that India could be engaged in, were taken into account. Tliese could be either another world war, though its probability was considerably remote, or a localised war, involving neighbouring countries with or without the support of a superpower with global ambitions. In the case of a world war, India, it was felt, was likely to remain neutral but her important strategic position, commanding international sea lanes could draw her accidentally into an unintended involvement. In such an eventuality, there would be consistent enemy submarine activity against merchant shipping and warships and sporadic raids by fast surface units. Hence it was felt necessary that India should possess a navy strong enough to repel sea-borne attacks on her merchant shipping, coastal forces, ports and installations.

In the case of a localised war, it was felt that India would require a navy stronger than that of any other neighbouring country or combination of countries in the neighbourhood. In times of war such countries would be dependent on vital sea-borne supplies which could be quickly strangled by blockades and further harassed by vigorous naval activity and amphibious operations along their coasts. For this purpose a navy strong enough to meet these eventualities was considered essential.

However, since India had just gained her independence and thus could spare only a limited amount of her meagre financial resources for the development of her navy, in view of other important commitments such as social reform, industrialisation, etc., her navy had to be confined to the minimum size and strength necessary to safeguard her vital commitments and interests.

The experience of World War II had made it abundantly clear that the hard fighting core of a balanced fleet consisted no longer of battleships but of aircraft carriers. The most powerful fighting force at sea now was the carrier task force generally comprising four fleet aircraft carriers, with four cruisers (or, in the absence of these, battleships) and 16 antisubmarine, antiaircraft, radar and general-purpose-type destroyers as escort. The proposal therefore recommended a balanced naval force for India spearheaded Ijy aircraft carriers.

According to the battle philosophy of the late 1940s, aircraft carriers provided the main striking power of such a forcebut since the aircraft carrier herself was highly vulnerable due to her light armour and inability to carry heavy guns, cruisers were provided as escorts for cover against surface attacks and to augment antiaircraft fire against enemy air strikes. Destroyers were also stationed on the outer screen which, in addition to providing

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER WAY / 43

cover against air and surface attacks, provided the all-important submarine screen and acted as a radar picket to give early warning of the approaching enemy. Battleships had by now become obsolete and had been reduced to large slow-moving targets that were likely to fall easy prey to the latest armour-piercing shells of the long-range rapid-firing guns borne on cruisers, destroyers and frigates.

It was recommended that the Indian Navy begin its expansion and modernisation with the acquisition of two light fleet carriers, which were smaller vessels whose complement of aircraft was about half that of fleet carriers. These two light fleet carriers would be replaced by two fleet carriers. Eventually, four fleet carriers would be acquired, the aircraft complement of each carrier being two 16-aircraft fighter squadrons and two 16-aircraft strike squadrons.

In the strategic perception during the 1940s, the biggest threat to merchant shipping was expected from the submarine and hence a large number of fast escorts in the form of destroyers and modem frigates became imperative for guarding convoys and for patrolling at focal points. Therefore, a nucleus force, capable of rapid expansion in war, of four destroyers with three frigates retained for training in this form of warfare was to be set up. In order to protect the convoys against the new fast submarines which had been acquired by some navies, it would also be necessary to provide air escorts. Aircraft carriers would escort each convoy or be stationed at suitable positions on important convoy routes. But instead of requisitioning additional carriers for the purpose, the carriers acquired for the task forces would be diverted, whenever required, to carry out this task.

Since cruisers could also be used as escorts for aircraft carriers or important convoys for defence against heavy surface craft, two training cruisers were to be acquired. Tn an emergency, these two cruisers could also be employed for trade protection duties.

Should relations with another power be strained or on the outbreak of hostilities, ships employed on training duties could be used for local naval defence. Merchant ships from coastal trade could also be requisitioned and converted rapidly for antisubmarine, escort and minesweeping duties.

Four harbour defence motor launches were to be retained from the existing fleet for sea training of Boys during the period of their training in shore establishments. In addition, the six frigates recommended for retention for training in escort duties were to be used for training of ratings in the first instance, until an adequa te number of cruisers had been acquired. Of these, two frigates could be used for the training of Boys and one for the training of engineroom and electrical artificers. As mentioned earlier, the other three frigates would be used for training in antisubmarine warfare.

Besides these ships, the specialist schools in the various training estab

44 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

lishments that were being set up all along the Indian coast, would also requireshipsforspecialisttraining.Of the existing fleet at the disposal of the truncated RIN, one antiaircraft sloop was to be used as a gunnery training ship and one frigate as a torpedo firing ship. A converted landing ship for tanks was to be used as a radar training ship; one antiaircraft sloop as a navigation training ship and an antisubmarine frigate was to be used as an antisubmarine training ship.

As regards the shore establishments tha t were proposed to be set up for training in naval aviation, it was felt that a total of 82 aircraft would be required out of which 22 would be used for basic flying training, 30 for operational flying training and the remaining 30 for training in naval air warfare. In addition, a few squadrons of aircraft would have to be positioned at naval bases where ships were likely to be stationed and at the site of the Gunnery and Navigation Schools for training purposes. Hence two Fleet Aircraft Requirement Units (FRUs) would have to be set up, one on each coast. The Unit attached to the training schools on the West Coast would require 14 aircraft and the second Unit on the other coast would require 10, making a total of 24 aircraft for fleet requirement purposes.

During World War II the immense value of landing craft in naval warfare had been established. Many important operations undertaken during the war had begun with amphibious operations and an appreciable proportion of the total personnel of the various navies had been employed in combined operations. Therefore, it was decided to establishand maintain a landing craft wing in India's navy. But the establishment of a large wing of this type was not economical in peace, as these craft have a short life-span andare both difficult and expensive to maintain. It was therefore decided to set up a small landing craft wing, with 30 such craft of different types, comprising one landing ship for tanks (LST), one landing ship for infantry (LSI), four landing craft for tanks (LCTs), eight landing craft mechanised (LCMs), eight landing craft for assault (LCAs) and eight large landing craft for personnel (LCPs).

In order to carry the war into the enemy's waters, to deny his fleet access to his advanced coastal air bases for refuelling and repairs and to prevent him from attacking India's ports and cities it was felt necessary to develop the capability of operating India's fleet for prolonged periods, far from its main bases. For this purpose, the navy needed support ships such as tankers, store carriers, repair ships, depot ships, air sea rescue launches, battle practice targets, barges, lighters and certain other types of small craft.

According to the proposal, the navy would need three 10,000-ton tankers for replenishment of fuel at sea, as each carrier would require 5,000 tons of oil fuel and aviation spirit and each cruiser 2,000 tons of oil fuel; two store carriers would be required for naval stores, naval armament stores and

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER WAY / 45

victualling stores; one repair ship would be needed to undertake minor repair of larger ships and all tj^ es of repairs for destroyers at sea; two depot ships wouldbenecessary for the submarines, each depot ship providing the normal amenities of life for submarine crews, acting as the parent ship and repair ship to each submarine flotilla; two hydrographic survey vessels would be required for preparing hydrographic charts of the sea areas contiguous to the long Indian seaboard, and for locating and defining new navigational dangers for the navy and the mercantile fleets in peace as well as for surveying advance bases for operations. The survey vessels would prepare special data on such navigational aspects as beach extent, beach gradients^ etc., and, if necessary, operate as frigates, after due conversion, in war; eight tugs - four at Bombay, two at Cochin and two at Vishakhapatnam

- would be required for berthing duties for heavy ships and 'rescue' duties in war; for gunnery practice at sea, the navy would require four battle practice targets and four high speed battle practice targets; eight air sea rescue launches would be required for rescue of personnel in the event of an aircraft crash into the sea; 16 amphibian aircraft, eight for each coast, would form two air sea rescue squadrons, for use in areas not accessible to air sea rescue launches. These squadrons would also engage in coastal reconnaissance in areas not heavily defended by the enemy. A squadron of 16

transport aircraft would be needed for expeditious transportation of personnel and stores between various bases and, in an emergency, for reconnaissance purposes when aircraft from the air sea rescue squadrons were not available; three dredgers of various types would be necessary for dredging the entrance to naval harbours,basins, docks, etc., and approaches to berths and jetties; certain other minor craft such as self-propelled barges for stores and oil fuel, dumb barges, boats, launches, etc., classed as yard-craft, would be required for efficient harbour ship-handling and turn-round operations.

The summary of the proposal to refurbish the post-Independence RIN

is given in Table 1.

Table 1. List of vessels, ships and other craft recommended (under the 15

year plan) for refurbishing the post-independent RIN.

Main Fleet

Fleet Carriers

4

Destroyers

16

Light Fleet Carriers

2

Submarines

16

(to be given up when two Fleet

Carriers were acquired)

Fighter Aircraft

128

Cruisers

4

Strike Aircraft

128

46 / BLUEPRIN T TO BLUEWATER

Trade Protection and Local Defence

Frigates

3

Escort Destroyers

4

(to be used as training vessels

in the first instance)

Fleet Minesweepers

6

Training Vessels and Aircraft

Cruisers

2

Motor Launch

5

Frigates

3

Service Training Aircraft 22

Destroyers

1

Operational Training

Landing Ship (Tank)

1

Aircraft

30

Fleet Requirement Unit

Aircraft

24

Landing Craft Wing

Landing Ship (Tank)

1

Landing Craft (Assault)

8

Landing Ship (Infantry)

1

Landing Craft

(Mechanised)

Landing Craft (Tank)

4

Landing Craft (Personnel)

(Large)

Fleet Train

Fleet Tankers

3

Repair ship

Store Carriers

2

Depot Ship

Surveying Service

Survey Vessels

2

O ther Vessels and Aircraft

FJeetTu gs

8

Communication Aircraft 16

Targets

8

Dredgers

3

Air Sea Rescue Launches

8

Other minor Vessels

Not

and Crafts

indicated

Air Sea Rescue Aircraft

16

R e so u rce L im ita tio n s W h ittle E x p a n s io n P lan s This proposal, if approved by the Government of India, was to be implemented over a period of 15 years, i.e., by 1963. However, the limitations of financial resources, the absence of any provisions to offset escala ting prices and the gross inadequacy, of training facilities, both for officers and sailors, resulted in the division of the expansion plan into a number of phases.

Added to these difficulties was the lead time required between the indenta-

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER WAY / 47

tion of naval hardware and its actual acquisition. For instance, during the late 1940s it took four years to build an aircraft carrier and about two years to build a destroyer. The lead time for training personnel and bringing the level of their performance to an acceptable level too was considerably long.

Due to these factors and the compulsions of diverting the meagre financial resources for national development, the 15-year plan was reduced to a six-year plan and the ships and aircraft that were now proposed to be acquired by 1954 were as given in Table 2:

Table 2. List of Vessels and Ships in the revised six-year plan Warships

Light Fleet Carriers

1 Submarines

6

Cruisers

3 Survey Vessels

1

Destroyers (Including

7 Landing Ships (Tank)

1

three to be acquired in 1949)

Fleet Train

Fleet Tankers

1 Depot Ships

1

Repair Ships

1 Landing Ships (Infantry)

1

Aircraft

Fighter Aircraft

32 Second-Line Aircraft

24

Strike Aircraft

16 Training Aircraft

82

It was also decided to review the position each succeeding year and to obtain Government approval for the development programme progressively six years ahead, a planning procedure which later came to be known as a 'roll-on' plan.

These plans were modified once again to suit the immediate needs of an expanding navy with limited resources and a pragmatic threat perception. The revised immediate objective was to build up a balanced modem naval force, more powerful than the navy of any of the nations situated in or close to thelndianpeninsula.This navy would include ships designed for all types of warfare at sea, and would be large enough to provide an appropriate foundation for rapid and sound expansion, to suit thecountry's changing needs. The essence of the revised proposal was to provide a naval task force based on the updated concepts of naval warfare. It would be sufficiently powerful to exercise an effective influence in the Indian Ocean in the event of hostilities and could also be used for other purposes such as convoy protection, interdiction, contraband control, for blockade, for protection of our coastlines, island territories, offshore interests and sea lines of

48 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUEWATER

communication in times of war.

The revised plan envisaged a small balanced carrier task force and reduced its strike content to two light fleet carriers, three cruisers and 12

destroyers. Light fleet carriers were considered suitable for the dual purpose of forming part of an attacking force or for playing a defensive role in escorting convoys. A minimum of two such carriers was considered necessary for a majority of offensive operations. This would provide a sufficient number of aircraft for a strike and, at the same time, ensure sufficient fighter protection for our own forces. Since vessels designed for surface action constitute an essential part of a task force in order to follow up and destroy enemy forces which could be sighted or slowed down but not sunk by carrier aircraft, cruisers would be required to perform these tasks. They would also provide cover against surface attacks and augment antiaircraft fire against enemy air strikes. For these roles, a minimum of three cruisers would be required for a small carrier task force. As regards destroyers, a carrier task force would have destroyers stationed on the outer screen, which, in addition to providing cover against air and surface attacks, would provide the all-important submarine screen, a radar screen and early warning of the approach of the enemy. A minimum of twelve such destroyers was considered necessary, eight of these being of the escort type and four of the fleet type (British Battle and Weapon classes) which were more powerful and suitable for offensive operations. In addition, in certain circumstances, a number of cruisers and destroyers of the carrier force could be formed into a surface force and detached for surface action, especially for night operations or during low visibility.

The requirements of all other types of ships, craft and aircraft were also suitably altered to meet the challenges that were likely to be encountered in the inrunediate future. However, due to the practical limitations concerning the availability of resources and the ra te at which personnel for the expanding navy could be trained, it was now proposed to phase the development of the navy over a period of ten years. AccordinglyJthe proposal made the recommendations as given in Table 3:

Table 3. Recom m endations made in the revised ten-year plan Light Fleet Carrier

2

One in 1954, one in 1956

Escort Destroyers

9

T h r e e i n 1949, two each in 1953,1955

and 1956

Fleet Destroyers

4

Two each in 1957 and 1958

Submarines

4

Two each in 1957 and 1958

Antiaircraft Frigates

4

Already with the R N

Antisubmarine Frigates

2

Already with the RIN

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER WAY / 49

Fleet Minesweepers

6

Already with the RIN

Landing Ships (Tank)

1

Already with the RIN

Survey Vessels

1

Already with the RIN

Motor Launches

5

Already with the RIN

Minor Landing Craft

28

Already with the RIN

Fighter Aircraft

32

16 each in 1952 and 1954

Strike Aircraft

32

16 each in 1953 and 1955

Operational Training Aircraft

18

12 in 1951, 2 in 1953 and 4 in 1954

Observer Training Aircraft

8

4 each in 1951 and 1952

Fleet Aircraft Requirement

All in 1950

Unit Aircraft

13

Advanced Trainer Aircraft

10

3 each in 1950 and 1951

2 each in 1952 and 1953

Air Sea Rescure Aircraft

4

2 each in 1953 and 1955

N o m e n c la tu r e P o l ity R ev ised

It was at this time that a general policy was formulated for naming ships and craft that were being acquired. According to this policy the names to be chosen were, as a rule, to be of Indian origin and the choice of names was to be based on three considerations - functional, historical and geographical.

The functional names would express the function of the ship in naval warfare, the historical names would perpetuate names from India's maritime history and the geographical names would commemorate such Indian geographical features as rivers, mountains and capital cities. Uniformity of nomenclature was to be ensured for each class of ships.

The light fleet carriers were to be named after mountains or peaks such as Vindhya, Vikrant, Satpura and Gauri Shankar; cruisers were to be named afterthenationalcapitalor the capital cities of our principal maritimestates, such as Delhi, Mysore, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras; destroyers were to be named in such a manner that members of each flotilla or squadron would have the same initials, such as Rajput, Rana, and Ranjit or Ganga, Gomati and Godavari; antiaircraft frigates were to be named after rivers such as Jumna, Sutlej, Cauvery (earlier spelling of Kaveri) and Kistna (earlier spelling of Krishna); antisubmarine frigates were to be named after Indian weapons such as Khukri, Kirpan, Kuthar, Talwar and Trishul; submarines were to be named after the various species of fish such as Hilsa and Matsya; minesweepers were to be named after states such as Bengal, Bombay and Madras (earlier name of Tamil Nadu); major landing craft were to be named after ferocious predatory animals, reptiles and birds such as Magar, and miscellaneous craft were to have appropriate functional names, such as S/iaM for a tanker.

50 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUEWATER

D harini for a stores carrier and Hnlhi, for a tug.

F u r t h e r C u ts in D e v e l o p m e n t P lan

The proposals made by Naval Headquarters to the Government in 1948

were approved by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet and adequate funds were made available for the express purpose of replacement of obsolete or obsolescent ships. The first phase of the development plan was formulated in July 1950 which, dicta ted by financial considerations, catered for the replacement, as stated before, of only a small number of ships. In an attempt to further reduce the expenditure on the Armed Forces of India during the period from 1952-53 to 1955-56, the Armed Forces Reorganisation Committee examined the Naval Development Plan in great detail. It decided to reduce the number of ships to be acquired for the navy during the planned period without making any provision for funds for replacement of ships. According to the recommendations of this Committee, two cruisers were to be acquired (one in 1953-54 and one in 1954-55) besides INS Delhi, during the plan period and the acquisition of the carrier was shelved indefinitely. The number of destroyers was to go up to eight including three

'R'class destroyers acquired in 1949 and three smaller Hunt class destroyers to be acquired during 1953-54. In addition, the navy would have,after some replacements, four frigates, two survey ships, eight minesweepers, one store ship, twelve seaward defence motor launches, one dredger, one mooring vessel, two fleet tankers and two tugs.

The former Vice Chief of the Indian Navy, Vice Admiral V.A. Kamath reminisces on the development of the Service:

The Defence Committee of the Cabinet, under the Chairmanship of Pandit Nehru, finally approved the Navy's proposals in 1953. The Service Chiefs were in attendance at, the Cabinet Meeting and I, as the Director of Naval Plans, a lowly Commander, was in attendance on the Naval Chief, then Vice Admiral Sir Mark Pizey. 1 well remember whert the Service Chiefs came out of the Cabinet room after the item was approved, the then Army Chief, General Maharaj Rajendra Sinhji.

turned to Admiral Pizey and said, "Mark, congratulations! That was the greatest naval victory after Trafalgar!' In the climate then prevailing with regard to spending money on the Armed Forces, especially on the Navy which unfortunately took the lowest priority, this was no understatement.

However, in 1955 the development plans for the Navy had to be revised once again to match the availability of ships and craft from various

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER WAY / 51

sources. According to the revised plans and replacement programme prepared under the personal supervision of Admiral Sir Mark Pizey, by 1962

there would only be one cruiser in the Navy, Mysore, as the earlier acquisition, Delhi, w as to become a training ship and replace Ti> in 1958; there would be no destroyers as the three 'R' class destroyers, Rajput, Ranjit and Rana, were to be attached to training establishments in the Reserve Fleet in 1957; the three escort destroyers, Godavari, Gomati and Ganga, were to be either returned to the British Admiralty as they had been obtained on loan, or consigned to the Reserve Fleet. The Operational Fleet would thus have four Types 41 antiaircraft frigates, two Type 12 surface escort frigates and six Type 14 antisubmarine frigates, eight coastal minesweepers, eight inshore minesweepers, and two tenders to training establishments - Kistna and Cauvery. T h e Reserve Fleet would thus comprise the three'R'class destroyers, four fleet minesweepers and the three Hunt class escort destroyers.

Another factor emerging from a careful assessment of the material state of the existing ships was, that, of the 16 major vessels in the Indian Navy, nearly all would be paid off soon. Rajputana had already become due for superannuation in 1952, Konkan, RohUkhand, Bombay, Bengal an d Madras in 1953, Rajput, Rana, Tir and Investigator in 1957, Delhi would be taken off active service in 1958, Jumna and Sutlej in 1958 and Kistna and Cauvery in 1959. This would mean that even with a reasonable extension of life of nearly 10 years, if the projected acquisitions were not accelerated, there would virtually be no navv left by the middle of the 1960s!

R e f u r b is h m e n t o f A c q u is itio n P lan s

Earnest efforts thus began to be made to expeditiously acquire a few ships to refurbish the navy, especially because by now the proposal to acquire a light fleet carrier had been revived and fast, modem escorts to operate against the enemy in all three elements would also be required for the protection of the carrier.

If the carrier was to have its full complement of aircraft embarked, the need for a surface escort would be less than that for a cruiser but with a reduced outfit of aircraft, the carrier's reconnaissance and strike effort would be limited, which could permit a hostile surface unit to bring the carrier to within its effective gun range before air effort could be ranged against it. It was, therefore, considered necessary to provide the carrier with surface escorts comprising cruisers or destroyers for protection against hostile surface forces.

Since it was not possible for carrier aircraft to intercept each hostile aircraft, and itsantiaircraft armament was limited tothe40-mmclose-range variety, it was considered desirable that long-range antiaircraft ships should

52 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUEWATER

also be in attendance on the carrier.

With the increasing importance of and emphasis on the development

of submarines around the globe and their ever-increasing lethal power, protection of heavy fleet units such as carriers and their escort cruisers from threats in the subsurface element was considered vital and for this purpose, the carrier would also need adequate sonar protection which was to be provided by antisubmarine escorts.

In addition, the carrier would at times be required to operate at a speed of 30 knots or thereabouts for launching and recovering aircraft, the maximum speed of both carriers and cruisers being around 30 knots at that time, and the escorts would be required to position themselves at vantage points ahead, astern or abreast of the carrier and to manoeuvre to engage the enemy whenever necessary. Therefore they would require to have an advantage of at least 5 or 6 knots over the carrier, i.e., their maximum speed should be around 36 knots. Besides, because of their increased speed and enhanced responsibilities, their sona r domes needed to be strengthened and their detection range enhanced.

In short, the escort vessels would be required to carry heavy antiship, antiaircraft and antisubmarine equipment, state-of-the-art radar, sonar, weapor^s and detection devices and speeds of over 30 knots. For surface and antiaircraft defence, m od em fleet destroyers were considered suitable and first-rate antisubmarine frigates would provide adequate antisubmarine and antiaircraft defence.

The optimal choice for the protection of the carrier would thus be various categories of frigates designed specially for certain tasks but for reasons of paucity of financial resources, a compromise was accepted and a type of ship was selected, that would have a combination of antiship, antiaircraft and antisubmarine offensive capabilities, which could be provided by a post-World War II destroyer. The vital statistics and capabilities of some of the ships that could be made available for the purpose by Great Britain at this time are given in Table 4.

Table 4. Data on ships to be provided by Great Britain

Destroyers

Weapon Class

Later Battle Class

Displacement (tons)

1980 to 2800

2460

Dimensions (feet)

(length, beam, draught)

341x38x17

355x40x17

Guns (Long Range)

Four 4-inch

F i v e 4.5-inch

Guns (Close Range)

Six 40-mm

Eight 40-mm

Antisubmarine Weapons

Two Squids*/

One Squid*

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GCTS U N D ERW A Y / 53

Limbo*

Torpedoes

Ten 21-inch

Ten 21-inch

Speed (knots)

34

36

Complement

234

232 to 268

* Antisubmarine multiple-barrel projectile launchers of different types Frigates

Type 12

Type 14

Type 41

(Surface escort)

(Antisubmarine) (Antiaircraft)

Displacement (tons)

2,000

UOO

1,750

(length, beam, draught)

Dimensions (Fleet)

360x41x12

300x33x10

330x40x10

Guns (Long Range)

Two 4.5-inch

Four 4.5-inch

Guns (Close Range)

Six 40-mm

Three 30-mm Two 40-mm

Antisubmarine Weapons Limbo

Limbo

Squid

Torpedoes

Four 21-inch*

(Two twin)

Speed (knots)

27

24

23

Complement

221

149

204

* Planned but not fitted

It is evident from this data that the frigates of various types, while bemg somewhat superior in their antisubmarine capability, were markedly inferior to the destroyers in speed and antiaircraft and antiship armament.

While the UK, France, Japan, the USA, Sweden, the USSR and certain Eastem Bloc countries were capable of undertaking the construction of destroyers for carrier escort, the IN was still tied to the British Admiralty's apron strings and hence the Indian authorities decided to follow perforce the beaten track and ask Britain to supply these ships. The Admiralty, however, were unable to spare any existing destroyers of the type required by India from out of those in commission with the RN or already under construction. At the same time the lead time required for the construction of new destroyers was far too long for India's requirements. It was, therefore, decided to acquire a mixed bag of new vessels - two type 12, three Type 14 and three Type 41 frigates - from the UK in the first instance, with provision for acquiring three additional Type 14 and one Type 41 frigate at a later date, if required.

International developments during the decade following World War

II,however, began changing the maritime threatscenarioinSouthEast Asia.

Based on the 1948 objective "to build up a balanced naval force on modem lines which will be more powerful than the navy of any of the nations m the

54 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUEWATER

Eastern Area" (emphasis author's), India had been developing her navy at a comfortable pace, commensurate with the availability of trained manpower, technical expertise and financial resources and occupied the top spot in the region so far as naval might was concerned. But ominous clouds developed over the horizon when in early 1956, the USA announced its decision to transfer one cruiser, four destroyers and some submarines to Pakistan (Pakistani naval personnel were already training in Turkish submarines). The cost of the ships, as well as the expenditure to be incurred on their refit and modernisation, and the training of Pakistan Navy personnel was to be borne by the USA. Pakistan, as a result of her alliance with the Baghdad Pact powers and the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), had jockeyed herself into a bargaining position for obtaining military and naval equipment from member nations of these organisations. In addition, she was likely to make her fleet considerably stronger as a result of the UK

policy of dispersal of valuable fleet units to 'friendly' countries, due to the threat of nuclear weapons.

As a result of this windfall to the Pakistan Navy from the USA and the UK and India's modest acquisition plan, the state of the two navies during the course of the next four years, exclusive of non-effective ships such as training ships, survey ships, etc., was likely to be as given in Table 5: Table S. Com parative strengths of the envisaged Indian and Pakistan N avies

Date

Cruisers

Destroyers

Frigates

India

Pakistan

India

Pakistan

India

Pakistan

June 1,1956

1

nil

3

4

5

2

June 1,1957

1

nil

3

6

5

2

December 1,1957

1

1

3

8

5

2

June 1,1958

2

1

3

8

7

2

December 1,1958

2

1

3

8

4

2

December 1,1959

2

1

-

8

10

2

It was thus apparent that the Indian Navy would be superior to the Pakistan Navy till the middle of 1957, when the latter would achieve parity.

W ith Pakistan acquiring a cruiser thereafter and India returning three frigates to the UK, Pakistan would achieve a marked superiority from Decem ber 1957 to June 1958 and a reduced superiority thereafter till December 1959. In addition, three destroyers acquired on loan by India from the in 1949 w e r e due to be returned in 1959 in which case, Pakistari s superiority naval might would again become ma rked and would remain so for many in

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER WAY / 55

years to come. If, in addition to the ships in the pipeline, there were future additions to Pakistan's naval fleet as a result of her alliance with the Baghdad Pact powers and the SEATO, it was likely to become a grave threat to the security of our ports and the safety of our shipping, both coastal and foreign. It was, therefore, considered most desirable that the ratio of two to one between the navies of India and Pakistan, as was adopted when the assets of the RIN were divided between the two countries in 1947, be maintained throughout. This was considered imperative because, firstly, the commitments of the Indian Navy were far greater than those of the Pakistan Navy and, secondly, it was necessary to ensure proper exercise of maritime power in the seas around the Indian peninsula and her island territories to enable her to sustain her trade with any country in peace and war.

The proposed strength of the Indian Navy was, therefore, to be expanded as given in Table 6: Table 6. The proposed strength of the Indian Navy

Strike Force

One Aircraft carrier - approved, to be acquired.

Two cruisers {Delhi, Mysore)

Six destroyers (Three 'R' class - Rajput, Rana,

Ranjit - in service, three to be acquired in lieu of

three proposed Type 14 Frigates).

Three escorts destroyers (three Hunt class -

Ganga, Gomati, Godavari - on loan).

Convoy Protection Force

Four Type 41 antiaircraft frigates (three on order,

fourth approved).

Two Type 12 surface escort frigates (on order).

Three Type 14 antisubmarine frigates (on order

but recommended to be replaced by three destroyers).

Three antiaircraft sloops (Kistna, Cauvery, Tir'm

service).

Seaward Defence Force

M otor Launch 6420 and five shore patrol craft in

service.

Six shore patrol craft (three on order, three

approved).

Minesweeping Force

Eight coastal minesweepers (four completed,

four approved).

Eight inshore minesweepers (two in service, six

approved).

Four Fleet Minesweepers (Bombay, B engal Ma-

56 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUEWATER

dras and Konkan - to be kept in commission till the coastal minesweeper fleet strength rose to

eight).

Fleet Train

Two tankers {Shakti in service, one approved),

D harini {stores ship)

(landingship tank),

H alhi (tug), etc.

Hydrographic Fleet

Four survey vessels {Jumna, Siillej, Investigator,

__________________________ one approved).

Besides the proposal to induct anincreased number of ships, it was also recorrunended that some of the existing ships be refurbished for retention in the navy according to the following programme:

Cruiser Delhi: Instead of being converted into an of f icers' tra ining ship, the cruiser should be kept operational till about 1965 by suitably improvingher radar detection capability and weapon control systems.

'R ' class Destroyers: Rnjput, Rana, Ranjit: Should be refitted and modernised for retention till 1964.

Hunt Class Escort Destroyers: Ganga, Gomati, Godavari. Instead of being returned to the Admiralty in 1959 on expiry of the loan period, these ships, which were considered suitable for operational use for many years, should be bought outright and retained in the Navy.

Frigates: Kistna, Caiiven/, Tin These ships which had recently been refitted, were being used respectively for the training of Cadets and as a temporary flagship and were expected to be available till 1963. The three ships could be quickly converted for operational use if hostilities were imminent.

Fleet Minesweepers Bombay, Bengal, Madras, Konkan: Since the indigenous construction of four coastal minesweepers and six inshore minesweepers had been delayed considerably, it would be necessary to extend the life of the four fleet minesweepers in service.

If these measures were implemented, the Indian Navy's fleet would, by 1961, comprise one aircraft carrier, two cruisers, three new destroyers, three 'R' class destroyers, three Hunt class escort destroyers, three Type 14

antisubmarine frigates, two Type 12 surface escort frigates, four Type 41

antiaircraft frigates, three antiaircraft frigates (Kistna, Cauvenj, Tir) three survey ships, four fleet minesweepers, eight coastal minesweepers, eight inshore minesweepers, one motor la unch, 12 seaward defence motor launches, one landing ship for tanks, two fleet tankers, one repair and store ship, two tugs, two dredgers, one battle practice target and one mooring vessel. It was also proposed to divide the major ships of the Fleet into two task forces to

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER WAY / 57

operate in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal

In course of time,however, the proposal to acquire three new destroyers and one Type 41 antiaircraft frigate fell through as the Admiralty expressed its inability to make these available, the order for three additional Type 14 antisubmarine frigates was cancelled and the thirdType 12 surface escort frigate was never ordered. The Fleet strength practically remained the same, with ships approaching obsolescence being given a fresh lease of life with periodical refits and replacement and modernisation of equipment, sensors, weapon systems and propulsion machinery.

A F le e t to C o u n te r the Sin o-P ak A xis

When the Sino-Indian conflict broke out in 1962, the situation had to be assessed once again. The Chiefs of Staff Committee were aware that Pakistan might take ad vantage of India's involvement with China, and seize the opportunity to annex Kashmir. It could also start border incidents in the then East Pakistan as a prelude to commencing general hostilities, and in that event India would be faced with a war with China and Pakistan simultaneously.

At this time the Chinese Navy had one cruiser, five destroyers, 16

frigates, 25 submarines, 400 shore-based jet fighters and bombers and over 300 smaller ships and era ft such as mi nes weepers, motor torpedo boats, etc.

and o u tof these only the submarines could posea threat to ourshippingor ports, as 21 out of these 25 submarines had the necessary endurance to operate for prolonged periods in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. The Chinese could easily make refuelling arrangements by positioning supply ships in the isolated anchorages in the Andaman and Nicobar group of islands and thus operate up to seven or eight submarines in the Indian waters at any one time. These submarines could be used for launching attacks on our shipping, mining the approaches to our ports and also for clandestine activities.

At the time of the Sino-Indian conflict the Pakistan's naval fleet comprised one cruiser, five destroyers, two frigates, one full/armed survey ship and nine minesweepers with plans to acquire one fleet tanker, some submarines and an aircraft carrier through American military aid in the immediatefuture.Themain threat from Pakist^in was likely to bein the form of sporadic attacks on ourshipping, on our ports and harbours, laying mines on the approaches to our ports on the West Coast, infiltration into the Sunderbans, and an air threat to ourshipping, warships and the carrier task g r o u p in the ArabianSea, from t h e s t r ik e a n d b o m b e r a i r c r a f t o f the Pakistan Air Force.

At this time the material state and availability of the Indian Navy's

58 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUEWATER

ships and aircraft was well below the mark. The fleet could boast of only a light fleet carrier with half the complement of her air component consisting of nine Seahawk strike aircraft, four Alize antisubmarine aircraft and one Alouette search-and-rescue (S AR) helicopter, two cruisers which were both undergoing extensive repairs, six destroyers of which five were not operational due to their age and poor material state, two old frigates, eight modem frigates out of which three had severe operational limitations, six rriinesweepers, three seaward defence era ft, one small tanker and one repair and maintenance ship.

It was estimated by Naval Headquarters that in order to be able to effectively counter the possible combined threat from China and Pakistan, the additional ships that would be immediately required by the Indian Navy would include three destroyers to escort the carrier, 10 modem minesweepers, two fleet tankers, one supply ship, four submarines, two landing ships for tanks, six medium patrol vessels or submarine chasers for the Andamans, six patrol craft for the Sunderbans, one dredger, 60 aircraft for the carrier including 18 Skyha wks, 16 Seahawks, six Alizes, 12 Alouette helicopters and eight jet trainers, two squadrons of eight Neptune aircraft each for the Indian Air Force for maritime air reconnaissance (the responsibility for maritime air reconnaissance was transferred to the Navy years later) and an adequate supply of weapons, equipment and spares for these acquisitions. The Alouette helicopters were to be positioned on board the carrier and the naval bases at Cochin and Goa for search-and-rescue operations, on board the survey ships and tankers for logistic support and on board the indigenous frigates under construction as antisubmarine weapon carriers and for surveillance. The number of Alouette helicopters embarked on the Vikrant later rose to three.

A reassessment of the threat from the two countries ruled out the naval involvement of China in the conflict though the presence of Chinese submarines had been confirmed, both in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and the likelihood of Pakistan joining hands with China to pose a combined maritime threat was considered low. Most of the proposals were, therefore, shelved but the ongoing process of replacement of obsolete ships, weapon systems and equipment, modernisation of obsolescent ships, indigenisation of warship construction, development of indigenous designs, etc., continued beyond 1965.

A cq u isitio n s D u rin g the L ate 1940s

After Independence acquisition of ships for India's truncated Navy began, as mentioned before, with the commissioning of HMS Achilles, (ren am ed HM/S Delhi,) of the World War II Battle-of-the-Ri ver-Plate fame; (along with

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER WAY / 59

HMS Ajax and Exeter, this cruiser, which had been loaned to the New Zealand Navy, defeated the German battleship iArfmi'ra/Gra/Speeon December 17, 1939). The Delhi was independent India's first cruiser and was commissioned on July 5,1948, less than a year after Independence. She had a standard displacement of 7,114 tons (fiill-load displacement 9,740 tons); her length was 554.5 feet, her beam a little over 55 feet and her draught 16

feet forward and 20 feet aft. Powered by four-shaft 72,000-horse-power turbines, she had a maximum speed of 32 knots. Her armament package comprised six 6-inch guns for surface operations and eight 4-inch guns, fifteen 40-mm guns and four three-pounders for antiaircraft defence. The ship had eight 21-inch torpedo tubes which were later removed in 1958. Her oil fuel capacity was 1,800 tonsand shehad been designed fora complement of 800 officers and men. Her pentagonal crest depicted a caparisoned elephant carrying a ceremonial umbrella wilh the logo Sarvnto ]ayam-ichchami - may you be a victor everywhere.

On commissioning, Delhi was handed over by the Commander-in-Chief of Nore to Shri V.K. Krishna Menon, the then High Commissioner for India in the United Kingdom. Her first Commanding Officer was Captain H.N.S Brown of the Royal Navy and her first Executive Officer, i.e., Second-in-Command, was Commander (later Admiral) R.D. Katari. The ship arrived at Bombay onSeptember 16,1948 and received a very warm welcome from the large crowd which had gathered at Ballard Pier. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Defence Minister Sardar Baldev Singh and a large number of civilian dignitaries visited theship as soon as she came a longside the pier.

The Prime Minister addressed the officers and ratings and expressed his pride in the floating fortress and the hope that the men on board would, if the occasion arose, effectively defend the country's shore with all their might.

Of the four landing ships for tanks (LSTs) of the RN, HMS Smiter, Thrasher, Bruiser and Avenger which were in Indian ports at the time of Independence, having been borrowed from the British Government by the Quartermaster General of the Indian Army, on behalf of the Government of India, for dumping surplus ammunition into thesea,only one, Auenger, was in operation, owing to an acute shortage of trained personnel. Since there was an immediate need to transport large quantities of stores and equipment from Bombay and Calcutta to Cochin and Vishakhapatnam for the development of the latter as full-fledged naval bases and the Navy's premier training establishments, it had been decided to acquire one of these landing ships for the purpose and thus Avenger was transferred to the RIN

and recommissioned as HMIS Mngar on April 11, 1949. This ship had a cruising speed of 13 knots and bunked accommodation for 18 officers and 150 men in addition to her normal complement. She could carry 2,000 tons

60 / DLUEPRINTTO BLUEWATER

of stores or, alternatively, a varied combination of lorries, landing craft and tanks and land them directly on beaches for amphibious operations and disaster relief. Her displacement was 2,256 tons (4,980 tons full load), overall length 347.5 feet, width 55.25 feet and draught 11.25 feet. She was powered by a 5,500-horse-power twin engine developing a speed of 13

knots, her armament included two 40-mm and six 20-mm antiaircraft guns and she had a complement of 180 officers and men.

Early in 1948 the British Government had agreed to transfer three 'R'

class destroyers, HMS Rolherlinin, Redoubt and Raider to the RIN after renaming them HMIS Rajput, Rnnn and Ranjit after extensive refit and modernisation. They constituted the 11th Destroyer Squadron with the Rajput as the senior ship. The standard displacement of these ships was 1,725 tons (2,424 tons full load) and their dimensions were 362 feet (length), 35.7 feet (beam) and 16 feet (draught). The armament consisted of four4.7-inch guns which could be used against both surface and aerial targets and four two-pounder pompoms for close-range antiaircraft defence. Besides, the Rajput had six 20-mm antiaircraft guns while each one of the other two ships had four 40-mm antiaircraft guns. For antisubmarine warfare, each ship was fitted with eight 21-inch torpedo tubes on quadruple mountings and four depth-charge throwers. The propulsion machinery of each ship comprised Parson's geared turbines, delivering a shaft horse-power of 40,000 on two shafts giving her a maximum speed of 32 knots.

On July 28, 1949, the Rajput with Captain (later Rear Admiral) A.

Chakraverti as its Commanding Officer and Senior Officer of the squadron of destroyers ( D l l ) , later designated the 11th Destroyer Squadron (11 DS), was commissioned with much ceremony at Portsmouth. Earlier, the Ranjit with Commander (later Rear Admiral) G.S. Kapoor as its Commanding Officer, had been commissioned on July 4, 1949. The third destroyer, Rann, whose Commanding Officer was Commander (later Admiral and Chief of the Naval Staff) S.N. Kohli, was the last to be commissioned on September 9, 1949 at Devonport.

The three 'R' class destroyers were supplied at a cost of 1,045,000

pounds while De//;i, acquired earlier, had cost 736,500 pounds. All four ships proved to be excellent bargains, as similar ships from any other source would easily have cost twice as much.

Q u e s t fo r N e w S h ip s B egin s

While these ships were acquired without much difficulty it became a problem convincing the British authorities of the Indian intent, regarding her maritime interests, after she became a Republic on January 26,1950. To quote from The Parted Garment: The Roijal Navy and the D evelopm en t o f the

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER WAY / 61

hidian Nnvij 1945-65 by Lieu tenant Commander James Gold rick of the Royal Australian Navy, a research scholar specialising in naval history: TTie British may well have proved more co-operative, even to the extent to which they supported the Australian and Canadian efforts to acquire light fleet carriers, had the widely diverging strategic interests of Britain and the Indian Government not been such a considerable stumbling block. It was this issue which was to restrict British support in the years ahead, if only because the British were not prepared to subordinate the requirements ofservices which were formally allied to the Royal Navy to Indian requests.

India w'as pursuing a neutralist policy and it was determined to remain within the British Commonwealth, particularly after the declaration of the Republic in 1950, only on the understanding that this did not involvecommitment to any collective defence arrangements with

other members of the organisation.

In consequence, the system which the British had evolved of encouraging the creation of Commonwealth naval forces which were capable of local defence operations and of contributing to joint activities, particularly in trade protection, was incapable of application to India.

While the British wanted India to acquire modern ASW (antisubma-rinewarfare)and AA (antiaircraft)escorts, minesweepersandharbour

defence craft, the Indians were more interested in developing naval forces which had the capacity to dominate the region (what is now termed a bluewater navy - author).

The strains in the relationship between the Admiralty and the Indian Navy were becoming apparent in 1949. Perhaps the most notable point is the extent to which Admiral Parry (the Flag Officer Commanding the RIN) and his fellow loan officers (officers on loan to the Indian Navy from the Royal Navy) pursued arguments which took

a markedly 'Indian' line against the objections from Britain and it was over aircraft carriers that matters came to a head.

The Admiralty position was somewhat awkward because between 1946 and 1949 the merits of a two-carrier force were being publicised in support of the expansion of the Royal Australian Navy.

If two light fleet carriers were being proposed as the minimum force capableofindependentoperations,it was inevitable that Indian naval authorities should be interested in the argument. Furthermore, the British had made Australia theofferof two carriers for the priceof one.

which was a gesture as public in its demonstration of how far the Admiralty was prepared to go when it wanted to be generous.

The Naval Plan which the Minister of Defence had presented to

60 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEVVATER

of stores or, alternatively, a varied combination of lorries, landing craft and tanks and land them directly on beaches for amphibious operations and disaster relief. Her displacement was 2,256 tons (4,980 tons full load), overall length 347.5 feet, width 55.25 feet and draught 11.25 feet. She was powered by a 5,500-horse-power twin engine developing a speed of 13

knots, her armament included two 40-mm and six 20-mm antiaircraft guns and she had a complement of 180 officers and men.

^ ^

Early in 1948 the British Government had agreed to transfer three 'R'

class destroyers, HMS Rolfierhnin, Redoubt and Rnids} to the RIN aftei renaming them HMJS Rnjput, Rana and Rnnjit after extensive refit and modernisation. They constituted the 11th Destroyer Squadron with the Rajput as the senior ship. The standard displacement of these ships was 1,725 tons (2,424 tons full load) and their dimensions were 362 feet (length), 35.7 feet (beam) and 16 feet (draught). The armament consisted of four 4.7-inch guns which could be used against both surface and aerial targets and four two-pounder pompoms for close-range antiaircraft defence. Besides, the Rnjput had six 20-mm antiaircraft guns while each one of the other two ships had four 40-mm antiaircraft guns. For antisubmarine warfare, each ship was fitted with eight 21-inch torpedo tubes on quadruple mountings and four depth-charge throwers. The propulsion machinery of each ship comprised Parson's geared turbines, delivering a shaft horse-power of 40,000 on two shafts giving her a maximum speed of 32 knots.

On July 28, 1949, the Rnjput with Captain (later Rear Admiral) A.

Chakraverti as its Commanding Officer and Senior Officer of the squadron of destroyers (D 11), later designated the 11th Destroyer Squadron (H DS)/

was commissioned with much ceremony at Portsmouth. Earlier, the Rnfiji^

with Commander (later Rear Admiral) G.S. Kapoor as its Commanding Officer, had been commissioned on July 4,1949. The third destroyer, whose Commanding Officer was Commander (later Admiral and Chief

the Naval Staff) S.N. Kohli, was the last to be commissioned on September 9,1949 at Devonport.

The three R' class destroyers were supplied at a cost of 1,045,000

pounds whileDe/Z/i,acquired earlier,had cost736,500 pou nds. All fourships proved to be excellent bargains, as similar ships from any other source would easily have cost twice as much.

Q u est for N ew S h ip s B eg in s

While these ships were acquired without much difficulty it became a hPr

authorities of the Indian intent, regarding

auotp ('

Republic on January 26,1950-

quote from The Parted C a n m it: The Roi/nl Nnvi/ and the D e v e lo p m e n t

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER WAY / 61

ljidtaiiN avi/1945-65hy Lieutenant Commander James Goldrick of theRoyal Australian Navy, a research scholar specialising in naval history: The British may well have proved more co-operative, even to the extent to which they supported the Australian and Canadianefforts to acquire light fleet carriers, had the widely diverging strategic interests of Britain and the Indian Government not been such a considerable stumbling block. It was this issue which was to restrict British support in the years ahead, if only because the British were not prepared to subordinate therequirementsofservices whichwere formallyallied to

the Royal Navy to Indian requests.

India was pursuing a neutralist policy and it was determined to remainwithin the British Commonwealth, particularly after the declaration of the Republic in 1950, only on the understanding that this did not involve commitment to any collective defence arrangements with other members of the organisation.

In consequence, the system which the British had evolved of encouraging the creation of Commonwealth naval forces which were capable of local defence operations and of contributing to joint activities, particularly in trade protection, was incapableof application to India.

While the British wanted India to acquire modern ASW (antisubmarine warfare) and AA (antiaircraft)escorts, minesweepersandharbour defence craft, the Indians were more interested in developing naval forces which had the capacity to dominate the region (what is now termed a bluewater navy - author).

The strains in the relationship between the Admiralty and the Indian Navy were becoming apparent in 1949. Perhaps the most notable point is the extent to which Admiral Parry (the Flag Officer Commanding theRIN) and his fellow loan officers (officers on loan to the Ind ian Navy from the Royal Navy) pursued a rguments which took a markedly 'Indian' line against the objections from Britain and it was over aircraft carriers that matters came to a head.

The Admiralty position was somewhat awkward because between 1946 and 1949 the merits of a two-carrier force were being publicised in support of the expansion of the Royal Australian Navy.

If two light fleet carriers were being proposed as the minimum force capable of independent operations, it was inevitable that Indian naval authorities should be interested in the argument. Furthermore, the British had made Australia the offer of two ca rriers for the priceof one, which was a gesture as public in its demonstration of how far the Admiralty was prepared to go when it wanted to be generous.

The Naval Plan which the Minister of Defence had presented to

62 I BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

the Admiralty in 1947 had included provision for two light fleet carriers. The British Naval Staff later reflected that they had probably been over enthusiastic in discussions v^ith the Indians. The VCNS

{Vice Chief of the Naval Staff of the Royal N avy), Vice Adniiral Sir George Creasy, reflected that 'he had, perhaps injudiciously, suggested that the ultimate aim of India should be to have a "balanced naval force", which would naturally contain an aviation element'.

Since Admiral Parry was'convinced of the n e e d 'fo r carriers in the Indian Navy when he left the United Kingdom in 1948, the limited political interest which he detected in India was sufficient for him to importune the Admiralty for support.

The Admiralty was not impressed. Tlie British were well aware

that assistance in the creationof a naval air arm required Govemmentto-Government agreement and this would be impossible without the formal Defence talks with India which Nehru had already indicated th at,' . . . he would be embarrassed if (Britain) initiated proposals to hold them'.

^

In fact, the British had already decided that India and Pakistan should be able to maintain, in some ten to fifteen years, forces of the order of: India - 3 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 8 frigates, 12 nninesweepers; Pakistan -1 cruiser, 4 destroyers, 8 frigates, 12 minesweepers.'

In general, these predictions for 1958-63 were to prove rather more sensible assessments than those of the Indian Naval Staff- By 1959, the latter were suggesting that their force levels for major units were to be: 1 9 6 0 -2 light fleet carriers, 3 cruisers, 9 escort destroyers/ 4

fleet destroyers, 4 submarines, 4 antiaircraft frigates, 2 antisubmarine frigates, 6 fleet minesweepers; 1968 - 4 fleet carriers, 2 light fleet carriers, 6 cruisers, 21 destroyers, 16 submarines, 6 frigates, 6 fleet circumstances, the suggestion by the British

r n n S

P’^^POsals Were 'grandiose' had a point. Strategic

mnro T

'‘etrospect that the Admiralty had a

line w i ' i h ' Z r ' “S e i s i n g on the subject, the Admiralty took a fin"

Wm on

Fif'h Sea Lord wrote to

detailed exam'” f ’

would be undesirable to embark on

2 f o r e 7 h « t « ^ T “•

O"

semiofficial basis

has been reached''

Defence T a f k r a ' i r f t h a r h e h l ? * ' politically ready fo'

^

*^0 other means but those of persona*

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER WAY / 63

contact whichhecould employ.Since hehad nnadetheopenadmission

that the Indian view was that 'Pakistan is the enemy', apparently during the course of a visit to Britain earlier in 1949, it was odd -

although perhaps an indication of his enthusiasm for naval development for its own sake - that Parry showed so little apparent appreciation of Britain's strategic reservations.

It seems, however, tha t the Commander-in-Chief eventually took

thehint, although not before the First Sea Lord himself had warned that India should not attempt to develop a sea-going Fleet Air Arm for some time yet. By late 1949, Indian horns were being drawn in. Parry explained to the Admiralty that financial difficulties had forcedhim to plan within rather restricted means and that carriers were no longer an immediate goal.

In a letter addressed to the Right Honourable Viscount Hall, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr Patrick Gordon Walker, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, said on November 20,1950;

The fact is, as I think we all realise, that there is a fundamental divergence of view between the Indians and ourselves on what the function of the Indian Navy should be. We naturally wish to see them build up a navy which, while providing adequately for their own home defence needs, would also in the future be able to make a significant contribution to Commonwealth naval strategy, on the assumption that India would be willing to cooperate. Hence the importance which we have all attached to the provision in the Indian Navy of adequate antisubmarine and minesweeping forces. The Indians, on the other hand, have been pressing for United Kingdom help in building up what they describe as a fully balanced force, including a substantial naval aviation element.

I entirely agree with your view tha t i t is not possible to give proper advice to the Indian Government unless they are prepared to tell us the role which they intend their navy to play. I should have no hesitation in suggesting discussions with the Indian authorities if 1 thought this would help. But we have already consulted our High Commissioner

about the possibility of such talks and his strong advice was that the mere suggestion that such talks should be held would do harm. It was for this reason that the talks between the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff and Admiral Parry were arranged this summer. There is, of course, the further underlying difficulty that we learn this summer, in strictest confidence from the two British Chiefs of Staff in India, that the aim of Indian defence policy was to produce balanced forces in all three arn\s

64 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

which would be capable o f dealing with any force that Pakisfanm' .

haveand that planning throughout the Indian arm ed forces v v ' a s S

on the assumption that Pakistan was the potential enemy.

Unsatisfactory as it may be, it seem s preferable to leave thinesas

^ y are, until we are able to make som e progress with the Indian T h e A d m ir a lty 's V i e w p o i n t

sairl t h a t‘f

• u •

^^*^'stan, how ever, the Admiralty

and Pak

^

C om m onw ealth as a whole that India

their r e s ^ ^ ^

be supported by

these naval fnr^esTn w aJ wouM

and tha t the functions of

India andPaWktanincludinPnr pnmarily be to provide for the security of and coastal cnnvoys and sfm n d " ' r

^^^^nce, minesweep.ng

of theBritishCnm^ '

'

*o contribute to the overall security

ofseacommunlraV'n"^^^!!

include a share in the control

and the Bay of B e n g a l O c e a n , particularly in the ArabianSea felt,thatIndiaanHplkisIln^^^^

countries were to oroviHo

^

'”'®^^°'^"^C)nstrategy.Inpeace,these

'police' duties and*aHo

i.

ff^>'ces (capable of expansion in war) for

primaiy functions in w a ^ t h p l l 'i ^

facilities. To be able to carry out their

ers,antisubmarine

^

would require frigates, minesweep'

- m e y e r , o ™ r t : : ;

« -

’ such lifh t forces shoui

f u n c t io n o f c o n t r i b u t i n e t o t h i . r

T '’ “ '"'y

"

consisting of

alread y signified h er infPnMnn J ° ^ .!.'^ ° ''

r e q u ir e d . B u t India had

that of the Royal Australian N

" " " i

" P

^ strength comparable to

given any indication of the

In addition, as a lone tprm

i- planning to a ttain.

and Pakistan were to contin,VpVrP°‘'‘^ '

Admiralty strongly felt, if In^i^

m o n w e a lth of Nations thpir

adherents to the B ritish Corn-

though not at the expense

^®P"'^tions should be encouraged,

their naval build- ud ^

f " * «ir force, and suitable guidance

should raise the level of their fn r ..

" u ''

"^xt ten to fifteen yearS/

frigates, 12 m i n e s w e e p e r s ^ p ^

cruisers, eight destroyers, eight

es.royers, eight frigates, 12 minp

one cruiser,

ran. As the expansion of the

some small craft for Faki'

"^>vies progressed, the short-term policy

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER WAY / 65

would be the establishment of suitable training, maintenance and logistic facilities, the development and maintenance of ships and craft to be used for

'policing' and sea training, thus welding the fleets into efficient forces capable of integration with other British dominion forces. Towards this end the Admiralty would provide necessary assistance to the two countries in developing their flotillas of ships and craft, expertise in the maintenance of ships and equipment and training of personnel.

Accordingly, in July 1951 the Admiralty received a proposal to transfer three old Type 2 Hunt class escort destroyers to the Indian Navy on three years' loan in lieu of the offer for the cruiser 'Jamaica' which was going to be the Ind ian Navy's second cruiser out of a three- cruiser force, which they now had decided to withdraw. In a letter to the Right Honourable Lord Pakenham, the First Lord of the Admiralty, on July 2,1951, Mr E. Shinwell, Minister of Defence, said:

I am aware that these ships are in poor condition, having been in low category reserve since the war, and that there is little prospect that the Admiralty will be able to do any work on them in peacetime to prevent them from deteriorating still further. I also understand that one of the conditions of the loan would be that the ships should be returned to the Admiralty on demand in emergency.

Nevertheless, I must confess that I have grave doubts of the wisdom of allowing any more of the antisubmarine vessels which we

now possess to pass out of our own control by transfer to another country . . . we have no defence arrangements with India, nor are we likely to have while the Kashmir dispute remains unsettled. Nor do I think that India's attitude over this and other important political questions in the past few months has been so helpful to us as to make it particularly desirable to show her a friendly gesture of this kind at present.

Inhis reply made on July 11,1951, the First Lord of the Admiralty said: The Admiralty policy for some time has been to encourage India to buildup the typeofnavy which we feel to be most suitable for herowm defence, and which at the same time would be most useful if it were to be ranged alongside the Royal Navy in war. To this end we have advised her against embarking immediately on an aircraft carrier programme and have suggested ra ther that a force of cruisers, destroyers, frigates and minesweepers should be her first objective, with emphasis on antisubmarine vessels. India, acting on our advice, has strengthened and expanded her navy in readiness to man the cruiser

66 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

which we encouraged her to believe w e could )end. This

w ,th d ra w n w ,th th eresu ltth a tln d ia i s l e f t w i t h s u r p l u s D e r 'n ^ j ; is,undeislandably, Iceenly disappointed. T h is can be mitigated but?

e n t i r ^ offset, by the present proposal to lend three frieftes our p™ c e t e Z f r

r

not re«ui;eH („

outsideN ATO a ! ?

'h em permanaiii,

tnereoy ensurG thaf fhp fripatpc \A/iii Kq ^

i •

j ■

■

order anH will

will be m aintained in good running

circumsta

' m e d i a t e l y available to us in emergency. Theonl^

whicMnH f '

we need n

us in war, and I am convinced that

we need not look to such a future.

don Walker sMn

Com m onw ealth Relations, Mr Patrick Gor-

India. W h i l e a d m i t t i n L ^ ^ i ! 7 - ^ / u t r a n s f e r of the escort destroyers to of their class vvhirhl

d

iargenumberofships

d i s r e p a i r 'w e r e T o S > ^ H '" n ^ ‘' ‘^^

in vaTying states of

completion if necessa ^

^'■'^'sh yards and were to be made availableon

unused and unusable he

them rernm

to give any underMVine ,

very difficult to expectlnciia

particular contingency''

from using the vessels m any

situation Was about

continued to dither on the issue and the

raify wrote to Mr F

’^ p a s s e when the First Lord of the Admi-

■ i^hmweil, Minister of Defence, on October 18,1951:

ensure that the iealm.^y Z

^ ith requests from Pakistan to

and answers to reaupctsa

'ndian Government was not aroused

be made with eaual'io.

both Governments should

^ -an g e with the

^'^hough yo u were invited to

^q'^ipment from th e P a k ic .:°;'^ "

to examine the request for

equipment from th p7 n H ^ T " " ' ® " ^ ^ ° 8®ther with any requests Defence C om m ittL n e v e r l h . r

and to report to the

informed you th a th e w U h ^ ^

'^’^ter (Clement Attlee)

'gates (escort destroyers! f_‘f^^!‘'‘^^8ements for the transfer of three t r o y e r s )to In d .a to b e p u tin h a n d .

»

on October 22 1 Q«^i

Minister'of D e fe n r T

the British Prinne

Mm.ster's Principal Private

the deal, 'The Prin^«

*7 has confirmed that it is in order to

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER WAY / 67

proceed with the proposed transfer of three frigates (escort destroyers) to India.'

T h r e e H u n ts Jo in the Fleet

It was on the same day, October 22, 1951, that the Admiralty officially conveyed to the High Commission of India in London the availability of three Hunt class escort destroyers on loan to the Government of India on seven conditionsffirstly, India would be responsible for any work required before taking over the selected ships, including any equipment installed to meet her needs; secondly, outfits of naval armament and logistic support would be supplied free of charge but equivalent amounts were to be returned at the end of the loan period; thirdly, the standard of maintenance and refits, and the periods between refits, would be the sameas for the Royal Navy; fourthly, all additions and alterations would be subject to the approval of the Admiralty and at India's expense; fifthly, the vessels were to be returned, with stores, in as good condition as when loaned excepting fair wear and tear; sixthly, in the event of any losses, adequate compensation would be payable and, finally, the loan was to be fora period of three years in the first instance and subject to extension by agreement, but the vessels were to be returned in an emergency. The most significant aspect of the conditions laid down was that barring any additional equipment required to be fitted by the Government of India, the cost of refitting the three ships, which would take approximately eight months, was expected to be of the order of 120,000 pounds.

Out of the four vessels that were available for transfer to the Commonwealth navies, namely, HMS Bednle (Pennant No. F126), HMS Chiddingfold (Pennant No. F131), HMS Lam rton (Pennant No. F88), HMS Croome, the first three were earmarked for the Indian Navy and the fourth for the Royal Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) Navy. While the Bedale, after her refit, modernisation and recommissioning, would become INS Godavari (Pennant No. D92), the leader of Indian Navy's 22nd Destroyer Squadron (22DS), the Chiddingfold (Pennant No. F131) and Lamerlon (Pennant No. F88) would become INS Ganga (Pennant No. D94) and INS Gomati (Pennant No. D93), respectively, the other two ships of the three-ship destroyer squadron. The three escort destroyers Bedale, Chiddingfold, and Lnmerlon had originally been laid down on May 29,1940, March. 1,1940 and April 10,1940 respectively and completed on June 18,1944, October 16,1941 and August 16,1944. All three had seen service during World War II and were put in the mothball fleet when the hostilities ended in 1945.

By January 1952 escalation of prices and the cost of carrying out major refits had taken its toll and the estimated expenditure on reconditioning the

68 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

three ships nearly doubled itself to 200,000 pounds.

Work on all three destroyers was taken up by different shinhniiH«

Lwerpool towards the end of 1952. Th e three officers selected to c o m S

^ destroyers soon arrived along with their key personnel for familiaris^-

hon and spec.al.st tra.ning. The first C o m m a n d in g O fficer of the G o C ri and

Squadron (D22) was C o m m a n d er (later Admiral

?

^ ^

Squadron Engineer

first ro m m ‘''® "‘^ " !" !^ 0 "^ " ^ a n d e r later Vice Admiral) J.T.G. Pereira.TTie Cnmm

/

Commander (later

c Z r h' " ; I

Lieutenant (later

L ie u t P n r n t r o m m a n d e ? n a S r ^ ''" ‘ co m m an d the Canga was Offirp, ;

^ ' ^ ‘®'^'“°""^°'^°''e)K .K.SanianaandtheExecutive

o Z

V.E.C Barboza. One of the

T G NaHW^^-

crew o f the Ganga was Sub-Lieutenant

i ^ v y

'9 8 7 , to occu py the highest office in the

All

°

as an Admiral.

the^shins had . i f

^P^*' 27 ^nd Gar,ga on M ay 26. Each oneof

feet(leneth) 31Rfp ?/

of 1/050 tons, dimensions of 264.25

performed by Shriman'^Q'^"^'^^'°'^’"® ceremony for all three ships was

’"« » ^ H | h C o m m iss ic ,„ e rin 7 rila ^ „ ^ "'

°

I h e H M S p 'l X ^ n d l h l ™ ', ^ ! ^ '"

“ ""m issio n e d as B ritis h ships w f

^^aurice James Manserph r

ord ers were issued by Adm iral Sir

the coronation of Queen

Hence, when

ships new the RNensicn on ihp^

2, 1953, all thre^

British Fleet at Spithead on innp

t^e queen reviewed the

B n t i J colours, along with three nfh'

w '

7

and Tfr flying the Indian colours t o t

I t w a s o n J u n e l8 ,1 9 5 3 f h ,f fK

the review.

Indian Navy at Liverpool assn'm

If®

formally transferred to the

avy ensign replacing the RN

^ I n d i a n names, with the Jndia^'

Naval Adviser to the High C n , T

masthead. The then Indian

tT \

G.S K a n < !r’'" '° " ® '’

London, Captaii^

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER WAY / 69

of bottles of champagne) against the bows of the ships was done by his wife, Shrimati Sundari Kapoor.

Soon after their transfer to the IN, the three ships left Liverpool and sailed for Plymouth to embark stores and ammunition and to undergo a brief'work-up' (on-the-job practical trainingfor the improvement of operational and material efficiency). After a short stay there, the ships left for Malta to join some of the ships of the Indian Fleet under the command of Rear Admiral N.V. Dickinson of theRN whowasat that time on deputation to the India Navy as the Flag Officer Commanding the Indian Fleet (FOCIF) and was flying his flag on board the flagship, Delhi, whose Commanding Officer was Captain (later Admiral and Chief of the Naval Staff) A.K.

Chatterji. The other ships of the IN in company were Ranjit commanded by Commander (later Admiral and Chief of the Naval Staff) S.M. Nanda and Tir commanded by Commander (later Vice Admiral) N. Krishnan.

The three escort destroyers took part in exercises with the BritishMedi-terranean Fleet, under the command of Admiral Horris, Flag Officer Second-in-Command, Malta, with Admiral Lord Louis Mountbattenacting as umpire for the exercise from his flagship.

At the end of the exercises, the ships paid the first goodwill and flag showing visit to Italy during the third week of July 1953, commencing with their berthing alongside at the Italian Naval base at Naples on July 22.

Commodore K.K. Sanjana, the then Commanding Officer of Ganga reminisces: We also had the unique honour of a private audience with His Holiness, the Pope. The three of us accompanied by our Ambassador from Switzerland, who is accredited to the Vatican, were ushered into the Pope's private study. The threeof us and our Ambassador lined up and awaited His Holiness' arrival. As soon as the Pope entered the study, one of the Swiss Guards, thumping his mace on the floor, made the formalintroduction,startingwith'CommanderSourendraNathKohli

of the Indian Navy, not of our faith'. Unfortunately, the other two Commanding Officers i.e. InderSingh and myself were also not of His Holiness' faith! However, the Pope presented each one of us with a small personal medallion and turning to Commander Kohli, said 'On return to India, please convey to the people of India my blessings and good wishes.' Commander Kohli very quickly replied, 'We also bring the good wishes and blessings of the Indian people to Your Holiness'.

Early in August the ships proceeded to Benghazi in Libya and thereafter to Alexandria in Egypt. General Mohammed Neguib, the then President of Egypt, added to the significanceof the Indian Navy's first goodwill cruise

70 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

to his country By paym g a visit to the three ships on the v ep , day r,< ,k ■

am v al, August 6 , 1 9 5 3 . The senior m ost Indian dignitarv , o 1

occasion was Sardar K.M. P an ild ar, the em inent h istS an -d ip ln m " . r was then Indian Ambassador to Egypt.

‘

'

^ ships then returned for som e m ore exercises to M alta. wher“ *hev

^ " S u s t 28, 1953 by Adiniral L o r S

Pamela M o ^ tb atten .

theiryoungerdaughler.Ud,

a t P o ? l i M f ™ T ” " ' i * " ’ " ''^ ^ '! * '‘’" ® ^ P '® " ’ ‘’® ' * ' ' ’ ® 3 a n d ,a ft e r calling ruler t h p n w

^ goodwill visit to Jed d ah in Saudi Arabia whose

C o ^ o Z e

o n t h e v i s i t to , e d d 4

Saudi Arabia w as old and ailing, all the duties

bPr;,mI fvT

perform ed by the Crow n Prince (he

her

^^.^*®^\'^^P^°’^ o ^ red th esh ip sw ith a visitonSeptem-

sacksfnlnfp

his visit. His Royal Highness who had brought

of the chine

iunioroffirprr^ presented an expensive w atch to each officer, the Rifted with c

while senior officers were

E i T a n d J •

'he dials in Arabic and the King'5

officer I ,„ o r e c e Z T s o M 'g o ^ ^ lttc h "

' Commanding

at Bombay a^Dorl^^^h ^ happened to be wearing this particular wat< andrrquestedhimrn r

^

L

e

r

a

l

of Saudi Arab.a

Immediately on

nearly fell at mv fppf

'•ascription on the dial the Consul Gener

years have elapsed sL^c

p

y ° “

watch which, I am tolH

‘^e w atch and I am still using

anytime!

'

be a passport to enter Saudi Arab’

one evening We tvprfTn 7 ^ if

^ proverbial Royal

Indian Conful General

f u e friendship was i u d l S

‘^e Arab wcx\^'

down banquet table haH iT

I

® ^ °^ n t of food

one ate! The si

m onarch orheadofstate.T h!!? ® manner befitting a visitj^

culinary delights from cpv ' ' s u m p t u o u s fare iindudej South East Asian - and thi/h^H

- Arabian, European an

Penenced chefs and cooks f r o l

particular occasion.

various parts of the globe for ^

g this banquet that we leamt that roasted baby camels

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER WAY / 71

vvere a delicacy in the Arab world. The huge table, therefore, proudly displayed, on giant dishes, roasted baby camels and, alternately roasted baby sheep! In typical Arab fashion we had to eat with our fingers and, not being familiar with mostof the dishes placed before us, tried to play safebygorgingon what we had already savoured and liked during our

visits to other Arab countries in the region. Fortunately, being the junior most of the three commanding officers, I was lucky to have a sheep in front of me. Poor Inder (Lieutenant Commander Inder Singh, Commanding Officer of Gomnti) was not fortunate, and was confronted with a dish containing a roasted baby camel! The grand finale of the banquet was that at the end of the repast we had to wash our hands with perfumed soap and water following by rinsing them in Ming ceramic bowls containing Chanel No. 5!

The Executive Officer of the Ganga, Lieutenant Commander (later Vice Admiral) V.E.C. Barboza, adds;

The presentations to our ships included wrist watches for each officer, a hefty donation of money to the ships' welfare funds, imported American rice and fruit and, to our amazement, forty live sheep. There was no way of embarking the animals except as carcasses - and that was discreetly arranged before we left.

After an eventful four-day stay at Jeddah, the ships sailed out of the Saudi Arabian port on September 18,1953 and reached Cochin on September 21,1953.

The setting up of the 22nd Destroyer Squadron comprising the three escort destroyers Godavari, Ganga and Gomati with Godavari as the semor ship of the squadron and the designation of her Commanding Officer as the senior Officer of the Squadron - Captain (D) abbreviated to D22 - were formalised on May 4,1954.

Fleet T an k er

In November 1953 the Indian Navy acquired her first Fleet Replenishment Group tanker, Shakti, from Italy as an im portant constituent of the fleet train, (a group of support ships) that was being set up for the logistic support of the fast-expanding Indian Fleet at sea. The tanker had a displacement of 3,500 tons, dimensions of 323 feet (length), 44 feet (width) and 20 feet (draught) and her diesel- powered propulsion machinery gave her an economical speed of nine knots and a maximum speed of 13 knots.

72 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

T h e S e c o n d C r u is e r

The requirement of cruisers for the N av y h avin g been reduced from three to two, the naval authorities had been looking around for a suitable second cruiser since the time the D elhi was acquired in 1948 and the search ended when if was decided to transfer the C olony class Royal N avy cruiser HMS

Nigeria to the Indian Navy.

The

originally built by Messrs. Vickers-A rm strong at Walker-

on-Tyne, had been completed on Septem ber 23, 1940 though she had already beencommissioned into the Royal N avy on A u g u st3 thesameyear.

Her keel had been laid down on February 8 ,1 9 3 8 and she had been launched on July 18, 1939. After her comm issioning as a ship of the 10th Cruiser Squadron shehad taken part in a num ber of operations during World War 11 and had won Battle Honours twice in 1941 (in N orw ay and the Atlantic), twice in 1942 (in the Arcticand Malta C o n v o y s),o n cein 1944 (atSabang)and

^ c e in 1945 (in Burma). In 1941 she had raided the Lofoten Islands in

^ German trawler and damaged several enem y vessels; in

M u ‘^^^'^®"'^^^‘ ' " ‘^°"''°y®^^°''^"P®'’^''f’ "san d had been to rped oed oy a U-boat near Gibraltar; in 1944 she had carried out raids on the

^ o rw ^ ia n coast and had taken part in attacks on S aban g along with the

^a..es..,p Queen Eliznbel/,; in 1945 she had taken part in the bombardment y^^^'^^Gheduba Island, had assisted in the sinking of the

inH

northern end o f the Malacca Strait

th a " t Z o

defences on Nicobar Island which was at

that time under Japanese occupation.

will

ended, the Nigm'n had taken part in several good-

reserve In l o S T ' K ^ t f u "

September 1950 she had been placed in

Naval p erso n n ;,«

annoIIlc€d on

o f 300,000 pounds was

tropicalisation and c

" V

underwent extensive refit and

weapons and w e a p o r s v T t e m a l t e r a t i o n s were made to her ShewasreconditioneH;,LmnH

sensors, control systems, etc-

of Messrs. Cammell Lairri

Birkenhead, Liverpool work*

Mi/sors on August 29 19S7

P '

^'nally commissioned as

Selkirk,FirstLordof thl

handed over by Lord

then Indian High Ccmmissll^n"; in ‘the U k" ’' "

'

T h e M y s o r e

T > ^ .n d ia „ N a v y .s s e c o n d c r.is e .w h ic h „ „ a s s ig n e d P enn on,N o.60,h ad

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER WAY / "TS

a standard displacement of 8,700 tons (full-load displacement of 11,040

tons) and her dimensions were555.5 feet (length), 62 feet (width) and 19 feet (draught); she had a weapon package comprising nine 6-inch antiship guns (she originally had twelve such guns but one triple-barrel gun turret was removed during refit), eight 4-inch guns which could he used against both surface and aerial targets and twelve 40-mm Bofors antiaircraft guns; her propulsion system comprised four-shaft Parson's geared turbines with a shaft horse power of 72,500 at a maximum speed of 31.5 knots and a complement of 800. The modifications that the ship had undergone during her extended refit included the replacement of tripod masts with stepped lattice masts, removal of one triple-barrel 6-inch gun turret as mentioned earlier, and six 21-inch torpedo tubes and replacement of all electrical eauipment.

The pentagonal crest of the Mysore depicted the legendary doubleheaded eagle which, like the Romanoffs of Russia, was the family emblem of the Wodeyars, the hereditar)' rulers of the Mysore State! The motto below the crest was Na hihheti kndachona (is never afraid).

When the M]/sore later visited Vietnam in 1958, recalls Vice Admiral M.P. Awati, who was then thecruiser's Signal Communication Officer as a Lieutenant Commander:

Everywhere the Mysore went she was besieged by curious and admiring throngs from littoral East Asia, come to see the new Indian Navy.

The ship and her ship's company were lionised. No mean distinction for us and for India which until just ten years before was a thraldom.

When we translated the ship's motto under the wings of her doubleheaded eagle into Vietnamese through an interpreter, they applauded.

'Like the Vietnamese', they chorused. 'W e are not afraid of anyone or anything. We 'are going to win.' One wishes, with hindsight, that the world had taken note of this Vietnamese determination back in 1958.

Reminisces Vice AdmiralM.R.Schunker, who was the ViceChiefof the

Naval Staff at Naval Headquarters before he retired in 1982 and who was the cruiser's first Gunnery Officer as a Lieutenant Commander, on the Mysore's commissioning ceremony:

Having spent a sizable period in Blighty as Course Officer, Long Gunnery Course, here I was on a bleak Li verpii Ilian jetty. . . the Union Jack fluttered lazily at the jackstaffof the imposing warship behind me, possibly aware that soon the Indian tricolour would supplant it. The day was 29th August 1957 and the occasion was the last day of HMS

Nigeria and the first of INS Mysore. As the cruiser's commissioning

74 / BLUEPRINT TO DLUEWATER

Gunnery Officer, I was a proud m an indeed for, by tradition .nH

r e f l a t i o n , I was responsible not only for the lethal firepower of the wn M r

pageantry, the rituals and ceremonials

- ^ o u l d be a part and parcel o f this m ighty warship's life ch arm in T H ^ Jh V

present, from our gracious and

ea L x v o®

Lakshm i Pandit, to a

Dickinsnn‘'"h

Admiral N.V.

I ndi a n H o , 1

“

f

f

^

C o m m a n d i n g , he

tnaUr,TY,<.«» c

^ “ '^ ^ ^ y o'-’f^gLieutenantCommander,

H

e r b e r t

A c !

I zherbert - who headed the Service from 1937 to 1943.

As regards the ship's weapon system, Vice Admiral Schunker recalls: unit to erarp^th ^

^^57, she was by far the m ost powerful

S r l r T ^ e M

L

'

‘^e states on the Indian Ocean

control sv sten iin '^ K ew o rT afih K "'

n*"

o fth e e ie h tie s,;;‘; y b e s ^ e h l d h l r ' ^ "

‘ fifties

j

f .

become an an achronism bu t in the late

which India's

sword arm of the Navy, the bulwark on

n rep ow “

V

b

r o

r i : ^

~

- T

" r

inch shell carries a 51-W

P

calculation. Asix-

spew out 459 ko nf Ho f

of M ysore's barrels could thus

sides per minute as t i

^

broadside. With 4.5 broad-

over two metric tonnes of

packed a punch of

m not available w itra n v h

' rnmute.Such fury o f gunfire was

° ' ' ' ” J ; ? » M “ «ifeb iep rid e1n

'' "

true. So possessive wL^h!*"'

^ Gunnery Officer's dream come

reputation that they wonlH

i

‘eam of its charge and its

where near the guns. It mi i. u

® dockyard personnel any*

team that photopraohs nf m ^ ”]'®ritioned in eternal tribute to this displayed in the office of thp

6-mch gun-firing were proudly

>"-C (M e d ite rra n e a n )

^»^<^hed tS the C-

Shximati V

Mediterranean Fleet.

down memory

I had

i n v o l v e d r a t h e r nervous about

^'P

- ^ a n y

b- ' s . ^ people around me, I looked

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER WAY / 75

rather helplessly at my Naval Adviser, Captain (later Admiral and Chief of the Naval Staff) S.N. Kohli, for help. But he was very muchcn duty and I received no friendly glance from him. He and the ship's Commanding Officer, Captain S.M. Nanda, were obviously full of the importance of the occasion and their own part in the ceremonies. I felt somewhat forlorn and thought I would rot be able to say the right thing! However, since there is a destiny which shapes our ends, I managed to get through the commissioning ceremony as well as the speech after the formal luncheon which followed. Once the formalities were over the world looked bright again and I could enjoy the occasion.

The beautiful brooch I received is a reminder of this historic occasion.

After her commissioning on August 29,1957 when she was formally

handed over by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Selkirk, and accepted by Shrimati Pandit, the cruiser carried out her acceptance trials for a month and was formally accepted into the [N at anchorage off Holyhead on September 29,1957. She soon completed her work-up at Portland and was inspected by the First Sea Lord, Lord Louis Mountbatten. While on her passage to India, she visited Malta and the Yugoslav port. Split, and finally reached Bombay on December 31, 1957. While the first Commanding Officer of the cruiser was Captain S.M. Nanda, her first Executive Officer was Commander K.M. Nanavati.

Admiral Nanda Reminisces:

The arduous days of work-up having ended satisfactorily, we were on our way back to India. The grey forbidding waters off the English shores gave way to the deep blue of the sunny Mediterranean. By now 1 had the total grip of theship and with a recklessness almost bordering on audacity invited theCommander-in-Chief ofthe Mediterranean (at

Malta) to put the ship through her paces and tell us our weak points, if any. The C-in-C (Med) must have been intrigued by the gumption of the young Indian Cruiser Captain, as he ordered the entire Mediterranean Fleet to put to sea - an awesome armada of two Royal Navy cruisers, some five or six destroyers and a couple of submarines. We came through with flying colours and, 1 daresay, better than most of the Royal Naval ships!

More prestigious events were in store for us. Soon after parting company with the Mediterranean Fleet, Mj/sors steamed into the Adriatic port of Split. Those were the days when the Nehru-Nasser-Tito charisma was at its peak and the official visit of an Indian warship to a Yugoslav port was an apt enough occasion to cement the bonds of

76 / BLUEPRINTTOBLUEWATER

friendship between the two

m - . 0 , ,^e s . , , . M . S H .

special aircraft for our an^bassador, Shri Ra,esw ar Dayal, and I lo be a t o to Ws private Presidential villa on the isle of Br.or>,. W hat mad.

he gesture more sigrr.ficant was the fact that ,ust a week before, an Ar„erican adrr,iral, flying his flag on a destroyer " h . c h c a l ^ ^

had been denied ihe opportunity of even calhng on the Pres.dent_

The return home was as memorable as it was m a ^ ific e n t. B e whole Fleet sailed out to meet us and the nag of Rear Admiral Katan transferred from the Delhi to the Mt/sore. Later w e triumphant y tied up at Ballard Pier. The Defence Minister w ho w as at Bombay receive us wasted no time in formalities and w e were out to sea on morrow with Shri V.K. Krishna Menon embarked.

Thus the Mysore replaced the DW /ii,flyingtheflagofRear Admiral RD-Katari, the first Indian Naval officer to have risen to flag rank ana co manded the Indian Fleet.

Six M in esw eep ers

While the acquisition of major ships such as cruisers and destroyers progress, the need for the refurbishingof the units of the m inesw eeping^

and in some cases replacing them had also acquired considerable urg andhadbeenconsideredby the naval authorities. Asa result of negotia i held earlier, it had been decided to acquire six m inesweepers, two ins ^

o n e s o f t h e H a m c l a s s a n d f o u r c o a s t a l o n e s o f t h e T o n c l a s s , f r o m t e Minesweepers are small vessels, sparsely armed, and do not

visitors as they are not equipped with the destructive power or

bility of other warships. But they have a vital role to play - they are designed and equipped to sanitise or clear the coastal w'aters, sea approaches to enemy territory of defensive or of fensi ve mines. The the passage of over four decades after World War II has in no way o'

^

ished their importance or utility was highlighted recently during t ^

War when the absence of minesweepers adversely affected the

^al

of the US task force and the American Government had to send se distress messages to the UK, requesting the latter for the immediate loa a squadron of rninesweepers.

•.^e'

minesweeper of the Ham class had a sta n d a rd disP j^

mm Oerlikon a

she had weaponry comprising

O “ l,ko n a n t,a „ c ,a ft g u n , a p ro p u ls io n s y s te m o f t w in I’ a ’' " ’ " "

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER WAY / 77

brake-horse-powercliesel engines givingamaximiimspeedof 14 knots,and a complement of 16 officers and men. The first inshore minesweeper of the Ham class, HMS Littlehnm had been built by Messrs. Brooke Marine Ltd., Oiilton Broad, Lowestoft and launched on May 4,1954. She was commissioned into the Indian Navy as \NS Bnssein with Pennant No. M2707onjune 14,1955 with Lieutenant Commander (later Commodore) B.R. Kapoor as her first Commanding Officer. The other inshore minesweeper, HMS Hildersham, had been built by Messrs. Vosper Ltd., Portsmouth and launched on February 5,1954. This ship was rechristened /WS Binilipatam with Pennant No.M2705 on her transfer to the Indian Navy on the same date, June 14,1955

with Lieutenant (later Commodore) L. Comes as her first Commanding Officer.

The four Ton class coastal minesweepers of wooden construction built for the Roya I Navy were HMS W iitfon, Diinueston, Wennington and Overton.

Wliitton had been buiit by Messrs Freelands Shipyard Ltd., Gosport, and launched onjanuary 30,1956. It was commissioned into the Indian Navy as JNS Cnimnnore with Pennant No. M i l 91 on August 21, 1956 and with Lieutenant (later Vice Admiral) S .L Sethi as its first Commanding Officer; Overton, built by Messrs. Camper and Nicholson Ltd., Gosport and launched on January 30,1956 was commissioned and transferred to the Indian Navy on August 28, 1956 as !NS Kanvnr with Pennant No. M1197 and with Commander (later Commodore) J. Chatterjee as its first Commanding Officer and Senior Officer of the Squadron; Wcnnm^/oji, built by Messrs. J.S.

Doig Ltd., Grimsby was rechristened INS Ciiddnlore w'ith Pennant No.

M ll9 0 o n August 30,1956 with Lieutenant (later Lieutenant Commander) S.S. Dighe as her first Commanding Officer; Diinueston, which was built by Messrs. Dorset Yacht Co., Ltd., Hamw'orthy, was commissioned as INS

KflA-morffl with Pennant No. Ml 201 on August 17,1956 with Lieutenant (later Commander) N. Rajagopal as the Commanding Officer.

N a m e d a fte r m in o r ports in ln d ia ,a ll six m in esw eepers in itia lly constituted the 18th M in e s w 'e e p in g S q u a d ro n but on S e p tem b e r 1 , 1956 they were s p lit in to tw o sq u ad ro ns, the tw o inshore m inesw 'eepers c o n s titu tin g the 239 th M in esw eep in g S q u ad ro n w ith Bnssein as the senior ship and the four coastal m in esw 'ee p e rs c o n s titu tin g the 149th M in e s w e e p in g S q u a d ro n w ith Knnuor as the senior ship.

Each of the coastal minesweepers had a standard displacementof360

tons (425 tons full load) and dimensions of 153 feet (length), 28.75 feet (width) and 8.25 feet (draught). The weapon package of each minesweeper consisted of one 40-mm Bofors and two 20-mm antiaircraft guns and the propulsion system comprised twin-shaft Napier Deltic engines developing L250brakehorsepowerata maximum speed of 15 knots and a complement

of 40 officers and men,

78 / B L U E P R IN T TO B L U E W A T E R

After a brief work-up with the Royal N avy, the two H a m class inshore minesweepers reached India before the end o f 1955. Tlie four Ton class coastal minesweepers which were com m issioned in August 1956, soon proceeded to the Royal Naval minesweepers base a t H ythe, situated across the river from Southampton, where they worked up under the guidance of Royal Naval personnel.

Mixing business with pleasure has been the hall-m ark of all sailors, be they of any navy, and this was confirmed once again at Hythe when a 17-year-old junior sailor, Engine-room Mechanic Class II Iqbal Singh, a professional 'pop' dancer and 'rock and roll' specialist (Iqbal could imitate Elvis Presley, the world famous hip-swinging dancer-crooner better known as Elvis the Pelvis) was in great demand at the Port tow n's social gatherings.

Iqbal soon walked away with the first prize at the South of England Rock and Roll Championship!

Lieutenant S.P. Govil, a sword of honour awa rdee (now Vice Admiral and Vice Chief of the Naval Staff) who is the only serving officer from the original commissioning crew of the Coastal M inesw eepers and who bas served in Carmanore reminisces:

It was a great day for all of us undergoing the Sub Lieutenant's tec

ical courses in the UK when we received our appointm ent letters

appointing us to the four Coastal Minesweepers. From RN Gunnery acnool, Chatham, where we completed our last course, w e proceeded to joinourrespective ships at Hythe on 06 Oct 1956.

.

V,

stayed at Hythe gave us a good groundingifi

^ ^ ^ ^ ' P ® ^ ^ ’^ ° P ® ’ ' 3 ^ ' r ' g t h e M i n e s w e e p i n g g e a r , w h i c h v / a s then the latest in the IN inventory.

", ' “ “ ' ’' ' " S fsrewell at Hythe by Captain S.H.

m e m b J r ^

and Ws staff a l o n g w *

W AdmTriK iJ® Admiralty. At Plymou tf,, we w ere w inedan d d in ^

had to cool our hppk f

we arrived in Malta where

the closure of the Suez

war clouds brought

satisfying as Caotain

period was professionally the

our paces. We particinatoH*^^^^^'"^ (RN) a n d h i s s t a f f p u t u s th r o n g majorminesweepinepyl '."’° ' " ‘ '"^ ’^°®uvres,formationanchorin^'

cal games at the RN T a c tk a K k

pl ayed ta

After cessation . J k

^alta.

hostilities, our's were the first ships to trans-

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER WAY / 79

through the Suez Canal and one could see the extensive dannage that had been done.

We reached Bombay in May 1957 and our ships berthed alongside

the Challanor steps, one alongside the other where we were received by the Defence Minister, Shri V.K. Krishna Menon, Admiral Sir Stephen Carlill, the then Chief of the Naval Staff and the Commodore-in-Charge Bombay - a great home coming for all of us indeed.

S ix S ea w a rd D e fe n c e Boats

Four Seaward Defence Boats (SDBs) were acquired from Italy during the period 1957-58. Constituting the 322nd Seaward Defence Boats Squadron, these four boats were INS Sublwdm, S im r m , SImmju and Savitri. The Si/bWm was commissioned on August 20,1957 with Pennant No. SDB3130

and with Lieutenant (later Commander) P. D'Souza as her first Commanding Officer; the Suvarm with Pennant No. SDB 313] and Lieutenant {later Commander) V. Bhushan as her Commanding Officer when she was commissioned on August 28,1957; the S/wmj/n with Pennant No. SDB 3129

w-as commissioned on October 28,1957 with Lieutenant (la ter Commander) S.C.M. Chitale in command and the Savitri with Pennant No. SDB 3123 was commissioned on February 6,1958 with Lieu tenant (la ter Commander) C.R.

Menon as her first Commanding Officer. These boats had a displacement of 63 tons and dimensions of 90.25 feet (length), 20 feet (width) and 5 feet (draught). They carried small arms for defence and were powered by two twin-shaft diesels developing 1,900 brakehorsepowerat a maximumspeed of 21 knots. The Sharayii was the leader of the Squadron.

These four craft had actually been acquired by the Central Board of Revenue (CBR) but were manned, maintained and operated by the Navy and hence were known as CBR craft. They were placed under the operational control of the Flag Officer, Bombay and their operations were coordinated by the Staff Officer (CBR craft) in liaison with the Central Revenue Intelligence organisation. These craft were essentially meant for gathering revenue intelligence and anti s m u g g lin g operations and hence had Central Excise inspectors on board during operational sorties. Since the opera tionof these craft in adverse sea conditions was fairly hazardous and the only navigational aid fitted on board was a magnetic compass, they could only be used in fair weather, i.e., between the months of September and May, and were brought back to their safe anchorage at Bombay before theonset of the monsoons.

Two Seaward Defence Boats were also acquired from Yugoslavia.

These were the Sharada with Pennant No. SDB 3133 and the Sukanya with Pennant No. SDB 3132 which were respectively commissioned on Decern-

80 / BLUEPRINT TO 13LUEVVATER

berS , 1959 and December 12, 1959 with Lieutenant (later Rear Admiral) P.P.I. Sivamani and Lieutenant (later Lieutenant Commander) S.K.

Kulshreshtlia as their Commanding Officers. These boats had a displacement of 86 tons, an overall length of 103.25 feet, carried small arms for selfdefence and were powered by diesel engines. These two boats were originally included in the 322nd Sea ward Defence Boats Squadron but were later separated and formed into the32-1th Seaward Defence Boats Squadron with the Siikamja as the senior ship.

T h re e A n tisu b m arin e Frigates

As regards modern frigates, initially it had been proposed to acquire six antisubmarine vessels of the Blackwood class but later it was decided to restrict the number of these frigates to only three for the time being. The three ships acquired, K lnikn{the Khukri is the Gurkha broad-bladed knife), Kirpmi (the Kirpan is the Sikh sword) and Kiilhnr (the Kuthar is ar\ axe) were similar to the British frigates of the Blackwood class but were slightly modified tosuit Indian requirements by removing the four21-inch torpedo tubes which had earlier been proposed to be fitted but were later omitted.

Each antisubmarine frigate has a standard displacement of 1,180 tons (1,456 tons full load) and dimensionsof 310 feet (length), 33 feet (width)and 11 feet(draught).Theweapon package comprised th r e e 4 0 -m m B o fo rs guns tor antiaircraft defence and two Limbo triple-barrel depth charge mortars tor antisubmarine operations. Each ship w as propelled by one set of geared ur ines elivering 15,000 shaft horse power at a m a x im u m s p ee d of 27.8

knots and had a complement of 150 officers and men.

^uiitbyM essrs.I.Sam uelW hiteandC o.Ltd.,C ow es,lsleofW ight,the Khiikn was launched on November 20, 1956 and completed and commis-

^oned ,nto the Navy on July 16, 1958 with Pennant No. F149 and with Admiral) S.H. Sarma as her first C o m m a n d in g

flaterT'anta'

Commanding Officer was Commandef

^

which was built by Messrs. Alex Stephen

wifpnf A v r

launched by Shrimati Beryl Shri H a a

Ilin e r fo

Hari, Ai, Adviser ,o , h . High Con^mis-

sioned on Ii I n'l

‘' “ S'lst 1 9 ,1958and completed and cctnmiS'

launched n„ n

I

T^e third ship, Kullmr was

pleted "and m m m v ■"

^'8*^ C o m m issio n er in London and com

W h ite & Co I H '

sh ip b u ild in g y a rd of Messrs. ]■ Sannue F146 and w i t h r

^^59 w ith P e n n a n t K®-

C o m m a n d r n r o S r ^ ^

C o m m o d ^ -e ) S.S. Sodhi as her

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER WAY / 81

T h r e e A n tia ircra ft F rigates

Three Type41 antiaircraft frigates (similar to the British Leopard class and modified to suit Indian conditions) acquired from Great Britain were Brahmaputra, Beas and Betw a.The Brahmaputra being the first major warship to be built in a British yard for IhelM since India became independent. Each of the ships had a standard displacement of 2,251 tons (2,515 tons full load) and dimensions of 339.25 feet (length), 40 feet (width), and 12.5 feet (draught); the ship's weapon system consisted of four 4.5-inch antiship and antiaircraft medium range guns in twin turrets controlled by the recently developed weapon control system. Fly Plane System Mark 5, and four 40-mm Bofors antiaircraft close-range guns controlled by another recently developed weapon control system. Medium Range System Mark 8 the antisubmarine weapon fitted on board was the Squid triple-barrel depth charge mortar, the propu Ision system com prised twin-sha ft standard range diesels developing 12,380 brake horse powerat a maxi mum speed of 25 knots while the complement of the ship was 210 officers and men. The three Type 41

frigates were also the first to be fitted with controllable pitch propellers.

The Brahmaputra had originally been ordered as the Panther for the Royal Navy on June 28,1951 but was later offered to the Indian Navy as her first 'state of the art' antiaircraft frigate. Built by Messrs. John Brown & Co.

Ltd., Clydebank, she was the first major warship to be built in Great Britain for the Indian Navy after Independence and was launched on March 15, 1957 by the Indian High Commissioner Shrimati Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit.

She was completed on March 28, 1958 and commissioned into the Indian N avyonthesam eday by Lady McNeil wifeofSirJames McNeil, Managing

Directorof theshipbuildingcompany (Shrimati Pandit wasalso to commission the ship, but, due to last minute indisposition, she could not undertake the journey to Glasgow for the commissioning ceremony), with Pennant No, F.31 and with Commander (later Commodore) K.K. Snnjana as her first Commanding Officer. The shipbuilders, John Brown, prided themselves in having built the world's largest ocean liner - the Queen Elizabeth.

Built by Messrs. Vickers-Armstrong Ltd., Newcastle-on-Tyne, the Beas was launched on October 9,1958 and completed and commissioned on May 24,1960 with Pennant No. F 137 and with Commander (later Commodore)

■R- Kapoor as her first Commanding Officer.

third ship, the Belxott, was launched on September 15, 1959 and completed and commissioned on Decembers, 1960 with Pennant No. F139, first Commanding Officer being Commander (later Vice Admiral)

■K.S. Ghandhi. The three frigates later formed the 16th Frigate Squadron

^ith the Brahinapiitra as the leader and her Commanding Officer the Senior

82 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUEVVATER

Officer of the Squadron (F16).

CommodoreKKSanjana takesa journey dow n m em ory la n e a n d reminisces: A fortnight after commissioning, we sailed for Plymouth to embark ammunition etc., before proceeding to Portland to undergo an extensive work-up programme under the command of the Flag Officer Sea Training (FOST). The Brafvmputra spent nearly four months at Portland, undergoing very severe and strenuous operational exercises.

After a very critical final inspection by the Flag Officer Sea Training and his staff, she was certified as 'operationally ready in all respects'.

Out of the many evolutions and exercises cond ucted by the FOST

and his staff, I remember very well a rather amusing incident. For a boarding party exercise, the officer-in-charge of the boarding party was Lieutenant Jeremy Black, a Gunnery Specialist, who was Staff Officer (Gunnery) with FOST. Before the boarding party, comprising a complete Royal Navy crew, could board the Brahmaputra I had passed orders on the ship's intercom that no one on board was to claim any knowledge whatsoever ofEnglish. We could o n l y speak Hindi, Malay-alamorTelegu! Lieutenant Black and his men, after boarding the ship, were totally flabbergasted as the Boarding Officers Handbook, pef"

haps issued by the Royal Navy in the days of Nelson, had no transl^

tions for any of thelndian languages: young Black put his hands up admitted defeat. This young officer,of 1958 is today A dm iral S i r Jeremy Black, at present serving as the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff in United Kingdom. I know for a fact that whenever he meets any Indiai^

officer today, even after 30 years, he is the first one to relate this incident.

Klnikri joined us in August and a non-composite squadron oi ships was formed as the 14th Frigate Squadron of the Indian comprising the Brahmaputrn (Senior ship) and the Klnikri. Both tn«

ships finally sailed from Portland in the middle of October 1958-On our passage home, we paid an operational call at Malta ^

refuelling and rations. We left Malta for Port Said - again for

and rations. After leaving Port Said on October 2 7 ,1 9 5 8 , we pas^

t ough the Suez Canal on our passage to Aden, where 'vvfi j

scheduled to pay a formal visit. However, on reaching Aden,

that there were some disturbances in the city and Aden had P

placed under a curfew.

u

passage home from Aden to

needed fuel very critically-

to the staff oHhe oil company responsible for our refuelling-

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER WAY / 83

manage to get some, imder the noise of small-arms fire outside the harbour precincts. Since the situation in Aden was getting worse and somewhat out of control, I was advised to get out of the harbour with the K//I//07 as quickly as possible. Under these circumstances, we could not receive the full quantity of fuel (hat we both needed.

On leaving harbour, the Khiikh signalled to me that she did not have enough fuel to make the passage to Bombay. The Brahmaputra class of ships had a tremendous endurance and as such she had enough fuel on board even though not to her full capacity. Since we were required to keep to our schedule to reach Bombay on November 1, 1958, and as I was not happy with the thought of having to tow the J<C//i(/fnunceremoniously in to Bombay Harbour, I decided to takeherin tow at sea. The Brahmapiifrn, therefore, towed the Khtikri for nearly 36

hours of the passage to enable her conserve her fuel and enter Bombay ceremoniously on her own steam.

On entering Bombay Harbour, the two ships anchored off the Gateway of India and, a few hours thereafter, we had the honour of receiving Vice Admiral R.D. Katari, who was then the Chief of the Naval Staff, and had specially come to Bombay to receive us.

Recalls Vice Admiral Ghandhi, who was then commanding the Betxua and who later became the Governor of Himachal Pradesh:

Betxoa was launched at Vickers Armstrong Shipyard at New Castle Upon-Tyne on September 15, 1959 by Mrs Kakkar, wife of the Commercial Counsellor at the Indian High Commission in the UK.

The ship was due to be completed on December 6, I960 and was

to be handed over on that date to the Indian Navy, but because I had handed over Caiivenj, which had been an extremely lucky ship for me, on December 8, two years earlier, I deferred the formal commissioning by two days and commissioned Bettua on the morning of Decembers, 1960. It was a bitterly cold but bright day. The chief gii^st was the Lord Mayor who happened to be a Lady at the time.

Speeches were made by the Naval Adviser, who also read out a

nnessage from the First Sea Lord, Lord Mountbatten. He was due to attend the commissioning ceremony but this had to be cancelled as he was away on tour at the time. The Chief Constable of Newcastle made a witty little speech and presented me with a policeman's baton saying that this symbolised authority without any need to wield it.

I read ou t the Com m ission I ng Warra n t, proceeded on board to the strains of the traditional bosun's {'bosun' is the abbreviation for boatswain) pipe. Tlie Officer of the Day was Lieutenant (later Com-

84 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUEW ATER

mander) M S Rawat. I received Commodore Marsh, the Commodore

Superintendent, Contracl-Biiilt Ships, who inspected the guard of honour,commandedbyLieiitenantR.P.Sawhney (later Vice Admiral).

A fte r c o m m iss io n in g , we wentdown to Portsmouth for whatwas called Part II Trials and thence to Portland for our work-up. I think Betwn was the only ship that carried out the full four-month work-up at Portland under the Flag Officer Sea Training, who then happened to be Rear Admiral Peter Gretton - a firebrand officer of World War II fame.

Whilst we were at Portland, because Admiral Mountbatten could

not come for my commissioning ceremony, he paid us a visit, inspected the ship atDivisions (a ceremonial parade), made a thundering speech to the sailors and was highly impressed by the decor and the fittings of Betwn.

The work-up was intense and severe and taught not only the Captainbut down to the last Seaman Boy how to set about seam anship and other drills in the foulest of foul weather. After a time, I just stopped reading the weather reports because they always mentioned gales, snow and sleet with force 8 and 9 winds. On more than one occasion, we had to secure to buoys in the middle of the night in the freezing cold andl have no hesitation in saying that my b u o y jumpers (sailors who secure ships to buoys) were superb.

After a successful Flag Officer Sea Training's inspection, w hen I was absolutely exhausted after he had ordered me to do a 360 degree turn alongside a tanker at sea, in his summing up note, he told me that my Chief Petty Officer (Telegraphist) Masih and L ieu ten an t M-S'

Rawat were the outstanding crew members of Betwa.

After our work-up, the plan was that Betwn would act as crash boat (ship used for rescuing thecrew of crashed aircraft) to Vikrnnt,bot because the Vikrant was delayed in her c o m m is s io n in g , w e wef®

ordered to return home and the highlight of our return journey was a vjsit to Monte Carlo. 1 called on Prince Rainier, the so v e r e ig n o'

Monaco, and he inviied me to lunch with my ADC Lieutenant Sawhney was appointed ADC for the day and he and 1 trooped o f f ^

the palace for lunch with the adorable Princess Grace of Monaco-return back home, the wives were anxious to find out from us wha Princess Grace ate for lunch that day and what she looked like whether she was really very beautiful.

,

For the interest of readers, whilst we had a full five-course

'

Princess Grace only had fruit and raw vegetables, and on my

told me that two or three times a week, she had this for lunch; and myquest,oningher reason forthis,shesaid,Ttisgoodformycomp'e’‘

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER W AY / 85

ion'.

It is all part of history now, but 'Betwa', when back in India, rode the waves strongly and I think I am right in saying that we captured every single trophy in 1961, including the Regatta Cockandthesinkingof the Portuguese destroyer Afonso de Albuquerque.

T w o Surface Escort Frigates

Two surface escort frigates of the Whitby class which had been tropicalised so that they could withstand the Indian coastal conditions, mainly high temperature and high humidity, were the To/zyo rand Tris/!»/. Each of these ships had a standard displacement of 2,144 tons (though the full load displacement was different - Tahoar 2,545, tons and Tns/jt/T2,557 tons) and dimensions of 369.5 feet (length), 41 feet (width) and 12 feet (draught); the weapon package included two 4.5-inch medium range anti surface and antiaircraft guns controlled by Fly Plane System Mark 5 and two 40-mm Bofors close range antiaircraft guns controlled by Medium Range System Mark 8 and antisubmarine weapons comprising two Limbo three-barrel depth charge mortars; the propulsion machinery consisted of two sets of twin-shaft geared turbines delivering 30,430 shaft horse power at a maximum speed of 30 knots and the ship's complement was 231 (11 officers and 220 sailors). The original design for this class of frigates had provided for twelve 21-inch torpedo tubes but, once again, these were not fitted.

The

was launched on July 18,1958 from the shipbuilding yard

of Messrs. Cammell Laird & Co., Ltd., Birkenhead, and completed and commissioned on April 26,1960 with Pennant No. F140, with Commander (later Commodore) B K Dang as her first Commanding Officer. The other frigate of this class, the Trishul, was launched on June 18, 1959 at the shipbuilding yard of Messrs. Harland and Wolff Ltd., Belfast, and completed and commissioned on January 13,1960 with Pennant No. F143, her first Commanding Officer being Captain (later Vice Admiral) V AKamath.

The two ships formed the 15thFrigate Squadron with theTrishiil (F15)as the leader.

T he N a v y s F irst In d ig en o u sly -B u ilt C raft

The honour of being the first vessel to be built indigenously for the Navy after Independence goes to Ajay, a Seaward Defence Boat built by the Garden Reach Workshop (now Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers), Calcutta. The other two boats of this class, Abhay an d Akshay, were, however, built by Messrs. HooghlyDockingand Engineering Co., Ltd., Calcutta.

These boats had a standard displacement of 120 tons (the full-load displace

86 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

ment was different - Ajmj 146 tons and Ablimj and A kshay 151 tons) and dimensions of 117.25 feet (length),20 feet (width), and 5 feet (draught); one 40-mmBofors close-range antiaircraft gun was the only w eapon fitted and tw indieseIsprovidedpropulsion,givingam axim um speedofl8knots.The Ajaxj was commissioned on September 21, i9 6 0 with Lieutenant Commander (later Commander) A.S. Bhat as the C om m anding Officer; the Abhay had Lieutenant Commander (later Com m ander) P M Verghese in command when she was commissioned on N ovem ber 13, 1961 and the Akshay was commissioned on January 8,1962 with Lieu tenant Commander (later Commander) G.S. Saini as the first Com m anding O fficer.

Logistic S u p p o rt S h ip

Another ship that was acquired for logistic support at sea at this time was Dharini which was formerly, the SS Hermine, a cargo ship, and was rated a repair and store ship as a constituent of the Fleet T ra in a fte r her com m issioning on A p ril 2,1959 w ith C o m m an der C.S. G u p ta as her first Com m anding O fficer. H e r displacem ent w as 4,625 tons, dim ensions 328 feet (length), 46

feet (w id th ) and 19 feet (draught) and she was p o w e re d by a trip le expansion engine.

The tanker, Shakti, and the repair and store ship, Dhnrini w ere to be the nucleus of the Fleet Replenishment Group for the'balanced naval force'that the planners were proposing to set up for the defence of In d ia's seaboard and coastal waters.

F irst In d ig en o u sly B u ilt H y d ro g ra p h ic S u rv e y S h ip The commissioning of Dnrshnk, a hydrographic survey vessel boih genously for the Navy's surveying fleet, on Decem ber 2 8 ,1 9 6 4 marked a new stage in Indian shipbuilding for she was the first m ajor ship to bebui byanlndianyard for the Navy. She was also the fi rst private ship (a wai'S^'P

smaller than a cruiser) of the Navy to carry a helicopter.

,

The keel of the Darshak was laid down at the H industan Shipy^^,'

y.shakhapatnam on October 14,1957, India's first privately-ow ned yar^

later taken over by the Government of India. The hull w as la u n c h e d ^

ovember 2,1959 and the ship was com m issioned on D ecem ber 28,1

with C a^ ain (later Commodore) D.C. Kapoor as her first Command't'g

?

displaces 2,790 tons and her dim ensions are 319 fee

(length), 49 feet (width) and 28.75 feet (draught). She carries a h e lic o p te r^

marme survey of India'scoastlineand harbours and is fitted w ith the lat^

surveying and navigational equipment. She is propelled by two dies electric plantsdeveloping3,000brake horse pow erat a m axim um speed

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS U N D ER W A Y / 87

16 knots and she has a complement of 180 officers and men.

V ik ra n t Jo in s the F leet

The most significant event in the Fleet during the period from 1950 to 1965

was the acquisition of India's first aircraft carrier, Vikrant, which was commissioned into the Navy on March 4,1961 not only to usher the era of nav'al aviation into South East Asia but also to complete the process of setting up a 'balanced naval force' in the region for the first time. While the light fleet carriers'acquisition has been discussed in detail elsewhere in this book, it must be emphasised that K.M. Panikkar's prognostication and justification made in 1945 for establishing a fleet air arm as an integral part of the Fleet, was adequately vindicated when the Pakistan Navy’s Fleet was kept at bay during the 1965 operations and the Pakistan Navy units in the erstwhile East Pakistan were totally annihilated by Vikrant aircraft during the 1971 conflict.

T h e F le e t's B irth -P a n g s

Vice Admiral V.E.C. Barboza, who retired as the Navy's Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Western Naval Command in 1981, had held many staff appointments at Naval Headquarters and reminisces on the growth of the Navy's fleet during the fifties and the sixties: I was Staff Officer (Plans) at Naval F^eadquarters from April 1950 to May 1952. When I joined duty, Indo-Pak relations had reached the brink of war and I was soon in the thick of all the urgent, extensive preparations to tackle the'em ergency' as it was referred toat the time.

Our war plan included an attack on Karachi Flarbour by Delhi and the three Rs (Rajput, Rann and Ranjit) - and Rear Admiral G Barnard (the Fleet Commander) had lost no time in working up his ships for this as well as other vigorous actions at sea. At Naval Fleadquarters, all of us were learning fast, gaining much from the experienced counsel of Admiral Sir Edward Parry (the Navy's C-in-C) and Commodore Peter

Drew (Chief of Staff, the equivalent of the present Vice ChieO- It was agreed by the respective Governments that, if hostilities broke out, all British Officers would instantly hand over their duties to nominated Indian officers and withdraw from the scene. This eventuality was borne in mind and faced with firm confidence. Though the Nehru-Liaquat Pact averted an armed conflict betw'een their countries which I think we were well braced to win - the experience we gained in preparing for it was immeasurable.

88 / BLUEPRINT TO DLUEW'ATER

Recalling the bureaucratic obstacles the Naval H eadquarters had to negotiate in its efforts to develop the Service and its fleet. V ice Admiral Barboza says:

When IndO'Pak tension appeared to ease, the G o v e r n m e a t directed its energies to m apping o ut its strategy fo r e c o n o m ic d e v e lo p m e n t in greaterdetail,withimm ediateem phasison the Five Y ear Plan. A Committee headed by a bureaucrat, Shri B.B. G hosh, w as appointed to examine the Armed Forces development plans to see how they could best be meshed with the National Plan. Not surprisingly the Committee soon encountered the tricky problem o f balancing our defence needs against the estimates of available financial resources. WhenShri Ghosh seemed to veer to the view that the w ay to m atch defence demands and inadequate funds was to have a sm aller Army, the soldiers were understandably alarmed. They regarded the idea of restricting the Army's strength to a coupleof hundred thousand-teeth, tail and a ll-a s a formula for fatal em asculation. And their consternation peaked when the Prime Minister reportedly m ade a passing remark in Parliament about scaling down the A rm y's force levels.

By contrast the Navy was too dim inutive to adm it o f any whitt ing 0 its strength: so our anxiety centred really on the volume and pace of expansion the Committee would recom m end. A low gear craw towards inconsequential goals would have m ade a mockery of to solve^'^^ opment and enlarged the very problem s it w as suppose*^

InHn

^ ‘^'^sver, som e a rm e d skirm ishes along the

b e llip p rp n r° [

P akistan 's implacable

• to undprm-

'i!

other political and eco nom ic factors,conspire

achieve

^feyer the Ghosh C o m m itte e w a s endeavouring t r e n i

‘o dissolve into a b lu r. The ArmV

J r c a n t u r

w ent by, it expanded o

are traceah lp f

n

whether the G hosh C om m ittee p a p f

-00 found

h a v e ? s ° 'i lo w 'v ^ ''

wage too intense a crusade to

securing sufficien/f

heavy odds w hen it

.gj

Servi^e^^thefos n > \

equipment-onentec*

I’y the small r h m '

c o u ld not e

continental threat bulke-Tl'^^” ^^'^'

allocations. Yet,

t'ves, it seemed

meci that the Navy would have to be content with the tn

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER WAY / 89

beer of a wfitered-down development. But if there was anything that the Service could count on it was the enli<;htened maritime vision of leaders such as Prime Minister Nehru and, as long as he lived, Sardar Patel. Their positive confidence-gencrating understanding of the seas'

importance did much to make the Navy's growth in the 'fifties gratifyingly sure and steady. True its budget si umped immediately after the Chinese aggression; but the ensuing lean years were wisely (and stoically) used to consolidate previous gains and prepare for the inevitable turn of the tide.

In d ia T u rn s to the U S S R fo r S u b m a rin e s

If was in 1965 that, having failed to obtain any submarines from the UK India turned to the USSR and thus came to an end the flow of ships, equipment, weapons and technical expertise from the British Admiralty to the Indian Navy, which now began looking around for other sources for state-of-the-art naval hardware. While India had wanted Oberon or Porpoise class submarines from the Admiralty, the latter was prepared to offer only obsolescent 'A' class submarines of World War II vintage and in return for the request for Daring class destroyers, it offered to supply Battle and Weapon class destroyers which were also about to be consigned to the shipbreaker's yard. James Goldrick feels that this watershed in the Indian Navy's acquisition programme was inevitable:

"The conclusion w'hich can be drawn from the abortive submarine negotiations," he says, "is that the British were determined to make a profit from any arrangements with India. From 1965 onwards, relations between the Indian and Royal Navies, however cordial, were marked by an emphasis on commercial advantage. India could have British equipment if it was w'illing to pay for it.

The announcement on the purchase of Russian submarines thus

marks theendofanera for the Indian Navy in several ways. Despite the difficulties over naval aviation and the British reservations on strategic issues, the Admiralty provided a measure of support for the Indian Navy which had both material and personnel advantages for India. It maybeargued t h a t t h e RN (Royal Navy)deliberately restrained Indian naval development but there was sufficient realism in British judgments as to the effect of rapid expansion upon fighting efficiency font to be suggested that such restraint was no bad thing.

^

^

Certainly, Britain helped India acquire cheap warships at a time when the Indian Navy was the lowest Service in Indian defence

90 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

priorities - and budgeting. E q u ally c e rta in ly , the m a jo rity o f ships w hich India received w o u ld n ot h av e lo o ked o u t o f p lace as active Royal N a v y units.

But the close relations could n o t last a n d it is p e rh a p s most significant that th e y w e re s u s ta in e d u n til 1965. P e rh ap s this w as dueas m uch to enthusiasm fo r naval a c tiv ity fo r its o w n sake o n th e part of both the A d m ira lty and In d ia n N a v a l H e a d q u a rte rs as to a n y other single factor."

In fact the 'other single factor', as v ie w e d b y s e n io r In d ia n N a val planners in retrospect, w as the British p o licy of m a x im is in g its com m ercial benefits by turning its 'lam e ducks' into p o te n tia l m o n e y s p in n e rs . Ships, ike destroyers of the Battle or the W e a p o n class, a n d s u b m a rin e s o f the 'A '

a c tiv e R o y a l N a v y units

n , T h l ! T

'seventies'. Th e fact th a t In d ia a c q u ire d a large f °

reasonable s e a w o rth in e s s and

e S p m l? 1

to th e In d ia n

w is h e d to s p p ^ h p W

Hs asks and ^

Ind.an N a v y q u ickly exp and to a size c o m m e n s u ra te w ith N a v v T r h "

b y th e B ritis h C h ie fs of the

m issionerin t h p T T / ^ ^ 1

^ ’^'^hna M e n o n , b o th as In d ia 's H ig h Com -

t io n t h a t 't h e R o v .r K l" r y S e r a ^ ? v " " f

* e sugges-

because there was s u f f iL n f

^

In d ia n n a v a l d e v e lo p m e n

rapid expansion nnnn f i

B ritish ju d g m e n ts as to th e effect of

the Brftl";: p o K f n

be a fa c ile defence of

flotilla into a'balan rp H n

t r

<^oi^'nion fro m d e v e lo p in g its coastal

a n e a s,

n a v a l policy/

supported by the

a ro u n d a B ritish b lu e w a te r nayy,

coastal areas and perp etu ally S d ' f

'd o m in io n s ' in th e ir respective

during W o rld W a r TT w ho,, ■

a p ro n string s, w a s e v id e n t even

C hurchill, suggested th

P rim e M in is te r, Winston

eration that political n a n L ’L ^

‘

m e a s u «

likely lobe'w ith a -p r o m K ;L ^ ^ “ '“ 8 "® '

change-over is

of the war’. It was even at th,?!-

P® for the Indian N av y at the end

en atth att,m e n o b e tte rth a n a m e re o ffe ro /^ « a p w ‘l'“’-

H ard w are

1960s, turning to o th « '’s o u r r i" (

during Ihf

indigenously constructing and

h a rd w a re in 1965 a ^ d f ^ a V

borne weapons and equipm ent

w a rs h ip s a n d ship

P

t has, afte r a b rie f p e rio d o f g n a w in g douP /

A MARITIME RESURRECTION GETS UNDER WAY / 91

turned out to be a blessing in disguise. The degree to which ships of the Indian Navy were dependent on the Admiralty during the earlier decades of India's independence is evident from the following reminiscences of Vice Admiral M.P. Awati, who retired as the Flag Of ficer Commanding-in-Chief of the Western Naval Command in 1983:

I clearly recall an incident in early 1951 when, as a Lieutenant in Ranjit, I had been told by my First Lieutenant (Second-in-Command) to chase up a consignment of paint buckets with the Naval Store Officer. That officer, whose office used to be in the Naval Dockyard, Bombay in 1951, told me that he was awaiting the galvanised iron buckets from the United Kingdom! At that time the country's industrial base was no doubt small and somewhat primitive. But India had been a manufacturer and supplier of an extensive range of war material by 1945. For her to require naval paint buckets to be supplied all the way from England in 1951 was a little bizarre. It was an example of the Navy's insistence on 'quality' and reliance on the 'Adm iralty Pattern' for everything from paint pots to peg measures, from caps to coverlets, from guns to gunny sacks! The Navy could not as yet trust itself to indigenous items of stores. Substitution could not even be contemplated!

This was one of several examples of shelteringimder the umbrella

of the Royal Navy. Tn 1951 it would have been unthinkable to break away from its protective tutelage. Only a year before, at the beginning of this period the great ex-Viceroy, now commanding a cruiser squadron in the Mediterranean (Lord Louis Mountbatten), had personally designed the new Republican insignia of the Indian Navy. The Ashokan capital atop the Admiralty foul anchor on the cap badge and buttons (of India's Naval uniform) could readily stand in for the erstwhile Royal Crown of the United Kingdom of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland! The white ensign too had been retained with the National Tricolour substituting the Union Jack in the left upper canton. The language and organisation of the Service, its manners and deportment, both afloat and ashore, remained very English or British. The pre-lunch gimlet and the post-prandial port would have been missed in the Wardrooms (officers' messes) had they been absent, and the President's health continued to be drunk sea ted -as it continues to be today

- in Wardrooms afloat. But the change from port to the similarly-tinted aerated cola beverage for drinking the Loyal Toast had come almost on the heels of the Republic. An officer from the Royal Navy would not have found himself inan alien environment in the Indian Navy of 1951.

92 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

Indigenisation of not only the procedures for p a rad es, ceremonials, rituals, traditions, etc.,but also of ships, w eapon s and e q u ip m e n t w as slovv b u t deliberate and hence had no adverse effect on the n a v a l a m hience or its operating efficiency. Vice A d m iral A w a ti feels that:

The slow progress towards In d ian isatio n has h e lp e d the N a v y to lay a firm foundation of its training and discip lin e. T lie s w itc h fro m theold traditions to the new ones has been alm ost im p e rc e p tib le , soim perceptible in fact that w e came to believe th at things w e re a lw a y s done that w ay. A tradition is as im p o rtan t to a fig h tin g service w h e n moving from an older form at to a new o rder as m o th e r's m ilk is to a c h ild which is grow ing from a craw ler to a toddler. Bereft o f e ith e r, the Service or the child w ou ld have grow n up ill-fo u n d ed and in c a p a b le of facing the strainsand stresses inherent in th e irre s p e c tiv e g ro w th to m a tu rity .Id o sincerely believe that the years of upheaval w h ich fo llo w ed M r. Nehru's d eparturefrom thenationalscen e,and w h ic h w e re in evita b ly re fleeted in the N a v y , caused v irtu a lly no dam ag e to the fabric o f d is c ip lin e and good order in the N a v y .

3

NAVAL AVIATION

FROM NASCENCY TO GLOBAL

PARAMOLINTCY

W ritin g on the evo lu tio n o f naval a viatio n around the globe. A d m ira l S.N.

Kohli, a former Chief of the Naval Staff, had said in 1978;

When one considers the aircraft carrier as a weapon system for achieving the primary role of sea control, it emerges as a cost-effective instrument of maritime warfare. Its ability to exercise this control in a wider and more efficacious manner than other less endowed vessels rates it very high in the naval armoury. The possibility of building relatively small carriers, shorn of much of the old launching and arresting equipment, using simple hulls - because V/STOL does not demand high speeds in the carrier vessels - and the developments in miniaturisation and automation, must be seen in this light.

As the Indian Navy grows, so will its air arm. The percentage of manpower and resources likely to be utilised in this long arm of the Navy is also likely to increase, because of the changing pattern of warfare at sea. Naval aircraft will continue to be used in our environment for many, many years, till India reaches a stage in technology when satellites will carry out all surveillance, and a combination of missile and electronic warfare can meet all threats. Whether aircraft will opera tea tall at sea is difficult to foretell. That it will undergo much

94 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLU EW A TER

changeand increasein sop h istication is,h ow ever,beyon d d ou bt And that it will continue to be one of the m ost vital elem ents o f warfare at sea in the present century is also a certainty.

Tracingtheevolutionofw arships over the last tw o m illennia we find that the galley, in its various forms, held sw ay in the M edi terranean region for over 1,000 years while the Norse longboat, its con tem p orary, ruled in the northern seas. Tlie d evelo p m en t o f sa ilin g w a rs h ip s in W e s te rn Europe gradually drove both these boats in to e x tin c tio n . T h e s a ilin g warships r a ^ e d as sailing 'ships o f the b attle lin e ' fo r a b o u t 300 to 400 years after f o r t span of time, they w ere replaced by ships

P^^fesofiron) knowi^ as ironclads. The era o f the heavily

u shered in, by shipsof

the DrPaHn^^’M

class within th enext h alf century or so. But

theaircraftra^'

for about 40 years and w ere dethroned by

S e n

W ar II. TT.e carrier has

overhalfacentuty.^ ^ 'P'^^n^ost of the m ajor navies around the globe for o f h i s t o ™ d 2 ! H ’ r S t h e m T H ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

warship tells us that a n v ^ •

history o f the evolution of the

ally J „ . e , : d U

weapon systems', aver. . spedalisHn

dominant

form of technology fru itioran d /hi Strategic offensive system s, area process of introduction arrpnta

trends. The

of weapon svstemc

ui

obsolescence and demise

shorter/

^

ships - has becom e progressively

T he C ,„ ie K s Pre-em in ence ae Sea

Since the middle of the 1940c tho

■

i.

as a surface w eapon nlatfnrm r> '

.»as successfully re ig n e d suprem e

theK orean, Viehiam ‘e s e a n d F .^ tr" 5 ^ ^ ® P ° " *‘ ^ ° ’'*'^ '^ 3 ^ J Iy e a rs its u s e iri 1971 Indo-Pak conflict as wpII

in the eastern theatre o f the

‘he long arm of the sunernnL^f

*^®P^°y^ent in the various o cean s as

capabilitiesbuthavealsc) e s t a h i i ! ^ d i s p l a y e d its fighting a credible stabilising and Hpi' ■

’^ con tin u ou sly m aintain'

world's more volatile areas

the superpow ers in the

w hen. Some o f the potential rhaiil^^^

fin a lly d e th ro n e th e ca rrie r and

w three decades, as progn ostirateH p'

the c arrier w it h in th e n e x t tw o

submarines

‘°d ay 's n a v a l t h i n k e r s , are likely to

S W ...H (small waterpiane arpa f '

or surface effect shipS/

P ^ne area twin hull) ships, land-based long-range

NAVAL AVIATION FROM NASCENCY TO GLOBAL PARAMOUNTCY / 95

aircraft, long-range smart missiles launched from a great variety of platforms and helicopter carrier ships carrying V/STOL aircraft with their rapid deck-cycle capability and, with the concurrent development in surface and sub-surface nuclear propulsion, supersonic jet aircraft and electronic warfare.

History is replete with instances of naval stra tegists or fleet commanders coming to grief only because theyrefused to accept thechanges that had come about in tactics, ship designs, propulsion technology, weapons and equipment. For instance, when King Philip of Spain decided to send an invasion armada against England, he was wise enough to replace his fleet of Mediterranean galleys with bigger and sturdier sailing ships, but retained two vestiges of the galley that spelt the armada's doom: short-range heavy guns characteristic of galleys which were predominantly manned by soldiers and not by sailors, as was the practice earlier. British seamen firing lighter but longer-range guns from smaller but nimbler English men-of-war easily defeated them and thwarted the invasion.

During the American War of Independence, confidence in conventional weapon platforms led the Union Navy to deploy wooden-hulled ships at Hampton Roads against the Confederate ironclad, Virginia, and w erebeingheavily battered when the newMoni/or (with two large centreline guns, a new concept at that time), came to their rescue and effectively repulsed an attack launched by ships of the line with 80,100 and even 120

guns each.

Till the beginning of World War I, as stated elsewhere in this volume, Britainhadnot developedenoughconfidenceinthesubm arinesasa potent weapon platform though some other countries already possessed the new lethal platform for operating on the surface and below the surface. But the sinking of three British armoured cruisers in one hour by a single German U-boat, soon after the beginning of World War I provided enough warning of this new and deadly form of naval warfare - an expensive lesson indeed.

The sinking of two British battleships in quick succession by Japanese aircraft spelt the doom of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia during World War II and exposed the weaknesses of this class of warships against air attacks. Besides, the Japanese carrier assault on Pearl Harbourcausing a US

battleship disaster and the signi ficant US victory at Midway convinced the Allied forces of the superiority of the aircraft carrier over the battleship in naval warfare and antiaircraft defence. Though the battleship continued for some more time, her role was mainly confined to the artillery-equivalent at sea, viz., carrier air defence and shore bombardment, the carrier having become the most potent surface weapon platform of all major navies of the world.

The position of the aircraft carrier as the most potent and versatile

96 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWA’re R

weapon platform in any fleet has remained unassailed during the last four decades, and has in fact been reinforced by the perform ance o f carriers and carrier aircraft in Korea, Vietnam, Falklands and Bangladesh, albeit in the absence of any enemy challenge to the carrier itself in these four wars.

During this period the carriers have progressed from operating propeller-driven to jet-powered aircraft, from catapults to the V /STO L mode of launching aircraft, from fair to all-weather flying, from steam propulsion to nuclear power, from coastal to global deployment, from antiaircraft guns to surface-to-air missiles, and from hit-and-run to stand-and-fight tactics.

However, thecarrieris notgoing to remain the queen of thesea forever and, as mentioned earlier, is likely to 'yield place to n ew ' w ithin a few decades - as the portents of her replacement are neither expected to be Ignored, discredited nor countered for long by the proponents of the reigning queens for, it is hoped, naval strategists have already learned lessons from history.

^o'^sver,thestudies,sim ulations,w argam es, exercises andanalyses 0 war games that have been conducted by the m ajor navies and naval

"nM

P

thinkers, indicate that the carrier will continue to

i^id ...e prime position in naval warfare for at least two m ore decades.

incorporate all Ihe current and program m ed improvB-

S X r d l ^ n t e ^ t ^ ^ r r ; ' -

.Her, .e c o .e s

several u n w iew j^ r^ u tt^ erd

M editerranean galley era,

evenquinauaremes with r

' quadnrem es w ith four tiers and

and troops manning thprr!'

h u n d r e d s o f galley-slaves

galley were, by thaf timp

“ "^o^'t^nately, the days of the

ironclads came in L c t

survive. When the

rate and cumbersomp

^

became more and m ore ornate, elabo-

1,000 men on b o a r d

° [ ‘he line, w ith 100 to 120 guns and over

aircraft carriers, they were

^^^^.^^hips were about to be re p la c e d ^

been fitted with virtuallv’imn

an tish ip an d an tiaircraftgu n s,h

complement of over 3 OOQ men*^^^^

arm our and had in som e cases

reigned supreme for

the w eapon p l a t f o r m that

platform with greater lethal'f

victim to a longer-range

today'squeenof any naval nn^

!!*

grow ing threat in recent

.

^

P^'^er, the aircraft carfier, from m odern vessels

NAVAL AVIATION FROM NASCENCY TO GLOBAL PARAMOUNTCY / 97

with greater versatility and less vulnerability, this weapon platform is being rendered more and more i mpregnable and other vessels, specifically designed for the defence of the carriers - cruisers and nuclear submarines

- are being built to indicate that involution is about to set in once again.

Nevertheless, this process is likely to take at least two decades - may be even longer in the developing countries - and hence the carrier is most likely to reign supreme for many years to come.

E arly H istory

The honour of flying the first aircraft from the deck of a ship at sea goes to an American civilian pilot, Eugene Ely, who took off in a 50-horse power Model-D Curtiss biplane from a 57-foot wooden platform on the forecastle

- the forward upper deck - of the US N avy's light cruiser, LISS Binningham, which was anchored off Hampton Roads, Virginia on November 14,1910.

Theaircra ft, designed by Glenn Curtiss, a pioneer designer, builder and flier of aircraft for both civilian and naval use, was the prototype of the allpurpose biplane that occupied the centre-stage of aviation for many years.

Ely could reach a height of only 37 feet above sea level and the aircraft's wooden propeller, wheels and float touched the sea, drenching him and damaging the aircraft but he managed to maintain his perilously low altitude and flew a distance of 2.5 miles before landing ashore. It was decided next to attempt landing on a ship-borne platform.

A large wooden platform, 120 feet long and 32 feet wide, was built on the quarterdeck of the cruiser, USS Pennsylvania, with a ramp with a slope of 30 degrees and extending to 15 feet at the rear end of the platform, to prevent the aircraft from crashing into the stern. A canvas barrier was erected at the forward end of the platform to stop the aircraft from hitting the cruiser's superstructure in case it overshot the makeshi ft 'runway', and wooden guard-rails were built on the sides of the platform to prevent it from falling into thesea.Twenty two manila ropes were stretched across the platform at a height of one foot from the deck, each one of which was attached to a 50-pound sandbag on either side. The tail assembly of the aircraft was fitted with three hooks, one of which was expected to engage one of the manila ropesand the aircraft, while m ovingoverthedeck, would continue to pick up an additional lOO-pound drag every three feet, thus experiencing and increasing braking effort and beingbrought to a stop after travelling only a little more than half the length of the 120-foot platform.

This arrangement was the precursor to the present-day arrester gear, the only difference between the two being the replacement of ropes by wires and the sandbags by hydraulic brakes.

Two months after the historic take-off of his aircraft from the deck of

98 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEVVATER

theBm m w /j«m ,ElytookoffinaCurtissaircraftfrom TanforanairfieIdnea: San Francisco on the morning of January 18,1911 and successfully landed on the deck o f the P C T fisi/to ifl w h ich had been an c h o re d 12 m iles awaym the SanFrancisco Bay. A bout an h o u r la te r ,he to o k o ff fro m th e cruiserand la n d e d a tT a n fo ra n ,w ith th e d istin c tio n o fb e co m in g th e ftrs tp e rso n to h a v e landed on and taken off fro m the d eck of a sh ip in a n a irc ra ft.

G lenn Curtiss, the d es ig n er-b u ild er-p ilo t, h a d also b e e n engaged in developing the technique o f taking o ff fro m a n d la n d in g o n the sea by placingthe tricycleu n d ercarriag eo fh is a irc ra ft w it h a c e n tra l w o o d e n float below the fuselage and tw o sm all cylin d ric a l floats b e lo w each wing-tip.

H e succeeded in flyin g his aircraft fro m S an D ieg o B a y a n d la n d in g back, a historic feat perform ed o n ly a m o n th afte r E ly s c a rrie r landing. TWs aircraft was soon fo llo w ed b y the T ria d A -1 b ip la n e (th e n am e Triad indicated the aircraft's ab ility to opera te in the a ir a fte r b e in g lau n ch ed from land, ship or sea) w hich had a w in g span of 3 7 feet, w a s p o w e re d b y a water-cooled Curtiss V -8 engine of 75 horse p o w e r, c a rrie d tw o perso ns including the pilo t, had a ceiling of 1,000 feet and a range o f 60 m ile s . T h is hydroaeroplane', as it was called by Curtiss and la te r cla s s ifie d b y C h u rc h ill as a

'seaplane', was the first aircraft to be acq uired b y th e U S N a v y .

It is not generally known tha t W ilb u r and O rv ille W r ig h t, the than-air flying m achine pioneers, h ad o ffe re d to sell th e paten ts of tneif flying m achine to the Bntish A d m ira lty as early as M arch 1907 b u t thelattet turned it d o w n because they considered the in v e n tio n to be "o f no practic use to the naval service". Th e W rig h t brothers th e n re tu rn e d to succeeded in selling the first m ilita ry a ircraft to the U S A r m y tw o y fi3rs The m ajor naval pow ers of the w o rld at th a t t im e - th e U S A ,B n ta < G erm any and Japan - had reposed all th e ir fa ith in th e D r e a d n o u g h t c of battleships w hich, w ith th eir 12-inch guns a n d 2 1 -k n o t

^

considered the m ost in vincible w e a p o n p la tfo rm s in th e w o r ld a

^

resulted in the in itia l lack of interest o f these c o u n trie s in th e a ircra ft o by the W rig h t brothers.The British A d m ira lty w a s ,h o w e v e r , siderable interest in airships because G e rm a n y h a d a l r e a d y b u ilt a nu 0

eppelms, airships designed especially fo r m ilita r y use. It,

^ cid ed to train four officers, three from the Royal N avy and one q ji.

RoyaIM arm e,m flyingShortbiplanesat the R o y a l A e ro C lu b in C h u rch ill,w h o was th e F irs tL o rd o f the A d m ir a lty a t t h a t t i m e ,h a d ^

.

aviation and arranged the a c q u is itio n o f th^

^

aircraft and the establishment of a Royal N a v a l Air Station at East m the same year.

C o m m a n d e r O li v e r S c h w a n n b

e

c

a

m

e

'

R o y a l N a v y p „ o l to e ffe c t a w a te r - b o r n e la u n c h w h e n h e t o o k o f f se a

a t B a r ,o w -o n -F u r n e s s in a n A v r o s e a p l a n e . In t h e san!ie

NAVAL AVIATION FROM NASCENCY TO GLOBAL PARAMOUNTCY / 99

Lieutenant Longmore successfully landed on River Midway in a Short aircraft fitted with rubberised floatation airbags around its wheeled undercarriage. This was followed by Lieutenant Samson successfully taking off from a specially constructed deck on Africa, a battleship, in an S-27 biplane, fitted with floats, on January 12,1912.

The Royal Flying Corps (RFC) with two wings - Naval and Military -

came into being on April 13,1912 with eight biplanes, five monoplanes, three seaplanes and non-rigid airship, and on May 9 the same year.

Commander C.R. Swanson, Commander of the RFC's naval wing, took off in a Short S-27 aircraft from the deck of Hibemia with the ship steaming at 10.5 knots and, two months la ter, another naval pilot emulated his feat from the deck of the battleship, London, while she was steaming at her cruising speed.

In May 1913 an old cruiser, Hermes (a namesake of the former/I uo far of India's second carrier), converted into a seaplane carrier, was commissioned. The ship was fitted with a trackway on her forecastle and equipped with three Short S-41 biplanes and trolleys on the short flying deck, for launching the aircraft. At the suggestion of Churchill, a Short aircraft with folding wings, known funnily enough as the 'Short's Folder', was soon developed and flown by Commander Swanson from thedeckof theHermes.

The launching arrangement on [heHerines comprised small wheeled trucks supporting the seaplanes, which made the ship's upper deck resemble a catapult far more than a flight-deck.

The Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) came into being on July 1,1914

with its own rank structure comprising Wing Captain (Captain), Wing Commander (Commander), Squadron Commander (Lieutenant Commander), Flight Commander (Senior Lieutenant), Flight Lieutenant (Junior Lieutenant) and Flight Sub-Lieutenant (Sub-Lieutenant).

A tramp steamer had been acquired by the British Admiralty in 1913

while under construction, converted into an aircraft carrier witha 130-foot flying deck and commissioned in 1915 as Ark Royal, but her speed of 10

knots prevented her from being used as a carrier. Her role was, therefore, limited to that of a seaplane tender with the planes being hoisted on board by cranes whenever required.

Three cross-channel ferries, the Empress, Engadine and Riviera, were converted in August 1914 into seaplane carriers, each with a capacity of three seaplanes and a speed of 21 knots. Since these ferries lacked seagoing capability and their endurance was limited, an 18,000-ton passenger ship witha speed of 22-knots, SS Campania, w as converted, in 1915,into a earner with a 120-foot flight-deck (later extended to 250 feet) and carried ten seaplanes.

One feature of the Campania has been retained by nearly all aircraft

100 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

carriers since it was introduced in this ship - an elev ato r on the flight deck which helped in stowing aircraft, w hich w ould n orm ally be positioned on the flight deck, in ah an g ersp a ceb elo w .T h ea d v a n ta g ew a s three-fold-ihe carrying capacity of the aircraft carrier w as in creased , m ore space was available on the flight-deck for conducting flying op eration s, and repair and maintenance of aircraft could be carried out in the enclosed hangar space.

Catapult launching of aircraft w as also tried o u t in 1912, when in November, an experimental catapult built at A nnapolis, M aryland, successfully launched a plane, piloted by T.G. Ellyson. In 1915, Commander H.C. Mustin of the US N avy becam e the first person to m ake a catapult flight from a ship when he was launched from theN orth Carolina in a Curtiss AE-2 flying boat. Two US cruisers, the Seattle and the Huntington, were fitted with catapults to launch twin-float R-6 torpedo planes.

In 1912 a Short b ip la n e w as used to d ro p 100- p o u n d b o m b s o n selected

^i»rgets and 15» p o u n d er guns w e re fitte d o n these a irc ra ft fo r strafing ground targets. By 1914 Short biplanes h a d m a d e a successful to rpedo drop w ith a 14-inch 8 10 -p o u n d to rp ed o a n d h a d b ee n e q u ip p e d w it h wireless equ ipm en t for c o m m u n ic a tio n w ith g ro u n d statior\s a n d s liip s at sea. The three m a in roles assigned to n a v a l a irc ra ft a t th is tim e w e re fighter operations for h o m e defence, sp o tter o p e ra tio n s fo r recon naissance and shipbom e aircraft fo r operations at sea.

These seaplanes were by now being equipped w ith 50-pound bombs and torpedoes, which was an indication of naval planners being seized of

«je potential for offensive uses of ship-borne planes, and it w as this future an d to rp e d o e s to targets

tho

/

e v e n tu a lly m a d e the a irc ra ft c a rrie r one of

m ost potent w e a p o n p latfo rm s in the course o f the fo llo w in g decades-French N avy, a British M aurice Farman

o

W

K ^ S eptem ber 1910 for tra in in g p ilo ts , and in 1912 an

“ n v « te d inlo a s«plan»

from and lanrtlS

board after they took o#

p T a S

Sh*! w as later equipped w ith a launch."?

successfully took off, on M ay 8 , 19M-

to the USA for train^ * °

I^panese N avy were sent to France an d tw

from t e a i n a S T ® n

Two Maurice Farm an s e a p U f

acquiredforlhelaoan.

the USA w ere thereafre

ton naval traSnort

^

Wakamiya Maru, a 7 , 6 ^

carrying

te n d e r w ith

Maru l ^ d s t a S o L ^ r n r *

Septem ber 1914, the Wakanruya

peratm g against the G erm an s b y successfully using

NAVAL AVIATION FROM NASCENCY TO GLOBAL PARAMOUNTCY / 101

seaplanes to bomb and sink a minelayer in Kiaochao Bay, off the Chinese coast.

In 1907 an officer of the Italian Navy, Lieutenant Mario Calderara, succeeded in flying a seaplane glider which was towed and launched by the destroyer Lanciere. Italian naval aviators received training in France and Calderara was the first to earn his flying licence in 1909. The first lot of seaplanes were acquired from Britain, France and the USA.

By the time the first World War started on August 04,1914, The Royal N avyhad 71 aircraft, Czarist Russia had 50, the Italian Navy had30 and the US Navy 12. The role of a reconnaissance picket a t sea had been transferred from the scout frigate and scout cruiser to the new long-range 'eye-in-the-sky' launched from ships of the fleet.

C arriers in W orld W ar I

Thefirst World War saw fairly extensive use of ship-borne aircraft. These planes were used for air reconnaissance, carrying out attacks on ships, submarines, Zeppelins, shore bases and installations and for the protection of fleets from air attacks.

Three British carriers, the Empress, Engadine and Riviera, each with three seaplanes on board, and escorted by a screen of two light cruisers, 10

destroyers and 10 submarines, carried out an attack in December 1914 on the Zeppelins' sheds near the German North Sea base at Cuxhaven. Bad weather, however, prevented the planes from causing any serious damage to the German installations and poor visibility caused the loss of seven planes, though the crews of the planes, which had ditched, were picked up by ships and submarines. Though this attack was not much of a success, it was the first true naval air operation with the attack being launched from carriers at sea with screens of ships and submarines and with the over-the-horizon targets, well outside the range of the ship's guns or shore*based planes.

The British carrier fleet was soon enla rged wi th the conversion of three steamers, the Ben-My-Chree, Manmax and Vindex, into carriers but lost the Hermes, the first ship to have been converted into a carrier, in October 1914

when she was torpedoed by a U-boat (Undersee boot - under-sea boat, German submarine) in the ^ g lis h Channel.

In September 1914 the German 3,400-ton light cruiser Konisberg took refuge in the delta of the Rufigi river in Tanganyika. Chatham, which had been chasing the German ship from Zanzibar after the latter had sunk the British ship Pegasus, could not move up the Rufigi river because of her greater draught (depth of water drawn). In July 1915, two monitors -

shallow-draught warships of heavy gunpower - and six cruisers were

102 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

requisitioned and these ships, assisted by two aircra ft used as spotters, succeeded in immobilising the Konisberg.

During the Dardanelles cam paign in 1915 the B ritish carrier, ArJtKoyal, was despatched to the area to operate a num ber o f aircraft under the conrvmand of Wing Commander Sw anson w hich very effectively carried outgunnery spottingand bombing operations against th eT u rks, occasionally usingSOO-pound bombs.Thev4rfc]?oi/£j/was soon follow ed by the Ben-My-C/iree with two out ofh er aircraft com plem ent h a v in g b een fitted with 810-pound 14-inch whitehead naval torpedoes slung betw een their floats.

Wing Commander Edm onds,piloting one o f these aircraft, attacked a 500-ton Turkish ship on August 12,1915 w ith a torpedo at a ran ge o f 300 yards and a height of 15 feet. This first ever aerial torpedo attack w as followed hy torpedo attacks on August 17, by Edm onds and L ieu ten ant D acre, sinking a large tug and a supply vessel.

In March 1916 seaplanes operating from the E ngadine and Vindex carried out attacks on Zeppelin sheds on the G erm an N orth Sea coast and caused some damage to the sheds.

It was d u rin g the Battle o f Jutland on M a y 3 1 ,1 9 1 6 tha t fo r the first time n av al aircraft c o m m u n ic a te d w ith s h ip s o f the flee t a n d w h ile th e useofthe n av al air a rm could h a v e led to the B ritish G ra n d F le e t's d e c is iv e victory over the G e rm a n H ig h Seas Fleet, q u irks o f fate p re v e n te d s u c h a trium ph and the British Fleet suffered severe losses, th o u g h th e G erm an Fleet was eve n tu ally vanquished.

The Campania, a converted carrier w ith ten seaplanes, had been ordered to accompany Admiral Sir John Jellicoe's 151-ship Grand Fleet when thelattersailedoutofScapa F l o w i n O r k n e y l s l a n d s n o r t h o f S c o t l a n d on M a y 30,1916 b u t had failed to do so because she h a d n o t re c e iv ed the sailing signal! T h e other aircraft carrier, the Engadine, w a s w it h V ice Admi'

n wK

F ifth Battle S q u ad ro n w h ic h h a d s a ile d fr o m R o sy th H - n n ! '

ni°

^ scouting force. T h e y w e re to in te rc e p t Adrt^ira*

H ip p e r s 101 - ship G e rm a n H ig h Seas F leet w h ic h h a d sa ile d fronn the N o rw e g ia n Coast.

Souadmn

without an aircraft carrier, the Fifth Battle

S o n o ^ . t S v " ' r r

'eyes-in-the-sky' as look-outs. O n the afte^

horizonanHnM ^f^^ 'J'^^^®®^‘^ y '^ sq u ad ro n sig h ted so m esm o k eo n ^

Lieutenant

v l S a n d ’^

and, despite poor

H e kept the airrr.T^ w ilh tn r 0 0 0 ^ ° “ f the G e rm a n F le e t w it h in m in u t and facpH

^

^

G e rm a n ships fo r s o m e tin'

u n til his engine m alfuncHoned

^?fier

g ne m alfun ctioned and he w as forced to la n d on th e sea. A fter

NAVAL AVIATION FROM NASCENCY TO GLOBAL PARAM OUNTCY / 103

carrying out necessary repairs, when Rutland took off and returned to the Engadine, he found that due to a lapse in the communication channel, his reports hadn't reached the C-in-C and no action had been initiated to intercept the German ships. Adverse weather prevented any more flying and thus a golden opportunity was missed for launching an attack when the German Fleet was least prepared for it. When the battle between the Fleets did take place anhourlater.acertaindegreeof the element of surprise and tactical advantage had been lost. By the time the battle was over, the British Fleet had lost 14 ships as against 11 of the German Fleet and 6,274

officers and men perished as against 2,545 of the German Fleet though it left theGrand Fleet in undisputed possessionof the arena and theGermanHigh Seas Fleet had to be confined thereafter to the Heligoland Bight, for the rest of the war. The conclusion that one could draw from the way that this battle developed was: the losses suffered by the Grand Fleet would have been far less if, firstly, the Campania had sailed with the main fleet and her aircraft had given the necessary information to Lord Jellicoe well in time and, secondly, if the information transmitted by the Engadine's aircraft on the sighting of the German Fleet had not failed to reach the Admiral.

In 1916 a new aircraft, the German Eindecker monoplane, was developed with its machine-gun synchronised to fire through the revolving propeller blades. It shot down a large number of aircraft of the Allied forces and the Royal Flying Corps. The Admiralty soon developed the Sopwith Pup armed with Vickers-303-inch machine-guns firing through the revolving propeller blades which was supplemented by an observer in the rear seat armed with a -303 Lewis gun. This aircraft was successful in effectively countering the German air offensive to a considerable extent.

In 1917, Rutland, the Grand Fleet's look-out- cum-spotter, got a Sopwith Pup into the air from the deck of the seaplane carrier, Matixinart as also the light cruiser, Yarmouth with a run of less than 20 feet. Despite initial apprehensions about having to turn ships into wind in enemy-infested areas, all

battle- cruisers were soon equipped with forward and aft

platforms to carry two aircraft each, while the smaller cruisers were fitted with revolving platforms.

In the same year, the 22,500-ton 31-knot Furious replaced her forward turret with a flight-deck-cum-hangar of length 228 feet and width 50 feet on her forecastle and embarked three Short 184 seaplanes with folding wings and five Sopwith Pups with fixed wings. It was found that taking off from this ship could be done without much difficulty, but landing was hazardous because of turbulence caused by the superstructure and the funnel discharge. Wing Commander Dunning made a couple of safe landings on the deck, while the ship was under way on August 2 , 1917, by approaching the deck at a relative speed of only three knots, cutting the

104 / b l u e p r in t TO BLUEWATER

engine and then being hauled down w ith the help o f rope toggles August7whenDunningm adehisthird attem ptto land,theaircraftstalled, rolled over the side and fell into the sea, killing him . T h e Funous was thereafter modified and fitted with a prim itive form o f arrester gear consisting of longitudinal arrester wires and transverse rop e attached to sandbags, both of which were engaged by spring clip h o o k s o n the axle of the aircraft.

. .

The first flat-top, i.e., the first true aircraft carrier o f the world witha flush flight-deck with no superstructure and vents discharging exhaust gases over the stem,

was completed in 1918, and in O ctober that year,

historywasmadewhenW ingCommander Richard B ell D avis tookofffrom

its deck in aS o p w ith 1.5 Strutter and landed back safely w ithout even using the arrester gear.TheFwnows soon e m b a r k e d a sq u a d ro n of the first aircraft designedtocarry torpedoes, the Sopwith Cuckoo.

About this time the Royal Navy carried out trials on another metho of launching of aircraft. Lighters with decks of 30 feet len gth and 16 fee width were towed by destroyers at speeds of over 30 knots, and the took off from the lighters. In May 1918, Wing C om m ander Swanson safety took off from a towed lighter in a Sopwith Cam el, and on July 31 the sai^fi year Lieutenant Culley shot down a Zeppelin, after taking o f fin a Sopv/i Camel from a towed lighter.

.

Argus, the first true aircraft carrier to be built, w as still in fighting t«*^

when World War I ended onNovember 11,1918. The others h a d eitherbeen lost, decommissioned or converted for use in different roles.

t

During the war the US Navy and M arine C orps had c o n c e n tra ^

mainlyonantisubmarineoperations, using the Curtiss H 12 and H l6F ly ^ o Boats,each oneofw hichhadbeen equipped w ith f o u r m a c h i n e - g u n s or

^

230-pound bombs or depth charges. These aircraft operated from ^

bases in Europe, attacked 25 U-boats and sank or severely dam aged them. Actual operations of planes launched from US N avy ships d u n ^

World War I were of little importance. As m entioned earlier, t h e U S cruis H«nh>i^io«andSeflH/ewereequippedwithcatapults,andcarried pla^

-

providing antisubmarine protection to convoys plying across the

(

but * e s e never saw action. The m ain reason for the lim ited develop of slyp-launched aviation in the US Navy was the short duration oi m v o lv ^ en t-o n ly .l9 m o n th s-a sith a d jo in ed th efra y o n ly o n A p r il6 .i^ ^

■

Air Force came into being on April 1 ,1918,

^

aircraf. of the Royal Naval Air Service were m erged w ith the Koyal

.

“ ‘"S Independent of the Arm y and the N f ^ „s,

a d o p tr f lW r a ^ structureoftheRN A Sw ithcetlaintriinor m o d ih «

w,tS offlcers of the Fleet Air Arm reverting to the naval rank structure

NAVAL AVIATION FROM NASCENCY TO GLOBAL PARAMOUNTCY / 105

T h e In te r-W a r Y ears

In the Royal Navy, carrier operations practically came to a standstill after World War I, with most of its aircraft having been transferred to the Rayal Air Force and the Furious having been decommissioned. The only aircraft carrier still in operation was Argtis which had been fitted with an experimental arresting device. This device caused considerable damage to the aircraft' undercarriages when they landed and hence was later removed.

Courageous was fitted in 1931 with transverse wires, with friction brake-drums providing the arresting effort and an electrical system resetting the wires. The electrical system was soon replaced with a hydraulic system which proved to be more efficient and fail-safe. The retractable hook suspended below the axle of the aircraft's undercarriage was now shifted to the rear of the fuselage and this prevented the aircraft from tipping forward on being arrested and thus avoided damaging the propeller, as was the case earlier.

While the US Navy had been experimenting with catapults for launchingaircraft as eariy as 1915 and had equipped a number of ships with catapults, it was tried out in Britain for the first time in 1917 when the steam hopper Slinger successfully launched a Fairey 9 seaplane from its forward deck with a catapult. It took the Royal Navy another eight years to introduce this launching system, when a Fairey HID seaplane, piloted by Wing Commander Burling, was launched by a catapult from the deck of Vindictive in October 1925. Initially the catapults used a hydro-pneumatic

mechanism which was later replaced with the more efficient steam-powered mechanism. The earlier version of the steam catapult, known as anaccelerator,hadbeen developedduring the earlier years of the 1930s but was not considered very safe and was used only as a last resort, when the ship's speed and the prevailing wind could not produce a relative wind strong enough for the aircraft to takeoff onits own. Another innovation for the accelerator catapult launch was a strop, a collar of spliced wire, engaging the aircraft to a projection on the launcher, which fell off immediately after the aircraft was airborne.

On April 13,1920, the second British flush- deck carrier. Eagle, with a flight deck measuring 625 feet in length and 96 feet in width and a speed of 24 knots, displacing 22,600 tons and operating 24 aircraft, was commissioned. Its superstructure, known in naval aviation parlance as an island which houses the bridge, mast and funnels, was on the starboard side of the flight- deck, as is the convention even today, and it was equipped with longitudinal wires to arrest landing aircraft.

On February 6, 1922, the Naval Armament Limitation Treaty was

106 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

signed at Washington, stipulating the ratio of 5:5:3 regarding the total tonnage for navies nnaintained by the United States, Britain and Japan. So far as the aircraft carriers of the three major naval pow ers w ere concerned, the United States and Britain were permitted a m axim um gross tonnage of 135,000 tons and the ceiling for Japan was 81,000 tons.

Britain's Fleet Air Arm continued to expand. Tw o battle cruisers, the Courageous and the Glorious, were converted into aircraft carriers with flight-decks of size570 feet by 110 feet and a carrying cap acity o f 48 aircraft each, in 1928 and 1930 respectively. The first ship to ha ve been designed and built as an aircraft carrier, the 27,000 ton Ark Royal w ith a flight-deck of length720feetand width 95 feet, asp eed ash ig h as 31.75 knots, and for the first time using a crash barrier to prevent landing aircraft from hitting and damaging other aircraft parked on the deck, w as com pleted in 1938. Four aircraft carriers of the Illustrious class, each displacing 23,000 tons and a speed of31knots,were laid down during the period. O f these, th e Illustrious and theFonniifib/e were commissioned in 1940 and the V ictorious and the Indomitable were commissioned in 1941. Each one of these carriers had a carrying capacity of 36 aircraft each but could carry a m axim um of 60

aircraft, the additional 24 aircraft being parked on the flight- deck. These na^flfigffWe.whichweresimilarto the ///wsfhous class b u t had a speed of32

^ t s and twohangar-decks which increased their aircraft c a r r i e r capacity to 72. Another light fleet carrier, the Unicom, w h ic h a ls o served as a supply an repairs P 3nd carried35 aircraft, was com m issioned in 1943.

As regards aircraft for these carriers, the biplane fighter. Hawker for eight years from 1931 to 1939. The biplane fighter,

H a r l Z - ^

T ''-

’" ‘ foduced in 1939, the tw o-seater biplane, the

fK

introduced in 1932. T h e strike role

the to rp e d o -c a rry in g biplane,

the two-seater monoplane dive bom ber, the Blackburn

1 9 2 2 ^ h

carrier was the Langley, com m issioned in

534 feet,w idth 64 fee{ and a speed of 14

a 880-foot'

I

o f 33,000 tons, a speed o f 33.5 knots a r ^

w as commisslonpH

7 5 .B v 1938 tw n m r,

a n d a n a i r c r a f t c o m p le m e n t

each with a speed of 3^

f

been added to the US F le ^

com plem ent o f 80 aircraft, h

the US NavyTnifthS l ^ n n

^ perm itted one m ore c a r n c ^

y and the 19,000-ton Wasp, a 30-knot c a r r i e r w i t h a c a pacity of

NAVAL AVIATION FROM NASCENCY TO GLOBAL PARAMOUNTCY / 107

aircraft, was commissioned in 1940. She was soon followed, after the termination of the Treaty, by the Hornet, which was a modified version of the Yorktoiun.

The first monoplane to operate from US carriers was the BT-2 which was introduced in 1940. It carried a 1000-pound load of bombs and was embarked in the Yorktown and Enterprise. Soon the successful dive bomber, ih e Douglas Dauntless, w as developed and used in the Battle of Midway.

The Vaught Vindicator, a scout/dive-bomber monoplane equipped with folding wings, was used till 1942 and the Douglas Devastator, another monoplane carrying a 21-inch torpedo, saw service till after Midway. In 1938 the Grumman F3F fighter began opera ting from the US ca rriers and was replaced in 1940 by the Grumman F4F-3, better known as the Wildcat, which was armed with machine guns and bombs.

It was on board the hangley that the development of the ^batsman'

technique for providing guidance to landing aircraft and the 'crash barrier'

for the prevention of landing aircraft from colliding with other flight-deck aircraft and the acceleration of the frequency of landing took place in 1926.

The 'batsm an', known as the Landing Signals Officer in the US Navy, positioned himself on the port side of the flight-deck and used a special arm signal code to safely guide landing aircraft down to the flight-deck at an approachangle that would ensure the engagement of the arrester wires. He raised his arm to indicate that the approach was too high, kept it in a horizontal position to indicate a correct approach, lowered it if the aircraft was too low and signalled instructions to the pilot to switch off his engine when the aircraft was close enough the deck. This system was introduced in the Royal Navy in 1936, but was discontinued in all navies when mirror landing sights were introduced after World War II.

During flying operations in 1926, an aircraft had failed to engage the arrester wires on board theLawg/eyandhita numberofaircraft onherdeck, damaging 14 of them. The ship decided to rig thick manila hawsers across the deck during landing operations and effectively prevented such damage to aircraft. The manila hawsers were soon replaced by steel wire ropes which were hydraulically raised before landing an aircraft and lowered therea fter to enable the landed aircra ft to be parked ahead of the barrier. The crash barriers ceased to be used as a regular safety measure in 1953, when the carriers began to use angled decks.

Japan, after flying some Sopwifh Pups from the seaplane tender, Wakamiya, an d from the battleship, Ynmfls/Jiro, commissioned a flush-deck aircraft carrier in 1922, the Hosfco, which displaced 7,470 tons and had a 550-foot flight-deck. Her speed was 25 knots and her aircraft complement was 21. In 1927 the 26,900-ton Akagi with a 632-foot flight-deck, a speed of 31

l^ots and 60 aircraft was commissioned, and in 1928, a battleship under

108 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

construction, the

was completed as a carrier w ith a displacement of

29,600 tons, length 783 feet and a speed of 27.5 knots.

In l929, Japanbuilt the 10,600-ton Ryujo w hich had a speed of 29 knols, length 591 feet and carried 36 aircraft. She then decided to disregard the restriction to tonnage imposed by the Naval A rm am ent Lim itation Treaty and went ahead to build the 18,800-ton Sotyu in 1937, and the 21,150-ton Hiryu in 1939, both ships being capable of a m axim um speed o f 34 knots and operating with 60 aircraft each, operating from flight-decks 711 feet long and 85 feet wide, theHr'n/u being theonly aircraft carrier bu ilt with anislard on the port side. Two more carriers, displacing 25,675 tons and operating80

aircraft each and having a speed of 35 knots, the Shokaku and the Zuikaht, were conunissicned in 1941.

As regards aircra ft, Japan produced the f irst ca rrier-bom e monoplane, the NflAHj'irrw Type 97, well before the com m encem ent of W orld War II. This aircraft had an impressive range of 1,238 m iles and cou ld carry machine-guns and torpedoes or a bomb load of 1,760 pounds. But Japan's most successful aircraft was the A6M M itsubishi Zero Sen w hich w as developedin 1939

and achieved great success during W orld W ar II.

The only aircraft carrier that France built during the inter-war years was the Bram w hichw asbu iltonthehu ll ofa b attleship and commissioned as a 21,800-ton carrier in 1927. She had a speed o f 21.5 knots and operated 40 aircraft from a flight-deck 595 feet long.

,

^ e Australian light cruiser, Brisbane, opera ted a S op w ith Pup if'

for a few months and, seven years later, the Geranium had a FaireyUj^^^

a short period. A seaplane carrier. Albatross, was co m m iss io n e d in 1^20

was tra^ferred to Britain in 1938. Five A ustralian cruisers were thereaf^

equipped with catapult-launched reconnaissance planes which

effectively used during World War II.

.

theSovietUniondeci

thi^d i w

‘

1930s but Stalin's views

a c a i i i H n T r ' ^ " ^ t o

Russian N avy's hop _

durS^e Wn IH w

and thus all its opera‘

the surface and sub-surface-

01 1939

global connict reached its flash-point on Septe

/

120300

oon

®

carriers w ith a total

additional carriers totalling ^

s e ^ e ^ c a l r ^

384aircraft nr,

8

and a combined aircra ft comp

jptal

t o l s l l ^ g S L i

395 aircraft with two addition^

/ With a combined carrying cap acity of 1

NAVAL AVIATION FROM NASCENCY TO GLOBAL PARAMOUNTCY / 109

under construction, but Germany had no aircraft carriers.

W orld W ar II - Evolu tion o f C arrier S trategy and T actics At the beginning of World War II, naval strategists had assigned two roles to aircraft carriers: as a fast striking force and as an escort force. These two functions being widely different, they were to be performed by different classes of carriers.The fast carriers were primarily offensive weapon platforms and were to be used for offensive as well as defensive operations, observation of enemy fleet and shipping movements, and strikes against

'beach-head targets'. Built to provide mobility and flexibility of operations, along with a strong air strike capability and heavy defensive armament, they were to take aerial control of large sea areas and to harass and destroy enemy forces which were likely to threaten friendly naval forces, coastal regions, amphibious operations or merchant shipping.

The mobility and tremendous striking power of a fast carrier strike force, comprising several task groups, each consisting of three to five carriers carrying fighter, dive bomber and torpedo bomber squadrons, and supported by several battleships, cruisers and destroyers, was demonstrated most effectively during World War II. In September 1944 the first air assault by the Allied forces on the Philippines included 730 carrier aircraft, the task force supporting the landing at Leyte in October the same yearusedl,060aircraftandthe task force raiding thejapanesehomeislands in February 1945 used as many as 1,220 aircraft.

The escort carriers, which were slow erandsm allerpla tforms, ca rrying a few squadrons of fighters and torpedo bombers, when organised as a force, provided adequate air and antisubmarine defence for invasion convoys andbeach-head areas, and aerial support for invasion troops until such time as conditions permitted the employment of land-based aircraft.

These carriers, escorted by destroyers, provided aerial support to amphibious operations and also operated individually in escort duties and antisubmarine warfare.

Since the first step in winning control of a sea area is to take control of the air space above it, this task, it was thought, was best carried out by the carrier which, with its high mobility, permitted itself to be quickly placed in the area where control of the air space was desired, while its offensive power, reckoned in terms of its aircraft, i.e.,itsair strike capability, enabled it to take control of the air space, in the face of the most persistent and continued opposition.

As early as 1941, an example of the importance of airspace control over a specified area was provided when the presence of the two carriers, Victo rious and Ark Royal, enabled the British to launch sufficient aircraft to slow

110 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

the formidable German battleship, the Bismarck, to the point w h e re battleships could close in for the kill. Later in the sam e year, Britain lost the Prince of Wales and the Repulse in the South China Sea in an engagement lasting only two hours, because of lack of adequate air space control. Another example of the importance of air space control w as the inability of the British forces to sink three German ships, the Gneisenau, Schamhorsl and the Prinz Eugenjn the Straits of Dover, despite the availability of land-based aircraft of the Royal Air Force, because the Germ ans had already deployed a very large number of aircraft and had effectively m aintained air space control over the area.

The tactical effectiveness of aircra ft carriers is best exemplified by the shipping losses sufferedbyJapanduringtheW ar.T akinginto accountonly vessels drawing500 tons and a b o v e ,th eU S fo rces,d u rin g th e4 4 monthsof their involvement in the W ar, sank a total of 2,728.ships with a tonnage of 9,736,068, and out of these as many as 520 ships w ith a tonnage of 2,101,477

were sunk by carrier aircraft themselves, and another 3 5 ships with a tonnage of 210,085 in combination with other aircraft and ships.

Immediately following t h e com m encem ent o f h o s t i l i t i e s i n the Atlantic theatre, Coura^eoiiswaslostwhilehunting f o r U - b o a t s a l o n g w i t h the Art Roi/al and the H em es but within months aircraft catapulted from the Ajax spotted the German battleship G raf Spee in the South Atlantic and a concerted action by the Ajax, Exeter and A chilles (later IN S D elhi) led to the scuttling of the G raf Spee outside MnntiviHeo harbour in U niguay. In Ap”‘

i

‘

cruiser, Koriisherg, was attacked and su n k , while she was berthed alongs,de at Bergen, Norway, by 16 Skua aircraft of the Ark Roy« -

In June 1940, Glorious was intercepted and sunk by the German battle Gneisenou and Scham horsl because she had stow ed all her aircraf com m enced, hoisting, marshalling and

launching aircraft even for self-defence had becom e impossible.

atackPd lCl '"'un^‘^^°'^'‘^®^"^^°F^alongwithsomesurfaceunitSj O ^nandip.

? T '

a’ready capitulated to G erm any.

to thl^ kfedile'^n'' “ "

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-

a

n

d

the Eagle, soon

1 9 4 0 , 1 o r p e d o

a n d

Taranto sinkinor.

‘tamers attacked s i x Italian battleship

and one destroyer and S

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*

'

^

'

o

n

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Swordfish aircraft had a r

a i r c r a f t a n d f o u r m e n . O

X

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Fleet haddorn X u n H

= " *'om , what the G « n

U sh ip s.

“ •''‘ " “" '‘ ‘•“ nng World W ar I, at the loss o/6,000 men ano On March 2 8 ,1 9 4 1 , a i,„ a f ,

F o m ld a ile l o c a t e s'"*

NAVAL AVIATION FROM NASCENCY TO GLOBAL PARAMOUNTCY / 111

shadowed the Italian Fleet in the Mediterranean and a torpedo strike virtually immobilised the battleship, Vittorio Veneto, reducing its speed to 8

knots, and crippled the cruiser Pola. This led to the sinking of three Italian heavy cruisers and tw^o destroyers, reducing the Italian Navy to an insignificant force within the span of a day.

Having been detected by a Royal Naval aircraft on May 23,1941, the GermanbattleshipBtsmnrcfcand the heavy cruiser PriMZ Eugen sailed out of the Polish port of Gdynia and entered the North Atlantic, where they sank the battle cruiser, Hood, and damaged the battleship, the Prince o f Wales but while the Prinz Eugen escaped, the Bismarck w as hit and damaged and was slowed dow^ from 30 knots to 28 knots. On the night of May 24/25, aircraft from the aircraft carriers Victorious an d Ark Royal attacked the B!S>narck, bu t because of foul weather the damage caused was minimal. On May 26, several aerial attacks were launched by Swordfish aircraft from the Ark immobilising the German battleship, and the coup degrace was soon delivered by the cruiser Devonshire. The sinking of the legendary battleship signified the end of the battleship era.

In November and December 1941, the Royal Navy suffered two major

losses - the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, while ferrying RAF aircraft from Gibraltar to Malta, was torpedoed and sunk on November 14, and on December 21 the escort carrier Audacity, while escorting a convoy of merchantmen from Gibraltar to Britain, was torpedoed and sunk by U-Boats.

The spectacular Japanese carrier-borne attack on Pearl Harbour has now become a part of legend. On December 7,1941, in a brilliantly planned and executed move, Japan caught the USA by complete surprise and virtually devastated the US naval units at Pearl Harbour. Six Japanese carriers, the Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, Zuikaku and Shokaku, carrying 132 Zero Sen fighters, 129 Aichi dive bombers and 143 Knte torpedo bombers, sup-portedby two battleships, three cruisers, nine destroyers, three submarines and a few auxiliary craft, (some of which carried another 450 aircraft), attacked Pearl Harbour, which had eight battleships, eight cruisers, 29

destroyers, five submarines and 20 other combat vessels at anchor or alongside, at dawn on that Sunday. In less than two hours of death and destruction the raid was over, the savage assault leaving seven out of the eight battleships - the US West Virginia, Arizona, California, Oklahoma, Nevada, Maryland, Tennessee and Pennsylvania - either sunk or badly crippled and three cruisers and three destroyers s e v e r e l y damaged; 188 US aircraft out ofatotalof394destroyed,andanother 159 damaged,2403Americanskilled

3nd 1178 wounded; the Japanese lost only one full-sized submarine, five midget submarines, 29 aircraft and 100 pilots. A s is well-known, the attack onPearl Harbourwasa watershed in the courseof operations during World

112 / b l u e p r in t TO BLUEWATER

War II, drawing the US into the W arand Japan herself to ultim ate disaster.

On December 10,1941 a task force designated Force Z, comprising the British35,000-lon battleship Pnnceo/Wff/esandthe32,000-tonbattle-cmiser Repulse (the third capital ship, the aircraft carrier. Indom itable, was still to join theForce asshe had runaground whilst w orkingu p in the W est Indies), were patrolling off the east coast of Malaya, 200 m iles n orth o f Singapore, in defence of the trade routes in the Indian O cean. The absence of air cover had prompted Admiral Sir Tom Philips, the Force C om m and er, to ask for air reconnaissance and a combat air patrol from the RA F base at Singapore, but this had been denied. At about 1100 hours on that day, Japanese Navy torpedo and dive bombers launched a fierce assau lt on these two ships sinking them in two hours. Admiral Philips and 840 officers and men losi their lives.

Within a week of the attack on Pearl Harbour, Jap an ese forces madea landing attempt on Wake Island but were repulsed. But the Japanese persisted and after a two-day three-element assault by ship s, submarines, assault troops and aircraft from the Hiryu and Soryu, the island fell to the Japanese on December 23, 1941.

During the Battle of the Java Sea which led to the Jap an ese capture of Java Island in March 1942, strikes from the carriers Soryu and Ryujo demolished all resistance after a long-drawn-out battle, during which the US

aircraftcarrierLflwg/^andalarge number of Allied ships, including three cruisers, four destroyers, one oiler and 20 sm aller ships w ere sunk-thesam eyear,125aircraftfrom a p o w e r f u l J a p a n e s e strike force coniprisingthe six aircraft ca rn ets, A kagi, S hokaku ,Z u ikaku , I V V A n

^3'^leships, three cruisers and eight destroyers

attacked Colombo and sank a few ships, besides shooting dow n 16

^rcraft aga,r^st the loss of only seven Japanese aircraft, w hile the Br.t'sJ

^or^isting of the aircraft carriers Form idable, Indom itable and i S T ;

seven cruisers, 16 des.royers and several

aircraft snnu Hn®

^ ? '‘‘ '''es- During the attack on Sri Lanica,

sank them Th'

°

^^u'sers 300 miles sou thw est o f Colombo^

S

L

h

<=" Trincom alee during

S

t u

r

T

destroyer escorting her

two o f e

were sunk, along with a B. ilish

Stoto°“ a ^ ® a i : ' ' ' ' “ ^'h'CoralSea,threeJapanesecarriers,.heZ»»^^^^

and Lexim ion fivp ho. ’

com prism g the tw o earners, ^

gse

landingandsankthp

crmsers and 13 destroyers opposed the

* e s e L t r , r e r S ^ed the Japanese carrier force, w h i c h was 2W

n a v a l AVIATION FROM N ASCEN CY TO GLOBAL PARAMOUNTCY / 113

away, and damaged the Shokaku, while a }a panese a ir strike of 69 aircraft set the Yorktorvn on fire and fatally damaged the Lexington, which was later sunkby a US destroyer. Though only one Japanese carrier had been sunk at the cost of a larger carrier, the first carrier, Shokaku, had been damaged, leading to the cancellation of the invasion of Port Morseby. For the first time in th eh isto ryo fn aval warfare, a majornaval battle had been fought with the two opposing forces not sighting each other even once.

The turning point in the war at sea, was the Battle of Midway, which resulted in the sinking of four Japanese carriers at the cost of one US carrier.

The success was attributed to the breaking of the Japanese signal code by US crypto-analysts and the absence of radar on the Japanese ships. On June 3,1942, aircraft from two Japanese carriers, the Ryiijo, and Jumjo, made a diversionary attack on the US bases in the Aleutian Islands and on June 4, an occupation force, comprising four Japanese carriers, Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu andSoryw, a largenum berof heavy surface ships and 16 transport vessels with 2,500 occupation troops, launched an attack on Midway, 1500 miles southof the Aleutians. Unknown to the Japanese force commander, two US

task forces, the first comprising the carriers Enterprise and Hornet, five cruisers and nine destroyers and the second consisting of the carrier Yorktown, two cruisers and five destroyers, were assigned the task of defending Midway.

On June4, the Japanese force launched a strike of 100 aircraft while still 230 miles from Midway, and caused severe damage to the US base, despite a largenum berof US fighters fromMidway intercepting them. Soona strike of 108 aircraft was launched by the two carriers Enterprise an d Hornet but an.

alteration of course by the Japanese force, on the basis of an intelligence report, saved the Japanese carriers from the air strike. A large number of aircraft of this air strike were forced to ditch as they ran out of fuel, returning to their mother ships. A second strike from the US carriers Enterprise and Yorktown lo ca ted the Japanese force but could not cause much damage. A few hours lateron the sameday,an air strikeof 55 aircraft from the EnieyT^rise and Yorktown caught the Japanese force by surprise and carried out a coordinated at tack. Asa result of this massive attack, thefCfl^fl was setonfireand blew up before sinking, the Akagi was set ablaze and later scuttled by Japanese destroyers, and the Soryu had an explosion in thehangar, exploded and sank. The Hinju, which had escaped the attack, launched a counterattack on the Yorktown, with 24 aircraft, followed, a few hours later, by another strike with 16 aircraft, causing fatal damage to the US carrier.

Meanwhile the Enterprise and Hornet launched a strike agamst the Hin/u, setting the Japanese carrier ablaze; it went down after the entire hulk had been reduced to a smouldering skeleton.

In the BattleofM idw ay,whichw as a decisive American victory, Japan

114 / b l u e p r in t TO BLUEWATER

lost four carriers, one heavy cruiser, 253 aircraft and 2,300 m en, while the U Slostonecarrier,onedestroyer,147aircraftand307m en.Th,sdefeatw as Japan's first naval defeat since 1592, when the K oreans, m history's first ironclad ships, drove the Japanese fleet from C hinhae Bay. And with the defeat in the Battle of Midway, the Japanese initiative w as w rested by the US who, to use the terms used by the C om m ander-in-C hief, US Fleet, moved forward f r o m the'defensive-offensive to the'offensive-defensive'.

Admiral C.W. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, summed it up thus, "Pead Harbour has now been partially a v e n g e d .. . . Perhaps we will be forgiven if we claim thatw eareabout m idw ay to reducingjapanese sea power to im potence." How right he was!

August 1942 saw another ca trier battle, this tim e in the Ea st Solomons, In an attempt to dislodge Guadalcanal from the US forces, the Japanese deployed the carrier%i/;D to provide air cover to the troop carriers, with the Shokaku and Zuikakii providing distant air cover. On A ugust 24, an a i r strike of 30 aircraft, launched by the Saratoga, attacked the R yiijo, scoring several hits, setting her ablaze, and later sinking her. The Shokaku and the Zuikakti launched anattack on the carriers EHfef^jnseand Wflsp a n d c o u l d causeonly minor damage, but about a week later they w ere both torpedoed by Japanese submarines forcing the Enterprise to retire to Pearl H a r b o u r and causing the Wasp to be abandoned and scuttled.

In October 1942anotherattem ptw asm adeby the J a p a n e s e to take f 2

portion of Guadalcanal under U S occupation. For this operation they deployed four carriers, the Shokaku, Sitikaku, ]unyo and Zuiho, four batt -

ships, 10 cruisers and 30 destroyers. The opposing A m erican force had t^^

carriers, the Enterprises and the Hornet, two battleships, nine cruisers, 20 destroyers. During the indecisive battle that took place off Santa island on October 26 and 27, the Home/was torpedoed by an air strike ro the Junyo and had to be scuttled; and the Enterprise suffered some damage. Between January 27 and 30, 1943, another battle was fo u ^

between these two forces, off Rennel Island, in w hich the U S forces s c o ^

a decisivevictoryand the Japanesefinally abandoned Guadalcanal.I^';'”

the battles for Guadalcanal, the US Navy lost two ca rrie rs, eight 14 destroyers and 6,000 men, while the Japanese lost one carrier, battleships, four cruisers, 11 destroyers, six su b m arin es and 900 op tional aircraft.

-

In order to pin Japan down to the sea areas contiguous to the

islands, before enforcing her final surrender, the Allied strategy was to launch a series of air strikes and am phibious a ssa u lts to Central Pacific islands which had now becom e Japanese bases.

tions for the capture of the islands began in N o v e m b e r 1943, Japanese bases on Wake Island and Rabaul in N ew Britain

NAVAL AVIATION FROM NASCENCY TO GLOBAL PARAMOUNTCY / 115

subjected to heavy strafing and bombing, for which a concentration of six fleet carriers and five light fleet carriers with 700 aircraft, six battleships, six cruisers and 21 destroyers (the largest naval task force ever used during World War II), was deployed, causing severe damage and the destruction ofalargenum berofaircraftfrom the Shokaku,Zuikaku,and Z uihoat Rabaul.

On November 18, air strikes on the Gilbert Islands were launched from the carriers Essex, Bunker Hill and Independence, and on November 24, the Japanese forces surrendered, but not before sinking the escort carrier, the Liscomh Bay, and damaging another, the Independence. Between December 1943 and February 1944, the Japanese naval base at Kwajalein in the Marshall Archipelago fell to the Allied forces, followed by the Roi and Bambeer islands and the other Japanese pockets in the same group. Truk atoll, a powerful Japanese base in the Caroline Islands, was also annexed, soonafter a strike by aircra ft from the Enterprise, Yorktown, Essex, Lexington, Intrepid and several escort carriers. The US task force lost only 25 aircraft and the Intrepid was damaged but the Japanese lost several htindred aircraft, one cruiser, three destroyers and 200,000 tons of merchant shipping, besides a large number of merchant ships damaged.

About this time the British Eastern Fleet at Trincomalee decided to launch an offensive in the Indian Ocean, in conjunction with some US naval units. Accordingly, theBritishcarrier,///usfnoKS and theUScarrier,Sflrafo^fl, escorted by several ships, attacked Sabang on the northern tip of Sumatra with a combined strike of 90 aircraft on April 19, 1944 and caught the Japanese by complete surprise, destroying 24 Japanese aircraft and neutralising the Sourabaya Naval Base in Java.

W arinthePacific theatre continued unabated andthe Americanforces

continued to score a series of successes. In June 1944, they fought the greatest carrier battle of the Pacific War during the Battle of Marianas for the occupation of three major islands in the Mariana group -Saipan, Guamand Tinian. The American task force for this operation comprised seven large carriers and eight light fleet carriers with about 1,000 aircraft and a large number of support ships while theopposing Japanese First Mobile Fleet had nine aircraft carriers with 450 aircraft, five battleships, eight cruisers and 18

destroyers. On June 11, a number of air strikes launched by the Allied carriers destroyed ISOJapanese aircraft in Saipan and within four days the US marines occupied the island. On June 19 the Japanese Fleet launched a massive air strike on the US Fleet, the latter countering by launching 200

aircraft to intercept the strike. During the air battle that followed, (the biggest single air battle in history until that time and la ter referred to as 'The Marianas Turkey Shoot'), 300 US aircraft continued for several hours to thwart the Japanese aircraft from establishingair superiority and by theend of the day had shot down 243 Japanese aircra ft at the cost of only 30 aircraft.

116 / blu epr in t TO BLUEWATER

Earlier in the morning, an Am erican air strike on G u am in the Marianas had been intercepted by Japanese aircraft from the C arolin e Islands and in the ensuingbattle a large num ber of Japanese aircraft h ad b een destroyed. The US submarines, which were w aiting for a suitable m om en t to launch an attack, struck. The US submarine, AJbacore scored one torpedo hit on the Japanese carrier Taiho and the Cavalla hit the Shokaku w ith three torpedoes.

Both carriers soon sank, followed the next day by the third carrier Hii/o, which was torpedoed by US aircraft after a fierce air ba ttle, during which 24

Japaneseaircraftw ereshotdow nata cost of 20 U S aircraft. H aving lost three carriers and hundreds of aircraft, the Japanese fleet w ithdrew , bringing to an end the greatest carrier battle of the Pacific w ar.

The greatest naval battle in history involving 282 w arships, 30 more than in the Battle of Jutland, were the battles for Leyte G ulf, fought from October 23 to 25,1944. In an effort to capture Leyte in the P hilippines,before clearing the arch ip elag o and launching an a ttack from there on the Japanese islands, 17 carriers from the US Third Fleet carried out m assive air strike on Luzon, Formosa, Okinawa and som e other islands on October 10 a destroyed 804 aircraft at the loss of only 48 US aircraft. This was soon followed by the US Sixth Army, led by G eneral M ac A rthur, landing on Leyte island under air cover provided by 18 aircraft carriers.

In an attempt to dislodge the US foothold in Leyte, the Japaf'^se decided to launcha massive attack w ith a force com prising four aircraft riers with 116 aircraft, 9 battleships, 10 cruisers, 31 destroyers and a larg num berof support sh ip s.T h eU Sfo rced ep lo y ed in d efen ce w asth e7th»

which also had a seizable force com prising a s m any as nine fleet carriers, light fleet carriers and 18 escort carriers. In addition, there were^

battleships and a large num ber of cruisers and destroyers

over 400 transport, cargo and landing ships. The air supp ort w as by 18 escort carriers with the main strike elem ent, the 3rd Fleet, comprj® °

nine fleet carriers, six light fleet carriers and a num ber of battlesni'

cruisers and destroyers.

The Leyte campaign began w ith the Battle o f the Sibuyan Sea to er 23, 1944 when two US subm arines sank tw o

^ tfie

cmisers and damaged a third, off Palwan Island. This w as f o l l o w e d Ub c a m « s torpedoing hvo Japanese battleships and dam aging a

^

cruiser. T^e Japanese carriers in the region retaliated and sank one fleet Mrrier with 46 aircraft and shot down 28 aircraft.

^ curiga'

u

SibuyanSea was follow ed by the Battle of th® ^

fnrro

w hen aircraftfrom tw oU Scarriersattacked a Jajj^

d am aap^

^ia the Surigao

jjing

39 motnr

^ destroyer. As night fell a U S force

j siJt

orpedo boats, a squadron of destroyers, eight cruisers

NAVAL AVIATION FROM NASCENCY TO GLOBAL PARAMOUNTCY / 117

battleships attacked the Japanese force, as the latter was entering the Surigao Strait. In this battle which saw the last confrontation between battleships, two Japanese battleships and two cruisers were sunk and one heavycruiserandone destroyerweredamaged.The US force losta number of motor torpedo boats and one destroyer was damaged. Later, one more Japanese cruiser was sunk by the US carriers.

Ia the Ba ttie of Sama r fought on October 25,1944, a Japanese force with four battleships and a number of smaller ships attacked a US force of five escort carriers and their escorts, with three other US carriers providing distant support. While three Japanese cruisers were damaged, two US

destroyers were sunk and five badly damaged. This was followed by the sinkingof the US escort carrier, with three escort carriers suffering damage.

Further damage could have been caused to the US force, but for a tactical blunder on the partof the Japanese force commander, which allowed the US force a little breathing time, during which they regrouped themselves and closed in on the Japanese force. In desperation the Japanese started attacking the US carriers with Xsmifezeaircraft, i.e., aircraft carrying heavy bomb loads, diving and crashing on the US ships, causing severe damage, but losing both aircraft and pilot in the process. One US carrier was sunk in this manner by eight Kamikaze aircraft.

The last phase of the Battle for the Leyte Gulf was the Battle of Cape Engano, the last carrier versus carrier battle in the Pacific. On October 25, 1944, a Japanese task force comprising four carriers, two battleships, three cruisers and eight destroyers approached Cape Engano with the intention of crea ting a diversion, so tha t the main Ja panese force could a ttack US ships in the Leyte region. Since the Japanese forces air cover consisted of only 30

aircraft flown by inexperienced pilots, it suffered considerable casualties -

three Japanese carriers, including the

of Pearl Harbour fame, one

cruiser andone destroyer were sunk;onecarrierand two lightcruisers were damaged and the rest of the Japanese force scattered. By the time this battle ended on O ctober26,1944, the Japanesehadlostfour carriers,22otherships and 1,000 aircraft in the battles for the Leyte Gulf. The Japanese Navy had, for all practical purposes, been neutralised, and consequently had ceased to be a threat to the US Navy.

The lastbattle that the US Navy fought in the Pacific was against the forces of nature on December 18,1944 when, within the course of a single day, a typhoon sank three destroyers and damaged four light fleet carriers and several other ships. One hundred and forty six aircraft were lost or severely damaged and over 800 sailors were drowned.

118 / bl u e p r in t TO BLUEWATER

T h e B attle of the A tla n tic an d th e M e d it e r r a n e a n So far as containing the German forces and assuring an Allied victory in the Atlantic region was concerned, the Battle of the A tlantic assumed greater significance thanin other theatres of the W ar, for an uninterrupted flow of food, munitions and other supplies from the USA w as of vital importance to the Allied forces in Europe. The British losses w ere mounting rapidly-432 ships with a total tonnage of two m illion h ad b een lost in 1941, followed by another six million tons lost in 1942. The ASDIC, a device developed by the Anti-Submarine Detection and Investigation C om m ittee, for detecting andhunting enemysubmarines had not proved to beeffective enough,and radarhadjustbeeninvented,but because of its bulk and weight it was being used only onboard ships. Soon aircraft began to be fitted w ith lighter ai^

smaller radars, which considerably increased the detection range, with iti much wider area of surveillance and with its ability to detect not only ships and surfaced submarines, but also snorting subm arines, i.e., su b m e rg ed submarines with only their snorts - air inlet pipes - projected above the sea surface. These aircraft covered a large area on both sides of the Atlantic but left a fairly wide gap in the mid-Atlantic, w here the subm arine continued to reign supreme.

.

The solution to this problem was sought by arm ing m erch an t with catapults (this class of ships w as referred to by the acronym CAM ^

Catapult-Aimed Merchantmen). It could launch aircraft at sea w hich, a e carrying out surveillance at sea, the pilot either landed at an airfie /

within range, or bailed out at the end of the m ission after ^handoning ^

aircraft. These aircraft also provided adequate protection against

.

long-range bomber aircraft, which had been wreaking havoc on _

shipphng in the Atlantic, by either bombing the ships th em selves o guiding German submarines to these convoys. Between December and June 1942, four Royal N avy ships, each carrying one Sea were fitted with catapults and deployed. They shot dow n only one y

proved to be a fairly effective deterrent at sea. Bet'veen

1941 and Aug^jst 1943,35 ships w ere assigned the CAM role and fitted ^

catapults, each ship carrying one Sea Hurricane; their effectivene convoy escorts led to the development of escort carriers, with the A tlantirO cM n^ convoys across the seas contiguous to Europe an commissioned the first e sco rt

a n f a

^oo^^ig^'^-deck with two arrester wires, a crash b ^

six m o n Z r T " '

" ‘" “ et-ll aircraft. W ithin her

aircraft haH h f

^

U-Boat in December 1941) the

-ohi^

nii\e U b n aK °

German bombers, dam aged four an

U -b o atsag am stth elo ssofo n ly tw o aircraft.

NAVAL AVIATION FROM NASCENCY TO GLOBAL PARAMOUNTCY / 119

Escort carriers soon began to be built on merchant ship hulls, the British built four during the War, while the USA built as many as 77 out of which they supplied 38 to Britain. Not only did these carriers escort convoys, provide air cover for shore bombardment and ferry aircraft and other material, they also very effectively carried out hunter-killer operations against German submarines and escorted military convoys to the USSR, sinking 24 U-Boats and shooting down 40 German aircraft in the process.

One of the major operations in the Mediterranean during the war was the supply m issionofaircraft, fuel, ammunition and other stores to Malta, which was being subjected to heavy bombing by German and Italian aircraft until July 1942. A convoy of 14 ships loaded with supplies and escorted by two battleships, seven cruisers, 20 destroyers and four carriers, sailed early in August 1942 and entered the Mediterranean on August 10.

A day later, 38 Spitfire aircraft from one of the carriers took o ff for Malta.

Soon one of the carriers was torpedoed and sunk. The other ships of the Allied force continued to be attacked by German and Italian aircraft, U-boats and fast German motor boats known as E-boats (Enemy boats) causing considerable damage. Two cruisers were lost and two carriers whichsuffered dam agehadtow ithdraw . On August 13, only five ships of the convoy reached Malta but they succeeded in saving the island from falling into the hands of the Axis powers.

In November 1942, the Allied forces launched an assault on North Africa. A task force of 102 vessels, carrying 35,000 US troops and escorted by four US carriers, sailed for Casablanca and landed the troops on November 10, after neutralising one enemy carrier. British forces landed at Oran and Algiers, with three carriers and three escort carriers of the Royal Navy. During the landing operations, one carrier was sunk and another damaged by torpedoes fired by U-boats.

As 1944 came to an end, carriers continued in their role as the cutting edge of the Allied naval forces. On December 30,13 US carriers put to sea in three groups, for carrjnng out attacks on Formosa, Okinawa and Luzon in the Philippines, as a prelude to launching landing operations at Luzon, later. The attack on Luzon proved expensive, as several US ships, including six escort carriers, were damaged in Kamikaze attacks.

The US forces also sought to establish a base at Iwo Jima, halfway between the Marian«S and Tokyo, and launched a landing operation on February 19,1945 after a month-long battle, in which they lost 5,500 men.

O neescortcarrierw as simk, o n e d a m a g e d a n d several other shipswere put Out of action

^

The largest amphibious operation in the Pacific theatre during World War n was the assault on Okinawa, which is halfway between Formosa

120 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLUEWATER

(now Taiwan) and Japan. It involved 318 com bat ships, 1,139 amphibious and auxiliary ships, a few hundred landing craft and 16 carriers. It was launched on March 18, 1945, and the landings began on April 1, after overcoming fierce Japanese resistance, including several Kamikaze attacks.

Eight US fleet carriers and one escort carrier w ere dam aged, and several other ships were immobilised, but the Japanese defence w as eventually neutralised.

Four British armoured carriers took part in the assault on Okinawa and continued to operate till May 25. One notew orthy feature of British carrier operations was that the armoured flight-decks and armoured hangars of these carriers could withstand the im pact of Kamikaze attacks, while similar attacks put US carriers out of action. A rm ouring the vital parts of British carriers had reduced their carrying capacity, but had considerably enhanced their invincibility.

The largest battleship in the world at that time v^as the Japanese Yamato, which had seen action in the Leyte Gulf operations. She sailed on April 6,1945, to carry out an attack on the US forces, off Okinawa, and was escorted by one cruiser and six destroyers. A day later, she w as sighted by UScarrier aircraft and a massive attack was launched; she w as soonhit vvi^

10 torpedoes and five bombs, and sank. W ith the sinking of the Yamato the Japanese Navy, virtually became emasculated.

,

Strikes on the Japanese islands co n tin u ed to be la u n c h e d fro m USano British carriers, until Hiroshima and Nagasaki becam e the ta rgets of US

clear attacks, killing 150,000 people, and compelling Japan to August 1945. For six long years during World W ar II, aircraft carriers dof^'

nated all operations at sea, and it was evident that they w ould continue do so for several decades, as the c ap ital ships o f a ll m a jo r navies o t «

w o rld .

r

r

I

When the guns fell silent on August 14, 1945 the US N avy had 3

^ c r a ftc a m e r s and 78 escort carriers in com m ission o r under construe The Royal Navy had built up its carrier fleet from 7 in 1939, to 62 in 1 ^

which mcluded35 escort carriers transferred from the U S A bu t byjuly ^

the earner w in p of both navies had been considerably w hittled down/

US N a v y was left with only 23 carriers and the Royal N avy w i * ^ ^

earners. At the end of the War, the only Axis 'Aircra ft carrier na tio n , J ^ j h ad nine carriers, besides a few escort carriers. Two of them were assig the task of repatriating Japanese troops after the W ar and by Japanese earners, including the ones under conshiicHon, had been scrapP^

P o st-W orld W a r II D e v e lo p m e n is in A irc ra ft C a rrie rs Four important developments took place in carrier operations

NAVAL AVIATION FROM N ASCENCY TO GLOBAL PARAM OUNTCY / 121

first decade o f the cessa tion of hostilities in August 1945 - introduction of jet propulsion fornaval aircraft, the angled deck, the steam catapult and the mirror landing sight.

Less than a year before the end of the War, a new era in naval aviation was ushered in when a Royal Navy Pilot, Lieutenant Comnr.ander E.M.

Brown, made the first jet landing on an aircraft carrier at sea in his Vampire jet aircraft. The aircraft was successfully 'arrested' on the flight-deck of the Royal Navy carrier. Ocean, on December 3,1945. And with that began a major evolution in the techniques of launching and recovering aircraft at sea.

So long as propeller-driven aircraft, w ith their slower speed, operated from aircraft carriers, the flight-deck used to be roughly divided into two distinct areas - the forward third being used for parking operational aircraft and launching them with catapults, and the remaining two-thirds for landingaircraft under theguidance of batsmen; the two areas being divided by a crash barrier which was erected during landing operations. But the advent of the jet age presented two problems - the much higher speed of jet aircraft and the sluggish throttle response of jet engines.

The crash barrier could stop the slower propeller-driven piston-engined aircraft, whenever they missed the arrester wires, without causing any damage to the aircraft, but it caused considerable damage to the much faster jet aircraft. It was Captain D.R.F. Campbell of the Royal Navy who devised a way out of this veritable impasse. He suggested the angling of the flight-deck by only eight to ten degrees to the port side of the ca rrier's centre line, and the discontinuation of the use of crash barriers, so that any aircraft that failed to engage the arrester wires, could open their throttle, take off once more and make another attempt to land, while the forward starboard side of the flight-deck could be used for parking and launching aircraft.

W ith this modification the angled deck would enable the carrier to simultaneously launch and recover aircraft, thus reducing their 'turnaround' time and considerably improving the carriers' versatility and operational efficiency. Early in 1952, two carriers, one British and one American, had the angled layout painted on their decks and successfully conducted jet 'roller' (landing and taking off without arresting) operations at sea. The first carrier to be fitted with an angled deck, the Antietam, was equipped with a flight-deck angled at 8 degrees to the port, and was soon followed by Cen/flur of the RoyalNavy.W iththesuccess of this new design, the angled deck became the permanent feature of aircraft carriers around the globe.

The launching speed of a propeller-driven aircraft was slow enough to be built up by a com binationofw indspeed, the speed of the carrier and the acceleration that the aircraft's engine could produce while moving

122 / b l u e p r in t TO BLUEWATER

forward on the flight-deck with full throttle, but w ith the

,

age,entailinghigher take-off speed and sluggisheneinprpc

no longer possible. A platforni; t h e r e f o r e S to

the aircraft into the air, after building up the air soeed rpn ' "

aircraft to be airborne, with the support of the shin'«

prevallmg wind. Once again it w as

* t the Rn

mander C.C. Mitchell, who developed the st™ m ^ ,

T

filled at the forward starboard e n ^ I L n- I . T ,

P”' "

"-h®

B ircraftloth elau n cW rlgtp eed ^ lrJ^ S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

steam catapultw asaisotohprnm a

^^^^'^‘^^o^^bout 100 feet.Soonthe

around the globe.

®

on aircraft carriers

- s t S L n d Y n g d t T c l T o w n t ; ^ "

was the invention of an officer of

Goodhart.TheproDPlIpr Hr*

Com m ander H.CN.

ingspeedandXrS;;

mg angle, at a speed verv c lo s e f o ^ tr t

fl'ght-deck at a steep descend-

over the landing site,coulHrntfKo

speed, and w hen in position

the jet aircraft, with its higher snpp^h^^

comfortably. But

precise approach and cnniH *^'■'7

3 ^ ^ c h flatter and more

arrested. IlYis rendered thp 1

erigine only after the aircraft was

carrier, especially during ni^h»

aircraft on the flight-deck of a

tjons,considerably hazardn^

and in ad verse w eather condi-

the naval jet pilots of the

landing sight cam e as a boon to

n^rror fitted on the port sidp'If

^®vice consisted of an oblong concave

^S^ts positioned on the shjn' * '

S^^-deck w hich reflected a few white

somegreendatumliehts

of the m irror were fitted

pilot had to keep the white Iioh»

the flight-deck for landing/ the

he was on the right

the green lights to ensure that

c o » e c t. Hie m irror angle w ash 'd "

a ircra ft was

adari Airspeed indicator which

different types of aircraft and it

indicate the speed oftheairrraff'^'J

note in the cockpit/

ler s roll and pitch, the mirm

°*'der to neutralise the effects of the

. Jet-propelled carrier

.

stabilised.

attacl^rflL^K'^®®^ ^ 3 r .

com bat for the first time

and

North Korean caiif^ \

tw o US carrier

Korean a” *

and fuel d i / *

and destroyed 11 aircra

f c n S ‘^ ,;:"'°'^ h in e s e a n d ^ t^ ^

l<ept a t bay, the N o ^

sition in

slower- th n ?.

‘destroyed a

^ays later

virtually no opp®

a n d i ^ d S i a r ’^er

attacked

“^tallations.'pjy.

^ refineries, airfields, railw ay tra<

re carriers soon joined the strike for^

NAVAL AVIATION FROM NASCENCY TO GLOBAL PARAMOUNTCY / 123

and continued to strafe and bomb vital installations. Prior to General MacArthur's amphibious assault on Inchon on September 15,1950, aircraft from sixUScarriers escortinga 280-shipassaultforcecarriedout softening-up operations. The US troops continued to move northward, with the carrier force supplementing the US Air Force air support, and on October 19, US forces occupied Pyongyang. Carrier aircraft continued to pound Chinese forces across the Yalu river, and in November started bombing Chinese troops whose strength in the area had by now gone up to 250,000.

Soon, however, theUS forces had to withdraw against stiff opposition from the overwhelming Chinese forces.InApril 1951,inorderto thwart the Chinese attack, the US forces decided to flood a large number of South Korean Rivers fed from the Howchon reservoir. This task was effectively carried out by Skyraider aircraft from a US carrier, as the 'dam busters'

succeeded in bursting the reservoir dam and inundating a large area.

Throughout the Korean War, which finally ended on July 27,1953, aircraft carriers continued to play a significant role in neutralising North Korean aircraft, ships and shore targets.

During the Suez War in 1956, the British deployed five carriers with an aircraft strength of 166 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. On October 31, 1956,40 aircraft from the carriers launched an attack on Egyptian MIG and IL-28 aircraft. On November 6, paratroopers were dropped by helicopters from a helicopter carrier, with air support provided by carrier aircraft, the first vertical assault in thehistory of naval aviation. With effective air cover provided by these aircraft, the British and French forces continued to advance rapidly but the operations were halted on November 6 at the insistence of the United Nations.

Vietnam too saw extensive use of carriers. When the French left the area early in the 1950s, the Americans moved in and brought with them a large number of helicopters on board two carriers. In August 1964, North Vietnamese motor torpedo boats attempted a torpedo attack on a US

destroyer and in retaliation, four aircraft from a US carrier, strafed and damaged the motor torpedoboats. Soon massive operations were launched against North Vietnamese ships and naval bases by US carriers, and 25

motor torpedo boats were destroyed or put out of action and their naval bases damaged. Before long three more carriers joined the fray. In retaliation for a massive Viet Cong attack on US fuel dumps, airstrips and personnel, a number of aircraft from three US carriers bombed a large military base of North Vietnam. Within a few months three more US carriers joined inand continued operations till the end of 1965, when they were replaced by the nuclear-powered carrier Enterprise. By January 1966, the US carriers had flown a total of 238,000 sorties, nearly ten times the number of sorties f l o w

n during the Korean War. I n J u n e 1 9 6 6 , there w a s further e s c a l a t i o n i n

124 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

the War and US carriers continued to o p erate their Phantom fighters, shooting downM IG 21s w ith sidew inder m issiles. T h e intensity o f the Wai thereafter went down, especially after P resid ent N ixon withdrew neatly 500,000 US troops from the area by 1970. In N o v em ber 1970 operations wereagain stepped up and two US carriers carried out strikes against North Vietnam. In 1972 another carrier launched operation s in the area, staging attacks against Viet Cong aircraft in the H aip hong area and mining North Vietnamese harbours; it was soon joined by three m ore carriers. The war continuedfor another year and a peace treaty w as sign ed finally in January 1973.

T he G lob al 'C a rrie r C lu b '

Before World W ar II only four countries - Britain, France, Japan and the US

- had acquired carriers for their navies. By the end of the W ar, Japan had ceased to be a member of the 'Carrier C lu b' but during the years following, several other countries real ised the im porta nee o f w ha t is know n as 'integral air' at sea and have acquired air arms for their navies.

O utof thefourteencarriers that the Royal N avy had at theend of WorU

War II, only eight - one fleet class, two light fleet class, four escort class and one maintenance carrier - were retained and the rest w ere scra p p e d . Durlf'S

the period from 1954 to 1955 three new 27,800-ton carriers join ed the British fleet, besides the existing carriers. In 1957, the four escort carriers were scrapped and in 1960 and 1962, two carriers w ere converted into mando carriers. On February 8 ,1963 the first v ertical take off and lan d ^

aircraft (VTOL), the HflwJrerP-1127, which w as to later develop into the Harrier, made a vertical landing on the A rk R oyal, the first such a carrier. And with that the concept of 'th ro u g h -d e c k cru isers', the n nomenclature for aircraft carriers without catapults or arrester designed to operate antisubmarine helicopters and vertical and short ta off and landing aircraft, w as form alised.

.

The US Navy scrapped m ost of the carriers o f W orld W ar II

and started a m assive programme of building nuclear-pow ered airc 7 5 ,7 0 0 -to n Enterprise w h ic h w a s cornrtuss‘^

ic*

tons displacem ent continued

th e w o rid ""

P " " '® aircraftcarriernati

to

^‘’^"3ft carrier w hich w as soon

carriL I n n ' ů r n " '" ''"

1946 France acquired an

^

fleet carri^Q‘! f '

Britain, and in 1951 obtained

^

963, and returned the A m erican carriers to

NAVAL AVIATION FROM N ASCENCY TO GLOBAL PARAM OUNTCY / 125

Navy.

The Soviets had no carriers during World War II and were firm detractors of the carrier concept for many years therea fter, but by the 1960s they too started thinking in terms of adding the third dimension to their navy and began the construction of two 'large antisubmarine cruisers', as they were described by the Russian planners, which were a cross between missiiecruisers and helicopter carriers. The first of these was commissioned in 1967 and the second in 1969.

The C anadianN avyacquireda carrier on loan from Britainin 1946 and this was soon replaced by another carrier in 1948. In 1952 a light fleet carrier was acquired from Britain and the carrier loaned earlier, returned. The newcarrier was soon equippedw ithanangleddeckandsteam catapult and commissioned as a full-fledged modem carrier in 1957.

During World War II the Australian Navy operated catapult-

launched aircraft from its cruisers. A British light fleet carrier was acquired in 1948 to be followed by another in 1955.

A British escort carrier was acquired on loan by the Netherlands in 1946 and operated till 1948 when she was replaced by another light fleet carrier. Between 1955 and 1958 she was equipped with an angled deck, steam catapult and mirror landing sight, and continued to operate till 1968, when she was transferred to Argentina. This carrier underwent extensive refit in the Netherlands and joined the Argentine Navy in 1969 as the sister ship of a light fleet carrier which had been obtained from Britain in 1958.

The first aircraft carrier nation inSouth America was Brazil which had acquired a British light fleet carrier in 1956. This carrier was earlier being operated by the Australian Navy and was commissioned into the Brazilian Navy in 1960, after extensive modernisation.

Spain's lone carrier, a light fleet carrier from the USA, was acquired in 1947 and was soon converted into an antisubmarine carrier.

Italy did not acquire any carrier during this period but in 1964

commissioned two cruisers which carried four helicopters each.

As is well-known, the first post-World War II aircraft carrier nation in Asia, India, acquired her first carrier, Vikrant, in 1961.

4

THE NAVY GROWS WINGS

Birth of the Fleet Air A rm

M lth etim eB ritain ru led o v erth is subcontinent, the British grand naval

^

m aritim e hegem ony o v er the Indian Ocean,

a 1 .

operating from three Koyai Nfluy bases in

in tV,'/

^ * ^ 3 ' rated as one of the best natural harbouts

strategically positioned port for the

haveadirp^fh

^nd at Bahrain in the Gulf, which would

coast anH Hi ^^5^®

Stretch of the ocean area betw een India's wes

coast and the Afncan east coast.

other^lWfeh

responsible for the m aritim e defence of India and all

riiTries

thenaviesof the B ritish -occu p ied^r-

S L t a d efS ce o - ‘I ' " " ' "

the responsibility of conducting

the c o m b S '

Fo^thispurposethe n S iu scu le fle e ttl«

aUowed to d e v e l^

Pakistan - the Royal Indian N av y - ^

sloops, one s i i r v e v v ^ i

outbreak of W orld W ar II, com prised

of smaller craft ButbvfVv.'r” ^’^u*^°'

ship and a

n v a in ly b e c a u s e o f its tt^ r ® * " '^ ^ ^ ^ '^ d e d ,th e s tr e n g th ^

and beyond, had risen to

^ yanous theatres of operation

frigates, four corvettes id

'

^’^ ^ P re ssiv e fleet of seven sloopS/^ -

auxiUary vessels 1501'

16 trawlers, two depot shiP®'

several rnotor

of various types, ZOOharbour craft

this unwieldy Royal Indioyt m

defence m otor launches. Howe^e '

y oyal Indran Navy fleet was soon whittled dow n to a muci'

THE NAVY GROWS WINGS / 127

smaller flotilla, and by the time the subcontinent was partitiorted on August 15,1947, it had only six sloops, four frigates, one corvette, 16

minesweepers, one survey vessel, six trawlers, six motor mineweepers, one motor launch, eight harbour defence motor launches and a squadron of landing craft.

When th e assets o f the Royal Indian Navy were divided between India and Pakistan in 1947, as mentioned in the previous chapters, only about two-thirds of these ships and craft came to India. W ith

a coastline

extending to beyond 6,000 kilometres, it was then felt necessary, that the small Indian flotilla should be immediately expanded to a full-fledged navy. For this purpose, along with the other platforms for operating weapons at sea, an air wing or a fleet air arm was considered an essential attribute of the future navy for India, even at that time, because the effectiveness of an aircraft as a weapon system in naval warfare had been convincingly demonstrated by the British, Japanese and US navies during World War II.

P o st-In d ep en d en ce Plan fo r A ircra ft C arriers

Within six months of Independence a 10-year expansion plan for the Navy was drawn up at Naval Headquarters, based on the concept of two fleets for the Navy, one for the Bay of Bengal and the other for the Arabian Sea. The nucleus of each fleet was to be formed by a light fleet carrier which would be replaced by two fleet carriers, and these carriers were to be protected against enemy surface ships for which cruisers were considered essential. This expansion plan, prepared in 1948, was based on the concept of the Royal Navy undertaking the bluewater responsibilities and the

'dominion' navies ensuring the naval defence of their coasts, their fleets comprising ships ofall types in use in other navies of the time, including aircraft carriers. It read:

Lessons of the last war have provedabundanfly thevalueof aircraft carriers. The hard fighting core of a balanced fleet consists no longer of battleships b u t aircraft carriers. Battle fleets have given place to a much more powerful fighting force - the carrier task force whose striking power is provided by aircraft carriers.

Fleet carriers of the type envisaged are large and powerful vessels requiring much technical skill and experience for efficientrunning.lt is, therefore, proposed that the Royal Indian Navy starts its naval aviation by the acquisition of two light fleet carriers which are smaller vessels with half the complement of aircraft, in the first instance. These two light fleet carriers would be given up when the

128 / blu eprin t TO BLUEWATER

first two fleet carriers are acquired.

The peace complement of aircraft in each o f these light fleet carriers is one fighter squadron and one strike squadron o f 16aircraft each. The peace complement of aircraft for a fleet carrier is four squadrons of 16 aircraft each. Two of these should be fighter squadrons and two strike squadrons, m aking a total o f eight fighter and eight strike squadrons for the four carriers.

Aircraft will also be required at naval bases w here ships are likely to be stationed and also at the site of the G unnery and Navigation Schools (at Cochin) for training purposes. It is considered that two suchuruts, one on each coast, will be required. Th e Fleet Requirement Unit for the training schools (on the w est coast) should have 14

aircraft and the second Fleet Requirem ent U nit on the other coast need have only 10 aircraft, making a total o f 24 aircraft.

Thus during the 10-year acquisition plan, the N avy proposed to acquire twolightfleet carriers, which were to be later replaced by four fleet carriers an d atotalof280aircraft(16sq u ad ro n so f 16 aircraft each and two Fleet Requirement Units with 24 aircraft), out o f w h ich one light fleet carrier and 154 aircraft (32 fighter aircraft, 16 strike aircraft, 24 second-line aircraft and 82 training aircraft) were to be acquired during the first phase by 1954, the capital expenditure during the period being Rs 13-^

crore and the recurring expenditure Rs 8.69 crore. The seco n d light fleet carrier was to be acquired in 1956, the four fleet carriers in 1958, I960,19

and 1963 and another 134 aircraft betw een 1955 and 1963.

S hore S u p p o rt

The Paper also proposed to set up naval air stations. It said: A number of naval air stations will be required for basing the Aircraft Requirement Units, Transport Squadron, Air Sea

Squadron, Corrununication Squadron and the First Line Squ

when not actually embarked on carriers, wrhen these

undergoing refit. In addition to these, air stations w ill be requi^

basing trainmg squadrons.

, ^ g

One air station will be required for the O perational

' g)

Training School. The College of N aval Air W arfare, w ith its J

wings (Advanced Training W ing, School for N aval Air Gunnef ^

School for Naval Observers), w ill need another air

airfield will be required to provide a base for the C o m m ^

Squadron.

THE NAVY GROWS WINGS / 129

The n eed fo raFleet Ait Arm was accepted by the Defence Ministers'

Committee (Navy) at itsm eetingheldonO ctober26,1949,andtheproposal for its formation was passed by the Standing Committee for Parliament on November 13,1950.

The acquisition of two light fleet carriers and four fleet carriers was, however, considered'too expensive for present resources'by the Defence Minister^^ Committee (Navy) and hence the requirement was soon reduced to two light fleet carriers, each carrying one fighter squadron of 16

aircraft, one strike squadron of 16 aircraft and two amphibious aircraft, with the shore support of 10 aircraft for basic flying training, 18 aircraft for operational training, 8 aircraft for observer training and 13 aircraft for the Fleet Aircraft Requirement Unit making up a total of 117 aircraft. The capital cost of aircraft carriers as well as the aircraft was thus reduced to Rs 5.55crore. The two carriers are now proposed to be acquired in 1956 and 1959.

There was another reappraisal of the nation's finances at this stage leading to the imposition of e x t r e m e budgetary stringency which immediately affected the N avy's plan for acquiring an Air Arm. The Navy's expansion programme had consequently to be drastically slash

ovw

and the proposed fleet strength reduced to a small carrier force, to developed around only one small aircraft carrier.

Plans A p p ro ved fo r T w o C arriers

The proposal received due support f r o m t h e Governor General of India, EarlMountbatten ofBurm a, and w as approved by

the Prime Minister of India. It also received the.blessings laureate. Professor P.M.S. Blackett, the British Defence Scientific Advi

,

who visited this country at the invitation of the Government o n concurred with the plans for the expansion

-5

recommended by the 10-year expansion plan,

°

Mlnwed

proposed to acquire a light fleet carrier from Britainm l955 to^onow ^^^

if funds could be made available, by a similar carrier m

—

Caotain

of an experienced officer from the Royal Navy's

H .C .R anald ,w ere loaned to the Indian Navy ^^oin t ®

jn

and a D irectorate of Naval Aviation w as set up at Nava

^

1948 w ith R anald a s th e N a v y ' s first C h ie f o f N a v a l via i Infrastructure of O p e r a t i o n a l a n d T e c h n i c a l P e r s o n n e l Recalls C aptain Balbir Law, one of the aviation pioneers a

Com m anding O fficer o f the fighter squadron.

130 / B L U E P R IN T T O B LU EW A TER

Those were heady and exciting days and the decisions were im p le -

m entedat a fairpace. A sm all team of Royal N avy O fficers were loaned to the Indian Navy to create the infrastructure, ashore and afloat.

This team led by Captain Ranald, began the task o f recruitment and training of aircrew and technical personnel in 1948, to meet the planned requirement for the Indian N avy to acquire two light fleet carriers by 1957. It was decided to train quickly, a sm all nucleus, using the Royal Navy's training establishments in the U K and, thereafter, to feed the additional requirements through the existing facilities of the Indian Air Force.The overallaim was th atth en u cleu s trained with the Fleet Air Arm w ouldnot only retain the personnel in specialised skills formaintairiing and operating aircraft from carriers but also lay the foundations for building the N avy's own aviation training establishments in India.

Volunteers were asked for the f l e d g l i n g a v i a t i o n wing and in 1948, out of the officers who had volunteered, thirteen w ere selected and d e p u t e d

t o t h e Indian Air F o r c e ' s flying trairving a c a d e m y a t J o d h p u r for a

four-week flying course o n Tiger Moths. These w ere L i e u t e n a n t (later Commodore) G.M. Shea' Lieutenant (later Com m ander) J.N .V ats, Lieute^

ant (later Conunander) B.S. Ranjit, Lieutenant (later Commander) A Bathena, Lieutenant (later Commander) H.K. Mukherji, Lieutenant M. •

Bakshi, Lieutenant (later Captain) T. Chakraverti, Lieutenant ( l a t e r Com^

mander) K. Cockbum, Lieutenant (later Corrunander) R.S. S o k h i , ant (later Commander) P.N. Parasher, Lieutenant (later Commod^^

P.C. Rajkhowa, Lieutenant (later Lieutenant Commander) G.C.O'Cruz Lieutenant (later Captain) B.D. Law.

. jg

Out of these volxmteers, ten officers qualified in the

tests and were sent for basic flying training to the Royal N aval Donjbristle,inScotland,inM archl949,three-Shea, V ats and Ranjit failed to make the grade. Out of these ten, seven qualified at Doni ^ ^ ^

(Cockbum, Bathena, and Rajkhowa did n ot qualify) and w ere trans to the Royal Air Force Station, Syerston, for the next phase of jjfy,

where five earned their 'wings' and two officers failed to Mukherji on Prentice and D'Cruz on H a rv a rd aircraft, these five officers were sent to the Royal Naval Air Station, for operational training (Bakshi, Chakraverti and Sokhi for

tv^°

o p eratio^an d Law andParashar in fighter operations) where, a years rigorous training, four officers - Lieutenant P-^^-

- g^ichi

Lieutenant B.D. Law,Lieutenant T. Chakraverti and L ieutenant K- '

-qualified in 1952 and returned to India. The fifth, L ieutenant ied tragically in a flying accident during his operation al tra

THE NAVY GROWS WINGS / 131

During their training in England, two out of these four officers had completed the fighter course on Seafires (the naval version of Spitfires) and the other two had been trained in the strike role in Fireflies. Parashar and Law were then attached to the 781 Communication Squadron and Sokhi and Chakraverti to the 771 Fleet Requirement Squadron at Lee-onSolent for consolidating their flying experience and for conversion to twin-engine and amphibian aircraft and a briefcourseonhelicopters. They flew a wide variety of aircraft including the Anson, Oxford, Martinet, Firefly, the amphibian biplane Sea Otter, the twin-engined biplane Dominie and the front-line antisubmarine and fighter aircraft Seafury.

Y .N S in gh , the N a v y 's F irst A viator

W ellbeforethepartitionofIndia,anIndianofficeroftheRoyalIndianN avy, Lieutenant (later Commodore) Y.N. Singh, had been trained in flying iiithe UK and had b eco m e a qualified pilot in 1944, when he earned his wings at the Elementary Flying School, St Eugene, and served in the British 804

Squadron as a fighter pilot. In fact h e w a s t h e first Indian ever to fly from the deck of an aircraft carrier at sea.

Besides these five officers, four other officers. Lieutenant Oajer Commander) N. Pavamana, Lieutenant (later Commander) Joginder Singh, Lieutenant (later Commander) C.R. Menon and Lieutenant Commodore) B.R. Acharya w eresoon selectedfor the Navy's air arnj and received their basic training from the IAF and were awarded wings m 1953.

Because of theabsence of technicalstaff required for aircraft maintenance, two officers of the Engineering Branch of the Navy, Lieutenant (later Commander) F.V. George and Lieutenant Commander (later Rear Admiral) H.D. Kapadia, were sent to the UK for specialisation inairengm ee^g-Two engineer officers of he Indian Air Force, Lieutenant (la ter p m ^ n c l e r ; Shrikhande and Lieutenant (later Commander) V.S.P. u ®

.

transferred to the aviation wing of the Navy to streng en i base.

^

The Navy at this time also required officers to s e ^ e ^

officers who fly in naval aircraft and are ^ ssi^ e

nhoto

reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, aerial photo^ap y,

P

intelligence, tactical coordination, radar control,

. ,1'^ vice

sation, eec., and hence a batch of Kve officers - U e u W ^ t a a t t r VKe Admiral) M X Roy, Ueutenant (later

^ e u t e n a n t ( l a t e r L i e u t e n a n t C

o m

m

a n d e r ) J.V.

^

l ^ „ d r a n - w a s

Com m ander) V. Chakravarthy and Lieutenant C.P. Kamac

s®nt to the UK for training in 1951.

132 / blu epr in t TO BLUEWATER

T h e B irth Pangs

The Defence budget for 1949-50 had provided for adequate funds for the acquisition of carrier aircraft so that these aircraft could be used to impart adequate training to the naval pilots in preparation for the acquisition of the first aircraft carrier in 1955 k o m the UK but no n aval aircraft couldle spared at this tim ebytheR oyalN avyfor transfer to India. Besides political pressures within the country, the w ar in Korea slow ed dow n the pace of development of the Fleet Air Arm for the Indian N avy. This was because the aircraft and aircraft carriers w hich India had proposed to acquire \yere no longer available as they were fully co n u n itted to the K orean War. The pressures on the Indian borders also n ecessitated attaching greater priority for developing the other two Services and the resultant slackening of pace also meant a change in the role of the proposed Fleet Air Arm-Whereas the original plans would have provided real teeth a considerable punch to the Service as a w h o l e , t h e n e w r o l e assigned to the Air Arm was the secondary task of providing the Fleet w ith aircraft to enable the surface ships to practice and develop th e ir a n tia irc ra ft defend systems and, to a limited extent, for air-to-surface c o m m u m c a tio n a ^

reconnaissance. The change in the role im plied a change in the ty ^

aircraft required. The main role of th eaircraft- cooperation w ith

,

at sea, reconnaissance and com m unication - dictated an aircraft could fly singly over the sea w i t h some d e g r e e o f s a f e t y a n d ability to a on the water, sufficient

endurance, long-range c o m m u n icatio n

navigation facility, and the ability to carry a sm all load of additional persoruiel. The Royal N avy had operated two qH

aircraft. Walrus and S e a Otter, f o r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e b y catapulting the most of its capital ships, but these had by now becom e too o acquisition.

.

Naval Headquarters had in the m eanw hile decided to

acquisition of a non-carrier aircraft for pre-carrier a c q u is itio n aircraftchosenw astheSeflFw ryFBnandit w asp ro p o sed to setu p a based strike squadron with 40 such non-carrier aircraft to be

the end of 1950. However, this proposal too fell through as the jgs

budget had to be severely curtailed ow ing to stringent 3 usterityii^^^jj,e adopted by the Government of India a n d n a v a l a v ia tio n became®-

jjg

targets of these measures, reducing the num ber o f a irc ra ft acquired, to only one, shelving the Sea Fury acquisition severely truncating the projected requirem ent o f other ships, c ra t^ ^

systems and equipment. A to n e tim e t h e G overnm ent contemplating the withdrawal of all persormel training in

THE NAVY GROWS WINGS / 133

giving them the option to revert to general service or to consider a transfer to the Air Force, if acceptable to them. Ultimately, against very stiff opposition from the lAF, the Navy succeeded in obtaining Government approval for keeping naval aviation going, even though on a very restricted scale.

The F leet R e q u ire m e n t U n it

Eventually, itw a sin Ju n el951, that the forma non of a Fleet Requirement Unit for providing aircraft to be used for maritime reconnaissance, training of pilots and observers, evaluation and calibration of radar and communication equipment, supportofthefleetinantisubm arine exercises andasair targets for antiaircraft gunnery practice and training in tracking, with a complement of one squadron commander, eight pilots, four observers, one air engineer officer, one air electrical officer and 31 sailors was finally approved by the Government of India.

The change in the role did not deter Naval Fleadquarters from going ahead with recruiting and training personnel in all the trades and professions of naval aviation to ensure that the new arm would be completely self-sufficient. A new and highly skilled cadre emerged; it comprised pilots, observers, engineers, electrical and radio specialists, armament and ordnance specialists, safety equipment and aircraft handlers, storesmen and medical officers specialising in aviation medicine.

Some of these aviation personnel subspecialised to prepare for the day when the tide would turn and the navy would man its first aircraft carrier.

The S ealand

The first aircraft eventually selected, mainly because it was the only acceptable aircraft available at that time for acquisition for the Fleet requirement Unit, was the Sealand M a rklL twin-engine amphibian aircraft, manufactured by Short Brothers at Belfast, North Ireland, and it was decided to acquire tensuchaircraft in the first lot. This was a simple, slow and relatively very cheap aircraft which could carry two pilots, an observer, communication and direction-finding equipment, a chart table, a dome for taking navigational sights o f t h e sun, moon or stars, and tour passengers, it had an endurance ofover f i v e h o u r s and had the luxury o a loo!

^

Whilst it may be difficult to justify the choice o^^^s aircraft, it must be appreciated that the deterioration in the international situation lead g to the Berlin blockade, and the requirements of the Korean War a "

resources, appeared to have precluded the release of suitable com

132 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

T h e B irth Pan gs

The Defence budget for 1949-50 had provided for adequate funds for the acquisition of carrier aircraft so that these aircraft could be used to impart adequate training to the naval pilots in p reparation for the acquisition of the first aircraft carrier in 1955 from the U K bu t no n aval aircraft could be sparedat this tim eby the Royal N avy for transfer to India. Besides political pressures within the country, the w ar in Korea slow ed dow n the pace of development of the Fleet Air Arm for the Indian N avy. This was because the aircraft and aircraft carriers w hich India had proposed to acquire were no longer available as they w ere fully com m itted to the Korean War, The pressures on the Indian borders also n ecessitated attaching greater priority for developing the other two Services and the resultant slackening of pace also meant a change in the role o f the p roposed Fleet Air Arm.

Whereas the original plans w ould have provided real teeth and considerable punch to the Service as a w h o l e , t h e n e w role assigned to the Air Arm was the secondary task of p rov id in g the Fleet w ith aircraft to enable the surface ships to practice and develop their antiaircraft defend systems and, to a limited extent, for air-to-surface co m m u n icatio n a reconnaissance. The change in the role im plied a change in the type ot aircraft required. T h em ain role of the aircraft- cooperation w ith the Flee at sea, reconnaissance and com m unication - dictated an aircraft could fly singly over the seaw ith so m ed eg reeo f safety and ability to on the water, sufficient

endurance, long-range com m u ru cation a

navigation facility, and the ability to carry a sm all load of

additional personnel. The Royal N avy had operated two annphiDi aircraft, Walrus and Sea Otter, for reconnaissance by catapulting t h ^ °

m ost of its capital ships, but these had by now becom e too oW

acquisition.

Naval Headquarters had in the m eanw hile decided to r e c o m in ^ '

acquisition of a non-carrier aircraft for pre-carrier acquisition aircraft chosen was theSea F u n /F B Ila n d it w asproposed

by

based strike squadron with 40 such non-carrier aircraft to be

the end of 1950. However, this proposal too fell through as the budget had to beseveraly curtailed owing to stringent austerity itieasu adopted by the Government of India and naval aviationbecanre one ox targets of these measures, reducing the number of aircraft carriers to acquired, to only one, shelving the Sea Fury acquisition programrt'®

severely truncating the projected requirement of other s h i p s , craft, vveajT^

systenns and equipment. At one time the G overnm ent vvas j

contemplating the withdrawal of all personnel training in aviatior^

THE NAVY GROWS WINGS / 133

giving them the option to revert to general service or to consider a transfer to the Air Force, if acceptable to them. Ultimately, against very stiff opposition from the lAF, the Navy succeeded in obtaining Government approval for keeping naval aviation going, even though on a very restricted scale.

The F leet R e q u ire m e n t U n it

Eventually, it was in June 1951, that theform ationof aFieet Requirement Unit for providing aircraft to be used for maritime reconnaissance, training of pilots and observers, evaluation and calibration of radar and communication equipment, support of the fleet in antisubmarine exercises andasair targets for antiaircraft gunnery practice and training in tracking, with a complement of one squadron commander, eight pilots, four observers, one air engineer officer, one air electrical officer and 31 sailors was finally approved by the Government of India.

The change in the role did not deter Naval Headquarters from going ahead with recruiting and training personnel in all the trades and professions of naval aviation to ensure that the new arm would be completely self-sufficient. A new and highly skilled cadre emerged; it comprised pilots, observers, engineers, electrical and radio specialists, armament and ordnance specialists, safety equipment and aircraft handlers, storesm enand medical officers specialising in aviation medicine.

Some of these aviation personnel subspecialised to prepare for the day when the tide would turn and the navy would man its first aircraft carrier.

T h e S e a la n d

The first aircraft eventually selected, mainly because it was the only acceptable aircraft available at that time for acquisition for the Fleet requirement Unit, was the Sealand Mark 1L twin-engine amphibian aurcraft,

"Manufactured by Short Brothers at Belfast, North Ireland, and it was decided to acquire tensuch aircraft in thefirst lot. This was a 2nd relatively very cheap aircraft which could carry two pi

'

observer, communication and direction-finding equipment, a c ai a dome for taking navigational sights of the sun, moon or sters, and f« = en 8ers,ilh .d ar> eJu ran ceo f over flvehours a n d h a d theluxuryofa loo!

VVhilst it may be difficult to justify the choice of

appreciated that the deterioration in the international situ ^ o

^ the Berlin blockade, and the requirements of the Korean War and wa resources, appeared to have precluded the release of suitable combat

134 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

aircraft for the Indian N avy. A ccording to C o m m an d er P.N . Parashar,one of the intrepid pioneering pilots of the In d ia n N avy , 'Cochin being surrounded by w ater and the need to find an aircraft w hich could fulfil m ultiple non-com bat roles for the F leet, aided b y the personal flying experiences of Captain H.C. R anald, m u st h av e influ enced the choice of this aircraft/

The first Sealand aircraft, n u m bered IN 101, w as form ally handed

,over to Shii P.V.R. Rao, D eputy H igh C om m issio n er at the Indian High C'om m ission in London (Shri Rao w as to later b eco m e the Defence Secretai

By Rear Admiral M .S.Slattery,C hairm an,ShortBrothers& H arland Ltd., at a colourful cerem ony at R och ester, K en t o n Jan u ary 13,1953. Latet, b e tw t’en February 4 and O ctober 2 3 ,1 9 5 3 , all ten aircraft were fenied to Cochin by some of the Indian pilots trained in the U K and a British firm undertak’<ing aircraft ferrying service. D u rin g one of these ferrying tri^, Lieutenar.\t P.N. Parashar and Lieutenant T . C h ak raverti distinguished them selves'by flying in form ation from L ee-o n -S olen t in England to Malta in a single-s eater Seafury aircraft in three hou rs and 11 m inutes, new speed record for the distance. This

feat provid ed consideraD

laudatory p u blicity in the British and M altese press and journals.

N a v a l A ir S\^ation

Meanwhile negotiations had been going on for some time for the o fth 6 Cochin airfield to the N avy for providing a h om e to

^ ^\\

aviation w ing and setting up the Fleet R equ irem ent Unit necessary facilities. It; had been used to a lim ited exten t during WorW

Has w as its nearest neighbour - Sulur in C oim batore. The

d evelopingtheairstatiionatC ochin, adjacent to th en a v a lb a se, was given to Com m a nder George D ouglas w ho h ad served in

L .

N avy's H eet Air A rm w ith distinction, had been aw arded the

.

guished Flying Cross for valour, w as dem obilised after W orld

permitted, by special dispensation, to jo in the Indian N avy. The first pilot to land a Sealand aircraft on w ater w as Lieutenant B.D.

successfully touched dow n on the Em akulam C hannel at C ochin on 9,1953.

From the beginning, this new clan of aviators acquired a

Identity ar^d enthusiasm w hich surpassed all expectations. Every P^ ^p, senior or junior, was full o f vigour, com petitiveness and c o m r a d e ^ j S

i , “ '/ ch iev m g the num ber of flying hours or in the ct

^

°

”^®iritenance, and this spirit asserted itself ev

^ 3,

strongly on * e sports grounds of the entire naval base. O n May the day the first Indian Naval Air Station, Garuda was commissioned^'

THE NAVY GROWS WINGS / 135

formation of four Sealand aircraft which took part in a fly-past was led by Lieutenant Corrunander P.N. Parashar, the other three pilots being Lieutenant Commander B.D. Law, Lieutenant Commander T. Chakraverti and Squadron Leader L.C. Datt of the lAF. Parashar recalls: After the flypast I landed and Admiral Sir Mark Pizey, who was the Chief of the Naval Staff at that time, boarded the aircraft and we carried out a water-landing in theEmakulam channel and taxied up the slipway to the Venrfurwt/ii/(thenaval trainingbase) parade ground.

Admiral Pizey was not really sure about what he was in for and, I think, greatly relieved to be safely back on terra firrm.

C erem o n ial F ly -P a st and T arget-T ow in g

On October 10, 1953, the President, Dr Rajendra Prasad reviewed the Indian Fleet at Bombay when six Sealand aircraft took part in a fly-past Over the Fleet and dipped their wings in salute to the Supreme Commander, and one Sealand aircraft, piloted by Lieutenant Commander Y.N. Singh with Lieutenant M.K. Roy as crew, successfully carried out a landing on water. On November 17, 1953 four Sealand aircraft took part in a flypast in honour of the First Sea Lord of the British Adnuralty, Adnrural Sir Rhoderik McGregor, at Cochin. These Sealand aircraft also provided a ceremonial antisubmarine patrol in April 1954 for Queen EliM bethII of Britain, whose ship, S S G o f f e i c , which also had the Duke of Edinourgh on board, was on passage from Aden to Colombo. Lieutenant P.N. Parashar was the leader of the flight which ceremonially escorted the yacht of the President of Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito, when it left Cochin harbour m December 1954 after a formal visit. The Fleet Requirement Urut was form ally v isited b y the P resid en t of India, Dr Rajendra Prasad, inFe 1956; by the British First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet, Mountbatten ofBurm a and Lady Edwina Mountbattenm March 1956, ana by His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia, m Oc^ber 1956. In August 1954, the unit b e g a n providing aircraft as a « ia ^'’8®

ships of the Commonwealth Navies t a k i n g part m t l^ a ^ u a l j ^ t Exercises of Trincomalee QET) along with Sunderland

Shackleton Maritime R ecorm aissanceaircraftof theR oya from ChinaBay, n ear Trincom alee. Hying

the C onunonw eaim Nav^^

continued fo r 11 y ears, for JET exercises continued to be held

/

''^hen the freq u en cy o f the participation b y t h e Indian N a v y and even tu ally d isco n tin u ed in 1965.

136 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

T h e F irefly

At this time the necessity of acquiring an aircraft cap able o f towing a drogue or sleeve target was felt and the Sealand aircraft w as found to be considerably underpowered for w ithstanding the drag produced by sucha towed target. Accordingly, two Firefly M ark I single-engin e carrier-borne strike aircraft, which were being operated from the aircraft carriers of the Koyal N avy and had been used during the K orean W ar, w ere fitted with target-towmg equipment for tow ing drogue and sleeve targets and acquired for the Fleet Requirem ent Unit in February 1955. T h ree months later, R e m o t e Firefly Mark I aircraft w ere acquired. B etw een September and ecember 1958, another five Firefly M ark IV aircraft, fitted with 20

mi im etre cam o n and also capable o f carrying bom bs and rockets, were acq ^ re , raising the Firefly strength to ten, and adding offensive punch to Indian naval aviation.

R e m in isce s B a lb ir L aw ,

W e remained shore-based and second line fro m th e operational point o view ut whether operating as a squadron or as a detachment, the ying operatior\s provided each and every one o f us invaluable expenence and self-confidence. M aintenance, re p a ir and overhaul developed to achieve rem arkable standards.

facilities ingrained in the minds

* . ®

^ i c e as a whole, the im portance of d e v e lo p in g a Navy if*

nich aircraft and helicopters would play a vital role. The Air Arm m te llig ^ t,

you ng

and

highly

nf

unteersfrom the Executive and technical branches

u n i v L ? r “^L'^!®

recruited short-service officers from the

professional^

merged very successfully, and their high

L d c o n t r r h ' ! ‘!i

fo rm e d th e b a ck b o n e o f th e n e w branc

co n trib u ted g re a tly to w a rd s its fu tu re s u c c e s s e s .

T h e H in d u stan T r a in e r 2

imparted b y ^ h eln d ian A^r^p'

supplem ent the basic flying

hence three Hindustan t •

flying training at C och in,

Fleet Requirement iJnif f

Ran-

galore and ferried tn

Hindustan Aircraft Limited (HAL),

.

Lieutenant R A T AnH

l->eutenant C om m ander B.D. LaW

Anderson on October 7,1956.

THE NAVY GROWS WINGS / 137

A ir S q u ad ro n s

Since theFleet Requirement Unit had by now acquired adequate aircraft to ju stify th e se ttin g u p o fa N a v a l Air Squadron, it was rechristened and commissioned as the Indian Naval Air Squadron 550 (iN/lS 550J with ten amphibian Sealand aircraft, ten Firefly target-towing aircraft and three HT2 trainer aircraft on June 17, 1959 and placed under the command of Lieutenant P.K.K. Menon.

A dvent of Je t A ircra ft - T h e V am pire

It was now decided to acquire som ejet aircraft for J ] V i 4 S 5 5 0 as the deal for acquiring an aircraft carrier had been gone through in 1957, the light fleet carrier Hercules, to be renamed and commissioned as Vikrant, had been purchased and it had been decided to provide India's first aircraft carrier with jet-powered fighter aircraft. Since the Cochin airfield was not long enough to operate jet aircraft, it was decided to acquire the lAF storage depot atSulurnearC oim batore as ithad a suitable runway which was not being used by the Air Force any longer. The Gunnery School at Cochin had a small establishment manned by a naval detachment atCoimbatore which provided all the facilities to personnel using the shooting range there, and therefore could provide all facilities to the air squadron. Soon three Vampire FB-52 aircraft were acquired from the Hindustan Aircraft Limited, Bangalore and a trainer Vampire T-55 aircraft was transferred to the Navy from the Indian Air Force. And with that a Naval Jet Flight came into beingat Sulur on Sep tem ber2,1957 with Lieutenant Commander B.D.

Law as its first Commanding Officer and with a complement of four officers and 56 sailors.

,

A few naval pilots were soon sent to the lAF Flying Instructors

^ h o o l at Tam baram and the first naval pilot to qualify as a

^ g

instructor was Lieutenant B.R. Acharya followed by Lieutenant (later Vice Admiral) S.C. Chopra, Lieutenant (later Commander) R.S. Grewal and Lieutenant (later Commander) K.K. Punchhi, all of them topping m their courses.

In 1960 the nomenclature of the Naval Jet

R an ged to

Naval Air Sqwadron 5 5 0 ' > 4 ' and that of the

Requirement Unit at Cochin t o I n d i a n Naval Air Squadron 550 B F

the task of training pilots for the two squadrons of fighter ^

™ rin e aircraft (or t h e V t a l ,

•urther change was implemented with the INAS 550

, /Contingent

l^faval d e ta c L e n t at S u l u r merging to become the Naval Contingent

138 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

Coimbatore and the INAS 5 5 0 ' B ' Flight at C ochin reverting to JN/IS 550

Within six months, i.e„ on September 5 ,1 9 6 1 , the N aval Contingent Coim batore was commissioned as a full-fledged naval base, Hansa, with Com maiider T. Chakraverti as its first Com m anding Officer; and the squadron of aircraft at Coimbatore w as com m issioned as INAS 5 5 2 on September Offic

lieutenant R.S. Grewal as its first Commanding

W ith the increase in the requirem ent o f personnel to occupyaviation billets on board th eV ikra n f as w ell as the shore aviation establishments and with the growing necessity of phasing out the obsolescent Sealand aircraft, JNAS 550, w hich originally w as the Fleet R equirem ent Unit, was w o u n d u p o n M arch l, 1962and a Station Flight, G an ida w as formed with

^ 0 Sealand aircraft. W/4S 550 was reform ed and started using the new Alizes of the 310 Squadron and the Seahaw ks o f the 300 Squadron for providing flying practice to its pilots.

T h e S o viet M I-4 H e lico p te r

It was m 1964, that five naval pilots. Lieutenant (later V ice Admiral) H.

^

^^^‘^tenant (later Com m odore) M .P. W adhaw an, Lieutenant

( ter Commodore) V. Ravindranath, Lieutenant (later Com m ander) S.R-C om m ander) P. Jh a,started flyinga Soviet'

p tte d MI-4 hehcop ter for the Thumba rocket-la unching range. This helicop-Th

^ p i^ e d the task o f carrying out surveillance of the sea areas off rnum ba in Kerala, prior to the launching o f rockets.

D o v e, H T 2 and K ira n

>«‘>D oveal,craft, threeHindustanTrainer2airc«ft

Aircraft U nited,

H a n g ^ re , were acquired for the JN/IS 550

I l S ’t h e l T r ‘* f

Fleet Requirement Unit (FBW

® ^

ofassum ing com m and w ere Lieutenant

1953), Lieutenant R.S. Sokhi Q an o.ryS,

a m M K

^ " ^ " '" " d e r T. Chakraverti (February 5 ,1 9 5 4 ), Lieuten'

1 9 5 ^ i e m p n T

lieu ten an t M .N. Gupta (February 2,

Pavam al^

r

(September 17, 1957) and L ieuten ant

from 1959 \n 1Q ^ "

the Commanding Officers of

UeuteJ^nt n L r r

were Lieutenant P.K.K. Menon Qune IS,1959)>

OaterRearAdmir;,'l5’ A r i

(N ovem ber 1 8 ,1 9 5 9 ),Lieutenan

Oanuary 16

I960), Lieutenant R .S -Gre^^^^

Lieutenant flatP rr '

V. Ravindranath (September 1 2 , 196D'

leutenant (laterCommander) Arun Rao (November 1, 1962), Lieutenant

THE NAVY GROWS WINGS / 139

(later Captain) R-D. Dhir (April 9,1964) and Lieutenant V. Ravindranath (AprU 10,1965).

Rear A d m iral H .D . K ap ad ia

Theperson who had thelongestassociationw ithnavalaviationandm ade a significant contribution to the development of material support and maintenance facilities was Captain (later Rear Admiral) H.D. Kapad.a, a specialist in Air Engineering. To quote Commander P.N. Parashar t ^

officer, in his various appointments in the UK and as Director of Air Maintenance andRepair at Naval Headquarters-played a very important part in all planningstagesofnavalaviation.Infact,out ofallthe 'backroorn boys",Homi Kapadia made the maximum contribution to the creation and expansion of naval aviation.'

In June 1964

551 was shifted to Hansa atDabolmi, Goa and the

jet flight a n d an cillary a v ia tio n units at C om batore w ere w ound up.

A ircraft fo r the V ik ra n t - T h e S eah aw k

As regards fighter, recom aissance, antisubmarine and

the Vikrant, the primary requirement for the aircraft to be chosen for the carrierbome fighter squadron of the Navy was an appropna e sophistication, reliability, versatility and ease ofmainterwnce, that w asstillleam ingtooperateaircraftatsea. Taking all Hiesevi a

^

i n t o a c c o u n t ,

the Indian Navy chose the British Seahawk jet a ^ ,

designated as a fighter ground attack carrierborne aircraft and manufac-turedbyM essrs.H aw kerSiddley,w hichhadbeenin operation rnmeR^^^^^^

Navy s L e 1953 and w hich was the cutting edge

force during the 1956 Suez operalior«, when it operated

of this aircraft from carriers a l o n g with the French orce ‘

RoUs RoyceN ene engine, the Seahawk had thus a

^

wasalreadyinoperationwithtwoothernavies-t e

c a

aircraft to

In 1959, an order was placed for 24 Seahawk FG A Mark VI a ^

be mainly used as fighter-bombers a n d the first aircra _ ^

to the Indian Navy on January 22, 1960. Soon

r e i v e d and a four-aircraft Seahawk F l i g h t X a l ^ a n d -

Naval Air Station, Lossiemouth for training Indi

P

galbir Law,

*ngOfficer-designate o f t h e squadron,Lieutenant

Acharya,soon

and the Senior PUot^designate, Lieutenant

c o n v e r t e d t o S e a h a w

k s a n d t h e A i r W

e a p o n I n s t r u ^ - —

-

^

V \ ^ a l e

“ >t RJ^, Ghosh, was deputed to the Gunnery School at E x c a m ,

140 / B L U E P R IN T TO B L U E W A T E R

Island, in January 1960 forspecialisation. By July 1960eight Seahawkshad been positioned at the RoyalN aval A irStation, B raw dy, Wales and on July 1 , 1960, after an intensive work-up, the squadron of Seahawks designated Indian Naval Air Squadron 300 was com m issioned at Brawdy by Shrimati Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, the Indian H igh Com m issioner in the United Kingdom, with the Squadron's crest depicting a white tiger of Rewa leaping out oftheseaina 'ram pant posture'lead ing to the Squadronbeing assigned thesobriquet White Tigers in later years. By the time the Squadron embarked on the Vikrant on August 4, 1961, its strength had risen to twelve.

While 27 Seahawks were acquired initially, the fleet of fighters was later augmented by the acquisition of r e c o n d it io n e d Seahawks from the Royal N avy and W est German N avy.

T h e A lize

As regards fixed-wing antisubmarine aircraft for the carrier, the British aircraft manufacturers were prepared to supply the Gannet ASW (antisubmarine warfare), the GannetASW 3 AEW (air early w arning), the S e a Otter and the Sea Mew, all of which failed to pass m uster. The Gannet was considered ur\suitab!e for a fledgling Fleet Air Arm because of the nance problems of its 'double-Mamba' engine, contra-rota ting prope and unreliable starting mechanism. The Sea M ew too had serious mam nance problems. The Sea Otter had by now becom e obsolescent.

Vice Admiral V.E.C. Barboza, who retired as the Flag Office^ °

manding-in-Chief of the W estem Naval C om m and in 1981, was pr at a meeting where the offer of the Sea Otter w as bein g considered-recalls:

The Sea Otter had been privately offered for our Fleet Air Naval Headquarters had asked the A dm iralty for an opinion o

^

aircraft. One morning Com m odore H. Drew, the Chief ofS taru was no Vice-Chief at Naval Headquarters at that time) re a d cn* ^

Admiralty's reply which advised against its purchase. Capts

Ranald, the Chief of Naval Aviation, who w as pro-Sea

,^^<5

moimted a vociferous but unconvincing attack on the

fhis

remarks. Whenhis ou tbu rstsu bsid ed , th eC h iefofStaffd isp ose^ ^

.,'

protest with a chuckle saying, 'W ell, the A dm iralty O tter knoW

Frpnrh XI

Aviation, France, which had been in operation

o n T o h ,

^ r

'

'

'

’ T

a

o f t h r e e -

s e r v e r a n d o n e radar p l o t t e r - a n d w a s f i l l e d w i t h o n e R o ' ' ®

THE NAVY GROWS WINGS / 141

Dart 21 turboprop engine and had already proved itself for its endurance reliability and performance.

'

The Indian Navy placed an order for 12 Alize 1050 aircraft and delivery commenced in 1961 at Aeronavale at Hyeres, France, where the Commanding Officer-designate, Lieutenant Commander M X Roy, the Senior Pilot-designate, Lieutenant R.A.J. Anderson,and other members of the crew were trained to operate theaircraft from land bases and from the flight-decks of the French aircraft carriers C/emenceflu and Arrormnches. It was on March 21, 1961, that the Indian Ambassador in France, Nawab All Yavar Jang, commissioned the squadron of Alizes designated the Indian Naval Air Squadron 310, at Hyeres. The crest of this squadron depicted a majestic king cobra representing a hamadryad that would protect its mother, the carrier. The first Indian Alize pilot to land on a carrier was Lieutenant Anderson who landed on the flightdeck of the Arromanches m the Mediterranean and was catapulted off the carrier on the Squadron's commissioning day, a feat witnessed by the Indian Ambassador and senior French Naval Officers soon after the commissioning ceremony. The 310 Squadron continued its work-up for another two months, before embarking on the Vikrant off Toulon, France on May 23,1961.

In August 1961, two more Alizes were acquired for the Indian Navy, raising the strength of the Fleet of this antisubmarine aircraft to fourteen.

The Alizes proved to be a highly reliable aircraft and adequately versatile, to be able to operate in diverse modes such as carrier-based or stiore-based antisubmarine warfare, antiship warfare, maritime

reconnaissance and short-take-off-and-landing (STOL) operations off the flight-

®ck in case of catapult failure, so long as the relative wind over the deck exceeded 30 knots. There were occasions when this mode of launching Aircraft had to be resorted to. For instance, the VtJtrflMf was off Bombay

^ m etim e in 1962, when she was required to desembarkher Seahawk and Aiize squadrons, but her catapult had developed mechanical snags and

^ n c e they could not be launched from the flight-deck. As Commander Parashar recapitulates:

Itw aspossiblefortheSeahaw kstobe towedfrom Ballard Pier to Santa

Cruz with their wings folded. But the Alizes were too wide and, with their wings folded, too high to pass under various bridges. It was p n erally believed that the Alizes could not carryout a free take-off romthe deck of the KiJtranf.LieutenantCom m anderJagdishPuriwas

‘hen the Senior Pilot of the 310 Alize Squadron and Lieutenant Com-IJ^anderArindam Ghosh, the flight-deck o f f i c e r . Between the two of

‘hem, they marked out the deck. After detailed calculations, agreed that with the average wind strengths, the ship doing the

142 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

maximum speed and the tanks con taining ju s t enough fuel to reach Santa Cruz airport, it should be p ossible to execu te a free take-off.

It would otherwise m ean the locking up o f the Alizes on board for almost eight m onths, till the catap ult w as rectified for the summer exercises in 1963. 1 assured C ap tain M ah in d ro o,

Commanding Officer, that it was an acceptable risk, that I w ould attempt it m y selfan d th atiflw eresu ccessfu l th eo th ers w ould foUow. God was with me and I successfully got airborne w ell before reaching the end of the flight-deck. Thereafter

the en tire squadron was

successfully disem barked, fuelled at Santa C ruz and flow n to Cochin.

When quizzed on the m erits of the Seaha w k and the Alize vis-a-vis similar aircraft in operation in other navies of the w orld at that time, Admiral Sir JohnTreacher, who was the ViA:ra«rs W ork-U p Officer after her commissioning, said:

I could not fault the choice of aircraft. The Seahaw k w as an obvious natural for any service w ishing to establish an A ir Arm . It had the performance required to do the jo b , it w as sm all enough to be manageable and forgiving enough for the essential confidence to be built up rapidly. The Alize was obviously th e right size, with perhaps the most reliable turboprop engine the w orld has ever seen and

^

ASW (antisubm arine w arfare) cap ability was relative y

modest. It was, again, the right aircraft at the time.

T h e A lo u ette III (C h etak )

t

e

u

S

T

f

f

"

' “

"

’ P

™

"

*

o f c a r r i e r o p e r a t i o n s is a h e lic o p te r w W

c h

o "

a n d a n tith '

P ^ ^ ^ °^ ^ ^ 3 i^ a t)le /re co n n a is sa n ce ,a n tisu b m a rin e '''f hai-t

acquisition o f

the V ikrant the requiremen

a

u

Z

S

A

r

m

was p r o j e S ' t o the French

Menon to helim

conversion of Lieutenant

Com m ander V-

M J* W adhaw ^^

Station, Palam , tw o pilots. Lieu

Lieutenant (later C om m ander) A.S. D h i l l o ^ ^ r

conversion to Ain

Beurgedu-lac in France, in January 1

' ^

h elico p t;rs, these h eU co^ ^ ,

w h ic h h a d b e e n n f(e re d b v S H °^ -^ °i

British Dragonfly

th an the D raeon flv

The A lo u ettell w a s more

engines which wnnM ^ ‘R eaper and had been fitted w ith gas

^ 'v o u ld o b v iate th en ecessity o fsto rin g p etro lo n b o atd .

T H E N A V Y G R O W S W I N G S

/

1 4 3

was required for the Dragonfly.

Two Alouette II helicopters were obtained on loan from the French N

a v y after the Indian pilots had been trained in search-and-rescue operations and embarked onthe ViTrranifor plane-guard dutiesoff Malta during the carrier's work-up. On expiry of the contract period of three months, the helicopters were relum ed to the French Navy.

A Sikorsky S-55 helicopter was obtained on loan from the Indian Air Force in 1962 and embarked on the Vikrant with its lAF crew but soon Lieutenants

Menon and Wadhawan converted

to Sikorsky S-55

helicopters and before long another Sikorsky S-55 helicopter joined the Vikrant, both being operated by Naval pilots. Oneof those helicopters was lost in 1964 when itsankintheEm akulam channel inCochinand the other returned to the lA F in the same year.

Meanwhile, it had been decided to acquire the latest version of the Alouette helicopter, theAloutte III, fromSud Aviation, France and the first two helicopters arrived in mid-1964 in crates. These were assembled by the Navy's air engineers with the assistance of a French technician at Cochin and embarked on the Vikrant in July 1964.

It was the Alouette III helicopter which was later converted to its new avatar, Chetak, the Medium-range Antisubmarine Torpedo Carrying Helicopter (MATCH). T h i s helicopter was equipped with antisubmarine weapons comprising two depth-charges or two antisubmarine torpedoes or a mix of the two and was indigenously manufactured by the Hindustan Aircraft limited. Bangalore for operating off the deck of carriers as well as smaller ships such as tankers, frigates, destroyers and even survey ships. Equipped with folding blades, this helicopter was powered by a 8,700-shaft-horse*pow er turbine and had an endurance of 2.5 hours, w i a maximum speed of 113 knots. It had a crew of three- p ilo t , copilot and an aircrew in rescue operations at sea.

. c u

v

The three - aircraft air element chosen for the Vikrant - the S ^ a w k fighter-bomber, the Alize antisubmarine aircraft and the Alouette helicopter-h ad to operate in all the r o l e s o f c a r r i e r - b o r n e aircraft such as fighter defence of the fleet and merchant shipping, maritime

and anti-ship strike, antisubmarine defence anda variety

,

tasks such as search and r e s c u e , minelaying, ground a tta ^ , supP

ground forces, aerial photography and transfer of

^

P w

y j

.

A fresh b a tch o f22 r e fu r b i^ d seahawk FGAMark IV an d M a rk ^

3|rcraft were acquired from the Royal Navy during

^

.

r

^i/eflies and m - 2 trainer aircraft were paid off in 19W and the few Obsolescent Sealand amphibian aircraft, disposed of m 1% 5.

144 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

A ir Stations fo r the F le e t A ir A rm

Following the fall of Singapore and the Jap an ese assau lt on Sri Lanka in 1942, several Royal Naval Air Stations and R o yal Air Force airfields were setup in India forproviding training and m ain ten an ce support to British aircraft carriers operating in the Eastern w aters. At C ochin, the Royal Ait Forcehad set up an Air M inistry Experim ental S tatio n on Willingdon Island, in 1941 which was follow ed by a m ain tenan ce u nit, an operations room and an advanced Flying Boat base.

Nearly eleven years before the co m m issio n in g o f Garuda at Cochin, a Royal Naval Aircraft Repair Yard, HM S Garuda, had b een commissioned at Peelamedu, C oim batoreon O ctober 1 ,1 9 4 2 , and w as inoperationfor over three years. HMS Vfliri, com m issioned at Sulur, C oim batore on February 1, 1945, was a depot establishm ent for 500 aircraft and operated Hurricane l i e and other aircraft from its airfield fro m N ovem ber 1943 until the end of the War.

On July 1,1944 HMS V allum was com m issioned a t Tam baram , Madras w hichhad the dual function of an aircraft repair yard and a f r o n t l i n e ait station, operating aircraft of a Fleet Requ irem ent U nit until March 19 ■

In 1943, the Royal N avy established th e R oyal N a v a l Air Station a Cochin vs'hichhadan Aircraft Erection D epot for a s e m b l i n g carrier aircfa^^

transported by sea for use in the naval theatres o f w ar in the east, of 130 aircraft per month. This s e c t i o n w a s c o m m i s s i o n e d a s HMS

o« February 1, 1945, w h i c h w a s l a t e r d e c o m i s s i o n e d o n August 1/

Consequent on the acquisition of S e a l a n d a i r c r a f t f o r t e requirement Unit in January 1953, the requirem entofsettingupaN ava Station with an airfield and other facilities for operating and nnainta aircraft, was projected to the Governm ent. The choice fell on Cochin ° j already existing naval base at this p lace, Vendunithy, w hich had a*

becom e the premier training establishm ent of the N avy , w ascontm g ^

to the airfield used by the Director G eneral of C ivil A viation to oper^

domestic air service. In fact, the airfield and the variou s joned

alreadybeentakenoverbytheN avy on January 1 ,1 9 5 3 and

M Venduruthy II, an adjunct of the m ain training estab lish m en t ^

and w ith r n * ^ ‘'Station,Garwda, w itha squadron o ffo u r Seala«^

The

George Douglas as the first CommandHig

ceremony was perform ed by the then

dGDictincx

M ah av irT y ag i who unveiled * ^

-

g

-legendary partly-human bird, Garuda, im m otabsed

THE NAVY GROWS WINGS / 145

epic R a m y a m , as a formation of four Sealand aircraft, led by Lieutenant P.N. Parashar, flew past dipping their wings in salute.

Speaking on the occasion, Vice Admiral(laterAdmiralSirMarkPizey,

Chief of the Naval Staff, said: 'This is one of the most important, if not the most important day, that the Indian Navy has had because it marks the beginning of naval aviation. It is a day we have all been waiting for and planning for a long time.'

A message received on the occasion from the President of India, Dr Rajendra Prasad, read :'T h e commissioning of Caruda today marks an important epoch in the history of our Navy. On this auspicious occasion I send you my hearty greetings and express the hope that this naval air station will play an important part i n the development of the Indian Navy.

Over the years, Ganida expanded its facilities and though the new establishment's initial raison d'etre was the provision of suitable operational facilities to the Fleet Requirement Unit, it soon established various other facilities that are provided in a naval air station such as training o pilots, observers and technical and non-technical persom el for operating and maintairung shore-based as well as carrier-based aircraft.

The first such facility to be established was the School for ^ rcra tt Handling and Fire-Fighting, later renamed the School for

ava

rmen

(SFNA), which was set up on August 17, 1956, with Lieutenant C o ^

mander B.S. Ranjit as its first Officer-in-Charge, for training non-techrucal personnel in such disciplines as airm anships, aircraft-hand ing, fighting, specialised transport, air photo, air traf ic contro, sa ty with Ueutenant Commander V.V. Narayan as its first Officer-in-<^arge for the training of all naval aviation technical persoiwd as wel technical training of p ilo ts , observers and flight engineers.

TTieObserverSchool was established in M archl960, w | th U eu ^ a H.C. Bhandari as its first Officer-in-Charge for indigenising the traimng ot Observers who had hitherto been trained in the UK.

to

Until 1956, maintenance of all naval aircraft

T w 1956 a HAL

the Hindustan Aircraft Limited (HAL),

xjavV itself

repair u n i t was set up i n C o c h i n . I t was, however, felt aircraft and

should be able to undertake the m aintenance of a

n

.

at

hence a Naval Aircraft Repair Organisation (NARO) w « ^ ^ ^

Cochin in February 1960 w ith L ie u te n a n t Commander V S .

^

first Superintendent. This organisation w a s also entrusted with testing and tuning o f all new systems and equipment.

Inspection

In November 1960, was established the Na WDectinn Officer for Service with Lieutenant J. Stephen as i t s f i r s t Chief Inspec

146 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

ensuring an effective quality control of all equipm ent fitted in naval aircraft.

While Hansa, at Sulur, Coim batore, continued to function as the mother establishment of all jet aircraft, its location w as not considered satisfactory. The N avy had been seeking to transfer this air station to a suitable site on India's eastern o rw e ste m seaboard but none of the existing ports met the requirements of a naval air station. The fortuitous liberation of Goa in 1961 presented a golden opportunity to Naval planners as Dabolim in Goa, situated halfway betw een Cochin and Bombay, hasa fully developed airfield which had been used by the Portuguese for several decades. This airfield was soon handed o v er to the N avy to set up its second naval air station, the existing 4,500-foot ru nw ay extended to 8,000

feetandother facilities created. On June 18, 1 9 6 4 Hansa and JN/IS55J were transfered from Sulur, Coimbatore, to Dabolim, to be followed by the stationing of INAS 300 at this air station in Septem ber 1964, after its disembarkation from Vikrant.

In ord erto en su reth eav ailab ility o f A louettehelicoptersatBom bayfe operations from ships and for search-and-rescue purposes, a small unit ot the maintenance of helicopters w as set u p a t Kw/i/fl/nn thesameye^’'

In d ia 's F irst A ircra ft C a rrie r

In 1943, the hulls of six aircraft carriers of the Majestic light were laid down in British yards and launched during the years 1944

1945. T h ecarriersw ereexp ected tobecom m ission ed for theRoyalNavy operaHons during World W ar II but the cessation o f hostilities m li'

to the stoppage of work on their construction. H ow ever, only the SIX carriers, the Leuiflfhfln, was never com pleted and w as finally up m 1 9 6 8 b u t t h e o t h e r f i v e w e r e e v e n t u a l l y com pleted and o p b

y

^

e

e

n a v i e s . T h e H

e r c u / e s w

a s a c q u

i r e d

b y

the G o v e r n m e n t o j

jj

a n d c o n u n i s s i o n e d

a s Vikrant i n 1 9 6 1 , t h e M agn ificen t w a s c o m p le ‘

a c q u i r e d b y t h e

R

o y a l C

a n a d

i a n N

a v y in 1 9 4 8 ( a n d d i s p o s e d o

M

c o m

p l e t e d i n 1 9 4 9 a n d t r a n s f e r r e d

t o t h e R

o y a l A

u s '

^

9 as Sydney, theM ajesticw as com pleted in 1955 and tra 1 . j

Australian N avy as Melbourne; and the Powetp^

p eted m 1957 and acquired by the Royal Canadian N av y as Boriao^

To quote Balbir Law:

Naval Headquarters had continued to press for acquisition AHm*-

serious negotiations had begun

Ca

1956, a new Chief of Naval Aviation was

- Captam R .H ^. Carver, RN. TTie Air Arm owes m uch to thisC

TOE NAVY GROWS WINGS / 147

during whose term of office all the detailed planning for acquiring and manning the aircraft carrier was undertaken. He was an officer with a distinguished war record and quickly moulded his team in New Delhi with determination, skill and affection, to move forward.

Even socially, the Air Branch became more conspicuous in the military and Government circles. The Carvers did much to build new bridges between the Air Branch, the Air Force and the Army.

A new training programme was launched to prepare for the

manningof the carrier and her operational squadrons. A small Naval flying unit was established at S u l u r , Coimbatore, to refamiliarises aircrew and maintenance personnel with operating jet aircraft (Vampires). I still recall, with great pleasure, starting this small i ^ t with a total complement of three officers, besides the Commanding Officer, and about sixty men. We had one empty hangar and four empty wartime barracks at Coimbatore - the two separated by a distance of almost fifteenmiles, and forwhichwewere provided one three-ton truck and a jeep, to start with. The lack of essential facilities and comforts bound us together, made us improvise, and every one found the challenge of achieving the a s s i g n e d tasks exhilarating. We ferried in our own Vampires, and made do with

empty crates and within days the flying task began. We estabhshed friendly ties with the local Air Force and the Army contingents.

Almost all the officers and men, who were at Coimbatore urmg

e

early stages, later rejoined me to form the 300 Seahawk Fighter Squadron.

. ..

Naval Headquarters was also concerned about providing a

quate shore facilities for the new carrier and her operationa aircra The airfield at Cochin was too small with no room

Sion. Furthermore, it wassurrounded byrapidlydeveloping c

cialcentres which demanded expansion of thecommercia ^

ancillary facilities. Alternative sites and disused air

coast but within easy reach of the sea, were bemg o

®

At aboutthistim e,C aptainC arver's

Indian Navy came to its end a n d the Admiralty

^ jig fter

distinguished officer who remained at

rp o N A h ad

the new carrier had arrived in India. The appom

CONA,

also been upgraded to the rank of Commo<tere.

.

Com rnodoreTaterRear Admiral)D.W .Kirke hadato^^^^^

reputationinhisow nserviceasa'go-getter a

ug^gsam anw ith

the development of the AustralianNaval

^ _ senseofhum our

a strong personality, boundless energy and a stror^

wi^ister. H e

and could be at ease with anyone from the peon t

148 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

knew thatunless detailed target dates w ere established, it would not be possible to mar\and com m ission the carrier w ithin a predictable period of time. The overall plan existed bu t its implementation required quick and responsible decisions. It w as a critical phase in which charm, tact and bluntness w ere needed to achieve the immediate objective. Commodore Kirke felt very com fortable in his new driving seat within a couple of days of his arrival at N aval Headquarters and soon went into action, As a couple, the Kirkes were very affectionate and sincere and, w ithin a rem arkablysh ort time, became an important part of the small, busy social circle of N ew Delhi.

The CONA and his staff faced a com plex organisational task involving three countries. Selection of all the different categories of personnel, their training schedules at different establishments and manufacturers of ships, aircraft and equipm ent, the delivery, acceptance and the positioning of aircraft at different air stations, workup of squadrons ashore, the trials and com m issioning of the carrier, and, finally, the work-up of the ship and her squadrons, was a mammoth task to complete from a distance of 4,000 m iles. It required skilful planning, co-ordination and leadership. It w as all brilliantly executed by Commodore Kirke who later becam e the Flag Officer Fljidng Trairung in the Royal Navy as a Rear Adm iral.

.

At this stageitw as also clear that in the absence o f a n alternative site having been found, the existing facilities at C ochin and Sulur would have to be improved to receive the frontline s q u a d r o n S '

Support facilities for the Alize's were established, and more

tantly, repair and overhaul facilities w ere extended to include

®

Seahawks. A small extension and the strengtherving of the runwap was undertaken, and provision m ade for the storage of weapons ^

ordnance, i.e., bom bs, rockets, etc. M uch credit is ow ed to WO

horse (non-specialist) Captains

of C aruda during

this

Captain N 5 . Tyabji and Captain (later C om m odore) K.K. Sanj T^e formertook command of the air station at thecriticalpoifit'

there was a sudden burst of activity on all fronts, training

and technical personnel), development o f the airfield and for the future development. His boundless enthusiasm and tei^

got him thoroughly involved w ith the Air Branch and m ost yo ^

members of the branch were influenced by his qualities

I am reminded of an accident in w hich the a ircraf t, a Firefly bu m s to his fa c e ,h a r»

back. The young officer was in a critical condition and in

^ r e .

ter two or three days, w hen barely able to whisp^^

bandages, he asked Captain Tyabji to sit beside h im and proin»

TH E N A V Y G ROW S W IN GS / 149

if he was, in due course, found to be medically fit, he would be permitted to continue to fly. Long before the accident, the Captain had already assessed the character and potential of this bright, handsome young officer, and their determination matched each

other's. He kept his promise and Sub-Lieutenant Arindam Ghosh, after months of skin-grafting, joined the frontline antisubmarine 310

Alize squadron. Ghoshregrettablydied,w henaRear Admiral, in 1985.

Towards the end of 1959 and early in 1960, our aircrew and maintenance personnel began to assemble at naval air statiorvs in the UK and France and commenced operational flying training on their newly acquired aircraft. Most of the aircrew had no previous experience of operational flying. It was an enormous task to make each individual pilot fully proficient in the skills of using his aircraft as a weapon system, and also to mould the squadron and crew^s to fulfil the varying roles of naval air warfare. The latter is liiost important, as naval aircraft do not operate in isolation but are part of a naval task force of which the carrier is a mobile air base. The limitations of size and, therefore, the number of aircraft that can be carried also dictate that aircrews and their aircraft perform a multiplicity of roles.

The frontline squadrons made excellent progress andachieved

iiighstandardsin allaspects of airtraining and work-up ashore. They received all the support from the officers and men of their British and French parent stations who in t u r n drew much credit from the achievement of the Indian Naval Air Squadrons. The stations involved were Lossiemouth and Brawdy and French Naval Air Station Hyeres, Toulon.'

'

The V ik ran t - C o m m issio n in g and W ork-up

k e e l

o f

t h e H

e r c t / t e , w

h i c h

w

a s

a c q u i r e d b y t h e G

o v e r n m

e n t

i n 1957, h a d b e e n l a i d d o w n a t H i g h W

a l k e r , N

e w

c a s t l e - u p o n - T y n e

O

c t o b e r

14, 1943. The c o n s t r u c t i o n w o r k w a s u n d e r t a k e n b y the

[^T'ov^ed s h i p b u i l d i n g concern Vickers-Armstrong a n d t h e h u l l was

^^unched on September 22,1945 by Lady Cripps, wife of the British Chan-Exchequer, Sir Stafford Cripps and the ship 'V^s formally

Hercules.

Further construction was, however, stopped m 1946

^cause World War II had ended in 1945 and the hull was mothballed J u t BeuT

acquired for the Indian N avy i n 1957, the hull was to w ^ to c

o

n

r

^

^

i t s r e f i t w

a s e n t r u s t e d t o

a n o t h e r

r e n o w n e d s h i p b u H d m g

ofrpf?l'u

and W olff atBelfast, N o r t h e r n Ireland. On completio

'

ship was commissioned a s Vf/rrflrt^onMarch4,1

•

150 / b l u e p r in t T o BLUEWATER

During the period from 1957 to 19fil

■

modernisation of the hull and eauiompnf'

'■^construction and

virtually emerged as a new ship. 'The ship m s

%

■ ™ ovae,ons in earner d e s i s n s u A a s l f a ^

“ 1 "

"ta p u ll. tile carrisT w , t

accommmodation provided for

tropicalised, additional

and certain areas p arW ly air™„H

® ^

electronic equipment installed and mnrf

'

®

electrical and

systems fitted.

w eapons and weapon control

During the early 1950c tko n

to commit itself to thecreaMnn

had continued tobehesitant

an aircraft carrier. Sir G o n a la c ^

Fleet Air Arm byacquiring

had stated in 1952 that nn

^Vy^ngar, the then Defence Minister,

carrier and Shri K.N

J^^en set for acquiring a

A yyangar,hadstatedinthprntc^If

of the portfolio after Sir

carrier Was yet to be taken

®‘” '^ p rill9 5 5 that the decision on the

approved the proposal a i u

-®^ence C om m ittee of the Cabinet finally

sej^ingintheMilitary

on April 30, 1956 (the author then

^«*sion of the Defence ^ ^ . ^ ^ ‘’•"e»Secretariat,recordedthishist tim

™ * “'’'» 'n 5 0 a r r iv i i"

S 'o u p o f officers andtechnjcal

conUn J ‘^““'pJetion of thp

Belfast to supervise the modemisa-

a

l

m

o

o

f

f

i

c

e

r

s

and sailors

h o u r s o n ^ '^ ‘“"N avy w h e n J^ ^ 3

ship officially became

tain (latpro

^

1961 with fk ^

""form ally commissioned at lOOO

'^arrant at a^J

Officer-designate,Cap'

to enahi

'^^’ ^monv at iw

out the commissioning

^‘“y in g a s h o r ^ * *

co m n l^ ^ ^ '^ '-S^ ^ v ecL n n el Belfast. W s wa^

o f f i c ^ o n b o a r d

and sailors, who were

ashore in bLk

" " ‘^sailors 1

'^dents. The S

®

‘' ni ean^l i l S

had been stayi^^g

^ o ciation , Cotml

the Bano

themselves to theloca'

^ 8''=^tandardoTj!r'^®'^T.R.Ea^8^ o r a n c h o f the local Royal Nav/

.

n,ai^t l^^P^^^sing ^is appreciation of

c o u n tr y

^ e a t c r ^ - “ ‘’ ^ h a v e d in .

„^et

i n

d

^

" " N

^

v

y

,

t h e s h i p and thj

- " ' o y tth ®

he

e crt

c, &

rp

, . j?®

^ ^ *

' h

n

e

e B e / f o c » c

“ l h

e i re ec r

n e fe u

r r

l

u i af^.

F e b r u a r y

i j j

andeapr'"'‘'''^0daKnr,'7'*'“^"

.

y in thp ” °n (on board th

t e

h

e He

H r

e c

r u

c le

u s

l )

^

» n o m in g

„ o j .g

fh an

80U

THE NAVY GROWS WINGS / 151

bluejackets of the Indian Navy, carrying heavy kitbags, began streaming on board and settling into their new quarters. More than 400 of them said farew ell to landladies in Belfast and Bangor with whom they have been stay in gforsev eralm on ths while the carrierwas still in the hands of the civilian workers. The remaining 400 arrived in drafts during the past few days and were accommodated

temporarily at the Royal N avy Reserve headquarters in Belfast,HMS

Caroline'.

Commenting on her stay in U lster w hile her husband, an officer of theVikrant, w asbusy supervising the carrier's completion, anindianw ife said.

Even if Ulster people are not so w ell versed in foreign news, they have made the greatest im pression on us by their warm welcome, and their unmhibited friendliness. Due to this friendliness, I have seen and done thingswhich Ish o u ld b e sita te to d o in ln d ia ; for example, going Out unreservedly to see m ills, factories and hospitals.

T h e O

u t s t a n d i n g q u a l i t y o f t h e p e o p l e i s t h e i r h e l p f u l n e s s . I s h a l l n e v e r f o r g e t

t h e t i m

e

w

h e n , s o o n a f t e r m

y a r r i v a l , I h a d t o c h a n g e

b u s e s i n t o w

n . I w

a s l e d b y a

k i n d

l y s o u l f r o m

C

a s t l e J u n c t i o n t o t h e

b a c k o f t h e C

i t y

H

a l l ,

a n d

p u t o n t h e

c o r r e c t

b u s .

I s h a l l r e t u r n t o

India w i t h v e r y p l e a s a n t m e m o r i e s o f t h e U l s t e r a n d B e l f a s t p e o p l e .

acr

20, 1961 C om m odore R.L.H. M arsh of the Royal Navy

to

from Harland and W olff and informally handed it over

4.

at the ship's berth at M usgrave Channel. On March

India.

Viyaja Lakshmi Pandit, the then High Commissioner for

h e r Vikrnrtt an d formally accepted the ship on

theAd° • 1

of India from Mr Orr-Ewing, the Civil Lord of

t

h

e

i

r

3 form ation of Seahaw k aircraft flew past dipping

officers a

^

t

h

e

ship. Present at the ceremony were the 1100

^^strali ^^®nof the ship, the fourthSea Land, representatives of Canada, Officer c :""®

Pakistan, the Lord M ayor of Belfast, the General

Civilian , 'J'?®'^‘^*"8-in-Chief of N orthern Ireland and a large number of In

dignitaries.

carrier's com m issioning ceremony, the Belfast

' ^ ° | ^ P o s e d i n 3,0 0 0 B.C . t o A d iti, t h e I n d i a n G o d o f E t e r n i t y ,

-

the convmissioning cerem ony of the Indian Navy s aircra

152 / b l u e p r in t TO BLUEWATER

carrier Vi^crant. T h e fou r vpr<;pc o f

hvm n

.

- ^ . e n d e n t f i g . . „ ,C a p .a i „ R S . M a h i n d r H ?

l,inguage m w h ich the h y m n w a s origin ally written

'

of theshm '^ic

o f a gu ard o fh o n o u r and the playing

bettered L

" ^t^'^dard w h ich could nothavebeen

English and In d ia n ls k ) ^ ''^ ’

w ere given in both

cerem ony took p lace in the g ian t ai rcra ft hangar of the carrier Watrh'

°

n^ost m o d em o f h er kind in the world today.

hunHrpH^ 'were the officers and m en w h o w ill m an the Vikrant and inM nrtK ' °;g y ^ s ts , in clu d ing m em bers o f th e Indian community m N orthern .re.and and w ives o f the crew in colourful saris.

the Admiralty, said that the

seenthP W c

' " f ™°^®f"<^apitalship of the Indian Navy. He had beentrroau ■

which would operate from the ship and had

S t a t in L r f x ? " ® " *

discipline and operational qualities.

M rOrr-Ewfn ^

and the ViTrronf had m u c h in common,

examples of

^

w erebothdedicatedtodu ty;they wereliving

c o n , r i t a i o n n T * “ “ ’ '*’. “ '’‘'5'-

.^ ad e a powerM

and they both had

peace throughout the free world

^ u Calm 3na dignity.

Pandit s a i ^ r * ^

Government,

"'ilestone in the nav:,i

ceremony represented a major

back into the distant r> f

India. Their maritime history w^nt

new naval tradiHons

say that much of India s

deal to the close associ

training methods owed a gre^t

efencepoiicy^a^^gg^'^‘ ’ ^ “ '®y had with the R o y a l N a v y . India S

cred itab l,to«'’; ; “ ' ° !

Navy“ ^ J " ° T ' ° h T ' a

saidaheartvL ,

^

“' e s e r v i c e ,

'vished the ship a

Indian wat^s. "

"wait the

ů

Mrs Pand't add

‘''" o n i when she arrived m

- , d „ „ ,y . e .e p .

people. As these little

the top S i I t

everything these meeti^ts“'f®?.*^«y 'vould havr®®“ "

^

ngs achieved. Tho

'" ° '‘e effect than

'gh Connmissionet

t h e N A W GROW S W IN GS / 153

*e c « w o f

an d k n o w in g

£ ' w Z « s e s and .le n g th . Mrs P an d i. said .h a t this w a s v ita l in the cause of world peace .

Oa the following day, M arch 5 , 1 9 6 1 , the V t e n f le ft B elfast a n d proceeded to Portsmouth and then to P ortland for sea trials w ith C a p ta in P5, Mahindroo in conrmand, C om m and er Y .N . S in g h as C o m m a n d e r (Air), Cominander (later Rear A dm iral) G a u ta m S in g h as th e E x e c u tiv e Officer and Lieutenant Com m ander B.D . L aw as L ie u te n a n t C orru n an d er (Flying). Forabout a month, the ViTcwnf con d u cted the trials o f a ll h e r flig h t-decic and otiner shipboard equipm ent and retu rned to B e lfa st fo r re c tification of defects and the final testing and tu nin g o f a ll e q u ip m e n t. A momentous event that occured on M ay 18, 1961 w a s the lan d in g an d anesting of the first jet aircraft, a Seah aw k, o n b o ard th e ca rrier b y

^leutenant Contunander R.H. Tah iliani, w ho later ro se to th e ra n k o f rniralas the Chief of the N aval Staff. T h e first d eck -lan d in g o f a n A liz e antisubmarine aircraft took place on M ay 2 3 ,1 9 6 1 .

and t

Vikrant had been readied fo r p ro ceed in g to In d ia m onth the carrier sailed fro m B e lfa st anci

'ompris^

^ aircraft of her je t fighter sq u ad ron , th e S ea h a w k s 1961

c '

Squadron, in the E n glish C h an n el o n A u g u st 4,,

w o * -u p off P ortsm ou th

^aimeonbMrd

P o rtsm o u th A d m iral M o u n tb a tte n

notprovid

about the perform an ce o f the sh ip 's rad ar w h ich

P a r t i c u l a r l y f l y i n g a r o u n d th e sh ip ,

‘’^'ersof the radar

stem . H e soon to ok it up w ith the m a n u fa c-

P^°ceeded to P lv m ^ I ^ f '

the defect w as rem o v ed b efo re th e carrier

^Ganvvhile thp^^

returned to P o rtsm o u th .

jk'

A

aircrAf»^«7u

sailed for T o u lo n in F ran ce w h ere sh e h ad

reco n n aissan ce a ircraft,

were two

M ay 2 3 ,1 9 6 1 . A lso em b ark ed

forcT

F,e„;^^^°^®“ ®I^l^elicopters for th e

321 Fligh t

'p la n p -ija ^ ^ ^ v ' search -an d -rescu e du ties at sea and a n in te _ .''‘'^raft during

‘

to rescu e th e crew

P'ane-^‘''®^‘’'-W eekw nX

sailed for M alta for

Operate

as th J’ f r.^’'*"8 'v h ic h R ajpu t jo in ed h er to carry out

'e atrugh,

®

helicopters on board the carrier co u ld n ot

theca, °o ^ erca rrie

t

.

AustralianM e/bowm eand

P Specialist team b

up at M alta by a B ritish carrier

' ^ ^

au thorities had d ecid ed to w o rk up

154 / b l u e p r in t TO BLUEWAHER

the Royal N ^ / s

A?m

°n

Treacher. It Boestnfhfjrro^-t tiu -'

°^® ^3^der (later Admiral) John

off smoothly without a

rf capable officer that the work-upwenl

landing w a L a d e “n c i r „ t ? , " 6 f S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

described by Admiral T reache; as a S

a l p if o tT

exlrem ely well, and it was

S

e r w .h h

" r P " ' " " *

‘ he working up of the ship

gether W,th her squadrons, should proceed with equal ease.

T h e G u ru

n av afav So r'^ ^ n ti^ ^ ^ !

team led by an experienced

report or\thesfanHTr?^ 1 -

°

subm it an independent

who led this t

^ ®

at the end of the period. Treacher,

Commander

recently com pleted his tenure as

standards of profp^c- ' i

' Carrier, Victorious. His own very high

inspired everyone’ ^Th"^*

qualities of leadership,

*enge and demands nf ^

com pany rose to meet the chal-

|hree months. Xrearh

“^volvementwithevprv^^ *

com m itm ent to the task and close

contact withpractiraiZ.t^^®^‘

work-up brought him in close

2nd, in particular

company. M ost of the sailors

sypport) Branch fo'und i t L ° -

® ^“ PP'y

Secretariat (logistic

®nd oftheWnrV

Com m ander Teacher-

chievement on their farp7

People had smiles of

"nd

H e e v e n t^ n C h ^ "

called him Com-

■ S ? e ° S

Admiraland C-in-C Fleet

'vith the initial deck-

most exciti'n

Franrp

^he South Coast

^dian N a v f l ^ ^ ‘^.^"'*‘=ouldweirv,

moulding the sW

age Oo

P ° ‘"*

offensive and

crews

work-up involves

conductedwithefS*''®'

'^^Vand h,? V"^®"take all operations,

displayed the same

''^asshor/ ^'8^1, with live weapons,

early d a ^

en th u stm ^ *;;;^ - Possible. E v e ^ one

®‘ '-ochm,andthework!T^ confidence as during

P Was a total success.

THE NAVY GROWS WINGS / 155

The Commanding Officer received kudos from the C-in-Q Mediterra-neanFJeetandanumberofother senior naval observers and was congratulated on the carrier's excellent performance v\/hich was particularly noteworthybecauseCaptainMahindroowasnotanaviatorhimselfbuthad

imbibed all the fine points of flying safety and carrier operations during his short attachment to the Royal N avy's aviation establishments and carriers. Recalls Mahindroo:

During the work-up we had to make sure that all pilots were adequately trained in night-flying at Malta because once we left Malta wewould nothave these facilitiesatsea or in India. Ourplane-guard ship, the Rajput, had a number of breakdowns and hence could not always accompany us. So I had to decide whether I could fly aircraft at night without plane-guard which was a very difficult task indeed and I knew that if I did so and if anything went wrong, I would have responsibility. lalsoknew that the Royal Navalauthorities

atMalta would also notapprove ofit. So I took Commander Treacher and the pilots into confidence and demonstrated to them thatlcould

^ Kf

^ ^'tched pilot as fast as a plane-guard ship would by throwing 3

ouy overboard and picking it up within a few minutes. They were quite satisfied and on a few occasions I carried out night-flying peraHoris without a plane-guard ship. We had decided that if an a 'T u

divert a II m y airborne aircraft to the nearest

*^*g ha^^^

up the ditched pilot myself but fortunately no such

T*l_

Toulon t

^rom Malta on October 6, 1961 proceeded to

set°

helicopters borrowed from the French Navy and

Calling at

reached Bombay on November 3,1961 after

^uadron

Aden and after disembarking the 300

Proceertino^

Squadron at sea off Bombay^ these squadrons

”8 respectively to Sulur and Cochin.

P^oceecied?*^^

arrival, the carrier had been joined by Beas and had

®heenter^^u^^ Bombay with two escorts, the Rajput and the Beas, and

'Voters on November 3, she was given a rousing

n a ^ -

^3gship, Mysore, with a i r c r a f t o f the Indian Air Force welcome to the carrier. The carrier majestically

harbour andsecuredalongsideat BallardPier at

• momentous day and received a tumultuous welcome. A

156 / b l u e p r in t TO BLUEWATER

K a t a n , w e r e p r e s e m a . B a l l a r d P i e r to w e l c o m e h e r h o m e n a v a l M a h i n d r o o rem in isces o n watershed in India's carrier's m m

o f h is stay in England prior to the

• -

.nussioning and o f h er w ork -u p andshake-downcruisethus:

Everyone on board w as full o f pride o n thecomnfiissioning day. Pride la

y

®

the fact that they form ed the complement of the

^

P of the N avy, bu t also b ecau se they w ere entrusted with

unit^T H

India's first aircraft carrier a first class figiiting

years later, probably v ery little is remembered of

thpKpl^^^f?u ^ in by the advance party o f the Indian Navy who, with

. ‘^

^ ‘’■^^^C)verseGing T eam , supervised the refit and

Wni*ff

^beVifcrant. H undreds of w orkers of Harlandand

o p eratio n ^ ^

w orked hard for three years to make the ship

decided

consultation w ith the Admiralty, h^d

to be c h a n a p ? e q u i p m e n t on board the Herculeswete obtaining

be overhauled and refitted. After

out,

m a jo r w orktobe carrno

* e Overseeinp

A t first our officers and

shipyard at a con

would m eet the manager of the

end, this was rh^

‘^^eck the progress. Towards

M

a r r h

i®Ql‘°°"^ ® ^ w e e k .

AdmialR.D. Katari

h^ '

<^a'’ed by the Naval Chi^/

Jo command the Indian

Ih ad been selected

1 feu. lh a d r e p S ^ h ? J ?

carrier. H e had asked me

r anything better.From

rarehonour an d I cou ld not

aircraft carriers a

s

t

o

learn everything

^°™Pletely ignorant of carnet

surface

quite

]

^ W that

conventional

and 50*salters su^'

‘^ e r T w L ^ ^ ^ l a n d and reached

hadtroregular n ,

m o ? c L ° " a r o u n d 15 officers

^hotels, boarding

h a d

‘he ship. A^ Belfast

popular with the lew- i

Private

P"V ate accom m odation

« ‘lo r s a n d

>o

W l a m w « «

" « » >ble to n « a „ o m ™ 2 ?

“ « o .

» '

"^"'f'dation for them *

^rom India, we

'°o Without much diffi-

THE NAVY GROWS WINGS / 157

^Refresher courses at various R oyal N a v a l establishm en ts w ere heldforofficersand sailors to fam iliarise them w ith the variou s types of equipment fitted in the ship. I too w ent through a n um ber o f cou rses and spent five days on board the Royal N avy carrier. A rk R oyal, to watch flying operations and other drills. Training of pilots a tB ra w d y and Hyeres was going on satisfactorily. I visited b o th these squadrons before com m issioning and m et the pilots and crew s. T h ey w ereall'rarin to g o '. I was assured that they w ould em bark as soo n as the carrier was ready to receive them.

Towards the end of 1960 the Indian C hief o f the N aval S taff cam e to England. R ev isited Belfast and saw the carrier under refit and w as fully satisfied w ith the progress. There w as, how ever, one p oin t that had been worrying him. The firstSea Lord had suggested to A dm iral Katarithat as the Indian N avy had no previous experience of carrier operations it might be a good idea if a Royal N avy C ap tain trained us during the work-up and until our arrival in India and that I cou ld understudy the Royal N avy Captain and take over the ship after its arrival. Admiral Katari asked for m y reaction. I told h im that if, as the Chief of the N aval Staff, he d id n o t have faith in m y ab ility to fulfil the task entrusted to m e, then I should be sent hom e. But w e cou ld n ot have two captains on the ship. The N aval C hief assured m e that he had full confidence in our officers and m en and w as certain that w e would fulfil the task entrusted to us.

carrier was to be com m issioned as Hercu/es on February 16,

ship's com pany o f about 50 officers and 800 sailors

start living on board. TTie responsibility o f looking after the of p would then be taken over from the shipbuilding yard by our livLn^"^^ 3^d sailors. At this stage, the highest priority w as given to trial ^ j^'^^°'^^°‘^3tion, m ess-decks, galleys, pantries etc. H arbou r wen^ ° n^achinery and equipm ent w ere also carried out. The ship then jj,g-3 couple o f occasions to test her m achinery but the

trials

were to be held after the com m issioning. Thereafter

radar

o f flight-deck m achinery, gunnery equipm ent,

control systenns, etc., w ere to be h eld at

o^tsmouthandPlyxnouth.

Or three

^bout 400 sailors w as due to arrive from India two

®cconut\o^t-

the com m issioning. It w as im possible to find

Caroline th

a large num ber in hotels and guest houses,

cam eto oi

^ ^ ^ '^ ^ rte rs o f the Royal N aval Reserve at Belfast,

w p ^ ”^®®cue. W ith the kind cou rtesy o f the

C om m anding

- managed to accom m odate this large num ber o f sailors

/ ' ‘ ■ u e p r i n t t o b w e w a t c r

m

d e c k s o f , h a , s h i p

t o m a n , h e f i r s . c a r r i e r o f f t e m S n M ' ' ' ' u “

c l ? ;

' h a t w e w o u M , l ? , ^ " ' ’>'- V e - y h a r t work layatad and retu rn w ith an p f r •

expectation of our

A fter the c o m r ^ l

ship,

increased. Both the

^ o ^ e n tu m of the work on board

^ °"^ p a n y g o t b u sy i n ' Z Z l

ven tu al

departurp f

®

for the final take-over and

prep aring for the nam -

first priority now was

thou gh the shin

’"8 '^ erem o n y to b eh e ld on M arch4 , 1961-Even

'■eady to receiv e imr^« .

w orkers, she had to be got

A fter the H e r c i z / p / h ^ ' i ^ u o t h e r guests.

fo rP

continued at

renam ed the V'rArran/onMarch4,sea

Portsm outh towa^/^ »u

®®*fast until the carrier was ready to sail

had been aw av fr^ ‘*^®endof Ju n e.B y this tim e, some officers and m arried to IrichK

m ore than three years. A few bad

JJJ® jetty to give the V ii-rL f

‘ ^^n 700 well-wishers wereon

® cou ld see wavint> c T * ^

sen d -o ff on the d a y o f departure.

O n arrival at

a lon g time.

"'® 8otdow !?f*^u'

a n e x c h a n g e o f normal

^ 3 p S ° ? ^ “ ‘P '^ e n r 5 M ? L ? ®

Navy.nnanufacturer

it Was W

^‘^^ools. This

^ ^*«yards and experts from various

on officers anrf*^®^P°'^>bilitv

o f trials and acceptance of

f

F>ilcJ?s h S

"^^^hineiy would restentirely

had flown

Flee! ®^^“ ‘ed by a

of a mn^

landing and taking off

S 2 J ^ ‘'

ship, in this training we

Treach“

o f the Royal Nava

Work

^ '^ P e rv icJf

provide 1 0 0 pej

" / “ “n d w o S n

®P‘“^ « o f7 h

^aj. « esta y e d w ith u s during

" « ^ ^ t s '' r i ; p f ^heist f e - i p r r S " t

? e -

light anH

Ravo

went out to

Capacity o f the

THE NAVY GROWS WINGS / 159

ship's company w ere rectified by the Royal Naval Dockyard. During this month pilots also got their initial practice o f'rollin g' (touching down and taking ofO on the deck and eventually landing and taking off from the ship.

,

^

^

It was during the six weeks at M alta that the ship worked up to her operational efficiency to enable her to launch and recover our aircraft The w ork up at M alta was indeed an experience. The ship spent normally five days at sea and returned to harbour for replenishment on week-ends.

The tempo of flying training during the work-up period could be

gauged from the fact that the Vikrant completed 1000th deck-landings by the end of Septem ber 1961, berely six weeks after her arrival at Malta. A 'well-done' message w a s received from Naval Headquarters, New Delhi.

. ,

Malta offered excellent facilities fortrainingourpilotsm rngtu-flying. Again Plane-guard was a problem. But a friendly ap p roa^ to the local Royal Air Force enabled us to get their sea-rescueaunc

three to four hours every night, and we managed to qua y som our senior pilots in night-flying.

, ^ .

u-

^

I was fully satisfied w ith the work-up of the ship. We

, ,

high degree of efficiency. Drills in fly in g control, on the gn

aircraft direction room and operations

was complete coordination and understanding between

and the engine room. I congratulated the ship s

acsis-

achievement. I thanked Commander Treacher for his v^uable assis tance and guidance that had helped us achieve W s gn ®

On October 6, 1961w esailed from M a U a .B g h t& a ta te over Malta to bid farewell to our hosts for two m o n ^ -

^

journey to India we paid courtesy calls at Alexandria, °*

Aden. Flying practice was carried out throughout

„.>,er 3,

Vikrant entered home waters on the

were

1561. Demonstrations of rocket firing, strafing

demonstra-

carriedoutby twelve Seahawks and four Alizes.

w

These

honswere witnessed by dignitaries embarked on

. ^ .g^^ay of

J^craft also flew over W orli,Dadar, Byculla

the

Jet aircraft and maritime reconnaissance Li

,upafternoon

m a flying welcome accorded by the I n d i a n Air Force. In berthed at Ballard Pier.

Nehru Visits Vikrant

^ the evening the Prime Minister accom panied by Admiral

160 / b l u e p r i n t TO BLUEWAT^R

F le e t.

a r L 'e p 'b n T a n d r N ^ ^ ^ ^

Indian

significant ev en t an d received fh l

the acquisition as a

the Vi7cra«f on behalf of India an d w i7h^‘

im p h ed in h er n a m e '. W hilP M h

victory that is

th em th at th ey sh o u ld bp n m

chip's company, he told

th at th ey h ad b een fhrnugv,iy“ ra\ned^^H h

th ey v^^ould servp tha

V

he expressed the hope that

a tou r o f the shin if

M inister then went on

theViitrflnt.

*

-•’'^as indeed a prou d day for officers and men of

T h e F ly -B o y s

Vice Adnrtiral V A TCaman,

u

^ 1 9 7 7 , com m anded

the V ice C hief o f the Naval Staff

w as im pressed bv tVio '

*

three years after her commissioning and

' - - ' 8 °-g e ttin g d ash o f our fiy-boys'. He recalls:

Thesesocalle^'flv-^^^!^^'^"?^^''^^^ proper exposure tonavalaviators.

'w ere' deliberatelv'^h

w erein m an y resp ectsa breedapart. Isay

w idely distributed '

those days thay have become rnore

iiaval culture havph^ *

service and, having imbibed the widef

else in the N avv at

^

^part. More than anyone

responsible for V,rnvi ' "‘

I think each o f them felt personally

justifiably fe ltth a t'th p l!.''^ efficacy o f carrier

aviation. They

ut in the process

” '^®^^®''°lveroundtheairdepartment,

problems. It was, if a n v ^

‘o be som ew hat im patient of other

*heit dedicatiniTt^'

‘he right direction and said

with them for f

^>' ' "8- I could also personally

of

to support rr,'

attitude that the

behind

gunnery offj^pfP^'^^^^t. la m fold that because

in their

assuror,

by different names

'^ ® re a s there .

this has

^^iators that this was not so

a carrier has man*^

^wo

with numbers.

*^any aviators!

°

officers in an entire ship,

A d m iral^ M ^ '^ f

on th e ! h-

W

i n g ,

V

i c e

■n'eShoclSeab ^ .

" ' “"'I in 1983, sa y j

®*'S/ the pioneer

THE NAVY GROWS WINGS / 161

aircraft designers in England! I have had the exhilarating experience of being flown under the Ma t ta nchery ra ilway bridge in Cochin by one of the intrepid am phibian pilots of those early days. Lieutenant

'Tiger' Joginder Singh. Singh, who later attended the naval staff course with me in 1959, was indeed a pioneer. The Air Arm was an instant success. It attracted to its fold som e very fine, young officers, among them a fast balding Sub-Lieutenant, Ram Tahiliani,w ho thirty years later was fated to lead the navy into the sophisticated jum p-jet age. The Sealands were quickly replaced by Fireflies which were ferry-flown from England by our owm pilots led by Lieutenant B.D.

Law who later led the 300 fighter squadron on its formation in the Vikrant in 1961. There were two Laws in the navy like everywhere

^ e , the younger brother being in the Supply and Secretariat Branch!

The Fireflies formed the Fleet Requirem ent LFnit in 1955 and did sterling service inhelping to im prove the antiaircraft readiness of the et. These early fliers and their maintainers formed the core of the

^*loat air squadrons in 1961 w hen the UzTrrflnf was commis-

sionad.Itwas a m ost auspicious beginning which,grafted, asitw as,

^ a g o o d , staunch and sturdy trunk, bore early fruit. There isno doubt g ^ y * ^ d at this distance in time that the naval air arm has been pro^W^^

beginning. I m ust narrate to you a story,

his fl

^^o^t^ n in trep id fighterp ilotof thosedaysand

who

The story is about Lieutenant Yashwant Bhide

got intn^

3 0 0 Squadron. D uringanexercisehisSeahaw k

Crashed

Bom bay and he had to eject before the aircraft

Was ev *

3 whole day and part of the night in the water and

Versova^"^!^'*^

^ fisherman and brought ashore at

fathprh

to reassure his parents then living in Bom bay-

an

ICS and was the Chairman of the Bank

^ believe - he called from a public

®**^'ghtbut^fh

father who had come to the phone thathe was

‘ohave said

aircraft was a total write-off. His father is reported

*'''®'Wasth ' ,

'^^” ^°*^*®randIarehappyto have you back; but tell

® P ane insured or do I have to pay for it?'

Wi°ho^!

of aviation in the Indian Navy would be

recording the contribution that was made soon

' C o m n ^ u n q u a l i f i e d success by some of our aviation Sir John T

Singh, Commodore George Douglas,

®^cher. A dm iralR.H. Tahiliani, CaptainR.H.P. Carver

162 / BLUEPRINTTOBLUEWATER

and Com m odore David Kirke.

Com m odore Y.N. Singh, the pioneer aviator of the IndianNavy, who retired from service in 1969 as a C om m odore, w as in his twenty first year w hen he was com m issioned in the Royal Indian N avy on May 1, 1943 as an Acting Sub-Lieutenant. He had already com pleted his training as a direct entry Cadet and M idshipm an at D artm outh and had served on board a Royal Navy cruiser, the Enterprise. Even before he was commissioned, he had applied for becom ing a n a v ia to r but his application was turneddownas theRIN authorities d idnot at that timecontemplatesetting up an aviation wing. His knowledge of naval aviation was thus restricted to the shortair course undertaken as a part of the Sub-Lieutenants' courses conducted at Lee-on-Solent.

The opportunity to becom e a naval aviator presented itself to Y.R

Singh under interesting circumstances. H e was serving in a Royal Navy destroyer which was sunk by German bom bers off the coast of North Africa, an action in which he played an effectiv e part for which he was proinptly awarded the Oak Leaf. On repatriation to the UK in October 1943, Smgh was Mentioned in Despatches and selected by the British Admiralty for flying training at St. Eugene in Quebec, Canada, b ecau se'England was r

operational com m itm ents', along with a batch 0

Drf^ersfromthe Royal Navy and theSouth African Navy, a n d l a t e r shifted Harvards. He thenreturned^

Hpiu-ate ^

w h e r e h e q u a l i f i e d i n f l y i n g Wildcats a

ant anTw

operational pilot. On January 16, 1944 he becam e a Lieuten-

op erationafr®

- 5

British Eastern Fleet based atTrincomalee f^

launched

® ^^^^^tion fromwhere flying training sorties we

aircraft Sinah f w t " '

u”

Ratnamala) near Colombo and the

th eR o y alN av y aircraftcam ^ r

of Hellcats operatmg off Trincom

I "

®

and was thus the

T

'vhere Singh had his baptism of fire

taken off from and landed

naval aviator andtohav

conditions. In 1945 an a

r

m

t

h

a

t

too in actual battl

Trincomalee for aninva'sio„«f ^

the Eastern Fleet set off fro^

bloodied in war when

Singh was about to be

waters east of the Aiidaman" t n d t h e Fleet w e r e s a i l i n g across the Nagasaki in Japan. The fleet

the bomb fell or'

aroim doff the Andamans when

onward m ove and began circling

ntish ships by Japanese aircraft anri^'^^f® several Kamikaze attacks on force was severely damaged. Sineh w

‘^^“ •sers escorting the strike

these aircraft while flying a Hellcat but

a dogfight w ith one of

Smgh had been sent by the Admira?™®

“ unscathed.

■j *or flying training, not w ith

t h e NAVY GROWS W IN GS / 163

, , „ a o n o . « 3 . i n s - —

r r ^

^

c i a e -

service

^

for it w f s co n sid ered th at a q u a lifie d n a v a l

tffr o m 'th e Royal Indian N avy w ou ld b e id eally su jte d in a n opacity at the Combined H eadquarters in this th eatre. B u t

^ e l^ime

services were available for t h i s p u r p o s e , p eace had d escen d ed o n S o u th

East Asia.

. T J-

_

Ur\fortunately for Singh, the N a v a l H ead q u arters m In d ia c a m e to know of his flying training only after he had retu rn ed to Inclia, w h e n th e authorilies realised the full adm inistrative im p licatio n s o f th is s p e c ia lis a tion without their approval. The officer w as th ereafter p ressu red fo r a considerable period, even after the W ar w as o v er, fo r co n trib u tin g towards the cost of his flying training, w h ic h h a d b een d u ly d e b ite d to th e Royal Indian Navy account by the A dm iralty!

After Independence, Singh w orked at N av al H ead q u arters a n d assisted in compiling the requirem ents o f the av iatio n w in g fo r th e first plans papers for independent In d ia's N avy under C o m m o d o re M a rtin S t

•Nott, Con\mander (later A dm iral) A.K. C h atterji a n d L ie u te n a n t nunander (later Vice Admiral) N. K rish n an w ith W in g C o m m a n d e r aterAir Chief Marshal) P.C. Lai as the tech nical ad v iser. A s m e n tio n e d a c o * ^ " ^ ' G o v e r n m e n t had accep ted in p rin cip le the many as six aircraft carriers for the In d ian N av y for w h ic h

‘'^Requirem ent Unit had been sanctioned.

'^'eaircra'f^

PGnod, Singh continued to fly at P alam an d A m ritsar b u t

Was

were Spitfires, M K S 8, 9, and 14 o f the In d ian A ir F o rce.

followpH^v!!

^eovilton in England for a refresh er co u rse in

helicopter cnnv

■

^ ^ ru m e n t flying course. H e then u n d erw en t a

'Jualify as a

G osport and b ecam e the first In d ian to

f'rst batch of n iim f

before the In d ian A ir F orce d ep u ted its

* Credit bvhpm

H e so o n ad d ed an o th er first to

when

I

qualify in flying a n a m p h ib io u s

M other imn

"

0 « e r at Lee-on-Solent.

Singh w as his ap pointm ent to the

thp" f ^ C oiT im andinrnfr"

its first C o m m an d er (A ir)

of SeaTaL^

Fleet Requirem ent U nit. H e led

fleet

when p J 'v J ^

d

Bom bay h arb o u r on

- ™ w e d the Indian

row 's^ f ! f-

H e then landed his aircraft

‘0 the f l a g s h i r D i

“ P

his

g t>'P, Delhi, and w as presented to the President an d

164 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

P rim e M in iste r Ja w a h a rla l N eh ru . W h ile taking off, Singh had a few an xio u s m o m en ts ca u se d b y a h arb o u r craft crossing his path but he m a n a g ed to tak e o ff after tak in g su itab le action.

S in g h la ter serv ed as the C o m m an d in g O fficer of Gantda and superv ise d th e co n stru ctio n o f the air traffic co n trol tow er a i^ setting up *e S ch o o l for N a v a l A irm en , th e N a v a l A ir R e p a i r Organisation, the Photographic Unit and the Safety E qu ip m en t Section.

^ f o r e the co m m issio n in g o f the

^mgh who

------o st officer in the N a v y 's A viation Branc a

I C on u n an d er (A ir)-d esig nate, w as sent to

g an

Com-

Cam er S v ^ u i i u n a i n a c j .

—

/ —

. , r a m e t ' S

m en t to A lbion for six w eek s to stu d y the functions y/ork-up

m ander (A it). O n co m p letio n o f this attach m ent he join and the

team of the V ikrant and supervised t h e com pletion o installationof all aviation facilities including the flight dec v?as

m aintenance workshops and landing and launching

gnsuied

Com m ander Singh w ho, along w ith C om m ander John ireac

-

an accident-free training schedule.

.

f the Navy

Y .N . Singh's nam e will find a pride of place in the arm

for having been the Service's first aviator,

carrier pilot to undergo thebaptism of fire in a c t u a l actionc the first Indian helicopter pilot.

j n t h e Navy<

W arm ing up to the reminiscences of h i s career ’ ^ggjnhis e s p e c i a l l y i n the Aviation Branch, in D e c e m b e r 1987, w hen pot

66th year. Commodore Singh, whose p h o t o g r a p h i c

allowed even the minutest details to be erased, recalled wit p 1 lemember that my views were quite clearly laid down be

Naval Staff that aviation was an integral part of the Anaviation officers were an integral part of the Executive other thmg that I felt

very

strongly about was

tjolo^

leconnaissance which should be under the command a n d co the Navy. I am glad that both these have since come about.

SitlohnTreacher, who retired as the Vice-Chief of the N a ^

Staff of the Royal Navy, feels that Commodore Sineh adequately fulfil tne expectatior\s as Commander (Air). He says:

Commander (Air), had one of

t h e NAVY GROWS WINGS / 165

.

but a s th e p ro g ra m m e d e v elo p ed , h e grad u ally the work-up team bu ,

P

“ I S g t l w ' h e a d s tt,e c o m m u n is t P arly (apparatus) m tus home area in Biharl

The credit for establishing an

to C o n Jw d o r e

d e v e l o p i n g

a

b e t h e

guiding a n g e l a n d m o v i n g

G e o r g e D

o u g l a s w

h o w

a s d

e s t i n e d

t o b e

^

. . f f Q

^

^

a t i v

e y

e a r s a n

d

s p i r i t o f t h e I n d i a n N

a v y ' s A

v i a t i o n B

r a n

c h

d

u

n

g

^

was the seniormost offlcerm this elite cad ^

British m erchant

Indian mother, he hadbegun his career a

M aster M arine w hich

marine in 1930 and had soon qualified as an

^ ships. W hen

entitlesa merchantnavy officer to com m and a wi

.. ^ n v a l N avy and

hostilities broke out in 1939 he offered to serve m the

qualifiedasa pilotin the British Fleet Air Arm as -

^

(RNR) officer in 1941. During the rest of the w ar,

ber of

number of appointments, ashore and afloat, and u n d ^ to o

j

hazardous flying nnissions. H e was soon p ro m o tw

o

lieutenant Commander and com m anded a torpedo bom ber

i g

Royal AirForce's Coastal Com m and, o p e r a t i n g agair\st G erm an

p

aircraft, The c i t a t i o n f o r t h e a w a r d o f the Distinguished Flying r

,

i«hichhe was decorated on July 6 ,1 9 4 3 , reads:

This officer has taken part in a large number of offensive

p

has displayed great skill and tenacity. One night in ^

participated in an attack on n i n e enemy m otor boats. A1

.

aircraft was damaged by intense antiaircraft fire from

vm s

/

Lieutenant Commander Douglas pressed hom e his attack and a stayed two of them. One night in 1943, w hen his squadron attaCKM

R boats, four of which w ere destroyed and three more dam ag /

eutenant Commander D ouglas displayed leadership a n d g r ^ ^

termination. By his outstanding efficiency and fearless exam ple,

'cer had contributed m aterially to the f i n e fighting qualities 0

squadron he commands.

e n d e d , D ouglas w a s g r a n t e d a r e g u l a r obtai*i A^y

L

i e u

t e n a n t C

o m

m

a n d

e r b u

t in O cto

Survevr.-^7 *‘^ ’-®^®^se a n d j o i n e d the Government o f I n d i a a s a PtQcess I'f

this time that the Indian N avy was going

Officer

aviation wing and in 1949 was looking aro

tjur

Arm experience and s o u g h t to utilise his ser ^

-

pose. Even though acceptance of this offer meant some Ics. o

' ® '- ' » W n t t o b l u e w a t e r

the A drniralty A ir S ta ff D iv isions an d ^

»^owIedge of the functions of

n a tio n , p ro d u ctio n and m o d ifi^ !r

u f

stores organ-

air eq u ip m en t, the plannincr

establish m en ts, the eau inm p %

layou t o f naval air stations and air

field s,sp ares provisin n ino

^^'l^^'rements for aircraft carriers and air-

In 1 9 5 7 D o u elas iJaf'^^^^^®^^®*®^'^^atisticsandcostingofairp!ans.

V arn p irejetin tro d iirfn «~ "

to the Royal N avy for a Seahawk and

C ourse a t L o s s i e m n i u f ? ' F a i r y MKVIIandGannetConversion th eR o y a lN a v y sta tes ' " j r " u

'Record of Flying Training'in

tt>e other students on

and enthusiasm seta fine example to

^ e citation for the V i«h°

w hom are less than half his age.'

W h is h t Seva M edall a

M edal C lass II (equivalent to the Ati

M

e d a l ) a w

a r d

e d

t o h i m

i n 1 9 6 6 s t a t e s :

Fr

Con:ut\odoreDouBUc°K^u''^* A viation in the Indian Navy in 1949, pf a ‘-°rnbatant Air^A

the driving force behind the evolution

^ t h e Indian N avva f ^ ’^*^

N avy. The development of aviation

initiative, harH 1

'"® P°^*tionithasattainedarelargeIydue to

^asvoluntarilv

and leadership o f Commodore Douglas-

“ ! o r d e r t o s e t

d a n g e r o u s f l y i n g m i s s i ^ r w

^“ a b ,lu ie s (h e w a s s e v e r e liy ° ''" ^ pilots and, despite phySiC^

thp forefront in flym g

during World W arll), heissU-

tD the rank of C om m od ore,

Headquarters th^° “''Nation; as the D‘

various capacities, most

h S w "

Air Equipment at Nava

period I f Z T t ^ P P o m t^ n t

Air Staff

.

^ 1 9 5 7 D o u b W

years.

'

o f Naval Aviation, (ot^

“ ^ ‘genous man^ff

P*«yed an i „

»«lecHonofthe

° f ‘heFrencr^^^^ role m the acquisition and

^

a x r c r a f t

f o r t h e

W

h

e l i c o

p

L

a n d

the ace aviator.

^^ree serv icesh ad .

I ' ^as to liaise whh

'^enon -?

to report to

'^••^'''^eArn.y T;,/"® Defence Minister

A

i r

F o r c e

a n d

THE NAVY GROWS W INGS / 167

r e c o m m e n d a helicopter co m m on to all. O n v isitin g the A ir C h ie f, A ir M a r s h a l Subroto M ukherjee, I w as in fo rm ed th at the A rm y re q u lre -

mentwould be paramount to an o p eratio n al role. I th en called o n the Army Chief, Genera! K.S. T h im ay ya. In b rief h e sta ted th at th e Army wanted a helicopter cap able o f liftin g 15 fu lly arm ed sold iers to an area of seven to tw elve thousand feet altitu d e, i.e., a fo rw ard area in either Assam, K ashm ir or Ladakh. O n in q u irin g w h a t m o d e oftransport was at present being used, h e s a id ,'M u le s '. In q u ick tim e, using pencil and paper and taking into accou n t the d istan ce/ trek k in g factor and equipment, food, etc., required for 15 sold iers fu lly arm ed , I worked out that one helicopter, in the co u rse o f three m on th s o r more, would do the work o f 150 m u les.T im m y laughed, called up the Air Chief and said, 'I have D ouglas h ere and he tells m e th at he h as your approval to select a helicop ter to m eet a n A rm y o p eratio n al yequirenuit. He further has proved con clu sively that o n eh elico p ter n^ules plus accou trem en ts.' T im m y th en h an d ed

ri¥>nri-

3sked w h at h elicop ter I w as reco m

P

Alouette II, a French m achine. I also stated that

thehpr'

^ s^ ccesso rh elico p ter,A lo u ettee III, w h ich w ou ld be

c o u r s e ^ would recom m ended for final pu rch ase and o f A'rcraftV'''^^*^

assem bled irutially at the H in d u stan

manufa t

bangalore and to gradually give w ay to the Indian-

Staff

C h ief then stated that he w ould h av e the

Soverninp* “ y my figures, and also that, prior to gettin g final would be indicated to other interested

*0 have

U SSR, the U SA , the British and the French, and

Operational ^

evaluated in India under

^'^•^ations^ conditions in A ssam , K ashm ir and sea level m on soon t the A louette III wa s la ter acquired for all

IV ^regard

operating in its new indigenised aoator, C hetak.

says- ^

selection o f the antisubm arine aircraft for the Vikrant,

^ general purpose antisubm arine aircraft in the

^‘‘‘^raft

Carrier Paper show ed the Seaha w k as the fighter

jQjg

Gannet in the antisubm arine, reconnaissance and

In iQciy 1

and theA^ ^ was sent for flying attachm ents to the Royal N avy •

^ Britain I flew all current Royal N avy

oundthat the Gannet, while having twin-engine capabil-

168 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

ity , h a d se v e re m a in te n a n c e p ro b lem s. I also found that the French N a v y h a d o rd ered th e A lize aircraft w hich had a Rolls RoyceDart en g in e to fu lfil th e sa m e ro le as the G annet.

O n retu rn to In d ia and o n taking up the appointment of the D ir e c t o r o f t h e A ir S ta ff D iv isio n , I forw arded my report on my a tta ch m en t an d reco m m en d ed th at the Indian Navy do not buy the B ritish G an n et b u t, a fte r evalu a tion b y sending a Navy team to France if fo u n d su p erio r, th at th e In d ian N av y purchase the Alize.'^tben C h ie fo fN a v a l A v iation , C a p t a i n R o d n e y Carver, appreciated tmy

re c o n m e n d a tio n w en t co n trary to the N aval Headquarters h®

Paper. H e took m e along to see the N aval Chief, Admira th en in d icated that the D efen ce M in ister w as very averse to a acquisition prim arily because of adverse experience

^ith tank

w h ich, as H igh C om m issio n er in London, he

purchases. It w as agreed that a N av y e v a l u a t i o n t e a m wou

^

final recom m endation as to the pu rchase: Gar\net Vis-a vt rest is all history.

A distinguished sailor, aviator and pioneer, Com niodo«

Douglas, w ho is now in h is m id-seventies and settled in Victor , recalls w ith m uch nostalgia;

The m ellow ingyears give rational perspective to a Navy in

expanding to m eet its future defence and f i g h t i n g responsi integrated to a high m orale in its officers and m en'.

P'o^eer aviator. A dm iral R-H. Tahiliat^'

After

theN aval Staff in 1987, has m any firsts to hi

nia.

^

M idshipman at

g,

01 1950 H e rn

Tahiliani was comiT\issioned onSep

.j,

Begumpet for b a S

Air Force J

inVampires, iustas

‘hen to Hakim pet for jet tra»^

Navy - m fact TahiUani

were being inducted into

. g(i

flew Sealand aircraft f o r * 4

a year. Led by the leeenda^, V

U

n i t a t C

o c h i n for abo

pilots of theFRU used the Sealan'nT

' Tahiliani and the other intrep

of the Fleet in order to give

out dummy attacks on shi{^

tracking aircraft targets

and

experience in detecting an^

occasionhis aircraft touched wat^r H

a*^«-aircraft shoots. On one

but he got away with a letter of dispie^s"® “

suffered damage®/

THE NAVY GROWS WINGS / 169

I n

1957 T a h i l i a n i w a s s e n t t o t h e Indian Air F orce S t a t i o i i a t T .m b atam for Ihe flying Instructor's

Air Force College at Jodhpur and then to the Jet T raining W in g at H a k i m p e t a s an in stru cto r a fte r q u a lify in g as an In stru m e n t R a tin g Examiner, the first Indian naval pilot to do so. H e w as soon to proceed t o S u l u r to set u p the N a v a l Je t F lig h t in 1 9 5 9 , a s s is te d b y L ie u te n a n t R.N. Ghoshas the senior pilot and the late L ieutenant S.G . V ich a rea s the Engineer Officer, a daunting t a s k accom p lish ed w ell w ith in the targeted time-frame.

T h e n e x t f e a t h e r i n T

a h

i l i a n

i ' s c a p

w

a s

t h e T

e s t P

i l o

t s

C

o u

r s e ,

o n c e a g a i n a f i r s t i n

t h e I n

d

i a n

N

a v

y , f o r w

h

i c h

T

a h

i l i a n

i w

a s d

e p

u

t e d

t o F r a n c e i n 1960 f o l l o w

i n g w

h

i c h

h

e w

a s t h

e

l o g i c a l c h o i c e

f o r t h e

a p p o i n t m

e n t o f t h e S e n

i o r P

i l o t o f t h e

S e a h

a w

k S q u

a d

r o n

i n

J a n

u

a r y

1961 a n d e m b a r k a t i o n i n t h e Vikrant. I t w a s o n M a y 18,1961 t h a t h e b e c a m

e t h e f i r s t I n d i a n p

i l o t t o l a n d

a j e t a i r c r a f t o n a n

a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r

b y l a n d i n g a S e a h

a w

k o

n

t h

e V

i f c r a « f , f o l l o w

e d

b y L

i e u

t e n

a n t G

h o s h .

R e c a l l s T a h i l i a n i :

T h e h o n o u r o f b e i n g t h e f i r s t N

a v a l p

i l o t t o l a n d o

n

b

o

a r d

t h e Vikrant

w

o u l d n o r m

a l l y h

a v e g o n e

t o

t h e

C

o m

m

a n d

i n

g

O

f f i c e r

o

f

t h e

S q u a d r o n ,

L

i e u

t e n a n t

C

o m

m

a n d

e r

( l a t e r

C

o m

m

o d

o r e ) B .R .

A

c h a r y a , b u t l u

c k i l y f o r m

e o u

r C

h

i e f o f N

a v

a l A

v i a t i o n

w

a s v i s i t i n

g

Brawdy t h a t d a y a n d s o t h e C O c o u l d n o t g o a n d t h e S e n i o r P i l o t w e n t w

a s o n e

o

f

t h e s e

l u

c k y

t h i n g s

a n d

I

s t i l l r e m

e m

b e r ,

i t i s n o t q u i t e p

r o p

e r f o r m

e t o s a y s o , w

h e n

I w

a s t a x i i n

g b a c k

G a g ^

^raivdy, I t h o u g h t o f t h e w o r l d ' s f i r s t a s t r o n a u t , Y u r i w

o r k - u p

t h

a t

f o l l o w

e d

,

T

a h

i l i a n

i h

a d

a h

a i r - r a i s i n

g

During a training flight:

’ ' ^ ^ ’ ^ p

e r i e n c e d

m

a r s h a l l e r g o t m

e l o

s t , t h e y d

i d

n

o t k n o w

W

e r e

( r a d a r s c r e e n ) w

h e r e I w

a s . I w

a s f l y i n g a t n

i g h

t a n d

t h e y

recko

b r i n g m

e

b a c k

b u

t f r o m

m

y

m

e n

t a l

D .R . ( ' d e a d

‘ E s t i m

a t e d p

o s i t i o n

) I k

n

o

w

t h

a t t h e y w

e r e g o

i n

g t o t a k e

e v e n t u

a l l y I w

o u

l d

h

a v e t o p u l l

t h e m

H

i n t o t h e w

a t e r .

B u t t h e r e w

a s n o

w

a y I c o u

l d

t e l l

I c o

u

l d

s e e t h e l i g h t s o f a p

a r t i c u

l a r i s l a n d

a n d

I t o l d

^

w

h e r e t h e s h i p t h o u

g h t I w

a s . A

n d

* ^ ® m

s e l v

I

a c t u

a l l y

w

a s

a n d

t h e y

soon r e o r i e n t a t e d

* ^ ® y b r o

r a d a r , s a y i n g , ' O

k a y , w

e h

a v e n

o w

g o t y o u

' , a n d

' ^ g h t m

e i n f o r l a n d

i n g . B

u t f o r t h e l u

c k y s i g h t i n g o f t h e i s l a n d .

™ ' ®‘-‘® “ n t i o b i . u e w a t c r

■ « a c h e r , h o w e v e r f e e M . w a s a l l i n , h e d a y s w o r k : 1 'r o u g h o u l a n d w c h a d n o 't h in o

w a s exrelleni

miss in actual S

i

r

m em iorung,how ever th .

P^^^aps, worth

°

CCA (Carrier

Iheperlormance

p lo ts felt dangerous s ih ia t'

such that a number of

T a l^ ia n iw a so n e o fth n ^ p

allow ed to develop.

R>ing Controller losino w

particu lar incident related to the

recovery instructions

w ithou t giving him any positive

sea.

allow ed him to drift slow ly down towards the

H a p p j j y | K p _ _

^ a v e r y ,b u tt h e r e w « r ^ r °

w hich are often the setting for

K«.u

flvino

personal achievem ents and records

lh»T j.P®'‘®orial achievpm **!

pioneering operations was

tivpf

’They ma

'hose taking part and a record for

m o rp T ^

those who

spectacu lar in compara-

vvork-un'*'^"*‘^ ® y 'v e r e i^ jS

naval aviation for thirty or

P’

^^^Pectacularinthecontextofthisfirst

how Trearh

Perfon^arfce

" " ^ ° « « g e d him and expressed his

J j ‘cher wasalway t

'''

to do twngs /aster

^

away

awa f jrJ

o^

pil

P’’o

° l ‘b

u

b t

u t

8 ®' ' off and ‘I’®

th quicker

e quicker

on

Q_ I f S '!,"

a ^

shPi

p U

i s

f

so th

th at

at s'he'°can°*'

quickerth

e

th sh

e ip

sh c

ip acn

an

on an’®•

<^ourse^‘ ^^^^erable

Proceed on her nussion.

Carrie!

« One of

threat when she is

the ttaarrooA-«*

” ‘ *^usiK,

° e

* v

v e

er ^

v i

t l!

K ;-! *^'"

, 8

*‘®

6= ' wh

nich y

ou

o tr

t y

r and d

ana o

‘*?“ ble-quick time. One

y o u a A °iK ^ ® ’' ‘

third

landings,

of ihevvires liw^^ “‘^ly ok»

* t^ame

^^®®cher paid me a

V °

<^^®wroom and said,

in m I*^i

'^ *'o t o o k

^

“ ^ d r o n C

o m

W May 1961 and ,k

°^®fasiK.

^ ° " ^ a n d e r r

t o an u x u a v o u , ? “ ; ® " . P * > o t , X

' P

»

o

t o

f [ u

.

^

‘ " C ' d e n t whi e ^ ^ u a d r o j ®

^ ® “ h a w

k S q u a d r o n

unfortunately,

on her way to

THE NAVY GROWS WINGS / 171

Bombay^ anticipating a tum ultuous reception from the hom e port and had decided to launch all her aircraft before entering harbour for a form al flypast over Bombay harbour in honour o f the Prim e M inister, But there was suddenly a development that took everyone aback. Tahiliani vividly rememebrs that nail-biting episode:

We had moments of anxiety on our w ay back w hen a couple o f disgruntled sailors, for reasons not know n, w ent and stuck pins into some of the electrical wiring in som e of the Seahaw k aircraft, som etning that hadn't happened before and hopefully never happens again. We were due in Bom bay on the m orning of N ovem ber 3, 1961

before moving in, we had planned to fly all the operational aircraft we had. Tw elve Seahaw ks and six Alizes were going to take part in the fl)/past over Bom bay and we were determ ined that all a rcraft would get airborne and not a single one should be left behind an ^ e r v ic e a b le state. Fortunately for us, the faults were soon M

rectified by

Lieutenant (later Vice Admiral) B.G.

lob T

' *he Squadron Electrical Officer, who did a magnificent

anntV^

that these disgruntled guys did not get

able

the aircraft and render them unservice-

on

officer sentries around the clock in the hangars and

had tfi

the last three days and only those sailors who

tea

aircraft were specifically checked and allowed

airc^^°^^^

And happily for us, on the appointed day, all 18

I

in the flypast, only two reserve aircraft having

” behind as no pilots were available to fly them.

t o o k o v e r t h e c o m

m

a n d o f t h e S e a h a w

k S q u a d r o n a n d

a s h o r e ^

t h e S q u a d r o n .

T h e r e a f t e r , a f t e r a b r i e f s o j o u m

Vikrant i

t h e L i e u t e n a n t C

o m

m

a n d e r ( F l y i n g ) o n b o a r d t h e

^ ^ 6 4 a n H

f

1 9 6 3 ;

h e b e c a m

e

t h e F l e e t A

v i a t i o n O

f f i c e r i n A

u g u s t

W

m

s e l f o n b o a r d t h e M

y s o r f d u r i n g t h e 1 9 6 5 o p e r a t i o n s ,

^ o n s -

b e e n

d o c k e d f o r h e r a n n u a l r e f i t . D

u r i n g t h e s e o p e r a -

" ' r o n p r t *

a f e w

s h e l l s , s o m

e o f t h e m

w

i t h p r e c i s i o n a n d s o m

e i n t h e

v v e a _ '

* * ^ ® c t i o n a n d f i r e d

a

f e w

d e p t h

c h a r g e s a n d o t h e r a n t i s u b m

a r i n e

I

d o

b e l i e v e t h a t t h e

( P a k

s u b m

a r i n e ) G

t o z i w

a s

I ^ t ^

action.'

^ ,,

N a v J ^ ^ ^ a c k o n t h e a s s o c i a t i o n o f R o y a l N a v y o f f i c e r s w i t h t h e f o d i a n t h e f o r m

a t i v e s t a g e o f t h e F l e e t A

i r A

r m

a n d t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n

^

t h e s e o f f i c e r s t o w

a r d s i t s d e v e l o p m

e n t , h e s a y s :

y o u a r e s t a r t i n g a n e w

o r g a n i s a t i o n , y o u h a v e

t o

h a v e s o m

e

172 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

p e o p le w h o h a v e h ad th e e x p e rie n ce and not merely knowledgebased on o th ers' experience. I tju s t m akes the process of acquiring skills that m u ch faster. 1 can n ot, for exam p le, think of the Vikmnl having had h er w ork-u p w ith o u t the h elp o f Jo h n Treacher who even at that time im p ressed us so m u ch. H e w as o n ly a Com m ander but I remember saying to m yself that this o fficer w ou ld one day become the First Sea Lord. H e a lm o st d id -h e retired as the R oyal N avy's Vice-Chief of the N av al S taff in the rank of A dm iral. W e had to have this type of gentlem en in the begin ning to hold our hands and shov^' us how to operate aircraft from carriers. W h en w e are trying to leam toopera^

aircraft fro m sh ip b o m e platform s, the com plexities of trying to so efficiently are m any and there are m any p r o b l e m areas which are n

o t d

i s c e r n i b l e

e v e n t o

a n

a v i a t o r .

I t t h u s h e l p

s t o

g e t s o m

e e x p e ^

g u

i d

a n c e

t o

s t e e r y o u

f o r w

a r d

t h

e r i g

h

t w

a y

i n a s h o r t e n o u g h m i

and then you take off and are on your own.

ko Poval

To w ork up the carrier w e had only three officers fromt

y ^

N av y . W eh a d Joh nT reach er as Commander (Work-up)/

Lieutenant Com m ander w ho was the D i r e c t i o n O f f i c e r a n a L ieu ten an t Corrvmander w h o w a s th e O p e r a t i o n s O f f i c e r a

ciated w ith the flying part of operating a carrier.

Commenting on the delay of 14 years after In d e p e n d e n c e acquiring our first carrier,Tahiliani is of the opinion that after of power,

Britain had arrogated to herself the responsibin^

m amtairtng a bluewater navy w ith each C om m onw ealth ip p o i^ b ilitie s reduced to coastal defence w hich precluded naval a f^ee India's N avy's first C-in-C, Admiral Parry,'

sought as early as in 1947-48, toestabl

* ® ^ ° y “^^^dianNavy to be developed around two ligh‘

p r ^ p o s ^ ^

'" 5 5 and the other two years later,

Tahiliani feels ’

Itw asfortu itous 0

out on board the

of the N aval

S t e p h e n C a rlill (th e Chjef

catapultfortheVi7crnnt.TheshinKr!?vf ^>scussiot\ took place or^

catapultw hich put a limitation on

®

b e operated f« ,m t h e c a r r ie r ^ p t 1 -’“

‘he aircraft that could

at that tim e felt that

t h e NAVY GROWS WINGS / 173

that we should insist on the catap ult being redesigned so that at a t o

date we could operate aircraft heavier than the Seahaw k such

T Z French Etendard. D uring the discussion,

A d ^ r a l looked

atm eandsaid, 'W h at does the young av iato r think? Isaid , Sir,Itlu n k if we are going to insist on learnig to w alk before w e run, we nught end up by only walking. W e m ight not be able to run at all. W hat is so difficult in flying aircraft? W e can fly Seahaw ks now , tomorrow we canflyfasteraircraft. M yp erso n alview is that we should insist on theu redesigning the catapult.' I do not know w hat happened thereafter but 1 was later told that t h e A d m i r a l t y had no spare capacity in its design department for the task and we had to accept the 110- oot catapult and to satisfy ourselves w ith flying only the Seahawk.

Treacher, however, feels otherw ise:

To have fitteda larger catapult would h a v e b e e n unrealistic in its day.

The Royal Navy w as going through agonies in considering what aircraft would replace the V ixen and the Scim itar and would eventually follow them w ith a generation of the Phantom and Buccaneer before ultim ately arriving at the Harrier a n d S e a l ^ g . t would be very easy to congratulate the Indian Navy on having foresight to have cut out the interm ediate stages!

Recalling his French experience, Tahiliani says:

French at this time w ere developing the Etendard-4 for

aircraft carrier and wanted to offer theaircraftto the IndianNavy and Australian N avy but its entry speed i n t o the arrester wires and

"unching speed were beyond the capacity of the Indian and Ausfra-2nd so they started a project to develop the 4-B version

"*^ch was the long-w ine derivative of the E ten d ard -4. They p r^

® glossy brochure and tried to convince you that

^»ched the levels of co-efficient where it could operate froni the A^^heendof m y te st pilot's course I was sent d o ^

g

I w,

evaluation of this 4-B aircraft in Istres, South of

tho!® f

dem onstrate to the French that they had

of co-efficient. If the French

co n tm u ^

h a v S r ”'® '*® y '^ o «ld p erh ap sh av e been a b le to d o it a n d w e j

^ vebeen able to replace the Seahaw k withEtendard 4-B but the t o

c o n r ’

i "

t h e E

t e n d a r d p r o j e c t .

^®cau«5o*'s'^u

Seahaw k, w hich had no mg

^

- it had no radar, stretching i t s l i f e b e y o n d anything 3 *

174 / b l u e p r in t TO BLUEW ATER

else cou ld h av e d o n e',

recalls:

T reach er takes a jo u rn ey dow n memory lane and

the two squadrons

w ere the more livdyof

pilots.

perhaps only to be expected from fighter

strong p e r s o n a S s . ^ F l l i l ? '''^ "

capable and

ships' officers rrpaf«»^

operations w hen first encountered - by

N ereis an u rgen cvnn t

w hich they are not accustomed,

from being resDoncihlp ° ® ^ * s e required in peacetim e and it comes for instance m ust work

^'rcraft w ith lim ited fuel reserves. Radar

t i m

e

a n d a t a j

j

p

a

i

-

o

r

a n e x e r c i s e - b u

t a l l the

S p e e d t o C r e a t e t h p

b o i l e r s c o n n e c t e d a l l t h

w

i n d s p

e e d

o v e r t h e d e c k m

e a n s a i l

3 h o s t o f o t h e r s e r v i r p s

u

c a t a p u l t s . A n d

^ b e c o m

e e s s e n t i a l

o ^ i c e h a v e

b e e n h i g h l y d e s i r a b l e

^ n d e r E d w S d * ( t h e '7 j2 ^ ^ 1 ® ^ P responded splendidly, Com-steamrequi^ed and seldom

Officer) provided all the

?^® «ectfrom H yco

h ehad tobeshovvn

it was. The

S u

n i l " ' *

^

“ ^

a n

d

e r f h

f l ^

^

^

D

^ ^ P ^ ^ t m

e n t

w

e r e

r e m

a r k a b l y

e v e ^ t h -

k e p t

t h

^ ^ n ^ i r a l ) K

r i s h a n D

e v a n d h i s

e v

e r y

o

^

g

, ,

^

* ^ e p t

t h e

a i r

s t o r e s a v a i l a b l e a s w

e l l a s

'^ommander Ca ,

theuri^ccrstomed7^'^‘^"°°"'(*"^O ffic^

Executive Officer,

air-crevv w it^

Renumber and

mess) and handled both

^ the On

“ '’*^®rstandina

behaviour of the

" « n d e r )^ N

Off,ce^treuL"'^ -PPropriate firmness,

of the Air Departm'

® voluble

Commander (later Com-

The Direction Off

®®gues felt he was a great

P

p r a c t i c e s . T h e s e " ®

®

' ° “ * * ‘ t u a t i o m

K ® ^ A

p p r o a c h

p r a c t i c e s w

e r o

^ ® * n g a l l o w

e d

e s s e n t i a l d a y l i g h t

THE NAVY GROWS W INGS / 175

preliminaries tonight flying and failure o f the o fficer in ch arg e to train andcontrol his team effectively resu lted in a total lo ss o f co n fid en ce by the air crew. Fortunately the C ap tain did n ot flin ch fro m the firm action required and after rem ovin g the cu lp rit, th e team w as ab le to restore faith in their capability in tim e to b eg in n ig h t o p eratio n s.

It is very unusual to face the task o f n ig h t-q u alify in g an en tire A ir Group; this can o n ly h a p p e n a ta b irth o f a co m p letely nev^ N av al A ir Arm drawn exclusively from w ithin the Service. Ju d g in g w h en p ilo ts are ready for the transition to n ig h t-fly in g calls

fo r

a close

wedge of

their particular

ap titu d e

as w ell

as

their

Ws

attitude. No two pilots are the sam e in their reaction to

tjualifv'*^

hands' available, these had to be

created by

carefull?^ i

officers and sen io rp ilo ts w ith one or two

'veather H't

juniors in an 'early ' batch. Basic condition o f

®ssentiall

som e w ind, preferably a m oon and

sionarva’^f^

bow l' visibility problem s), p roxim ity to a diver-

fime.

^^‘^^''silability ofa p la n e-g u ard w eren ecessary allth e

^°yalI\Taw^^

ship w as w orking up off M alta and all the usual

^^®faciliti

could be called upon, and particularly

Providf^*^' ‘'o y al Naval Air Station, H alfar, they did n ot extend destroyer

^

guard for night flying for w hich an Indian

•oserviceah

sailed from Bom bay. U nfortunately due

other mo

problem s she never becam e available to Vikrant a n d

h ™ “ ? t'^ x ito b e .a k m ,

rescn

^

Service Authorities in M alta, the RA F put a

disposal and, after careful briefing about

station H •

‘■equired to take-up and rem ain in

^^sentiai

flying operations, they provided this absolutely

^quadro

throughout night-flying. A pilot from one o f the

^ovvled"

at all times to provide the

cockpit escape procedures had a rescue become

*^6 wiii^ They all appeared to enjoy this temporary duty. W ithout response, this final and crowning part o f the flying

^|P Would have been impossible.

W i t h Q u a l i f i c a t i o n for both squadrons went remarkably weJl diverc*

than the average number o f 'bolters

and s ore

f^el. All pilots had to be handled differently and I

appro

onie Lieutenant Santosh Gupta who made

® ^ ‘

thew°

only to flare just before t o u c h - d o w n a n d hence float over to'bolt'several times. F i n a l l y I t o o k the microphone from the

176 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

a'ld saW loW m / Ify o u d on 'tg el o

u n

,,

-

j m e . w i.. send you ashore and y ou w ill never come back to the sm p .

caught the target w ire on h is n ext approach. Heisnowa

°

(Rear A dm iral) still servin g and he recalls the occasion

With some am usem ent.

^ the knowledge that after leav in g the Victorious - where I had en(^ommander (A ir)fo r tw o years - I w ould be the leader of the I arranged w ith Commander (Air) at

the three m ost experienced pilots in the

exnT-'

Squadron out to the ship for som e deck-landing

They duly arrived in the circu it from Brawdy, where the

four

the last few m onths o f w ork-up ashore, and made

beforp ral

four catapult shots each from the Victorious

^

m u ch aw are o f the critically

andtheval

*^^se three officers w ould play in the Air Group

pilots It was

^®cl^'landing experience in advance of the other

The

Commandina

Lieutenant C om m ander Balbir Uw<

®

Acharva ~c;p ■

Squadron and Lieutenant Comma^

Tahiliani. b n

Squadron and Lieutenant R-

^ommander (Flvinl" a‘‘? "

^961, Law becam e Lieutena^

^ahiliani became »V,oc^

'

com m and o f the Squadron a

^twas diffi 1

^

pilots to'^thosl^r?'”

standard o f perform ance of the

^ ahonwhich obia\p„rt

A rm s b ecau se o f the

% ing exner-

pilots, although they had di

carefully

a main

set-backs such as wo

operation'^^®^

this w

Confidence has to

pressure Was

rneant that the pace at W

'hework-up PP‘>ed aU aircrew

a ni

^

very t e l l and by the end ;

partir.,1 .

^

as theircontemporar*

throughout *K ^^.'f'^'arly

durinBnf„‘P-^had

by the aualitv of the sailo*®

It w7 s

ca..'^‘ >»^ed7 K

quality of the

OUg]

'ff-d,

Telegraph^ Pe??^ ^®adine°J^'^d a

sailors w ere relaxi^'g

sept

the Indian Ari^^" shouij^'^^paper*/

f P™Po«ion of

bu

the sailors ^

^rm edForces“t ’'° :

heading theTim es or th«

suS'^l^'^Prised at the ability

°^viousiy well-educatetJ

t h

e

NAVY GROWS WINGS / 177

' “ “S p tain Mahindroo w as an

who grasped

understanding. The rnystenes o f

® P

of Advance

manoeuvring required to

w ith which he soon

(MLA) and meet launch and landing

g

^^e compass

became v e r y familiar. I w ell rem em

^

him that

platform in the early stages of the

'^ P

g

nieant the green

t h e f l y i n g p r o g r a m

m

e s h o v ^ e d a l a u

n

c h

a t

.

g ^ g a j y c o u r s e

flag for the first aircraft - and hence the ship

g

^

into wind with the required wind speed over

and said,

a t t h a t i n s t a n t . H

e l o o k e d t h o u

g h t f u

l l y a t m

e f o r a m

o

m

e n

t a n

Two or three days later when the flight-declc

jq tell

sharp as they

l ^ a v e b e e n , h e w as qu ick to com

me that when the ship was into the wind and w

....nch orecisely on

over the deck, he expected the first aircraft °

.

^ u ch h e w a s

t i m

e . H

i s t o n e w

a s v e r y f i r m

b u

t h i s

e y e s s h o w

of s t r e n g t h

enjoying the situation. H e continued to be a

.

the

throughout the work-up and handled prob ems

„iane-eiJafd, to

C.C.A. (Carrier Control Approach) and lack of a pia

B

which I refer later, w ith g r e a t determination.

^

A bright and resilient personality who was a «

extremely

1-aw had to make the very difficult transi

^ -^ is in itself

demanding task of L i e u t e n a n t Commander (

fot

'vQuld have been enough for most

f

he should be fuHy

thenext Commander (Air), I w asdeterm ineo

j,is ja y

’^ight-qualified and to that end it was

jfo rth is w a s a t the

t l e c k - l a n d i n g f i r s t . T h e o n l y tim e h e could

^

-otainine f®’^

end of the day's flying and so I put him on

^ vveek. That he

or four catapult shots and arrests a

( . o m

p l e t e night qua

completed40 day deck-landings and

..Riding ability-

f’cation says all that is needed about his

w henhe'bolted a

He achieved all this with one minor laj>se

J)'s reaction time at the end of a tirmg d y

* ® ^ , w k

^avebeen. P o w ercam eo n to o late oavoid and the S ^ a w J

^’f'gle, his hook caught the edge o

shaking herself

Appeared almost to slop in mid-ait

^

' " “ t e o n e s e a . a „ o m

- ^

178 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

Commander (later Admiral and C hief o f the Naval Staff) Oscar Stanley Dawson and indeed w ise to appoint him to this crucial position. It is the responsibility of the N avigation O fficer to resolve the conflicts of the safety of the ship, the m aintenance of her Mean Line of Advance, the requests of the Air D epartm ent for launches and recoveries and often also special wind directions for engine runs, etc., the stationing of escorts and so on, on behalf of the Captain.

Dawsoncarriedout all these dem anding tasks w ith great efficiency, determination and tact. He quickly appreciated the need to have a very close understanding and working relationship withFlyco and made full use of the ease with which potential conflicts of interest could be resolved by personal contact. Despite modern-day

electronic communications the close physical proxim ity ofFlyco to theCompass Platform provides thebest and m o s t i m m e d i a t e answer.

1 personally found Dawson a wonderful person to work with and the success of the Vikrant work-up owed m uch to his persona dedication.

Commodore DavidKirkeOater Rear A dm iral)wastheChiefofNaval

1962, the period that saw the cuHm-

with the arrival of the Vikratil,

Rodnev C a r v

f

^^^''^^refully moulded by his predecessor, .

andcohesivp^'^'

naval aviation becam e a viable, effic

selecS n o r a T ? ^ ; "

undertaken by Kirke were th

major airfield

* a t

had been provisional

antisubmarine aircraf

rejected X

‘he Gannet which he himself had

Navy, because ofitslimuJ?on"^"'®” ‘'

was offered to the

ity and so he decided in rin ru

Performance and operational avail

French Breguet Alize 1050 v .-ith r R ^ r

I f stiff

o p p o s i h o n

f r o m

t h e B r i t u i ?

•

D

a r t e n g i n e a n d a g a i n s t s

o b t a i n i n g

t h e a c c e p t L c e

l o b b y ,

s u c c e e d e d

T h e o t h e r i m

p o r t a n t t a ^ w «

' ^ , ' ' ®

' ^ n i e n t

o f I n d i a f o r the l a t t e r ,

n a v a l a i r s t a t i o n f o r w

h i c h s o m

T

U

^ s i t e f o r a p e r m

a n e n t

a n d S u l u r b u t n o d i s u s e d W

o T d W

d e v e l o p e d i n C o c h i f '

l o c a t i o n c o u l d b e f o u n d u n t i l t h e

a t a c t i c a l l y

o p W

^ ^

ofG oaw henits civil airf.el<i'

for .tsnrst permanent air s t a U o V T '" '^ ' ^ ^ d e d o v e r t o the NaV/

harbour ranges and other f a c i l L f

^n adiacent deep-wat^^

Commodore Kirke who succtKcf n

^ a Flpot Air Arm It

the transfer of the Goa airfield to

t h

e

NAVY G ROW S WINGS /

179

Ki,k= sums up his Slay in India w ith th ese w o rd s ,

m

o u l d themselves into the s u p e rb te a m

sweepingaway red tape ir. the UKar^d takm g on

t e M t B r ^ .s h

aircraft companies and the like w ho could

blinkered greed,given us a hard tim e and got us off on

iv j^ p fo r

After my three years in Delhi there w as n o p o i n t in m y applying to a job in British Aviation w hen I retired! It had a long m em ory o f w hat IdemandedforthelndianNavy at their/its expense and consideraP.

embarrassment.

Within a few weeks of her arrival in India, the Vikranl

of participating in free India's second naval operation, the i ofGoa, w h ich w aslau n ch ed on D ecem berl7,1961.T h ero lea ssig n o

carrier Was to lead a task force for blockading Goa during t e opera from a position 150 miles N orth-W est o f the Portuguese

^

6 fectively seal all the possible escape routes for Portuguese roop

‘oEast Africa or Pakistan.

^seeding H orizon

ihree decades h av e elapsed since the ad vent o f aviation V/STO L aircraft are n ow fast replacing

jg and

mai

"^^nnber of aircraft squad rons, aviation shorees ®

fei W

facilities ha ve been com m issioned and a seco

be

Hennes), hasjoined the Fleet and thus ship-borne aircraf

f

Carr-

' ^ ’^sval strategist feels that smftH an

carrying

and strike against ships at

^

; ” t e t . b m

a n n e

h e l i c o p t e r s a n d V

/ S T O

L a i r c r a f t w ould c o n t m u

S u e i n t h e

f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e . A

s r e g a r d s I n d i a s N

y .

• rm. The percentage of

^ *he Indian Navy grows, so will fj^ jslo n g arm o fth e

j^anpower and resources likely to

haneing pattern of warfare

^avy islikely to increase, because of the c h a n g

environment

f sea. Naval aircraft will continue to be u

jg^^nology when

niany, many years, till

reaches

/^on,bination of missile

^atelliteswill carry out all surve.Hance^a^^^^

e l e c t r o n i c w

a r f a r e c a n

e ) i s d i f f i c u l t t o f o r e t e l l .

T h a t

operate at all at sea ( i n t h e distant f u t u r e )

180 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

it will undergo m uch ch an ge and increase in sophistication is,how ever,beyond doubt. A nd that it w ill continue tobeoneof

the most vital elem ents of w arfare at sea in the present century is also a certainty.

5

RUN SILENT RUN DEEP

The Evolution of the Submarine

submarine came into its own during World War I, its devastating

^^ality and near-invincibility reinforced during and after World War

“' and its nuclear propulsion and t e e t h g i v i n g it virtually limitless range

^ calamitous destructive power during the post-World War

[however, it made a fairly late entry into India's naval fleet, possibly cause the submarine was earlier considered an offensive w ea p o n P^«orm and hence could not have a place in t h e arsenal of a countiy that pledged to abide by the principles of peace.

Since the capability to operate in the third element - tne s u ^ jc e ^ ^

now been added to the Indian Navy's repertoire, it is f sent.aUhat ^

"Elution of the subm arine from its t e n t a t i v e conceptual s t a e m ^ ^

^"•^tury to its present d a y status of being the pnme

as w ell L the significant role it played

° ^

World W ars, b e s ^ d i e d i n detail before ^ P ^ d S ^ ^

P t ^ p r o v i d e s a b r i e f resume of such

Na vy's Submarine Service

duriTA

addressing the

^ d said; 'Of all the branches of

p e r ils !

there is n on e.

in the air and on the

lani

^uroSses y o u r exploits.'Indeed, nothing can

182 / b l u e p r in t TO BLUEWATER

tio m a g a im ta w id e v a r ie tr o

greater th an that of the su p ers2 sinn

^

galleon, the sailing shin of S ,. i = T X th by the carrier-borne and sh n rll^ ^

^

ironclad, the battleship

electric p rop u lsL n svstem^ T f ^

aircraft, and the dieseN

Adoption of new

nuclear power plant,

oruy and weanon

'‘^ ‘^o^ogy/strategy or tactics, weap-

»^use u,r';„Vn;;*z fr^"

^ <=^'y '-s

«■»

tactics, etc havetnV>D,»

■ “. ^ ''^ ^ ^ a g e s o v er the existing techniques,

in any Service.

before they are introduced

N avy for several years

be constructed for England's

yearsafte, I h e f i r s l b a l t l ^ i ; , - ! ^ ^ “f ' 7

continuedtobeeauin

fitted w ith engines, steam ironclads

anend in 1945 thefi^’H

for a 16-inch giin tu rr^ F*'

w a s s till working on a new design

submarine technoloev

reasons, despite the developments in

iri Great Britain thp R^T

^rid America concurrently with those

submarines only after th

^^vy woke up to the danger posed by

cruisers, Cressv/Hotju^^anH

W ar I when the armoured

as a result of which thp -

b y one sm all Germ an U -boat

be drastically altered

Fleet's m eth od o f cruising the sea had to

way, the British had bepn ^

they learnt their lessons the hard

of submarines because thpvcr,

d iscourage the development

navy, had nothing to gain

that they, w ith their hugesurface

fo rtv !°p *^ ^ '^ °P ‘‘° n o f this

developm ent. As a

^

®*‘O y alN av y h ad to b e ni

‘be design of the first submarine

and, what^Is even

Am erica for construction in

d esie!

S'^pplement the Britis'h

of subm arines were

O ctoher'i V qo?

antidote to

I"'"* °n ly to enable the British

bein ew ith tt, 1

®nthe Roval M '

^'Snificant to note that until

th a tsu b m a rin ^ “^

' thepopular view

^ r m e s w ere'underhand

several m illennia, was

to tradiUon as

surprising as

damned un-English',

scorned as the'miirK *

World w

profession so wedded

M

a r s h a l

Joffre h

^

j

. . ' ^ ^ ^ * ^ ®

* * i 3 c h i n e g u n h a d b e e n

p o i s i o n

h a v " ^ "

i

l

k

"

’ “ “ S

W

Germans was d a s s i f i e r a r ^ ° P ‘®d by th e ^ " f . installed in his office; projected twice by the Britfsh

its use by the

srO ffice a n d ^ '

trench m ortar was

finally accepted after a

RUN SILENT RUN DEEP / 183

cabinetminister secured the funds for it fro m a n In d ian m a h a ra ja ; B n tis h subalterns got their swords sharpened b efo re cro ssin g to F ra n c e ; an d as laleas 1918 'Pershing had cluttered up h is s u p p ly lines w ith m o u n ta in s offodder for useless horses, still d ream ing o f C u ster and S h erid an an d the glint of Virginia moonlight on the shin in g sad d les o f S tu a rt's cav aliy /

Early History

There are occasional references in an cien t h isto ry to the attem p ts m ad e by niantoseek stealth and surprise b y op eratin g from su bm erg ed or sem isubmerged vessels during wars at sea. T h e v ery early p ro tag on ists o fth e submarine were not so much inspired by the d esire to d escen d below the surface of the sea to explore the depths o f the sea as to devise a m ethod o f rendering a warship invisible to the en em y so that it could carry out attacks and escape at will,

warfi •

reference to attem pts m ade at w aging underw ater

theGrp^ 1

!

writings o f A ristotle w ho recorded that A lexander

ofthes^ 'h

to enable his m en to descend below the surface

toimped

of Tyre in 332 B.C. H e also ordered his divers

(still in use and know n as boom

submerged

likely to build to prevent the m ovem ent of

^descent!

according to legend, A lexander h im self'm ad e

^ght.'

°

sea in a device w hich kept its occupants dry and adm itted

^’'Perinienfc^^

nearly acen tu ry earlier than A lexander's

^y^acuseha

Athenians had used divers to clear the entrance to the

Over

^'Ivantages r ‘° ' ’°w ing two m illennia the potential and the tactical

®PPrecia^gj°L

ting below the surface o f the sea continued to be

this

'^^ny mlitary thinkers and several attem pts were made

^6ainstenp^^'^'°^

develop an underwater platform that could be used

vessels far m oreeffectively thansurface

defensive operations. In the 16th century,

coniw

Leonardo da Vinci, is said to have designed a vessel

remain submerged for some time and surface

design “ ^[®P*'tiousIy P

p'

lant bombs or mines on enemy vessel**

s ., but

fnan

this Ssu

u b

b m

m aarriin

n ee was ke

W p

p t

n t sec

cp ret

rrPt bbeeccaauussee da Vinci he felt that

^ misuse it. 'H e knew a method of rem aining ^ -

but he refused to tell of it because of the “evil nature

^

Ubinejjjibie T a k e s S h ap e

^ e n ts in diving and m oving underwater continued but the ft

184 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

recorded m ention o f a subm arin e d esign cor\forming to the basic principles of subm ersion is found in the w ritin gs o f a British naval officer, William Bourne, w ho published a d etailed design o f a 'b o ate that may go under the w a te r'in 1578. The vessel w as a com p letely enclosed boat which couldbe subm erged by reducing itsv o lu m e b y con tractin g the sides through theuse o fh an d v ices, w hich could bring the bo at b ack to the surface by increasing the volum e. This vessel could also m ove underw ater by using watertight oars. This realistic design^ provided for both subm ersibility and propulsion underwater but w as n ever built.

Tw enty-sevenyearslater, in 1605, using a design similar to Bourne's, M agnus Pegeliusconstructed a su b m ersib leb o atb u t due to theviscosity and adhesive properties of underw ater m ud the craft never surfaced aftet diving.

In 1620, a Dutch physician, Cornelius van D rebel, built a submarine and successfully conducted trials in the Tham es river, making the craft cruise repeatedly on the surface, dive, m anoeuvre underwater and th^

surface for several hours at a stretch. H e later built two more craft embodying the same principles, but larger in size. V an Drebel's craft had p o u te r hull made o f g r e a s e d l e a t h e r s t r e t c h e d o v e r a w o o d e n framewo^'

l^opulsion was provided, both on the surface and while submerged, by oars whi^ch extended through the sides and w hich were sealed endered watertight with tight-fitting leather flaps w hich allowed free anchoring the oars to thehull. T h e underw ay

comDro<;«pH *

submarine crew was sought to be enchanced by

part^as w m , i H ^ ® r 'r e s t o r e to the troubled a i r s u c h portion of repeated tr ia l^ ^ t^

^

while, fit f o r respiration.

new 'boatr'

established the capabilities of the

atd ep th so fi2to ‘l?iaer® inP Tl!'

a n d m

a n o e u

v r i n g undetwa

of the larger m odelftn

^

^ reported to have taken a trip

proof of the desiciiPr.;,

its safety. But d e s p i t e t h e conclusr

platform, the novel

ct

of the British Navy.

failed to arouse the intere

Wars in thp 17fV*

a

proliferation of subinaVmp

Europe, however, led to

from professiW other th an ih ^ u ^

of w h i c h were t h e w o r k of men

factsom eofthe designers

the navy or sea faring; ^

suchdesigner was Oliver Cromwell'fv.^^it^®'

' P'*ests and monks! One

o fl^ n d o n . His device for

Wilkins, Bishop

while remaining submerged led to th"'

underw ater lock

lavatories in the latter-day submarines

u n d e r w

a t e r

submarine to surface repeatedly. He

‘he need for the

• >e on future naval develop'

RUN SILENT RUN DEEP / 185

m e n t s a n d centuries la t e r m a n y o fh is p r e d ic t io n s tu rn e d o u t t o b e tru e, s u c h ashispredictionofjoumeys by subm arines under the Polar ice-cap , an idea which was dismissed as science fan tasy in the 17th century.

By the middle of the 17th century, m any naval arch itects had concep-tualizedand experimented w ith possible su bm ersible w eap on platform s.

In 1653, a Frenchman, deSon, designed and bu ilt a 72-foot su b m arin e'th at doeth undertake in one day to sink 100 sh ip s' but his subm arine never sailed, as its prime mover, a clockw ork device, w as n o tp o w erfu l enough to propel it on the surface or underw ater.

The earlier decades of the 18th century saw num erous 'underw ater boats built, the British designers a lo n e having patented no few er than ourteen tj^es b y lp 7 . The concept of using a ballast tank for submerge

^’’'■ stvisu alised byan in ven to rw h od escribed h isd esig n

in l7 4 7 . T h eh u ll o fh is craft was equipped w ith

subme°

w ould be filled w ith w ater to m ake the vessel

w ater out o f the

•’^cktothe

^

provide positive buoyancy and bring th^vessel

"’^chanical^a'^H*’ u

how ever, w as never built. At this tim e the

yettob^f

principles involved in diving and surfacing

•umed Out to

understood and hence m any o f the ideas put forward

in som e cases, even grotesque.

Sion at this r ° ^'^‘^^^standing of the principles, the general im pres-

^^erwaterancT'

that it would be im possible to navigate a craft

"'3rfare woulri

becam e possible, its tactical advantages in naval

u>a De minimal.

Hovvev^/

B u s h n e ll's T u rtle

o f a subm ersible craft with w eapon delivery

‘^“ulddive

“ ^®^°^'rithearm in 1776 w hen the first subm arine that

plosives onenp^' ^''uise -b o th o n th esu rfacean d u n d erw ater-an d p lan t

^ 1 ‘Cappearan-pT^

rem aining submerged, made a dra-

an American

Am erican W ar o f Independence. David Bush-

S^Powdgj,

srm er sson, had developed the technique of exploding

s„K*^^'®'^^"^^^‘^^°^loweditup w ith the invention of the

Onl **' ^^aped

was to be used as a weapon platform, the

coi

^ b e e r - b a r r e l , it was powered by a hand-

tat

which could m ove it at a speed of three knots. It

^nderwate'^^'^ niinutes during which it had to approach its

30 explosive on its hull and get 3way.

a Seared ?

^9 years before the Battle of Trafalgar, that

® tin the American Revolutionary Armyand the firstsub-

186 / BLUEPRIN TTOBLUEW ATER

m ariner to lau nch an u nderw ater op eration against er\emy vessels, undertook to scuttle E agle, the Flagship of the Britih Fleet which was blockading N ew Y ork H arbou r, by p lan tin g a powerful explosiveonUs hull. H e set off on his historic m ission all by h im self on board the Turtle and, operating the handle o f the screw -propeller

reached the Eagle and dived. T h e T u rt/e th e n got under the hull of *e Flagship and Lee tried to bore a screw device into the Eagle s nu securing the explosive device to it. Later, a pre-set clockwor

,

would trigger the explosive device. U nfortunately for Lee,

.

hull of the Flagship had a sheathing of copper

at-

prevention of the form ation of any m arine grow th.

^(fnrutoolant

tem pts,Lee failed to penetrate thehull. H ep ersisted w ith .u se the device, but soon the effects of carbondioxidepoisonm g

him . He then withdrew, surfaced and set course for shore

rareoand

and pursued by a British patrol-boat. Lee jettisoned the explosive it went off, almost blowing the p a t r o l - b o a t o u t o f the water.

cigoship

The Commander of the British Fleet s o o n r e a lis e d that had had a narrow escape and ordered the blockading ships o

i ^

withdraw to the outer harbour, where they w e r e com parative y the effectiveness of theblockade w as considerably reduced. Thus

first sub-surface attack in the history of s u b m a r i n e s had prov abortive, it brought home one lesson which holds good even to

the mere presence of a submarine lurking below the surface

plans of a tactical commander over a large area far more than tncs

^

ofash ip .In o th erw ord s.th efearofth eu n k n ow n an d th eelem en to su P

area greaterdelerrenlatseathar\anactualattack. S u b m a r i n e warfare became a reality, even though thefirst ever s u b m a r i n e a tta ck h a d fs’

cause any physical damage.

Fulton's N autilus

Robert Fulton, the American inventor who was the first to propel a steam m 1803, and the first to build a steam warship, the Fulton, in 1815/

S m a r n ?

all the main features of a modern

h

T i V

f

tl^eNflutiii,s,whichwasbuiltofsteela»^d

shapedhkean elongated oval, was powered by sails on t h e s u r f a c e and by b r j:v ? n tT d !r p 3 ^ ^ ^ ^

tightportholew asprovidedandw as usedfor o w T t i o n a .S '^ n o e u -

vrmg the craft underw ater.lt was

equipped w ith b a l l a d t S l s fo^

diving and surfacmg, as modem submarines are, a n d h a d a L ^ e r g e d

r u n SILENT RUN DEEP / 187

^ ter»r.l.,i.hadad ev.ce^h^ ^^^^

mtilus a. Paris. He offered it to

° " ^ f d L a g e an y

French coast against British w arships but it failed t

'^^ Disappointed, Fulton then approached

demonstrated t h e c a p a b i l i t y o f h i s subm arine craf ^

f h P snbm a-

luiisudieu luc «-auauiiii.;f --------------------

-

, , ,

cunma-

1804. The Prime Minister, W illiam Pitt, w as so im pressed by t nnes perfo

pert rmanc

orman e

ce th

nat he

n aske

K d

eu th

m e A

rtd

um ir

.iaclty

w j rto ac

-----vq

j u

nrir

p e

n t^ e

x

requestwas,how ever,dism issedbytheFirstSeaLord(then

r

' . _

_

with the rather intemperate rem ark, 'P itt w as the greatest oo existed to encourage a m ode of w ar w hich those w ho com m an

not want and, if successful, w ill deprive them of it.

For about 60 years after the disappearance of the

J ^ \,Jor«iih les

continued to test various designs of sm all, hand-propelie^.* su witha crew of six to eight men. N one of these was,

"lent on Fulton's craft, and hence n o p ro gress towards fu

.

q z ^ h

^entofsubm ersiblesw asdiscem ible. H o w ev er, during the

-pcordedL

• , ® ^ ^ e n e x t n a u tica l m ile s t o n e i n s u b m a r in e d e v e lo p m e n w a W h the sinking „f a w arship by a subm arine, “ h f

“ 3

e Housatofiic, which w as blockading Charleston ha

L

ip-aedia

/

“'•Confederate subm ersible D avid (according t o ^ i n e x ^ o s i v e

« " » n ic a , thename of the subm ersible w a s m n le y ) in

“ accom -

P ^ su sp e n d e d ahead of the bow of the

' T

l S

H o w U .

subm ersible ram tned t e

fo 'h

^^^satonic was salvaged, the

d Because of

t 'l ^ n d w i c h e d betw een the corvette's hull and the

to

be ,^^®^sible's proximity to the Housatonic, the

f^gusaionic thus

^

attacker as to

to be sunk by a

subma .

honour of being the

ghed a submarine m an

(and the first su rface vessel to havecrushea

'®f'ded Kamikaze attack).

ntin-ed to be bedevilled by

.

^ogress in submarine development contin

submarine to

a suitable propulsion

to

dis,|^P^'»'ted, could be launched or fired oy

188 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

S te a m a n d E le c tr ic P r o p u ls i o n

S tea m en gin es, t h o u g h b u l k y an d m essy , w ere tried for some time for the p ro p u lsio n of su bm ersibles an d in 1880, G eo rge G arret, an English clergym an , b u ilt a su bm arin e w h ich w as p ro p elled by t w o propellers driven b y steam from a co a l-fired b o iler, w h ich featured a retractable smo sta for ven tilation . A bout this tim e, a S w ed ish gun designer, No coristructed a subm arine p o w ered by steam . This submarine was cajp of subm erging to a d epth o f 50 feet, had an underwater e

.

20 m iles and w as the first su bm ersible to be fitted w ith a prac ca tube. The novelty o f the new w e a p o n - l a u n c h i n g device Turks and R ussians w h o a c q u i r e d som e of these craft but, ecau lim ta tio n s, could not achieve a n y t h i n g worthwhile-Experim ents w ith the still new form o f energy, e e c ^

the m ean tim e proved successful, and storag ebatteries wit

of endurance had been developed for t h e p r o p u l s i o n of su

' ^jppgdan

e l e c t r i c m

o t o r s . I n l 8 8 6 t w

o E n g l i s h m

e n , C a m p b e lla n d A s ,

^^^Qjots

all-electric subm arine w hich w as pow ered by two 50-horse-po ^

a

operated from a lOQ-cell storage battery. It w as capable of

. ^eing

surface speed of six knots but the storage capacity of its t»a very low , its effective range was lim ited to only 80 miles.

The endurance of the storage battery f o r subm arines '^^.gggand erably im p rov ed by a Frenchm an, C lau de G o m b at w h o , b etw ee 1890, built som e sm all battery-p ow ered su bm arin es w h ich

-jvverc

a n d u s e d b y the French Navy for about 10 years. T h e s e subm arin

.^g

about 160 feet long, h ad a maximum speed o f 13.5 knots and an range of 200 m iles.

The 'Holland Type' Submarine -

Ballast Tanks and Hydroplanes

Meanwhile lohnP.H olland of New Jersey, anex-Irish s c h o o l teacher had migrated to the USA and who was to virtually becom e the creator of S ’?RR? w * ®“)’"'®J'"®^®^‘‘'e'^adlaunched his first submersible m 1» ^

In 1882 he constructed the Feninn Ram which was tested on the Hudson nver, and which was propelled by gasoline engines on the surface and tine design. Of these, the most important are tho

1 u if ^ i

for

submerging and surfacing, and horizontal rudder«^ of ballast tan n » ™ e „ v ,m g the « a f . in ,h e v e r .l c l plane ,

o

r

h yd ro p lan es to<

Forsomeysa,sHollanda.«iN„rdenfeU were v y i„ g „ T ,h „ * „ ,h e r for

RUN SILENT RUN DEEP / 189

R ed esign for all the subm arines that

iubraarinl, which was launched in 1897 and which w as tested for three years before d e liv e ry , w a s n a m e d th e Ho//fl«ii.

l -u a

A contemporary of H olland, M ax Lanbeuf o f France, a so submarine,Norufl!, which was sim ilar in construction to Hoi a

s s u

rines and it was also powered by a coal-fired steam engine but, ms ea tanks, it used the space enclosed in its double hull for ballast.

Internal C om bu stion E n g in e

The submarines of Holland and Lanbeuf were the prototypes for submarines built for several decades t h e r e a f t e r and they had aimos a

^sential features of m odem day conventional submarine -ba ast

/

internal combustion engines for surface propulsion at nine knots c argingbatteries whilst on the surface and electric motors for un P'opulsiorv at seven knots; its effective operational

'mpressive 1,000 miles. H ow ever, the internal c o m b u s t i ^ e n g i ^ s ^ ^

^hat time were gasoline engines w hich were a fire haza

highly noxious and inflam m able gasoline fumes, a n ^

j, jo ip h

by diesel engines developed by the G erm an engin

,

.during the last decade o f the 19th century.

the

submarine designer, Simon Lake, had bui ^

such

J

ir. 1894 w hich was primarily

living

for m

w ealthbelow the surface of the sea and

salvage operations. The

^ them to render it

‘Werv°

with a sheet of canvas be

t^e seabed and

to water. This submarine

diving helmets, to

device which permitted its crew

g

P from the submarine and explore the su

which was

Povvi"

built his second submanne,

cigar-shaped

hulif^f^ya 30-horse-power gasoline engine,

o f ^ la k e a ^

mov??

submerge to the bed of ^ r e t r a c t e d and tw u s^

inthpl

bed on three w h e e l s w h i c

^ A

^^‘^’^hlarine

honour of being the first su

'^berisgs, t h e

had the ho

190 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

to cross the AtlantLc w hen she sailed from N orfolk and, despite heavy storm s encountered on the w ay, reach ed N ew York.

Ai\other subm arine, th e P rotector, w as bu ilt by Lake in 1906 and sold to Russia. A fterit w as tested and accepted in R ussia, he built severalmore subm ersibles for the Russian G overnm ent.

T h e F re n c h S u b m a rin e - T h e G u s ta v Z e d e Claude Gombat, a Frenchm an, built som e sm all but effective submarines betw een 1888 and 1890. One of these, the Gustav Zcife, w hich was in service w ith the French Navy for over ten years, had a hull 160 feet long, was powered b p to r a g e batteries and had a range o f 200 miles at a cruising speed of six knots and a m axim um speed o f 13.5 knots.

in 1901, this submarine, while taking part in exercises, staged a mock attack on the French M editerranean Fleet after travelling 160 miles under her own power. While remaining totally undetected, the submarine hit the battleship Charles Martel, the pride of the French Navy, with a dummy torpedo. The successful'sinking' of a fully protected battleship by a tiny submarine which could approach its target, deliver a lethal blow and escape without being detected, was a watprshpd

history of subma-

an object lesson to the naval planners of all m a j o r countries, p o w i

wrought into the future shape of sea

acquUed^^ntri'

1

century, only six navies in the world hpd

Leading thp«; v. ° •

^“ '^''^arines and eleven more were being bu> •

14 buiU or

France, which had a total of

only two, o n e o f t w ^ K

reckoned to be the best'd ®‘."®°^*'^®^°**and-type w h i c h was at that ti had acqu red s u W n - i n the world,

other countries w^ch

had one c J a fte a *

Portugal, Spain and T u r k e y wh^ch

time,wasyetto acquire one^

one of the mightiest navies at tha

ment from the British Admirau'^^'^*^ active and continued discourag The 1901 success of thp P '

u

came as a rude shock and an pvpn

Gustav Zede, however,

and so it overm^eH the policv o'

mandarins of the Admiralty/

pronnptly ordered Twe sub ^ rin ^! n

f

S

t

.

Vincent, and

not for using them against enemy war^h-^ Holland type of the US Navy '

mtemive research into antisubm^ine rnpf

defence, but for

for the Royal Navy, Submarine No. 1 (with

submarine built

launched onOctober2,1901 a n d i h S ° ^ ^ ° " ® torpedo t u b e ) was thus was bom.

bmanne service of the Royal Navy

r u n SILENT RUN DEEP / 191

Submarines for th e B r m s h N a v y -

Acute Su bm arin e-P h ob ,a

_^ ^ ,^ „^ „3,i„ed e™ lo p m en th ad

The policy of active discouragem ent g

^

^xad

prevailed in the British Admira ty o

developm ent in England

U practically no research m

d u r i n g the 19th century. As a c o n se q u e n

.

^

U SA. In trying to

rinefor the Royal Navy had to b e acquired

th ^ u ^ ^ ^ 3 ^ io n e d ,

perpetuate this bias, even as this

w ith the

the Admiralty had decided to curtail the fo

To au ote an official

commissioning of the n e w v e s s e l to the m m im u ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

notice reproduced in the journal N aval and

j [ugt no cerem ony w ill

3 ,1 9 0 l,th ed ay afterth elau n ch in g :'Itisu n ^ d ersto o d h ^ su b m arin e at lake place at the forthcoming launch of the firs

whoUv in the

W i n - P u m e s s . The Adm iralty regard

“J ^ S e d f r o m

nature of an experiment and, like all other exp en

^

time to time, this one w ill be carried out w ith all privacy.

.

Despite the official stance against the d e v e l o p m e n t of the tercraft,sh ip b u ild ersin B ritain h ad actu allystarted b u i ing Mily as in 1885 - full sixteen years before the

^ on the

s u b m

a r i n e f o r t h e R o y a l N

a v y . I n t h a t y e a r w o r k h a d c o n r i

construction of an experimental subm arine at theBarrow -in

.

y^id. This submarine, which had a 1 0 0 -foot hull,

country,

W 1886, sold to the Turkish G overnm ent, shipped out

^123

J''d assen:^bled there for the Turkish N avy. Soon, another su

'

long, was built at Barrow and sold to the Im peria Russian

restingtonote that'underhand, unfair and un-Englis

. . - p i j p d lucre

J^^ptable to B r ita in b u t o th e r s c o u ld in d u lg e in its o lo n g a s ity ie id

‘Or h(;r!

clac ‘^^‘f^'^'^ding five H olland-type s u b m a r i n e s , Britain built

^ ^ ^ s ^ a r in e fw ith one torpedo tube) in 1^02, B-c ass g d o ,,b es) in 1905, C-class (with two torpedo t-^ e ) ^ 1906^^^^^^

gun)in Jon

’^ n n P six-p o Sn d eror

^our-incu

'

E-class (w ith five torpedo tubes, an

surface

W ean^

in 1913. The B-class was the first to be fitted

.

E)-dass was the first to b eeq u ip p e- w '

y

engines

torpedo tube - all earlier classes having u ^ d gasoim

5

pulsion, and being fitted w ith f o r w a r d torpedo

^

^altv

®'^^'^arine-phobia and surface-vessel mania 0 ,^ ^ 31 N avy,

w aTthe C om m anding

'^^^romwhatCaptainHughOliphant, who w astn

192 / b l u e p r in t TO BLUEWATER

about the prevailing am bience at tha?"’ t i m r " n ° ™ ' ' “ ” “®°'“ ''‘

« t s ' t p t ™ d r

™

r '

d e „ a n d " g r h ™ ® b ™ “

Dir:c,.sro'’; r

»«

officers “npvpr

was w arning non-expendable senior

cor\sidered that thp

w a ter", and the Engineer-in-Chief

so dangerous that

engine in a confined space was

amone the rpmnto

subm arine m oorings in Portsmouth were

'depotshin'anH f '

p o w d erh u lk s.'T h e first Subm arine

nai^e o f Hazard'.

given the not inappropriate

realised thrnn^I^r ^

Navy, som e o f the senior officers had

nnandine

'^.°^*^®^'^bmarineandwerequitevociferousinde-

R s h e r w r o te p r ^ X t i c S y " ' " '

a m o n g l T i r s t S t ^ 'v V ^ ^ ^

astounding, how the very best

tion in naval

realise the vast impending revolu-

accomplish!'

^ *^aval strategy that the submarine will

Empress o f L d L

^ simple instance, with the battleship

proximity of

manoeuvres and knowing the

oblivious of the nncc v."^*'

sslf-confident o f safety and so

^ ey see a Whitehead

w arfare.. . and suddenly

And how fired?

her stem by a few feet!

period; small, slow

^ ®“bmarine of the 'pre-Adamite

■ • ■ ■ I w / „ o ; l ‘*'> ',''''« l.'v ith n o p e risco p e a .a il.

,

season and out of

*hink of

™ "^ediate, vital pressing,

ord er^ "

theLrv°l^^ adjectives) necessity for more

S

S

^'^'Iding and

^ addition to those noW

be caught

as soon as practical, or we

1 return of the cer\t

'

operation ^of lub^^^fbTes"'? P ^ n c iS ^

proved to be the m o s te ff ? ®"8ines, both "

valid even

propulsion, as an altematTv"J

n!?

^

® Of >n tandem whh!!- P'^^ts; electric

*^iesel or gasoline

RUN SILENT RUN DEEP / 193

enein« had proved a success; the in v en tio n o f th e p e risc o p e h a d S s e d the 'feasibility of underw ater n a v ig a tio n an d im p ro v e d th e potential of the submarine for su rveillan ce and for ca rry in g o u t a t t a c ^

whileremainingsubmerged; and the torped o, th e p rim a ry w e a p o n o f th e submariiie,had been perfected and had proved its d ead ly ca p a b ility . T h e manually propelled and operated o ne-m an su b m ersib les h ad b e e n replaced by the larger and more versatile, lo n g-ran g e an d lo n g -e n d u ra n ce submarine. These would soon becom e a m ajor co m p o n en t o f n a v a l stra te g y , both for offence and defence. A n e w ch ap ter h ad b eg u n in the h isto ry o f naval warfare,

Spedal Features o f S u b m a r in e s D e v e lo p e d

Som eofthefeaturespeculiartothesesubm arineswere the all-w eld ed h u ll, e periscope, the schnorkel or the snort, the d iesel-electric p ro p u lsio n revolutionary w eap on - the torpedo,

thetr

superstructure deck w as the h u ll w h ich had to w ith sta n d subm erged, and to m ain tain its

vesselh H

under varying pressure con dition s. T h e sh ap e o f the

HoUand ~

Bushnell's spherical T u rtle to the cy lin d rical

basis oHh

^ Period of 125 years, the latter bein g co n stru cted o n

®fwaterfiehf ^

of 3 series of w atertigh t con tainers by m ean s

inside

ty p eo f subm arines, the p ressu re hull

®>l tanks

betw een these hulls w ere the w ater and fu el

Pressure

^®hveen the non-w atertight superstructure deck and the

^'’Ujiunitiori f

a

s

locker space for stow ing anchor gear, lines,

''°*8etdamaB°H K

^ n s , boats and other equipm ent that did

*^fisuperstjyp^

^y’^’^^rsionin w ater. Extending upw ards through

the tQ

w atertight to w erk n o w n a sth eco n n in g

^'‘ttollejj^. P ° which w as the bridge from w here the vessel w as

*^e surface, ^“ t w hen subm erged, it w as controlled

^ontrol"^^ tower or from a com partm ent directly below it, know n P®*iscopgg

rnaking observations while totally subm erged,

'Ovvet

Ending above the bridge w ere operated from the conning

T o rp e d o

surjCg^^® essentially a torpedo vessel, launching its torpedoes 3s a to

®u^"^erged, and hence it has basically evolved over the

'*des ^.^P®*^0'l3unching platform, though today its w eapon outfit

'Ssues. The torpedo too has been developed into a highly

194 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

com plicated ujnderwater projectile w ith a heavy explosive charge. It is detonated by an exploding m ech anism w hen in contact with, or in proximity to, the hulls of target vessels. Today, high-pow er engines drive it at high speed and sophisticated instru m ents control its course. Torpedoes are fired by, or launchedby, surface vessels, aircraft or submarines. Its capability of being launched, approaching the target and striking with little orno warning makes it particularly useful to subm arines, which can frequently carry out an attack and escape w ithout being detected.

The word torpedo is derived from the w ordTorpedinidae, thefamily name for the fish called electric rays. T hese fish and electric eels,havebeeri referred toas torpedoes.The term torpedo w as first applied to an explosive device around 1800 and, in its various experim ental forms, this name was used for the next 65 years or so for a type of floating mine.

The first to use an explosive device of this category was David B u ^

nell in 1 7 7 6 . His was a simple type of floating m ine with a c lo c k w o r k mechanism which was designed to be secured to the bottom of an enemy y ^ sel with the help of a screw driven into the latter's hull, and to go off af«t pre-set interval. As described earlier, no dam age was caused to Tget, the British warship Eagle, as the subm ersible. Turtle failed to secur the explosive device to the ship's hull.

•

spri

the A m ericangeniusw hose talents had beenrecog^

d e v r ^ H

England, used 'a catamaran

Of their'iKtended t a r ^ t r

‘^^mage as they exploded ^

used by theU niw '^^'n'

various kinds of torpedoes

l^egs filled with eunnn

forces. Som e of these were

jj,

known outburst from ArT .

'^se was responsible for the

aheadl' At the o th re ^ l"'*™

'D a n m the torpedoes

over90kilogrammes of

torpedoes car^; ^;

Federal gunboat Commodo^ r

which was used to blow

It was anEnglish on

smithereens

a

who, in 1868,

which

'^'ne

speed increased to 27knots

*he US

^00 yards.

'><notsthough^

ub N

used this torpedo, »

""8"badbeenextended only by300

r u n SILENT RUN DEEP / 195

naval warfare. lr\

nHp<;<;a b e c a u s e th e la tte r r^du c i

.

keep clear of the Russians f

sp e e d , ra n g e an d h ittm g

shipswithtorpedoes.Withtheirrap

y

to cap ital ships, i- ^

power, torpedoes soon becaine a set

torpedoes

larger ships of the fleet in la te r r « « ;^ ^ ^ f ^ d e r w a t e r an d sin ce it w a s greatest damage w hen they h it th eir

g

p ro te c tio n o f the s

impractical to make exten siv e u se of

their h u lls b y p ro v id -

underbellies'of these sh ip s,n a v a l d e s i g ^ -

g^tm entalised huHs-

ing double or triple b o tto m s and V u ^ y -

d esig n of th e G erm an

excellent example of this is p ro v id ed y

ajpHlv h it by torpedoes

battleship Bismarcfewhich, d esp ite b ein g rep e

in W o rld W a t H in

destroyers and aircraft during a

w atertig h t in teg rity

May 1941, remained afloat b ecau se of h er e x

design-

produced by her multi-bottom and

the torpedo-boat cam e

About the time of the Sp anish * American

'

sWps- As a

into being and was used to great effect agains

d ev elo p ed , the

against these boats, larger torp ed o -boat des

w eap on for m any

latter finally evolving into the destroyer

^ .^ p d to counter,

years was the torpedo it had originally been ^

underwater

.

During this period all torpedoes were design

^ torpedo for b e ^

and until 1922 even b attlesh ip s used toqjed

' ^ q . it in c o ^ o r a t ^

unched above the surface was first deve op

^ e , had a

* horizontal type turbine instead of the ear ‘

oOOya^^^®'

;> 8 'e n g in e % s p e e d o f 3 5

torpedo design

During W orld W ar I , G erm any sanK ^

G erm ^ -

^

d 3 ^°'^Pedoes alone, and during

-

virtually ^

during

'gners developed the acoustic ‘°'^P

^ n h Allied ® ^^jLicko£tim e

^ ' estothebrink of defeat. Itp lay ed

s t o p p e d t h e

of the A tlanticbu t the

e le c tiv e defence agams

J^®ve\oping a device that provided

-

"®'Jstic aspect of these torpedoes.

^

direction of

target had b « n

^

^*®°lished. the a c o u s t i c torpedo w asi

196

' “‘■‘' ^ ‘" W t o b l u e w a t c r

the target. After t

■

t h e ' t a r r ' ''"

control problem

fo solve w 4 t T i l

f^ge of the acni.c*-

*'®st to the

asthefire

intercept its target-so

w as that it did not^

^^van-

homed on to it I ! ! ' ° ^“” 8 as its speed wa<= h

high speed lo

development of th^

for a littIp T

Wobbly w m ^ " '^'■P^do which could

its cours

'

a spiral tr;, i

P^P^^a^Iy referred to as

r

■'Picked t f p T i

' ' ' '

* 8 Curley Ctarfe

Battle O f

. '"^ '“ -Pedo played ^

' " ? «

'’0 " ’« l on toil.

noisemaker w h ich '"'

defenJe'^aM ^",'“ I,‘ ‘^PP“’8 ‘*“* 8 “"

target's p .

‘^^velonpH h

this torpedo, was a

they lost

® ‘^^'^C-'Jserr.aLr d

- '^ -S louder than the

by su h L ® ^°T’edoes

^’'^ austin g their fuel

|°ng an"d

and d e ltro y e rT '"

two sizes - those

bypaj 7® ^bytorpejQ , ^®'’®21-inchesindiameterand21feet

y'd 13.5 feet ii^j

boats r p j

the la ter part of World

o ^ - I h e cyiin^^^’ f°^ '^ > ^ e re 22.5 inches in diameter

^ontainin

P ° ^ d s persn

contairungcompressed

i'vsert^ **®‘ »odeton5t

explosives. An exploder

actual o ^

'^^rhead

info contact with any

fhe torpedo was fired.

'^^‘gned t''

did

^°rpedn P*^®' ®^^ discovery by the enemy

®ndoftheru^ '^‘■'German*^^'^ of their

'vere, however,

o f t h e ! ° ‘^®»they ‘°lP « d o e s w e r?

»° hit a target

a

n

d

used

torpedo and of le**

UnH?^ *°*P®do

didnotproducea^

*°T>edoes inn®

l95o r ')8e of 4 Ijjje spe^^ ^ ° ‘s and a range o f 4 ^

strovoro - " ‘^l^ded

‘be ^ .'°00 ya-n. ° ^ as reduced tn 30 knots,

' ‘'""bed t^^ines.

used' for launching

by e|err°^^^

aircraft. ^

^^‘'" 8 them from tubes

RUN SILENT RUN DEEP / 197

m ountedontheirdecksw ithachargeofpow der, the latter also carrying aircraft torpedoes which were m erely dropped over the side. These torpedoes were used by the P.T, boats to launch attacks on all types o f vessels including battleships.

Torpedoes were launched by subm arines from tubes fitted in their bows and stems with a charge of com pressed air. Cruisers were initially

^fed with torpedo tubes but discontinued using them after 1936; battle-

*ips never used them m ainly because their gun range far exceeded the enemy ves^T

range they presented very large targets to the

tnm

torpedo threat during World War II came from the

at on °

because the attack could come from a number of directions

plan

r”

warning was very short because of the high speed of the

oiariM

0^ th'S advantage and better cost effectiveness of torpedo

increasing employment of aerial

fouoht^w-'fK

subm arine warfare was almost exclusively

surfacpv*

and the effectiveness of the torpedo against

‘onsof I

be gauged from the fact that out of a total of 10^83,755

'^P^rieSe naval and m p r r h a n f c h i n n i n c r « i i n t h\/ tViP A)liprl fn rC P ^

duriiip W 1

^ riaval and merchant shipping sunk by the Allied forces

forbv^tn

5,320, 094 tons, i.e., over 50 per cent was accounted

'

oes fired from United States'subm arines alone.

Im p ortant F eatu res

submarine is the periscope which was

the

solely for the purpose of providing a means to

Iheearii ^^y^?® or sky without detection by surface vessels or aircraft.

Sub

of submarines didn't providefor any viewing device

were in a submerged or semi-submerged state,

^®®dfor

y^^^^htheyhad to grope theirwayblindlyafter diving. Butthe

iTian^ E N4 ^'^'^^ble viewing device was soon realised and in 1854 a French-n\irrors

designed a submarine sight tube containing two

oppos;/

above the other, held at the angle of 45 degree and facing in

merppri^ “ ""ections. These did provide some degree of sight to the sub-were rather limited in performance and were hm ce

Peris^“

in 1872 with prisms. The credit for inventing the original duri^P® goes to Thomas H. Doughty, who developed the basic form American Civil War.

^

.

American subm arine to use anintem al com bustion engine

'vhilol^ 'vith45horse-pow er, two-cylinder, four-stroke gasolineengm es

^ ‘he British preferred gasoline engines fitted with 12 or 16 cylinders.

198 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

The inherent hazards o f these engines w ere soon realised, for stowage was a constant problem and h and ling of fu el w as extremely dangeroiii.

Also, internal explosions w ere frequent and m any o f the engines gave off considerable carbon m onoxide fum es, creating a m enace to personnel.

M.A.N. (M aschinenfabrik A ugsberg-N w inberg A.G.) of Germany had developed a four-stroke diesel engine, cap able of producing 1,000 horse power but all these engines developed structural weaknesses in the crankcase. Until 1930 theenginesusedinm ostsubm arinesofallthelarger naval powers with the exception of G reat Britain w ere four-stroke diesels.

With the development, how ever, o f fleet type submarines, the need rinorepowerful enginesbecam e apparent and eventually a 16'Cylinder single-acting engine was developed as w ell as a 9-cylinder double-acting engine^The fact that submarines are both surface and sub-surface vessels L ’^ .^ ^ ^ '® "® ® *“ ‘^‘io^ son size,h u lld esig n and shape. The total weight is also a factor having considerable bearing on

operations. In the first engine-pow ered submarine,

connected directly to the propeller shafting- j

the diesel

®pparent after testing various types and desigtis,

best^ In this type, the engines w»e

turn supplied power to the

A

n o t h e r f

i

o

n

o

f

t h

e g e n

e n

' ®

T o d S ^ rn

storage batteries.

propulsiondiesSeSS^ submarines are generally powered by

|„g

around 20QQ y.o,c

capable of driving a generator pro

drives a slow-speed

'Regenerators.

'®^'^®uxiliary engine is also available for ^

generators while

submarine does not use the

by the

the Germans adopted a

submarines. Thesn^i^^ repienishi!l‘^ '® ^ ^ r k e r - a n invention and further abbrevfateri?'^®®

to develop the new

British

^

Americans to 5^®

i

development

The Germans w eref^rc^

and ran g in g eq u ip m en S '^ ® °r^ar(u^fP‘d strides already g

v e s s e l s a g a i n s t C e r . a ^ l : S ^ a a r . .

RUN SILENT RUN DEEP / 199

TTieschnorkelwasoriginallya breathing tube w hich was raised while the submarine was atperiscope depth. W h en it was raised in p o sitio n ,air for the crew was obtained from the surface. In 1944 the Germ ans equipped their submarines with double-tube schnorkels, o r e for letting in air for the submarine's diesel engines and crew and the other as an exhaust for diesel fumes, carbon dioxide and other pollutants. The intake tube projected by a foot or so above the sea surface w hile the exhaust gases were

*^®^®^‘"^ 'sco n sid erab ly red u ced th ev isib lep o rtio n o fth e since the submarine

cruise almost totally subm erged on its engines and conserve its

-^pow er for attacks and evasive m easures.

tobe sDn^t -■ /^^^^^*^°^^y°'^®^^^^^3ck.Whilebyitself it was too small could b e v '^ *11^ ^ - ^

*he air it left a distinct wake which

weather

up from an antisubm arine ship oraircraft in calm

Darkness

be detected by the radar fitted on ships or aircraft.

The I

p

r

o

v

i

d

e

any cam ouflage any more.

'euDDv'

N avy developed an improved schnorkel and also

'"’derwate

the end of World W ar n . The guppy (greater

fleet Si

power) had the same type of hull as that used for

3bout

II fame, was 306 feet long and displaced

in the hull was in the superstructure

®''®*yprotrJi;

changed by reducing the surface and streamlining

(posts) to

object. T h elifelines and all guns were removed, the bitts

Periscope

ropes were secured were made retractable and the

*°Psidear

(supports) enclosed in a streamlined metal fairing. All

stream^”^^'^*

equipment were either removed or made retractable

that

speed of the new 'guppy' was considerably greater

subrtiarir,

nearly twice that of the old-style

^ytheles^^

changes were broughtabout in submarine construction

Torpedoes came to be fired by hydraulic

^^ycha

^^mpj'essed air as was done previously, eliminating

‘ell-tale air bubbles escaping to the surface and betraying the

Hi H ^ * P^'esence.

^OrdGPn ? ůnderwent a major change - they were given grea ter s ^ g t h ivas

that enabled the submarine to dive to greater depths than

«Xten.i.

possible. Hydraulic mechanisms (oil) were enriployed

SonajT^ y throughout the ship for quiet, efficient operat^n. :^ d a r and I'orpp .'^^’P'^^ent increased in importance as it increas

m

ci

longer had to be f i r e d w i t h sharpshootmg a c c u « ^ ^

ta rjy ‘ ,5^ “ >Pment and homing torpedoes (the torpedo that s e ^ s its

'"^ ^ ted m u ch of the guesswork and chancem firii^ torpedoes, electric motors and generators were made more compact.

“ “ ' “ ^ ^ W T O B L U E W A T E R

‘heintroductionofnuclear

turbmes ^ d been used in s h S s T

^

ftrst time thatUS,subm arineshi!S^^.' w " unconventional in thatit wasthe _ A '^ " '^ ^ e i n 1895, and that fu jl

firstunsuccess-

^’^''®^t®ani-turbine eenpr

tim e nuclear energy was

ors and shaft to w hich thp c ~ ^

in turn drove thepropulsion

along withgreater speed a t t

means of projulsion

cruising

subm arine anadvantagLfalm ost

'

only by the endnra

^^^'T’^J'ged endurance, a limit probably

- nee o f its crew and its storage capacity.

ne E m ergence o f th e <;„K

.

^ e n the First W i

^ o r l d W a r I

B^tTsh?'

*^eat p'J^sed^^^

people were

U-boaf j H o o i i p a

to surface ships until the

the A °^^^® ® elgiancoacr

torpedoed by the German

harbours la,""

'vas of'im

^Potent w e a p o n i n future naval

‘he recoeniQ.^^*''within the ono

significance, that many British

for“h “ " " f ' ™ S e of Garman subn.ari.es. A.

®'Plcmbcr 1

®'iSsh h S •*'= Orkney Isles at S a ^

anchorage'.

“ '^’^^'vsrepracticallynon-existent.

u n t u ^ " « ^ ‘ in favour o f Loch Eweon the

^^^ences could be hurriedly

W a n d the

^ve^P »K

®

navigation

small

look-out for eneff.

proved »o

'vith ‘^ ® ^ ° ''e r n a tr ^ the troop transports g o i j

.

-*-3

consistingof destroyersa^

increased raDiH^ P'‘'°8*'essp'ri ''^eepin^.?® ‘^*^s, was deployed and as S,e | a?

b S

'

^-boats at bay.

shipping by

Were em f

o f the submarine

/Hie U-boat a cv

'

w erT?’®^®'^ effectively in waters

litue effect oix\ T ^ ^ *=°nsid^

British and AlHed

"merchant shin.

naval !

®^bles„,

January So!^'!, Jpn. H q w ^

end of 1914 but it

'

a n t ! '

sinking of si’^

‘^ 'c a tio n o fw h a tw a s to

RUN SILENT RUN DEEP / 201

come. OnFebruary2,inrepIy to the British declaration o f blockade of the enemy coasts, Germany published a notice w arning all peaceful shipping against approaching the coasts of Britain, follow ed by a m em orandum on February 4 proclaiming that after February 18, the w aters around Great Britain would be considered a m ilitary area, that every hostile m erchant ship found there would be sunk w ithout regard to safety of passengers or crew and that even neutral ships w ould be in danger. This was promulgated and enforced despite the illegality o f this m easure being pomted out by the USA.

insurance schem e in Great Britain prevented panic as

the Order in Council o f

Merchanr' k;

that tim e as the Retaliatory Order, was issued,

procediirpr"*^ were advised on the precautions to take, the best Minefields

P^when attacked and on the use of wireless telegraphy.

3u>iliarv

protect shipping routes in the North Sea, the

adopted

strengthened and various navigational measures

^f'dthera

f

spite o f all precautions, however, losses continued

Gentian

?* attack increased. M any victims were claimed b y the

approaches

subm arines, w hich laid their mines near the

minp

^

close to navigational light vessels and bouys;

^uth Coa*^t ^

victim s o f all nationalities on the British East and

^ the

After April 10, the bigger U-boats operated only

' '^sScand^

W estern approaches where their worst victim

Passeneer T f s h i p p i n g . In May 1915, the Falaba and Lusitania, two sunk, with heavy loss of life. It caused widespread

instrucfio ^

following US protests, the German government issued

^*'ierican"

U -b o a ts to spare large passenger ships. A further

^’’obic call^H^*^**

occasion of the sinking of the White Star liner

^^^marin

fresh instructions from Germany, andthefirst U-boat

^^^5U-b ^

in British waters ended inSeptem ber 1935. By/une

Mediterranean and, working from Austrian

a serious threat to the Dardanelles and Saloruka

'onary forces, prowling the sea areas.

increacJj^® the months of transition from 1915 to 1916, the Germans U -b o at fleet and decided to sink defensiveJy-armed merchant

sinkii,,. r

warning, though passenger ships werestill to be spa red. The

protajf

Sussex crowded with passengers brought fu rt^ r strong blocS j

the US President and again Germany gave way. The ^ Iie d

a8an ?®^^^®cted US commercialinterests so adversely that feelmgs

‘England grew bitter and tension between the US and Germany co^^shed. Encouraged by this, Germany decided to renew its w aj^ n

"^ fce, and now Scandin avian shipping became its mam target. The

2 0 2 /

b l u e p r i n t TO b l u e w a t e r

S L

® ^™ ‘‘

in

167Allieda„d„e„W

um ea unrestricted warfarP / i '

Germany

aHH'

Francp ^

^917, it declared the

destr"

PortueuesP AHanh

?

to be war zones,

^ s tr o y vessels of any”n atinn .‘i .

^ A r c h a n g e l . It decided to

consideration for tho-

character found in the war zones

.

all possible

mission.

)Jfdtom ountrapidly a n d ? " :

m easures, the Allied losses contin-

c l S

faster

that the U-boats would win the war.

Anrii 'io

iTiethnH

f

being destroyed and it was

S n l t 2 1

for Great Britain, H

o n cim

isles th ft ^

^ ^ ''^ ^ “ "^■‘^ " e o u to f every fourvessels

Jear

^^°^ght the U n T n ^

T7.is unrestricted war

'M e r^ ^ L ^ ® "“^oyers to as^is* ‘t ? "

by the end of the

th rc c n : "

of d e fe n d

,

Was resorfo,^ ^voy system wh; u , ^ S ^ m s t U-boats became impera f “ nce“ " d ,* = -n.»™ eThod ,

^'^ccessfui anH

and l'a fr^ ‘ employed on the short voyages to

‘^anhal{ofvvh,rfK^°''eniber,

^^utes proved to be quite

continued to vo

Josses were reduced to less

success c a m e w S ? r ^ s u it a b l e « ° v ^ ^ v e r , scientists and inventors the trawlerchen-

’"''^'ition

and the first

&

'

G erm l^

On April 23, I9l6,

t>ng It.

'

ith depth char'>es ^“ ’^'^^'•‘r'e U C .3 with a hydro-submarine^

of 1917 ap

detecting

EuTOpe!“a^nd

increasingly clear that the

sinking's,

sh^ ^'^tober

troooc

U-boats failed to

effectively fo,

airrr f®

O ' " t r o o p s to

of DoveM° “ '"8 ^'boais

d i r S

U-‘’°a ts.A tth e A i? i3, J " t > ‘iesadvan"'

latter found the

"^'^'■‘^ e .ia s u C a ts ^ ^ .th e G e ^ ^ '^ to abandon the

‘ had sur

destroy the

•^endered were brought

RUN SILENT RUN DEEP / 203

to Harwich. While the war was over and Germ any had accepted defeat, it had clearly established the fact that the subm arine was decidedly the deadliest weapon platform at sea.

The fremendous success o f Germ an subm arines during World War I js apparent from the devastatingly high num ber o f naval vessels and merchant sjiips sunk by th e m ,, though they themselves had to pay 1,098 in 1916 and then

dup'tn'*"*"'/

during the first ten months of 1918 mainly

chasprsanHTkl°

convoy system , deployment of submarine

tio

ti n

o

n(i

nf

f c

ci.v,

j ---------- . o f underwa

a t

i e

e r

i l

l i

i s

s t

t e

e n

n iin

n g d

u e

e v

viic

c e

e s

s f

r or th

m e

e d

a e

ette

e c

c -

-

ships 18

submarines. The German U-boats also sank 10 battle-

fVDes' Au'u

and 40naval vessels of other

rose frnm 1/1

U-boat losses suffered by the Germans also steadily

analysis

' r

1916, 66 in 1917 and 68 in 1918 in the final

3ccounteri

lost only 183 U-boats during the entire War but

5/408 m erchant ships and 94 naval vessels.

Was a've ^

World War I, the British realised that the Allied victoiy

seapo^er?

theirgreatlysuperior battle fleet on which

^

r o

a count

n o

t

er .u

^

for sev

* e

=‘ r

“ a

i l

c c

e e

n n

t t

u u

riri

e e

s s

, ,

n h

a ad

n n

o o

r t

o b

e e

e e

ii n

d a

u b

i l

e e

l to

u

u do

u i im

iu u

l c

iih

to def ^

from below the surface. The submarine had not been

conunerce

^

by adopting the tactic of attacking

^®condIv

becom e a potentially war-winning weapon,

could on^

“ ritish had found the submarine of great value because it

*^6Sea of^^^

^reas where ships could not go such as in the Baltic and

proved u

beyond the Dardanelles. Thirdly, submarines had also

^®6titsp]f'

*'®connaissance and by the end of thewar, the Grand

^‘^^fnarin

fast steamsubm arines of the K class. And finally, the

®^>tishs. t ^'^^how n itself to be quite effective against its own kind and sunk 18 U-boats.

„ ^

abni“r “ '^realisation, the British decided to press inlemationallyfor

^ a s h i n ^

submarine. In 1922, the British efforts to do so at fte

•^Ountril

Limitation Conference were opposed by all the o * e r

p -

noteven secureagreementtolimitsubmarinenum

■

could only come to the ‘iedsion that the rem am jn g ^

that t h ^

destroyed and that the Treaty of Versailles should ensure

" ' ' ^ ‘ ^ r a n c e S

a

U

h

e y

^

r o

u

i r

c o ^ n m

e r c e r a i d i n g .

2M / BM P R ,N TTO BLU E W A raR

protruding funnels and n n ew as pa •

V

8 ^ / one

^ e r e w as the K class su b m arin rw i*> ?'''^ P

hangar!

J>Te of submarine, called the

funnels. In 1925 a new

wets and six forw ard to rn e d n r'k

four 5.2-inch guns in twin

^ “ nng the inter-war years I

3 .0 5 0 toSs wasbuilt.

PntJshsom ethingthevhadno

of the ASDIC gave the

co u ld make depth cham o

before, and though its range was short

The submarine rnnff.

U-boats m uch more accurately,

greatest asset bpina

into a potent weapon platform

^ ^ ^ te c te d in th e d e p th < ;n f t^ ^ °"^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ® '^ ^ ’ ^^e a b ility to m o ve unseenand tssubmersiblecapad^^^^^^^

th a t tim e w as on using

efficiency o f its w e a n n

^

tra n s it s e c re tly u n d e rw a te r and improve

" “ “ o™ coS » T : ™

w

“ 'M s , aflo at

late igVn’’**

^^‘rcou fotl 8«n t

la rg e r sub m arin es. In 1934 the

the slipKi/'^®^"'®'^cans built » i^ "® ^ °^ "tin g 8-inch guns, and during the T ? !’ y *^*8ger/^mon«n

^ ‘^^loha! an dN au tihs o f 2, 7 3 0 tonsand

^ the

y e a r s ^ ‘l u i p p e d w it h tw o six-inch'guns.

going

an d

W a rs d id n o t s e e m uch change

and their ^*T®*‘^ es Were betTv^^ ‘I'ties of submarines. Most of the ocean-K ^^^^^cpow erS

three hundred fe e tin le n ^

P r o p u l s i o n '^ ^ ^ c e a n d ten ^

them ataverage speeds

' ^ ‘^it ros'e

10

while s u b m e r g e d . F o r underwater

Vo“,

h

"

^ 0 1 4

the basf te

S .-

O"*/^ single line

a n ? ^ - ^ b o t h o t P"*

t« b l o c k channels,

V o y ; ; : : ; r j ^ ’;‘^\hourt

»o u , ; | ’°"^^^^«fleethadtoevacU'

Afalsealarmof^

’^‘hSeaann'^^l’le ste^ ^ ® great disadvantage

,„ ,He , o « . poW '

°'^hadK

^ ^ ° * ^ a y passage-

thecauseof the 1914

R U N S IL E N T R U N DEEP / 205

atioiT the 1939

was occasioned by the sinking o f Royal Oak by a

evacuation the

bom bing o f Iron Duke w hich soon follow ed.

m

9

^

^ a d '0 U -boats ready for action as a g a ^ t

hproIannedstrenethofaOO.The British fleet and coastal con^mand wa co'nditions w ere less favourable to G - t B n t a ^ ^ s o ^

important respects than they w ere in 1914. At the very b eg in s §

_

declared its neutrality and Britain w as deprived of

Queenstown, Berehaven and Lough Swilly. It w as also obvious

y

was going to join Germany, and after the fall of France an orway

entire coast of Europe from the N orth Cape to the Sparush fronber was hostile. This entailed Britain's abandonm ent of the South western a p proaches to the EnglishChannelbecauseof the th re a tfro m ^ e a ir/a m u c longer sea passage round the N orth of Ireland and heavy additional convoy commitments for the North Sea and Scotland.

.

,

between the two W ars there had been little change in the size a ^

shapeofiheGermanU-boatsbut they hadim proved in speed a i^ were a e t o r e m a i n

s u b m

e r g e d

f o r

l o n g e r

p e r i o d s

w

i t h o u t s u r f a c i n g ,

c a p a b i l i t y i m

p r o v i n g f u r t h e r

i n 1 9 4 4

w

h e n t h e y w

e r e e q u i p p e d w

i t n m

s c h n o r k e l . T h e y c o u l d d i v e f a r d e e p e r t h a n b e f o r e , w h i c h h a d n o t

a t

m

s i

b e e n r e a l i s e d b y t h e

B r i t i s h ,

a n d t h e y w

e r e a r m

e d w

i t h e l e c t r i c

h a d n o t e l l - t a l e d i s c h a r g e b u b b l e s a n d l e f t n o f r ^ c k . G

r e a t

been made by both sides in im proving aviation arid the

^ u n ic a tio n , and the in stitu tio n o f the British

-j^ e

^'^tive co-op eration W ith the Fleet w as to

^ ^ ^ A v i d e n ^ ^ e

command also played an im p o rtan t part, both at saa atvl in la n d ass'

submarines and the aircraft of the

of

the important duty of carrying out the ^

coasts and h arb o u rs-a task which

®

This proved

consta

perilous and most monotonous duty, w

^

tjie area

^■^araly increasing area as Germany continued lo e x p a "-

dom ination.

,

^ g ee d by Germ any

th e v e ry o u ts e t, u nrestricted ^ar^arev _ ^.^^jg^^ggptem -

^’eriQoo^^'^^convoysystemwasinoperation -

Id permit. At the

be^n

as the su pply o f escort vessels

J g ^ e a s a n d was

U-boat attack was concentrated o

aircr^t

by surface patrols assisted by ^P°‘ " « 3 ctice was a b an d o ri«i

^ ' . - u t after the sinking of C o u r a g e o u s , Islands >n l ^O

occupation of Iceland

new b a s e s for escort

a ,7 ^ '‘led their capture by Germ any a n d prov.d

operations.

2 « / MEPRINTTOELUEWATCR

n the hydrophone as, besides

^

^

improvement

oat accurately. Radar had hoen invented

<^irectionof the U-

« or vessek till 1941 and H f X Z S t

ratus)^was introduced in 1 9 4 2 .

^ direction-finding appal l order to c o L tT f p '^ o t^

Churchill had,

Plan Rainbow prepared hv

attack, agreed

necessary,asearly as m o tI h;

Staff for joint action, if

’^^gardedasthefirstobiectivpa

P '^ n , the defeat of Germany was

^ * e Japanese attack on Pea rlH

J^panas the second. Consequent

of Staff

Washington. Great Britain ?

fo r m e d

with headquarters in

Jantic,Mediterranean anHT

responsibility for the East

^ Australia and, N e w 2 e Jl“ ‘ H^^

the assistance

Pacific.

'

Zealand undertook that for the W est Atlantic and

B r i t a i n w

a s v e r y

p e r i s c o ^

^^aft. TH p r '^ ^ ® ^ ^ ® P ^ '' ® *'6 ta l< en to m a ss-p ro d u ceth e n ig h t

to rn eH n o ^ ^ "’ ^”

a t t a c k co n v o y s at

casualties^®^^'^ " ^ e s w e r e a l s o T - ^ ^ ^ P ^

g u n fire by

Arov^rtlu'"® the hulls vvith

antidote of degaussing ships,

^ ^ 6

of 194f'

current-carrying conductors.

convoys, buT^^'^ cam pai^^'.. rmany withdrew its U-boats for use provided the iaJt«-°'^®"unning o ^ R . f

tem porary relief to the

use of thesfM •u'^^^anumberr.ir *

N orw ay by Germany

ofNorwa„i,_-

t^'Westor„

new basp<:

abandon

Bera.

194,

>^oats and t h i . c

''^nimerce m uch cioseriu u.

« ^

t ' * ' *

''==‘

•heir tasks much easi«.

n ' o n m : , ' B r i t a i n f o u i ^ u

U-boat tactics-

of con vovS f '*sfirsti,ji,^^'''8 ra d a rin ^ ^^‘^“ ‘^^dattackonthesurface rise

‘0 other ^°,'^®vet fear of f

vessels and in that very

^8s.H ow ej!^R ly'® speciaiiv'

this c ^ u ^ ^ ‘°/^'^®'^essitateddiversion

^®a‘er range ^nlllf'^^'^'^reaSK^P'^oduaio

o f shipping losses

open ocean c

'*’°atsexceeded ^

]

because

also

focarar^""""d^andnewaircraftof

O f c ! , 5 ^ ^ ^ “ c e d a b

^

/

. ^ o d r i v e t h e e n e m

y i n W

^

' ■ ^ • ' o n b e t v v ! l ® ‘ '^‘ ^ ' ^ ® ^ ^ ' t h e F o c k e - W

u l f /

® ® n ^ t s n a v y a n d a i r force.

R U N SILENT R U N DEEP / 207

t h e i e s u l t s w

e r e l e s s s a t i s f a c t o r y . T

l ^

o u

g h t h e y w

e r e a t t a c k i n g a s f a r w

e s t

as l o n g i t u d e 40 d e g r e e , G r e a t B r i t a i n r \ o w h a d n e w a i r b a s e s m k e l a n d a n d N e w f o u n d l a n d a n d c o u l d p r o v i d e e s c o r t s f o r f o o d a n d

m aterial c o n v o y s .

In order to maintain the p ressu re, G erm an y h ad to devise som e new tactics. The new tactic that w as d evised w a s to attack a co n v o y w ith a number of U-boats over a short p eriod o f tim e so th at if so m e boats w ere discovered and counter attack ed by the e sco rts, oth er U -b oats could get closer to the convoy and attack it u n m olested . In o th er w ord s, they shadowed the convoy and, w ith their su p erior speed, w ere able to concentrate on it and swam p the escorts. These p ack attack s during 1941-1943

weremadeatr\ight.To deal w ith them , t h e e s c o r t s w ere provided with w hat were known as escort carriers, i.e., sm all aircraft carriers w hose planes could search out the surrounding w aters b y daylight. E scort team s were given intensive training and instructions an d they w ere kept together in units as far as possible; but the sinkings, instead of decreasing, continued to increase,

D e s p i t e P l a n K

a i n b o w

, t h e U

S w

a s u n p r e p a r e d f o r s u b m

a r i n e w

a

r f ^

w h e n P e a r l H

a r b o u r w

a s a t t a c k e d . I t a l s o h a d n o c o n v o y o r g a n i s a t i o n a n d l a c k e d

e s c o r t

a n d

a i r c r a f t .

I n

J a n u a r y

1 9 4 2 G

e r m

a n y h a d 20 U - b o a t s

the US coastal waters, causing very heavy losses. But by y

^

h a d c o a s t a l c o n v o y s i n o p e r a t i o n a n d i n c o n s e q u e n c e t h e h u n t i n g f o r

t h e

U

- b o a t s s h i f t e d t o t h e C

a r i b b e a n a r e a .

F o r s o m

e t i m

e t h e c o a s t a l c o n v o y s h a d a n e a s i e r t a s k b u t u s s i a

Malta convoys suffered severely. The Russian convoy route Iwd to for a time, but not before an alternative supply

“ ^Pleted by rail th rou gh lran . After the fall o f F r a n c e , with the e ^ p fa o n T „

^

0

*

s i d e s

o f

t h e M

e d i t e r r a n e a n

from G i b r a l t a r t o g y p

w

e r e i n t h e h a n d s o f t h e A xis p o w e r s . C o n v o y s

^

^

f ; > ^ . a n d r i a h a d t o p a s s t h r o u g h t h e n a r r o w w

a t e r s

b e t w

e e n S i ^ l y a n d

'Bomb Alley' a s i t w a f c a l l e d ,

w

h e r e

t h e y

were e x p o s e d

a t t a c k

f r o m

s u b m

a r i n e s

a n d

a i r c r a f t .

May

c l o s e d a s

t h e

. u „ p a r E a s t , h a d

t o h

B ‘ ' ' * > s h s h i p p i n g , n o t o n l y f o r I n d i a b u t a

^

m

i l e s t o t h e

io jr

the C a r l of Good

'

® a n d w

e e k s o f e x t r a s t e a m

i n g .

n n w

i b l e t o g e t

t h r n

h a z a r d d i d t h e A l l i e d

b a s e d a t M

a l t a

D l a

M

a l t a . N

e v e r t h e l e s s ,

t h e A l l i e d s u

n r e y i n g o n t h e

»

y ® d

a

d e c i s i v e r o l e i n

t h e

N

o r t h

A f r i c ^ ^ ’

P

( j „ ^ e o f t h e

a

j

‘ ^ ° ‘ ^ v o y s

s u p p l y i n g t h e N

o r t h A f r i c a n

-

an ceo fth eSth A rm y fro m E lA Iam ein ,

shipping. The vital

on Malta together sank 300,000 tons of

L li s e d by

M

a l t a

p l a y e d

i n

t h e

M

e d i t e r r a n e a n

o p e r a t i o n s w

a

208 / BLUEPRIMTTOBLUEWATER

g a s o l i n e a n d s t o r e s o f a l l k i n d s f r o m

?

q u a n t i t i e s o f e s s e n t i a !

o

v

e

™

E

g

y

p

t

b

u

t

f

o

r

t

h

e

t

t

X

s

X

^

^

f o r c e s

o p e r a t i n g

f r o m

M

a l t a . '

s u p p l i e s c a u s e d b y t h e

i n e w

h o l e o f t h p p

,

c »

t e r r i t o r y b u t t h e r e w

a s a

i a

r p

5

° " " ' ° !

w

a s

n o w

A l l i e d

t e p a , r o l l e d

b y t h e c o a s t a l f

o

r

S

\

c

t

i I

I

' "

r

"

*

/

' ' ‘ ’ "

“

"

" ' “

^ ^ e n c a . This area, known a«! th '

® from Britain, Iceland andNorth

c L

W h e n G e rm a n v n '

'

becrossed

« talfo rces onboth sides n f Ik

advisable to avoid the

^ > "^ ^ on ed from itsH ead q u al

attack,organised and

i n ^

'vas to emnlov

con cen trated in this area.

arr

to take uo tidV k

U -boats and send them

w ged patjQj

r i c n s ab ou t 12 to 2 0 m iles apart on a pre-

b

b

r l T

i

‘ ^ e i n g s e e n

n r o

^ o ^ ’ d p a s s t h r o u g h t h i s p a t r o l

w

a s c o m

p l e t e .

T h i s v i r t u a l

' ‘ “ P P ’ i e d w

i t h

^

h

f

U

- b o a t s , a s t h e y w

e r e c a l l e d , w h i c h

" ' a s s i o h t ^ ?

°

°

^

°

^

t

o

n

t

h

e

s

i

i

r

^

f

s

t

o

r

e

s

a n d f u e l ,

n o t e d

o n e s i g h t i n e ' ’ f C

^ ^ ' ^ ^ P * . ^ y ^ ^ ®

U

- b o a t s u n t i l a c o n v o y

b u t

a n d S D

p L “ t u ^ ° " ' ' ° y * " ^ ' ^ ®

* ^ ' 3 t e l y d i v e d a n d l a t e r

* ® P o r t e d

'

^

‘ ^ o n v o v

u 7 ^

^ o u g h i t s p e r i s c o p e .

N

o t o r p e d o w a s

b y W

a V e l e ^

U

- b o a t s u r f a c e d

a n d

the crisis

then

a n d la u n c h a n attack on the

l 9

1

7

c

S

- f J "

‘

devastating at times and

but in 1942 there

^^ring the foul weather

and m oreco asial?""°''ev vn ;er® ‘ by th e ^ ^ corresponded closely to the b l a c k p i t ,

r i i o r e a S * ^ ' " “ ' ' ' l a i t c t ? f ' ^ ‘ ° b

e t r i e d

° ^

° " ° ^

t h e c o n v o y s y s t e ^ /

« c o r t g r o u p s

a n d

I T ” ' ® e sc j® ■‘ ° f l o n g e ^ : ^ e o n I y s o I u t i o n w a s i T » o r e S'^rface surveillance.^^"

reduce the siz eo f the

^

o

u

g

h

t h e c r u c i a l r r ,

' ' ' » e c l l i ’ "

‘ ® ' ' ^ ‘ v e t r a i n i n g o f t h e

^’^thvvasM

of surface and s u b '

'

G

e r m

a n e f f o r t s b e g a n

RUN SILENT RUN DEEP / 209

to slacken by April. In May the wolf pack suffered three severe defeats and no further attack developed until Septem ber w hen the Germ ans tried their newacoustichoming torpedo. These torpedoes inflicted severe dam age on Iheescorts but did not overwhelm them. The convoy was unharmed and the pack suffered considerable loss. This w as the turning point of the Battle of theAtlantic for the Germans found their losses too heavy and withdrew their U-boats for installing better equipment and m ore effective weapons.

There had notbeen a singlesinking in theN orth Atlantic foranum ber ofmonths in early 1943, Teamwork had beaten back the wo]f-packattack, soon as it was certain that the packs had been cleared from that area, m turned to the task of sealing off the Bay of Biscay, to prevent their asse

irg in the North Atlantic again. The support groups and the c o a s t a l c o m

m

a n

d

w

e r e s w

l t c h e d

o v e r t o

T ^ e a ^

b a r r i e r a g a i n s t t h e i n g r e s s

o f t h e U

- b o a t s f r o m

t h e

B a y .

3 r i e w

a i r b a s e i n t h e A

z o r e s i n 1 9 4 3 g r e a t l y a s s i s t e d i n

T h e ' o f f p n ^

t h e r e b y o b t a i n e d f u l l a i r c o v e r r i g h t a c r o s s t h e A t l a n t i c ,

' v a s not e a s ^ ^ ^ a s n o w

i n t h e h a n d s o f t h e a l l i s , b u t t h i s ' f l o o d i n g o f t h e B a y '

w h i l e t

h

e

^

^

^

f

i

n

s

h

o

r

e

p r o v i d e d

o p e r a t e d f a r t h e r o u t , b u t t h e

U

- b o a t s w

e r e n

o w

' “ p r o v i d ^ ^ * ^

s t r o n g a n t i - a i r c r a f t a r m

a m

e n t a n d , a c t i n g i n g r o u p s o f f o u r

S u p p o r t ,

p r o v i d e d t o u g h o p p o s i t i o n t o a v o i d a t t a c k s .

’lyin 1944 *'

to counter the 'flooding of the Bay' temporar-

'“■■emain

invention of the schnorkel, which enabled them

'^®tect bv

rendered them almost impossible to

^3d once more to be depended on. C o n v o y

^ ® y v v e r e ^ . ’fP ^ S ^ ^ /b u tth e U -b o a tssu sta in e d h ea v y losses and in M a r c h prepare for the next major offensive, the

j ^ . ^ ® ®

^ ' ' ' ^ ^ ® b ® e n a n e w

d e v e l o p m

e n t - a h u m

a n t o r p e d o h a d

S e a t e d

w

h i c h c o u l d

b e

n a v i g a t e d

b y a c r e w

o f

t w

o

m

e n

^ h a r g e j

h u l l a n d b y m

e a n s o f w

h i c h t h e y c o u l d s e c u r e e x p l o s i v e

r e a d

y j ^

° ®

' ‘ *

e

b o t t o m

o f

a s h i p a t a n c h o r .

S e v e r a l o f t h e s e c r a f t w

e r e

1 9 4 1 a n d , d e s p i t e t h e n e u t r a l i t y o f S p a i n , I t a l y a r r a n g e d

° ' ^ ' ^ h o r o f f « ^ - u

f r o m

w

h i c h

t h e s e c r a f t c o u l d

a t t a c k

s h i p s

a t

ofwarfa u '^^‘^‘■•'^eseintrepidmensucceededinlaunchinganewform

° f t i i Y i e

s u c c e s s f u l l y d a m

a g i n g 1 4 m

e r c h a n t s h i p s w

i t h i n a s h o r t s p a n

l ) a s e s ^ ° '

s h i p s G

e r m

a n y h a d a l s o p r e p a r e d a l m

o s t i n a c c e s s i b l e

u p t h e N

o r w

e g i a n f i o r d s .

In r e c e s s e s p r o t e c t e d f r o m

P e d o

p a t r o l s , m

i n e - f i e l d s a n d l i n e s o f a n t i s u b m

a r i n e a n d a n t ' t o r -

‘'y h ioT ® '

h a d b e e n prepared under o v e r h a n g in g c l.ffs su rro u n d e d i i i o u n t a i n s , w

h i c h r e n d e r e d

t h e s h i p s i m

m

u n e f r o m

b o m

b i n g

210 / b l u e p r i n t t o b l u e w a t e r

ofa ship at anchor T

T

explosivecharpp?

®

but th b o a ; 3nd

early in

operation

c o u ld n n t h

\

^ ^ force of six

'vasconsiderd^^°^^^°"^'

autum n

^

and S o

as regards d, r.T

^ e penod September 20-25

^ ^ r ^ k h a -T Y ’^

selected as

and moonlight,

defences

full detai"^ of

unitinMur-

German dispositions andnel

1943, each in tow of a

'vith freaupir^® ® ^°^°^3boutT2nnm ?

ScA^?r«Aors/and one for

'leather w " " '

v e n S i n n

?

knots'speed,

'vas

® " ^ ° ^ r e d and several'tow

ten days. Bad

attherenrto^

to bescutHo^ u

were broken. One boat

submarinesi^H'^^^‘^‘^^^®fowswerp'

remaining four arrived duly

“

‘ ■ ' - " ^ T h t l ! " , ! ' ’

. ! * ° " -

° f d e f e c t s , o n e o f t e

i n f n ^ . a ^ - ^ ' ' ' ^ ^ ^ t h e o n l y o n e t h a t r e t u m e d , b u t

* = ^ ^ 8 6 5 b e f o r p

^ h e r e m

a i n i n g

t h r e e w h i c h

« > « p e r i e n c e s n u '

i n s i d e t h e n p t c '

g u n f i r e o r d e p t h

" " ^ ^ g e d t o

c h a r g e s , . n ! l

o t h e r t w

o ,

a f t e r h a i r - r a i s i n g

S '^b ygu ^i® J«ck “'^fside the n^r^fk ^ ^^‘P

difficulty

J» ^ e rth e T iW .y ‘®"^f^eycarneto ft^^

the explosions. They were

^rther part in

damaged it s o but

their charges exploded

crewo?fo

‘hat it was unable to (akeany

'®^ments were

and the s 7

rescued and made

t h e J J : sreat

and n t

^ue to t h l t ^ "8^

had been heavy.

stroneanH^^'^'^^^d, th e d °

Africa were not affected b y

landing c “^ "'a rin e p a .^ "''n a tio n oJ^'.'^I®'"®^ by the A llies as to time Sn^P^'^f^'^tine

inform ation and the

and naval o f f e

'^“n^bined A^‘*°n o f jj

Before the Normand/

B a tl" ^ * r -

in the channel ports vva5

was mainly d *’® ^ ‘l^ntic w

effective ait

scientific researri?''® *° ‘heir

® '^on bv

s u r f a c e f o r c e s a «

' ^ ' ' “ r > t i o

i n V c « r , - ^ ^ * i i e s b v a n a r r o w m a r g i * ’ '

a i r c r a f t w

h

1 c S >

‘

°

^

^

S

; i , r

e

c

t t P

‘ - 8 i u

s t a h e a d o f G

e r m

a n y i j

•^Admiral K a r i ? ^ '^ainiJa™'!®'? b etw een theairan d

° ®

" ' ‘ 2 a c | ^ '

f ' " ’

long-range shoi^

owledged t o b e t h e most

r

u

n

S I L E N T R U N D E E P

/

2 1 1

U S n a . a l k . r c e s o n

t h e

„

™

n

c

e

d

b

y

U

S s

u

b

™

™

«

j

r s r r

?

S

.

t

\

r

a

—

r

r

.

i

,

e

"

"

e

T h e n a t u r e o f

o p e r a t i o n s

m

t h

e

^

^

j i

g

t h e E u r o p e a n c o n f l i c t w

a s

w e a p o n . b o th s t r a t e g i c a l l y a n d t a c t l c a l l y ^ ^ ^ ^ e ^ ^ ^

i ^

^

japan w a s

aground and air war with naval support,

^

primarily a naval war, with ground an

the very beginning bas

^

The United States naval strategy w as

the empire was

on two important factors in the Japanese

. j^ygrds w e r e n o t a b l e t o

d e p e n d e n t o n w artim e o p e ra tio n s a n d m

a t e r i a l s f r o m

S o u t h E a s t

t u r n o u t s u f f i c i e n t s h i p p i n g t o b r i n g m s u e

r

c o m

b a t s u p p l i e s t o i

A s i a a n d o t h e r r e g i o n s a n d a t t h e s a r n e i n ^ e

, n

d

m

i l i t a r y

i n c r e a s i n g l y n u m ero u s a n d d i s t a n t p o in ts o n g ^ t r a t e d

t h e i r

a c r o s s t h e P a c i f i c . A

c c o r d i n g l y , US

j ^ e j i t o f Ja p a n e se s u p p *

tiononsinkingshipssoastostopseabom em o

^

a n d r e d u c e

i t s m

e r c h a n t m

a r i n e .

v ^ r v ^ a r i n e b a s e i n t h e F a c i i c a n

P e a r l Habour w a s the p rin cip al U S

*esubn\arine fleet there w as fortunately

r i_pds,w asa stnal

With the Asiatic fleet, based in the

t h r o u g h t h e DutchEas

ofsubmarines. D u r i n g the Jap an ese advance

t h e

the Southwest Pacific islands, submarm^^tro^

‘" S e

(reorganised early in 1942 a s the 7th fleet a ^^gj^pjead ^^oss th Brisbane and Fremantle) and the

j Japanese s^‘PP‘"^„jated out of

theatre of operations, taking an early tol

submarines oper

r e t a k e n i n A

u g u s t 1 9 4 4 , t h e F a c i i c

-

S o u t h - W

e s t

“ ^ t b a s e f o r t h e

r e s t o f t h e W

a r .

f o r c e s i n

- l e

a n d

U

S s u b m

a r i n e s o f f e r e d s u p p o j

^

^

^

^

e

w

h e r e v ^ f a ^

e y

o

n

d

t h e

r ® c i f i c a r e a , d e l a y i n g

the J a p a n e s e

.

gjion. O p e r a ‘ S

.j. determined

“ 1 ‘ e r r u p t i n g

t h e i r

l i n e s

o f

„ o ( , r t ,

t h e y ‘ ^ ^

' "

o ^

l e d g e

o f t h e i r

f e c t i v e r a n g e o f s u r f a c e o r a e n a ^

P

^

^

x h e

h a d t h e e f f e c t o f

® ‘ » a c k s d e e p i n t o J a p a n e s e

' J a p a n e s e d ° ' l ’ ' " " \ ' ° t t a c k s o n s e a l a n e s P r e s e n c e i n a r e a s u n d e r e x d u s » v

t h e i r p e « > ®

^ n l y

r e d u c e d t h e

^ W

m

g u p J a p a n ' s operations, w

^

‘ " g s u p p l y o f « w

m

a t e r i a l s

f o u g h t a r i s i n g s c o r e

o f ®

J ' J %

o i n t e r r ‘ | P ‘ ® f

i

^ o n ^ b a t f o r c e s .

^>nese merchant marine

supples to tne

• ^ t H e i t i n d u s t r y

and b a d l y

212 / blueprint TO BLUEWATER

ships. In the second year, 1943 the scorP

naval and merchiint

of 1;341,968 tons. By this time the

total

mfull swingand in 1944 U S submaHn

building programme was

sWpswith a total of 2^87,780 tons

ships of less than 1,000 toris hnnHrp^

>gJJre d oes n o t includemerchant

lunks,schooners a n d b a re e s -"wo

w

-s m a lle r vessels such as

submarines. Andwiththe^tnll nf

^y g u n fire from surfaced

the Japanese ships and shorP base

c o u n t in g , the supply lines to

^

subm arines had" sn h

iricreasm gly difficult to sustain,

they managed to sinkonlv

the Japanese fleets by 1945 that

ended. Japanese shinning

‘,1

total o f4 6 9 ,8 7 2 tons beforethewar

cW eflytoA siaticcoas'tai w ^ f

w as left was confined

At the time of the

of theJapanSea.

stopped Japanese sea tra ff

U S su bm arin es had completely

"e x t month they commenrpH

® Indo-C hina and in the

sea power in the Sea of Tana” "

d ow n the la st rem nants of Japanese

,

J'tt'^ P a c ific th e a t/ e ^ ^ ^ K

^ P P .y ships (tankers

m ain ly directed against

v e s ? i

game w h ^ ^ ® transports, etc.) but the US submarines

one b a t t l e s h i r '^ ” ®^*^^® and san k a total o f 189 combat Paciftv j y ’®®^®'^elightcruispr

carriers, fou r escort carriers, three

tactical

niade it clear that wh f ^ ^ subm arines. The operations in the f r e q u e n t ^ t ' subm arine is alw ays a hunter, the

theynevera

■^°’’*y'SixU SsiiK

subm arine the object of a

"'^ ^ ce e d e d in sS '

to t h p T ^

continued t o b e ever on

^ ell as 60 other pr®^^^“P®"®sedestrn

P'^^viously m entioned, they

Japanese forces

vessels alsn

principal sub-hunters, as

a d e q u a t e p r o t e ^ « ®

^

^

r

d

p

r

e

s

s

!

!

^

?

antisubmarine w a r f a r e .

W

h i l e U S s u h

o w

n s h r n

^ “

^ ^ ‘ c i e n t e s c o r t c r a f t t o e n s u r e

h ^ U

f o r

J a p a n e s r ^ v " ® ®

P a t r o ^ r

^

o f t h i s o f f e n s i v e ,

s e l y c o n j ^ g ^ j e ^ i v ^ i *

‘ P p i n g , o t h e r s w

T ^ ' ' ^ ^ o u s s t r a t e g i c a r e a s i n t h e i r 1 9 4 2 '

c o n c e n t o f

o p e r a t i o n s m o r e

' ®

P ° « t h e ^ H

a s s ^ l !

r ^

' ' “ ' ^ 3 r f a r e . I n t h e B a t t l e o f

^^onaut l a n d e d ^ ' ^ c e O f t h e

T a s k

F o r c e

1 7 s e r v e d a s

Japanese teinfo,

Pacific oD^r / i

^‘

•

r

S

J

1 5 4 2 ; t h e r ^ .

f o r

^ P ^ . ' ^ ^ t e d w

i t h

T a s k

F o r c e

8 > «

"** -ea in Jui^g 19^ ’°” and S-27

■'“^•eutian garrisons in the

'"*^*ch Was

^°®t in the Battle of the

a result o f the fact that

r u n SILENT RUN DEEP / 213

S - " “

Battle forLeyte G u lf in O c to b e r 1944 sa w U S su b m a rin e s su cce e d -

inginsutprisingthe heavy first d iv e rsio n a tta c k fo rce o f the

'

the Dflcesank the heavy cru iser Maya an d th e Darter sar\k a n o tf^ r, while a third of the six cru isers assig n ed to th at fo rce v/as The Darter was grounded d u rin g this en g a g e m e n t and d estro y y

forces later

The tasks assigned to U S su b m a rin es d u r i n g t h e w ar in clu d ed recon naissance, rescue, su pply and lifeg u ard m issio n s. S u b m arin e r e c o r ^ a i s sancecould be m ade in w aters w h ere e th e r v esse ls d a re d n o t S°-

rine rescue was effective for the sam e reaso n ; the f i n a l stag e o f ^ n e r a

^ouglas MacArthur's escap e from the P h ilip p in e Islan d s be ore

^

was m ade by su b m arin e. A v alu ab le cargo o go

‘>>«wise removed from the P h ilip p in es sh ortly b efore the J a p a n e s e

“" ’asion of the islands.

...

.

.^ “^ "’arines w ere used to su p p ly A llied forces in the Phi l^ ^ rlan d s Indies, b o th b e fo re a n d a f t e r t h e Jap an ese f a l l

of w ere ta k e n in to C orregid or b y subm arines

p^lied

tortress, and variou s gu errilla forces in the islands w

P .

and other m unitions o f w ar.

on a minor scale,

Rescue ODPratinne a^coal^^7CIlhmarines com m enced

__

'viththT^" operations a t s e a b y su bm arin es c o m m ^ n ^ —

^

^

air

®“ " 7 M°he Tapanese increased in

sttPnr-u

P®

carrier strikes agam st the J

enem y

terrif^ ' ‘*^®P‘‘°b le m o f rescu in g personnel of planes

vessels

increasingly im p ortant and

during

‘

o r e I h a n W ^ " ;;'” "

Wp,o

theTflng k ick ed up 22airmen-

Japanese.

perishing at sea or being cap

dangerous or

1,m .^^^arines w ere also used for

volu nteers from the

2 .^ W

n w aters and even raids on

" °n a ^ a i^ e s e train, and

paddled ashore iniubberboats to O ci^n j jg^tfuction along

as w ell as others, created

j^ g n t o f ports and installa-

{ P“r>ese coastlines by gun and rocket bom bardm e

P

214 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

Japanese to any pow er. Approxinnately 120 m ore Japanese submatmes were to be sunk by U S naval ships and aircraft during the Wat and on August 14, 1945, a U S subm arine got the last Japanese submarine andlast major Japanese naval vessel to be sunk.

Destroyers and their new W orld W ar II offspring, the destroyet escorts, w ere the principal participants in the role of submarine sinkers^

W ith SONAR and depth charges, l a t e r augm ented by hedgehog smaller but powerful explosive charges dropped in greater num rs was possible with depth charges), these c r a f t constantly improv technique of hunting and sinking subm arines and were rw st y KSp sible for the score of 63 submarines sunk by US surface ships.

The hedgehogs' main advantage w as

a submarine, they did not explode, w hereas t h e d e p t h chargesw a predetermined depth and the resulting underw ater distu

pered further tracking of the target if a hit h a d not b e e n scor The principal submarine killers, i.e., the

usually hunted in groups, with one or m ore ships tracking

.LgcubtT»a'

by SONAR while another followed a course plotted tomtersec^ t ^

tme s track, at which point an attack was made. In such op ^

destroyer escort England was credited with sinking six submarines ^

apenodoftw o weeks. US submarines were also successful m

^3

craft with sonar and s i n k i n g t h e m w i t h torpedoes.

' ^ jtet

as a result of attack by

day

credited with sinking three s u b m a r in e s with

m o st attack s on

loss of the

“ submarine's sinking generally

all on board

S-39, S-36 and S-27 were

crew with a w A f n

'^^sbombedbutlaterdestroyed y

j,e

b a « y dam aged

numbers, survivors of thp

captured and i m p r i s o n e d - in

also taken prisoner bv th e ltl

Tullibee and ^

own torpedoes which bon

was destroyed by 0

by the US in wartime

total o f 5 2 s u b m a r i n

No account of submar'mT'

officers and 3,131 men died-

g

wifliout reference to the pan

Pacific could be

submannes: about 15 of the

British and Dutch East I n ^

but heroic campaign against 50060^

t h e hope

o f t h e w

a r , w

i t h h e a v y l o s s e s .

^ ° r c « i n t h e e a r l y

f i r s t s u b m

e t n n e k i l l s of b o t h

w

e r e c r e d i t e d

s o u t h - w

e s t P a c i f i c a r e a , a

p

p

r o

S

^

: " ^ v a l

" m e r c h a n t v e s s e l s -

I n ^

y w Japanese vessels were sunk PX

r u n SILENT RUN DEEP / 215

S u i n l S s 'o T n 1942and then

9 7 d u r i n g t h e f i r s t f i v e m

o n t h s 0 ^ . 1 9 4 5 .

^

r . u

i s e r s , 3 4 d e s t r o y -

period were two b a t t le s h ip s jiv e a ir c r a f t c a r r ie r s ,

^

ers, three submarines, 37 frigates, sloops an

3 5 in 1 9 4 1 , 86 in

other types. Germanylostnine U-boats in 1 9 3 ^ 2 2 in

'

^ a total

1942,237 in 1943, 241 in 1944 and 153 in 1945. Thus the Ger

of 783 U-boats, an alarm in glyhighnu m berb utsank4,797 A1

ships and 107 naval vessels.

Further Ascendancy of the S u b m a r in e

Just as had happened during the First W orld W ar,

V

only

againcome very close to winning the Second W orld W ar “

^

narrowly defeated by two factors - installation of radars m

^

s h i p s a n d a i r c r a f t f o r t h e f i r s t

t i m

e f o r s u r v e i l l a n c e a t s e a a n

F

American shipbuilding activities.

.

aicm against

I n

t h e P a c i f i c

t h e a t r e ,

t h e

A

m

e r i c a n s u

b m

a r m

e c a m

p

^

j a p a n e s e c o m

m

e r c e

h a d b e e n

e x t r e m

e l y

e f f e c t i v e ;

i t h a

- o r n m

e r c e

paneseconvoysystemand,aidedby aircraft,h ad brou g

, .

the

“ s t a n d s t i l l . T h i s

w

a s p r o b a b l y

t h e m

o s t i m

p o r t a n t s i n g

«0>y over Japan and at least equal i n importance to the great a.r a m

p h i b i o u s a d v a n c e a c r o s s t h e P a c i f i c - -

_ » p i v o n e - t h i r d

o f t h o

^

e

r i c a

n

s u b n r \ a r i n e s h a d a l s o

o r e o n l y s e c o n d

P ® o f t h e j a p a n e s e N

a v y a n d a l t h o u g h

^

j p

U

a

d

f a r g r e a t e r

t o c a r r i e r a n d s h o r e - b a s e d a i r c r a f t , j ^ p e r i e n c e w

i t h

Z f T r

A

m

e r i c a n b a t t l e f l e e t ' s . The B r i t i s h W h e r

d u r i n g W

o r l d W

a r I I w

a s

a i r p o w

e r ,

S

' ”

c e s w

e r e u n a b l e t o o p e r a t e b e c a u s e o f e n e m y

P

V i n t h e M

e d i t e r r a n e a n .

a r p a t l v e n h a n c e d r e p u -

U t i r m

^ ^ ®

s ^ b m

a r i n e e n d e d W

o r l d W

a r I I v ^ '

f t l e f l e e t a n d s e c c w

C f t i l v

p r o v e d i t s e l f t o b e m

o r e i m

p o r t a n t t

c a p a b i l i t i e s t h a

‘ h e a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r a s a w

a r s h i p .

enem y ^

P o v u o r ° ^ *

was able t o o p e r a t e m

s t r o n g e r as w e

the

now w ith ou t doubt a w eapon

j ^ ? / b e e n victorious

o n l y

0 ? ^ '^ " g w e a p o n .N o to n ly h a d itb e e ^

.^the Atian

® ^ ' ^ » > s u b m a r i n e

m

e a s u r e s

w

h i c h h a d d e

216 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

c o u

n

t e r e d

i t a s

a

s u

b m

e r s i b l e t o r p

e d

o

a n d

i t

w a s r e a l i s e d t h a t m o s t o f

t h

e m

w

o

u

l d

b

e

i n e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t

a

t r u e

su b m arin e w h i c h o p e r a t e d

s u

b m

a r i n e s d

u

r i n g W

o r l d

W

a r I I a n

d

w

a s F l a g O

f f i c e r

u

■ R o y a l N

a v

y

a n d

l a t e r F l a g O

f f i c e r S c o t l a n d

a n d

N

o r t

s u b m e r g e d

' T

h

e n

e w

G

e r m

a n

t y p e s o f s u

b m

a r i n e o f g r e a t l y i m p r

. ^ y ^ g j ^ h e

perform an ceb ein g p rod u ced atth een d of t h e W a r t h e r e ^

and not

U

- b o a t c a m

p

a i g n

a g a i n s t c o m

m

e r c e h

a d

r e a l l y o n y

If the Germ ans h ad been able to build the

o

^

^

c

h

even

underw ater craft w hich they had perfected by 19 ^

roupie

today's conventional submarines are largely based, a

^ ^ g ^ g r a t s e a

earlier, andin large enough num bers, they c o u ld h a v e w o during W orld W ar II.

lier

of

The submarine came into the lim elight during t h e e a i

j j p o n

c e n t u r y

a n d

g a i n e d c o n s i d e r a b l e

n o t o r i e t y

b y

| r e r t n a ^ ^ y

A

l l i e d m

e r c h a n t a n d n a v a l s h i p p i n g d u r i n g W

o r l d

W

a j f

■

g j ^ a c y

d e m

o n s t r a t e d t h e l e t h a l p o w

e r o f s u b m

a r i n e s a n d t h e i r s

y

u - b o a ^

s u r f a c e f o r c e s d u r i n g W

o r l d W

a r I I w

h e n , t h e

o f

a g a i n s t m

e r c h a n t s h i p s c a r r y i n g A

l l i e d p e r s o r u i e l a n d m

i n t h e A

t l a n t i c a l m

o s t b r o u g h t t h e A

l l i e s t o t h e i r k n e e s .

c a n

A

c a r e f u l a s s e s s m

e n t o f t h e v e r s a t i l i t y o f t h i s

b e j u d g e d f r o m

the following a s p e c ts of its c a p a b ilitie s . A

o p e r a t e s u b m

e r g e d i n w

a t e r s w

h i c h i s u n d e r t h e c o n t r o l

o f a

p o w

e r ,

i t

c a n

m

i n e e n t r a n c e s t o enem y harbours, p s ^ s a g e s /

^

. j ^ g j ^

v / a t e r w a y s , i t c a n a t t a c k s h i p p i n g e n t e r i n g o r l e a v i n g e n e r t ^ P

^

a

s i n k e n e m

y n a v a l

o r m

e r c h a n t

v e s s e l s w

h i l e r e m

a i n i n g s u b m

e g

p l a c e o f i t s o w

n c h o i c e i r r e s p e c t i v e o f t h e s p h e r e o f i n f l u e n c e

s u r f a c e .

I t

c a n n o t

b e i d e n t i f i e d

u n l e s s i t i s c a p t u r e d ,

' d

e b r i s

u n l i k e l y , o r d e s t r o y e d w

h e n t h e i t e m

s i n t h e flotsam c a u s e d b y

^

e

a

'

a r e p i c k e d u p b y t h e a t t a c k e r s . D

e t e c t i n g a n d t a k i n g e f f e c t i v e

a

s u r e s

a g a i n s t a l u r k i n g s u b m

a r i n e i n

a s e a a r e a ,

l a r g e o r s m

a l l , e v

p r e d o m

i n a n t l y s u p e r i o r s u r f a c e f l e e t i s e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t e v e n t o d a y

s p i t e a l l t h e t e c Y m

o l o g i c a l a n d

t a c t i c a l a d v a n c e s m

a d e .

t i o o

A

n o t h e r s p h e r e o f a s u b m

a r i n e ' s d o m

i n a n c e

i s t h a t o f t h e d e ‘ e f .

„

a n d d e s t r u c t i o n o f s u b m

e r g e d e n e m

y s u b m

a r i n e s , e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e

»

b e l o w

t h e t h e r m

a l l a y e r - a l a y e r o f w

a t e r a t v a r y i n g d e p t h s f r o m

t h ® 5

_

s u r f a c e i n t r o p i c a l w

a t e r s w

h e r e t h e i n t e r f a c e b e t w

e e n t h e l a y e r a n d

w

a t e r a b o v e r e f l e c t s t h e s o u n d p u l s e s e m i t t e d b y s h i p s ' s o n a r s e t s a n d t h e s e l a y e r s a r e , t h e r e f o r e , a

s a f e

h a v e n

f o r

a s u b m

a r i n e

h i d i n g

f r o m

attackingsurfacefleet.Thishappensbecause the temperature gradient,! ^ '

RUN SILENT RUN DEEP / 217

ihefall in the temperature of sea w ater with increasing d ep th reverses a t the interface and the temperature starts rising. In ocean ograp h ic p arlan ce, this phenomenon is known as 'tem perature inversion' and is quite co m m o n in the tropical and subtropical regions. Since the sound pulses em itted by the ASDICsets or tlie latter-day sonar sets cannot penetrate the therm al layers and undergoes total reflection, it is only a subm arine w hich can dive below enemy subm arines lurking in the therm al layer and

C.W

however, has a few draw backs com p ared to a surface

tarUraw

to essentially rem ain subm erged in the

wide a v'

hence carm ot have as detailed or as

a ship. S ^ n ^ i

surroundings as w ould be available from the deck of

surface shins (

effective as a visible deterrent as

■ fhoueh it cot

blockading harbours, straits or w aterw ays

wheniheenem

^ surface task force in that role especially

superiority ovefth

submarines in a defensive role or has air

asufficientiveffp

sam e reason, i.e., for not being

as eunhnat*^^ visible deterrent, it is not very effective for w hat is

^^®fiornavai nm' “ flexing of naval m uscles to overaw e an These dra h

submission.

Periority of

despite the overw helm ingsu-

"^clear vveapop '

-su bm arin es with nuclear propulsion and

and a hitfi

virtually have unlimited endurance, extrem e le-

^^omarine,

thousand miles, the conventional

■^^ades,isUp

to fulfil the tactical missions for m any

nere to stay.

■'

197b

S.M Vo,V.i- r

“•

"

*' formerly the Chief of the Naval Staff, w rote in

^"'erestingiv thp

® ^resh lease ’

the nuclear submarine has itself given

’■®asons.Ojie° V

conventional submarines, for various

^^at each of ih

cost of nuclear submarines; it is believed

Mother is

^

will cost approximately Rs 1,000 crores.

is driv ^

noisiness of the nuclear submarine as its vast

Censors

^.’8^ ^P®®ds

powerful steam turbines. M odem

consiHo ,

and aircraft make underwater noise detectable

^^tack

is regarded as a good weapon not only

and H ^ submarines within its endurance zone but also to Relatively ]

other conventional submarines. Because of its

**Ve|y gji^ °"^®^®P®ed and motor-driven propulsion, itiscom p ara-further, it has benefited from the same advances in _

218 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

qualities of steel, sensors, and w eapons that have made the nuclear submarine a formidable foe. Yet another virtue rediscovered in the conventionals is their com pact small size, w hich make themextremely difficult to locate and attack. Thus, the conventional submarine has acquired a new status in the antisubm arine role, particularly when used in combination with other antisubmarine fo rces such as surface ships, helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft.

6

THE NAVY ACQUIRES THE

TfflRD DIMENSION

Birth of the Submarine Arm

story of the evolution of the Indian N avy's subm arine arm ^

itscoming of age asthesw ord arm of ^

against

a lltH °^ °^ ‘»^^'i«‘--'-e d % f f o f ts r n a d e by the

P C u L s rfalffe

that,

over several decades, to make

_ p o „ e n t s of

any

arm was and is one of the most essen la

^

and

y

odem navy and finally succeeding, despite several canards

' ^ g s from different directions, in the early

the first

sej^°"f°f^-^'elaterplannersvvasCommodoreBXDan&w

with all

Opera,”

Indian Navy to formally fami^anseK

training aspects of submarines He

3^

'®ssess^^^'^'^^8thevariousphasesofthedeve^_P^

training of

Personr2^''‘ of requirements in the context of

^^t outfit, spares,

®siahli^ performance levels, weapons and eq p

g^pport and

W

^

of logistic facilities, bases for " ' " ' " " " n U a r and peace, training and the deployment of submarines m w

^ ‘‘®^bmarine T ra in in g d u rin g W orld

submarines,

i l h a j ?

e a r l y 1 9 4 0 a , th o u g h t h e R o y a l

a n d

O

p

tt ^ ^ P ^ ^ f o r c e c o n d u c t c o u r s e s

t o

r p

e ^

w

a r f a r e ^

^ i t h

t i o n s f o r t h e g ro w in g n u m b e r o f s h i p

220 / b l u e p r i n t t o b l u e w a t e r

W ,-,0 „ .

,3 „ ,

" p fo T x x r v

i

2(” '5 < '"J« W N )w h o h a ™ d o n V h t

= R°y»l NavalResem

w

o ffic e r to q u a lifv in a

^‘^f’S u b m a r in e c o u rs e at Ospreji,

W orldW arUwas U e u . S , ^ l ' ^ ' ' ■ ? “ ^™'•'•™ Warfare (A /S ) d „ 4

mmanderof theYardaf theNav [ i n i*^ Joe Jefford, then serving as [he

^

“ "bryo A/S school in a small

«ter rose to the rank of VicP ah

the same Dockyard. Jefford

™efm August 1947.

became Pakistan's first Naval

C om m ander Gon h u

.

n S !o ® '^ ® ‘''^ ^ ich cam eto

recognised for having devel-

o n r ;

a submercpH

the Goord Target, which was

"^Tra^-

•

.

^'^hmarine for training in antisubmarine

the"^Wa*r”h

(A /S ) continued during the

staff, Goord recaiil, ; '

Problem confronted by the

wbs no

■

temn*^

oflen detectpH*'

passing merchant shipS/

’^y^rs i

X

'

^

w

a

y

owing to the frea

a

““ tdummvTn ^ u

hence of not much

i n t e n d ? ;" .

It was, therefore, decided to.se

bubbles

elert

Johnson, afte^

los^!^;

an echo

^

^

good methori*

j{

' ^ ^f’ag was that if had a habit

‘h a t ? a 3t ° i S '° '" - " 8 b u t

that we had a pedectiy

suitable d e p t h

to dev''

diving pump and hose^

- c t Z T r

^hi?h^ would r.n at a

; ' ‘‘hthecrewtomn^''‘°f’>sh', v v ^ h

•"<^ked only d o n > " ' ‘hepunio f '

behind tF.e motor cutt'A

rom T h e i r L o r d S j i ? ' ^ " '

b r o n ' o K

r , J Z S r

s n ; ° W « c o m p l i m e n , a r y W ; «

t 4 a a " „ '

No u ? '

» T u t

pump

P °'^ e rco rn „ ^ o n h e R ,^ ‘‘ /Commodore M-H- ^

bottle) instead of thedivW’^

THE NAVY ACQUIRES THE THIRD DIMENSION / 221

. . . We moved to the new A /S School in N ovem ber (1940). This was in Castle Barracks (Bombay).

An A ttack Teacher (training

equipment for antisubmarine w arfare) arrived from Britain, was imtalledand demonstrated to V.I.P.s, including H.R.H. the Duke of Gloucester and, more importantly, w as brought into constant use.

ourses oroffice^^

w ere stepped up and a Reserve

Course passed out, to provide instructors and Port A /

F

I/I ^ the future. One of the officers on this course was then“

w R o f f i c e r ' '

Ram dasKatari,

Place^nr**^"^ though the Attack Teacher was, it could not take the small VPS

Th®SG we carried out in various

wasmn

even smaller ones as targets. In some ways this

^eabort'pH^K^f^*'^ thari using the 'Goldfish', but every attack had to purpose

target vessel. The conflict of

avoidance of actually

never occurred^^'''

t)ut, somehow, a major accident

2nd w ithr

^ *^^^9ged to shed the Bombay responsibility

and

Kendall, RN drew upplansforacom bined RN

Sombav

K ^^ti-Submarine School {Machhlimar) ai Versova (a

‘^ontlnuoH*^

started functioning in March 1943 and

the War

officers and ratings during the remaining period of

^

l e

t h

A

f t e r I n

d

e p

e n

d

e n

c e

‘ both foj.^?°^^^’^^®ofacquiringa submarine for the Royal Indian Navy

?^-®"sive operational training and for conducting exercises in

®'^9“irino

Warfare -h a d been fully appreciated, the question of

developing a subm arine arm was never taken up,

'varrant^^f Perceptions of the Navy's erstwhile foreign masters did not WjiL ® Inclusion of such a potent weapon platform.

ilcJij'j fu j

advent of Independence in August 1947, however, free

Navy started looking afresh at its national maritime

from the b asically secondary supportive role assigned to

lhesi~/“® "W the British Royal Navy. T h atroleh ad undoubtedly enlarged insupu ®^^he Indian N a v y considerably during World War II, but chiefly the

as escorts o fm erch a n tsh ip p in g ,p a tro llin g o fco a sta la rea sa n d terri* .

of amphibious craft for the recapture of South-East Asian from the Japanese.

u j u • uj .•

this timeithadbeen established that submarines had theiniliative

222 / blueprint TO BLUEWATER

against the verv murh

roughttoa point of sucheffectivp"""^" submarines in World War H was course of the war in the A tlanfi'l^i^ u

virtually determining

While shit Was the submarines^

control of the surface of sea areas,

tWs control.

operating below the surface that neutralised

"aval piannL"du?ilIe'Ihr^

upperm ost in the minds of the Indian

blishment of the

post-w ar development for

^

^ s m e n tio n e d J i

boAK

ships and craft of the

an d H o p ^ 'lf

fitted wifh s°C>m!r '

minesweepers andpaWl

live

therp « ^*''^^equipment,antisubmarinemortars

starts w iT ® ^ anHsubmarir.p^"’° f * ’ " " ^ " " ^ w i * which to train.Hence, Indian

^"tishor Au«^^^^^

imparted in fits and

(JET)

^^^^“ adronor p i

visited India or when the

Betwe.

in the R jkx

3n d 194Ra i

J^tisubmarine 10^^^

of Indian officers and saijoj

globe.

had been

escorts and ships to whi6-

^^cacy of t h ^ X

P ^ ^ s o n n p f f i o f operations arou

effective , ^ “-element w ‘

only been impressed by t^’«

in thp^H-^^*^ "^^liverv

P^^tform - the submarine - a® I*'

Afew * ^ ‘sciplineof^,^^^*^e but some of them had

“ A / s ’ X w ? . ™ =nd A .,.s u b m a r in e Warf»«

indenJ^j

senior positions in

effecUvp

^^'a's

on

terms of expertise and

submarines

Defence forr

.^*^®^avy would be far

ters had

of

“^ g '^ se n id

submarinearmwere

'<

was la tS ™ P ° s a ls to ° S ^ ‘*onalsla°//

*he Ind ia n Na vy

®

THE NAVY ACQUIRES THE THIRD DIMENSION / 223

The First Proposal

Within a fortnight of the historic transfer of pow er and the resultant parhlionoftheRoyal Indian N avy into two navies for India and Pakistan on gust 15, 1947, Naval H eadquarters put up a proposal to the vemment for the acquisition of four submarines for the Indian Navy.

prepared by C om m odore M .H. St. L.Nott, a

Headau^^‘* ^

^ (Specialist) sfV d !'

officer of a new cadre designated as the

^ons hp f L .

^ ‘^hin t

t h

n e

e B

D ri

n t

t is

is h

n C

v o

^ m

o m onweal

i th

m o

o f

r iN

\ a

a -

-

receive frn^^

much lightened by the assistance she will

thesecirn ^

^oyal and other Dominion Navies. But even in

expected and indeed she will wish

®'^cordance ^ °

g^fieral Naval Defence of the Commonwealth in

^dianOcean^'

status as the principal sovereign state in the

The *

* •

shortest tirri^^*^!f

before us, therefore, is to build up, in the

^"d'ans,

naval task force, officered and manned by

•nfluence ‘ p

of exerting, when theneedarises, a definite

to ach'

waters. The minimum force w hichw ouldbe

‘^fuisers g-

object would be two light fleet carriers, three

arenec

^ “^sstroyers, foursuhm arines and such smaller ships

^'^xiliarv

tenders to

training establishments and for

'''3s Bnn

estimated cost of a submarine

\ 7 ° 0 0 ( R s 6,666,000).

num^^

r e q u ir em en ts of thenavy were reassessed and

^*^oiniQcn^*

submarines required was raised to 16, to be acquired

®^ancpH

fr> ju stification of f t e

Subma-:"’‘®'3“ ’^ement proposed. Naval H eadquarters stated, ™

offen^j,“1®

a powerful naval weapon which can be used both

defensively. As a weapon of offence, submannes

aftacw

"®"^ywarshipsbuttheyare

morefrequentlyemployedfor

ingt^,^°"enemymerchantshippingandmilitaiyconvoysthusstr^^^^

FgMK-

threattoanyen«m y attempting

Conw

destroyers and other light craft.

y

^®red with the result they may achieve.

‘ “'■“ '^’’X'NTTOBLUEW Ara

■'

^

tairtng

naval bases'

tobeslfedonVh

othe

‘hehv

oesifedonthecoastatoneoflhe

^®putation

heltf

Navyandsome

^'^ependencp •

Navy Hn f

P

who wereon

off

o i

ff c

i e

c r

e fo

f r

o

r th u

p A

V p r i l iq

19 q

5 o

s .u

f -f

u ^

, . . ' n

^earl

s y ele

ne ve

arl n

y vea

ele rs

ve a/

n years after

^®PWationtoo„''^M"'^®^-

senior r‘

headed by an Indian

J^40sandearly

who w ereat'Ih eh "?^ ^ ’

^ . ^ ° P h i s t i c a S

^oy^ever l 'u ^ ^ ^ o fa ffa ir s during theJale

l ^ a n naval norc

with eaua/i

^®''*evv thatsubmarines were/ar

/^pendent

operate _^^°P^'^^'cated weapon sysfems for

t o f e n ' '

a little too early for

safe and Were 1,1.

felt that l^h

submarines, torpe-

withouf ^^^°'^3usearriH “ " ’^"nes were yet to be rendered peJS'^®' '^‘^•'ed- anH^^“® 'eexperi?"'^ 'eading to loss o f life if handled Would ,I '^'shappenp^^^^

they felt, Indian nava

m Tu

the

fime thr^®'^"'®"toflndYa

standing in

^»vy S i "

A u s t r a l

gen eral public-

°*'^ained aV®"®

t o

* ' ‘^e as thp

Canadian

Chief oV7, and O D ^ :r‘^'*'aineesof * u ' o ^ " wflicn, w - -

^"'nple Of

by r

host country's navy, were

^P-

^^''aandr?^®''yfelttLf^!,'^®' Personnel. T h e British

prnn

®' howp^

'

‘’^fore

,

had b

" " ^ ' - - ^ - " n e a n n w a s . t

^ole w h ^ n N a J t ? b e

didn't find favo^

*'’" « ° y a | > c o n t > f helved. It was felt that thj

'Confined to the coastal

" ° " ‘>nue to be assigned

THE NAVY ACQUIRES THE THIRD DIMENSION / 225

bluewater responsibilities in the Indian O cean, the defence of India's 6,000-loncoastline, and the task of assisting the Royal N av y in perpetuating its big-brother role in the region.

Other Navies Go A head

While fheproposal to develop the subm arine arm remained in cold storage in this country, rapid strides were m ade in the rest of the world in propulsion technology, weapon system s, sensors, the subm arine's oper-

*o*"pedo range and hom ingcapabilities, other anti-ship weap-certain

” *^86/ navigational equipment, diving capabilities and

underwaf

^

ofsubm arine operations,

but m ost markedly in

alino

endurance. The era of the 'true submarine', oper-

■""g^rjy Mow the surface, w as dawning.

AdmiralRrT^^*^'

revived when the first Indian Naval Chief,

appreciated th ^^"^^^'^^''erin April 1958. By n ow ith ad on ce again been offensive role f*

Indian navy needed submarines not only for the

'vaterswashi °

vessels at sea, defending the vast coastal

fleets and

peninsula and operating as escorts to our

*^pboardpp^' ^ ships, but also to provide adequate practice to our

^^Ps of the R c o n d u c t i n g antisubmarine operations. Nearly all

'^aritim^-

been fitted with SONARs and these ships

^uently

needed to take part in antisubmarine exercises

®^^®ntialtk,,

to hone their skills. For this purpose it was most

*^®SouthEa j 'P®°^^h®FIeethaveadequateandfrequentopporturuties in

“nderw-1'

‘ '"opical operating conditions to exercise with our own

^'^^Penden^ 7

i.e., submarines. These exercises would be

^°'»'nionw«. wu

j° '" * exercises (JET), held with ships of the

limit

South-West monsoon which only pro-

L°"'^'Hons

°PPO''f“ nities with limited scope for creating real-Jife

^ d e s th

prevail during the circadian, seasonal or annual cycle; the only other opportunity to participa te inan tisub-Corni^^^'^'ses that came the Navy's way was when submarines of

'vhile

navies called at Indian ports during goodwill visits or

quiteun

’*'"g

waters contiguous to our shores. Obviously, this was

‘‘^factory and the level of the Naval personnel's training in anh-notbe alwf °P®'‘3f'ons continued to be low though it was felt that it could

'ved to continue to be so.

Constraints

‘his limitation, it was generally felt that the budgetary'allocation

226 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

m ade annually to the N avy, com pared to the allocations made to theothei twoSewiceS; w as m ost inadequate, how ever, despite the lack of adequate appreciation of the im portance of sea pow er, especially in the Indian peninsular context, a paper proposing the acquisition of three submarines for the N avy which would not only be deployed for operations in theses around the subcontinent but would also be available as live targets for antisubmarine training of naval personnel, w as put up to the Government byNavalHeadquarters in 1959. This failed to elicit a positive responseand despite protracted discussions wherein the advantages of acquiring the new weapon platform were repeatedly stressed, the Navy could not make any headway for several years.

It was also stressed that every m odem navy operated submarines, that it would take several years to train submarine personnel and hence, pending the availability of funds and the official approval for acquiring su marines, Indian naval personnel opting f o r t h e s u b m a r i n e arm cou be trained abroad and could man submarines when they were acquired so as o minimise the lead time required to make them operational.

Meanwhile frigates, sloops and corvettes of the Fleet conHnuedto carry out antisubmarine exercises but the need fora submarine for usea during the 1950s and the ineffica^

®'^.^^™®^''a'ning while exercising once or twicea

j

to f h S '

behighlighted in the reports submitted

Kirpan

a n d B e f r y a o f T y p e 4 1 a n d

K

'

S S h ?

1950s had actually bean p l a n n e d

t h e U ^ l t S r

"^^Pability, the requirement o f submarines fo

Type 12

Government. Tl«ship

w Sl as\ "

armament, air defenc a

i

«P^biHty, combined in a hull o f very successfu TypM l h a V m S

consumption. The sh .p s^

a ^ d h e n c e h a d r t r "

antiaircraft and surfaceoperafo^

endurance; in the e v e n r ip

capability though they h«d go

because of problems nncoH

did not perform very well ^

navy was yet tobecomp f

v

machinery which were of a

smaller

w

The ships of Type 14 were slightly

own right fairly effective

capability. These were in the

adjuncts to a bigger force with

'if

in

the absence of a submarine tnr«

®

'nnportant capabilities and»

was greatly lowered.

P''actise with, their value for the Indian Fle«

N eed for Subm arines Stressed

THENAVYACQUIRESTHETHIRDDIMENSION / 227

pjoposal

“ b c r o r ! i n 'n « t

: l ^ ; \ S S r f . h e n e w M s a —

iy b e ca u se it ta d bee., rep ortedm 1958 t h a u ne,gn^

^ ® oposal

» . s c o n s i * r i n g t h e a c q u i 5i t i o n o f s u b m a r i n e s on the subject submitted during th atyear, .

availablein the N a v y

therew asanurgentneedforaugm entingtheiacuK ie.a

su b m a rin e

for the antisubmarine training of surf&ce ships wi

N av y m

targets and unless this could be achieved, the efficiency

.

antisubmarine warfare would, of n ecessity, rem ain lov/. t a acquisitionof modem ships fitted w ith the la test antisubm arm e ^ ^

didnotbyitselfconstituteanefficientantisubm arineforceror,am o g

things,itrequiredahigh degree of sustained and continuous trairung

livesubmarines under realistic conditions.

.

,

Stressing the importance of the operational role of subm ann , proposal stated;

^submarine is an integral part o f a balanced m aritim e force . . •

local or global war in which India m ay be forced to take pa , submarines canbeem ployed to great advantage in a c h i e v i n ^ w t over the waters which affect the defence of

country^

«

“e employed in patrols off enem y-controlled w aters, a

*

against hostile surface ships on the high seas

^ the

submannearmisoneof the m ost effective means

.

^ c o -

seaborne trade. It can also operate

fetation with the surface fieet as radar pickets anv*

^

for providing valuable early information.

.

-g t,gji,g

submarines for hunting enemy ®

-j^^jntries,

and from recent k n o w l e d g e gained from

jj^ajdition

the very fact that w e p ossess submarines w 11

'°^'derable s u b ^ r in e effort on the enemy and thus m a x

a ^ i s offensive power.

„Wdare «*^pending acon -

sida ^

"^ jo r maritime powers of the wond

effort on the build-up of their subma

she

submarine design and P®'^^°*^” ?^*'^i,^arines have been in

th„

The latest improvements in su

-^jybmarine, and

■^^^®''eofaquabatics, i.e., the shape and

propulsion. Th^se

J " ^ e a n s of propulsion

i n c l u d i n g

nuclear

l^l^^en^ents have given a new

, proceed at very high

® 1 intents, permanently submerged a

improvemen s

when submerged. These, t a k e n together wim

F

228 / blueprint TO BLUEW,ATER

jn o t

of making submarines a

s r o p e . , . . ,

^

‘ ' ' a

n

' N

«

y

s

t r

u

l d

S

a

n

e

a

r

' v

^

™

a r i , i m

e f o r c e , f e

arm of its own. The important t h i L

a submarine

operatmgsubmarinesasearlvaqno 'k i '°

the technique of

withconventionaloroldsubi^arinpr i f

thatpurpose a start

^ ’^^Provideanadequateanswer.

a p p r o x i m

a t e l y ! 0 0 0

o f a t l e a s t f o u r s u b m

a r i n e s , e a c h o /

^p port in terms of dockinc

^

^0. Technicailogistic

and submarine

battery and periscope repairs and

; —yard at Bombay. ThentVio f-

would be provided by the Naval

^ ? ° } ®^’P '^ifh machine shn*^

required would be a shore base or

f o r S ° ^ ^ " ’^.®P®*'®8earstnraS'

preparation shops, electrical

'win

,°P®'^ational andtechn^ '

'*y‘®9*J'Pped training establishment

'

"

^

'

S

‘ " ' " ■

' ’ S ' f - ' i >

' e

s f o

r 4 g = u s s i n g - a n d

r e s u s c i J C

With

jj^^^^^qiJipment.

S®' diving gear, divers and

WpaciSf^^

the services of foreign submarine

placedbv?nH -""® experience i t

^

^'ave officers with

The

as andwf«

would gradually be te-

four new s J b i^ ‘he estahlU h^^ acquired sufficient experience-recurring c o s t ^ " " “ at that timp

submarine branch With

an

2^ ; :

^6

^

frigates fitted

on the way

had acquired t w o cruisers and

w e a p o n s ^

there were eight ne»^

.^ d also b e e n S j!."°“8^ to a c h i d e t e c t i n g d e v i c e s a n d antisub'

waV ^ r l '" i t h a n ^ ^ ^ "

T h f six destroyers ofth«

t o t 2

equipment and one of their

S

S

t

r

‘oget ^f ' - ^' ^^^n Of submarines. Since

oracnmi.^^®®ofdent>,

^''byanf:. I a favourable position to fire

with submI^-’°^°^ ^ o

and coura^"^^” "®

and these tactics

' - P e r i e n o e

,“ "

'

C

T

"

' h ® “ «

o f d e c o y d e v i c e *

'

‘ ^ ' ^ o f s e r v i c p ^ ^ ® ' ' ® ® ’ ' s e d t j i a t o n l y o f f i c ® * ®

submarines, would kno'''

THE NAVY ACQUIRES THE THIRD DIMENSION / 229

what tactics a submarine was likely to ad op t under a given set of circumstances. Since the training im parted at the N a v y 's T orp edo and AnfisubinarineSchool and Tactical School at C ochin w'as based on theoreti-csi knowledge, practical knowledge acquired through service in subm arines was considered of utmost im portance.

for this purpose, the Navy now proposed the establishm ent of a subm^ine-trained cadre of 38 officers and 65 sailors to be trained over aperi

of fouryears. The firstbatch of four officers and 12 sailors being Royal N avy's subm arine school in 1961 for

Submarine SHU A V essel 'N o n G r a ta '

'^apon pla^tfo^^

subm arine w as only an'offensive'

^‘^quisitlon vvo^Th^

the feeling persisted at the highest level that its

"on-interferenc^ '

^°“ r»terto our national policy of non-violenceand

for trainjn

^ i!

of other countries. Governm ent approval

Itisbeliev^H^ilr'^^'^'"^ personnel abroad continued to elude the

^^sterofIndia

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Prime

|“^niarine oniv h^H

other national leaders were of the view that a

which vva

'■0^6 3nd hence should not be acquired for

'^I'Onal territorial

peace and had no ambition outside her

^**’|udewaspei-i-

and the sea area of her responsibility. This

^ Underhand

to Britain's dism issalofsubm arinewarfare

^^onest form'of^^**^

un-English' and the French branding it as 'a

' ■

>s interesf-' ^^'^^^'^^' around the turn of the century,

g

^’an-dipioj^

^"^ofethat

K.M. Panikkar, the distinguished

^P®cially its im^*'

appreciated the importance of the submarine,

^^sels.vVrit'^P^^^ on naval strategy

its edge over larger surface

®^dianOj,p®

as in 1945 on the significance of India's position in

® f f e c t j y g j

,

s s i d t h a t t h e 1 9 t h c e n t u r y c o n c e p t o f t h e u n t e n a b i l i t y 1 °dany

' 0 ding a regional sea against a superior fleet did not hold that an inferior navy with lighter craft, supported

"siderak! ®"daircraftsuitably deployed, could now ensure the safety n

^‘''etches of sea and there was thus no reason why an

^*”'■01 of , r 'J[®^l-ba]anced In d ian N a v y should not be able to secure

^enever *

Bengal and the v i t a l stretches of the Arabian Sea,

^

required,

r

£ve^(

S u b m a r in e P e r s o n n e l A p p r o v e d

in 1962, i.e., 15 y e a r s after I n d e p e n d e n c e , approval was

230 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

obtained for the training of one Captain and eight junior officers in submarine operations, technology, m aintenance and tactics at the Royal Navy's submarine training school, Dolphin, at Gosport off Portsmouth, England. The senior officer of the group, the Captain, was to undergo a condensed course but was in addition to acquire the necessary expertise in the orgai\isation of a submarine arm, setting up the necessary ii^rastruc-tureandlogistic support, development of the maintenance facilities in the base and the dockyard, the operational set-up, the tactical doctrines adopted by submarine arms and fleets operating w ith or against submarines, development of training facilities,

including simulators and escape

towers, and submarine rescue operations. The other officers were to be trained in submarine operations and maintenance for manning the submarines that would be acquired in later years.

.

Strangely enough, the Government continued to impress on Nav eadquarters that it had only agreed to allow naval personnel to undergo submarine training in order to enable them to improve the Indian Navy s antisubmarine capabilities and it did not in any way commit the Government to acquire submarines for the Navy at any time.

Training with the Royal N avy

S ne""

comprised Captain (later Com m odore)^'

establish the nuc^us of the Submarine

RJ Millan

^“^'^^fi'ianian and Lieutenants M.N-

c a r e f u l l y ^ " o f the Executive Branch, who

decided to ventur/inSfhl^"®® number of intrepid volunteers These officers sailor^ ( ^

element below the surface o

, j jf,;

Captain Dane for

^ F e b r u a r y 1962 for training at - J

^ n th s ’ duration, and^ho

acquaintance

^ e y w e re to study

® traim ng

hoW

and maintenance andbarW

'i'^^“^®°>^8 anisation, o p e ra tio n a lly cubfi'®'

nne ^

of the Na^y

^^^^'^ties required for Setting up the Subn'

I

n

d

i a

n

during the establishment

*theRo^M°^'^'^® upv/hiieVc'^^.*t^®®‘^0'Jarters w a s also w a ty

“jjiiiC®

'"^'•^gimensiveantisubmarineexerc'

TOE NAVY ACQUIRES THE THIRD DIMENSION / 231

held with British ships and submarines after her com m issioning in the UK, hehad been equipped with the necessary expertise to sift and imbibe the maximum possible quantum of inform ation during his attachm ent and crash course in submarine operation and technology. It had by that time been decided that the overall planning, initial training of personnel in reign countries, acquisition of ships and m aintenance expertise and qualitative and quantitative requirements in

^ ^ ’ ''shment of the subm arine arm , operational

and

tower

installation of an escape training

nelandnA

Indian Naval person-

Cant

would be sought for the purpose.

intheRovaT I

joined the N avy in M arch 1943 as a Lieutenant

officer hp c

r "

Volunteer Reserve (RINVR). An ex-Dufferin

Torpedo Anti-Submarine (TAS) discipline at

^^544 had ex

Completion of the course

% al Indian

major antisubmarine commitments of the

shipping ae '

^

waters - the defence of our fleet and merchant

®' edto be

underwater predators - though the Service was consid-

critp^-^y adjunct to the Royal N avy at that time.

*^aining wp

selection ofthe first batch of officers forsubmarine

^ *°P physic^ extremely rigid. Besides being in medical category S, A ,, (i.e., to ^ ‘■^^dition for service ashore and at sea) the officers were to

^^®o^her faculties most essential in a submariner -

^f'environm

within extremely confined spaces with, occasionally,

^’'•ended

high carbon dioxide content. Secondly, withstand

°^®ntation

submersion and absence of daylight and natural

^^enabiiih,. Jfdly, withstand long spells of loneliness and, fourthly,

■^es beca

^°^-bunking, i.e., time-sharing of bunJcs peculiar to subma-

^hrouph

constraints of living spaces. All these officers sailed

Subm

% 'n g colours.

• h r e e

a t th e Dolphin f o r i n d u c t e e s

m

a i n l y

c o m

p r i s e d

t h e o r e t i c a l a n d f o r m

a l t r a i n i n g f o l l o w

e d b y a l o n g s p e l l

o f

O f f i c e r , 7

^

®

‘ s e a o n b o a r d s u b m

a r i n e s b a s e d a t G

o s p o r t . A

l o n g w

i t h t h e

l ^ a v v

*

' ^ ' ^ n d i a ,

t h e r e

w

e r e t r a i n e e s f r o m

t h e R o y a l

N

a v y , C a n a d i a n

t h e

N

a v y , N

o r w

e g i a n N

a v y a n d P a k i s t a n N

a v y . I t g o e s t o

^sthpf

British Admiralty that there was no discrimination so far

trainees were concerned, and they were allowed access to all

«levK I ®'®«and classified documents and by the time they passed out,

•

a c q u i r e d a s m

u c h e x p e r t i s e a s t h e i r R o y a l N

a v a l c o u r s e - m

a t e s .

H i t e / ^ ® f r > d i a n N

a v a l sailors w h o w e r e d e p u t e d t o t h e D o / p A m f o r s u b x n a -

performed equally well. Rear Admiral M.N.Vasudevi, who

t h e f i r s t b a t c h o f t r a i n e e s f r o m

I n d i a a n d w

h o w

a s t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r

232 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

of the Indian N avy's Submarine A rm to rise to flag rank, reminisces.

Besides officer trainees, we had several senior sailors from different navies in our group. I remember one of them, M. Singh, who was an En^ne-Room Artificer in our N avy. Though he was undergoing training and had seen submarines for the first time in his life when he came to Dolphin, he was in great dem and in very submarine even before he had completed his training. W henever the submarines or submarine equipment ashore had problems, they soughthis assistance and he went and solved them. Our capabilities were thus soon known to the British and so we were respected and trusted and assigned tasks that were more complex and called for higher expertise than those assigned by the R o y a l N a v y to even their own submarine personnel in their own subm arines.. . .

officers. Lieutenant Commander (lat«

c v

S^iT^ant and Lieutenants V.S. Shekhawat (later V!ce

\

(later Commander) and P.K. Ramanathan (late'

^

t

h

e

first two were from the Executive Branch

l i f v S

Engineering Branch, p r o c e e d e d to the UK

consisted of Lieutenant S. Nagram

Branch

Sodhi(laterR ear Admiral) of the Executiv

Inderjit Singh of theElectr.®

and K R w

LieutenantsL. Talwar(laterComrr>and )

the Executive Brar^ch and

^-ieutenamComrn^'nST'S!!

Sub-Lieutenant l^e^

Branch. By 1965, 15

‘

school and base of the

Oolphin, the submarine

the Flag Officer,

l^eadquarte^

ence for him, rubbinBshouM o^^°^^'^^''y-^‘ was a n u n u s u a l expe submarine officersof theBrifiaJ^

young Lieutenants as well as sf'’

from the grass-roots level Hp u

^^^'^^'''csand starting histraii''

including escape from a I'oo-fooi

^ curtailed L ie u t e n a n t 's c o u ^

most essential, physically and

m

over any initial hesitations whkh k u

“ submariner to g

effect of being shut down in a small „

because of the claustrophob»

to sunlight or fresh air. It also nrov?^!!

sea with no acceSS

motivate others into joining the subm it

necessary confidence to

A month of basic submarine acquaint?^'"-

"ce Was followed by a month

^CQUmESTOETHlRDPWENSION / ®

THENAW

go'^'g^pe He underw ent train in g

‘^ during W o rld W ar II and

“'d r X s e ^ w W c h were in British

^

Unde w a t e r PropuUive

W be™ GUPPVED ( ^ q f P f I

. „ 3„ c e but were rather played out

‘r S r ^ e r c U s l h a d g o o d e —

inteir machinery status.

^ v e r s i o r i ,t h e O b e r o n c l a a ^

Propoiseciasssubmames and the.r .t^P™

,icipaling m a week

w««l tD sea on board both these rnodern W ^

exercise m

t a g t j c t i c a l e x e r c i s e o f f N o r t h e r . j l r e U n d a ^

^ , i „ g sub

tactical evolution of d etection betw een aircra

which did not surface at all.

chmvards, suchas Sannuel Wniie

He then visited so m e of the

problems faced

and Camel Lairds, to fam iliarise himse

their m ain ten an ce an

by them in the construction of su b m a n n e hulls,

batten^,

clocking, maintenance of their main mac

fjje control systems a

torpedoes, detection eq u ip m en t, sonars, ra

/

other equipment.

,

^ ’ ovprcises w ith a squa ro

This was followed by a month

jriesinan

/ S

of the Oberon and Porpoise classes of su

returned to the Do p

in the Northern waters off F^slane. T h ereafter h

andstudied the organisationof the Flag ^

construction a ^ °

interaction with the material division of sh p

problems ot

Admiralty departments at Bath concern

construction, refit and maintenance.

Criteria fo r S u b m a r i n e s f o r t h e I N

tant aspects of s e t t ^

^ is exposure helped in crystallising

?|°g%aterial for the

'^Pasubmarinearminhis mind andco

nreparedonhisre u ^ started

assessment of requirements. I^*^®P^P®/.upTndianNavy

rustoma*y

proposed that the Submarine Arm of t

is nothing

^>th a minimum of three submarines,

oneofaf')'

u'^hich,

J » h i o n o f a s q u a d r o n o f n a v a l s h , p s .

^ 0 may be meaningful and three 1

. one su

,n the

® case of submarines, was

g time, one

jniles from base,

® m n^ajor maintenance at any

jsggetimeor j S

bgsubmann

“burned patrol area at one w e e k s

the

^ '^ w e e k s o n p a t r o l a n d o n e w e e k ^ ,,..g n tto re a c h a y W e e k s n o r L l o p eratin g cy c'e ,

marines for o u rn a v y had

of Bengal o r the A rabian

thesubm

^ e second requirem en

234 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

to have a sufficiently wide radius of operation and what the Indian Navy needed w ere patrol subm arines capable of long reach and considerable endurance. It is the basic geographical position of the Indian peninsula at the top of the Indian O cean w ith its tw o arm s, the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea each ending with extrem ely narrow waterways in the Malacca straits to the East and theBab-el-M andeb and the Straits of Hormuz to the W est, w hichw ere the deciding factors as regards the minimumendurance of out submarines.

The third very im portant and vital requirement was thatthedesign of the submarine m ust be rugged and should incorporate high safety actors, adequate safety margin in its buoyancy characteristic, a fail-safe quality in its machinery, duplication of critical equipment such as gyios< v alv es, etc., mainly because the Indian N av y w as setting up an arm with an ^ e r e n t hazardous quality of service and any disaster ortragedy in^e ewher stages of such a venture would probably mean the avoidable a n onment of such an important enterprise.

.

And, finally, the fourth requirement, an obvious one, was that the

^bm arm es that were going to be acquired, whether new or old, must be w i t ^ the economic repairlife of the hull. W arships generally have an S T n ? .'

20 years for smaller vessels such ^

^"^’"^ ’^•""^^"^SOyearsforthecapi

ships, i.e., a.rc«.

apm oach^a

" submarine was ^^.er 20 years old or ^

attachedtn ft

^

very uneconomical even if the pnce

w o u u t i

low enough. The tw i disadvantages of a n ew su b m a^

^ " d t h e h i g L r price tag but

prepared to accao» a

was,

importanc?wartt\emethorf^i

^^o^^er aspect of

i^ e d ia te ly and in co n tin u i^ % J°''th f

was realised at this staee that tK

subnnarine arm to be forin^

India would mean considlraV.r.

lengthen the lead t i m r f o f

in equipment a n d

therefore,wastheuseof thesi.bJ^^“ ‘’° " further. What was visualiS^'

forwhich theyshouldhavesuffi!^^"^"®" tbem selvesasfloatingclassrot^

^ patrainingd ass of about 50 per

"o t only their crewsb«

This was an important requirem'ent as'^‘,1

Per cent of the crew strength-

accommodation and the hoi-bunklnr^H"'^®"

extremely cramp

bunks for only two-thirds of the

entails provision of

submarines, such as the old American

crew. Some larg f

Porpoise and Oberon classes and ihe S o v il c ?

the British A,

et P class had, however, the

THE NAVY ACQUIRES THE THIRD DIMENSION / 235

n e c e s s a r y space for carrying ad d itio n al p erso n n el for on-the-job training.

Types of Subm arines C o n s id e re d

Though the American Fleet class boats had two to three years less remaining hull life than the British boats, they w ere known to be in better condition and had very rugged hulls and m achinery which would have possibly added five years to the econom ic life after a refit. The 450-ton German-built Baltic class submarines w ere far too small for our purpose.

The French Daphne class had a new design but was rather small and its endurance was limited to about 1,000 nautical miles which did not fulfil our purpose. There were also Italianboats and some Dutch boats as well, but their basic characteristics w ere not compatible.

Meanwhile, if it was not the papers, proposals, monographs, presentations and pleadings of the Naval Headquarters, it was the Chinese incurgior^ ir>to the Indian territory in 1962 during which some nmese submarines were reported to have been operating in the Bay P'Bengalchallenging th e'm igh t'of the Indian N avy that tilted the balance avour of the submarine's acquisition. The N avy lost no time to once gam put up a proposal in Novem ber 1962 highlighting the areas of our haH u

at sea, and the possible loss of face if the Chinese submarines mpri

"

«:!jsplay their prowess either by attacking our naval and

minPQ

or by blocking the approaches to our

ooerAf

p^'oposed the acquisition of three submarines wi

inem!-

of 1,500 nautical m iles-on e on patrol, one

P a S area"""''® and resting the crew and one o n transit to or from the asubm

another detailed proposaljustifying the formation of

arm in the Indian Navy was put up to the Government It was

alteadv^^’" reiterated that the advent of the modem

^nes

the trends of maritime warfare,

a

'°ntrol

of operating deep inside an 0PP°"®"* ^

technologi-

to operate without

® had enabled modem subma

^ strfking

^“Pabilfhr

v a s t l y increased

pointed out that

•

T th e c a p a b i l i t i e s and sophistication of ^ ® a t strides made in improving t P

the lethality o f

Wean,. ®*^t‘submarine detection e q u i p m e n t

the

fact

to seek and destroy subrnarines

edge over the

antisuif

established that the

jjoncouldbecreatedatsea

bys,7'"arineforcesand that a

^"jnniepower. The appearance

Of '^^^-rines of even a weaker

^^^emajor naval powers of the

submarine had already shaken t

j

236 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

w orld out of their static orbit of conventional weapons, conventional propulsion and conventional w eapon platform s, and it was now an epted fact that submarines h ad becom e prim e weapons of offence as acc

a .o ,h .r im p o ru n . aspect highnghled —

environmental factor thathad not received adequate

’ prevailing in

w as

the waters contiguous to our shores enhanced a su

well-eauipped

ties and subverted any efforts m ade even by a m o

Indian Ocean-

fleet to neutralise it. The hydrographic structure °

. .

relatively

thermal conditions, tem perature and density gra ’

^issionsof

shallow depths ofw ater-attenuated the low-frec[uency ^

sutiT'S-

even advanced antisubmarine ships and

'^ i^gpinanyo'^®'

rine hunting and killing operations

^ccg^jivenessot>l'®

sea area and would increase the survival potential and e

IndianNavy's submarines well beyond the u su a l estima e

planners and strategists.

, gj,.0ady

Another argument put forward was that India ha

austet®

Vished some control of the surface and the air with her rei butcomplf fleet andtherecent acquisition of the aircraft earner, Vikr command of the surface would only be possible if it could

jnode^'

surface as well. For local air and sub-surface superiority,

nf the

coupled with India's peninsular position at the focal poi

Ocean and her easy access to the Ocean's choke points wou Navy to deny the surface in the contiguous sea areas to

g^deridu^'

flotilla, e v en if it is m od erately superior in w e a p o n c a p a b i l i t ' S

ance.

tabli^'

It was also stressed that at that point of time,

^ g jia,

maritime states, even around the Indian Ocean such as Indon accorded adequate importance to the establishment of a subma andhence, if the Indian Navy was to grow into a balanced

the establishment of a submarine arm would be a n i n e s c a p a b l ®

^gbin®^

It was stated that as e a r l y as 1 9 4 8 , the D efence C om m ittee o f t h e had accepted the proposal in principle but, due tovarious factors surface wing was yet to come into being.

,ged

It was also pointed out that'killer'submarines wereacknovvl 'I'gepi'

the best weapons in antisubmarine warfare. These s u b m a r i n e s ployed as barriers in the submarine transit areas and since theycO^ jjoy communicate with patrol aircraft, they were in the best position to gjd

enemy submarines. Since the Indian Navy had large ocean tracts to and these weredominatedby narrow and restricted focal areas ofef’“^%d such as theMalacca-Straits, Gulf of Aden, etc., the k i l l e r submarine"

THE N A V Y ACQUIRES THE THIRD DIMENSION / 237

be most effective in such areas.

Submarines could also be used for offensive m ine-laying. W hile the offensivecapability of the surface forces against naval forces of the en em y wojldbedependentoncharceencounters at sea,su b m arin es w ou ld h av e thecapability of mining enemy harbours and thus deterring the en em y from aggressive intentions. Besides, the possession of subm arines w ould aclasadelerrent to any hostile action around our island territories in the Bay ofBengaland the Arabian sea.

anH

f

highlighted the need for setting up suitable repair

Suitable be

•

p u rp o s e , M a r m a g a o w a s c o n s id e re d m o s t TornpHo

re q u ire m e n ts a n d w a s close e n o u g h to th e

‘ The

A n tisubm arine School a t C o c h in .

^‘^quisition fo*

which m ight be available at that time for

Oberonclasses tha A

the British A, T and P o rp o ise /

theFrench Nfarval I

class, the Russian W and Z classes and

°^themore imn

which were conventional subm arines.Som e

^'niitations aro

their vital statistics and capabilities and

are given in Table 6.1.

'*"f^avy

®sand Limilations of the Conventional Submarinesavailable to the USA

(/.S.SR

France

T

Porpoise/

■ 'w

z '

‘ N arval'

Oheron

cTor^)

1321

1«->n

2030

1816

1030

1900

1640

1570

2410

2425

1180

2200

1910

282

273

S g h ,

22

295

312

240

290

256

26

a -

26

27

22

26

24

15

"

18

17

15

19

18

16

24

24

14

20

14

6 lo8

6x21-

8x21“

10x21"

6x

8x

8x21"

X21

21"

21"

11

15

20

17

20

18

132 T

14,000 M

300 T

16,000 M 26,000 M 15,000 M

MiCr

5+55

6+59

6+65

85

60

70

7+51

1943-

1942-

1957-

.

1945-

1951-

1955-

„

1946

"'■' ‘'(kb) 2

1945

1962

1962

1960

1960

to 4

3 lo6

6 to 12

2 to 8

Very

Not

Not

poor

known

kno um

238 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

Suitability foi

Tropical

Conditions

Moderate Poor

Moderate Very

Poor

Not

Mode-

good

known rate

Remarks

Designed Designed Post-WorldDesign Acquired

-

for the

for the

W arn

for the by China,

ved

Pacific in Atlantic Design for Pacific UAR&

World War

the Atlantic

Indonesia

xxidas9

n

The total expenditure on a squadron of

marine base, and a submarine service of about 30 officers a w wasestimated atR s30crore; andif thesubnnarines,weresecon^region of four to six years' remaining life, the total outlay would be in t Rs 8 to 9 crore and in this case, from out of the existing ol

^

American Fleet class boats were considered m ost suitab e o conditiorvs.

Subm arine A cquisifion A p p ro ved

^

The Government finally acquiesced, and therecommendations

Headquarters were accepted - a n a u t i c a l milestone in the Navy. But the type of submarines to be acquired had not yet

^jtional

upon and what was available was a m i x e d b a g with varying ran ge,d iving,sp eed an d m an oeu vrabilitych aracteristics,w eap onsy

sensors and balance of operational life. There were the British

|]jc

classes which were already 20 years old, had developed

^u m aH sm and arthritis and were on the verge of being consign

^

"modern British P orp o ise class w

beeninipruir i

had several sub-classes

,„ictio‘'

f i l l ( h e

s a p

w

h

l l e

n

^

?

«

“

modemnewlvbuiU

initiated for the acquisition o

about 350 tons, w

h

i

c

h

w

a

s

the G e r m a n Baltic

but was considered too srtiliv

ided

consideration for a cq u S tt^

*"

its limitations prerludec»

N

e g o t U

l l o M

„

i , h

B r t l l a h A

u

,

p

,

,

,

After a careful scrutiny of all car

mi*'

ments and foreigixexchangeava\?Ihn !."®'l"^’“ '**"g financial

rine was considered to be ideallv

British Porpoise class

j

■

acquisition for the Navy.

THE NAVY ACQUIRES THE THIRD DIMENSION / 239

negotiations began. The British, how ever, w ere n ot prepared to part with a Porpoiseclass submarine but offered to build anO beroncIass subm arine forourNavyand,since the Oberon would take som e time to beavailaW e, tfsy aJso offered an A class submarine for use until the form er w as ready.

hence w a Y n o r a L p L r

superannuation for our purposes and

Indian conditions and if

specially built for the Indian N avy to suit

available by the UK rRc ^

for Rs 5 crores w ere made

spares), but the Rnf'eh ?•

submarine and Rs 2 crore for the

to offer any such

purpose and fhnc

prepared to spare the funds for the

Lord LouU J

P

aborted.

J^ountbatten w rote in 1965,

so Very

^°^.^^P°^'^'^y^®3rtfortheIndianNavy,havingdone

Commander a

from the time I was the Supreme Allied

from 1943 r~ i

(Royal Indian) N avy serving under

'''hen I took a °

^

Viceroy and the Governor General,

^elVavy.

^^^^P®'"sonalpartin the division and reconstitution of

‘■ ® q u i r e m e n ^

instrumental ingettingalm ost all the

two

^

vy by the British Government, including

^Orbuildin„'!r^^'

3 ircraft carrier, the destroyers, the organisation

1 had

®^ructionof n ^ ‘•naged to get more favourable terms for the con-P^rticula t ®

submarine but alas it all took so long that this

transaction fell through.

•afer said that the British denial of deferred credit

and e

Scrore virtually brought to an end the flow o/British

soi,-^

to India, and acquisition of naval hardware/rom

•

T^eRnvt^^'^balledsoon.

Royal'a '

had also offered the use of an old A class submarine from

*')Hsubnv, .

N avy on temporary loan, to be used on iy fo r

^®j®cted

training; but for obvious reasons this offer was promptly

'^^®^e«hed' decision to acquire the Fclass submarines from the the w

was preceded by interesting exetianges Iwtween theO iie/

Staff, Admiral B S. Soman, and the

Fl“ t Sea U rd ,

W '^ I th the'^developments following the 1962 Chinese incursion InW

•“" 1 the conse*emreassessn.entofourrequiremenlofsh.ps,a,rcrafl

240 / blueprin t TO BLUEWATER

islands on which we had no presence o f an y m l

decided to acquire a sizeable package from BrUiin tn

it was

th e ex istm g F leetan d to p rim arily e s t a b H s h T n lv l^

w aters. A fter t h e p r e lim in a r v e v L n ^ P n f t H o !s i S r T "

Government of India to the AdmiraUv . n i

' « • °^^’*^'^’ behveenthe

Soman and Sir David Luce all

between Admiral

sistedof two or three Battle

the Indian Navy con-

Australian Navy and already 3 n‘v

were with the Royal

which were also with the Ai^t

^

submarines

Seacat missiles, whose rarahiHr

atedlow-levelequiompn'f cuch T n n X

limited, and associ-

^ehang-over ofhaVinet-pn

• u '

"^ade presumably because of

for centuries, and

t- *'f^ *S htiest maritime country in the world

equipment to 'dominiori^navi'er^ desire to supply lower-level ships and Chinese attack^ h r w a V ^ ° " j^ ^ ^

l^ritain did not look upon the

New Delhi, C aptainFw ' w

then British Naval Attache at

Naval Headquarters c *

to the Director of Naval Plansat

demolishing India an ri“h?H

the Chinese had never thought of

[«ppened was that the

attacked India - what had actually

aders and some erraUr ,-?■

Provocative statements madebyour

* cMahonLineaswellaqinT

^fontier positions on the disputed

th

^fidians on tho^

^^^ade them react with a view to, as

ca5'J °''®'^'i''isG dnottotakPtK

N aval authorities were,

•'

shoppine lu i'f ^ "^ e s e attack too seriously and to radi-

‘h e d e m i - o f S

apron S t'S

d etach e^th ^? Admiral Soman to Sir David Luce,

'Thank^ o^^^

^

Navy from the Royal Navy®

meet the wgencr^^'f®’'' ^ t a t e ' ^ d e t r i y “/^^^istance which you have a f t e r the

the reaniro

’®vel o f r e s p o n s e does ^

^■■gGnt and

1962.Wp

we see it in the situation

quantity. I

'"equirements clearly as nnore

"T'oreftan this,

point out

equipment in

- .

^ a t 'sornethini .? ’^''st give

you not b e a b l e to do any

SnHsh A dm iralJJ'a^,

Z s 2 ^“ "^^where soon.

^

'

^^.C4-r„r it: tr s '

THE NAVY ACQUIRES THE THIRD DIMENSION / 241

Chinese incursion, envisaged the m ajor change resulting from British insularity- that of looking elsewhere for naval h ardw are.

Delegations to th e U S S R

friMayl964, an Inter-Service Defence Delegation headed by the then V

B X h a v a n . and with the D eputy Chief of the

Nanda

th eN aval Staff)S.M .

U S A f o r the main

Chinese Navy in t h T R " ^ " ? n * " ’" '®

&vemme“, - L L t l J

I " " ? ': 'h at Hme.TOe US

from India's and

n avalth reaf w as also different

3<^quireanvnaval h P lj" ’

consider it necessary for India's N avy to

"'Mponsandeaiiinml

them, though they had supplied som e

advised fhedeleeatin ? °

Army and Air Force. On the contrary, they

^^iiipment, the British

its traditional suppliers of ships and

Union for thesun^^*°^'*^if

was decided to approach the Soviet

some Wclass snhlv^ °*

The Soviet Union had earlier supplied

"'^s, however, rennr^H^^

United Arab Republic and Indonesia. It

the submarinp^^' that these boats were not operating effectively,

*®' ior]eve]s in

^

been over-staffed by Soviet personnel at the

One Out of pv

^'^^'^‘^onesia thesituationw aseven worse and

''“niarine of 2'infT'

submarines was operational. But the F class

(^^tobesimiia '

offered by the Russians to India now was

^fondassanri

to the more modem British Propoise/

“'’^akea bid fn

American Fleet class and hence it was decided

Q.L

S c q u is it-* s u b m a rin e s of the F class.

‘ " ® r t h a n t h e

T

v e s s e l s a n d

w

e a p o n s y s t e m

s

f r o m

a s o u r c e

" ’^ t e r s h e d i n ■

h i s t o r y o f t h e I n d i a n N

a v y w

a s

f o r c e . I t

’ ^ ^ v e l o p m

e n t f r o m

a

f l e d g l i n g m

a r i n e w

i n g t o a m

a j o r

^

' O ' - Until

a l s o g o i n g t o p o s e s o m

e n e w

p r o b ^ m

s t o t h e

s

^ntilth' .

"lbOgOingtOpOSesuiiieJiew^iL.1^^**-^

f u ^ ' ^ ^ ^ a s h o r

s h i p s a n d c r a f t h a d b e e n a c q u i r e d f r o m t h e U K , a l l

j ! ’' ^ i l i t v o f ^

w

e r e

o f

B r i t i s h

o r i g i n

a n d

t h e r e

w

a s a d e q u a t e

‘ ^“ "

’ n ^ o n a l i t y i n t h e u s e o f t h e s e

s p a r e s

i n d i f f e r e n t t y p e s

o f

f a c i l i t i e s a n d d o c k y a r d p e r s o n n e l h a d , o v e r t h e t o o n l y B r i t i s h s h i p s a n d

e q u i p m

e n t ,

t h e p e r s o n n e l

“ P e r a t i o _

' v i t h t h e

R o y a l

N

a v y ' s

p h i l o s o p h y

a n d

r o u t i n e

f o r

' ^ ^ i c a l

m

a i n t e n a n c e , a n d t h e l a n g u a g e i n w

h i c h a l l o p e r a t i o n a l a n d

^ U n g , . .

P ^ ^ ^ i c a t i o n s w

e r e p r i n t e d a n d t r a i n i n g c o n d a c l e d - E n g l i s h - w a s

8e Indian naval personnel w ere w ell-versed in.

242 / b l u e pr in t TO BLUEWATER

w

=

.

e

t s

r

.h

:'

»

u

. s i n

„

. h e S

„ . e , o

, .

n

o

t w

i t h

s t a

n

d

i n

g

, h

e

p

r „

L

n

«

r , w

o

l f a

v

r , n

' ’f ^

> h e

F

c l a s s

s

„

b

„

, ;

Its op eration al an dm ain tenan rp H r.--f

u ,

‘o resctucture

andthelanguagebarrier. Accnrdipgiy Another

gation, headed by Shri Y B

mter-Service defence dele-

ral S.M. Nanda, who wassHll 'fi.

l ^ ' ^ " ^ ° " ^ ° ‘^®'■®''^'*^“ '^ ‘^‘^■

Dlrectorof Weapon Policy &-T3 f ’ ^

^hief. Captain B.K. Dang,

Bhandari, the technical “ ^P‘^^^Pf3'f^0aterRearAdmira!)CL

September 1964. G e n e r a M S o v i e t Union in Augustand Lieutenant Colonel r <; c

the then Chief of the ArmyStaff,

time.

'-'^ridhuwerealso inthisdelegationforthefirs!

received a

headed by Shri Y.B, Cha.*

"aval team was incli .

M oscow. This was the first time thata

having had earlipr

delegation - only the Indian Air Force

The naval tearn'Tn"

Russians for procuring MIG aircraft,

nient centring arounH

concern was the acquisition of naval equip-

with the StateCommittP^^f^^c^^.^*^* for submarines. At the first meeting naval members Were shn^ •OJ'J^oreign Economic Relations in Moscow, the mentoffered to the

and specifications of the equip-

Engineering Division

S o v i e t G

o v e r n m

e n t . T h e G e n e r a

h an dlin g the deal,

h demonstrations anH

Sevastopol w h ere the ships were shown

™

F

c

' a

' " ' *

' ' '

“

« ! » ■ ; » t o o k p l a c e .

c.a^i o-uuniarine. A anirV ' “ »

S ^ d n aroou r wnereiney^'-*-'

^ ^ e le n g th fro m s t e m i r ,

‘'-^ °^nd'of the subm arine covering ^

d a r i < “

' °

! , ' ” ' P « i ' >

t S

'h® team.observrf W

desien*^^

Provision for inc^^ ^ f ^ ’^gem ents, accom m odation sta

t

e

s

s

r

b " » h e b „ „ k strength, t h e n . a c ^

the outer

f^atureof t h Z '^^^partm ents and oth er equ'P^,

b a t t e r i e s ^ ^ !‘" 8 “=^edeiK^^^^^

Jong-distanrp

which™^'

speed orcharging ‘‘

® T ie

^‘SSer, was used for slow, S.Ie-’f

° f the subm aVi^s"'^3p ‘®!; ®"d°aTerbal'bri

diving to a dep^

submarine had yet

^houch

various o th e ra s^

cumbersome, arrano

threp c , ' °P®>^ational standards o(

ined, sophisticated

partr'^'P*'°P“ '5'0^

^^Ln-

' ‘" ' ' ° " ‘” q - i p m ^ ''’V “ PP<>''had„o, been e » ^

w

a s

m

i n i m

a l , a n d

t h e

q u ^ l W

t h e NAVY ACQUIRES THE THIRD DIMENSION / 243

,

^ , r i c a ' - c u —

torpedoes had not been established. The

fSmnEvertheiess felt that the subm arine w as generally sti^itaBle for r e

l “ n i n W

i a n w a l e r s . B e s i d e s , i t h a d a r u g g e d s l r u c t u r e and m aterial

? S C l « y had been used for its c o n s t r u c t i o n . It.would fill ttebiU .

Wlicn the naval team later visited Sevastopol, they

^

m\ types of ships that the Soviet Governm ent was

India. Tliese s h i p s included a sub m arine'm oth er

which was described as such because she had been d e s .^ e d to p ro M e

accommodationforstand-by submarine crew s, logistic and

'

a n d r e p a i r a n d m

a i n t e n a n c e f a c i l i t i e s at sea. The acquisition o a s ip

type was considered worthwhile because the Russian phi

^

submarine operations was dependent upon mobile floating

portsince theyperforce operated at that distances on the highseas periods without touching shore bases. Some minor limitations later revealed, but by and large it w as felt that a ship of ..this type was a essential requirement for the submarine arm.

, ■

Some of the other long-term r e q u i r e m e n t s related to t su

arm, such as a submarine rescue vessel and support ships of

'

not gone into at this stage, but the s h o r e s u p p o r t re q u ire r^ ts v^

studied in great detail for the d e v e l o p m e n t o f a submarine se

^oast.

The Russians offered to build three F class submarines

I*?®

vvith the delivery to commence two to three years

nc

O'One year.

.

i^p.

When the delegation returned from the USSR it

Sir David

l u ^ P '^ ^ ^ S e f L o r d o f t h e B r i t i s h Royal Navy,

'/special

to Admiral Soman saying that he

t

technician

an Admiral, aCaptainan ^

, (.^.operation

5

he Adm iralty: to p o in t o u t the c h a n g e s t h a t D nt.sh «

would undergo if Ind.a

„f these

cha

naval hardware from the Sovie

t h e First Sea Lord

s i a t e f l r e l a t e d to the question o f security, g v a l e q u i p m e n t ,

' ” "dia went to the Soviet Union

be je o p a r d ^

have t o curtail re a

'' 3ssifip/.‘‘7 ^ G o vem m en t would

m d i a n Navy

-

•nformation a n d e q u i p m e n t t

— pnt

,^nfinue to

'"'“s

®

but she hoped

of

'^^•ntai

‘" 8

security

keepi'^S

h e Indian Navy,

ftier^j

S°od relation s'w ith ogyalN avy^^' finances for the

^ ip an d c o - o p e r a t i o n b etw een I

from abroad had

even t, the G overn m en t

acquis.fons fro

"''y^^causethe b u d g e t a r y aiiocat-o^ ‘

248 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEW ATER

m * e In d ia n Ocean, ris in g tensions in th e G u lf, the grow ing strateeic O cean, a n d the im m e n s e p o te n tia l o f the living and fu tu re V a T s "e v e ^ -f? *

a n d c o n tin e n ta l shelf in this ocean,

the success nf n?ir

” ^°st lik e ly to be fo u g h t in this region, and

w o u ld larooi V ,

w a s e m b ro ile d in w a r w ith another nation,

s u p e rio rity , b o th in numbers and

h v T in w W

°

u n d e rw a te r w e a p o n p la tfo rm s . T h e n a t i o n h a d of the v ia b ility o f a s tro n g su b m a rin e force as a vital intrusifin

"'^^ritime force and the m o s t e ffe c tiv e deterrent to any M inister

in k e e p in g w it h t h e assertion of P r i m e at s

e

a

'

a

n

d

'

t

o

be secure on land , w e m ust be supreme

b e in f o r c in g t h e c a is so n

/ 255

TT-

//lie; A D I H iu e n -T s a n g (6 4 6

m A n ^ Ptolem y (1 4 0 A.DO.

“a d . ) , A b d u r K a z z a q (1 4 4 2

nfi7n A D )

liave corroborated the

y

jo r,de

Bowtey (1670 A .u.j,

5 fa s t as th e w in d a n d tn e ir

/

These ships displayed the m o b fs

and stem s enabling

sidesoftheirstem soronthetransom s t

|

je^-line, ensuring b e te

them to carry their anchors w ell

in rough w eather. Ships of

visibility and preventing sh ip p in g of sea

j Kozhikode, C ochin,

this type were built all over the p en in su la,

i^,,and

Kaveripattinam,Masulipatnam,C alcu tta a

j^ gu ryas, Andhras,

intiepots and were in use during t e r ^ ^i^eras and the Fandya ■

Pallavas, Chalukyas, KaVmgas, P alas,

vessels but not as

These ships were larger than co n te m p o ra ry ^ ^

r

^^^^^g^fQjtraciing

largeasshipsbuiltintheFarEastastheyw ere

a n d h a d to o fte n p ic

purposesw ithportsinthePersiangulfanclt ®

jg j^ u a rie s.

,

up their merchandise from In d ia's m inor po

period in ship e*

Considerable im provem ent took

j n avig ation. Directiona

signandlay-out and techniques of searnans ip

^ ^ g d e more effectiv

control, originally achieved w ith steering oar '

pg^gted w ith the

P

wifkr*.^^__ _______ a

tn th6trsnso

r

athwflrtsh^P

m

e n u n s t r a n s v e r s e a u c . t o ..............

*

„ o n f m

e r c n a n u i ^ ^ ------------ ----

compartments for a c c o m m o d a tio n an d sto w a g

and d am ag e to t h e h

technology was developed for preventing ea

iHsway

'"th e n ih c m tu i7 4 h sa d v e n lo flh e M “ ^P^^^^^^

'^°ast and the yards at Surat; on the Ma a-

quality ^ (flotilla)

*”<1 earned considerable recognition for

imperial Lahore,

‘^ejt'-The M ughals had Heets of

^ l y , Balasore, Jes

'

merchant fleet built at Dhaka,

,nf£unshipsand

^ '"= ^ 1 and many other sea

J;7498> 'S I’"'=JL" ‘S r i n i l Ko»hik“'i"

.

ThearrivalofthePortuguese

. ■ ^leslgn 'l^ ^ ^ p le a n d soon some

Jj^hips leading to som e changes m

Portuguese

at Goa, Bassem

J^the first to effectively e m u la t^ p^rtug^jess bu^

with bolts

^^['enativerulersfollow edsuit-^^^^^^o fabricate

of the

y Daman and the local shipbu'ld

y , The Malabar coast

nails and not ropes as

" ;J l d i n f i technology

features of Portuguese sh.p»^

252 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

retained for a long time but gradually the two systems of propulsion exchanged roles and the m an-of-war, instead of being a sailing ship with an auxiliary engine,becamea steamship w ithauxiliary sail. Theopeningof the Suez Canal in 1869 also dealt a heavy blow to sailing ships since, besides shortening the route to the East, the Canal reduced the distance between coaling stations and so allowed the steam ers to reduce the size of their coal-holds and thus increase their cargo capacity.

Composite' construction, i.e., the combined use of wood and ironsoon made way for all iron and then steel construction and screw-propellers began replacing paddle-wheels around the globe. In 1853 the Peninsular and Oriental (P&O) Line built the iron-hull screw steamer Himalaya, biggest vessel of her tjrpe in the world at that time, with a gross tomageol 3,438, dimensions of 340 feet in length, 46,2 feet in width and 34.9 feet in depth of hold and her engine capable of giving her a susta ined speed of 13-9

toots. The first twin-screw steamer, the 400-ton Flora, was built on the Thames in 1862.

Turbine engines, as opposed to steam engines using reciprocating nia T

sea for the first time when an expenme^

of2 n n n - f i t t e d with turbine engines with a shaft horse po N a v a m "

‘ o note that during a review of the M

ship causfd a great sensat.onb

speed of 34 5 kno*ts

jhips at what was then the astou

w hichexobd^

internal combustion

the Caspian steamp

incandescent bulb

which in turn ran a

completed. The engine

taken out a patent in 1892^0^^'^'

screw-propeller. Rl‘ dof ^ .gcied

b v T » i c ; n r v U - .

G n c ^ i n o i n

I ' K a r t r P W

a S

by raising its temperatnm

in which the charge vk^as &

diesel engine. One of the.

comprassion and thus was I

^

— ” * ' 5; u i r n o o a

__ _ . .

»

.

motor ships Selfl„df: ® ^

b

e

fitted with diesel engine

W esei-electricpropulsion u

completed in 1911 and ran unt

s h i p s .h y d r o t S p s '^ r

r e i n f o r c i n g THE CAISSON / 251

, .^,11 lateen-rigsed vessel w ith three m asts, e q u ip p rf w ith a f S r a m a wide transom on which the aftercastle w a s based and the pUng was'so attached to the hull fram e as to give a flat finish to the

;urface (caravel-building). Then cam e the galleon with a rnuch

^uU

with the ram lengthened to a long beak and a square-ended forecastle niaceofthetringularforecastle of t h e e a r l i e r type. The frigate soon followed a s a s m a i l m e m b e r o f t h e g a l l e y f a m

i l y a s a s m

a l l f a s t v e s s e l w

i t h t h e l e n g t h

f u r t h e r i n c r e a s e d a n d w

i t h t h e t o p h

a m

p

e r - n e c e s s a r y b u t c u

m

b

e r s o m

e

e q u i p m e n t o n b o a r d - c o n s i d e r a b l y r e d u c e d .

_

B y t h e s e c o n d h a l f o f t h e 1 7 t h c e n t u r y i t h a d b e e n r e a l i s e d t h a t s h i p s

a r m e d s o l e l y o n t h e b r o a d s i d e s h o u l d f i g h t i n lin e -a h e a d f o r m a t i o n i n a p r e a r r a n g e d o r d e r a n d t h a t w a s t h e o r i g i n o f t h e t e r m

' s h i p o f t h e l i n e ' o r

l i n e -

o l - b a l t l e s h i p ' , t h e l a t t e r b e i n g l a t e r a b b r e v i a t e d t o ' b a t t l e - s h i p ' .

I t w a s a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e 1 8 t h c e n t u r y t h a t t h e s t e e r i n g w h e e l m

a d e

■ i s a p p e a r a n c e a n d b r o u g h t a b o u t a n e x t r e m e l y i m

p o r t a n t c h a n g e . F r o m

t h e

I f ? ! ' ’/

c

e

n

t

u

r

y

t o t h e e n d o f t h e 1 7 t h , t h e t i l l e r w h i c h o p e r a t e d

™

^

p

' s r u d d e r h a d b e e n w

o r k e d

b y

t h e

' w

h i p s t a f f ' , a

v e r t i c a l

l e v e r

^ ® s i n g t h r o u g h a p i v o t i n t h e d e c k t o m o v e t h e t i l l e r l a t e r a l l y , a n d t h u s w a s

w i T ' k

e f f i c i e n t t h a n t h e w

h e e l , f i r s t i n t r o d u c e d i n 1 7 0 5 ,

'

r o p e s l e a d i n g t o t h e e n d o f t h e t i l l e r .

5, a „ J

. ® ' " ' d c l l e o f t h e 1 8 t h c e n t u r y t h e n u m b e r o f g u n s f i t t e d o n b o a r d

r a p i d l y . T h e f r i g a t e s b u i l t d u r i n g 1 7 5 0 s a n d 1 7 6 0 s h a d 2 8 , t h e n u m

b e r s o o n g r e w

t o 5 6 a n d m

o r e u n t i l t h e Victory,

u i

“ ' 1 ^ - b n s t l e d w

i t h 1 0 0 g u n s .

> « c r e a J H ‘ i

t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e c l i p p e r , a s j i > p w i t h a n

* P e e d c

a n d r a k i n g b o w

a n d m

a s t s , w

h i c h w

a s c a p a b l e o

g r e a

f c p t S i r ’ " l^ g e ly em ployed in tran socean ic trade. T h e A m e r e n

^ ® ^ O r d M

^ 8 5 4 i s b e l i e v e d t o h a v e m

a d e t h e b e s t d a y s r u

i n a d e t h " ? ^ ® s a i l i n g s h i p , 4 3 6 m i l e s , b u t t h e t w

o s h i p s t h a t

passages across the Atlantic in all conditions were .

Clippers, the Thermopylae and Cutty Sark o f 186 .

H

period saw thp

n f

use of iron to strengthen the keel

thp

the beginning of the use of iron to streng

niainl; " ’^^nfr^n.e which obviatfd the 'sagging'

"''’Oden n *

enabled the yards to build larger ships

‘ “

^ as the

f^place

on iron frames. Another significant change w

hemp with wire for standard *''88''^®'

.he British fleet in

anH

had made their first appearanc

jg4Qs, it became

adoption of the “ ®'^:P'°P® S ' r n p l e l e broadside arma-of

propulsion

- J^ g ly sailing ships had

% die

ships. By 1850

° p L d with steanr, propulsion

'^°"'«nued and all ships began o be ^ u ip p

^ere

^'^pplement or alternate propulsion by sail. JVi

256 / blueprint TO BLUEWATER

had spawned a wide variety of ships of various sizes and s h a p fa centuries and a contemporary of the Portuguese-type s h i p s M i l which was equipped with two m asts w ith its hull being 50 to 60 tea long, w T l M e e t wide and 8 to 10 feet deep. The Portuguese bu.lt several ships at Goa and Daman using local technicians and artisans

materialbutadoptingacombinationofthebest ea

°

Portuguese shipbuilding technology. In m any w ays these ships r e *

the S»n G.briel, Vasco da G am a's flagship, which had brougirt him..

Kozhikode from Mozambique in Africa.

technology

There is also enough evidence to estabhsh the fac

peninsula

of building ships especially designed for w ar at sea exis

frort\ well before the advent of the Europeans and tnat

wereequippedwithcatapults a n d i n c e n d i a r y t h r o w e r s .

j ^ a s s i v e naval

A.D. the ruler of Honavar on the Konkan coast carried

®

vessels- A

operation by attacking a small port in Goa with a fleet o

^jobably

notable feature of this assault was the use of two landing

jj^grnseWes

first time in India's maritime and naval history/ which beac

charg^^

on their stems and as.the stem doors were opened, cavalry so

in

forw ard on h orseb ack tolau n ch ab listerin gattack on th ep o support of the ir\fantry which had already jumped ashore a Another type of ship with long endurance was the

roamed the seas around India, especially the Arabian

°^g„tury

invasion of India by Alexander the Great to the end of the 19t.. -

overtv'?

of the oldest and most successful ship designs that existe

. Qf74fee*'

imllermia.Theseshipshadabroadbeamof about25 feet,a leng^

of the

a depth of 11.5 feet, drew about 150 tons and had a long Bflghfllflh-type ships, the Dnrin Dflulof, was built by the British a t

^ 7

1750 with two guns mounted on her stem and was in commiss

-a period of 87 years!

. sHP'

of shipbuilding in

te m b ^ t is u !

f V xI'O " of ^^ps ®“” or'i«»5

caulking and repairs) atSuSt

careened' (turned to its side fo^

to the Surat Council in 1626 th

P^mrose. As stated in a le^t _ c»r

■

the ships had to be sheathed by 'coun‘^

^

r e i n f o r c i n g THE CAISSON / 257

l i , durability, slrerglh, seaworlhiness and their

watet-bome worms that a tta A timber and bore holes in it. The ship GrsatSuratmainlycomprisedParsiswhoproved to b e n o to n yc a p a es ip designers, builders and gunsmiths but excellent shipwrights as w e .

Because of its strategic position, considerably w ide range o tJ es, proximitytoalargeanchoragenaturallyprotectedfronntheseaan a n a equate number of landing places and shore sites for the repair, construction and launching of ships and craft and construction of cranes for handling stoiesandequipment,safetyofegress and ingress into the anchorage by ay andnighl and suitability for defence against sea-borne attacks, the advan-tageofbuilding a dockyard at Bombay Island with the attendant benefits ot 3 fine natural harbour, were soon recognised by the British.

of M a in te n a n ce F a cilitie s , E x p a n s io n and demisation of N av al D o ck y a rd B o m b a y

A skeletal dockyard was initially set up at Bombay in 1693-94 but was

^'^'pped with minimal facilities followed in 1735 with t h e cons true on

‘

l u i i u w c u 111

—

-

‘ iUwP Trt

quarters, officers, carpenter's sheds and ^ ®rni y-

B o r n K

famous l i n e of Wadia m a s t e r - b u i l ^ r s °

^ ™

” S“ " '- = y “ “ " 8 P a r s i(o r e m a n < a r p e n te r r ,a ^ ^ ^ ^

: i ' - « « b r c , u g r . S

^ X h l H e a m ^

« s t e d with t h e m o d e r n i s a t i o n o f t h e e x i s t i n g d o c k y a r c l

.

t h e t u r n o f t h e 1 7 t h / 1 8 t h c e n t u r y t h e s h i p b u i l d i n g

^ 3 c e d w

i t h a n a c u t e s h o r t a g e o f o a k t i m

b e r

, j j j

Q

f o a k

* ' e e s

^ 8 ^ 3 n d h a d b e e n s e v e r e l y d e p l e t e d b y c o n s t r u c t i n g

* ^ O r e a

T

^

' " ‘ ^ ' ™

" 8 * ®

i f " P ^ ®

8 T ’ a b i I i t y o f t h e E n g

f r o m J

w

a r s h i p s o f a l l

H p H d e d t o d e v e l c ^

t h e

e j t i s f i n

w

o r k m

e n , i t

d o c k v a r d f o r ^ b e c o n -

s t n i r r ^

a t B o m

b a y i n t o a f u l l y e q u ' p p

j ^

j ^

j c i a n

s a n d

S k ” " = '

- ' " " ‘ ' " 8

r w

h r /y h

m e h a d proved

itspu

indigenous M alabar teak which by tn

^

e x c e l l e n t s h i p b u i l d i n g t i m

b e r .

„

, ^ „ a r d w

a s the U p p e r O l d

« r s t m

a j o r d r y - d o c k f o r t h e B o m

b a y ^ o c k y

P o c k w

a s

£

b

a

y

Dock - 2 0 9 f e e t l o n g , 4 7 f e e t b r o a d a n d 1

^

0 , B o m b a y

i n 1 7 5 0 a t a c o s t o f R s 1 2 , 0 0 0 f o l l o w e d s o o n b y t t . e

tio riio f Ir.diar.'bu:/.sr.ips a r c

v iy a le -s .I-ii a'.ic r=-:::d=cth3tduring

A.Ie/arider ^

s .h G reat's i.-.vsiior.

I" r i i ;r

4:'r. ler.rjr.' 3.C.,bc3lsand

ships - s o rrs of ‘ rerr.

- v. e :e : j i l : : : : r i i r = %7 1 ::? u r ;2b.

"

T o v / a r d s

‘. h e

e r . d

c :

t h e

G - : ‘5 e r a :r. : h e :-j". := r.!-jr.'A .D ., s h i p -

b u l ' i d i n ? t e - : : h j ^ , i a u e s h a d r e a c h e d a h

' s h

' . e v e ! : : 3 : r r - : i r . c a r . c n v , - h i c h i B S

b & e r > d

o c u

m

e n t e d

i n d

e ‘ s : l f c y K

- r g B h ' ^ a > : a : e p a - : _ i r h i ;

A

c c o r d i n g t o a n o t h e r c o n t e n ^ . p o r a r y d c

c

'

j

r

r

e

n

'

:

,

o

u

r

a n c i e n t s h i p b u i l d e r s h a d a c a ^ j i r e d t h o r o u g h l - c r . c v . - ' e d g e c i s h i p b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s a n d t h e p r o p e r t i e s a n d t : / p e s o r r i n - ^ b e r u s e d f o r b u i l d i n g s h i p s t o r i n s t a n c e , s o f t a n d l i g h t t i m

b e r v . ’ h

i c h

’ . v o u l d b e j o i n e d t o

k n o v / n a s t h e B r a h n n i n c l a s s , l i g h t a n d h a r d t i n n b e r v . h i

c

h

c

o

u

l

d

j

^

t o t h e o t h e r t y p e s \ v a s t h e K

s h a t r i y a c l a s s , s o f t a n d h e a v y t i

V

a i s h y a c l a s s a n d t h e h a r d a n d h e a v y t i m b e r v , ’ a s t h e

m

i x e d c l a s s w

i t h a b l e n d o f t h e s e p r o p e r t i e s w

a s k n o w

n a s t h e

' J ]

B h o j a ' s t r e a t i s e a l s o w

a r n s s h i p b u i l d e r s a g a i n s t t h e u s e o f i r o n e x p o s e s h i p s t o t h e i n f l u e n c e o f s u b m a r i n e m

a g n e t i c r o c k s . I n s t e a

’

m

e n d s s e c u r i n g t h e s h i p s ' p l a n k s t o e a c h o t h e r w i t h r o p e s w

- 1

j e , ,

t h e n e c e s s a r y r e s i l i e n c e t o th e b u ffe tin g c a u s e d b y r o u g h s e a s , s t u f f i n g t h e j o i n t s w

i t h o a k u m

t o r e n d e r t h e m

w

a t e r p r o o f , a p p

j n d

o f q u i c k l i m

e a n d o i l o n t h e p l a n k s

t o

p r o t e c t

t h e m

f r o m

s e a ^ ^ g g s i d e * '

d o u b l e - p l a n k i n g t o i m

p r o v e t h e b u o y a n c y a n d s a f e t y o f t h e u

■

t h e Yukli Kolpataru m e n t i o n s s h i p s a n d b o a t s o f v a r i o u s w i t h * ^ ®

d o u b l e , t r i p l e o r q u a d r u p l e m

a s t s , m

u l t i p l e s a i l s , o a r s a n d

s u p e r s t r u c t u r e o n t h e p r o w

s , Agramandira, o r i n the m i d d l e ,

d i r a , o r c o v e r i n g t h e e n t i r e d e c k , S f l r D f l m n n d f r a .

t h v a b o i * ^

E v i d e n c e f r o m

o u r a n c i e n t l i t e r a t u r e i n d i c a t e s t h e f a c t t h a 200 B.C. t h e s i z e o f s h i p s b u i l t i n I n d i a h a d i n c r e a s e d c o n s i d e r a b l y / ^

o f b u l k h e a d s w

e r e u s e d t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e h u l l w h i c h w a s b u i l t w i t n ^ ^

teak wWch had proved itsglf as far superior to oak seaworthiness, J

meability to water and resistance to marine o r g a n i s m s . T h e discovery trade winds' or the monsoon air current blowing across the

th®

by Hippalus in 45 A.D. ushered in the era of sailing ships and sigri*

gradual obsolescence of the multi-oared galleys though the retained for use in no or low wind conditions and for manoeuvring

- insideharbours. The earliest sails seen in our waters were lateen or tnan^^

lar sails on long yards at an angle of 45 degree to the mast and were of thick cloth or light canvas. These were later replaced by square and tangular sails, the ships carrying a large number of these sails in square-^'S

configuration and were builjt.with more than one deck

j

A very large number of travellers and writers who have adorned history s hall of fame such as Herodotus of the pre-Mauryan era (5 *

century B.C.), Megasthenes and Strabo of the Mauryan era (321-184

t h e n a v y a c q u i r e s t h e t h i r d d i m e n s i o n / 247

,plo no good'. To quote Rear Admiral V asudeva,

no respect for the law and had had severa

p

detention quarters for fairly serious offences.

s e i e c t m

e , I p r o m

i s e y o u I w

i l l n e v e r l e t y o u d o w

n . P eas

^

- j U j g

sen/ice documents and m y past. If you select me, one

proud of me'. So I decided to give him a chance and se e .

one of the reserves for m y submarine.

cocatVladi-

Johnson sailed through his submarine training cour^-.- ^

vostokinthe USSR and soon becam e a "

pn^ine

administrative and maintenance m achinery in t h e K

g

room. While we were in Russia, I noticed thatyoungjo

-

roving eye but as soon as he cam e on board he meant

u

^ur way

was efficiency personified. W h e n w e sailed out o f Rig

-tarted

home and were crossing the B a y of B is c a y , our su

^.g

lolling alarmingly. We could not dive in the channe

degrees

great risk of fire as the ship continued to roll as muc

ship's

romihe vertical o n either side. N e a r l y a l l mem

^mpany (crew) weresick and w e r e b r i n g i n g u p ev

"beaten, but throughout our p a s s a g e throug takingfuH

available in the engine room, ever on JS

'^ge, was Johnson, E n g in e R o o m M e c h a n i c i .

went

^^'en w e -were rounding the South Cape

which was

O'lgh a terrible storm when we couldn t

waves. T h e

a nautical mile away, because of themou

JPPerlidhadtobeclosedandtheofficerofthew

3 fixed structure because every time thee

^^^^jcerwas und^

“;°keoverthe conning tower, eventhe head of

gxpos^

J^^^terforafew moments, and the

“'tures off the hull. A lm o s t everyone wa

j^^^sonnevwga

and a half days which seemed

who was

the ^ ‘'f''®^"lspoketotheengin«J-^^,^ya,

'^ons who can .

reply was always the same,

-grem ad eof P

J!“ffthe Indian Navy's subma«"®

g^gdown-

to great heights w hen the

,h u n d an tly clear to the

it had beco _ -ciiner power build'Up

the middle of the 1960s i

continuing

P

a u t h o r i t i e s t h a t i n t h e s e e n

244 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

beenutilised by the A rm y and Ihe A irforce. Thus the Navy W

m ore than a bit of w ind ow -sh op p in g' out of the Inter-Service Deftm DelegaUon s 1964 vi$it to the USSR. H ow ever, in the exercise of assessing our requirem ents, it did help in fornauiating the basis, subsequently further m atured by detailed study at Naval Headquarters, for the acquisition program m e that w as adopted in 1965.

^

Shri Y.B. C h avan led another Inter-Service Defence Delegation - this time to the UK - tow ards the end of 1964. The Delegation madeariother attempt to seek deferred credit for building an Oberon class subnurine in the UK but w as once again unsuccessful in its bid. The project virtually re acted an impasse as the Governm ent of Ir\dia too L'ontinued tobe ur\willing to make budgetary provision for the submarine.

Soviet Offer of F Class submarines Accepted

From the Soviet point of view, India's navy needed to be strengthened, parfacularly because of the Chinese incursion into our t e r r i t o r y in 1962 an later, and also because Chinese criticism of the Soviet p o l i c y in Soviet W

Indian Ocean was changing the politico-military scenano

®86opolitical compulsions in the region. Hance

r " ° " ' ^ * “ ° " > '® » d e d b y S h riG l Shelh, A d d itio ™ '

R w t Arf ^ 1^/1^'

comprising the Deputy Chief of the

C

a o t a t n

Chief of the Naval StafO S

„(j

S c t e a ? N "

Dang, Director of W e a p * P » W j

Captain n t ^ ® ® ^ '^ ^ ’^‘®^s,Captain{later Rear Admiral) C.L.B

Director of S '

Admiral) K.R. Ramnath and Shri

y n i o n r e a d i l v : ; l ? ; ‘f '

offereddeferred^creSfoTp” ^'’"^'

a t a l o w

i n t e r e s t r a L

o f ^

^

P

^

^

P

a

y

n

^

e n

t s p r e a d o v e r a p e n o d o

- a s a t t l . t H ; ; : : : ; - ^ f P - c - t p e r a n n u ^ ^

two Submarine crews at

crore. The Soviets also offered

. . . An interesting featur*fofriT®'^^®®'"^'^divostock.

j^,,tbey

didnot nave any fixed n d cL w

tions with the USSR

o v e r a l l

o f f e r e d - t h e y c o u l d r e a d i y

w

M

e t h e B r i t i s h a s k e d

f o

^

S

^ ® ® d s a n d p u r p o s e s . F o r e x a t J P ^ e

m

d u d i n g t h e o u t f i t o f s p a r e s

class s o b i ^ ^

2 5 c r o r e e a c h . The s u r f a c e v i s l u

t h e F c l a s s f o r ^ ^

o t h e r s o u r c e i n t h e w o r l d .

b y t h e m

w

e r e c h e a p e r t h a n a * ;

As C o m m o d o r e Dang reminisces th.

•

'

price of the Petya clasS/

ACQUIRESTHETOIRDDIMENS'ON / 2 «

t h e n a v y

the price further.

The N e w E n v i r o n m e n t

H h p en ir\ close c o n ta c t

Until this tim e, as a lr e a d y s t a te d , th e

N a v y w a s o f B n H s h

with the R o y a l N a v y a n d e v e r y t h in g

ju p S o v ie t Union p o s e d s

origin. T h e a ^ i s i t i o n o f subm arines f r o m th e S o v ie ^

challenges to th e p io n e e r s o f t h e S u b m a r m e Arm ^^^ w a s c o n d u c te d m a was the fa ct th a t s o p h is t ic a t e d a n d e x a c ti §

^ ^^,0 h a d b e e n c a r

Y

new lan gu age u s in g a n e w s c r i p t

^ ly a n d

selected ,h ow ev er, fa c e d t h e c h a lle n g e s c r h o s tile w e a th e r ‘^on

aspects of th e a rt o f s u b m a r in in g d e s p U e ^

p r e v a i l i n g i r M h e i r t r a i n i n g e n v i r o n m e n t

vvaters

the

regions, in raging blizzards,

ice-bound

w

^ ^elow the

temperatures which sometimes went

mfort*

freezing p o in t.

th e a r d u o u s an d y " ^ o

-

Added to the inimical environment w^_^^ ^ as ‘°n ical regions,

®ble living conditions on board a sub

those from trop

ffomwhat average human beings,

pgces, ^ot-buf^'^''^S' ,

l .'e accustomed

c l a u s t r o p h o b i c

«mng otwater, absenceof cooked m - J '

dioxide, “ “ X e r ameniti»-

atdous pollutants and a high

'^creational and

atsea

«P«ially while submerged,

^ ' ' ^ d a y s

i^ w ith . W

co>ifinement in arr enclosed space

^ ^ o r l d one 'S ^

j o f dedicalior*

^ith no com m unication w ith the

j^itiandsahig--

^ p lg,„easu re

V r i s k s associated w ith su bm an n i ^ gersdisplay^^J ^ ^ g rsity , over-

^ "d m o tiv a tio n which o u r s u b in a r.n e p.on^ ^ , to a a

^‘« tS u b n .a n n e sq u a d ro n

had been

T^Wenty years after the prop°®®

250 / BLUEPRINTTOBLUEWATER

tru n k s canoes o f b a r k a n d s k in w it h a n in te rn a l fram ew ork, canoes and b o a ts fo rm e d fr o m p la n k s s titc h e d to g e th e r, vessels w ith planking nailed to g e th e r a n d w it h a f r a m e w o r k in s e rte d a n d vessels built by attachmg p la n k s to a p re fa b ric a te d fra m e w o r k .

T h e ships a n d g a lle y s b u ilt b y th e G re e k s , h o w e v e r, laid

“

•

tionfor the evolution of large ships for high-sea navigat.

o p e ra tio n s fo r G r e e k vessels w e r e b u ilt u s in g a en t fro m th a t o f E g y p t, h a v in g k e e l, ste m ,

and

v^ith th e p la n k s a tta c h e d ed g e to ed g e or

liv e ly , si^Tular to th e c a rv e l a n d c lin k e r b u ild in g techniques ot m V e ry little is k n o w n to d a y o f th e ships o f

th°e Phoeni-

sea power i n t h e eastern M editerranean about

a-^inns had begun to

ciarw w h o to o k th eir place b u t it is k n o w n th a t W t "

and be-

d ifferen tiate b e tw e e n th e fig h tin g vessel a n d the m develop-tw e e n the ro w in g g alley a n d the s a ilin g s h ip , the l e v e l s and the

m e n ts b e in g th e a rra n g e m e n to fo a rs in tw o b a n k s a t i

,

jgrnnnii'g

fittin g of a ra m b o w in ,g alleys in te n d e d fo r

^asanEgyP*'®"

dart«ig in g en en \y ships, th o u g h so m e b e lie v e th at tne invention.

,-nneUed

A t tt\e tim e of the siege of T ro y the g a lle y , an

^ o n each^ide

vessel,w as generally a 5 0 -o a rb o a t w ith a s i n g l e ro w ot 2d 0

Since the len g th of the galley co u ld n o t be increased

great®*

of 'sagging' caused to the h u ll, some o th er m e th o d of gen jj^gtheo^'®

propulsive p o w er h a d to be fo u n d and this w as d o n e b y arra g ^

in tw o staggered row s in galleys a p p ro p ria te ly called incteas®^

rem cs-oar,70Q B .C .).Then um berof ro w s o f oars w as later fur gf,y-bai'^®"

in triremes w h ic h h ad as m an y as three ro w s of oars and the m galleys (500 B.C.).

.

^ opeare^l'’"

■ W e U b e f o r e t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e C h r i s t i a n era th e sail had jl,e

t h e s c e n e , i n i t i a l l y b e i n g s u s p e n d e d f r o m

t h e m

a i n m

a s t

gtee*'*'®

p u r p o s e a n d s o o n e v o l v i n g i n t o i t s m u l t i s a i l c o n f i g u r a t i o n .

5 jnhef'

p

a

r c o n s i s t i n g o f a l a r g e p a d d l e - s h a p e d r u d d e r t o b e g i n w i t h , w

^ ,ii e

I t e d f r o m

E g y p t a n d w

a s i n i t i a l l y f i t t e d o n t h e s h i p ' s s i d e , t h e n m o v

s t a r b ^ r d q u a r t e r a n d f i n a l l y t o t h e s t e m

.

abO^J*

f ,

o f g u n p o w

d e r d u r i n g t h e 1 4 t h c e n t u r y b r o U g

f c r th ^ h ,„ g » m ship design and soon a (l« the middle of " «

™ nyasfourm 3M s.ndelghtsaiU .T hel6,h„„,“ ^ f , J S s p l * « “"

7

r e i n f o r c i n g t h e CAISSO

E v o l u t i o n o f

j d

P e v e l o p m e n t o f B o m

b g j ^ S S ------------^

.

of the history o j

“Naval architecture is an Egyptian art

Egypt Evi-

slupbuildir\g for the whole world

Qmith in 1917 in his

of

Ofthe4thrtfllenniumB.C/, averredElU ot SmUh

fence. His claim was buttressed by

^ r e ^ a s far b a c k a s ^ . ^ e

^ats.srtiallcraftand ships cam e f r o m E ^ P ^ g^ced

^ form of

^ats and other small craft were aheady far ad

_

^ ^ e

5>nn which they had in all probability been de^

or other

“'“'dies of reeds tied together with rop

as

f i b r e s a n d steered b y o a r s o r p u n t - p o l e s .

^

^ ^ ^ s o ^ J J g ^ b e s t k n o ^

For a few millennia rafts

recent times

of

^ goii^ gcraftm m od em o rcom p arativ y^^

America-

“'^- e

^ fo

•v rm

ju

n of

oi th

m e c

c a

a t

i a

a m

n a

w r

i a

o n

i s

w (^

V- at

— tu

'r a » )

l,lr-,.ia tnillenn’® f gO/to

J-'dbalsas (balsa is Spanish for the

of Ocean^^ ^

to

'0 test the theory with regard to

P ^ o r Heyer^ah ^

from

patty of Norwegian scientists led y ^^^.ient day

a yoyag

iNorwegian b c ic iii--

ancie»>‘

„q in

“

^ ones used in So u th A m erica m

^iki expedi*'®?.

by

^ Wands e»s. of Tahiti a

, s tW “ o^T^Tr^eS

^

t «

t h ,« and a half m o n '

The other vehicles on w i

^se

^®ter and som e of w h ich wer

246 / b l u e p r in t TO BLUEVVATER

subm itted, t h e l n d i a n N a v y f i n a l l y e n t e r e d t h p s u h m •

s u

b

m

a r i n

e a r m

f o r m

a l l y

c a m

e i n

t o

b

e i n

R

w

i t h

=

K u rsu raah P n ,m eo ^ a

^ y ^ ° '^ '^ ^ " ‘^erMXR.SamanUnd

AudUtn w ere'com m c *og-snouted shark) commanded by Commander A, b er4 I

respectively on December 6, 1968, Septem-

named^

submarinedepotship,appropriately

V ic p -rh w ;* '” *” ^"<^‘^0"inianded by Captain (later Vice Admiral and Decei^hpr9 R*iQ^Q^^'^^^ Staff) M.R. Schunker, was commissioned on ters TAm •

.

D irectorateofSubm arineA rm at NavalHeadquar-

D ire c to ir ^

January 6, 1966 with Captain Dang as ilsfi«l

Indiari?^!,/°^1'

first submarine squadronofife

theServirp «nt

8th Submarine Squadron - and transfor

timePakistan"? a ‘^'’^^^i'Tiensional wing of our Defence forces. AtJ^

p o s s e s s e d

s u b r^ r^ e

^

the British Oberon^^

important asnprt •

'■aspects superior to the Russian F class, t

'vas an improVed^anri

being, firstly, that while the J

produced by a Germ

'Assign, the latter was basically a

Hand secondly the l/t?

designer immediately after Wot

s h i p p 4 ' > ; l V " : ! : „ ^ b asic „ , e w a s c a rry in g c . a , . o n ^ , I'ad more positive h.ir,!

submarines. The F class,

, i-„j;

^bm arine arm, was an

Oberon class which,

^^ynt-

They also feel that if t h e T ^ - ‘u"

^^redf

Oberon class subma^-' '

decided to give us deferred

the Labour Party had losU h?*;

^tive*

we einpower, our Submar np

and the Conser/aj‘

could

did five vears "i'^'^'^°^*‘^

come into beingif’

y

a s e S n d ^ ^ - «

within which the Na'/

submarin.*^

®’<ampleof the^^^

nnS?

exam ple ^

'^"ninchinj>"i'^‘' ^ f f e l l o w - f e e l i n g amo S

-o d e .™ ,o „

tr ,° 7 * H r h a r .« j^

P 'm s o „ ,e , m e in n jv a l cells a n d '" ’

r e i n f o r c i n g THE C A IS S O N / 253

Ships of the Ind>

shios are known to h av e been built in this

M ragard sth eln d ian p en j^ u la s h .p s a ^

S t i n e n t ever since the dawn of

Theeariiestevidence

.

VaUey dating back to at least 3,000

unearthed at Mohenjodaro in the Indus V ^ ley

^ g

portrayed on the

B.Cnie sharply upturned prow and ste

^esentations of boats

seal are distinctive features also

^

Minoan seals, the

peculiar to other ancient civilisations su

Sumer w h ich di-

Jre-dynastic pottery of Egypt and the

^„°|,^“ T b etw een the

reclly suggest the existence of intimate m aritim e

Indus Valley and these countries at that time.

^^

While Mohenjodaro had developed on a site on

^^.omeinto

Indus,some250milesfromitsmouth,its tw in city ,H a pp«/

^ 2^000

being at a site on the left bank of the Ravi, now in Pakis a -

some

B . C . i . e . , a b o u t a r r u l l e n n i u m

a f t G

r t h e a d v e n t c f th eh ig

then

Harappans sailed in ships and boats down the Indus

extent of

coasted south to Kathiawar to settle down there and v/i

Rann

Harappan culture. During this period Kachchh was an is

surroundingit was deeperandstill navigable. A d r y -d o c p

^j^^ hvo

periodandm easuring710feetinlength,124andn6fee i

, ugg^exca-

11 t a In cUpth buil. around 2 ;J50 B .C has

f '

„

valed at Lethal in Gujarat. The dock is equipped w i * a g - -

provision

‘^ 'e been used as a wet basin and a boat pen. The doc

' f^gulating the inflow and outflow of water at

^

^ using

slidi^

designed spill channels and for

^ caissons.

’ S gates and an arrangement for operating

_

^ ^ ^l^gt refer-

It was during the Vedic period from

“ j tion of boats and

w e r e m

a d e i n c o n t e m

p o r a r y l i t e r a t u r e t o ‘^^"^^^"PyTical t e r m s and Ofp ' '■°'^®t' '^ction o f river c r a ft and s e a g o in g ve

' a fifjashasira, w h ic

S ' ' v o y a g e s . Tl,e remarkable w o r k of Kautilyaj^^^^^^^^

to the

gyj /■°*’^P'led during the period from 321

( s u p e r i n t e n d e n t o

department run by a

^

providing

i" l° 'r f o n ;n T r e p a J r .to s W ^ ^ ^

s7 -^ fh m en t of PrinW vijaya of

on

his voyage

PassilT

P"!j^argeshipcarry>^^® jtflshavedescnp-

^ j e o f V i j a y a 's b r i d e i n a v e t y ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

a num ber o f slaves and 700o

258 / b l u e p r i n t TO BLUEIVATER

51 fee( broad

valuable a c q u i s i M ; „ ;; Z ’’, S : " ™

S ^

continent to seek repairs For w

from various

siderable rise and fall of tide was fnimH ■

P‘^''Poses Bombay'scon-

Itw a s in l8 0 7 th a f * r

“ especially suitable,

long, 63 feet broad

h

e r e a f t e r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n

c o m

p l e t e d . W i t h i n a y e a r

N

a v y , t h e 7 4 - g u n Mindpn

^ 0 " ^ b a y f o r the Royal

be c o n s t r u c t e d t o t h p T i r v

S h e w

a s a l s o t h e f i r s t s h i p t o

c o n s t r u c t i o n o f s h i p s b

u

i i r ; , r f r ‘ ^ n "

t h e h i g h q u a l i t y o f

q u o t e f r o m

a l e t t e r t h

f

B

o m

b a y D o c t c y a r d , i t w o u l d s u f f i c e t o h u i l d e r , ' T h e r e o o r t

*

o f f i c e r o f theMindeu w r o t e t o t h e f o r t h e y w

e r e n o t o n l ^ ^

•

^ ^ ^ ®

^ u r v e y o r s o f t h e N

a v y w i l l n o t e o n e f a u i l ;

h e a r d m a n y o f th e

'T^uch g r a tifie d b y the inspection. Ihave

b e e n la u n c h e d fr o m

h ig h ly furnished... has

E n g la n d d u rin g th e last ^ ff

D o c k y a r d s o r fromanyotheryard

Marine a^nd late"fnr^.!°^R

‘he dockyard, earlier for theRoyallndian

2 0 th century with fhoH^ *

Indian Navy, until the fourth decade of It'S

t o t i m e . D u r i n e i t s

^ ^ ' ^ ^ g n ^ o d i f i e d f o r t h e p u r p o s e f r o m time building Shi DC hpM®

Dockyard distinguished itself by nK

viding maintenance

built in Europe but also excelled inpf®'

riumber of countries

' '

^

variety of ships and craft fro^i a

d8Scr,pi,on o f Ihe Bom bay D o ckyard in 1775 says:

Here is g dockvc^rri la

i

stores deposited in

contrived with all kinds ofna^*

of timber and planks

together w i t h great quanti^

leaking of anchors as

building ships, and forges

boasts such a dry d o c^ "

kind of smaller smith's woric.«

®“ ber for size" r

"P"'

to be seen in any

and three pairs of stro'no

"'tuition. It has three divisiO_JJ

repa.rmg three ships

as to be capable of receiving

ev r ; ^ ^ ‘

walp^' :;" :^ ^ ^ « -e o r a ts e p a r a te tim e s ;a 5

secn^H^

Stide without an !'- ^ ""°^her be admitted in her p i f the wnru

° ‘bers be receivo^^^

"^°^t and the second ship ca-

is a conv'r®"®'^P'°y®^ »n t h e i h ^ ‘^®‘''P'^ceswithouthindranceW

'

8'^®at expedition a ,

'PS at o n c e , w h i c h i s done 3

'

« r i y d o c k i n E n g l a n d . Near t h e

REINFORCING THE CAISSON / 259

dockyard is a rope-walk w hich, for length, situa tion and convenience equals any in England, that in the K ing's Y ard , at P ortsm outh, only excepted, and like that, it has a covering to shelter the w orkm en from the inclemency of the weather in all seasons.

Here are made cables and all sorts of lesser cordage, both for the Royal Navy, the Com pany's M arine, and the m erchant ships, w hich trade to these ports of India. Besides cordage m ade of hem p, cables, hawsers, and"all kinds of smaller ropes, a re m ade of the external fibres of the coconut, which they have in such abundance inlndia, as to make a great article of trade am ong the na tives of this place, and those along the coast between Bombay and Cape Com orin. The y a m m ade of the fibres is mostly manufactured in the towns and villages on, or near, the sea-coast of Malabar; m any vessels belonging to the natives are laden wtirely with this yam which they alw ays find a quick sale for at mbay and Surat let the quantity be ever so great, as it is the only cor age made use of am ongst the small trading vessels of the country; rgeships use much of it made into cables, hawsers, and smaller ropes; calledKyah.

Ships built at Bombay are not only as strong, but as handsome, and

finished as ships built at any part of Europe; the timber

rab'p

'''hich they are built, so far exceeds any in Europe for du-

whl M

usual for ships to last fifty or sixty years, as a proof of

fou^ *

^ fo ™ e d that the ship called the Bombay grab, of twenty bee^

second in size belonging to the Company's Marine) has

n built more than sixty years, and is now a good and strong ship, south

peculiar to India only; what grows to the

Q„,

‘lie coast of Malabar, is, however, very good, and great a

>t are brought to Bombay; it is called teak and will last in c imate longer than any wood whatever.

^•Hal

S®^®'^3tions of Wadia M aster-b uild ers constructed 352 largeand

^ Ist*u'^'°^'^^®'l^e/C0 a slalv essels an d h arb o u rcraftd u n n g centuries and a high standard of

Out. Tho^® superior to that of English shipbuilders, was

'

'® ullZ

of Malabar teak, the iniperviousness of

9 n d

the s u p e r i o r t e c h n i q u e of planking, keel an

“

technicians

ea,ne;i!u^'8her standard of craftmanship and skill of

^^^fr'eadmirationofeventhemostexperiencedj.pbuidprso^

'I'Jirerti^'

1809-ton, ComwaUis, the first

in 1813,

fired

Indian Navy'

war m 1826,

Pa ^ f l r s t b road sid eL d took part in the Ang>o-Ar^r.can ^

"^''“=*PatedintheBalticcampaignagainstRussiaafferconvers,onfo

260 / b l u e p r in t TO BLUEWATER

finally scrap p ed i n ^ l S s

'"England and was

n e a r .h e j e .^ ’ ^has s u X ; d “ o f h is T y ”

' ' "

E a s t M a

D°^l<y«d for the

t h e o u ts ta n d in g !h *^ ' ‘ u

rulers.Someof

a] T

^

B o m b a y w ere:

j g j g " * ^ ^ ^ ^ -74g u n s , 1715 tons,builtbyJam shedjeeBom anjee,Iaunchedin

^ g^riS/2289 tons, b u ilt byJamshedjeeBomanjeeJaunchedin

^

2 2 8 6 tons, b u ilt b y N o w ro je e Jamshedjee launchedin R ose-w ater w as u sed in I S lU o r nam ing the S//fl/w//i/mas to havedone so w i ^ w ine w ould have been against the principles of the Imamof Muscat tor w lw m she w as built. Of the Asia, which was Admiral C ordingion's I agship at the Battle of N avarino, Admiral Sir PultneyM alcom e wrote,‘TeU

m y old friend Nowrojee w hat a glorious part the^lsia sustained in the Ballte o

^ v a r i n o a n d h o w

p r o u d l a m

o f h i s s u c c e s s a s a b u i l d e r . ' E a r l i e r ^ t h e

>

leutenant 'Second com m and' of the Salsette, a frigate had wntten jam sh «^eeN ow rojee,'Y ourprofession al abilities were thehappyr’^^^'’*

preserving us from w hat appeared to the human eye to be unavoKJ _

destrurtion; that ship, with five other small vessels-of-war and valuable merchantm en u n d e r convoy, b e i n g b e s e t b y t h e i c e in the Baltics"

^

she alone escaped shipwreck/

remarkable as the career of any other ship was thato

Swallow built by Maneckjee Nowrojee in 1777.

She was first employed as a Com pany's packet;’ wrote a

between India and England; was then ta

®‘" ° " ^ ™ ^ ^ ° ’'^3nyyears.Abouttheyearl8^^^^^^^^^

U n i o n T H

^

packet, was sold to the D a n e s , fitted^

U n d on , and went to Copenhagen, whence she is supposed

w h i l X r f w

S

bya Bn<

^cndem n^i as a prize. SW

t o t the K i n g s s e r v i c e a n d b o u g h t b y s o m e merchants

r e i n f o r c i n g THE CAISSON / 261

16 th June, 1823.

„ was Ktimaled by the Controller of the

^

gun ship could be built at Bom bay at a cost of o v e r * 2 0 ,0

England and said that 'it is universally adm itted that a Bom b y ship is 50 per cent superior to vessels built in England.

I t w

a s o n b o a r d t h e B o m

b a y D o ck y a rd -b u ilt R o y a l N

a

v

y

s 'P '

'

thefirst Ship-of-the-line built of teak outside the UK to the ord er of A a -

miralty, while

was shelling the tow n of Charleston, W est

during the Ajiglo-American W ar that the A m erican national anthem , tne Siar-Spangled Banner, is said to have been com posed by Francis ey.

AnotherBombay-built ship,/4si(7, was t h e f l a g s h i p o f the British N ava ee

atlheseabatrieof Navarino in 1827. The Punjab, later renam ed the Tweea, oncennade the London-to-Melbourne passage in a record tim eo f 83 d a y so wiling which remains unbeaten to this day.

.

T rin c o m h e , w h ic h w a s r e n a m e d H e r M a j e s t y ' s T r a i n i n g S h i p

®"'®?®^she w a s d e c o m m is s io n e d f r o m t h e R o y a l N a v y , w a s l a u n c h e d a t w m b a y a s fa r b a c k a s 1817 b u t is s till a H o a t a t P o r t s m o u t h H a r b o u r a n d is e^ingas a tra in in g v e s s e l - t h e o l d e s t n a v a l s h ip a f l o a t a n d

'"EWorld. Writes Charles A llenin anarticleon theev olu tion ofship bu ild -

*"8 m India:

^ h o re d in the roadsteads of the British Navy's dockyard

attered,ancienthulksw ingsw iththetide.C om paredw i

,

^gship. Victory, gleanning with spit and polish and fres

short

dry-dockdoseby'she s e e L a pathetic sig h t w ith her rrjasts cut short her gun-ports battened down. Yet the history o

-^ -^ liia to f

ainjng Ship Fowdroi/flnt is just as remarkable in its own ^ X

famous sister-ship-of-the-line not, because o

' ed in her but for those who built her.

to .

and Foudroyant are the last survivo

thedistlnc-

Navy really did rule the seas, but

in

n of heing the oldest vessel in the world ‘

g^ip foryoung-

hve service, which these days is serving as

S

^ ,;j,e ^ live

who come aboard for a few days to

.

j,g has remained

nd Work in an old man-o'-war. One reason

y

yff-tory m a d e

^"tforwell over a century and a half IS t ^ ” resop^'Oudof,theFou-

^row the'HeartsofOak' t h a t E n g l i s h s e a m e n w e r e P

is built of Malabar teak, cut

o n e , built for

in fact, is not a British

at a j b -ta n In^

Royal Navy in Naval Dockyard, Bombay

262 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

T h e ship w righ ts w h o designed and constructed the Foudroyiini alo n g w ith fifteen o th er sailing ships for the Royal Navy and a great m a n y m o re for the Indian N a v y - w ere all members of an extraoidinary fam ily w h o for n early w ho hundred years dominated the dockyaidcf B om b ay, and h elp ed to turn w hat w as a quiet backwater into the b u siest seap o rt in A sia.

,

I n 1 8 3 9 a s te a m s lo o p o f 705 tons a n d 2 3 0 horsepower w i t h 5 g u n s , w a s la u n c h e d a t B o m b a y , fo llo w e d frig a te o f 9 4 6 to n s a n d 2 2 0 h o rs e -p o w e r, f

®^ ^ ihe pisi

a n d in 1 8 4 2 a n o th e r s te a m frig a te « m e fro rn

-

andthe

b u ild e r s o f th e D o c k y a r d S h ip s w h ic h w e re

. j^gaysofthem,

e n g in e s s u p p lie d f r o m B rita in . L o w e , th e Rnmbav weie the

'T h e s e s te a m e rs a n d s a ilin g sh ip s

ariv atidsuchas

m o s t s e rv ic e a b le o f a n y in th e possession o f the

°

'^jtionatthe

w eren otlostb y th e a c c id e n to fth e se a ,w e re in p e t i m

e o f t h e a b o l i t i o n o f t h e S e r v i c e , w h i l e

t

,

p

u r c h a s e d

i n E n g l a n d

w

e r e g e n e r a l l y s i g n a l

a i

r

■

2 0 w a i

I n 1 8 6 3 , w

h

e n

t h e I n d i a n N

a v

y w

a s

t h e m W ^ i e

v e s s e l s , a l l b u

t t h r e e h a d

b e e n b u i l t i n

p o w e r f u l v ' ® * ®

s t e a m

- p o w

e r e d

f r i g a t e s , s l o o p s o r g u n b o a t s . T

l ^

ysccflveof

t h e P u n j f l h o f 1 8 0 0 t o n s a n d 7 0 0 h o rs e -p o w e r, a n d t o n n a g e a n d

6 5 0 h o r s e - p o w e r .

N

o w

r o j e e J a m

s h e d j e e W

a d

i a , w

h o w

a s t h e

^ g v y b a ^

w

h o s e s u p e r i n t e n d e n c e s o m

a n y o f t h e s h i p s o f t h e

‘

co r\ stru cted ,d ied on N o v em ber2,1860atth eag eof85.

^ a v o f b ' S ' ^ ® , ®

t o h i m

. C

o m

m

o d

o r e W

e l l e s l y c l o s e d t h e D

o c k y a r d o n t

p a s s > * ' &

a n d t h e f l a g s o f t h e v e s s e l s i n h a r b o u r w e r e h a l f - m

a s t e d -

>

b e g a n t o p a s s t o o t h e g l o r y o f B

o m

b a y a s a s h i p b u i l d i n g c e n

s h i p s w

o u

l d

s o o n t a k e t h e p l a c e o f w

o o d e n o n e s a n d i t w

a s t o

b e f o r e I n d i a c o u l d a g a i n b e c o m

e a g r e a t s h i p b u i l d i n g c o u n t y -

b u i l t b y t h e W

a d i a s w

a s t h e Navigator, w h i c h w a s l a u n c h e d i n A

t t h e t i m

e o f t h e I n d u s t r i a l R e v o l u t i o n t h e r e h a d c h a n g e i n t h e t e c h n o l o g y o f s h i p c o n s t r u c t i o n w i t h t h e i n t r o d u c

g ^ j t i s l '

i n p l a c e o f w

o o d a n d s t e a m

p r o p u l s i o n i n p l a c e o f s a i l s . S i n c e s h i p b u i l d e r s h a d r e f u s e d t o t r a n s f e r t h i s t e c h n o l o g y t o t h e l n d i a n s a j t

i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n i n I n d i a h a d l a g g e d w a y b e h i n d t h e E u r o p e a n n a

l \ a d s i g n a l l e d t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e v i r t u a l e x t i n c t i o n o f t h e s h ' p ®

i n d u s t r y i r \ I n d i a . T h o u g h t h e B o m

b a y D

o c k y a r d had s u c c e e d e d i n b u i

_

its first steam ship, the Hi/gh Lindsay, as early as 1830, it had failed toSU

the effort of updating the technology of building ironclads and thuS

relegated to the status of a m aintenance and repair yard.

r e i n f o r c i n g THE CAISSON / 263

: , e « , o W

o , , d

W

a r s e s p

e c i a , . y

. h

e S e « ^

^

^

^

^

^

^

“ L r a i n L T e t a f L t , e v e T c a m p a i g n d u r i n g .h e and more, from China to Ethiopia, from E g y p t to

^ '^ u t L '

received material support in a large m easure from th,s

importance given to it during W orld W ar II w a s n ev er exceed ed m the p as^

With Hong Kong and Singapore lost to the Japanese, it becam e m e o y dockyard available to th e A llie s east of S u e z in th e n o r th e m h e m is p r e a

had t o c o n s e q u e n t l y h a n d l e a w i d e v a r i e t y o f ships a n d c r a f t i n v o l v e d m o p e r a t i o n s i n a l l t h e a t r e s of w a r f r o m t h e C o ra l Sea to the M

e d

i t e r r a n e a n .

When World War IT b r o k e o u t i n S e p t e m b e r 1939 t h e D o c k y a r w ^ s l a c k i n g b o t h m

e n a n d e q u i p m

e n t f o r t h e i m

m

e n

s e t a s k s o f t h e c o n f l ^

t ,

it e v e n t u a l l y r o s e t o t h e o c c a s i o n a n d b y t h e t i m e H i t l e r m a r c h e d m to P o l a n d , i t h a d s t a r t e d w

o r k i n g ' a t f u l l b e l t ' to m

a k e t h e R IN s h i p s a n a

’ ■ e q u i s i i i o n e d v e s s e l s r e a d y f o r w a r . W

i t h

i n

t h e f i r s t 10 d a y s o f t h e c o m -

j n e n c e m e n t of t h e W ar, 17 v e s s e l s w e r e g o t r e a d y w i t h

m

a n

y , m

a n

y m o re to

o w d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f t h e n e x t s i x y e a r s .

,

During t h e s e s i x y e a r s t h e s t r e n g t h o f w o r k e r s i n t h e Bom bay D o c k y a r f e ^ e d t e n t i m

e s , i t s p r o d u c t i v e a r e a w

a s i n c r e a s e d b y f i f t y p e r

c

^'^^^dseventy th o u sa n d sq u a re fe e to f co v e re d a re a w a s c o n s tru c

,

’ ^ o n - p r o d u c t i v e b u i l d i n g s w

e r e d e m

o l i s h e d t o r n a k e r o o m

^

f i o r n * t ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ' ' ^ ° ^ ' ^ ® W

S / t h e n u m

b e r o f s h i p

s h a n

d

l e d

a t a t i m

e i n c r e a s

v e s s p i

d r y - d o c k s w

e r e e x t e n d e d t o t a k e

n u m h ! '

d e e p e n e d

t o

a c c o m

m

o d a t e

l a r g e r

f l e e t

u n ^

W

w

a s c o n s i d e r a b l y i n c r e a s e d f r o m

t a i l o r s t o t i n s m

i

o f

e x p e r t s t o m

i l l w

r i g h t s a n d r e f i t s w

e r e c u t t o a t h i r d o r a

t

, d

t o o k b e f o r e t h e c o m

m

e n c e m

e n t o f t h e W

a r , t h u s r e n d e r i n g

r ^ * ' y a r d c o m

p a r a b l e t o t h e C

h a t h a m

D

o c k y a r d .

" ' ‘ t h s e J

h a n d l e d b y t h e D

o c k y a r d i n c l u d e d r e p a i r i n g ^

P » 5 n >

'iners Info armed merchant ^ru’sers 'ttm g out

ingfQ

*^ips as troop transport, hospital ships and mule s ip ,

i n t o l o c a l n a v a l d e f e n c e v e s s e l s , r e f i t t m g

s ^

r g

e

a n d i n s t a l l i n g g u n s a n d w

e a p o n c o n t r o l s y s

^

o

f ' d

e f e n

s i v

e l y a r m

e d m

e r c h a n t s h i p s . '

.

t h p r r u i s e r

C f l p e ^ ' o f

’ ™ i a j o r a c t i o n - d a m

a g e r e p a i r s w

e r e e a r n

a r v ' 1 9 4 2 t h e

d e s t r n

” s h e h a d b e e n t o r p e d o e d o f f M

a s s a w

a ,

J

s u b m

a r i n e i n

t h e D

o c k y a r d b u i l t a n e w

w

a s t o w

e d t o B o m

b a y w

h e r e t h e

R o y a l

^

t i e r a n d r e a l i g n e d t h e n i n e - t o n m

a i n g e a r w

h e e l , a n o t h e r k

y

2M / b l u e p r in t TO BLUEWATER

d u r i n g a J a p a n e s e b o X *

m a jo r r e f it b e fo r e s h e saW ed

° " ‘:®^S®“'^ '‘0"8httoBombay[o.

a g a in .

o p e ra tio n s in the eastern th eatreyet

th e

E n g in e e r in g D epartm ent tre b lin g its capacity,

p le x beincr co f

D e p o t c o m in g in to b ein g , a m assive naval sJorescom-d is r in l-r ,

w o r k s h o p s caterin g to diverse maintenancn

h a ffio , * ^fu

fu n c tio n a n d a la rg e num ber of vessels beingmade

e w rin

s h o r te s t p o s s ib le tim e. To quote C a p ta in W.R.Sh-

D n rV ^

y e a rs o f co n ce n tra te d effort, the historic Naval

B o m b a y h a s m a d e a d istin g u ish ed contribution to Victory, w o r th ^ y m a in ta in in g its 2 0 0 y e a rs tra d itio n .'

.

n e re w a s a b r ie f lu ll th e re a fte r in th e activ ities o f th e D o ck y ard which

^

r e fittin g o f s h ip s b u t co n stru ctio n o f ships h a d been per-cKSn

B y th e tim e o f Independence,however,threeiwjo'

p yard s h a d b e e n se t u p in the co u n try - H industan Shipyard. Vishakhap^

™ ;^ ^ ''^ ® '',^ ® ^ ‘'*^'^o>'kshops,C alcutta an d Maz^igon Dock,Bombaya^

D o w t S ^ f

started building fishing trawlers,batj^

?evTved

'

construction o f warships was yet iobe

e n c e ™ r e n d T a s s i g n e d to the Bom bay Dockyard

B r i H s h R o t

'■^°^*^® “ " d '''id e d fle e ta n d a s s o c ia te d a s s e «

and c a p a X

earm arked for transfer to Pakistan sea

western and

passage to P akistan's major naval base

ratings o f the

and Chittagong. AH o ’

these ships which wp

^^^'^tan had to be

operational e ffic ie n c rm ’^^^'“ ®^'

victualled and

yjtan a*

Karachi and C h ittao ^ n^aximised before their departure fo^ ^ litlesat jjja t tim e. A third o f t h im a

Pak'5<

N avy Was alsoshinnoH *

and eq u ip m en t allotted to tf’®

^ t o

* e occasion and the sh in °

^ h e person n el o f the Dockyard r

- two sloops

5"Sates, four mainswee^p"®

undivided RIN 's flagship, GodaVOf^'

a°’i'‘^^5*'ůrdefencemoto7la

two m otor minesweepers

an naval a « th o r it!« u n d t n o o t ^ lJ J a 'k

sk o f restructuring the o r g a r ^

REINFORCING THE CAISSON / 265

l i o n of t h e Dockyard for m eetin g the r e q u ir e m e n t s o f I n d e p e n d e n t In d ia s n a v y but it was soon embroiled into a sta te o f h e ctic a c tiv ity fo r p re p a rin g the In d ia n Navy's fleet for its first n aval o p era tio n after In d e p e n d e n ce -

bottling up the coastal waters of the state o f Ju n ag ad h in K a th iaw ar w h ich had illegally acceded to Pakistan. Th ree slo op s, th ree m in esw eep ers, th ree landing ships and one m otor launch w ere refitted and m ad e o p era tio n a l a t short notice for the operation against the b ellig eren t N a w ab o f Ju n a g a d h and his rebel force in October, 1947. T h e tasks o f lan d in g the A rm y o n the Kathiawar Coast, sanitizing the area o ff the recalcitran t 'n ativ e s ta te ' and occupying its shore areas, w hich w ere o f co n sid erable tactical im p o rtan ce, was successfully carried out.

In order to revamp the D ockyard 's organ isational tree, w h ich h ad c ui^ to the archaic Royal N aval dockyard stru ctu re for sev eral d ecad es, imrap

material efficiency, a special co m m ittee had b een set up

recom m ended th e a d o p tio n o f the

woulcfi*'! °

’^'^'JStrial system o f m anagem ent for the pu rp ose. This controlllii

the introduction o f the latest scien tific tech niqu es o f

f^refullvD

m aintenance operations and at the sam e tim e

'•s future

for the exp an sio n o f the D ockyard to m eet

It w as em phasised that w ith the

plan the Dock

system o f m anagem ent it w ould be p ossible to

P ^ g re ssa tm

^ activities in detail, ensure better coord in ation and

and ens

w orkshop levels, im prove econom y and prog-

®^“iprnent

®” 6ctive control in the handling o f m aterial, labou r and of

com m ittee were accepted and, w ithin a

^^nieinto j g'j

a new organisation based on m anagerial concepts

Under

I^ockyard being headed by a C aptain Superinten-

^Partmgj^jj.

placed an Industrial M anager heading five technical

^°*inting.

Electrical, Construction, M aintenance and Gun-

*®^uencing

^^f^'^P^lanningSection was charged with planningand

^®3tereconn

o f ships and repairs on a scientific basis, effecting

^8 and co-n .^ ’^ . ^ ‘^^‘''sa tio n o f materials and m anpow er and im prov-

^

the operations o f all tecfuiical and non-technical

“'®pKwere^

cranes and cradles with hoisting gear im ported from

A^^^^*®^^*®“ **3blelocations to facilitate the handlingof heavy

b

of stores and spares w orth a few crore rupees,

^ c e the p

unused in the various departments o f the Dockyard

World W ar II, was withdrawn and placed under the

J!?^^ge,ret

officer and an efficient centralised system o f spares

introduced w ith th e c re a tio n c fa S p a re P a rts

C entre. A beginning w as also m ade in indigenising the su p p ly

266 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

o f stores and spares.

^ ‘J ^ t h e a c q u is it io n o f t h e N a v y 's first cru iser, D e/fti,in l948,on eofth e dry-docks o f the D ockyard, the D uncan D ock, had to undergo a minor modification to accom m od ate the 555-fo o t hull o f this 'David' who had slain h ath in the B attle o f the R iver P late and a num ber of tugs and fetry craft had to be requisitioned to m anoeu vre the cruiser through the caisson into the D uncan D ock, an operation undertaken by the Dockyard staff for the first time.

W ith the acquisition of the three R class destroyers, Rajput, Rn«fl,and Ranjit, in 1949, one store ship, D harini, in 1952, the three Hunt class destroyers, Godavari, G om ali and Gartga, in 1953, one Tanker, Shakti, in 1954 and six nvinesweepers, Bassein, BimUpatnam, Kakinada Cannanore, KarwaranA Cuddalore, in 1956, the m aintenance facilities had to be considerably extended and m odernised to cope vi/ith the post-W orld W ar II generation of propulsion machinery, weapor\s and w eapon control system s, electromagnetic and underw ater sensors, data transm ission system s and damage control tec ■

ruques.

W hen the first atom ic reactor, Apsara, was being set up at Trombay durmg the early 1950s, the Atomic Research Centre was faced witha major engineermg task which had not so far been undertaken in this country inw o| fashionmg a very large base-plate weighing a few tons for the u M W c r

reactor with great accuracy at short notice as Pr

wppI c

'vas to inaugurate the reactor within a

d o r r a ^

thechallenge, worked round

all thp’rp'*

task within a few days and the pla te fabricated

all the requirements of stm rtnrai

____ 'tnlprance ,i-8'

Permissiwl^ >^ents of structural strength, com position and 'tolerance^, high levpl

weight and dimension. Another instance o- ‘‘

Konkan which ^ dockyard's expertise was that two ships, Cmvery, the s n e i ^ v

major refit at the Dockyard, exceed^

in

‘’l:, ‘1 '™ “ “ ' ' " e ‘I'® build ers' sea trials over 15

of D em , which had

ord time of six hours

changed by the Dockyard within th

skills of the w orkere^Tw w W

arid channelise the

Manager as the Chairma

Cornmittee was formed with the Indus

representatives of the workpr«" •

*^®^ds of various departments a

b y th e C o m m itte e w a s tid a s s X ^ h -^ 'T '"^ ® '‘'-'^ ® ^ ‘""‘ ‘^®’' “ "'^®'* S

REINFORCING THE CAISSON / 267

sieam propulsion of ships, which had ju st been introduced^ bu t m o st o f the workers had to be trained on an 'o n -th e-jo b ' basis as no sep arate organisation for (he composite training o f w orkers in the variou s skills existed. And hence,inorder to improve their perform ance, the low est edu cational qu alification for apprentices was raised to m atricu lation soon after Independ-Sch oo l set up w ithin the D ockyard 's

I a p p r e n t i c e s w ho branched into various

hasnotonlu^r.” !!°!l^u

training. O ver the years this school

has also tumM

®'^®‘^®5sary skilled m anp ow er to the Dockyard but

requirements nf'tv!

num ber o f professional tradesm en to m eet the

Bal^Tn

establishm ents.

« * e

1960s, as projected

PTOposed the a c(^ ’

N aval H eadquarters in 1948 w hich

destroyers, frie a t*r^ *v ^

a large num ber o f aircraft carriers, cruisers,

fending crafty

^mnesweepers, hydrographic survey vessels,

wastal craft, harb^ ^

subma rines, subm arine tenders, diving tenders,

^on with the B

^'•'^^aft and helicopters, and in consulta-

^<^kyard e x n e d A d m i r a l t y , it was decided to suitably expand the f’yit.Accordinel*

augm ent the facilities and services provided

^^®niationairf

"'^^^®’^^’^‘^®'^G>bbandParhners,consultingengineersof

additiorTV

contracted to prepare a suitableplanforcreating,

^^^itionalberth^

within the Dockyard by reclamation, secondly,

‘^f’ona! dry-do

by constructing new wharves and, thirdly, ad -

®'^£»ft Carrie ^

facilities for the repair of capital ships, f.e., cruisers and

proviso that the expansion plan was to beim ple-

^M av

normal functioning of the Dockyard.

^'^’"•crease •

u

‘consultants finalised their report which provided for

acn

^’‘isting land area of 39 acres to 120 acres by reclamation

^®^^‘ Club

portions o f the Ballard Pier and the Royal Bombay

basin'

'rO'^truction of a 3,200-foot breakwa ter to form an artificial

‘ncreasing the protected water area from 24 acres to 150

^®^^laim !J‘^*‘° ’'°^"®'^workshops,offices,storesandotherbuildingson

'^°ckeof -

extended land area, constru< t*on of two 'graving' (diy)

*ler

sjze for all classes of vessels to be acquired during the next

fidal ba ^

extension of the total berthage w i* in the area of the

Hie ]q_

nearly four kilometres. After a few modifications regarding

of the docks and the various buildings and workships, the

•■ecommendations were projected to the Government of todia

yard

‘he proposal for a Rs 25.1-cror.^ five-stage, 12-year Naval Dock-

Chipf P^*^s*on Scheme with Captain (iater Vice Admira ) Daya Shankar, obT,

J^aterial at Naval Headquarters, being the nodal functionary for

'ainingGovemmentapproval and for the implementation of the project.

268 / b l u e p r i n t TO BLUEWATER

e x te n s io n o f th e B a lla rd P ier by 750 feet, reclamation of 27a c r S s e a L

e r e c tio n o f th re e w h a rv e s o n the reclaim ed area providing 2^00 feetoi w h a r f a g e a n d c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a c r u i s e r - g r a v i n g d o c k o n the reclaimed area, T h e R s 1 4 . 5 9 - c r o r e s e c o n d s t a g e w o u l d e x t e n d th e re cla im ed area by another 4 0 a c r e s o n w h ic h w o u ld b e c o n s tru c te d the outer deep-water basin with a llie d w h a rv e s to p ro v id e g rea ter berthing facilities to be used for repairs a n d f o r o p e r a t i o n a l r e a s o n s .

T h e B o m b a y P o rt T ru st au th o rities and the Maharashtra Govemmait d id n o t, h o w e v e r, tak e v ery k in d ly to the Dockyard's proposed expansion s c h e m e . T h e P o rt T ru st felt that it w ould ham per the movement g e r lin e rs a n d freig h ters to and from the Ballard Pier and detna 3

m o n e ta ry c o m p e n sa tio n o f R s 1.4 crore while the Maharashtra vm

m e n t's o b je c tio n w a s b ased on the apprehension that it wou im p o rta n t to u rist a ttra ctio n - the panoram ic view of the G a te w a y o f In d ia. T h e co n tro v ersy had delayed

.g^^ed,

b y o v e r tw o y ears w h en P rim e M inister Jaw aharlal N^^ru o v e rru le d th e o b jectio n s and decided in favour of the globe

sio n . W o rk o n the p ro ject entru sted to various

^^pfore,

an d o v e rse e n b y S ir A lexan d er G ibbs and P artners could, m e n c e o n ly in 1955. W ork on the project, how ever, came to a s grtitra*

a g a in in 1956 w h en differen ces over contractual obligations tio n an d fu rth er con seq u en t delay in construction work.

pgfencel^'

In 1958 the late V .K . Krishna M enon, who was the

"j^gyai Dock'

ister, v ex ed b y the slow progress o f the project, dissolved * gj^pgnsiof^*

ya rd C o n stru ctio n C om m i ttee, w hich had been overseeing th e D o ck yard on b eh alf o f the G overnm ent of Ind ia,

<r/'homp with ComiTlO

^

tio n o f a N av al D ockyard Expansion schem e with Co

A d m iral) S.M . N anda as its first D irector General. He was of Hi®

^ .

_

a _

d _

e ^

q _

u _

a _

t _

e _

fa_

c _

il _

it _

ies^

, _

f _

i _

na_

n _

ce_

_

a _

nd_

authorit^

y to steer the

^

h

1 a

_ z

__a_r_ds

__ it

__ h

__ad

__ s

_ o

__ f

_ a

_ r

_ b

__e_e_n

_ f

j a ced with. In

T 1

—1 96

Q 0

/c nR

ear Ad

A r

H ni

m riraalP

lP -I

'* ^

^ ' ‘

the N av y 's Engineering Branch took over as the

during h is long tenure o f seven and a half years in this assignr*

ceeded in com pleting several m ajor projected works.

ihree

C or«tru ction of the cruiser-graving dock, equipped w ith .

^

h ou ses, tw o heavy-duty cranes and the attendant se^ ices,

w ay w hen it w as decided to acquire the N a v y ' s firstaircraft earn /

The dock w as, therefore, suitably extended and its shore end

com m odate the carrier's forecastle and its protruding gun spo

A fter its com pletion, the cruiser-graving dock had the

tio n o f docking all three post-Independence flagships o f the India

r e i n f o r c in g THE CAISSON / 269

Delhi, Mysore and Vikrant. In 1963 a large oil tanker, SS Sarulla, w hich had spningaleakand had thus b eco m ea p o llu tio n h azard to B om bay H arbour, was isolated by being docked in the cru iser-graving dock, o n a request received from the Bombay Port Trust, and n ecessary repairs carried out.

There were occasions when as m any as four ships - subm arines and frigates

- were simultaneously docked in the cruiser-graving dock.

Along with the cruiser-graving dock, w hich was com m issioned by Shri Krishna Menon, the barracks w harf, the destroyer wharf, the boat wharf and a patent slipway were com pleted and by 1962 the Ballard Pier was extended by 750 feet.

Construction of a south breakw ater w harf, a rubble-m ound breakw ater and a protective retaining bund was com m enced in 1958 after obtam ing theciearance of the Bom bay Port Trust. For this phase o f the project, 24 large reinforced concrete caissons had to be laid on the prepared foundation, the basin had to be deepened to 34 feet and nearly 40 acres o f sea area had fo be reclaimed by removing rocks, blasting charges underwater and filling up the cleared areas. The breakw ater thus erected was capable o f berthing

•■gest naval ships on the protected inner face in all w ea th er conditions

"'d on the outer face in fair weather. A novel feature of the south breakwa-owing to the cellular construction of the caissons, was the additional for the storage of fresh water and o il provision of pressunsed salt com pressed a ir,lo c a tio n o f electrical substations an d ab atteiy of and other equipment below the breakwater's upper ^ p o sed d a k .

left clear for the installation of cranes andotherhandlmggea ,

of K*

of vehicles and for layin g rails for the supply or re

xnachinery and weapons. The slipway was bui t

a S l ?

repairing smaller craft such as patrol “ 3

^

/

P

^cal naval defence vessels without having to dry dock them,

con J

reclaimed around the cruiser-graving dock

^

'°"«ructedwharveswereuti!isedfortheconstructionofworkshop^^^^^^^

Wean

'Maintenance of propulsion

and naviga-

tionfi°"

systenrts, sensors, data

jndependence

as (kj ^‘^‘' ’Pnnent installed on board the ships acqui

caDabilities than

moresophislicaled and superior .n ths.r capaB.m

-■•ar equipment of World War II vintage.

deposition of silt

in m ®®''while the tidal structure and the pat

^ gj^^yater underwent

^['‘‘^earea contiguous to the Ballard

a few

Onipiete change owing to the erection o

T h e dredging fleet of

270 / b l u e p r in t TO BLUEWATER

h na P rod uctivity C ou n cil w as invited in 1963 to examine its o'rganisa-w i n ^

operating procedure. A team deputed by theCouncil.

neaded by a Ford Foundation specialist, conducted a detailed study of al aspects of the D ockyard 's activities for a period of four months and pointed out the deficiencies in staffing, training, organisation and the planning and control of its m aintenance and refitting operations.

As regards staffing, the m ain lacunae pointed out were quick rotation o f technical officers, who m ainly com prised officers in uniform, inadequate educational and professional training of technical personnel and low morale due to a poor w age structure and prom otion prospects that had rem ained close to the low w ater m ark since the cessation of hostilities in

^ 45. Training activities w ere considered infrequent and lacking in professionalism and needing reorientation on m odem scientific lines andinterac-similar technical establishm ents in India and abroad. "Hie NPC team thus stressed the fact that the Dockyard was lacking in discharge s several im portant functions of m anagem ent, viz., process planning and estim ating, production control, work study, da ta processing and a standard cost system - and recom m ended their inclusion in the organisationalstiuct o e and operating procedure of the Dockyard. Accordingly, the orgamsa-tiom l tree of the Dockyard was pruned, cross-cut and revamped and pr

ucticm planning and control departm ent was created in 1964 for i provmg the utilisation of human and material resources and productivi^

or s t u ^ team was also created to systematically study and critica-S m T p T L

‘t.e Dockyard, recommend more efficient twh-

i«nrion°

evaluating defect and repair operations, and

-^ in g .he layout of workshops for im proving their efficiency.

reDairnIn^™‘i!-‘^^^^°‘^°"^'"®"^®‘^ °^3^s2.9-croresteam testhousefoi^

air c o r n o r ^ / ^

steam-driven equipment such as tu rb o -g en era^

ers pu m o-fa'h'

instrument controls and turbine-actuated bio

Tnd c S o I

setting up a modem weapo^

o riy the

(WECORS), which was responsible for

cbmDuters <;pnc«',c

Overhaul of diverse electronic devices,

cal, electronic merhn"

^'splays and their support facilities -

. g

WECORq r . , - ^

y

^

' ’3ulic. The Rs 5 8-crore first phase of

Admiral) A K Chattprii ThcJl

*

Naval Chief, Vice Admira* (

to the concept o f

scientific basis.

’

pment repairs and fault diagnosis o

REINFORCING THE CAISSON / 271

The Other improtant w orkshops set up w ere th e d iesel w o rk sh o p fo r testingand repairing high-speed diesel en gines an d thus in d ig e n isin g th eir maintenance, a steel fabrication shop for m akin g steel ca stin g s fo r the re placement 0/damaged propellers, p ro p eller sh a fts, ju n c tio n b o x e s, cra n k pins,journals,casings,condensers and sw itch g ear u sed o n b o a rd sh ip s and yard craft and a quality control departn:ient to en su re relia b ility o f sh ip board equipment, machinery and w eap on s, to test raw m aterial and sp ares rt eirsuitability for use and to lay d o w n sp ecificatio n s by the p ro cess o f scien tific an aly sis o f sp ares and co m -

ofitsheav^^^^*^

undertook in-house m ain ten an ce and co n stru ctio n

caissons and

equipm ent such as h yd rau lic en gines, boilers,

“anes, davits

8ffes. A rrangem ents w ere also m ad e for the rep air o f oifiereauinmo„t u"

tools, m otors, cap tive g enerators and h au lin g and

^ th^dockyard slaff. Tl,e ta c lio n s of estimating fere-

Supplying a wi-"^ P*'°yjsioning, safekeeping, preserving, accou n ting and 9'ganisationandtl^^c^^

stores and equ ipm ent by the N aval Store

liJied On the basis of th

D istribution C entre w ere fu rther stream -

with the asc'

concepts of logistics and m aterial m anage-

f"da Special suDDf

A dm inistrative S taff College, H yderabad

'1’portance reoui

evolved for handling spare parts o f critical

of other sh in ^ "

o f ships w ithout upsetting the refit sched-

Since resear

required for operations and exercises,

has a dire^f

in m etallurgy and the chem ical sci-

^*ntistof (u p^'

j

on quality control. Dr J.E. Keyston, the C hief

P^®Pare a repn

^^''31 Scientific Service, was requested in 1948-49 to

[^ommendaHn

aspect o f the Dockyards's activities. One o f the

®talIuroicai T

by him was the setting up of a Naval Chennical and

an

(NCML) within the Dockyard premises. Accord-

ScienHf “'c^"^®

1^53 with Dr G.E. Gate o f the Royal

_^ian hJavv ~ ^ ' ^ ‘ce on loan service as the Scientific Adviser to the

' ^'*hir. ({,g

Laboratory was located in a 600-square-metre building

•'^Search

of the Dockyard and was suitably »_quipped to haridle

tn

chemistry, biology, material corrosion and paints

The

indigenise the production o f naval stores,

of

^Tfiade a significant contribution to the operational availa-

^o"upk..

reducing the 'down-tim e' of weaponry and equipment

thrusf

^^stained effort to improve the quality o/compfMients. The mam

^°rro«‘ * activities, however, was on fighting the worst scourge at sea -

J ' o n . Wher; the ship's hull was made of timber, it was protKted from Peri,. j.^'^Sanisms by covering it with a thin layer of copper which had to e

’Cally reinforced by 'recoppering' but when ironcJads were in ro-

/ “ ‘•“ E P R Ifn -T O B L U B V A reR

d u c e d in th s 19tPi

“

4 n t t t ' a y f

“'Ship's =,&arD“ '“ S

marine fouling o rg a n i/ 4 ( S ® '''!'''>

™

c o r r o s io n . W h a tc a n c e r is to t h l h

contributing to enhance

Jic s tr u c tu r e s im m e r s e d in qp

corrosion is to the metal

L ike c a n c e r, c o rro sio n

t

r'^^®^^®''t^eyarestaticormoving.

la te d a re a s. I f it jg n n t ' ? ^ ^ ^°calised o r spread over large and isoin itia te d , c o rro sio n ca , and curative measures not

e ffe cts the sh ip s b vatt*^

im m ersed structure. Corrosion

c o m p o n e n ts, h u t al

“ ^^®'T^3ferhullandmachinery

fixtures and f i t t i n g s w e a p o n systems and ail

TJi0

•

^ “J y paints com a inino"^^"

N C M L w ere the development of heavy

praer to provide hpff,.?

chem icals, n ot a ffected by sea water in

introduction o f 'ealvan- ^*^°^®ction to sh ip s' hulls from corrosion and ih^

c ^ d i c p r o t e c t i ? n t o T h o > ! '^ ^ " ' ^®"*g"ed in its laboratory for providing i^ c a l reaction thaf h i

current to reversethecorrosive

sophisticated techn

P^^ce. The l a b o r a t o r y also devd-

-P s m achinery

sifu w elding and chemical cleaning<J^

, . ^^m lndenenH

a d i s t i n g u i s h e d o f the 1960s the Naval Dockya^'

its

,?^®®'^^ceto theKoyalNavy,Royal

'Varshin

P^'^OSOphy tnw^

n/

sophist^c^f^^^r^'^ce and their n *

the increasing challenge

process sni

®^POns en„jn

*' ^“ *^-around. Since invenfioi^^

for

automation of

attack a "^ P ^ ce of naval opera tions,a>^.

^^otonlytoh^n^ P ® ""'i'v eap o n „

defence leading to even fur^lj

the Naval Dockyard conti^V^

role of t h e S V a ,

it continues to

in

also to p W ^

^ b r ^ r y 9 , 1 9 4 1

s p ir it^ f 'P ’Maintenance and fiti'^ S°f.

Ne> Ujer t h e s u d d 4 n s h ^ S

f a i f j ‘ ° ^ h at Winston Churchill said^^

"o n wi„ , e a r - d o ln

■ ^»ve us the tooif

trails o f vigilancea«J

- and w e will finish the job-

8

THE MEN BEHIND

THE MACHINES

Personnel

^eof thegraveinadequacies the fledglingRoyal Indian

p ^ g o n n ef

‘^f<^rmative years after Independence was the '> n a d e q u ^

s e n io r c a d r e s , a n d s e r io u s im b a la n c e s m i s p g

in

^

M u ch o f th is h a d s t e m m e d fr o m th e p o lic ie s

^

^ e c t o f se r v ic e in th e RIN d u r in g th e d e c a d e s v ir tu a U y a

naw f ^ a v a l fo r c e s , s u c h a s th e y w e r e ,

P B r ita in , w h o s e

oWn °

le d a lm o s t e n tire ly b y B r it is h 0 1 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

another navy of any

'onspa

a r o u n d th e g lo b e , h a d n o

a u th o rity a t a f u tu r e

date

w h ic h m ig h t e v e n r e m o te ly

’ ® " ^ ^ e r o n s h o re w h ic h

Briiuu l^ ^ ^ 'v a n te d w a s a s u b s t a n t ia lb u lk o f m a n ^

p ro b a b ly e x p la in e d

p r o v id e d m o s t e ffe c tiv e

In d ia n o ffic e r s w e re

j

'v a s th e la s t o f th e S e r v ic e s

. i^ i a n Navy o n Inde

Problem that

‘„^ ® ^ °i'ftm en tin to thesailo^^^

Was

®rose fro m th e fact th at the b u lk o ^ _

partition

ala

ainong the Punjabi M u s lim s .

'

P akistan lea

g

large num ber of senior sailors w « " ^ ^ c a t e d Navy,

void in the hierarchical structure of the t

274 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

W hile the im balan ce in the officer cadre caused by the partition of the coiintry w as tided over by resorting to a deliberate policy of borrowing officers fro m the R oyal N av y , particularly in the senior ranks,untilths com paratively ju nior Indian officers could gain the necessary experietice,a crash program m e of recruitm ent and intensive training of sailors was a o undertaken, and w as p articularly aim ed at filling the g a p in Itase™

At the tim eo f partition a b o u t2 1 p e r cent of th eof ficers R IN o p te d fo rP a k ista n b u tin th e c a s e o fsa ilo rsn o le ss t an ^

trar\sferred to the Pak N avy. By 1950, how ever, the °

increasedby 59 percent to 720. In 1955 thebornestreng w

an increase of 39 per cent. By 1960 the borne

® A strength was

i.e. a substantial increase of 43 per cent and by

hemes of recruit'

increased to 1934, i.e., an increase of 39 per

brought in

m ent including direct entry had been initiated and ■ ®

^gfjonswert

adequate num ber of officers into the various branches. i

band's

thus firmly laid for sustaining a personnel cadre that cou

fy^ure.

diverse specialist tasks, ashore and afloat, in the Navy o

.jgj hadbee*’

W ith regard to the strength of sailors which, as sta t

.gj^^ent at '1'

reduced by nearly 50 per cent of the undivided RlN s

t im e o f p a r t it io n ,w a s in c r e a s e d in l9 5 0 b y a b o u t 4 0 p e r c ^

1955

RIN 's complement with the strength being raised to

gjcent,a‘®

sailors' strength had increased to 9 ,6 0 9 , i.e., an in crea se o y,as a*'

in 1960 the sailors' strength was further raised to 12,8

,^933 i£-i^

increase of 33 per cent. In 1965 the sailors' strength

increase of 32 pet cent. Here also a firrn base was progress

r^yitiply^^

the vital sailor structure to meet the increased requirernents o

skills in the different disciplines of an expanding Service.

The training establishments, which had been geared up

^

effective training of a very large number of naval personne '

mendablejob to meet all the commitments for the different bra

had

Services without allowing any fall in standards. By this time the ‘

the

not only made up the steep fall in its officer and sailor cadres

j^^ic,i.e-'

partition of the subcontinent but had also created a sizeable skJH-

^g|{

a nucleus of officers and sailors with considerable experience

^^15

specialisations and subspecialisations and capable of reaching

of proficiency in the various operational, maintenance, logistic

. g.art

support disciplines required to run a viable naval force with sta te-ot*»

equipment, technology and strategic and tactical manoeuvrabil'ty-

T H E M EN BEHIND THE M A C H IN ES / 275

Officers

On August 15,1947 all British officers o f the R IN and its R eserves (R oyal IndlanNavyVoluriteerReserveandRoyallndianNavy R eserve) w ere co m pulsorily retired. They were paid com pensatior\ for the 'lo ss o f ca reer' and were granted full or proportionate pen sion based on the len gth o f service.

As regards fhelndian officers, M uslim s re sid ln g in ln d ia and n on-M uslim s from areas in Pakistan were given the option to elect service w ith eith er o f the two new navies while M uslims from P akistan could only opt for service with the Royal Pakistan Navy and n on-M uslim s residing in India could m e only in the Royal Indian N avy.

British officers released from the RIN w ere invited to volu nteer for l ^ e i n the Armed Forces of India and P akistan and those w ho volun-un*

® Special List of the Royal N avy and w ere placed

(Navv/

control of the D eputy Suprem e Com m ander

ODtlnl*

‘henn to the RIN or RPN . A num ber o f these officers

granted com m issions in the Service on a

oktain thpc^

^ January 1948. In addition, it was decided to

^“nches on?

o^SScommissioned officers and 61 w arrant officers o f all

‘5a stop.gap 3^^

Royal N avy to m eet the m anning requirements

'°^‘ep

expansion of free India's N avy, it was decided

‘^' ^ctrecruif

recruitm ent of Cadets from 24 to 46 and to resort to

thePTvJ^'f^

com m issioned officers in all branches of the Navy.

^5') officers • L

riiJm ber of R oyal N avy and R oyal N avy (Special

resp ectiv ely g on e up to 61 and 8 w ith an out-

loint-Spru'

m ore officers. In ad dition, 33 Specia 1-Entry Cadets,

?'^issionrIS® ‘'^ ^ S -E n try Cadets and 48 D irect-Entry short service

"^“^ficers

recru ited into the N avy. Besides, as m any as

J^urino

^®Puted to undergo variou s courses w ith the Royal N avy.

> » s,v iz r

^“ "O 'ving tw o years, 1951 and 1952, tw o senior appom t-Su perintend ent, N aval D ockyard, Bom bay,

were nationalised, the number

,

reduced to50,initial trainingofjunioroffice

^®'Cadr^^^^“ PP^y3ndSecretariatbrancheswasinitiatedinInd ,

to ll'

Special-Entry Cadets and 66 commissioned

^

P®rn\aneni

branches and 82 ex-Reserve officers were gr

,

Byioco^'^'^'SsionsintheN avy.

i

Thesf.

a n d D e p u t y C o m m , n d e r - i n . C h i e U n t o

I ? " '’ N

a

v

J

r

l

?

N

a

v

a

l

H eadquarters;

'“'ficer i

H eadquarters; D irector of Engineenng,

Officer Educa-

"^'■'^'Charge, Torpedo Antisubm arine School; i-tarr Officer, M

276 / b l u e p r i n t TO BLUEWa TER

C a d e h

' °

asmanyas200Reg»lai-Enl,

c-pr« a„H ■

C a d e ts , 5 0 p erm a n en t regularcommissionedolt

P

sn o rt-se rv ice co m m issio n ed officers were recruited in the ecu iv e. S u p p ly and S ecreta ria t, Engineering, Electrical and Corwtrucloi an c « o f th e N av y . In 1956 the use o f the distinctive colourlace between ran k strip es o f officers o f the Indian N avy worn on their sleeves or ep a u lettes w a s ab o lish ed . (E xecu tiv e - no colour, Supply and Secretariat-w h ite, E n g in eerin g - p u rp le. Electrical - dark green. Education-blue, and S p ecial - ligh t green).

1 9 5 7 p ro m o tio n to t h e r a n k o f C o m m a n d e r w a s on ly b y selection.

In 1958 officers b eca m e eligible for prom otion to this rank by tiine-scaleas w e . S u b stan tiv e L ieu ten an t C om m and ers who had completed 24 yeat^

reck o n able service b efo re attain in g the m inim um age of compulsory m en t and w ho w ere considered fit for prom otion were now p ro m otion to the rank o f C om m and er by tim e-scale. Also, the ex.stinga^

0 1 co m p u lso ry retirem en t, v iz., 45 years, for officers of the rank of ue ant C om m and er w as raised in 1958 to 48 years.

.

.,u ^

there w ere only two Royal N avy officers lert

.

In d ia n N a v y - th eC h ief o f N aval A viation and the D e p u t y D i r e c t o r (Flyi"

at N a v a l H ead q u arters.

vl^ 1959 on the institution o f the schem e for granting honoraty» ^

^ 'g ^ e s s the N aw ab o f Palanpur was the first to uC^‘

m f s s S ? : / ; " L i e u t e n a n t C om m ander in the Navy, oneSer.0rC0^

the h ^ o l S

of Sub-Lieutenant)

petty

O fficers w«P

° Lieutenant on the Active List and

honorary rank o f Commissioned

four Soecial-Fnf

j

recruitm ent of 34 R e g u la r-E n t^ -_

2 7 shortservlrar-*^ Cadets, 12 permanent regular commission

granted

before being recruited into f t xt

screened by a selectionD^ .

the final year while cont^J?^'"^ I

T

Acting Sub-Lieute^j^

candidates were recruited in 195* ^

studies. Under this schenr^®

THE MEN BEHIND THE MACHINES / 277

During the year 37 officers w ere deputed to the U K for u nd ergoin g various courses including those o f Electrical A qu ain tance, C on stru ctor, Advanced Aeronautical Engineering, O bservers, A dvan ced M arine E n gineering, Advanced Armament Inspection, A dvanced A ir Engineering, A ir Eleclricai Engineering, Survey, A tom ic, B acteriological and D am age C on-tol, Air Weapons and Engineering Specialisation, N avigation and D irection and attachment to aircraft carriers and aircraft m anufacturers.

In the course of the next six years, 499 officers com prising 268 R egular N^val A viation C adets, 15 Uni-

^e<^hnical branches, 90 perm anent regular

cruiterf"inf!?tK**Kr^'

short service com m ission officers w ere rerisen to 1 <340 %

strength of officers had

branch

- 921, Engineering Branch - 312, Electrical

andMedical B

h

^®“ ®‘^riat Branch - 237, Instructor Branch - 1 1 7

Ihe Indian

^ii^mber o f officers holding com m issions in

^ ) ^ a s 9 0

” o ‘^fiteer Reserve (IN VR) and Indian N aval Reserve

the new

officers had been deputed to the United Kingdom

^®puted to the

being acquired for the N avy and 24 officers were

to officers of tho

specialist courses. Theaw ards m ade

^'^^shtSeva MpH

^“ ^nprised: 1960 - one Naosena Medal; 1961 - One

^''3 Medals n '*^l^'^®®^'^°^^shishtSeva M edalsC lassII,nvoV ishisht n, One

N aosena M edal; 1962 - three Ashoka Chakras

' ®*^aosena

Ashoka Chakras Class Til,

^dianisaHr,

f

M entions-in-Despatches.

^®^3st British fP °

N avy's officer cadre was completed in 1962 when

Admiral) D.vv

on deputation to the Service - Commodore ( la te r

■ ’■ke. Chief of Naval Aviation - returned to England.

®«'lors

the ces„,.

®®risuspgj^j

of hostilities in August 1945 recruitment o f sailors had

The n f ^^^^*^'^nnberofNavalrecruitmentcampshadbeenclosed

!'^ °Jm en tin l Z

'‘ecru itm ent had been revised and the eligibility for

S ® c ts or ; u? ^^Nhad been restricted to, firstly, Indians who were Bntish o f an Indian State and who were either domiciled m

? ®^'Hsh W

''

Sta tes, secondly, Anglo-Indians who w e re d o ^ c 'Ie d

;° a Was

Indian States, and thirdly, Goans (it will b e recalled ^ a t fc’'

Portuguese at this time) who had taken

Or t £

‘he British N ationality and Status of Aliens rt,

*

0

‘®’y il'0 0 0 b y ju n e l9 4 6 a n d th e p r o c e s s o fd e m o b .h s a ti^ h ^ ^

In the first phase about 6,000 sailore i n c l u d i n g ex-Army pets

ATER

H o s tilitie s O n l

SSr“SHif?ss”:^^

-a‘ S'-"SisSs=»S

5

K Ademobili«,io„

''‘''‘’*=°"’“ l’«neh«and™ .3

S i l

" ’® '^ "'’A l ’o w w '?/ If ™ ' " “P for the sudden loss of ntirly Armourer Pi°“® courses such as

deputed to the UKlo

Detection A

Artificer ? L h- Boafswain,Quarter

'^®*’e also

P a r t M e c h a n i c and Torpedo

®stablishm

The Rr\r i 9 ^^^'^'^^^>ons(specialistquaUficitions)

^i^st?^;"'^,'-eredisbande?lnH ""'

security of shore

ued to

r i ?

Security Corn

replaced by personnel /rom the

T h e re c ru ‘*t

b efore.

A rtificer Apprenticescontln*

* * '^ e o f S S ® ' ‘^°"^akeupfo^^^^^

sailors had soon to be stepped JjP

establiltT^^'^^^'^eputatio^

the personnel strength at the

« ^ e r y /s to r ? r ® " ‘"

t h r i S ^

'^.'•genumbero/sailorstotheKoyal

''"arfare,radarcr.^^^*"®'^ydroeranK*^^^*^*'^^ courses in communication'

®pgineering .

^^'P'vright^•

to r p e d o and antisubmanfl®

;>on-W orthy)^ hp

"marine

technologyandalldisciplineso^

ra n ?

' ^'^o k n o ; : ; " ; j 7 5 ^ ' r a d S . 77,eC.W.(Conun.*'

tion

A‘^^‘*^8Sub T ^ ‘^^"^•dates from m

Yardmen Scheme ■

aviat?

aviat^on“ ‘®"'’" ‘ '" a l l bTan t

"

duties.

several cate^n "^ ® ^ ’ Consequent on the introdUC'

the

‘he t a n n i n . ••

.

*^>'ors were introduced for

improved and henC?

dants. ByP" '•''‘ng and

^°Passes

fo r the 'Dotoey

C o m m u ^ S *r °''^ er to

fo r the sanita-

^*^°^«>lors,vvhohadn"'^.®'«'^arS

recrtiifmenf to the

was resumed. A

cfion tests fo r office^/

T H

E MEN BEHIND TH E M A C H IN ES / 279

were promoted to the C om m issioned R an k (B ran ch L ist), th e n ew n o m e n -

c l i t u r e (or the ershvhile W a rra n t R a n k .

The education tests for ad van cem en t to h ig h er ran ks o r fo r p ro m o tio n to commissioned rank, the Educational T est 1 (E T l) and the H ig h er E d u cation Test (HET) respectively, w ere revised to su it the c h a n ^ n g req u irements of the Navy. In addition, a m od ified test called E d u catio n al T e st 1 -

ETl(M) - was introduced in 1954 for C ooks and S tew ard s for ad v an cem en t lo the rank of Leading Cook and Leading Stew ard . In 1961 the d esig n atio n of Sick-Berth Attendant was changed to Sick -B erth A ssistan t w ith the acronym remaining unaltered - SBA.

Inl963 th en o m en clatu reo fth e C o m m issio n e d R an k (B ran ch L ist) w as changed to tiieSpecial Duties (SD) List and the rules fo r p ro m o tio n to h ig h er ranks for this category of ex -lo w e r-d e ck o ffice rs su i tab ly rev ised to im p ro v e eir career prospects and retirem en t b e n e fits.

By 1965 the annual intake o f Boys had gone up to 800, that o f A rtificer

^prentices raised to 160 and the num ber of direct-entry sailors recruited sr* stepped up to 1500. As m any as 40 sailors were prom oted during

^ ^ ‘'•j'^oniniissioned rank in the Special Duties List and six sailors were Udd? v

of Acting Sub-Lieutenant in the G eneral List under the

mann'

Scheme. A Batch o f 40 sailors w as deputed abroad for

^ g n e w ships being acquired for the N avy.

made to sailors during the period from 1951 to 1965

Good

°"^*^®"dations by the C hief of the N aval Staff, Long Service and Sratuih/ ^ .j*^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Q M ed als w ith or w ithout gratuity (the am ount o f the ServicplS^!,

‘rdtially Rs 25 but was later raised to Rs 100), M eritorious

P*idner ^ ^

w ith or w ithout annuity (initially a sum o f Ks 25 was

®nnumV

33 annuity but this w as also later raised to Rs 100 per of th

^ Chakras Class III and Naosena Medals (NM). The num -

6 awards made are given in Table 8.1

made to sailors from 19S1 fo 1965

°*f'mendniion

LSGC

LSGC

MSMwilh MSM Ashoka

Jnm ihe

without Anrntibj without Chakra Medal

_ ____ Gratuity Gratuity

Amuity Class III

S s T s T - i ----------------------- -

3______ i ---------- 5---------- 6---------- z -

‘

8

;»S4.sa

•

/i

i

1959

•

93

9

-

41

J

1960

■

26 13 - - 3 *

1961

■ ^

28

14

5

*

31

16

3

280 / BLU EPRIN TTO ELU EW A TER

its

. P “y^^®^'^*’'<:'’ ^"='t'ledlheServicetocoi>tinueli.mi,l s u ita h la r .

the follow ing decades and to provide

p erso n n el fo r the n ew acqu isition s of the 1970s and 1980s.

P h asin g out the British Presence

W h e n p a rtitio n cam e o n A u g u st 15, 1947, the Indian Navy was a Service m o st o f w h o se top ech elo n s w ere occupied by British officers with tie ru orm o^^Indian officers. R am Das Katari (later Admiral) beingonlya p tam . T ^ e su d d en , thou gh unavoidable, large-scale retirement or rep^

R a t i o n o f B ritish o ffice rs to their p a re n t Services i n the UK and of MusJ^

allotted to Pakistan to that country, thus left

p

senior levels o f the N avy's hierarchy.

^

”

°

o f the undivided Royal Indian Navy and its

,

officers being granted compensation

re tire m e n t and o ffice rs n o t q u alified for full pension pa>dP

£ r S

Som e o f these British officers who

Forces o f India and Pakistan wer^^;;;

Suprem e

^’®^°f*heR oyalN avyand were placed undertime

R o V alP ak rs't^ '^ T

fo r se rv ice w ith the Royal Indian Navj

ca d re o f o fficers pV^ . " ^ ^ ^ s e o f the persisting acute short g^

j

w h o h ad voluntw rerf^*^

sen ior ran ks, a n um ber of

co n tract b asis fo r

selected for exten d ed service with the

sen ior officers were hn

Jan u ary 1, 1948. The services 0

sen io rm o st appointm em ^yn •'

f ^ f " t^e Roya^

R oy al N a v y personnel I '" '^ ® P ® " ^ e n H n d ia 's N a v y , the totalnui^^ ^

officers and 61 w T r^ n t ^ f ^ s ) .

tt'e G o v e m m iit S'in d fa to

Admiral J.T S . Hall, RN was select®^!^*’,.

Royal Indian Navy and was

'^®‘^°'^^tituteindependentl'\

Royal Indiar, Nav^ (TOCrtm?

O

f f i c e r C o m m a n ^

y I UCRIN), Commodore M.H. St. L. Nott, RN

THE MEN BEHIND THE MACHINES / 281

appointedtheChiefo/Staffat N aval H ead q u arters, th e a p p o in tm e n to fF Ia g O/ficer, Bombay was abolished and C o m m o d o re H .R. In ig o -Jo n es, R N

assumed the duties of C om m odore-in-C harge, B o m bay in lieu. A ll th ese officers belonged to the Special List o f the R oyal N av y (u nd ivid ed R oyal Indian Navy). They were later joined by a few sen io r o fficers on loan fro m the Royal Navy who included C o m m o d ore H.B. E llison , w h o w as ap-pomted the Commodore-in-Charge, C ochin.

of British Officers from the undivided R oyal Indian N a v y post-partition Royal P akistan N avy. O u t o f these became

was prom oted to the rank o f R ear A dm iral and

Havinelatprhf

'cerC om m anding, R oyal P akistan N avy after partition.

o/Sd^err

Besid

R

reacti this rank,

son, the other

C om m odore N ott and C om m odore Elli-

distinctionwerPV-°''

officers w ho served in the Indian N avy w ith

FOCRINfrom V

* Si r G eoffrey Mi les, w ho had ta ken over as the

^eDeputySun

^ ^ ’^^^^■^•^°‘^^''®y'ri^^3rchl946andw asappointed

flater AdrnJrltT-^ Com m ander (N avy) after Independ.ence. Vice-A dm i-

^^rk)M.PizevanH V-

Vice-A dm iral (later Adm iral Sir

four of whom CO

’‘^®'AdmiraI (later A d m iraISirSteph en)S.H .C arliil,aIl

^^58, Conunodn"^ u

N aval C hief in succession betw een 1947 and

and the

"-N .S . Brown, who was the Com m anding O ffic er o f (COMlNS) Cn ° ^ ^ ° ‘^ore Com m anding the Indian N aval Squadron

^dian FIp

(later Rear Admiral) G. Barnard who commanded

'Ending,ir,d’^ v

COM IN S and later RACINS (Rear Admiral Com-

^^®^erRea'j Ad

Com m odore

and Ch-

^onvmodor a

the N aval C hief, C om m odore E G . M cG reg oran d

^°nimodo ^

^

J^y w ho in tu m su cceeded C om m od ore Ellison as C ochin, C om m and er A .j. P etrie H ay and C aptain

^®PtainT p

served as the N aval Secretaiy at N aval H eadquarters;

'^^0 servpH

Captain A.H.F. H unt and C aptain I.F.M. N ew nham

Nf.V.n,v..

Chief of M aterial at N aval H eadquarters; Rear Adm iral

Rear Adm iral F.A .Ballan ceand Rear A dm iralSt. John (Rear

Barna j

R J- Tyrw hitt, Baronet, who succeeded Rear Adm iral

Fleef

^'eet C om m ander designated as Flag O fficer Flotilla, Indian

Servil o

R -Jessel w h ow as the C hief Instructor at the ^ ^ e n c e

n ,

p^StaffColIegeatWelllngtonintheNIIgirisandCaptainH.C.Ranald,

Art ®“^ JE .Sm alIw ood ,C aptain R.H.P. Carverand C om m odore(IaterRear

'^/al) D.W . Kirke w ho held the appointm ent o f C hief o/Na val Avia tion.

All these officers had had adequate experience in

^ h o n and com m and and were inducted into independent India s fledgring

^ a ’'y ,n o h v it h s t a ,

A d m iral S. C arJill in i g L

Chief, took over/ram

, , , .

" " y s in his /I Sailor Remembers,

W ith a few e x c e o f

y e a r s w a s s e r v e d * w !^iI 'k

N a v y o f th e posf-Independence

f ^ a v y - T h is is n a r H r r 1

^^ ^t w e re len t to us by theKoyai

fad t h e S e r v i c e - V i r

o f th e th r e e s e n io r officers lent (o us lo

a f f e r e n t i n h i s o w ' ^ ' ‘" " ’' ' ‘^^ ^^ ariy .P izey an d C arlill.E ach o n ew as

^ 'f f e r e n t p e r s o n a H h T

b o o k in g b a c k , I believe each one's

S e r v ic e a t th e ^iBh^ Si"

^ P ^ c ia l c a p a c itie s w e re projected on to Hi^

f ^ity a n d h i ^ a r i r n ^ ' ^ P d e v e l o p m e n t . P a riy 's balanced pewo' '

immediatepost-Tnri"^^^^^*''® ability w e r e j u s t w h a t w e r e needed in the

^ 8 from the

f h e N

a v y wasstilirecovef-

P 'z ey 's bu bbling

by the mutiny and partiWJ

” ^ P act on the

operational experience had lh«j

P r s o n n e l s t a b i l i t y

a s i t w a s s e t t l i n g d o w r t i n f o s a m e s o r t o I s s i n c e r i t y a n d e p n

o p e r a t i o n a l s k i l l s i n j e c t e d i n t o it.

with theLpirationsof^

* ^ e r i e h t m ^ ^ ' ” ^°^^'‘^^allm enandm alice towa^

d

n n T ^ -

i-f

Navy on its way to

■ '^ds at the apex

^ smooth transition from British

'^ - A dm iral K a (a r t'^ J® ™ ° " a n ty traits o f the three British Chiefso/>W

N s ^ . ' ? d " ‘ ’ ® '- » « a l s o h ^

higher direction of ^

to a r7th

'■^ ^‘zey.

P f^ n t Service and was replafe^

creaf

fo br?*^ “ '^Settled S e ^

excellent job of brinff^S

--P e rie n c i and m atur^

''y *> yrecen tev 2 /PP™ ach to the many problefl^

leadership and understand'

THE MEN BEHIND THE MACHINES / 283

ingguidance to me in m y efforts to sort out the co m p lica ted p erso n n el situation was an im m ense boon to m e. It is p ro b ab ly n o t g en erally known that it was he, som etim e in early 1 9 5 1 ,1 th ink, w h o g av e us the first reports of the Chinese co n stru ctio n o f ^he A ksai C hin R oad.

Having been the Director o f N aval In tellig en ce in the A d m iralty , h e still had contacts in the D epartm ent w hich p assed on this titbit to him .

His successor was an equally experienced officer, b u t their p erso n ali-tiesan d m eth od so ffu n ctio n in g w ereasd ifferen tasch alk fro m ch eese.

Whereas Parry was a tall, angular p erson w ith a m atter-o f-fact, n o -

noi^rwe way of dea 1 ing w ith things, P izey wa s som e w ha t ro tund and rouixl-faced. His enthusiasm and energy o ften left one g rop in g w hen to follow his thinking. H is pas t exp erience m ade h im m ore o f an which was probably the right em phasis to introduce

■ntc this service at that stage

istrati^^^vn*

F ° v id e d a happy mix o f operational and adm in-

”iuchwi?rl'

execution o f his responsibility, displayed

ofhis out' f

"lark ed sincerity. Indeed the latter quality was one

^toconta^

’*^8^^**'‘butes w hich im pressed all w ith w hom he cam e

wnk and i f '

dow nw ards, and endeared him to the

Prime M '°*

So m uch so that w hen Carlill left, it w as at

^’ce-Admir

® initiative that he was given the honorary rank o f

British Ad ^

N avy, a fitting honour to the last o f the

y®ars a fte r ^ d ^ e p '^ nursed the Indian N avy along in its form ative

^^oheldternpn°^^*^^'^^ beaded the N avy's Fleet after Independence - Hall

^^§O fficerC ^^'^‘^^^^8®afterhandingoverto Vice-Adm iral Party as the

^'*®nce and T

Koyal Indian Navy, Brown, Barnard, Dickinson,

p

and Was d*^

Com m odore Brown took over from Rear Admiral

^^“adroi^(QQj^®'|^ated the Com m odore Commanding, Indian N aval besides holding the command of Indian N avy's first

''^vvas; "

com m issioning. Admiral Katari says that though

'^as remarkable how he identified

'ishedarni*"'

aspirations o fh is Indian ship's company and estab-

stem-fa^"^®* rapport with his Ind ian shipmates. He was deceptively

^eservp^iu

an amiable, human person. He thoroughly

'^'^avv d

awarded and it was a pity that the luck of the

®nied him promotion to flag rank in his own service.

M other officerwho had served on the secretarialstaffo/Commodore

284 / BLUEPRINTTOBLUEW ATCR

B r o w n w h e n h e w a s th e S q u a d r o n C o m m a n d e r. re„,inisc«, SO fa r h a d th e e x p e rie n c p o f

no Indianofficerhac

e n tr u s t th e io b tn ^ f 5.® ° / ‘^ ° '" '" 3 "<^>"gacruiser,itwasdecidedic s u ita b le o ffiL r h p

h isn n ico H'

-i, P ’^°y^^'*^^®^^*otie!Thoughnotverytallinhei^,

stah iro

thorough professionalism gave hima

bpfnro ^ .

seen an y other commanding officertoequal,

neith

T h e officers and m en respected and adored him. H«

anH fK^

cheap pop u larity nor was a regressive disciplinawn

e personal exam p le h e set w as high and immaculate. Once, u ring a flag-sh ow in g cru ise along the East African Coast, a local n is ^ o u p invited him and other British oncers in the ship for*jJ

ening s entertainm ent. C om m odore Brown replied: 'It^s either 2

none . The in vitation w as then extended to all officfifS'

n f f

follow ing a s l i g h t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e e r r o r in thesip^

c n n f!' ! T

a letter from a shore authority who, not W

content to p o m to u t the m istake, urged him to 'take necessarydisap res^ o n ^ ^ °" against the persons concerned, to avokl unnecessary ^

ascprf?® ';.® i "

bothering to call his s^ref ^ J

s tn irf'

e ^acts. C om m odore B row n pencilled the follow g tive ac?"

bottom of the offending letter; 'Reply: Internal co

tive action w ill be taken w ith o u t external request Your letter yo u r o w n heading o f unnecessary correspondence.

G e o f S r d a S " ' t

'o

rank of Rear Admiral and w g 'g

tenure as the Fleet C o m m r !l’^^ him self during the entire P®^1° chinS

the highest runo n f

relentlessly pursued the goal 0

.

E n g l a n d ! t S d i ° ' operational efficiency and by the time he r e t u ^

during the annual Commn"''

Exercises off Trinrnmai ^,‘^'^®alih naval exercises known as

staff, recalls,

Rear Admiral Krishan D e v , whoserv

fighting unit and trainM^e'lnd-^^^ Indian Squadron info a

’^^jLctS

of warfare at sea. During th i

Personnel to work together in all a ^ ,

^

Propaganda in P a k is jp

^"®°” "d e p e n d e n ce w h e n in ^ « ^

between the two coun.rieL I "h

deterioration of

t h e MEN BEHIND THE M ACHIN ES / 285

Chief of the Air staff) who attend ed the Fleet E x e rc ise s d u rin g B a iria rd 's p e r i o d as Fleet Com m ander, r e m in is c e n c e s : ' I s p e n t 3 o r 4 da y s in t h e I n d ia n O cean as a guest of Barnard on D elhi. B arn ard w a s a v e ry in sp irin g C o m mander. He hardly left the bridge o f D elhi even th ou gh d u rin g the la st d ay orso he had visibly swollen ankles. H e had am azin g stam in a and the In d ian ratings and officers appeared to adore h im '.'

Heindeed was oneof thebest 'acq u isitio n s' from the R oyal N av y as the Fleet Commander and his conduct o f the F leet exercises and goo d w ill cmises was legendary.

Barnard was succeeded by Rear A dm iral N .V. D ickinson w ho also made his contribution to the m ain tenan ce of a high standard o f Fleet operations. Popularly known as U ncle R ichard, A dm iral D ickinson ran a well-synchronised Fleet with high efficien cy, b o th operation ally and ad-

'I'^tratively. As Admiral Katari describes him , 'H e w as som eth ing of a but very hum an and a good practical seam an .' H e w as a

ceran'

standards in sh ip s' 'tu rn -o u t' (appearance) and

Mnunir"'^ ^h 'ch earned the Indian Fleet high praise from A dm iral during the C oronation C om m onw ealth N aval Review at

™ d , Portsniouth in June 1953.

^llance

to com m and th eFIeet w as R ear A dm iral F. A.

sis on the'^ °

^ specialist gunnery officer and la id considerable em pha-

'^eapons

efficiency o f the ships o f the Fleet as guns were the prim e

'^8 or si

‘he early 1950s and the difference betw een im m obili-

'®'ativeeu

enemy and getting im m obilised or sunk lay on the

efficiency o f the com bating fleets. An Indian contem po-

isabsoluipf

and more gun drills and firings and m ore firings. It

Cruiser n

the gunnery efficiency of theFlfeet, particularly

^odatciri vv

'*

three Hunt class destroyers, Ganga, Gomati and

W r

height with Ballance in com m and.'

^°hn (Rear Admiral Sir St. John) R-J- Tyrw hitt, Bar-

P^®^ededK-

‘^e qualities of the four Fleet Commanders that

thn"^'^''own,Bamard,DickinsonandBallance.Hismamcontrfbu-

*^' >cian a °Pe'^3t>onal efficiency of the Fleet was that he was a m aster d ..^ effectively raised the level o f gunnery and antisubmarine exercises besides having one of the keenest seaman s ^ s

' •no to »

m onitor ship's movements and evolutions wi

u

^'s

' p

^ l

P a^

v c

c ' Z

»r-e

e c

c o

o u

u rs

rse to referring to the radar scan o r o t h e r

or omer navigational

'"^‘'’ativo

®^^ůraged, ships' commanding officers

^ 'd n e s s and the o f f L i v e spirit and he 'hated h a lf-h e a rte d ^ s

‘*>e|ast^

being cbicken-livered.' A befitting fa*'ewe".was accoided

-’^'tish Commander of the Indian Fleet when Admiral Tyrw

286 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

p v e n a rousing cerem onial sen d -o ff at Ballard Pier, Bombay afial,,!,..

l o S ' '

Rear Ad J r a l S u t

. ctober 2 ,1 9 5 6 - a w atershed in the h istory o f the Indian Fleet.

n n

Commodore (later Rear Adtni-

ralj e.odfrey French, a specialist in navigation, had served in the Royal Indian N avy's D irectorate o f T raining during and after World War II as a eputy director from 1944 to 1946 and w as later recalled from retirement lo serveastheIndianNavy'sDeputyCommander-in-Chieffroml953.Hew3S

a o a proficient naval historian and w rote entertainingly on naval life in England and India.

•

acclaimed hero of the M alta and Arctic Convoys, with a Distin-

^113 ed Service Cross and bar, three Mentions-in-Despatches, a DSOand

^ ig h th o o d 1st class of the Order of St. O lav, Captain R i c h a r d Jesselwasa aestroyercaptainofoutstandingdashandbraveryduringWorldWarnand

had served on the Directing Staff o f the Royal Naval Staff College a‘

G re€ n w ich b e fo re b e in g p ick e d u p b y A d m ira lM o u n tb a tte n in l9 5 3 to te 2 cJ

ifo *

tactics to the Indian Services at the Joint

\

P P ? '

as its Chief Instructor (Navy). He was held ^

estepm i

Indian

b

oy a

lil th

ne three wings and

a a

a wh

nol

u e

.

c g e n e

—— « ^

Mm t L i

® > ™ ' ' V ice A d m iral R.K.S. G h an ih j*

th eau th or)w asa student of C ap tain Jessel at th eS taff Collcge="‘'®>^'

S 2 t ’ d » f T ^ ' ° ' ‘^'®">'“ ' " ' ' ' ' ' ' » ‘ a“ ignm entandthosew w W

S'J’nts such as General

structor(Arm ^

(*^^®'"^-'eutenantGeneral)Bhagatas

Force as C h -'f t

andbravebanr;TvI^"l‘°^

^ven am ongst such a dist.nr^^jf

course;or the offirp^^

^ ‘ whether it was

^-the

battle of the

”)®®®°' ‘*^®syndicateroomwhentecou

,j

single t\ote in front of him*^

before a huge chart

liHle stories

^^‘'dents and I well retnermber^Js

comments on our e x p r ' r - w h e n we would rush

?>1 aspired to get the thr?,*'

''

com m ented very lij'l® “ gjnd

W e e d ) - the L s

w “ " “Sic letters, from h im - VGI (Ve^ >

t e u ^ t us to be bold a ”d ^ “?

exercises, the b e tte r 't

w

l"">seif

, g

e

m

l

i

n

os the offen sive spitH " ' ‘’“S"

core.

Commodore M.H.c» T v,

THE MEN BEHIND THE MACHINES / 287

1928and had commanded four R IN ship s, Ram dns, In vestigator, P an sy and M ada,had served in naval training establishm en ts and as N aval 0/ficer-in-Oiarge in Karachi, Staff O fficer (Plans) at N aval H eadquarters and C hief Staff Officer to the Flag Officer Bom bay during W orld W ar II. H e had also drawn up detailed plans for the sea-borne assaults w hich led to the im m oMisation of the Persian N avy and the capture o f Bandar A bbas and the Gerrjanand Italian ships sheltered there during the w ar, his 'm asterm ind-Z S n S !

w inning him an OBE and a

lishmeniiin?,

P^ftiHon cam e, having lost the N aval estab-

trainlne esfabli^r

for independent India's navy to develop new

e x p e r i e n c e “

and hence N ott, with his varied

Charw Cochin i

n

t

h

e

N aval Officer-in-

twinJnebase wuv,-

c

developing the establishm ent as a com bined

as the Chief n K f

he was shifted to Naval Headquarters

Commanding Ro"

Plarmineabr{an^^^‘

N avy where his m ost im portant task was

^ott acDlip?

independent India.

®'’®rgyandh^ circr!'^ ^ i‘^

indefatigable keenness and

)''*^niasterlvevno u

bore fruit in the shape of plans prepared

^8 its fleet intn X k i

erudition which led to the Indian Navy evolv-

decade

yet formidable force at sea in South East Asia

thrash off C nrc^'

tragically killed in an

"48,

while proceeding to the UK on deputation in March

11% a few of

British officers who served in the Indian Navy,

‘^ ' ‘Contribution

^ mention here, Vice-Admiral M.P. Awati lauds

Progress J !

essentially a beneficial association, p ie slow

'Nation of •»

Indianisa tion has helped the Navy to lay a firm foun-

^0 new * ^^*^^'ninganddiscipline.Theswilchfromtheo]dtraditions

‘i^at

a'm o st im perceptible, so imperceptible in fact

Were a

believe that things were always done the way they

from '/‘ V^dition is as im portant to a fighting Service when m ovjng is Drn'o‘°

form at to a n ew ord eras m other's milk is foa child which

eithp:‘’?'®^‘" 8 from being a craw ler to becoming a toddler. Bereft o/

Pahu'

Service or the child would grow up ill-founded and inca

288 / BLUEPRIN T TO BLUEWATER

th e S e rv ic e h o ld in g fa st th rou gh the vicissitudes of the post-pattit y e a rs, th a n k s to v^'hat h ad b een so well-imbibed from a very wortl m e n to r.'

R ein fo rcin g the Sinew s of War - Training

T h e p a rtitio n o f the su b co n tin en t left very few

th e tru n cate d R o y a l In d ian N av y and the severance of the R o y ^ ^

ap ro n strin g s, to w h ich the R IN had been tied for near y cen tu ries, m ad e it im p erativ e for independent India s

® ^

in d ig en ise exp ed itio u sly all operational trairiing bot or o o rs, secon d ly, to exp an d and update the training faci 1 1

train in g establish m en ts and, thirdly, to set up new training

in disciplines w h ich had n ot so far been catered for.

functioi»«8

A D irectorate o f N aval T raining and E d u c a ti^ nVectoratenoto>’^y atN a v a l H eadquarters, N ew Delhi since Ju ly 1943. This i

planned the con tents and schedules for the vanous

^ oversaw

the n aval training establishm ents and training ships u

inl948tl'®

m onitored the progress of the courses by these

D irectorateh ad b een split into two directorates, the Direc

and Training and the D irectorate o f Education. In 1952 a s

jj,eapP°^*

ate of Training started functioning at N aval H ead q u ar^ rs

j ^ n i s

m ent of Com m odore Superintendent, IN Training Es a

abolished.

.

entsatKa^^ ,

C on seq u en t on theloss of the B o y 's training esta b lish ^

Bahadur and Dilawar, to Pakistan in 1947, a temporary t r a i ^ g .

w as set up at Akbar, Bom bay and shifted to Circars at Visna D

e c e m

b e r 1947. T h e t r a i n i n g s c h o o l s a t C o c h i n , v i z . , the o

Sch o o l, the A ntisu bm arine School (the last h avin g been set Ind ep en d en ce), the Su pply and Secretariat Sch ool and

the m ech an ical train in gestablish m en t at Lon av ala, Shivajh

Sch ool at Jarr\nagar,Vafst(ra, w ere found to b e totally inadeq^a ®

taking the trairung com m itm ents of free In d ia's fledgling but fas'-

inR N av y . In addition, it w as felt necessary to discontinue depu trainees to Royal N avy establishm ents for basic and specialist train b

to initiate the creation of training facilities for officers in India.

jied

A3 regards the training of officers, the num ber o f cadets

.rfy

annually w as increased from the pre-Independence figure o f 24 to double that figure to 46 each in 1948 and 1949 and to 47 in 1950

j jji

deputing 21 cadets to the Royal N aval C ollege at D artm outh in Engl3t'‘‘

THE MEN BEHIND THE MACHINES / 289

1948and 25 in 1949. In order to m ake up the acu te sh o rtag e in the v ariou s cadres of officers caused by the partition o f the su b co n tin en t and the consequent resignation, retirem ent and rep atriatio n o f British o ficers o f the RIN, a scheme was introduced for the recru itm en t o f o fficers o n sh o rt sereice commission of seven years' d u ration and som e o f the officers w ho had been released earlier were recalled.

The first experiments in inter-Service basic training o f officers in India Pre-C adet C olleg e (ISP C C ) at N o w g o n g an d

N C O s o f the Arm y, N avy and A ir Force

cadets

ion-commU«'^ applicants for com m issions, both from civil life and from boards to en'su^^fh

forces, w ho w ere screened by selection

and course conTo

^'^^f^bility for m ilitary service. The training schedule

f ' e l d C r a f t b a s e d on that im parted at the H ighland The exo"

of the'^thr^^^c^^

ISPCC had been w atched with interest by

*^®fnorial Comm'tt

Chairm an of the Indian N ational W ar

^''rtvnander-in-rh-^^ fie ld M arshal Sir C laude A uchinleck, the then Memorial, theestahi;

Services, later recom m ended, as a W ar

®^^ices. The Dm

'* ‘ ‘^®^^°^^'^-Academy to train officers of a 11 the three

® ^ommi'ttep"°^* *

^‘^cepted by the G overnor General-in-Council

®"0uld be equival

exam ine the project in detail, advised that it

^'^"ools Were to

degree In arts or science and that residential

The partition

as feeders to the Academy.

and the Ch° f

^“ ^f^ontinent delayed the implementation o f the

^ ‘^terimmea.

Staff C om m ittee suggested, as an experimental

**nent Town t^ '

up of a Junior Inter-Service Wing (ISW) at

at Kh H

planning for the Indian National War

'lister's (;^Q ^ ^ k v asla, Pune proceeded. In January 1948 the Defence piJary

^^tteeapproved of this. The ISW was to start functioningin

/'^'ned the i^r?'

Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun to be

^® ^Forroc

was to form the National War Academy or

'

later th

^ ”^y-

V V i n c f c h a n g e s in nom enclature. W hat started as the Infer-F o rrf A

^ b ecam e know n as the Joint Services W ing QSW). T^e

K*^*ary Wjr,

becam e the N ational Defence Academ y and the

Dun

‘he Indian M ilitary Academ y which ren ^ rx ed a t

Vasia

• 'vhile the N ational D efence Academ y w as moved to Khadak-

^SW training w as to encourage c o - o p e r a t i o n between the j

adm inistration which had, for various reaM /

^•'lered inadequate. If w as hoped that those who spent two orm ore

290 / BLUEPRIN T TO BLUEWATER

o f t h e ir f o r m a t iv e y e a r s a s C a d e ts in an inter-service atmosphere,bavinj b e e n tr a in e d t o g e th e r a n d fo rm e d a ss o c ia tio n s overlapping iheboundaiijs o f th e d iff e r e n t S e r v ic e s , v/ould, w h e n th ey becam e senior officers,meel e a c h o th e r in s ta ff c o n fe r e n c e s a n d o th e r com m on platforms in an stmo|-

p h e r e o f g r e a te r u n d e r s ta n d in g th a n th o se w h o had seenandknowt\Me o f e a c h o th er b e fo re.

.

E n tr a n c e to th e IS W w a s to b e th ro u g h a "

th e U n io n P u b lic S e r v ic e C o m m is s io n fo llo w ed b y ^ . cgfviceaivl S e rv ic e s S e le c tio n B o a rd s . A t th a t tim e th e N av y was

‘

fo r a m o n th after th ey jo in ed , the N aval

^^uedtothlsday.

th e n s w itc h e d o v e r to th e c o m m o n u n ifo rm w h ic n a

. .g . jp j, formed

T h e in a u g u r a tio n c e r e m o n y o f the ISW in Januap/

anetided,

b y S a r d a r V a lla b h b h a i P a te l, th e th e n H o m e a m o n g s t o th e r s ,b y th e th ree C h ie fs o f S ta ff,

A

G e n e ra l K .M . C a ria p p a a n d A ir M a rsh a l Sir T h om as E

T h e in ter-Service seniority, h ow ever, as is

the senld

ch an ge w h en , on Jan u ary 26, 1950, the Indian

r V

Service and the N av y occupied the m iddle berth.

^as

F or the first few courses, the duration o f training

years on com pletion of w hich the Arm y Cadets

gs Cade*® •

C adets w ere sent to the U K for further training ro>‘ o ^

a

the Air Force Cadets proceeded to the Air

.. p n K

^

N aval C adets of the First C ourse proceeded to

training as Cadets in the Royal N avy's ships and ®sta

X

1951. They returned to India in April 1952 and joined ^ '

Midsh'P’^®^'

m a n T ra in in g S h ip ,in M a y 1952. This was the first

gjght

training w as being conducted in India. After connple ‘ ^

training on board the Tir and another eight m onths on

-nirimisS'O^ 4

these officers against proceeded to the UK where they

, prof®®^'

on Septem ber 1 ,1 9 5 3 and underwent their 9ub-Lieutenan

training of 16 m onths' duration.

three

T h e 4th C ou rse (1st C ou rse JSW ) w as the first to spend

.g^Qted*®

th e JS W , out of w h ich the first four term s lasting tw o years

. jraii'^^'

com m on training and the last tw o terms lasting one year on na

^ad®*®

C adets of this course then joined the Tir for six m onths' training follow ed by six m on ths' training as M idshipm en. Thereafter

-gjithS

m en w ere trarksferred to other ships for further sea training for s>x and then proceeded to the UK for 18 m onths' professional training 3

Lieutenants.

jg,

This w as the last batch to proceed to the UK for, w ith the 5th the entire training syllabi were covered in India - as C adets, Midsh’p and Sub-Lieutenants - w ith the duration of Sub-Lieutenant's training

t h e MEN BEHIND THE MACHINES / 291

.

„npvear Thus

19=54-55, the en tire train in g co m m itm en ts fro m

D efen ce A c a d .m y to ,h e p ro fess.o n al

M » « o u rs e s f l the various training e stab lish m en ts w ere b ein g m et b y te J a n N a v / s training ships and estab lish m en ts an d

the d ^ u W -

lion of officers to the UK for undergoing basic co u rses w as d 's c ° n t m u ^ .

Besides, the duration of the course co n d u cted at the N D A had b een m creased to three years, that of M idship m en reduced from 16 m on th s to U

months and the time as Acting Su b-L ieu ten an t reduced to one year.

The National Defence Academ y w as shifted to K hadakvasla in Jan u ary 1955 withMajor General E. H abibullah con tinu in g as its C om m and ant and with Shri Morarji Desai, the then C hief M inister o f Bom bay, taking t ^

salute at the colourful inaugural parade. T h e 8th C ourse C adets c o m p le t e iheir training for the sixth term and w ere the first course to pass out o f t e Academy at Khadakvasla in June 1955 w hen Prim e M inister Jaw aharial Nehru took the salute at the passing out parade. The pattern o f sea training of these officers remained the sam e, i.e., six m onths' training as C adet a sw months' as Midshipmen on board the Tir, three m onths on board the

^^other three m onths on other ships o f the Fleet.

®

P ^ t t e m

o f t r a i n i n g r e m

a i n e d u

n c h a n g e d

u

n t i l J a n u

a r y 1974 w en

sot S fh ° " ^ of sea training for M idshipm en was reduced from one year to D During the early 1960s it w as realised that the turnover o f the N ation al

of ap p ro xim ately 40 N av al C ad ets every six m o n tfe

<3ecidp"°*

requ irem ents o f the expan d ing Service a r ^

■ntrorir °

acad em y for train in g N ava! C ad ets at oc m -

- " T scheme® Accordingly a Naval Academ y

Adm;

at Cochin in January 1969 with ^omrriander (

Of r ?

^^"^das as its first Officer-in-Charge. The first ba tch o f Cadets A drJLu ?^^-'y completed its training in December I f 0 when Rea C o ^ ‘

Vice-Admiral) V.A. Kam ath, who

" S L at

passij|^"^'"8 ‘he Southern Naval Area at that time, took the salute a to shift the Academy to Goa

n

^ training institu tion of its kmd

j^ e search, a

suitahii

available at C ochin. H ow ever, after a

at

Ezhiniai

for perm anently locating the

jioning in the middecided to use two ships f ° ' o t h e r as the Midsu-one as the C adets' Training s p

g e a training

for the

only ship that

This was done to remove congestion

292 / b l u e p r i n t TO BLUEWATER

E W tr ir al P

Ju b ile e T ech n ica l Institu te, Bombay fora degreecomseir

fa rtn

'^h’f arran gem en t, however, proved to be unsafe

c . '

h^^ce an E n g in eerin g and Electrical College was started al u n iv aji m 1 9 5 7 as a p e rm a n e n t m easu re for trainingin these two disciplines, c ((

to the p artitio n o f the sub-continent, the Defence Services

ta f C o lle g e a t Q u etta w en t to P akistan and hence the requirement was im rn ed iately felt for settin g up a sim ilar institution in India. It was thus ihai In d ia 's D efen ce S erv ices Sta ff C olleg e w as set up in 1 9 4 8 at Wellingtoninthe N ilg iris w ith M ajo r G en eral (later Lieutenant G e n e r a l ) Joe Lentaigne as its first C o m m a n d a n t and B rig ad ier (later Lieutenant General] ShivD. Vemia as Its first C h ief In stru cto r. T h e first course, of six months' durationa™

con d u cted du ring the period 1948-49, had a strength of 5 0 officers includirg tw o fro m the Indian N avy , Lieu ten ant (later Commodore)

L

Lieutenant (later C om m and er) R. Aibara. It m ust be mentioned here ee officers o f this cou rse later rose to the top rungs in Services - G eneral T .N .R a in a , G eneral O.P. Malhotra and Air Chief Ma rf. M oolgavkar.

,

In 1958 specialist courses, better know n in the Navy as

w h ich h ad so far been held in the UK started being conducted inlnd^-

p u r s e s required a thorough study o f the m odem equipm ent

^

detailed know ledge o f the subjects and hence

instructional staff, which was

shiM

* equipm ent installed in the training s c h o o l s and

T o ro ert^

® N avigation and Direction Course (ND)

, 0 ,

theToncr

Antisubm arine Course (TAB) were started in

the mid IQi^nc '

The o t h e r m a j o r c o u r s e s star

Physical T r a in ^ t"

Supply and Secretariat Advanced C o u r s e (

M

D e

i t

v eo

m r

g o

l

Cog

o y

m C

s o

eůr

D s

^e ?M iM

^ ^ ® ' ' ’83tionCourse(N )andDe

" . S . ? o ’S S ^ C o " S ' r ” " ’’' *

Commissioned

G>mner a o r p S r a „ d ^ ; , ^ G x n n e , t o u ^ . C o m m i s s < O m c «

Course, C om m issioned f l « "

t h e MEN BEHIND THE M ACHIN ES / 293

^ in India in c lu d e d th o s e f o r G u n n e r y I n s t r u c t o r s , G u n M

Ratines. R a d a r C o n tr o lle r s , Q u a r t e r A r m o u r e r s , T o r p e d o a r i d A n tisub m arin e In stru c to rs, U n d e r w a t e r C o n t r o l l e r s , ons,Plotting Radar In s tru c to rs , R a d a r P lo tte r s , Q u a r t e r m a s t e r s a n d D iv e r s .

About this time the Ordnance Branch o f the N av y m erged w ith the gineering Branch. Officers of the O rdnance Bran ch w ere g iv en co n v ersio n courses in marine engineering w hile O rd n an ce A rtificers w ere ^ v e n c o ^

version courses to qualify for E ngine-R oom A rtificers or Electrical A rtificers.

Because of the non-availability of specialised equ ip m en t and trained instructionalstaff, however, officers had to b e depu ted to the U K for certain other courses, viz.. Constructor's C ou rse, O bserv er's C ou rse fo r aviators.

Advanced Marine Engineering C ourse, A dvanced A rm am ent Inspection Course, Advanced Aeronautical Engineering C ourse, A dvanced Air Engi-

■iseringCourse, Long H ydrographic Survey C ourse and the A tom ic, Bacte-Dam age Course.

y ,\!*^''^^*^3tchofEngineerOfficers trained at the Engineering and Elecl^wicollege at Shivaji, Lonavala, passed out in 1961 and w ith that an a/ffW

er was provided to the N avy's technical officers, besides totally indi-gemsmg their training.

..

com m encem ent of indigenisation of officers and sail

intrai ‘"'"8-severalforeign naviessou ghtth eassiStan ceofth eInd ianN avy basicrn'

'■ Pei'sonnel. The cou rses con ducted included n ot on ly the at all

officers and sailors but also technical and specialist c u r s e s

-^o^^tries from Asia and A frica w ho deputed heir

Ecv

w ere Burm a, Sri Lanka, Indonesia,

J'W opia, G hana,Sudan, M auritius and Nigeria.

Gu^ '

f or the officers from these countries included tfie Long

Hydrot,

^ °ng N avigation and Direction Course a

^ •

^“^^raphic Course

,

period a num ber o f *nter-Service coun.es

thp u

courses conducted by the Navy for t e o le

Antisubmarine Course for lAF o n ce rs

the

Cochin,

of Military Engi-

neerK® y®«:^ical Staff Officers Course at

Courses for

Kirkee, to the Gunnery School a tC oc

.^ ^ rt ^u^ation for

^'^'lent

personnel, Techiiical Cour

Wellington,

coursg,.

of the Defence Services, Staff

COursp“ ^ ^ ”^®Warfareasa partof th e lA F s I^ Naval personnel were the B o m k

^ ^ f ' d u c t e d b y t h e o t h e r t w

o S e r v i M

s f o

n i v i n g I n s t r u c t o r C

o u r s e

294 / b l u e p r in t TO BLUEWATER

I n f a n t ^ M how , for o n c e r s u ndergoing the Long Gunnery Course.

rin/-t • 1

establish m en ts and schools opened during the pe-

n o d m cluded the S u p p ly and Secretariat School at H am h, Bombay in No-vemDer 1953, the T actical School at Vmduruthxj, Cochin in October 1954,the new

ectrical Sch oo l a t V akura, Jam n agar in 1955, the Torpedo and Anti-

^ S c h

1956an d theSignal School at

F or som e tim e the n ecessity w as being felt for bringing out a thought-p r o ^ k in g m agazine in the Indian N avy on the lines of [he MilitmjDiinl M

fill this g a p ,a biannual magazine called the

i^ av alD i^ atch w as started in February 1957 with the specific objectiveofen-couraging thought and discussion on such subjects as strategy, nava operations, staff w ork, adm inistration, organisation, co m m a n d ,dis plme, education, naval history and other disciplines affecting the opera-nonal and m aintenance efficiency o f the Navy.

^

riPc cl, V

Periodical, the Vanina, containing articles, poems,

3fid reports on goodw ill cruises and exercises

" ‘

published biannually early in the 1950s.

. .059

ine

^^‘ ^y^^°Sraphic Training Unitat/in^re,Bombayforcond'<

Unit

« Basic and D iv isionalT ra'

W c h a ^ T t

of ‘he Supply a n d Secr^^^J

Sick-Berth A t t ^ n S f

authorised training establishm

C 0 T , l \ N T O S i ' V f

N aval W in g o f the National O "

Regular p r e io i^ m -r '°

? ^ " ‘*

^ ^det Corps (S C O was activ^^^

to be conducted at

refresher courses for the NCC Cadets

camps for both Senior and^Iunin^*!?’" -

combined annual [ti

Vishakhapatnam and ia ^

W

i n g U

n i t s at Bombay/^

vid ed ad equ ateexp o su rer^ P '

within their respective

'Qjng

training at these places

the officers and cadets underg

M adras, theaijt’ ?[

boys from schools, wishing to

ambition.TheN avy provided t h l ?

c^a

traming of SCC Cadets on board na vaTshio/^^*'

betw een Bom bay and Cochin.

during the passage of the F

THE MEN BEHIND THE M ACHIN ES / 295

In 1960 a 16-mm film, entitled F ire-fig h tin g at Sea, w as p ro d u ce d by the fjimsDivisionof the Ministry o f In fo rm ation and B ro ad castin g . T h e o b je c t of the film was to demonstrate the co rrect tech n iq u es o f fire -fig h tin g o n board ships with particular em phasis on first-aid and th e ap p lia n ces u sed iniheNavy and their m aintenance. T h e film s D iv iso n later p ro d u ced tw o more films entitled Damage C ontrol on board a S hip and A sa ilo r in the M a kin g depicdng the damage control organ isation, eq u ip m en t, etc., on board a ship and hfeon board a ship at sea respectively. T h e A rm ed F orced s F ilm and produced a num ber o f film strips for train in g in the N avy.

Venduruih

^ Petty O fficers' Lead ership S ch oo l w as set up at

19fil thic

for im parting training in leadersh ip to sen io r sailors. In

sioned as

^ ^ "^ ck s, K ozhikod e and co m m is-

shiftedfrom B V

year the H y drograp hic T raining U nit w as

shifted toCnim!

Cochin. The Petty O fficers' Leadership Sch ool w as

"'asamaleamatoH

^2,1965. O n Sep tem ber 1 8 ,1 9 6 5 this school

^^ftandEneinp

D etachm ent, the R ifle R ange and th eA ir-

^ecause ofVh Ůnit at Sulur w ith the pew nom encla tu re, A grani.

'Sfs selected fnr ^

scientific background o f C adet-En try o/fi-

°fficers to the

courses, it w as decided in 1962 to depute such

' 'aslaterchaneeH t'^ !

Armament Studies (IA S), w hose nom enclature

® l^aval ScIp

^ '''^ 3m en tT ech n o Io gy {IA T )/ atK irk ee

'^' 3tionbefore ^

O ^entation C ourse (N SO C ) o f about 22 w eek s'

Wurses' in

^ en du m thy, C och in fo r undergoing the 'long

Direction, Gunnery, Torpedo, A ntisubm arine

'^^ationof Lon^

^o^^sequent to the introduction o f this course the

^cholastij. s u b i e ^ f s u i t a b l y reduced by deleting instruction in

^ ^®fiards^ ^ previously covered during these courses.

i^®ntsinifjgj^

soon after independence, the training establish

- ^ecoujgg^.

specialist courses for junior sailors at Cochin.

^adar. Plotting, Radar Control, G unneiy,

Writers A

^ ^ '^ “ '^j^^ation. Aircraft Artificers, Leading Patrolm en

^'^ationai

standardise the conduct o f

^‘^Test

senior and junior sailors - the Higher Educa-

’^®‘^culatl«

^"3d been officially r ecognised as equivalent to the

^ 6X3711171 n

___ ] _1- •

J

>>»«rvl»vl^cetrtr^O/^

and

which qualified sailors for'commissioned

^' °'»iotinn *

Test 1 (ET 1) which qualified junior sailors for

.

Soon tu

.

®^attii

specialist courses for senior sailors were also intro-

5 '^®*'*o^strainingschoolsat Vendumlhy. By 1952 an Atomic, Bac-

^^•ors J

Chemical Damage Control (ABCD) School for officers and

^ ® v la

Shivaji, the mechanical training establishment at

' ™ch had already been conducting mechanical and marine engi-

296 / b l u e p r in t TO BLUEWATER

sh

^ ^ ^ ^ e n c e d . Referencelibraries weresetupin

all ^ -- -

a ishm ents and a com pu lsory Hindi test was introduced for

all Serv ice personnel.

In 1953 n ew courses w ere started at Cochin for Torpedo and Antisubm arine sai ors and N av igato r's Y eom en and, for the first time in India, five sai ors undertook the qualifying course for prom otion to the rank of Comm issioned Boatsw ain.

In N ovem ber 1953 th eS u p p ly a n d Secretariat School was shifted from

•

at M arve, Bom bay and construction was commenced for

tne Torpedo and A ntisubm arine School and the Tactical School at Cochin.

_

During the course o f the next five yea rs, the Torpedo and Anlisubma-

^ e School (1956), the Tactical School (1954), the Signal School (1958), the Diving School (1958) had also started functioning at Cochin and courses schools for Gunnery Instructors, Gun Laye'S'

tnr

Arm ourer, Torpedo and Antisubmarine InstwC'

■ D ppn?

Control, Underw ater W eapon, Radar Plotting Instruct*-

at

Diver sa ilors. The new Electrical

In 1 9 ^ '’''

‘he ‘raining of officers as well as sailo^

both basic and^L^ianredTt^tlt^w^

undergo courses in

jeeling.

~

^'m^i'ayan Mountaineering Institute,

INS Shivaji

converted (he ^hradr"*^

illustrious sons of India wlw

above sea level and on lv«i-:i '

situated at a height of 630

.

resort, Lonavla,has b e L the oTmoT

^^aharashtra's pop“ '^/ J s

J^gmeering branch for s e v e r a T d e c ilf

depictsahand,ho!dinga mallet r u S

®

of engineering personnel at sea witKTthpV’

signifying the/

work) below it.

°8o Kannasti Kaiishalam fski'*

™ s M e c h a n ic , Training E s „ b ,is h „ e n ., , s i,

referred .0 earlier.

t h e MEN BEHIND THE M ACH IN ES / 297

to rammand the establishment was C aptain (later

? 9 5 0 ^ s

who took over from his British p red ecesso r o n Ja n u a ty 2 6 1950.

training establishment was entrusted w ith im p artin g tech n ical train in g S to k e r s ,Mechanics, Boys, A rtificers and sen io r sailo rs su ch as L e a d in g an Petty Officer Mechanics and M ech anician s.

.

During the period from 1950 to 1965 the a v erag e n u m b er o f A rtificer Apprentices recruited annually varied from 4 8 to 90; besid es 66 A rtificer Apprentices from the Sri Lankan N av y and 15 fro m the In d o n esian N a v y underwent training at Shivaji.

The Atomic, Bacteriological, C hem ical and D am ag e C on trol (A BC D ) School started in 1952 at Shivaji w as assign ed the n om en clatu re in

November 1953. From a m odest begin ning m ade w ith a few firetrays and jiand-hpJd fire-Tighting appliances, the A BC D Sch ool p ro g ressively g rew

^to a self-contained specialist o rgan isation for im parting training in fire-Qf ft “

^ n ia g e control to N aval personnel and on occasion s, to th ose anH f

Services. The first course for officers w as con d u cted in 1954

*°rsailors in 1955. About a decade a fter its establishm en t th isin stitu tio n

^ o w n as the N uclear, Bacteriological, C hem ical, D am age 1

Fire-Fighting (N BCD) School.

^ S V a ls u ra

•^^l

electrical e q u ip m en t w ere lo o k ed a fte r b y p erso n -

to the d

B ran ch o n b o a rd sh ip s o f the R lN . H o w e v e r, ow irig installation o f several electrical and electronic

e l e c t r i c - , W a r , it had becom e necessary to establish a separate resolution

^ b se q u e n tly , as m ore and m ore m odem ships w ithh igh-

Asdics vj-

sophisticated w eapons, w eapon control system s,

the T o rp ed o

all

for tbe m ain ten an ce o f to rp ed o es, d ep th -ch arg es

'^'hed i n T

electrical eq u ip m en t and a T o rp ed o S ch o o l w as estab -

War

B

o m

b a y o n D e c e m b e r 2 8 ,1 9 4 1 .

and paucity o f space in the D ock yard n e c e s s ita te a

Tan J

suitable site for this school. H is H ighn ess Sh ri D ig v ijay

^^0 0 ] at f t '

Jam sahib o f N aw anag ar, donated the land for the

*'®'*'edtVioTv^*'

Jam nagar, and built the training block w h ic was

•^ent w a, ^'Svijay Block. It was on A ugust 15,1942 that the new estab. ish-Vflisura.

. ,

.

® considerably large quantum of f

ceqiijpm entw asacquiredfortheN avyandthisestabhshitientw as

298 / b l u e p r i n t TO BLUEWATER

aiK

Tame

iIT ^

‘

stone of which was laid by flu

Ja m s a l^ b o n N o v e m b e r 15, 1952, w as inaugurated in April 1955.

_

W h ile th e c o u rse s ro n d u cte d at Valsiira during the 1940s were essentia lly u tilita ria n in n a tu re and co n cep t, the vast technological advances m a d e d u rin g th e la te r y ea rs m ad e it im perative to reorient the training co u rse s . O v e r th e n e x t ^A'0 d ecad es all courses for officers and sailors were In d ia n ise d and n o n eed w as felt for depu ting electrical personnei abroad foi tra in in g in e le c trica l o r electro n ic technology. Several trainees from Nigeria, G h a n a , M a u ritiu s, Sri L an k a, S u d an , M alaysia, Bangladesh, Iraq and bn w e re a lso train ed a t this establish m en t.

INS H am la

O rig in ally H am la co m p rised fou r establishm ents InH ian a n d B ritis h w in g s re s p e c tiv e ly o f the C om bined (Amp '

p ra tio n sT ra in in g C en tres a tM a la d ,B o m b a y a n d twosimilarcentre

/at M alir, K arach i and H am la II a t V ersova, Bombay. On January '

jj

th ese estab lish m en ts w ere am algam ated into one e s t a b l i s h m e n t ,

. tie s w ere

^ e n the h o s tilitie s ended all C om bined O perations

‘^ o n

term inated and the e sta b lish m e n t v irtu a lly went into

T a n u a ry 6 ,1 9 5 4 ,th is e s ta b lis h m e n tb e c a m e th e tr a in in g e s ta >s j^cook'

Sup ply and Secretariat Branch w hen the Supply and Secretaria

to

ery Sch ool w as shifted from its tem porary accommodation

.

itraini^8

T h e establishm ent w as m ade responsible for the

soch

' ?AT

Supply and Secretariat and Domestic branc

W riters, Store A ssistants, Stew ards, C ooks, Topasses and

, .grtranS'

A ttendants; the training responsibilities o f the last branch

' ^nduc‘

erred to Asvtr ia t Bom bay. An added assignm ent for Hamla w ss Supply and Secretariat Advanced Course, for which

i 0 -

erto been deputed to the United Kingdom , which was commence

Torpedo Antisubmarine School

^

With the development of ihe offensive capabilily of submarines d“'“lSp|C

“"d the installation of

antisuhm °

detection, it w as felt necessary to

gthu®

A ntisubm arine (A /S) school vva®

1941

^

o f the C astle Barracks, Bom bay on Decembef^^,

D o c k S r ^ n J

establishm ent of a Torpedo School at the ^

dockyard, Bom bay. As stated earlier, the Torpedo School was shifted

t h e MEN BEHIND THE M ACH IN ES / 299

V n»rlamnaear on Hprpmber 1 5 ,1 9 4 2 an d c o m m iss io n e d as V alsiira.

S S f r , =

School was shifted ,0 V erso v a B o m b a y o n D e ce rn b e r 26,1942 and was commissioned as th e c o m b in e d K u y a' N a v y a n d R o y a l I n d i a n Navy Antisubmarine S ch oo l w ith th e n a m e M a c h h m a r . In 1 9 4 6 tn s establishment was paid off and the A n tisu b m arin e S ch o o l w a s s h ifte d to Vend«rw% at Cochin. A year later the T o rp ed o S ch o o l w as also sh ifted to Vetidunilliy and on September 20< 1947 these tw o S ch o o ls w e r e c o m b in e d to constitutea Torpedo Antisubmarine Sch oo l fo r the R IN . T h e S ch o o l sh ifted toitsnew buildinginN ovem berl955.Itw ouldn'tbeoutof p la ce to m e n tio n here that this school was renam ed the A n tisu b m arin e W arfare (A S W ) School on October 1, 1985. The courses co n d u cted b y th e S ch o o l in clu d e Specialist Long Antisubmarine W arfare C ou rse, tech n ical co u rses for o fficer trainees, professional courses for sailors selected for co m m issio n ed rank^tisubmarine W arfare In stru cto r's C ou rse, p ro fession al co u rses for C o n t n d i s c i p l i n e s of U nd erw ater W arfare and U n d erw ater sailors'

shallow-water and deep-sea diving cou rses for officers an d School

Trai^on^p°°i

T alzoarat the site now occupied by the M otor

^^■'orsofthpr

in April 1941 for the training o f officers and

sema^ ’ ^^'^fiunica tion Branch in encryption and decryption o f m esand w ireless telegraphy and p ro cess-

shifted t ' l T

signals of variou s categories. The Sch oo l w as

^hooi'5 npi,.° ^<^tiruthy at Cochin w here the foundation stone for this building w as laid by the C hief o f the N aval Staff,

Thoc , ‘^'^Pizey.

^*®phen

b u ild in g w a s in au g u rated b y V ice-A d m iral S ir

*®' ®falcours

f

'^Mcationr'

officers and sailors including the Specialist Long C om -

cours'"'^^^®

courses forofficer trainees, profes-

P^orriotinn

^junior and senior sailors and those who are selected for

‘Commissioned rank.

of M

MetgQ

‘

Oceanology and Meteorology

‘ raining in the IN began with the deputation of Lieutenant

^^49 R, ! S ^ Chawla to the UK for a course in naval meteorology early crucial role played by meteorology towards the

and air operations, as exemplified by a number o

*' «! a

during the two World Wars, had been adequately appreciated

"g in n in g was made by incorporating it in the factors that go into

300 / b l u e p r i n t TO BLUEWATER

of the E d ip t o n Branch

in I f 2“'

o f .h e t ? J lf o n : n T & a ™ C b « ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

weather-watchinx Wh™A^rH»nHi

n ica ! v ariatin n c •

A ir H an d lers w ere trained in detecting the tech-

M eteo ro lo m ral

their effect on aircraft operations,the

w a tch , rPr?rH

taught to keep a continuous weather-

contrnllp

n

d issem in ate m eteorological observations to air traffic

w ea th er wa^*

sh ip s, co d e or decode weather messages andtoissus

G f l n / r f f l , C o c h i n h a d s t a r t e d fu n c tio n in g in th e

''V o

a full-fledged MeteoroIogicalTraining

M ov -1^0 '

?■

assigned the new nomenclature - School of

O cean o lo g y and M eteorolog y (SN OM ).

Gunnery School

'='‘‘" 4 Karachi which undertook Ihc Wi.*g j

this est.h ° K °

Gunnery Branch before hdependcnce. With

. r ? - '

at (he lime of the country's partition.»»««

re su m J

branch was suspended for about a year bu «

provTsedh"

“ hen a Gurie^, School was setup

o n O c to b e r f in '^ f s j ^ h a u ^ T ™ - " '*

perm anpnt

® train in g o f G u n n ery sailors was shifts

school i" Ve^iurulliy.

j-e.Juniorm o.qfllun

I ’^ P a rte d professional training to

«cers

being sent to E x ce1 1 ^ °{^ ^ Gunnery Branch, the senior sailors j in

Portsm outh,Ene]anrl*'w fi,^!^ guruiery establishm ent at

. fionii'

the country howpvo

heralding an era of indigems

p^ dia.R esou rcesand ^

School soon begaVi to conduct t ^®®®nr s es

introduced between

to be mobilised and the

(1952)X ad et-a^ t '

1958 included those for Second-Rate

Sailors selected

^ "^"^*(1952),F irst-R a te sa ilo rs(l9 5 4 ),

Instructors (1957) a n d ‘? n 'T ° v "

com m issioned rank (1955), ^ . , 053).

Prior to 1957 the „ ?

Course for officers (‘S

into five specialist trades

« (C^)'

Layer Rate (LR), Anti-Air (AA\

V

Q uarter Rate

ever, th eL R and A A tradPcw

^

R adar C ontroller (RC). In 1957, ^ f

(GL), Sim ilarly the O R

S '

f a d e w as also aboUshed annTK

‘^e Q A trade. Later th« ^

verted into the RC and Q A trades

sailors o f this trade w e te C

t h

e

MEN BEHIN D TH E M A C H IN ES / 301

co n sid erable w astag e o f t - ^ g

time and resources. Hence a new establish m en t for co n d u ctin g a ” ^spects of gunnery training was set up at Fort C och in d u rin g the 0

^

c o m

m i s s i o n e d a s D r D M

f l c / i f i n / a , n a m

e d a f t e r t h e w i s e p r e c e p t o r w o r a in e a

the great warriors of the M ah ab h arata in the art o f w e a p o n ry .

Naval Police and R e g u la tin g S c h o o l

TheNavalPoliceandRegulatingSchoo],whichalso incorporates th e M o to r Driving Sciiool, came into being in 1943 for training Petty O fficers and sailors of higher rank of the Regulating Branch, i.e., the N aval Police Branch forprom otiontotherankofM aster-At-Arm satDfl/; 20MSie(now. 4 « ^ e )B o m -

In 1948 this School was sh ifted to the N aval Provost Barracks, Old TalwarCamp, Colaba, Bom bay w h e r e c o u r s e s fo r Leading P a t r o l m e n w e r e Mmmenced in 1950. In July 1954 the School was shifted to the N avy s Provost establishment, Kunjali in C olaba, Bom bay.

soon was entrusted, besides running the N aval Police Regulat-

responsibility o f m anaging the training

^

ten^

adm inistration of the M usic Branch and the De

Quarters and the training of N aval Bandsmen.

^^genisation of Training Complete

cour" ^^^Pendence came other than the basic training of

^

s S r''^°P^^^‘ !onaltrainingforjuniorofficers,allcoursesforof^^^^^^^^^

cilitie! '^^'^''o^^ucted abroad. But by 1965 besides setting “ P

'■■ainlnp

training equipment and

technical the

high -t!

2nd establishm ents, both operational

^

divL; " f

of training for the entire gamut o f

enough

f^om

and sailors from as

^»nva

foreign navies to attract student off»c

.j^eableskill-bank

^ °^ "‘ »es. This also led to the

°

uctors in the categories of officers and seni

9

OF FUNDS AND FINANCES

The N aval B u d g e t _____

T h e N a v y c o n tin u e d to re ce iv e a v ery tin y slice o f the already s cia l ca k e th a t h a d b e e n se t a p a rt fo r D efen ce. In the early it w a s n o t p o ssib le to h a v e a n y a p p re cia b le g ro w th and deve op S e rv ice . T h e e m p h a sis a t th a t tim e w a s o n sp en d in g m ore on e an d less o n D e ^ ^ c e a n d tliis w as b ro u g h t o u t in the th e n .

Jawaharial Nehru's own words. In a letter written to the Chief March 1,1950, he said:

•

dsy

Y o u w ill rem em b er th at in th e P resid en t's sp e ech on the o f P arliam en t, r««erence w as m ad e to a red u ctio n of

ture. A fter carefu l t h o u ^ t w e h a d co m e to the conclusion effort sh ou ld b e m ad e to red u ce this expend itu re. It is, in ^

im p o ssible fo r u s to spendSO per cen t o f o u r C en tral budget ^

^ progress is slo p p ed b y this top h ea v y expenditure,

h o w ev er, h av e m ad e it very difficu lt fo r u s to m ake any redu ction, as w e had hoped. N ev ertheless, in the budget

jgs

yesterd ay, there is so m e reduction. L ast y ear's actuals were 1^-

g

fo r defence. T h is year the figure is 168. T h is includes a new it

, jq

crores for the S ta le arm ies. If w e exclu d e this, then the reducbo crores IS noticeable. O f co n rse,as our Finance Minister pointed oui/

h ave to keep vigilant anH w e shaU h av e to spend m ore on V e t e t f ^

^ e s s i t y requires i t This reduction in the present year, in V

difficulties and crisis, show s how eam est w e a te in the tnBtter

OF FUNDS AND FIN AN CES / 303

reduction on Defence exp en d itu re.

^

_

This emphasis on development vis-a-vis defence, was a continuing factorandanyincreases in defence expenditure were indeed frowned upon.

Commenting on the budget for 1951-52 wherein expenditure on the Army had been reduced by Rs. 12.88 crore, Nehru wrote:

Most major countries are today spending vast sums of money in huge rearmament programmes. We are rather unique in this respect. When armies are growing up in Europe and America and more and more we hear the tramp of armed men elsewhere, in India we have had the c^age to reduce our army. We have done so after the most careful primary duty of a Government is to take no risks about

county s security. We do not think we have taken any undue risk, denenrf^

defence services and we are proud of them. But strength

merely

quality than on principle. Strength depends not

theecon”

services but also on the productive capacity and

that unn^”^^ |Oundationof a country. It depends finally on morale and defeat

spirit which never surrenders to evil or accepts

cannot ca^

these facts in view. The defence forces

Productivr^

unless they are fed continuously by the nation's

J^eep up

while making every endeavour to

also ei

3“" force at a high level of efficiency, we

°^ythede^

thought to those basic foundations which make not

th e n a tio n g e n e ra lly fu n c tio n in a s a tis fa c -

limited reso*^

^ caim o t d o aU th a t w e w a n t to d o b e c a u s e o f o u r

*3ge.

urces b u t w e c a n a p p ly th o se reso u rce s to th e b e s t a d v a n -

^’igust 1,

thfi rise in d efen ce ex p e n d itu re, h e w ro te o n h an d ^ f

su d d en ly co m e up b efo re u s in this w a y an d fo rced

'vhen vsre °

m o re an d m o re in fo reig n exch an g e, at a m o m e n t

®''6ry bjt

|U-afford to d o so , w h en in d eed w e w an ted to sav e

*«ceiit]ya°L

exch an ge? Few things h av e p ain ed m e so m u ch

^'vishwp^

spend larg e su m s o fm o n e y o n th e ap p aratu s fo r d efen ce.

deveio

av oid it an d sp end this m on ey in stead fo r ou r sch em es O tt e r s a

^ b etterin g the lo t o f our p eople. But, in so m e

co n c e rn .^' there is no choice and no risks can be taken.

^

budgetary m eth od ology follow ed b y the G overnm ent w as to ar-

304 / BLUEPRnsITTOBLUEWATER

^ .^ O .d n a ,.e V a c .o S “

a^^^^^

I n n 7

e x p e n d itu re o v e r th e p re ce d in g years was studied and the a H v i H

lo o k ed at, though notnecessarily

p racti^

w a s re g a rd e d at the tim e as being eminently

T h e siz e o f th e A rm y a n d th e e v er-p re sen t lan d threat was the param ourU stra te g ic fa c to r. S in c e d ire c t a ir su p p o rt in the land battle was y a r d e d as a sin e qua n on , th e n e e d s o f th e A ir F o rce took the next priority.

1

H >,

a t th e tim e to h a v e n o perceptible influence on ths

i ^ d b a t t l e , w a s the la s t in th e q u eu e. It w as accep ted as a n e c e s s a r y adjunct, b u t o n e w h ic h co u ld b e b u ilt u p m o re grad u ally . Our poliHcal leaders

^ d e r s t o o d th e m ariH m e fa cto r, b u t th e co m p u lsio n s of the moment ma^

ir in a n cia la llcca tio n sfo ritsd ev elo p m en tseem re sid u a l.T h isg en er t ^ m g m the S e rv ice th at w h a t it receiv ed w as w h atever could b e spared fo r th e o th ers h a d b een done. Admiial Kataa our

first In d ia n N a v a l C h ief h a s reco rd ed :

Governm ent budgetary policies left very Kttle for expenditure on ^

S Z '

y

it to put into effect plans fcn«

com prehensively drawn up as ea .

tickW ir °'^^'^^°^®*^®‘^ ® ^ 6alIw ecou Id d ow astokeep th eserv ^

demoralizadon le^-‘

leadership at aU le v 2 “ '

“

Admiral Katari has later recorded that:

J e s t e r p l a v i n p ^ F ^ c e Minister Morarji Desai with

.. of

the soft

autocraHc arbitrator. In

side of the Finance

g^neraUy came d o ^ ^

™>t get a pie more If wo T

heard to explain,

^e-

Fight w ith lathis if n e c e s s S ^ ^ 2 r * '. ^ ° “

1 1 three

Chiefs o f Staff w ho wprpfV.

•

K atari adds that the

of the C abinet M eetings

s c ^ . The author w t^ w a^a

Cabinet Secretariat during t 4 p e r iS

B mis penod recorded the minutes of

OF FUNDS AND FINANCES / 305

meetings forthieeyears where the defend

a critical

„ m o ( t h B e m « U n p w h e r e f o m ^

rerruirk thiit

„ ,« ito ..n d in g a U fti3 .e a c h y e a r o f

Notwii

percentage aUocation for the N avy, as sh o w n m

tables* 1^

^

enough, L t from 4 per cet^t m 1950-51 it m ore tharv d o u b led to y p er 1956-57 and reached 12 per cer\t in 1959-60.

n a w 's

FoUowing the Chinese aggression there w as a

ta'i

budget allocatior\, descending to 4 per cen t in 1964-65.

sie h t

aggression was such a blinding surprise th at w e seem ed to

v e

^

of the maritinrve perspective for several years thereafter.

Everyone in the Government accepted the fact that the N ^ y w

e<luipment-orientedService rather th an a manpower-oriented rvice,

that made it an expensive one. The N av y 's capita I bu d get, spent on

•fighardware for combat, mainter\ance and training i n v o l v e d h e a y j ^ x p ^

* ^ 6 , rnuch of it in foreign exchange. Left w ith no perm anen ^a g

“ tablishments after partition, a heavy civil w orks budget w a s n ecessa iy tor setting up new faciHties. And the fact that w e had sw itched from acqu«« g

^■^dhand to buying new ships of the latest design m eant the

^

t of a whole new range of n\aintenance facilities in our repair y®

o n l u ^

allocated to D efence in 1950-51

Incrto^

which w as n ot m ore than 4 per cent o f

. o f ^ g

total

to be sm all as years w ent by, but in

of Rs 197 crore, the N avy w as aUocated R s 12 crore w ^ c h

a subsf

to 6 per cent of the D efence budget. There was,

Ss 19

increase in 1954-55 raising the naval budget to R s 15 c

^ ^

tion. Th’

had 10 per cent of the d e f a c e

the next year, U ., in 1959-60,

* “ ; e a s ^ ^ R s 4

expenditure, the capital e ^ p e n *

cent o f the

total Tw

Navy now received Rs 33 crore which

budgetary aUocation.

to Ra 3 2

N avy's aUocation decreas(^ a _

allocation

f ^

^nd m 1 9 6 1 - 6 2 , 1 9 6 2 - 6 3 , 1 9 6 3 - 6 4 and 1 9 ^ - 6 5 * e N a ^ continuous Went down and ranged from Rs 2 4 to 2 8 crore. I t was a

306 / b l u e p r in t TO BLUEWATER

stmggle to get adequate funds even to maintain the naval force at, a d d u c e d fo r sp e n d in g m o r e o n th e A rm y an d the Air Force.

Table 9.1 shows the total defence allocation and theriseandfaUinths allocations to the Army, Navy and Air Force during this period of 15 years.

T a b le 9.1. R e s o u r c e a llo c a tio n s to th e A rm y , N avy and Airforce during 1 9 5 0 -5 1 to 1 9 6 0 -6 5

____

(fo in Crores)

~SU- %

51- 7o 52- %

53- % 54- % 55- % 56- % !>}■

51

52

S3

54

55

56

57

58

Revenue

132 79 135 74 142 77 134 6 8 133 68 118 62 129 61 159 57

Navy

7 4

7 4

8 4 1 0

5

11

5 12 6

12 5

IJ

Air Force

1 0 6

15 8

14 8 2814

28 15 2815

3717

70^5

9

14 8

15 8 15 8

« 14 7

TOTAL 164 98 171 94 179 07 187 9^ 187 Qd 172 90 192^0_J5i— -

Capital

'

------------------------------ -----------

Army

£

6 2

4

10

5

6

3

9 5

6 3

Navy

7 3

5

3

1

13 5

0

1

1

2

1

2 1

4

2

7 4

8 4

4 1

Air Force 4

2

1 1

2

1

2 1

4 2

2

1

3 2

Others

-7 -4

-2

-1

-4 -2

i'OTAL

d

0 0

-3 -2

-1 -1 _

2 1

2

in

■"oTTTiD

—iiL 0

6

3

Kevenue +

11 5

8

4

1810 .

Capital 168

i8 i

212

^jPOenue

-62-

-fii.

M .

J 5 .

Navy

16 5 ^ 5

^04 62 314 66 532 65 524 65

Air Force

82 28 5922

L

19 6 19 4 21 3 23 3

Others

14 «;

.^3

59 18

74 16 134 16 126 16

T o r

18

4

17 2

C

i

ap s

ital

----- ^48 88

am 92 491: on 70^1 a/i 693 S6

Army

8 3

Navy

15 5

19 7 15 5 13 4

27 6

68 8

76 9

Air Force

4 1

3

6 2

3 1

4 1

5 1

6 1

5 1

Others

l 0

5 2

4 1

i n

17 3

35 4

26 3

Total

28 Q

-

2 0

6 1

Revenue +

-3513__M _11

25 ■5— *9 10 m j 4 11314

Capital 249

265

281

7v«her« - tensioiis «c ttefcnce KU3-----815

806

O F FU N D S AN D FINAN CES / 307

It is apparent from the above that th ou g h the a llo catio n m ad e to the Navy d S t h e period rose from R s 8 crore to R s 3 3 cro re th e p ercen tag e of the total budget allocaHon rose from 4 per cen t in 1950-51 to 12 p er cen in 1959-60 but dropped to 4 per cent in 1964-65. T h e serv ice thus f a i l ^ to develop owing to inadequacy of funds, to a lev el c o m m e ^ u ra te w ith its tasks and respor\sibilities in the context o f the p o litico -m ilitary situation developing in the Indian O cean area. T h is w as p ro bably due to the p ersistent land-oriented defence perception o f the pow ers that b e and thus the capabilities of the Service continued to be confined to a brow n w ater role.

The prospects for development proposed in the P lan Papers o f the N avy prepared after Independence also continued to rem ain unfulfilled.

Footnote:

Defence Budget -1991-92

Defence budget has gone up by Rs 600 crore in the b u d g et proposals for 15,750 crore in the revised estim ate for 1990-91 to Rs

crore,

*‘®venue expenditure for the defence sector is estim ated a* ^

-,139 crore for 1991-92, up from Rs 11,012 crore in the budget estim ates last 4 717^® capital expenditure for the defence sector has jum ped from attra?

of the armed forces, the army, with

2! S ‘^-‘ ^^®lion'ssharLthebudgetestim atesfollowedbyair force withRs The Defence Budget at a glance

(in crores o f rupees)

T o i j r r ----------------------------------------------------

16,350~

expenditure

11,139

t)ef„

^®venue expenditure

5,211

-

-Ce capital expenditure

-----------------

308 / b lu epr in t TO BLUEWATER

Defence Revenue Ouflay

1990-91 1990-91 1991-92

Budget

Revised Budget

Estimate EsHmte Esfimic

Defence Services-Army

7,910.15 7,965.00 8,079.13

Defence Services - Navy

877.00

826.00 892.06*

Defence Service - Air Force

2,017.76 2,072.74 2,054,96

Urdnance Factories

143.20

148.70 112.63

Capital Outlay

4,801.89 4,737i6 5^11:22

• Revenue 892.06

Capital 1413.00

2,305.06

10

d iscip lin e a t s e a

Evolution of N a v a l_ ^

Earlier Centuries

. craft ha ve had to

Ever since man began to sail the seas,

on

to various punitive measures to

harsh

^ *md in harbour. Some of these measures

'^ ‘des the spirit of adventure and the 1im«

to opt ^ t/ie

to go to sea, the more important

j^y^ient,

debt and

profession in the olden days were

from

beenl»id

*'?‘te, slavery, questionable antecedents,

P > « tic a lp ro p ^ itie s .N o c o d e fo rs u c h p v ^ ,

^ 0 1 adopted during the earlier

j arbitrary-

^ p to ^ rf

*«veral mUlennia it continued to be

/or

-n« first instance of codification of

^

Pj^inthelndiansubcontinentisfo

^ ,0

of E m p ero r Chandragupta

^ ^ b e d a s o n e o f th e g re a te s t^ rf

o f

^ describes iii detaU

^ duties and rcspon sibU **^

S h i p s B 0

fr--SE ===S

5

5

p o r t o r h a r b o u r a u t h o r i t i e s t o v i o l a r

“I

p e r s o n e l o p i n g w i t h a n o t h 8 ° r w f f o

®h

la r c e n y , a p e r s o n su sD ectP d f o h

daughter, a person committing

'p e r tu r b e d a p p e a r S c ^ f l

offence, a person witha

a tte m p te d to c o n c e a l o r e v a n Jfh ^ ^ w ithou t any baggage, a person who p e r s o n in d is e n ic p a

^ ° S ^ a n c e o f a load carried by him, a

to p a s s h im s e lf

a d is e a s e a DPT

•

a p erso n pretending to be sufferingfcom

o r a e e n t

®*^te o f alarm , a p erso n spying for a foreign coumJy

w e a p o n s M n f

° h a d co m m itted m urder or assault,a personcanying

v a lid Da cc r.

p o is o n an d , finally, a person not in possession of a

. o r e n try d o cu m en t.

o f A k b a ^ «

p e r io d fr o m th e 1 6 th c e n tu iy to the 18th, i a , from theragn k n o w n a c f v ,

A u r a n g z e b , th e fu n c tio n s o f the Mughal Admiral^/

M u e h a l or>

w ere g ov ern ed by the regulations laid down by 6

th e w ell V

T h e se h a v e been described in detail in/4w

r e c o r d < rS °iT ^ A ^ ^ ® ^ ^ ®

w o rk o f A kbar. According <o

organisaH n

^ ^

elab o rate regulations had been framed iot

co n stru cfin ” ° j

N a v a l D epartm en t, w hich had four main htnc

ta tlo n o f

PP^y°^^^Psa^cIboatsforw agingw arandfortransp

s a ilo r s to

m erch and ise; recruitment and supp^y

w a t e 4 l v s

th e A dm iralty; surveillance o f rivers a n d ^ ^

reRulatioii^

^ p o s it io n , realisa tion and ran issio n of duties.

c o n ^ p o n d to th o se a t C h an d rag u p l^ »

m

S u

™ a r ly tw o m iU en ria i» fo r e th s adv®<

u r e r t o b e

re g u la tio n s o f th e M u g h als also provided for

centuries, the navies o f the littoral states

forces d ow n the ^

^ suitable organisational structure for thetf

form alised and w as left

C onsequently

j -

® *^ "® tio n o f the commanders of such f

disciplix^e

"measuresresorted toform aintai^^

" ^ n d e r .Itw a s o n Iv ^ ^ fh tK *° "

^ g io n and from commander to c

o f the East India Com

com ing into being in the seventeenth

British N avy that

was larg ely m o d elled ^ ,

e n tiin es, b egan to crystallise.

DISCIPLINE A T SEA / 311

The British M odel

The evolution of naval law, so far as today^s n a v y is co n cern ed , o w e s its origin to the laws and customs o f the sea w h ich fo rm ed the o rig in al b o d y o f rules for the day-to-day m aintenance o f order an d d iscip lin e a flo a t in G re a t Britain's navy. No requirement for a statu to ry co d e o f la w w as felt, la rg ely due to there beingno standing navy in England u n til th e 16th cen tu ry . F leets were raised, as the nation's interests dem anded , fro m p riv a te sh ip s a c quired for the occasion and fitted out. W h en the e xp ed itio n w as read y , the comir^der of the expedition w ould issu e sp ecific in stru ctio n s to the

^em led fleet for the punishm ent o f offen ces and the m ain ten an ce o f ti. ■

instructions w ere lim ited to th e p articu lar serv ice fo r winch the fleet had been raised.

subseou^

passage o f tim e, it becam e cu sto m ary fo r co m m an d ers, on put forth b

i s s u e the sam e b ro ad in stru ctio n s th at h a d b e e n

®3ryforthX

.P^®^®^®ssors, m odifying th em as th ey consid ered n eces-

of law

or m ission and thus d eveloped an in form al

custom ary practices o f the seafaring com m unity,

which Was c

these instructions w as their u ndue Iiarshness

which

^ necessitated by the 'lu m p en ' section o f society from

As tite p

recruited at that tim e.

c u sto m

^ ’'Majority o f the rai\k and file w ere unable to read, it becam e

"^tticles of

these instructions, w hich w ere later term ed the

8®nesi5 of jj, * > at a m uster o f the m en o n ce a m onth. This explains the

'^^quiring th ^

the Q ueen's Regulations for the R oyal N avy

ands

be read out to the 'sh ip 's co m p an / , i.e., all

j^gof the shi

onboard, at the first opportunity after the com m ission-

!''^°*^tion

displayed in a prom inent position in the ship for the

'7 and is '

This practice has also been adopted by the Indian

“ 'corporated in Regulations for the N avy, Part H (Statutory).

®nly ijj

observe that disciplinary powers were originally vested

canfa'

operational commanders, who would delegate them to

c u' ^®serving to themselves the right to deal with more serious

®^®rciso

mutiny, murder and manslaughter. The captains were to

powers in accordance with the laws and customs of the sea

Provid^^f^S to the gravity of the offence. T h e early British bodv

^«ch m acabre punishments as tying a murderer to the Omaa

^ 'Victim and throwing both into the sea. At one time, djsmissal

naval service entailed first ducking a m an under two fathoms of

3 1 2 / b l u e p r i n t TO BLUEW ATER

I

i n ju r y to a n o t h e r c o u ld b e buried alive or have his limbs

^ c k e d o f f o r h a v e b o il in g w a t e r p o u r e d o v e r his head. With thepassageof t u n e , t h e p u n is h m e n t s b e c a m e s lig h tly m o re hum ane and the convicted n \ a n w a s l a s h e d to t h e b o w s p r it (a s tr o n g sp a r projecting over thebowsof a s a i l i n g s h ip ) g iv e n a b is c u it , a c a n o f b e e r an d a knife. He then had the c h o i c e o f s t a r v i n g to d e a t h o r c u ttin g h is b o n d s andfallinginto thesea.Then t h e r e w a s 'k e e l - h a u l i n g ', i.e ., p u n is h in g th e con v icted man by hauling him u i u i e r t tie k e e l o f a s h ip b y r o p e s fr o m o n e sid e to the other while the ship w a s u n d e r w a y o r t h e m a n b e in g s u b je c te d to 'm an y ln g (or idssing) the g u n n e r 's d a u g h t e r ', i.e ., b e in g tie d to a g u n an d then being flogged. It was s a i d o f t h e s e p u n is h m e n t s t h a t th e y c o u ld ta m e the m ost c r u d e and savage s a i lo r s in t h e w o r ld .

T h e Three Form s of Trial

T h e r u le s o f d is c ip lin e w e r e fo r m a lly p re sc rib e d for the first w h e n a n o r d in a n c e a n d a r tic le s c o n c e rn in g m a rtia l lawr office/

o f t h e n a v y w e r e p r o d u c e d b y th e L o rd C o m m issio n ers at tne L o n d o n . T h e s e e n jo in e d tr ia l b y a c o u n c il o f w a r and o f tr ia l. F ir s t ly , th e c o n u n a n d e r -in -c h ie f, a s s is te d b y a coiinci

^^^ghthe

t r y a n d p u n is h a ll o ffe n c e s c o m m itte d a g a in s t a n y a r t l c l ^ ^

a p p r o v a l o f t h e L o rd s C o m m is s io n e r s w a s req u ired ^

a fleet ot

p u n is h m e n t o f d e a th o r m u tila tio n . S e co n d ly , th e flag o to tiy

d iv is io n o f s h ip s c o u ld c a ll to c o u n c il a t le a st th re e o f h ^

^

o ffe n c e s a r is in g in h is d iv is io n b u t p u n ish m e n ts in v olv in g ty tb^

d e a th , m u tila tio n o r th e c a s h ie rin g o f a n o ffice r w ere to e cap®^'

L o r d s C o m m is s io n e r s . T h e th ird fo rm w a s th e sh ip 's

w it h th e a s s is ta n c e o f h is se co n d -in -c o m m a n d aind oth er o

.

w a s e m p o w e r e d to try a ll o ffe n c e s c o m m itte d b y

° ^ g jin g of

in th is c a s e a ls o , se n te n c e s o f d ea th , m u tila tio n o r the ca o ffic e r w e r e to b e referred to th e su p erio r au th o rity .

T h e se cou rts w ere essen tially courts o f ro u g ^ b u t effectiv J

Ji

ce m e d only w ith the m aintenance of discipline an d harmony is in terestin g to find that the present-day system of M va J

ch an ged very little over the last 300 years and our existing m artial, discipliruiry court and sum m ary trial b y the corrunant“ ^

are virtually the continuance o f the three courts conceived as

to

17th century bu t w ith progressive m odifications. The original j

th e C om m ander to inflict punishm ents according to civil law,

^

and custom s of the sea has been continued in tl.ie successive Navy

DISCIPLINE AT SEA / 313

The Judge A d vocate

TTierequirement of appointing a ju d g e ad v o cate at a co u n ca o f w ar, charged with the responsibility to a d m in iste r an o a th to w itn e ss e s, to a d v ise the court OT matters of law and to p re p a re m in u te s o f th e p ro ce e d in g s, w as prescribed as early as 1653. T h e term 'ju d g e a d v o c a te 'w ith its su g g e s tio n o f cornp efely opposite fu n ctio n s b ein g p e rfo rm e d b y th e sa m e in d iv id u a l is

t o t h S a ^ l ^ ^ ” ^^°*T*^^“ ^ "^ ^ ® ^ '^ ^ S -Itm ig h tIead an accu sed p erso n also an advnratP^

is n o t o n ly a le g a l a d v ise r to th e co u rt b u t

iatein the

w ell. It is, h o w e v e r, tru e th at u n til

navalcourtmlrtial t 3 V ^

^^nction o f th e ju d g e ad v o ca te a t a

appointed to rnnH

" ^ g h t arise, an d also w h e n n o p ro se cu to r w as

<:ourt on behalf nf

in su p p o rt o f th e ch arg e b efo re the

description givpn

v ’ ^

e x p la n a tio n o f th e title m a y lie in the

advocate, where

L ord C ra n sw o rth o f the d u ties o f the Ju d g e

assist the court th

"judex a d v o ca tu s', i.e., ju d g e called to

tr

t a

T n

a s

S iH

i^i ,,

on ^ ^ fo rm in g n

o co n stih ie n t p art o f i t.

^or ^

m a

w s

a

s a

a m

mat

a t

t P

te

^ co u n cil o f w a r

^t o

c a

o

u c

noc u

il r t

o m

f a

w r

a tri atl

o i n

a i

c ts

o

up

r r

t e

s

mean

r t

t

‘Cou s

rt

snia

marh

rt -

i ,

a1

l

o f n am e t

h an o

f su bstan ce. .T

he ex act t i

nm e at w h

nich

n

^®yare mention

^

b eg an to b e h eld is n o t p re cisely kn ow n but

^ayl,1553 Itic ^“ ‘^ ^ ^^ ^^^^^^^^ theA dm iraltyR egulationsissuedon f ubsequenthic?

n ecessary fo r the p u rp ose o f this ch apter to go into the

to say that aft

the ev o lu tio n o f N av al La w in the R oy al N avy. Su ffice to brine

great m id -19th cen tu ry legal reform s, an attem p t w as

°^the EngliciT

®y®tem o f n a v a l ju stic e clo sely in line w ith the procedure

°f these refo

and the N av al D iscipline A ct 1866 w as the result

rem ain e d in force for 91 years although num erous

*^®Placed s f

niade to it from tim e to tim e, and w as ultim ately

' °

as the Indian N av y w as concerned, by the N avy A ct, 1957.

H l a d e a n ^ i t s origin in the British m ilitarylaw s w hich were

^*9tutn

Indian troops em ployed by the East India Company.

pai\y^ 2^ provision w as first m ade for the discipline o f the East India Com -

deserK

L

act passed in 1754 for punishing acts o f m utiny and

a rtic i(l°",^ officers and soldiers. Ttiis act empowered the Crown to frame

'VasH ?

^or the effective com m and o f these troops. Although t ^

c o u , ? ° i ; ‘ ' * a s t o t h

e a p

p

l i c a b

i I i t y

o

f t h

e B

r i t i s h

a c t , i n

t h

e a b

s e i ^

e o

f a n

j ^

^

t}^ '

G overnm ents of Bengal, M adras and Bombay applied the act and

rvec

o f w ar w ith such m odifications and omissions as app® ai~

^®®sary for the adm inistration o f the Indian troops maintained by them.

" r t " l e s ° o f w T f o ®^™‘ ’" y =nd

J"e sp e c tiv e s e r v ic e It

o/ all officers and'

“™::;rr

-

5

.

to

^ ^ o n ib a ta n t fo r c e ca m p

‘‘^ org anisation of the Royal Indian

thPQ

d is c u s s io n durincr tK ^

‘^^‘'"® ^ °^ id eratio n and subjected

J e s e d iscu ssio n s and w iu ,T / ^

^919 to 1926. As a sequeito

decid ed in i

o f theSecretary of State and the

fifi °,'^^Syear,abilIvvasD a«:«!

^®RoyalIndianNavy.Inthe

° the G o v ern m en t o f InH.

^he British Parliam ent amending Section

t h ^ f

R oyal Indian Ma

^919, w hich provided for the establiih-

^

force w ith su ch m

o

d

. f i the BritishN avai DisciplineActto

A ccordingly, a biU wTs 1

adoption as was found necessary.

Wovvever th« 1 ?

®

C entral Legislative Assemblyo/

J J d having stalw arts n i^ %

^«d by Shri Shanmukham Chetty

M alay .y a,L aIa U jp a t

N ehru, Pandit Madan Mohan

;n d o m e r s ,d e fe a tS

SirH ari SinghGaur

Indian T ^

ground on w h irh °fjf

*0 a Select Committeebyone

but

w ould n ot h

m otion w as then passed was that the

■^gislature. In i9?!4

____ cpntofthe

becam e

Indian Legislah

again presented but this tim^

^^arinebecnjv,-'^^^" N aval

heated debate a

tbeRegulaH^!!^*® t^ ® ^ °y al Indian Nj^

' 1934 w ith the Royal

sh ort titled

N av y

to this ^

tions

^ 2) w ere

^

‘^anN avvBonknfT?pfprenceN o-2.

«ons f o r * e N

2) were f r a m e r i l r ^ " " ^ ^ ''y Boo^

" th e M avy

^ e d and p rom u lg ated in 1938 as the RegtJa'

The law r e ^ t i ! ! * ^ ^ *® « P lin e A c t, 1934

^

v

e

r

r

^

'

;

t

l

n

i

s

contained in the

®mment o f India Acts of I9l9

d i s c i p l i n e AT SEA / 315

„d 1935 empowered IhB

Naval Kscipline Act,

i

i"

P T ‘? ^ 4 h t d u l e to the Indian Navy (Disci-

1JS6 which was set f” * "

India n ecessitated , th e a d o P " ° "

pM Act, 1934. Ihe ‘’’‘“ ’P^jfhrG^ovemance of the Navy in k«P>ng w *

t o S n g e s , and actton

K £ S S ;? —

donofl^ws Order, 1950.

. A ^n q-iA iarepW ^ealt w ith disciplinary

ThelndianNavy (Discipline) Act,

J

variou s other

provisions and there w ereriostatutoryprovi

^nmmissions arid de-

matlers such as admiiustrabon, eruolm ent, gr

T h p n e c e s sity w as,

ducdonsfiom pay ar\d allowances of officers and sa

j;._ :n iin e adm ini-

therefore, felt to have a corisolidating statute

c t a ^ t o ^ deduc-

itia^ion, appointment of officers and enrolm ent o sa

/

tions, applicability of fundamental rights and v an o u s o

The Navy Act, 1957

^ Uament

Theievised Army Act and the A it Force Act w ere

task and

1950. The revision of the N aval Act proved a m ore

]and

was felt that as the conditior\s of service at sea differ

respects

^ that the Indian Navy (Discipline) Act,

p o jce.n o attem pt

Jflerent from the law relating to the Army and the Air ru r

.

made to assimilate the revised N avy

° , Inited Kingdom

«wielating to the Army and the Air Force. Besides, m ^ ^ ^ g y i^ io n o f the lect Committee had been appointed to

, j^ g ta k e n o fitb y

^oshNaval Act and it vy^as thought that a d v a n ta g e

-^tge commonly

some of the recom m endations of that Committee,

as the Pilcher Comrruttee.

iiowpd the report of the

of the revised N avy Bill closely

Committee and,

ah u

The draft

was referred to ^

oeriod or four years,

J/havingbeen exam ined byth atC om m itteeove

P ^ ^ ^ g ^ P ^ g ^ e n t

to

became effective from Ja

;,tF u * ^ ^ 8 « ° ^ ‘l 'e N a v y A c t , 1 9 5 7 , t h r e e e a r l i ^ ^ 1934), t h e ^ ^

C u

a n d S a v a l F o r c «

1 ^ 1 Reserve Forces (D iscipline) Act, 1939,

- - t h e

Provisions) Act, 1950 (LVH of W W

AC.J957 «v^

^ Some important changes were made by

contained in the Indian N a v ^

con^'^Punishments were modifietH

^ y specific p

C r " " ^ 8 p u n is h m e n t s in t h e t h r e e S e ^ | ^ ^ ^ and enrolment m included concerning grant of commissi

3 1 6 / BLU EPR IN t t o b l u e w a TER

p r o v £ o ^ w

l

maintenance of d i s c i p S X

sailors fo r

^ c o jp o r a t e d fo r the deducHon from pay of officers and m p cc

W ith o u t le a v e , d am age to Government property,naval

a l ‘

s im ila r p la c e s; fifthly, the penal sections were ration-

^ is e ^

a fe w a m e n d m e n ts m ad e as necessitated by experience; sixthly, try civiloffenceswasmodifiedtocoi^formtothatexisting

in th e A r m y a n d th e A ir F o rc e ; sev en th ly , the main points of p ro ce d u re ol c o u r ts m a r tia l w e r e in c o rp o ra te d in the A ct itself; eighthly, officers of ths n o n -E x e c u tiv e b ra n c h e s o f th e N a v y , w ho w ere formerly not eligible to sit a t c o u r ts m arH al, w e re m a d e elig ib le, it being provided, however, that the m a jo r ity o f th e o ffic e rs w o u ld b e o f the Execu tive Branch with th e a d d itiw "

p r o v is io n th a t in c e rta in sp e cia l cases, only officers of the s h o ^ d s it as m e m b e rs o f a co u rt m artial; ninthly, provision was th e is s u e o f co m m iss io n s to ex am in e w itnesses; tenthly, A c t w a s m a d e a p p lica b le to th e p roceedings o f courts martial; th e ju d ic ia l re v ie w o f th e Ju d g e A d v o cate General of the k n o w n as th e Ju d g e A d v o ca te o f the Fleet, w as placed onastatuo^^^

a n d th e q u a lifica tio n s fo r ap p o in tm en t o f officers to the Depa Ju d g e A d v o ca te G en eral w ere p rescribed , tw elfthly, the existing m a rtia l p ro ce d u re , p e rm ittin g the accu sed to give evidence (he

co n tin u e d w ith a slig h t m o d ificatio n to conform to the prov C rim in a l P ro ced u re C od e, as am end ed b y the Crim inal A m en d m en t A ct, 1955 and finally, p rovision was made for w th e estates o f d eceased p ersons.

gbon* ®

It w o u ld th u s b e e v id e n t th a t th e N a v y A ct, 1957

r e v is io n o f th e n a v a l la w b y in c o rp o ra tin g in itn e c e s sa ry p r*’ ' ^®

re la te d e n a c tm e n ts a n d re g u la tio n s w ith a v ie w to m aking

^

s u ffic ie n t a n d to a d o p tin g the th en e x istin g p ro visio ns to su*

c o n s titu tio n a l se t u p an d p re se n t-d a y req u irem en ts.

Inter-Service Act D iffe re n ce s

^

T h e A rm y an d th e A ir F o rc e A cts h ad b een ca st in the sam e in itia lly th e d ra ft N a v y B ill w a s also d raw n up on the sam e vvefC

w a s la te r g iv e n u p an d sig n ifican t d ifferen ces w ere allow ed d ic ta te d b y the p ecu lia r co n d itio n s o fs e r v ic e a ts e a and n a v a l tradioo

^

u sa g e s. N in e im p o rta n t p o in ts o f d ifferen ce b etw een theN avy Act, g iv e n b elo w :

(a) T h e A rm y h as fo u r kin d s o f cou rts m artial su ch as general coO

DISCIPLINE AT SEA / 317

m a r d a l , d istrict court martial, su m m ary g e n e ra l c o u r t m a r tia l a n d s im im a r y court m artial. The Navy, on the other h an d , h as o n ly o n e ty p e o f co u rt martial in peace time and of course one m ore d u rin g w a r tim e fo r th e trial of officers for certain specified offences, called the disciplir\ary co u rt.

During peace time, the Navy has five types o f tribu n als: th e C o m m an d in g Officer, theFiag Officer Com m anding-in-Chief, the C h ief o f th e N a v a l S taff, the Central Government and the court m artial.

(b)

The sentence of a court m artial under the N a v y A ct is n o t subjetTt lorevisionorconfirmationand takes effect im m ed iately o n p ro n o u n cem en t ty the court martial except in the case of a senten ce o f d eath v^rhich requ ires coitaHon of

Central G overnm ent b efo re execu tion . T h e p ro v isio n s

to revision and confirm ation o f the findings and sen ten ce o f an i^ rtial are peculiar to the A rm y. T h e existin g n av al co u rt nottODutT^^'

give pow er to the co n ven in g au thority

loitheCent^^?f^^^^^°

should he doubt its legality; p ro v isio n exists

sentences

the C hief of the N av al Sta ff to red u ce or rem it

to anv

^ acquittal by a naval cou rt m artial is co n cem ed , it is n o t an acauItTTv^

review by any authority. U nder the A rm y A ct, till

1° Army Ru]gg ' 1

^ court m artial w as n o t final bu t b y an am endm en t

^orporated in fi, V '

Provisions o f the N av y A ct have n o w b een

W) In th^

^

P '^ t at the tim ^ f ^

N avy, the accused p erson is n ot required to be

.^refoiecannot cr °

the surrunary o f evidence against h im and

“®ing recorded

the w itnesses w hose sum m ary o f evidence

person

difference is that under the N av y A ct, an

'vas no Such ^ ^ y'^l^ess in his ovm trial w hereas in the A rm y A ct the

^

recent tim es. The N avy A ct thus

onl

®^*^rnent

^

Crirrunal Procedure

^

^

The Arm y has w oken up to this developm ent

^|^®>CGs cortmii^d

scales of punishm ent for sim ilar types o f

f^j^-^^erereferreri

in the Arm y and the N avy. These differ-

®ased on v

Trevor Harries, the then Chief Justice, for

agreed on

*’®^OK'mendation, the Chiefs o f Staff of the three

V o ^

the Navv

scale o f purushment w hich have been incor-

i ^ ^ r a t e

cq^yi

'

Army and the Air Force have agreed to

^yCfore the

scale w hen their respective Acts go for am end-

^‘tself foj th e^ ^ ^ Navy Act has m ade statutory provisions in the N avy

•®in steps of the procedure of court m artial, the Arm y Act

p e r s o n s o t h e r S

A cf^ o f th e a d " ^ - ^ P ' ^ ' i ® « l or

®^antoffi-p ^^<^onrunis_.

'

Povvers o f n

authority;

Q^n.

*‘^‘® ^to2 8 d ay s'i; 2 ^ °""°"^ sion ed officersor

^

"W ds „“'2 ‘'

the above diff

' '° '™ “ ' ' " " ^ ‘“'>'“ “^)'

^«*pec„

- e navy

i„ .h e fa c .« « , fadi.ip..

^ ^ ^ g h n r

^

Services in three major

up

s

' '

O ffe n c e F *

^^artfai

fo r c e w h ^ *>eheld w ith convenienceai

^ t a n H v "* ^ * * ^ * 'e a s o n

in a nnw

°''®"^entscannotI)eheld

^

^ ''a U a b le t o ? K " ^ 8 h d e g r ^ "

^ ^ com paratively trivial

y

s a f e t y o f

mu5t alwaysbe

P ' a « '

“‘he" U t l l '^ 'i p U n e

cannot J a n y m.

h a r r l ^ ! ^ ^ e y

'vhere^^^^

^

^

added

®^d the ^

^

r e a f

arelighterin

afloat

that th !

^evitaMl^?*^ this is that life at sea has»

-

. '''h ^ C Q n ^ j ^^’’^econdu-j ^ ®*'®*entment if there was

of tho* "^ tte r of hic*^.^^ ® sailor _ ®'‘® *°^®PunishedmoresevertJy

^ o m p a ^

^

^ a v a 7 c ? :^ e P i l c h e r S ^ w W

^ V

s y s te m o ftrig j^ . *^ tru c tiv e tn

■

« -he o r C ; - : S ; " “' ’

o , « .e p ,o c « lu «

comparison would rev^i*

DISCIPLINE AT SEA / 319

that the naval system of justice incorporates not orvly som e of the essential conditions in relation to the adrrunistration o f ju stice b u t also in relation to its procedure, by its freedom from technical form s and obstru ctive habits thatdelay the operation of civil courts. This h as resulted in a sum m ary and swift administration of justice w ell w orthy of im itation in som e respects by the civil courts.

The procedure by which charges ag a in sta n a ccu sed sa ilo ro ro fficera re iwKtigated and brought to trial is in m any respects sim ilar to those by which an aUeged offence is investigated and tried by the civil courts. In the nava system, the function undertaken by the m agistrate of him self dispos-

^^3rges or conducting a prelim inary investigation of those to

before a superior court, is undertaken by the conunand-

maas»T^

establishm ent, w ho, in his capacity as the exanurung

<lismis ^

disTtuss any charge if h e is not satisfied it is made out; if he

that

^ ^ ^ *8 ® - bis dism issal is final and the accused caruiot be tried on In o ^ °^

nulitary authority.

% long*^

accused person is not kept in custody for an im reasona-

Ijounddi^” 1

sdm iiustrative ir\structions provide for time-

^ ^ ^■esuU, a sailor arraigned on a charge is b r o u ^ t

' “minal c ( w

3 m atter of days and the proverbial delays of civil

the

^

'ii'know n to the naval system of justice. If the case is one

officer is not em powered to deal w ith or not

"'ritvno

®^nunarily,he takes steps to have the evidence reduced to

t

m artial. O n the basis of documents

aiy?

c o n v e r^ g authority decides to convene a court

“^position

summary or abstract of evidence serve, like the

‘The

^

indictment, to inform the accused of the case against

least th

^ entitled before trial, as a matter of course, to a copy of

expected testim ony of every prospective

K ^

information regarding every item of evidence in

XiYg °

® prosecution w hich may be used against him.

^‘^' tiallv c

?

^

martial attended by a judge advocate is subproceedings of a trial before an ordirwry c n m ^ l

® striking resemblance to the procedure before a tnal by

® COUT+

/®'®"‘^® '® *3tw hereasajuryischosenbylot,thernem bers

appointed by the convening authority,

e

^^*^torv

number of members of a court martial is withm e

for

^

Criminal Procedure Code, the law makes allow-

^

rioht K ^ ^ ^ S a in s t the jury both by the prosecution and the acc

•

been secured to the r^val accused. T ^ r e ^ agam

'

^ ' ^ e r of swearing in of the jury, o p e t^ g of

and the defence, the taking of special pleas by

'

320 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

v ie w in g o f th e p la c e o f o ffe n ce , su m m in g up of their respectivecasesbyik p r o s e c u tio n a n d th e d e fe n ce , an d th e ju d g e's charge to the couit.The object is to o b ta in a co m p e te n t a n d im p artial tribunal actuated neither by partiality , n o r fa v o u r o r a ffe ctio n . T h e m a in differences between a trial by coiM

martial an d a trial b y ju ry in a crim inal court are, firstly, the court martijl m a y a rriv e at its fin d in g s o r sen ten ce b y a m ajority and under thelndien , th e C rim in a l P ro ced u re C o d e perm its the m ajority verdict of a ]\^

re ce iv e d , w h erea s a ju ry , u n d er E n glish law , must seco n d ly , m em b ers o f a co u rt m artial fix the sentence advisory,

ju d g e a d v o ca te in th e d eterm in atio n of the sentence

.

w h L a s u n d er the C rim in a l P roced u re C ode, a jury has nothmgto the sen ten ce w h ic h is d ecid ed b y the ju d g e alone.

mvenunderthe

T h e ev id en ce ag ain st the accu sed in a court rna

^gsbeforeo''

san ctio n o f an o ath or affirm atio n as in any jucuca pr

j,Qjmiuttedbefo*

co u rts. T h e w itn esses are liab le to p u r u s h m e n t for per] ^

a co u rt m artial. T h e co m p eten cy and credibihty o

fact, coui'

b y th e sam e ru les of evidence as prevail in the civ

0

nm rtial are b o u n d in general to observe the

^ courts.

,

principles o f ju stice as observed and expounded y

also governed by the In d ian Evidence A ct as fo ° ^^jgenciesof^

cou rts, subject to certain exceptions as dictated by

service. O ne lacuna in this procedure is that tM

i 8 7 2

draw n chiefly from English Law and w as

^ T - j j a n

ruled the w aves and Q ueen Victoria ruled over tr«

jgviewof

..

D espite repeated exhortations b y legal lum inaries

f

A ct, the continued application o f its archaic provisio

^ fg je n t

vVadilliUnllgg a

d flt

l e

c r

t

th

U l e

c l

I a

d p

p s

a e

c o

U f

I

o

U v

V e

c rl

a

d c

C e

Cn

i l t

l u

U r

i - y

y ,

y u n d e r a to ta y t H s t '

for

m ent and in an ethos w hich is radically different from

iti

rulers,

s h

nas b

e

b c

e om e an anach

r r

i o

r ni

msm.

. 1i uas

J^as a i

a C

c O

oe ^

ic"'

r t u

As iil l

n Lt i i

h ce t i

c v

iv jijl aau i

d i u

m ii un ai is itcr i u

atui i

oLn u

oi fj L

j i

u as iitv

i -

c ce ,, u

a co ---

u --r- t ma

* gjiable^^ n£*

^gj

pow

V

e

Y C r

i .

to s e cu re th

U L e

L C

a

a t

l l t

. e

c n

i l . d

u a

d in

u c

. ce

:

o

U f

I

w

W

i1tLn

L I e

C s

9 s

D e

C s

^ > . T h e w itn e s s e s

alties and pim ishm ents upon com plaint of n o n - a t t e n d a n as any w itness neglecting to attend a trial in any civU co u rt

arrest is also given to witnesses in going to and

tiS

m artial in the same manner as witnesses attending any of

petS^^

a r e p r i v i l e g e d . A

c o u

r t m

a i t i a l l i k e a c L

v i l c o u

r t i s a n o p

e n

c o

other than the witnesses.

^

It would thus be evident that the procedure of trial by

cO'^'

almost analogous to the procedure of trials in the ordinary

oi

and that the naval justice system affords to an accused person so ^

basic protections available to an accused before an ordinary

Notwithstaiuling this, the system of trial by court martial has

d

i s c i p

l i n

e AT SEA /

321

criminal justice. In some resp

,

p q D o u g las said in a n

« « S ' r c M

a n ‘lr J i s h e ld in a n a tm o s p h e re

system of naval justice are, firstly, the absen ce o f the n g t o

,

accused person; secondly, the ad-hoc co m p o sitio n of the co u rt m a a

its determination of both guilt and the senten ce; thirdly, the inv o ^

position of the judge advocate; fourthly, th e p ossible co m m an d in flu en ce by the convening authority; and, fifthly, there is no right o f ap p eal to any superior court.

As a result of these shortcom ings, courts m artial are prone to be regarded as sununary and arbitrary proceedings. A lthou gh the d escription of the naval system of justice as 'drum head ju stice' is over-draw n, there a ^

indeed glaring defects as regards the safeguards afforded to an a c c u s ^

person and a court martial is in fact regarded as an instrum entality o* ^

wecutive power to enforce discipline in the Service. Though the other mocratic countries have carried out large-scale revision of their m ilitary to bring them in line w ith the changing conditions and co n cep tso P ^ o gy and administration of justice, o u t system o f ju stice has r e m a i ^

is now lagging behind the system s of ju stice in other countries.

of the Accused

Accused' h as b een a n in stitu tio n in the

over the years an d there w o u ld b e ^ y

S y f ^ K

^as b eco m e m ore com p lex a r d t h « e f o ' e ; 2 ^

^

'c o m p a n / o f civU law yers to assist

anddpfo

M artial. G enerally, C ou rts M artial in w h ich p

® been con d ucted b y com p eten t n aval officers 8

^

^ ^

u n fu ssy m anner yet stro;ng

and dignity. Civilian law yers

education for

dL ° ‘ ‘r r ; ! ° !!“ '

hand, there have

**^at*w as to plain term s,

> 'd e d

o f no worthwhUe

ine Vr

-------

.

has oeen «

N aval C om m and before

rem inisces:

^ ^ d a ry 'frie n d o fth e a c c u s e d 'fo r o v e ra q u a rte ro fa ce n tu ry , 1 Was never trained in law and m y in v o lv em en t in C

322 / b l u e p r in t TO BLUEVVATER

- 4 -U T n rs t'rfs

ex D P riP n rl

^

officer's professional equipage. My

tflinoH

if ?

C o u rts M artial system of trial generated andsus-

a w h o le s o m e re sp e ct fo r it. It is up to those who administer this sy s e m to a c h ie v e th e h ig h qua lity o f ju s tice it was structured to attain.

I a lw a y s fo u n d it esse n tia l (and fascinating) to carefully stB(iy*e en\eanour o f w itn e sse s, as recom m ended by many famous judges a n d la w y ers. It g a v e m e p recio u s insights into the strengths and w e a k n e ss e s o f th eir ev id en ce an d helped m e to decide how to tackle th e m in cro ss ex am in atio n . The law books say that cross examination is a tw o -ed g ed tool. H o w true.

. .

P ro fessio n a l law y ers p ro bably develop a certain dispassion >*’

h a n d lin g the cases o f th eir clien ts. N o t being one of h a rd to b e d istan tly a lo o f fro m the fears and hopes of those I

^ a t is p ro b ab ly w h y I regard ed the label 'Friend of the Accuse Id eal one. It im p lied an act o f com radeship rather than a merest j

"O ld law y er-clien t contract.

Unified Inter-Service C o d e

^

It w ou ld b ein terestin g to aUude at this stage to theefforts madeby w ar

about uniform ity in the three Services

co u n tries lik e th e U n ited States,

o fth p

S ° " ^ ^ ^ ic a te d the d e s i r a b i l i t y o f m a k i n g the rights

^ g to

f s S t w " ?

readiTy ascertain ab le w ith r e fe ^ ^ e

three Serv ’ ^

countries had thus gone in for a u n i f o r m

nf

of India, also being convuiced ^ ^

e s s L t i ^ o L

three Services to develop a

of rfn

organisation, set up in 1965 a

Justice and

M inistries o f Defence

drafting a uniform

H eadquarters, w ith the avowed

Services. l h e a i m w a s u , r a b ^

^ l o g y and also the f a c t ^ f t “ "‘° con sid eration the d ev elo p m en t co m e from m ore ed u r A ^ m em bers o f the A rm ed Forces would ^

The Uniform rr.n

P °*‘^cally conscious classes.

**^tter for nearly 14 vp^

after having deliberated ov

quarters w ished to recnnc vi ^

o f consideration the Army “

^

'^^onsider the u seh ilness and desirability o f hav*ng

DISCIPLINE AT SEA / 323

single uniform code for the three Services arid w ith d raw fro m the con\m ittee,advocatingthateachServiceshouldbringaboutamendm ents to its o v m Service Act to meet its own peculiar conditiorrs. A s a resu lt, the effo rts at biingingabout a uniform code of Service d iscip lin e w ere g iv en u p an d the draft uniform code was put in cold storage. R ecen tly , h o w ev er, the A rm y Headquarters has had second thoughts abo u t its earlier stan d and there is a feeling thatmilitaryjustice also needs to be brought in co n fo rm ity w ith the modern notions of criminal ju stice. This th ou ght has o b v io u sly em an ated ram e flood of court cases involving the A rm y w h ich has m ad e the P ^ W g h e r echelons of the Service rethink about the an tiq u ity o f the changed'^notionr^

reform it and bring it in co n fo rm ity w ith the

^sgraduill^'H’

n a v y ' as it is te rm e d in a p o p u la r d itty ,

' ®-from the

present fo rm over the last three m illennia,

and ballistic

? triremes and galleys to the days o f nu clear subm arines

•heperception

attem pted to keep abreast o f the changes in

and the growin

requirem ents o f discipline ashore and afloat

other disr'

procedures into the Services. Like

Continue to evnlv^ • t f '

basically protean in nature and w ould thus

'vithout, and to ^ ^ *^®cping w ith developm ents w ithin the Services and

’^ c e o f

m ost im portant im plem ent fo r the m ainte-

11

O F THE SEA

h i s t o r y o f th e I n d '

the formdation o f *

promise tn

t h e Jaw of the s^'

‘' > ^ 8 * ^ “ , ? ' ’" “ ■ So Ar

" " “' “ “ rapidly d^ pr^ de^ f^

'h i ™ « ,d „

^

“ « e r In d L ^ * = “ concem«i, it had b ^

countries

o

f

^end towards unilaie^

^‘ates, vvouJd plT

parff

oceans made by

2'**ftandingth§^^®'‘%alinhibidon^^oth"’°"’^

developing ^oa^,.

tt>e Govemme^.»*^®®^tion, there w^f ^^^^^rcise of naval power.

and^fp ° ® ''^ * u a t e a n d ^ " “ '^^^honal/nechanismvvitf^

from piecemeal adl^^°"^''

formutT^*^ ocean-related activities, J

®**"Consirfo_,..

^C®fromfhQ»^- .

^ ^ ^tional nrpanc nnlicv.

THE LAW OF THE SEA / 325

and naval presence. It was realised th at the in c re a s in g c o m p le x ity o f n a v a l missions wodd principally arise th ro u g h d en ial o f la rg e a re a s o f o c e a n space coming under the actual or claim ed ju risd ictio n o f c o a s ta l sta te s.

Infact thela w of the sea had been developing over the centuries around the widely-accepted notion of the freedom of the seas which justified p cing fhe oceans at the disposal of all. This principle was based on two resources of the oceans were regarded

secondly, the resources were treated as res

’iulius, zrantino

'vorld community) as opposed to r£s

'fixst-comer', and hSfce were not

assiunpKons

'^®’^^^^s*veusebyanysingle state. In view of these

tJ>eirvastecnnnm;V^^ were the subject of political or naval rivalry but of theii resources

and the exploitation

During thesP r l!!?

minimal.

•^sveiopmentofanaH

navy constituted the key element in the

'•'osdy content with

Asaresult, thecoastalstateswere

"'as Only in t^g 2 0 t ^ ^ ^ claiming a narrow belt of territorial waters. It resources near their

coastal states, finding their fishery

^‘‘pped Vessels of fn

^creasingly threatened by large and better-

jjational authority

tes, sought to pro tect them by ex tending their

'^w the beginrupp

adjacent to theircoast.TheendofWcrldWar

P^'vers and the eni

^^colonisation of the possessions of Western

new states in Africa and Asia. Fears and

^ “Cations Qfj^^^'^°*^3™i-basedi^atural resources stimulated practical

!°^^6oceansor ”^*®^^°^°8y/^6ading to revolutionary changes in the feiu

Spired hv°tvf

® Truman Proclamation on thecontinen-

fhe

’Mediate! Ik

^63^" of a shortage of hydrocarbons, was

convgr^p

J ^ y ^ o s e of the developing countries, culminating in

Pttonofthg^ “

1-aw of the Sea Conference in 1958 and the

^

after irv^^ -^eneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea.

ew

miles

1947,India claimeda territorial sea of three

^edbetvvpo

'"^"ous questions relating to maritime areas were We •

1955 and December 1956 and four Presidential

/®^^®^®dclaiminga territorial sea of six miles, a contiguous

1> ^ '^ontinp.^f ^°"servation zone for fisheries extending up to 100 miles acK "®^icatio

of shallow sea area bordering a continent.

L ,'® ^ re g a j.(j;^ ]^ ® ™ e re gen eral p ro n o u n cem en ts an d no co n s^ u e iitia l

.

W

a s p v p r * a i - < a n

A c a n a c i i l t n f i n d e c i s i o n o r i n a c t i o n /

accpc •

was ever taken. As a result of indecision or inaction,

Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea

thp

under consideration for a long period. On September

On in t>

waters of India were extended to 12 miles, largely as

• akistan's extension of her waters from three to 12 miles rather

326 / b l u e p r in t TO BLUEWATER

^on^ycomiderationsofdeliberatepolicy.ll.us,inthethenprev,ii„

f^ lh p

articulate any managementpS •

insHfi K

the question of havingjflj

institutional arrangements never arose since the navy represented lis major national activity in ocean issues.

^*"''^t'however,berecognisedthatthecontributionofthenavyinihi cision-making apparatus of the Government of India was largely lv result of individual efforts made by officers who manned the LawCaditd e Navy from time to time. One such officer deserving of mention is Shi E.E. Jhirad who took over as the Judge Advocate of the Fleet in 1946aha having served in the Royal Indian Navy for a few years. He wasanacknov*!

edged expert in the fieldof International Law and because of his specialisaton, he took keen interest in the deliberations of the Inleniatifl Law Conunission which had been set up in 1949 by the General AsseW

of the United Nations in order to select topics relating to the law of for codification.

^

The la w s re la tin g to th e o ce a n s w e re intensively I r te m a tio r w l Law C o m m is s io n b e tw e e n 1 9 4 9 an d 1956 and on tw m e e x te n s iv e g r o u n d w o r k d o n e b y th e Commission, the N a tio n s C o n fe re n c e o n th e Law o f th e Sea w as convened s u c c e e d e d in a d o p tin g fo u r c o n v e n tio n s o n territo rial seas and ^

z o n e s , h ig h s e a s , fish e rie s a n d c o n s e rv a tio n o f the living resource*

a n d co n tin e n ta l sh e lv e s.

conference, however, failed to agree on two

issues submitted to it, viz., the precise extent of the

Unitprf

exclusive fisheries zone. In 1960, thetefote,

Conference on the U w of the Sea was convened to

,

conference could not succeed in achiev**^

I n d i a n ^ £ ^ * t A d v o c a t e of the Fleet was a

second co^ pV ^

participa ted in the delibera tions of the

tionCv esoou .

'

Sea and made a significant c o n ^

of the'lndLn d e S o H l S

^

the oceans and s 2 !

tion to the evoluKnn r.#

conferences and made significant

continental shelf nature^^rilhi*^*’’®

relating to the defi^ '

tal shelf, character of

^ exercised by a coastal state on its c

above those waters la vin

waters of the high seas or the a

^

on

niaintenance of subn^rine cables

t h

e

LAW OF THE SEA / 327

, „ , p „ u i . i n i „ « n « U o r « U a w , p o l . u . i o n o ^ ^ ^ ^

was.., a -d

passage o f

, .e^ afy to th e

Thereportsonthedeliberationsm^etwoco^^^^^^

^ ^ 3,

peBistence and assiduousness with which national vie p

issues were negotiated and gained the acceptance

””™Apill^om the work of the two United Natiom

of the Sea, three major developments were gradually m e _ ^

1950s which required a re-evaluation of the scope and impo

_jygd

power. The first major development was political in

®

newly

the rapid increase in the number of new rtations- ^ m e

alien

emerged nations were inclined to look on international law « .

sys!em which the Western nations had imposed on them and w

'

hadbegun to claim the right to select those rules which suit^ tJ^ir J"

orwhicharoseoutofagreem entstowhichtheyhadthem selves

P

earlier. Thus, psychologically, the developing states

conditions had changed and that they were not obligated

rJ^cuIar

created by others - rules that were not designed to protect their pa interests.

^

jn^e second development, which was technical in

in

P«^y escalating techiwlogical revolution around

8*° »hp v^seabed

^elopedcountries,had alerted thenations of the

of the continental shelf and ocean floors.

the

0 uti^ in the oceans had just started gatlwring ^

visio n of what

v a C o n v e n tio n sw e re co n clu d e d in l9 5 8 .T h e re a

'

j. recen tly, the

e x p a n d e d ^ n o n n o u s l y ^ ^

shor!

petroleum resources took place

t he depths of

J°^;now off-shore platforms extracting the Uquid

^ Oceans dot the seas all over the world and are rap»dly

P®r Waters.

. ^onof

. The third development was the

arouruJ the three

■sue of the extent of the tenitorial sea m

gain intemabon^

limits. The Soviet Union

* f

the UnitedStat^ was

her long-standing 12-mile eta

^

were sign

bi(y.J^”^Pioning the cause of the th r^

^

superpo'J'^'

of

nations aligned with the positoo

voted for b

««wly emering nations of

cast their v o t ^ w i * ^

i^°rialsealixnits^Lanticoloni^^^*^^,,ftheNA

328 / b l u e p r in t TO BLQEWATER

faUedto iLIa

held in 1958 and 19f«t„a

o ffs lire rri^ d ic tfo n ^ ^ ^

countries

increase at an alarming rate. A number of

Am^ri

extended their territorial waters to 12 miles or beyond.TTieLatin

?nn

•*!

claimed a territorial sea exlendingtc

<!taf

vv Tvr^

coast, consistently maintained it. Some of the African

.

^ Nigeria, Congo, Mauritania and Ghana also extended thei temtonal sea to a distance much beyond 12 miles.

strong tendentious move was thus evident whereby coastal states were making urureasonable claims appropriating huge portions of the

^earvs as an extension of the areas within their jurisdiction and control Moved to acHon by this alarming trend, the initiative to call a wotM

conference was taken by Arvid Pardo, Malta's representarive at the United bons. Pardo had a horrendous dream wherein he saw that the era o s

ace vessels had passed and that the seabed and the ocean floor w^s

^ r ^ with crawling and creeping defence installations and

*

niankind was facing the prospect of extinction. Soon

^ l o n came public knowledge and statements were made by

j,.

the useof the submarine-launchedl*

(SLBM) and other sophisticated ballistic missiles which co^

fir^ underwater from vast distances, and with the articulation o‘

Destruction), Pardo was

sionpH 1

t “ 'visioned was a distinct possibility. He made ^ ^

A s s e m ^ f

T

T h

h iis

c

preserv

Ve

C t

h

u i e

e o

o c

c e

e a

a n

n s

s

a

a s

s

a

a c

c o

o m

m m

m o

o n

n

heritage o

- f

|

nir«

m »sg g

v ii^

g orous ssp

u eeeecch

h helped a_ _g

__r_e_a

_ t_ deal in brin

• g

__ i

_ n

_ g

__ cto

h asrh

o a^ * icea

Inhi<5

suitable means for the peaceful uses of

itnij

be temoteH^f^

^^’^P^essed the apprehension that some county

(.jg

aka'

world

competence to achievenear-^

.

oceanflonr' TK- '^ “ ‘^•jugn preaominant control over the

already begun 'and wiB

MKl a\e oceans sutossv

over the land undcrlyinS

scramble

^ rnagnitude and in its implications

ordertopr^tw f^r^.'^J^^'^^^A frica.'H efurtherpleaded^^^

increasing tensions

.®^'^*®*^®''®^opedstatesfromcausing

^,1

floor-. . should be frow.

sovereignty over the seabed

jfis

formulated' and that thic'

^

definition of the continental

peaceful pu-JSe^and",

mankind' shouldbe

m a n W , with particular

primarily in the inter

In 1968 the General As£ . J ki

of the poor countries-

member committee on the nea

United Nations constitut»i

tee on the peaceful uses of the seabed and the ocean

L A W O F THE SEA / 329

beyond the limits of national ju risd iction

o f P rin -

X em ber 1970 the Geaetal

the'subsoil hereof

ciples' governing the seabed, the o ce a n

th a t the

teyondthelitrals of national jurisdiction

^

'pfmankind' and

.,4«danditsresourcesarethe;co,™ o^^^^^^^

shall be subject to an international reg im e estab lish ed Dy treaty generaUy a g re e d u p o n .

. , . i „ f ; n n t o c o n v e n e a T h i r d

'nieGeneral A s s e n n b l y f u r t h e r a d o p t e d a resoiutio

^ equitable

Conference o n th e L a w o f th e S e a w h i c h would e hcnil th e re o f'

intem ationalregim e fo r th e s e a b e d a n d t h e o c e a i^ f l o o r a n d s u b s o u m beyond the lim its o f n a t i o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n . T h e S e a b e y, ^iv Vor th is

enlarged from 42 to 86 m e m b e r s to a c t a s a p r e p a r a t o r y

- Y

nif

VVlui the convening of the Third United Nations

Law of the Sea in 1973, the Indian Government set up an

Committee on the Law of the Sea and the Seabed i^der tn

^

^retary. The Secretaries of some of the Mirustries of the

,

fridia and the Chief of the Naval Staff were ex officio

ofthe

onumttee. For each session of the Third LIN Conference

® " ^ ^ 8 6 -

a- the brief for the Indian delegation was

y

^

^ Indian delegation to the Third Conference was led

officers as

'V, Justice & Company Affairs and included two s ^ o r

Defence -

representatives of Naval Headquarters and the

p^er of the

Commodore (later Rear Admiral) F.L. Fraser, Chief H y ^ f s f i ^ naval law'^K^'^ Captain (later Rear Admiral) O-P.

officers were

je

° t h e Judge Advocate General of

, 3 ^ 5 of the sea e.g,

ponsible for negotiations on all aspects of tradi

^ewly developed

extent of the territorial sea, the contiguous

, continental shelf,

of the exclusive economic zone, the broa ®

. ijtatginallthese

Shseasandthenatureof rightsexercisablebya

these zones.

„nes and thos. of sl»% of other

uS scope of

Ugh some of the developments mentioned

inclusion here, bu

overed ir\ this volume, their

jhe conflict involving the

also needs to be stressed at this stage IS * a t *

states

and the

t &

r - d r r s s i - ' - ' ” -* "'

330 / b l u e p r in t TO BLUEWATER

bKoming areas

logical or econnm,v / !

resulting from the advent of new techno-

t o i s o l a t e t h p n r i n •

^ i . ° ’} ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ° ^ ^ * ^ ^ ® x a g 8 e r a te d .b u titis p o s s ib k fo u r*

d i a l e c t i c a l t e n s i o n w h i c h a c tiv a te them. We see

-

u n i d i m e n s i o n a l , i t is b e c o m in g pluridimensionai; ifc 1

® ^s® ritially a l a w r e l a t i n g t o m o v e m e n t , m o r e a n d m o re it is taking I t s p l a c e a s a l a w r e l a t i n g t o a p p r o p r i a t i o n ; o ^ t h e m o s t p a r t it w a s a la w o f a p erso n a l character in which the notion o s o v e r e i ^ t y h a s l i t t l e p l a c e ; t o d a y , o n t h e c o n t r a r y , it h a s becom e territo-a a w w i t h ^ e j u r i d i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e s t h a t i t im p lie s ; a w o 3 uruversalnatuTeandfunction,itnow eiveseffectm oreandm ore to regional situations.

T h e s e f o u r p r i n c i p l e s s h o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d , a s a lw a y s in a dialectic^

^ l y s i s a s p o r t r a y i n g n o t p h e n o m e n a o f s u b s t i t u t i o n b u t sources»

^ ^ ^ ‘^ P riricip le , the seco n d altern ative does not replace the I t o ^ y c o n f r o n t s t h e f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e o b U g in g t h e f ir s t to ta k e accountof it w .th o u l succeeding in ciestroying the fir s t

,

i n t P r S ^ - ^ '"

t h e s e a h a s a d ir e c t b e a rin g on I n i

S a S

'^ f ^ ^ ^ ® '^ ® ^ « i ‘=‘^® beinganim portantrnem berof t h e c o ^

e x t t ^ S S “ I

f o i m a n y y e a r s h a d b e e n d e m a r i j g theriehK nK

S^s in the W estern concept o f the law of the sea and c a

hadsDpr" 1 ^ ^ ^ ^ ® ^ ^^*°P® *^ cipateintheform ationofthesealaW , r ' " ‘ “ ' “ “ ‘^“ ^ ^ “

“ S in g la w b e c a u s e o f h e r p e ^ ^

"f^ ^ p a x le n c e the

was preparing lK « f “

later in 1976 h

interests through natiortal legislation, which s

the e x t e n t S h e r territo rS l waters to 12naut.®

tion of the conKno .

^-®v the low-wa ter line, and the j ,

'ftv ro u g jh o u t th e o r o ln

«

s e a b e d a n d th e s o il b e lo w the se

c o n tin e n ta l m a r ^ nr

te r r ito r y to th e o u te r ed g e

^v h ere th e

^0 0 n a u t i c a l m ile s f r o m th e b a s e ^

d is ta n c e '. I n d i a 's n o lir v •

m a r g in d o e s n o t e x te n d u p

resources in the coastal ar^

to support the protection of

^on

of the pace of progress towaVd '

exploitation and theaccelerab

only pron?ote® Se

intem aitonal laws that

order but would also widen S,

® ™ore balanced and just econo

establishment.

for international cooperation for

THE LAW OF THE SEA / 331

India has a vast coastline extending to over 6,000 kilometres and a

'constelJation' of 1,280 outlying islands and islets, most of which are in the archipelagos of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal and Lakshadweep group of islands in the Arabian Sea. The Indian coastal margin in these two seas covers a very large area that has hremendous potential for exclusive exploitation for hydrocarbons and other living and mineral resources.

~

M defined in Article 10 of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, an surrounded by water, which is

islandsarp^

• pince India has 1,280 islands, even if some of these

the

growing acceptance of the 200-miles limit of

125 nnn cm, ^ ®^°^°™ic zone, each island would bring a minimum of thoufih in ^ '^^i^tical miles of sea area into the country's jurisdiction atound the

considerable overlap of these areas

^iongwiththep r

archipelagos. These sea areas,

zone, Would nl ^

200-na utica 1 mile s tre tch of coas ta I exclusi ve economic

Exploitation

^ very large area at the disposal of India for the exclusive

*

resources.

the rapid!

of the im m ense potential of ocean resources

powers to atte^ '''i d l i n g land resources has already led the m ain naval of whi

the law of the sea to suit their ow n needs as a

exclusive eco^

have ended up am ong the possessors of the biggest

'*®' ®lopxnenK

w orld m ap. W riting on the international

na- f

the law of the sea in its issue of July 18,1 9 8 7 , The has bee

"•

grabs of all time, a quarter of the earth's surface

3rea fn

poached within a few years. Claims covering a total

P3 J.J

times the size of Africa have been asserted and, for the m ost Unrip

little fuss that few people either noticed or

w hat w as happening.

^°'vino /

dem and for hydrocarbons and protein from the sea, the

'^Pidlyl,

the fishing fleet for taking fish from the sea, the

turnover of the offshore platforms extracting petroleum

pollufj

the oceans'subsoil and thegrowingfearsoflarge-scalemarine doctrii^p

to the old 'high seas' or 'freedom of the seas

tptvii, .

national iiiricrlirHnns hpinff confined to a nai

terrijor- i

ruitional jurisdictions being confined to a narrow stnp of

’3 Waters, preferably only three miles wide.

earlier, extensive claims to arbitrary stret<*es of

s m ,

Piinri

^

Americas, began to multiply from 1945. In

i

Of

of the three-mile-limit was virtually abandoned by the judgement

!Iin te

t r national Court of Justice on the dispute b etw ^ n Bntam

^Y/ leading to greater prospects of conflict and chaos. The ir

332 / b l u e p r in t TO BLUEWATER

£™ H ~= sS E 3s= i^

r i e h t s 'n f n

s t a t e s , B r o a d - m a r g i n ' c l a i m a n t s , s ta te s contesting the TnH M 1

s u c h a s theG ibralar,H om uz

wi+K ^

m i n e r a l p r o d u c e r s a n d m a n y other groups

a<i

trying to carveout

0 the new 'w o rld ' for themselves as they possibiy could, re-m am d m g one o f the 'g o ld rush' o f yore.

ut by the middle of the 1960s, winds of change blowing across the oceans w ere perceptible around the globe and the developingnations began The first U nited Nations Conference held in 1958had

,

®

® ^^®^^tional la w w h ic h a p p e a re d to ru n co u n te r to the interests

■ *"^fP®^dent countries though it had produced four convention c o a s fa T ^ f

practices: freedom o f the seas as long conceived; e

toms

^ sovereignty in its territorial sea; its ancillary physical cus-eicn ripht

*’™ ^ 8 ^ 3 tio n rights in a contiguous zone; and its sove

atSr^n^d

second C onference held m

to s ix ^ p s ”

jurisdiction of coastal states over territorial wa

to S

e

i n --additional six miles as exclusive fishing zone but fa^

f o i S r t r t s u T r '"

for its acceptance and then ^

meagre resourrP<°”?

^®^s faUed to

the accelerating n a °

t developin g co u n tries. D urin g the i 960s,

gj

considerably a ltered °th ^ ^ ^ °^ °^ ^ ^ ^ '

^

o*'

th e firs tc o n fe re n c r ‘^ t ^ ^ ^ ’ Ocean relatio n sh ip . In 1 9 3 0 the p an ts, the U N C LO S 2

o n ly 4 4 , th e U N C L O S 1 in 195« h a d 86pa

^ough the aUgnments fn

^

universality to its

the

North-South confronta'tir, obvious reasons, increasingly resentb ^

d evelo p ed co u ritries seew ?

countries attempting to

1°

their b en efits an d the

^

resou rces. It is iA tereV t^gT^tnf

81 states asserted over 5Tn

the third Conference,

claims for thp ^“ '^^dictional claims o f varying degf

‘Krafican, is u « „ t e remaining 35

t h e L A W O F T H E SEA / 333

rfc h is b e b ig cla im e d b y th e cM S ta lsta te sa n a ^ ^ ^ ^

“ “ S

.

p eerC eu m —

»dules in the oceans o f th e w o rld ,

t o o u g h o u t th e

3,000 to 6,000 metres and w h ich

tonnes and, u r ^

majoroceansoftheworld,areestnnated^300^^^^

^

fossil fuels, are renewable. These pollymeta

^

nickel, cobalt,

abundant source of important metals s^uc as

'^inc, lead and

copper and, to a lesser extent, molybdenum, -

rnillion

cadmium, and are spread over an ocean area

square kilom-

square kilometres in the Indian Ocean as aga

i-^vinc been found

etres in all the oceans of the world, the richest deposits ..b

^

in the Pacific Ocean.

ps of the oceans is the

Besides fish, another important living

-^isandpharma-

seaweedwhichcanbe exploitedfor food,fertiliser,^c

seaweeds) and

ceutical products. The demand for agarphytes v-^oP

jgoidly though

alginophy tes (algae) in India and abroad is m«eas g

»

ow country is yet to develop a viable

The recent allocation of a sea area or 1 ^ ^ - - * ,

exploration

International Seabed Authority, a United

exploitation, to

and mining of the oceans' mineral wealth for co

by the UN,

hdia, the first country to be entrusted

, f^rge an alUance of the

augurs well for the developing countries ar\d CO

resources and

'South' states for an equitable distribuhon

exploitation. After

acquisition of the technology for their extrac

-^^^gtres in the centra

su^eying an area of over

kilometres of comrn«^

Ind]anOcean,two mine sites, each of 150,

having a density of 21

'^lal viability, the richest areas at these ®'

- j g n t i f i e d f o r the extrac

gramme o f n o d u l e s p e r s q u a r e metre,

ve

of our ocean wealth.

ctnalnstitutedeDriotlntemation ,

AsRene-JeanDepuy,membero

'Pteedom of

,t^as

Freedom of the seas has

f

effect the right of the ^

IndustrialEuropeofthel9thcenWr^^^^^^^jl

licence, that of the poor w a ^ u

,d comity of na

j^ ^ a l

there is a growing

^^°"°T.anied ^cha

changes

the technological po^^^^^b.accon.paniedDy

8

structure of the intemation

i Taw at Jawaharlal

in Law.

„ fpssot of International Law

j

R am Prakash A^^^nd, Pr '

that new law

l^ehiu University, New Delhi, opu«

334 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATEK

is taking the place of old dogmas, and this new law must be in accordance with the needs of the new society. The sea is no longer a mete navigation route, a recreation centre, or dumping ground.Itis the lastphase of man's expansion on the earth and must become an areaof co-operation for orderly progressive world development in whidi al wDl share equally and equitably.

One hopes that the law of the sea would continue to evolve to fulfil tlus hope.

12

THE SUN SETS ON

PORTUGAL'S ASIAN EMPIRE

Liberation of Goa, Daman and D iu ^

Sy the end of the 16th cen tu ry , th e P o rtu g u ese o ccu p ied “ ” 1^? a , M S 'S

popularly know n a s the 'jew els ixv th e P o rtu g u e se

-

S alsette,

^ tire length of th e In d ian co astlin e i ^ c l u d ^ D m , a

^

Chaul, Bombay, San Thome (near M^ras)

. ^j^jchwere

f ) % l 9 4 7 m o s t o f t h e m w e r e l o s t s a v e G o a ,D a m a n ^ ^ ^

liberated by India in 1961. With that ^ d

,. ^g£.ountry,who

;^abia and In d ia' ev er sin ce V asco d a G a rm

m onarchs b y the bull

^ o v e r l o r d s h i p h a d b e e n gran ted to

Alexander VI, JuUus H

\papal edicts) of different p op es su ch as

'

d ecad e of the 15th

Leo X on the basis of w h ose fiat,

,o a „ the u n d is c o v e r^

'^e»»tury,Portugal w as given the

370 leagues w est and sou

<^oimtries to the east o f'a n imaginary bned

Cape V erde Islan d s.'

M iddle ^ g^’s had such

by

T h o u gh 'n o ev en td u rin g

the sea-route to I n d ^

'Ussions o n the c i v i U s e d * y e r ? ^ s e a - r o u t e ^ / " u t i c S -

'‘'ascodaGama,theEuropeand.scoW ^ ^^^^^^^^^g^enofnautic

^ ^ v v a s o f n o g r e a t i m

p o r t a n c e a

''enture. To quote K.M- Pan>

•

' ' ' “

^ ’ ' " ^ ’ ■ T O B L U E W A T C R

f ted l,gh, on Vasco's achievem ^T

c«tfc?nr----- India was in nn «nc« ,V».

^nco^ita. It w a s in c lo s e c o m r .K r

and the Moors. Besides

t

through the Venete

consisting main]v of Ar^w

f

on the coast of Afriti

and da Gama Iiad thp hoi T

'"outes and the winds,

the Kine of ]Uoi- ^

*P°^~°^p6tent Arab pilots supplied tohimby

A / r i ^ & , 5 n ^

P“ "

broughJ him lo W Htalli

entirely on

v, fyarie, was, however, an Indian).... His glory is based

responsible!

results that followed,forwhichhewashard]y

on trade

before the Chris tian era, India has b een carrying

ports on „^^®f*^y^^^‘^andsea,thesearoutepassinggenerallyff«®

^^erchar\disefh'^^v,^^^* Coast to the Persian Gulf or the Red Sea, or other M pHu

overland respectively to Beirut, Alexan

entrepots.

ports-and from there by sea to various

'^here the trado"^^^ Indian port was Cranganore (Kodungallore)

"Merchandise

fanned out to Arabia, Egypt and

countries and brin^ "mainly comprised pearls, pepper and

rise of Islam in

^®ad and other commodities.

g^aduaUyToScI^"^’" ' r e f e r r e d to in Europe those days as j^rts in India and fV.

^ existence for several countnes

^

flow Of m S ch fn H -^ ^

Sea, Red Sea and the P e r s i ^ ,

-h a t led

< „ . . .

wece Sf=5

THE SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL'S ASIAN EMPIRE / 337

Reports from travellers about the fabulous wealth of India were the stimulus for several great voyages of discovery, leading to the search for a sea route to the East receiving fresh impetus under the Poxtuguese Prince Henri theNavigator, during the firsthalf of the 15th century. Tlie European natioi^at that time did not know the exact location in the Indian Ocean of Ma, China and Sri LanJca, the main sources of silk and spices. When Dorn Pedro Prince Henri's brother and a great traveller, obtained an invaluable K

m . A

‘’y

f

Sieatesl traveller known to

route to

^ tremendous fillip to the quest for the sea

'in a darlf

But India continued to be as elusive as before

Z

T

^perfectly understood world'.

Pope to r!!!? •

of Portugal, in perpetuation of the bull granted by the

rainty over all

conferring on him and his successors suze-

•^6 African W

might be discovered beyond Cape Bojador on

fionstotheEas^K

in 1434, 'including India', sentexpedi-

Europeantrari '

.*^®*^‘^®®3/WiththedualgoalofdevelopingLido-

^yJoao n Alfn

Christianity. The two emissaries despatched

reachine

Paiva and Joao Peres de Colvilhao, parted company

iatterembarl^

former proceeding by land to Ethiopia and the

'Siting Cali

Arab Vessel andreaching the Ma Jabar Coast and also

Sofala and^

return to Aden from Calicut, Colvilhao proceeded

the sea

information from Arab sailors on the trade with

Ocean and n

Calicut, the location of the major islands in the Indian

w h e r e O c e a n . He then proceeded to Cairo

^ *f the Po f

^ detailed report to liis King. Hie report also pointed out

^°3st Were ^

sWps which traded with Guinea on the African West

’'•esouUig °

their course southwards, they were likely to reach

had s F

continent and then proceed eastwards to India. Thus

■'^®^3rers a H

limited to rumour and hearsay among European

If

had now been cor\firmed by Colvilhao.

®entouth \Z^'^*olmew de Diaz, a brave seafaring adventurer, who was o f t h e n e / ^ g J o a o Ilin 1 4 8 7 to sail d ow n t h e w e s t co ast of Africa in quest firs^t

D iaz p ro ceed ed d ow n the African W est C oast and was

® '^ O u n /°5“ 8 u ese to ro u n d the continent's southernm ost tip Storms while rounding the cape. He

led on for some

u

sailors' entreaties to turn back but, after a

^

projected venture across the Indian Ocean and re ^ rn ^ to

338 / BLUEPRJNTTOBLUEWATER

Chinese and tho a t If T

coasts of Europe, Only theHindus,i!u

offtese , the Hmdus had the largest share till the end of the 13th cento/.

Di~-

achievements of the Indian and Arab seafarers,whal

^

w e s tc o a s to f Africanduringhisvoyageiuut

pe, w as in no w a y rem ark able but, in a way, it is considered epocb-a

S

it m ad e a direct route to India from Europe possible.

V asco da G am a's In d ian Lan d fall

In 1495 King Joao II died and his successor, King Manoel, continued fe ettorts to reach India by sea. From the experience g a i n e d by BathoIofflW

r

other Portuguese seafarers of the sea conditions 3**^®

^ o d Hope and the east coast o f the African continent, a new design W

long endurance was evolved by Portuguese naval architects an

ps were specially built for the expedition to India.

board

Gama, an experienced sailor, was to lead

“ ' ’™ ' < '2 0 t e r n ), ttie fla g s h ip o f a four-ship G a m a ^

ftlp te e l ( 1 0 0 to n s ) c o m m a n d e d b y his

f r ”

“ ™ ^ n d e d b y N ic o la s C oelh o, and “ ^

Nunis'

anununition ship (200 tons), commande*^

I

S s T a

Sac Gabriel h a d a n overaU

w ith a n a r ta v o ? 2 n

a n d six

With the PorT

displayed on her main-top tr\a

With

Manoel.

. Va5f“

da Gama, the

160 men under the

25,1^' ;

fleet a r riv p S ^ ° ^

Belem near Lisbon

1497. W h i l e t h e s o u t h e m e n d o f A l r ^

the ships'crew co n tJ

encountered a viol ^

to throw the

"mutiny but it was put down by da

"'embers of the

®

side and arresting some r

^

on the

^ e m b e r 25,1497 a n ^ ^“ “ theast coast was sighted by the ^’‘P^fgrrP ^

on

I’irth). By F e ^

appropriately

and w a t^ '

had

having encountered

damage Tho

and

hence broken^

8»- The st„,e

^

Sao

^ ^

su(fc

1»

" " “ "•'■on ship h ad a lre a d y been s«>'

THE SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL'S ASIAN EMPIRE / 339

Portugal after her stores had been transferred to the other ships.

There were now only two ships left, the Sao Gabriel and the Sao Raphael, whidi reached Mozambique, then an important Arab trading centre of the African coast, in March 1498. At this African entrepot, they acquired necessary stores and victuals for the voyage across the Indian Ocean and also carried out some major repairs to the two remaining ships. Vasco da Gama then engaged a local pilot who helped him navigate the ships further ncrth to Melinde, the regular port of departure for Indian destinations, mere was considerable traffic in those days between India and the African

^ Arab ports across the Indian Ocean and so it was not difficult for Vasco a ama to fmd a capable and experienced pilot. It was a Gujarati Moorish ro er and pilot, Davane, who had excellent knowledge of the winds and offered to counsel da Gama against raising any possible Arab

jealo^y^d to pUot the expedition across the Ocean,

was { ^

monsoon winds had already begun, the weather

avourable and Vasco da Gama and his brother embarked on their

®f^ross the Indian Ocean on Aprfl 24,1498. After spending

zon

sighted a large blue land mass on the eastern hori-

closer approach, was clearly defined as the famous land-

^

n India s west coast. Mount Deli (also known as Kappat). The ships the nnrtk

® roadstead off Capocate 'which stood two leagues to

^

of the great city of Calicut' and dropped anchor on 17May, 1498.

accord^

ruler of Calicut, who bore the hereditary tide of Zamorin,

for th

welcome to Vasco da Gama whose visit opened the way

Princrn

of commercial relations between Portugal and the

fojl

ori the Indian peninsula's western seaboard. This was soon

“firs A

Portuguese merchants coniing to India's shores in large num-

Calip f P®™Wcar looks at it, 'llie full significance of da Gama's arrival at a 2oq^

recognised only if we appreciate that it was the realisation of year-old dream pnd of 75 years of sustained effort'.

® 'Portuguese Spread their Tentacles

Alvar

Gama soon ret^*rr^

Lisbon on March 9,

M O / b l u e p r i n t t o b l u e w a t e r

established b y 'l^ 'c a m t c a b r a r

c l a f ^ e d 'a f p ™ C « “

^

Africa and p a s s ^ t l i o u l ,> » '

w h e , e h a l f l S s s C 3

fhe Cape of Q»d H„

venture and reach J i

^

coasted to the S d „ ? ? T ” “

*’®

IheGulWan*.,,

tim e o n ly siv of h k

p roceed ed to Calicut, by which

F

Vi

sh ip s w e re left.

t h e P o r h i ^ ^ very O u tset Cabral h a d decided to establish the supremacyol lim its of

e a ste rn se a s. H e n ce , in stead o f confininghiinself fothe and deori V-tra d e , h e b e g a n raid ijig m erchantm en of other nations Calicut

benefits of fheir commerce. Zamorin, therulerof

h e an d ViJc

“d e p e n d e d o n A ra b m erchants withvvhoin

b rou B h H n f^ 't *^^^.*^

e x tre n ie ly co rd ial relaions, was thus inevitoWy

toehold on T°

'v ith thp P o rtu g u e se . In their efforts to establis a E u ro p e th p P

c o n t r o l o v e r In d ia n tra d e w ith West Asia ^

w ith ru lers

s ta r te d b e frie n d in g an d entering

^ j a s o f Cr»rK-

P ^ ^ * P 3 ^ itie s o n th e w e s t c o a s t o f India, especia y CVK-

^ ^ " ‘^ ^ °^ a th iri(C a n n a n o re ).

„

a desire

going to adoDt

‘"dw^ation of the marauding

followed him ’ai^

refusal to pay the customs of the port. Ca r '

complete mor\onni °"r '^®^“'^ocal and uncompromising

who n a v i e a t L ° t l

including confiscation of

gues®

^

led to a sPa

perm ission of the

Of Which t S S

i r ? "

Z am o rin 's n a v y and Cabral s fl^e

^

had to sail aw ay.

^«realfoun(j^^

Daman and Diu

^

cam efo r

I"d ia w as laid by

S u &

r

S

f "

ter appointed G o v ^ ,

time, w^s' *"

v^hich belonged to the

a s a i S l S ! 2 4 ‘^ ^ ° ^ c a t i o n r ^ ! i “ ®^ ^

Albuquerque

^

of

com m ercial

poliO^

.

^ r e g a r d ^ - th?w ' *^®daGama,continuedW ith

Albuquerque

^

appearance off the west coast in the b e g i ^

THE SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL'S ASIAN EMPIRE / 341

of 1510. At first anHcipating a valiant resistance, he sent his nephew aiongwithTimoja to take soundings. They discovered a fort which was weU provided with guns and defended by 400 men, and they not only had the hardihood to a ttack, but the good fortune of capturing it. This SMmed a most auspicious commencement, and proved only the first 0 a series of fortunate events which followed rapidly, and put Albuquerque in possession of this most important locality before he was require to sWke a blow. According to Portuguese accounts, some njuror oi fakir whose predictions were implicitly believed, had an-p r « ^ tu t *

destined shordy to become subject to foreign-

of ffnnri ^1 ■

^ prediction, the inhabitants thought it a stroke

ul

u H

l m

H

m f

f I u

ins

--t-e

- a

l d

ii o

ci f

i e

uin

tid

r u

ieri

a n

ug

i t

dhe

M m

Cgis

e er

w i

ne

i s

c o

n f

1

1a

1

1s

1 i

5 e

1 ge which must

t o ^ ^ ^ u

^

voluntary surrender. A ccordingly,

m ost agreeable surprise of Albuquerque, w hen he

lation a 'f

^ M arch 1510, h e w as received ashore by the populate w h u

their n ative prince, conducted in state to the

palace

received the keys and therea fter put in possession of a

take-wa^r^*^

of Bijapur, wa s iriformed of Albuquerque's

witha f ^

®

m ad e preparations and attacked Goa in M ay

-^uquern^

contingent of troops and drove the Portuguese out of Goa.

Cannanore A

^ set h ad to perforce return to Anjadip and then to

when th

m onths later, how ever, he returned to Goa with a large

sonr.reca h

w as aw ay and launched a brutal attack. H e

hepute

a n d ,in a n a c t of greatblood-bath and wanton cruelty,

India

sw ord. Goa thus becam e the capital of Portuguese

‘^OntroUi

I

Albuquerque died in 1515, the Portuguese were

naval ®

s w est coast andhad established themselves as thestrong-

power in the region.

Karvva

Anjadip, situated about eight kilometres southvi^est of

and K-

visited by the Portuguese in 1498 whsn Vasco da Gania

after

‘

a few days. They established themselves there in 1503

a

from Arab traders who had occupied it after driving out

in the 15th cenhiry. The Portuguese r e ^ o rc e d Uie

‘’'hiding a formidable fortress on it. J ^ w e v e ^ ^ e forfress that

«teontheisIandtodaywasbuiJtinl682andwasniannedbyaPortuguese untU its liberation. Anjadip was used for centuries thereafter as a

.

Gulf of Cambay about 160

f “ometrcs n'orttTrf

was fonm rly ceded lo the Portuguese by the

^^'athas

342 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

3 detached pargana, Nagar Haveli, to its east, the latter includ rro<j

t

Haveli, was Indian territory which had to be

rossed to gam access to the tw^o pockets. Freedom fighters from both these enclaves ousted the Portuguese in 1954 which was followed by their accession to India.

Daman is cHvided into two distinct parts, Nani (small or northern) am ^ ^ d M o ti (big or southern) Daman, with a ferry crossingovera tidal nver being the only mear\s of physical communication between these two paite. After the loss of the two enclaves of Dadra and Nagar HaveU, thearea o amanhadbeenreducedfrom213 square kilometres to about 60square kilometres.

The Portuguese colony of Diu comprised a small area on the mainland, the island of Diu about 11 kilometres long and 3 kilometres broad, and a small island, Panikota, about 16 kilometres away to the east northeast.Tlus colony was gifted to Albuquerque by the ruler of Gujarat and Cambay, y^^g^f^/aftertheEgyptianfleetundertherenownedAdmiral jr

ussam, had fought two inconclusive sea battles with the Zamoi^s r S S

Portuguese in 1509 - he was in fact deprived of ^

^

of treachery on the part of the G o v e r n o r of

^ a z , who had withheld the supplies from the fleet - and had sm j Gujarat knd Cambay released Por^^^

of peace and allowed the Fortugu^

^ fortress on Diu island.

number

^

^ successors gradually esta

Diu SalspHp ^

settlements near the sea -

in Btogal - dottW fh

Bombay, San Thome near Madras ^

Sri Lanka too

entire length of the Indian Coast. The "'ajor P

“ wi ahalf most of

Portuguese influence. But over the nex

Diu Were left with the Portu^'

^ to r ic a l Background

* e

Past. References to it can be

onlyafewfragnient^rS'“ "“.'“-

ancient Hindu city of Goa,

^ t i o ^ i n t h e P e r i p i u 33f® ^ove, Govapuri and Goinant.

^ P d e d i n t h e 1st c e n tu ry

S e a ( G u i d e t o the I n d ia n

y y

^ c o m ^ c i a U y s u p p o ^ ^ - ^ ^ ^ i ^ r e m it is s a id to h a v e been p o ^ ^ ^ i s (P o n n a m ). G o a w a s re ferred to at l f h’

( Ca n n a n o r e ) a n d T ^ ,

the Island of Aegidni in West As.a

THE SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL'S ASIAN EMPIRE / 343

time. The mediaeval Arab geographers Icnew it as Sindabur or Sandabur and the Portuguese as Goa Velha.

Originally a tribe of Dravidiar\ origin known as Kannadigas, inhabited Goa and were converted to the Hindu faith by Hindus who came from the north. At the time of Ashoka, Buddhism came to Goa and was widely-practised unta the beginning of the 2nd century B.C. Then a Hindu tribe from Karnataka known as Kadambas captured Goa, devek>ped the place into a centre of trade and commerce and defertded their .territory with a strongarmy andnavy for thenext fifteen ceninrles. In 1312 Malik Kafur, the Lommander-in-Chief of Sultan Alauddin Khilji, invaded South India and, devastation andplundeiing, captured Goa. The territory

hv tha

by the Kadambas but was plundered once againin 1327

Goa

° Muhammad Tughlak. The Kadambas once again captured

thrown out by the navy of the Nawab of Honavar. It

domLri ^

the Mohammedan rulers of the Bahamani King-

ajid a Quart ^

emperors of the Vijaynagar Empire for over a century

five inde

^ til the break-up of the Bahamani Kingdom into

^usuf

^gdom s in 1482 when it was passed into the power of

first

Bijapur, who was its ruler when the Portuguese

For

shotes.

continuedT^^fl^^*

known for its commarce and trade and

declin °

under the Portuguese but the trade languished with

^

power in the east. Eaify in the 19th century

exDort^f^

confined to opium which came from Karachi and

^ 1843

China but this was stopped when the British annexed Sind

frade^^

centuries of the Christian era, Diu had a flourishing

'vealthv ■ 1

Persian Gulf and hence was a prosperous and

*his wealth which attracted the Portuguese who

trade

around the middle of the 16th century. There was regular

®ral CP . ^P^^ercial intercourse between Diu and Mozambique for sev-However, this trade gradually dwindled and ultimately

6

ecame the chief occupation of its inhabitants,

the snJ

18th centuty, the Portuguese had lost their influence in

sphere of Indian trade, though they were the earUest 'intmders mlo the d o w ^ f " ^ ° s to f th e m h a d taken to robbery a n d p i r a c y .'p i e c ^ ^ ^ ^ e i r were their reUgious intolerance, their clandestine a«d ^ o n e s*

disco

their ignorance and lack of respect for local

of B razil w M * d re w Ihelr colom sing a r f v l o e “ “ “

C

f

“ " ' P ' * ' successfuUy w ilh

E u ro p e ^ . M d « «

^ S o r t u g u e s e p c B K U te d n ot only the M oors b at »H non-Catholto*

3 4 4

/

b l u e p r i n t T O B L U E W A T E R

*

° ‘® " S * " '

Portuguese w cre^ L rafa,

eacherous, untrustworthy and barbarously cruel' They evenaUenated the K aja o f C o c h in , w h o w a s frie n d ly to them an<i supported them in their o p e ra tio n s a g a in st the Z am o rin , b y plundering and destroying one of his te m p le s a fter h a v in g p le d g e d n o t to harm it. They indulged in large-scale n e p o tis m an d a u ctio n in g p u b lic appointm ents and had a highly inefficient a n d co rru p t ad m in istration . It w a s bprause o f these aspects of their attitude to w a rd s fridisuis an d other A sian s that they eventuall5' lost t h e i r possession s to the t?utch, the E n glish and th«e French w ho had also proved to e b etter sold iers cind seam en.

The Struggle for Freedom Begins

hadbeen

E ver since the P ortu gu ese occupation of Goa, the local

thevety

Trtaking all efforts to th row o ff the y o k e o f slavery. Revolts s a ^

Fron^

first yea r o f P ortu gu ese occupation and w ere ruthless ^ ^^^jgcade-1555 tiiere w ere a num ber of rebellions averaging

j7g7 and

A n uprising kn o w n as Pin^n's rebellion

^eredetei^

p l a n n e d b y som e a r m y o f f i c e r s a n d a gro u p o f priests they'''

to overth row the Goverrunent and establish a

betrayeH by som e c o l l e a g u e s a n d t h e f i r s t major a ttemp smothered.

.

- -55 by

M eanw hile, a series o f revolts w ere staged since

^

^

m artial class know n as Rane. The Ranes in Goa continu

1912

rose in rebellion several times before being finally P^^^ps

the Portuguese authorities resorted to the use o

gedo*^

Portugal and sonr\e Portuguese colonies in Afnca.

19 12 ,

Urttil the fii\al suppression of the Rane rebellion

0i ih®

struggle in Goa w as violent in nature. However,

this century, they decided to adopt non-violent

p h i l o g o p h y o f a f e f m s a o f M a h a t m a G a n d h i . I h l 9 2 8 a G C J

w as formed b y Goans in Bon\bay at the

^

C u n h a , a firm b eliever in ruin-violence. This organ isati

th e G an d h ian cre e d for attaining liberty.

h c s '

O n Jim e 3 0 , 1946 M ahatm a G andhi w ro te in

ventxire to ad v ise ttie P ortuguese G o v em m en i o f G oa to

^ ^

o f th e tim es an d co m e to honotirable term s w ith its m ha

fu n ctio n o n an y treaty that m ight exist betweean them an

^

e m in e n t'. A t a m eeting held o n A ugust 12, 1946 the CO h

THE SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL'S ASIAN EMPIRE / 345

Committee passed a resolution accusing the Portuguese Government 0/

Goa ofhavingreduced the people of Goa to a state of penury leading to their migration out of the enclave and declaring that 'Goa has always been and must inevitably continue to be part of India. It must share in the freedom of (he Indian people'.

The struggle for freedom gained momentum after India attained Independence on August 15, 1947. Agitators in Goa began holding meetings to demand freedom in June 1948 and during the course of one of these meetings, the Indian socialist leader. Dr Ram Manohar Lohia, and several tocal leaders v/ere lathi-charged and arrested. In 1949 the Government of India wrote to the Government of Portugal seeking the peaceful transfer of thflirendavestolndia but the Portuguese, far from responding to theIncUan request, intensified flieir repressive measures and radically curtailed civil liberties in Goa. All efforts to negoHate Goa's merger w i* India were brought to nought by the Portuguese Goveimment's intransig^ce.

With India becoming a republic on Jariuary 26,1950 the

emment had decided to vacate its territorial possessions

^

coast and with that the freedom movement im Goa

fQj. the

Indian Legation was then opened in Lisbon to discuss ®

j ^Jy

t o f a of Goa bu,

refusing to even discuss the liberation of G

detaining free-

repressive measures already instituted in

^

freedom struggle

dom fighters without t r i a l , shadowing tf\e ea ®

m

a d e to start

3nd restricting their movement. In 1953 ano e

assurance tlwt

negotiations with the Portuguese - this time

after their transfer

the cultiiral identity of the enclaves ^ o v l d b ^ ^ _

they were as

^ d the laws and customs would remam'

^ theovertures ma

^ transigentasbeforeandrefusftoev^^ ^P ^^ ^

India. It was, however, made

were c“^^^”^'„intedoutthat

three enclaves o f Goa, Daman

,

^ ^ 5 o f

t o t h e winds

ethnically and g e o g ra p h ic a U y

e n cla v e s ran c o ^

g„ticolonial

Ihepresenceof a foreign

f

of tf-e

Of char>ge that were blowing ac

^ i

a n d acquired their

m ove^nt was gathering

world, most o f w h ich

would

-p ia c « m th e s u n ^ I .w a s a ls ^ ,,„ d .B * “^ ^ ^ ^

eral discussiorw to fma

the

Hehtening uP ® notorious for

enclaves. As was to be exp

t^^^’^ L c'u e se have b

Legation in

em m ent to th ese o v e r t ^ ^ the P ^ ^ a e . T^e repressive measures,

discus* tn*.

centuries, and their r

« ' * ’ e I l i o „ i „ D a m a «

pocket ea^st

Dad

the Unifo^ r:_.

rose in rp h .n :„ /

Dadraj

r^ c e a s to fD a m ;,T i

Naear R:..rZ- : ” "^^™8^»aII.0nly

begiiuune of t ^ '

th e P o r ^ i ,o

'•

Portuguese

tinent. The Papal

^o^oniaf^e^^lt

niarited

In December iQ«;t; p

to be on^ninoten^ ^

sub-con-

d elivered itsiu H

°^ P T O tracted ^ ° ^ ® ^ stab h sh Portuguese rule

Portuguese

of fte L

the righi of passage

^®garded

of

of the enclaves by the

For soin^!?"S'>^o/acfo puta^ " T

^

enclaves must be

as Z

theS l h ?

right of passage',

sought

territories

^^g^r Haveli woe

® "^ lav es in to t w

w ith

^ V a r isk ta Panchaj/at

bills fo r integrating i^se

passed b y the Pari

rig h t to h ^ ” ^ ® t e r e d b y th e Centre, and »c-o f being

A u g u st

^

L ok Sabha, wei«

^ e M o v e ^

« « h -P o ta t

14 A 5 ^ l9 5 g ® ^ g a th e rin g o v e rG o a , D»manand

'* 'S a ^ ? a ,'T ™ “on

Indian

Portugue- ® ^

Dam

banners of freedom ano

'i n f a d ^ y

^ s u p p o ^

Diu from all directions »

t i

trico?_” ®s T h e G o a l^ ^ ^ ® < ^ th e b o r d e r ,a tta < i^

opened fi^ealS ^S^^s

buiid^^^°«'ed the Indian

a large n

d istrib u tin g

The army and &

sualties - 22 Indians and tvfO

THE SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL’S ASIAN EMPIRE / 347

Goans shot dead, including a woman Satyagrahi, Subhadra Bai Sagar, who was carrying the Indian standard and was cut down at point-bJank range.

As many as 225 persons were injured, 38 of them seriously, and a large number of Goans were rounded up and brutally assaulted before arrest.

A groundswell of resentment had already been sweeping across India forsome time as reports of indefinite incarcera Hon of Goanfreedomfighters Mdtheirinh^antortureatthehandsofthePortuguesewerecarriedbythe

r^ess. e savagery perpetrated on the participants in the movement caused thegroundsweU to develop into a tidal wave

lu

^ ^ (strikes) and demonstrations were held all over India and

euesf

strongly urged to take police action against the Portu-

ceded that T

Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, con-

'vas

^

situations could not be handled in haste or anger, it

onceaeain"^ ° prevent any further escalation so that conditions could TheGovem

start negotiations and to settle the issue peacefully.

P«ss assailiri!!!^ of India sealed the borders of the three enclaves, the world

‘heir refusal to

Portugal but the Portuguese persisted in

^ v e r a l G o a ' s liberation came up in the United Nations too.

•^ftjuisite inf

^ demanded in July 1960 that Portugal be asked to submit

colonies and possessions around the globe

^®^r colon] ^

Nations but the Portuguese retort was that these were not

velopmg^

°iP°^®^ssions but integral parts of Portugal and hence the de-

Trusteeshi" r

sn internal matter of Portugal. This led to the UN

^GneralAs^

passing a resolution in November 1960 urging the

Once aga"

request Portugal to provide the information asked for.

passed 3

refused to co-operate. The Trusteeship Council then

'J'ortu

^ resolution in November 1961 convejwg its condemnation

request ® refusal to transmit information about its overseas territories member states to deny to Portugal any help which coiJd

Under Pr^

subjugation of the people of the non-autonomous territories

Pri

administration',

to exerr^^ ^'finister Jawaharlal Nehru's exhortations to the Indian people

- in a

’^^straint and to tiy to achieve their objective - liberation of Goa considered manner was misinterpreted by the Portuguese

debate in the Trusteeship Council to say that the Indian Prime

fo enri B

Siven the assurance that he would not resort to

V-K ^ : °^^guese rule in Goa. The Indian representative at the 1 ^ ,5 ^

W s iI ^ ^ ^ e r io n ,m a d e the Indian position very d e a rm N o v em b erl961

a S N ‘hatlndia -hadatno time abjured the f

P ri

that 'India wouldnothesitate

^eMinister of India too hadresolved to use'other means toliberateGoa

3 4 8 / b l u e p r i n t T O B L U E W A T E R

had already become apparent when, while addressing^

^esecolom a.sm inO ctoberl961,hesaid thatth^

m eam to resolve the Goa question had failed and that 'we have been forced into thinking afresh by thePortuguese to adopt othermethods to solve tte problem. When and how we will do it cannot be forecast now. But lhaveno doubt that Goa will soon be free'.

Freedom for the Goans was now only two months away and IkHe did the Portuguese know at that time what began in the very fiistyearofihe Portuguese occupation of Goa, i.e., 1510, and continued to beruthlesslyput down for four and a half centuries by Portuguese tormentors, wouldot achieve success and that their day of reckoning would dawn on ece er 19,1961.

Nehru's Green Signal to the A r m e d F o rc e s

^

A couple of months before Operation VIjay - the Armed

inlndi^'

India for th e liberation of Goa and the other P o rtu g u e ^

it had become apparent that Prime Minister N e ^ i-ugrate the colot^

would have to eventually resort to 'other m eans to ’

soon and rid India of the last bastions of the

though the Armed Forces had not yet been app« ^

India using any military action. However, Lieutenan

and Chief of the Army Staff) J.N. C h au d h u ri, the

3

manding-in-Chief of the Sourthem C om m an d , ha P

sive 'appreciation' (assessment) of the prevailing

land, sea and air aspects and a detailed plan for the

Deployment of Portuguese Forces

^

According to his appreciation, the Portu guese Army

wa®

of three Portuguese irUantry battalions wtiose totiil s

nnately 2 ,2 0 0 . Damai^ and Diu h ad three com p an ies ° ^

ad d ition , all strateg ic points w ere defended w ith anti-

g j at 7

nel m ines. F o u r squ ad ron s o f arm o u r h ad been Bicholim , P on d a and Bally an d three batteries o f artil eiy mmhowitzershad been deployed at Margao, Vasco da

A n ti-aiicraft guns had been installed at Dabolim airfiei h a rb o u r,th e la tte rh a v in g a lso b e e n p ro v id e d w ith lo n g -r^ 8

co astal guns. The b order of the G oan enclave w as being a®

arm ed local police persormel and custom s guards e q u *p P ^ ^g i,eing ”

an d au to m atic w eapons. The borders of D am an and Diu w e tected by about 4 5 0 such persoiviel each.

_

F o r the n aval defence of Goa, it was reported that ther

THE SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL’S ASIAN EMPIRE / 349

/rieafes, each equipped with tJ-iree 120-mm guns and four multiple pom-noms (automatic rapid-firing guns), which patrolled the sea areas of all three enclaves. These ships were the Afonso de Albuquertfue, Bartholomeu Dias Gonsalves Zarco and Joao de Lisboa. When the action took place, however,'it was found that only the Afonso de Albuquerque was available for the naval defence of Goa, the other three having sailed for Portugal earlier.

The Portuguese air force in Goa was reported to comprise a few transportplanes fitted out to carry bombs and up to a squadroriof tramonjc fiehterbomberslocatedatDabolimaiiportwhichhadbeenmodemJsedand

equipped to international stan d ard s. D am an and Diu had an

p ea

but these could only be used for staging purposes. The total s tr m ^ o the Portuguese forces thus v/as 5,200 in Goa, 800 in Dam an an

The Task Force

ITie Amiy task force required to libprate

inde-

Chaudhuri in his appreciation, included two u^ntry g

'

pendent para brigade less one battalion, one light

light armoured regiments, one m«dium

jt was estimated

neer units. For capturing the Partuguese forces a a

/

25-pounder

that the Army would require one infantiy batta on

j.

^ gne

battery and at Diu the requirement was one mfantiy batta company

.

, chaudhuri recom-

To assist the task force in its

. first, blockade o f^ e

mended the assignment of four tasks to

PortsofMarmagao,PanjimandDamanand the

^

^ond, prevention of the removal

^ gnd fourth, dose supp°

*^,01056 support by Naval aircraft, if

'

^ naval guns in an emergency.

(asks of

°

H » S o , o e was M y lo

support to the ground forces,

'

providingintercommuiuca*ionflig

' ^rcraft

necessary, and immobilising PortugU

D enouem ent Begins

taking

^erchantshipshad for many)«<*«^

'Vide expanse of water

^d the Indian mainland w

ese»oldierson *

^fovember 17,1961, when

which

^

‘f’isshortstretchonherwayw^^^

the damages suffered y

suddenly resorted to

totally unprepared for s

350 / blueprinttobluewat®

o f c a n ! * e c S f o ^ e r o f ! h e ! w * ^ S h ““p ' ' ^ “ ' "

" ™ * ;,e d " a nd M

enclaves and the neShbn uc

in the three Poitugis

was lodged with the Portu^ ,p!

mainland. Whenaprotei

ted an act Drpj,odicial to

™ c e n t passage h rl

k

^

eninvpH

-i

• . ^ 8 ^ the stretch of water which all merchant shl[^

Kuese T>» ^ ^^^^^^ttheSfl&arwjhhadbeenfireduponbythePortu-whik» nacf-^ owever, committed a diplomatic /aux pas by claiming fcl

^ 8 through our territorial waters'on the night of Novembet24, Inriia ^

Sabarmati incident which they had denied, some

.

^t ships had refused to identify themselves when chaleigEd

n f

attempt to reach the island of Anjadip.

,

i^ *^“^teresting to note that the Sabarrmti, which was the firstvesseito 10 ^ 0 .V

w r a th , w a s p re s e n t in M a rm a g a o harbour on Januaiy 6,

‘

Republic Day to be celebrated in p o s t-lib e r a tio n G»

on

onNovember24,1961, the Portuguesega^

firp nr.

committed another belligerent act by once

20 fish in ^ ^^erm en who were opera ting close to the same K o S ^ r

? ! " -^provoked filing fataUy injured R a j a r a m ^

kar dipH K f ^ °

three-member crew of a tony (fishing era )■

S S v

-id could reach him. Four other fisherm en

aenousiy mjured.

^

first

^

firing three rounds had been fired from Anjadip

^

28 Prime Minister Nehru told the Lok

the

°nnshBroaHras^eC*^^°'^^®®® Government and

boats and passenef ??^°^®tion, they had stated that some

ca n l^ ou rratt^ ^ k on Anjadip ^

P f danger ships

island w ith if she w a n t ^

island as she had 'stouter ships to

nations. P o J * e

turning points in the history

subcontinent, after

signalled the final departure fron^ th

jj,

tt.e

f o r E ^ p e a n c o lc n ^ ^ J ^

^ l^ e g in n in g of the e lim in ^ centuries ago, and for the Indi ^ ^ ^

In order to boost the

vestiges o f colonialism-

.

^ u r e ^ a n Naval p r e s e S * ’^^'

fishermen of the area

«^ o y er,an d K .,7,a„,an an tisu b m arin e frigate,

THE SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL'S ASIAN EMPIRE / 351

deployed off the Karwar coast on November 28,1961. The two ships held exercises at a distance of 10 kilometres from the Portuguese-occupied enclaves, this distance having been assumed to be the extent of the Portuguese territorial waters. The ships arrived at Kaiwar on November 28,1961

and started patrolling the area.

Meanwhile, all roads leading to Goa's interior from the border had beenheavily mined by the Portuguese and a dusk-to-dawn curfew im-E

meeting held on December 1 at Allahabad, Prime

cannnt! 1 t

developments with anguish and said, 'We

0 erate such acts. We will take the necessary steps at the right time'.

Sanitising the Approaches

patroUi^^y

Headquarters had instituted a surveillance and

^jput and

Chutney. The two rhips positioned at Karwar,

aircraftfrieat*^^”'

withdrawn and Betwa and Beas, two anti ofl3kilometr^^'

^ linear patrol off the Goan coast at a distance

and person i ^

report aU ingress and pgress - of shipping, air-

wifhnecessa f ^

of the Portuguese enclaves and to retaliate

Surface.

^

by the Portuguese units in the air or on the

patrol 1

'vith minor alt °

established by a relay o f ships till after D-Day, th

t e

h

e p e r i o c f l e n gle

t ng

h th

a a

n n

d d

t t

h h

e e

d d

i i

s s

t t

a a

n n

c c

e e

f f

r r

o om

m t

th he

e c co

o a as

st t

T T

h h

r r

o o

u u

g g

h h

- -

Though th K

patrol observed and s;ignalled useful informa-

"merchant ^

of intelligence obtained by them related to the volum e

situation of an airfield at Dabolim w as estab-

®ctivity oth

accu racy. They did not, how ever, observe any air

^'Onally

four-engined and two-engin(jd transport aircraft occa-

^ywhere ‘

neither did they observe any flying activity frcwn

'^ther a ir f i^ •

AH this convincingly in d ic a t^ the absence of any

®'fcraft.

the absence of any Portuguese combat

onpatrolalso ma intained an effertive w atch on the only Por-

frigate A fonso de Albuquerque, whose m o v ^

also nh ^

^ j a d i p Island and M arm agao w ere faithfully reported. It othp

that other than the Albuquerque, there did not s ^ m to be (tho"^ ^’^ - o f - w a r of the Portuguese N avy (>f similar or larger size in the anijtiais

today teams with 'P o rtu g u ese m e n -o f-w a r, sea-

■T^

ch are able to give a painful, even deadly, sting)i

in

ships could not, however, confirm the existence o f coast a 3lbeit^f.

ThelocaHonofsuchbatterieshadbeenindiratedonclwi^,

cu^ca 1880 vintage, and were iater confirmed by lAF air reco

352 / blu epr in t TO BLUEWATER

sance just prior to D-day.

in Indian waters w aT ^ava^bw fb^on °th ^ ^

submarine wing in the Portuguese N a w ^ t w

°

existence of a

submarine threat in the area.

decided not to discount

f o r l n S l j ^ a t s ^ p T y S ^

had promulgated the rajuirmi

DtanH SteW, S

r

Operational at the earlipcf

-S' Cannanore and Bimlipatan to be made w h i c h w e r e a L X ^ ^

in ad L o n to theshif»

Cauvery. It was alsmi J

Trishul, B«twa, Beas, Kimn and

Squadron r d i s A r

^

December 10.

AirSquadrononthecarrierby

SabflrmaH and^thp^fi

Government of India to the firings on

detailed consiHora^j * r®,

occupy only the Aniadip Island.

Consequently the^faV^^ by restricting the 'take-over' to Anjadip Island, and the Island'nf A n -

of Portuguese territory in the enclave of Goa,

to obviate Portupiio^^ P was favoured. Later, on reconsideration, in order D iu , th e s e tw n

* ^ 8 in the enclaves of Daman and

action plan.

aves were also included in the proposed 'take-ov

andthenopeningfij^ out searches, confiscating villagers' p0ssess'°^

fi

twenty PonT^

territory. For instance,

300 rounds on thf^^^"®

tossed into Indian territop^^^*'

^•thdrewintoGoa

village Talwadi and

SETS ON PORTUGAUS ASIAN EMPIRE / 353

t h e SU N

S r „ r t ^ " ° ™ e 65 (square)

“^

7 “ ''

H e

Wia B the South of

i f i f r t a ta M a . There was no

enclaves of Daman and Diu, the F o r

it should not

obvious reason, its greater antiquity (fro

) P

'

prench India

have become part of the Indian m uon, along w i

Independence,

and the partially independent Princely States a

to the Indians

T^e fa ilL of the Portuguese to yield w as a m ajor

3 , 3 le in-

as was the .s e of Goa as a centre for sm uggling on ^

the

eluding the whisky that w as banned by the

to Christian-

adjacent state of M aharashtra. Though extensively converted ity, the Goanese are not ethnically distinct

j L g s e cause, Gal

As regards the unflinching US support to tn

/y S Secretary

braith said, Tn 1955, in a uniquely

Cunha,in calling

ofState)had agreed with the PortugueseForeign -*i* ‘ ^ j

endorsed a

Goa a province, that is to say, an integral

°

°

Portuguese in 1951,

latter-day constitutional a m e n d m e n t adapted by them exempt,

which so described the overseas territories an

juysiastically contin-

hopefully, from anticolonialism. Secretary Rus

x^gpartment, some at

“ed, both in Spain and Portugal, w hat liberals

^ policy'.

'east, called the Iberia uberAlles (roeiia above ®'",^ a(-efui solution to Galbraithcontinued inhis endeavour to sees

peacehil

Goa problem especially because

ingrealweaknessifever

"l^eaivs of the British and t h e F r e n c h , would be sh g

aU efforte

she had to use force to be rid of the F o r tu n e

p

^g^-gniber 17, T

‘0 dissuade Nel'a-u from using force and a

Ustened '

bother talk with. Nehru. H e w as m uch more

j

®^ely to mv argum ents and w e parted in

also

the feeling that the o p e r a t i o n nught be p arguments had something to do

to Adlai Stevenson, * e U

^ r > t with the proviso that

g o t h e r e (Delhi) tne

p r o v is io n s of t h e R e s o Iu U o n s .v

^pU as In d ia w a s the fact

‘^ t T>. Franco Nogue^na, th

^ ' " “ ^™WTOBLUEWATER

Dean Rusk, the US

*

Rusk s reaction to these two nr

to desist them from usineforct

mg to note fta ,

^

offi

George Ball

against Cuba,

officials, 'had called i^B pc m >,

f f

State Departat

urged thedisastrouseffertr.'

f^dian Ambassador in the USA),

Reputation and chain rpa

opinion, damage to Nehru's

Indian action. Then thp ^

violence which wouJd result from the

six-months' susoencJn

that Prime Minister Nehru announce a

with thePortueup<?p tu

would then promise to make a majorafSart

hedged but it did mp

’^^^ure of the la tter effort was unspecific and badly

bring the Portueup^p^

effect that we (the US) would do something to

On the

° .

round .

'only for suffideTl^^ December 17, Galbraith met Nehni and pleadjd

‘bourse of the discus^io

Portuguese. But in to

Pass^'.

it became plain to me that the zero hourh^

^rce and was hesitant

‘^ame, Nehru had remained averse to

^ot being

1956 and Nehru, being a believer iaP«^

‘ was not clear

®^ercise restraint, but what action was con

^ w o rth

‘

Ambassador to India earlier^

" ^ ’^gaged^cu”'

million ^ ^ ‘^^^^*®®f°^acquiringLouisia^

j

'daughter,

and the

Denmark when King

'WSera?T^®'® «^rriage t^^^^^^^^^^sinMePforthedoWiyf j

f ^ of

and Trlnn? ^ 8 J^mes III of Scotland. Denjrutr^

States in 1917 £0 7$^'^' * .^^‘d 'tr a S ^ "

in 1844 for the

.

ere not prepared t

LitOo

Virgin Islands to the

^

^«e;howevSSfp‘°

off t^Sr ^ « ^ e r iSow that the P o f S ^

S?sSss£S^s;i"^"i:Sg

= .7 s .r ~ .t a i 5 ~ 5 s - ,s p s .r .'£ $

"'Panyin 1668ata princelyaf^

__

^

, , , ha Naval s t a f f f r o m V/ce Admiral Sir

Admiral R D Katari taking over as

taking over as the first I n ^

^’®Phen Carllil on 2 2 April 1958. With

^ '^ ra rs Flag was brought into serviM . I^ e

P®=ial feature o( this (lag was the add.t.on

o f th e St. G e o r g e 's C r o s s .

° " ‘“ ' Commaodor S

Transler by Jackstay Irom Mysore to Delhi - M is . M e e n a N agarkar.w ife o i C o m m a n d e r W S N a g a r k a r -t h e first In d ian e v e to b o u n c e a c ro s s the waves in a bosun's chair im 959,

C o u rte s y M a rio M ira n d a

C a p X a i a S i f r .

x e a c i\ r ^ Q \ h © c o r t \ m \ s s \ o n \ n Q w a T r a n V o t T r l s h u l ^ A S J a n -^9 6 0 , A l s o s e e n i n t h e p i c t u r e I s C a p t a i n R S D a v i d , i h o t h e n

\rv^\-a.Tv V4«sj b\ PktiNis-sot, \_0rv<i0T\.

co™,^^*.™,

London „ .

. « « . 96, . «ho ^

p „ „ e a ,. • » C o ™ » ™ > „ ,o *< » ,,C W .In P S M a h i„ < „ < » .„ d C o m m .™ e ,K ,ish a n D „ .

L ie u te n a n t C o m m a n d e r B R A c h a ry a S q u a d ro n C o m m a n d e r 3 0 0 Squadron (Sea »

b rie fin g N a v a l pilots b e fn rp a p ra c tic e s trike m ission a t R oyal Naval Air Station Bra y 1 9 6 1 . A ls o s e e n in th a p ic tu re a re L ie u te n a n ts R V Singh, A.G. Jog, RH Talmani, T ip n is , S K G u p ta , K A S Z R a ju a n d R N G h o sh .

P r i m e M i n i s t e r J a w a h a r l a l N e h r u o n b o a r d o n V i k r a n t 's a r r iv a l a t B o m b a y o n 0 3 N ov .

A l s o s e e n in t h e p i c t u r e a r e S h r i V K K r i s h n a M e n o n . M i n i s t e r o f D e f e n c e , S h r i t n a i i j ^ p L a k s h m i P a n d i t , S h r i R a g h u R a m l a h M i n i s t e r o f S t d t e f o r D e f e n c e , V ic e

.

K a t a r l , t h e C h i e f o f t h e N a v a l S t a f f , R e a r A d m ir a l B S S o m a n , F l a g O f f i c e r C o m m a n i ^

I n d ia n F l e e t , C a p t a i n P S M a h l n d r o o , C o m m a n d i n g O f f i c e r a n d L i e u t e n a n l s M B K u n t e ^

M M L S a x e n a .

P o r tu g u e s e p n s o n e r s o n b o a rd M y s o r e a fte r th e ir s u r r e n d e r It^ D e c e m b e r 1 9 6 1 .

Courtesy C om m ander N B obo (R etd)

H O Ka\ar\. Vho

q \ S t a t l m s p e c ^ n Q 'r w n ^ n s ' o1 A J b u q u r q u *

'm O « c«n > b « T

a v O o a . M » o a e « n a r * C o m m o d o r e K A A^mxm.vtsm \f% ty N a v a l O f « c * r - l n -

Ot\mi^a Ooa-. Xt\a an^VnaaT Vn o>«aTa\\% Va Commandar Tf=H Oaiat.

0«M>r«*aiV

Mom

j

, la n d - P la q u e c a r r ie s Ih e n a m e s o ( t h o s e killed in to t h e h e r o e s o ( A n ja d .p Is la n o

_ , j , , , f , e N

a « / a l S t a f f la y in g a w r e a th

in D ece m b er 1 9 6 1 .

^ A d m iral K A S Z Raju, th e C -in -C S o u th e r n

*’6 m on u m ent. A lso s e e n in th e picture is

Comm and.

^ax\ >AouT\\toatVerv o\ Bumxa.

ot the F\qoI on board Vikrant \n May ^ 963 Also seen

\T\VV\aplkcA^jTa ata ^aax KdrnxTaX SOKarmaTVax, P\aQOtl\cer Bombay. Capiain N KiisMnan CoTT\fT\%r«S\n^O\\Vcef nr><\ VAta. v:.T\aV\rvar\.

Commissioning Ceremony o1 Jarawa (Port Blair) on 15 Feb 1964. T h e tribals seen are m e Jaraw as.

l /

: 7

i ' t -'

/

IS

ec,u,pmenx. Seen

vhe p.«u,e a,e Sh^ V b C hra ”

N ikita

P h o t o f f r o p f y . C o u r t o a y S U r i H . C . S a r i n

JL

# 5 5'- ■

Type 41 Anti-aircraft frigate INS-beas has the distinction ol liaving being com m anded by father and son - C o m m a n d e r (later Commodore) BR Kapoor (inset) and Commander (now Captain) Sanjlv Kapoor (inset).

R e a r M m ifa > B A S a m s o n , ih o t h e n F \ ag O t t ic e r C o r n r n S O

V ikran t d u rin g E x e r c i s e s a t s e a 1 9 6 5 . W s o s e e n a r e M a io f C a p ta in B E n g i n e e r .

___ _

,n 1 9 b / vvnose c o m m is -

Mysore, our second 0 - ^ 2 9 ^ ^

pennant w as hauled °

(orover

*^3Tory w h ose m em ory vi^lH “ O

'®aL :i iWfi *eisr-»

«6si5?»>V';-Vv; '■

\fc f » # -

•* N ' I' / •

r. > 5*^'‘ 5J

j

:

:

*

"

■;

iSafi-S,:,:;.

.'■‘-■'l-v'iv' M

^

'

“

SiJfVeying S hin

^ 's to ry of In d ia n h y d ro g ra p h ic surveying is thai of W

em ployed for s 'u rv e v tn n ^ f r '’

4 5 0 -to n s sailin g vessel Investigator was

^ c o n d In v e s tig a to r a

“ ^ ''' ^ h e w a s paid off in 182S-

^ rn m ls s lo n e d in i r h i

P e d d le s te a m e r w ith a 5 8 1 -tons dispiacemen diii?'

'^°m m issionpH •

s a m e n a m e w as a sleel

9 3 2 W hen s h f . 'I L ? ° ^ :

c o n tin u o u s ly e m ployed on

veriBH '^®^'®-'aying vesspi )^ ® _ '’® P 'aced by a fourth ship of the sa m e nams, w as d ^ ° ® ^^f^eying s N n

S te w a rt. K ukri, a river class frigate

^

ousiy

in 1 9 7 4 p “ '^ ^ 's ® '° n e d in 1 9 5 0 a s fifth two year 1=7'’’'

commiaBi

shows the sixth Investigator O" C

'3 'e r. T o be

on 1 1 J a n u a ry 1 9 9 0 , o n e hundred and s.xty

' secure <

'snd, We m ust b e s u p re m e at s e a

. W . ( .

THE SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL’S ASIAN EMPIRE / 355

At his meetings with Members of Parliament from various parties and even in his public statemnts, Nehru had ruled out military action in Goa. He had, in fact, expected the United States and Britain to advise him in the matter especially because the latter had already compelled the Sultan of Muscat to transfer Gwadar to Pakistan. He had 'Instructed M.C. Chagla, the Indian Ambassador in Washington, to discuss the Goa dilemma with officials of the State Department and to convey to them India's unwillingness to wait indefinitely for the Portuguese enclaves' integration into the Indian Union. 'The ultimate solution can only be close association with India, with possibly internal autonomy', Nehru said. He was even prepared to accept an interim settlement short of merger of Goa with India' on the es of the transfer of the French possessions in India, in deference to world opinion in general and American opinion in particular and at the risk of

^dian public opinion and his own preferences and conmut-

n

occasion of the silver jubilee of G oa's liberation in 1986, Lhe political analyst-com m entaior, Shri M.V. K am ath, w rote:

Poking back now it is astonishing to w hat extent N ehru was willing riot to use force out of respect for w orld opinion, even when he had

®very right to do so. H ow w ould the W estern countries have reacted if india had been in occupation, say, of Calais or Ham burg or Liverpool f , refused to budge? W ould France or Germany or Britain have tolerated it for a m om ent? A nd yet, India w as a victim of its ow nnon-

' 10 e n t p h i l o s o p h y . W e w e r e being q u i e t l y t a k e n f o r a ride.

N

e i t h e r Britain nor the United States w e r e o f any h e l p . -^ e y ^ d

^e.r own reasons to embarrass Nehru. Nehni tried to isolate Gm

'^onomically, but that only rebounded against India,

e oyc

suited in widespread smuggling while there was no

^re on Portugal to relent. Had there been an internal

.

.Butno

•^ehru could then have w ith s o m e justification sent his arm y m.

Je r e was a new US Ambassador,

ordernot to blot his

ose to Nehru and advised him not to use

Nehru to go to the

od India's good record in the past. Ga ’‘ll.^nence, Nehru was in no Uruted N ations. B ut after his

that his cup was full and

J'o o d to fall into that trap. H e told Galbraitn

beginning to spiU over.

Mehru went to stay aw ay from the

It is am azin g to w hat exten

j 3t the sam e hrne, he

"^litary option. He did not wan

Britain's Prime Minister,

did not want to appear irresoiui .

356 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

Harold MacMillan, thathe couldn't promise he would not use forcein any circumstances, giving hitnseU some elbow room to manipulate.

Meanwhile, Krishna Menon had fixed a date for the invasion and

the Indian Army was raring to go. Galbraith came to know of it and persuaded Nehru to postpone action for two more days. Galbtailh encouraged Nehru to think that the US would compel the Portuguae Government to agree to leave Goa on the understanding that '

would take a generous view of the economic and

Portugal in Goa - a commitment which Nehru had no

^

But Galbraithhad overestimated his own

ton and with President Kennedy. Kennedy gave no

that, in his opinion, India had a good case. On

jegiffle'*

State Department indicated active sympathy for the

adamant attitude.

j negotiatio'®'

When UN Secretary General U Thant sug^s ^

Salazarwouldordysaytt^at suchnegotiations c ( ^

^j^jgdStates

basis of co-existence of India and a Portuguese Goa.

solidly

was playing a double game. On the one hand it

t}iatit'VO“^‘^'*

behindPortugal and on the other it was warning

!

be good form to attack Goa. Galbraith suggested ttx

^ fool

resolution on Goa in the UN General Assembly-

caii'eup'*r

have fallen for the trap. At this point the US Govemir^

.

^ o th ersu g g estin th atln d iap o stp o n eactio n fo ran o

lattet'^.

V'/hen this proposal was taken by Galbraith to N

' jjehT’^

even then willing to listen. But then Krishna Menon

^ j giie

was too late and that advance parties of the Indian Am y iJegun to move.

e t ^

'veU-known parHamentarian

t i c t a t S S ^ l

theGoans'freedom^^^^^

oa«rfreedom

years' imprisonment^* 8

r e l e a s e d ^ T O m l n d i a includingN.G. Gore and

,^<1

feels that

the intervention of - . ^ lib ® ^

o India's Independence. He says:

finally in the midnight of

61- jjfe

the evening of December

action, say, by a 'dUfca

me it seems that asm

»jie

'^'*^^ded battalion', would have done

t h

e

SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL'S ASIAN EMPIRE / 357

Goa in 1948. But Nehru then would neither countenance unofficial armed action n o r an official o n e.

About the morality of the use of force, I must say that the state a state, and as long as it maintains armed forces, it must keep thern m a state of readiness, and use them both to defend its territory as we as toenforceits birthright. India was precisely doing that in Kashnrur and Goa.

Mahatma Gandhi had lent support to the Goan freedom movement

from its very beginning. When Lohia was arrested by the Portuguese authorUies on June 18,1946, he not only justified Lohia's defiance of the prohibitory orders but also lauded the letter's 'service to the cause of civil liberty and especially the Goans.' He said that the Portuguese enclaves existed 'on the sufferance of the British government' and once India free,Goacouldnotbe allowed to exist as a 'separateentit/.Headvised me Portuguese to recognise the 'signs of the times' and expressed thehope Gna would be able to claim the rights of citizenship of the free India state.

He also advUed the inhabitants of Goa to shed fear of the foreign power as

^ansdidand seek thefreedomoftheenclaves. When thePorhiguese Pro

Consul criticised Lohia for having acted against the 'historical ^ t h of the our centuries' and 'troubled the peaceful people of Goa',

'

ppose you know that I have visited Mozambique/ Delagao ^

t

i dicl not notice Uhece

government for

^

astonished to see the distinction that

Govemmmt^de

Indians and Portuguese and between

p

added that the Inhabitants of Goa could affor „p,son or croup can

greater India has regained it.

^ ^

limaye

adrf^'f

without civil liberty without

s

/Tohja's),yet

S'Al^HoughGandhi'spolitics'probably'differedfr^^^

3»Gax\dhisaid,hadcommandedhis'admiration

3

put his finger on its black spot.'

had passed a

resoi^^'^gust 12,1946, the Congress

a n d must inevitably

Cft

0 1 ^ G

o a a s s e r t i n g t h a t ' G

o a has alw y

r-gg^jom of the Indian

to be part of Inla. It must

^ lo o r^ e p e a ce f^

P^ple.LohiahadfoundedtheGoaNatio^lCo g

nee and was arrested on September 29 19 ^ and

g^em ent in the Aguada fort. At his

Hi. intervention

lauded Lohia's action and praised his learning

Oon secured Lohia's release.

« a fineer in the Goan p i e m 195 by

, . Pakistan too had attempted to

g® jions in India-

fg

y«ig a vague claim to the

. Pthe Goan enclaves as Po ugue

'*®claration forms of Pakistan referred to the t.o

Pak ist

^ dKistan and an air

countries in 1958. And vSTa^t^IlT!

concluded between the h«,

sev en -m em b erm iIitaiy d eleg ario n fro °'p l^ ^ "^ ^ '°"'''**'^ '‘'*«'»

r “ " l r

of December 1 9 6 ra „ J ° r p !t u f

been sighted a few days LrliVr

^ Navy

ship,

Konkan coast. Durincr ^ho

vmg Karadii and sailing towards i »

have been flvino hoif

same period several aircraft w ere reported to

Portuguese

evacuating the families of

plans f

for fth

hJe i

;

l k

i

horoi.- “ ^

three encla

cJa ve

ve s.

s I

. I t was, t

t he

e r

r e

e f

f o

o r

r e

e,, deci

deci ded

ed ttu

t ui

ofPaVicfc. • • . ‘

also have to cater for the contingency

^ J a n joining hands with the Portuguese.

,

ripht

^

ijnenviable position. It had recognised the Indians'

aw;iri:>

had withdrawn from the subcontinentinl947andwas

f

^ intransigence regarding the Portugueseenclavesjw

of tho^r'

after independence, had become an importantme

1,,*

‘commonwealth while Portugal was Britain's o ld e s t a lly , led to^

vini^ assuming an attitude of neutrality by advising India to

"

Porh^ ^ ean s for libera fing Goa, preaching avoidance

ob«!P f ^

supporting the Portuguese proposal

Goa. This was not acceptable to India as it wo

jne

Porh,^^^”

Porhaguese claim of sovereignty over

ob< 5^ ^ ® se persisted in their demand for the appointment o jygacB

take^l^*^^' ° 'witness if and how viola tions of frontier and pi« . jj^wal while rejecting all suggestions for negotiations ° ^ s 3 ?o!'

P°^haguese State of India' which they refused to consider

in India.

nialism

United Nations and all majornations 'vereopp® ^ggiobe

o f colonies aroujid^^^

(

force attem

while India was advised not to

.

had pers^e^pH ? !f * “adP Portugal to w ithdraw peace^Uy fourteen years a n T ? ^ '^^violent negotiated <^ourseo{^^fjtu(i‘'

' appa

a p p a rent

re n t tr h

t , . , . * .

w as n o ^

c ^

n ange in

u i th

uie

c F

^ortugu

'V hU e add™

action was called for.

. g

.

^^ehru reiterated th*?f

on December U'

gcd'^'^^ner

Goa had fiiuilly been ^

® patience in regard to

•

J e natural

friends and allies,

^aw al from Goa/ He hn

P'^^sent developments, which f

question by adopUne

that India's policy of soi^it^ g t)e^

so lv ? « I^ * ° thinking f fr e s h b lif^®®"

^nd that

®olve thxs problem.®

P ortu gu ese - to adopt other

P ° « u g a r s persistent refusal to H-

r,Ir>di^

<^‘scuss their possessions

THE SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL'S ASIAN EMPIRE / 359

teed Mia (oresort ,0 armed artior.. The operaHon was set to be launched S

S

r

i

“

• » ' = ^

p o s m

t f

cros J w h T S ° A r ^ M

^ » y

Ol the colonial Dustnb. f ™ t'7- “ f'"'

**“ excision

December 18, 1961.

'

“

® vjsage in the early hours of D-day,

■^^eAcHonPlan

TJi6

'

*

■';;asp]aced°,llidPr*l!!o^^^

‘ Operation Vijay

"'hose members w

\7-

Chiefs ofStaff CommitteeatNewDeJhi

^aval Staff, Genpr^t

{later Admiral) R.D.Katari, Chief of the

A'M. Engineer Ch 0/ < •

/ Chief of the Airny Staff and Air Marshal

^eral Officer r ^

Lieutenant General J.N. Chaudhuri,

Land

Southern Com m and, was the The-

^®utenant G e n p i - O p e r a t i o n Vijay, M ajor General (later

^ 3n tiy Divisin

•

General Officer Corrmianding the 17th

Admiral) B.S

^°^’^ 3 r > d of the Goa Operation, Rear Admiral (later

^ e a tr e N a v a ir '” ^ "'

Officer C om m anding the Indian Fleet, as the

^^fo. Air Offi'

and A ir Vice Marshal (later Air Marshal) E.W .

^oinmander*^ Com m anding, Operational Com m and, w as the T h eatre

^°rfh, T v i t ^ ^ A rm y w as to m ove in from two directions, the east and the made bv

sou th.T heeastem thrustw asplanned to

Mollem tnpjf*^ ^7th Infantry Division along the route from Anmbd to Infantry p

northern thrust w as to be launched by the 50th

Bicholijn

^’^gade along the route from Dodamarg to Assonora to

^outhwa

^

force m oving westwards to Mapuca and then

but

Betim; and the 'decoy' force, titled the 20th Infantry Brigade

roufg ,

‘^y of a com pany strength, was to enter from the south along the om Karw ar to Majalito Canacona.

AirPo^

support to the ground forces was to be provided by the Indian

Wa5 1

°P6ratiing from the airHelds a t Pune and Belgaum whose main task pQ

°

air suprem acy by destroying all aircraft of the Portuguese Air Plotting the airfield at DaboUm out of action and silencing the wireless

'^‘lOnatDabolim.

The N aval Task Force was to enforce a blockade o f the ports o f armagao and I’anjim, neutralise the coast ba tteries defending these p o rts sink or immiDbolise units of the Portuguese N avy deployed inside Goa rbour or patrcilling its sea approaches.

/ blueprint TO BLUEWATO

te O m s T /

' ="di, , gof toop„„

from the d i ^ I ^ n

IstM aratha Group was to enter the territory

then capture thp fnTAm •»

airfields north of Daman town and

of two hours ^o nrnv-ri

•

lAF was to deploy two aircraft at intervals

lance of the a Vfi

^

the land force and to carryout surveil-

reinforcpm

f ^ ^

prevent their use either for escape or for landing

off Marv.

^ 1'

^ ^ a v y was to enforce a blockade in the entire sea area

I n ^ I

*"Sress and egiess ol all vessels,

from th

^ .^f*^^®°^^®®3^JtcraftforthecaptureofDiu,whichisseparaled

imnrn^fc^^

^ narrow creek, 20 Rajput was to cross the creek on

DrpTPH’

land on the north of the island during thenigt'*

movp pa ^

°P®*'ation, move south-east and capture the airfield and tljn

Madn,« «

capture the town and fort of Diu. One company^

beforp

!i^ ‘^^Phire Gogla, which is north-east of the citadal o> ' -

t - c W ^ ‘^ . ' ' ‘^ ^ ‘’y 2°^ ^ jP '^ t^ ‘itoprovidecoveringfiretothetroog e 're d ^ ^ i?"

The requirement of air support wa.

° " ' y

p o s itio n e d

f'ff the ifitanH ^'^''^^®^°P*^°''*deadequatesupportbydeploying it

provide naval giSfire support to the^V;

naval

-A^adip was to be captured by the Navy

weanons and thp^^ ^

softening up the island beaches with c

*The Navy was a U o t^ l ^ d eq u ate gunfire support to the assa^ ^

touseAlizeandSeahawk*-

^

^

fthesei>

offBonnbav tonrpv^ 7

to carry out reconnaissanceofth

^j^g

range'of

Portuguese warships from reaching w

cany out strikes on

^ ®PProaching the Indian coast anywher

off Goa or as reauir«»H*K

warships breaking through the P^p.^( to

“ ■ ^ o u , . e , S X ^ e ^ « = g O f n J r C o m ™ n ® d i „ g t t . e I n d ^ ^ ^

support to the Army

®

to provide necessary na

^ e d out from ihe

to the Air Force a n d ^

THE SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL'S ASIAN EMPIRE / 361

maridme reconnaissance operations and two officers were positioned on board Mysore and Delhi for advising, controllig and directing Air Force striJces against targets in the Goa and Diu sectors and for surveillance of the tactical areas.

A minesweeping force comprising Karwar, Kakimda, Canmnore and Bimlipatam was to be kept for minesweeping operations if the approaches were found to have been mined.

A Naval Officer-in-Charge organisa tion headed by Commodore H. A.

gate was placed on board Dharini, which was to be positioned close to s

taking over the administration of the liberated port on the

^

rofthePortuguese.Commodore Agate, who was to takecomplete

rge of Marmagao and Panjim harbours, was to be on the staff of the Ma

^vemor at Panjim but would be responsible to the Chief of the

TU

adniinistration.

fine-tn

assigned to the Navy were scrutinised and gone over with a

12. iq#;

a d e ta ile d N a v a l O p e r a t i o n O r d e r is s u e d o n D e c e m b e r Admi 1 n

Officer Commanding the Indian Fleet (FOCIF), Rear

Cojj-m *

Admiral) B.S. Soman, was to be the Naval Task Force

ters

receive necessary orders from Naval Headquar-

MariH

operations were to be conducted and controlled through the

e Operations Room at Bombay.

~

30, w hen the G overnm ent of India decided to adopt me

ODpra^ °P^on, Only six ships of the Navy were ready and available for for ^

the only tanker of the Heet, Shakti, was expected to be ready ava.M

on December 14. This, besides the requirement of all

‘0 be employed at sea on D-Day, made it necessary to ceHi

‘^^^tralised control over their employment during the

any projected D-Day. As the trend of poUtical thought ^ d the dec H ^ ‘^ould be made available at short notice only at New Delhi, it was

®f^trust the control of all preparations, deplo^ent

^mp oy.

of sh ip s,re p a irs,lo g isticsu p p o rtL d o th e r related t a s k s ^ A ^ ^ ^

' J ’H of ships for the projected operation to N aval Headquarters and not appointed a

3 6 2 / b l u e p r i n t TO BLUEWATER

w ell as the Air Officer Commanding, Operational Command,bothopetai-m g trom Belgaum. One Army officer and one Air Force officer were attach ed to the headquarters of the Flag Officer Commanding the Indian Fleet for liaison between the Fleet and the Army and the Air Force Comm anders.

T h e N a v a l T a s k F o rc e a n d th e T ask s Assigned The tasks assigned to the Naval Task Force were, firstly, the establishment of effective control of the seaward approaches to

Goa (including the harbour of Marmagao Bay and Ense

Dam an and Diu and capture of Anjadip Island and, seco

y*

tion of hostile action by Portuguese warships on Indian e

^

The Task Force organisation was as given be

divide*

As seen in the organisational chart, the Nava

the

into four task groups - the Surface Action Group

^ jj.ierTaskGio“P

N avalShips Mysore,Trishul, Betwa,BeasandCauvery. tr« _

comprising the ships Vikrant, Delhi, Kuthar,

. fCanvaf,

„

Minesweeping Group comprising the

only

Cannanore and Bimlipatam and the Support Group Dharini.

In te llig e n ce

Intelligence regarding Portuguese forces and

seen

the Portuguese frigate Afonso de Albuquerque h

l^ggn ^

about four cables northieast of Anjadip Islan

,

gjg susp^^

between the island and Goa. Ttiree other ships ^ .

{jgensigl'*^ ygs£0

warships could probably be in Goa, two of therri

^ g f located a ^jj,.

and Betwa on December 2 and December 4, and tnfi Dar*'^*'^hanl'

..o

V.,,

TKioi-o w pre no w arsnrps

, ^gra

as reported by police wireless. There were no war X. gjid The volume of sliipping traffic in Goa

i^own

rrum and tankers were arriving and leaving for

g jnarkifP

regularly. Military fouj.'-engined aircraft With

Deen observed on reconnaissance tugnts over

on December 8, a four-engined S k j r m a s t e r h a d a p ^ o a

w a s a t sea, and h a d flowm over her a t a height o f 5,000 fee •

^

serving in V ik r a n t at thgit time.

btnari^®* ^ a

There w ere no conifirmed reports on the presence of su

.

sea area off Goa though K u th a r, an antisubmarine frigate _

possible subm arine co n tact on a patrol line close to Goa'at ggail^^

Decem ber 7. A bout seven hours later on the same day, K u t h a r a confirm ed contact of a possible submarine and fired one live

'TbUc 12.1 Commander Task Force Flag Onicer C o m m an d iD g t h e l a d J a n F l e e t - R e a r A d m i r a l B . S . S o m a n CttmmaiiMtr Task Graup-I

Commander Task Cn>up-2

Comm ander Task C rou p-J

Commander

Task Gmup 4

(Commaoding

Officer, Dluriiu

(CoomidJDi Onioer, Mytore

■

(Seaior Officer, 149

Minoweepint

Conmuodcr

K.K. Mukheiji)

P.S

SquKlnia,

i.e.

Coaumuxliiig

l ). CMBcno)

Certain P.S. Mihindroo)

D.SU. Caenn>

F.S. MihindrDo)

on ker,

K*rw«r • Cdr.

H.F. Dub«h)

Unit l .J

ToA Unit 1.2

ToA (/nil l . J

Task Unil 3.1

Task Unil 3.1

Task Unit 4.1

U jm (Cdr.

TrUul (Cdr TiA Unit • Bttwt B eat (CMr. T.I.

Karomr K iJanoda (U.

B M ipatam (Cdr. Tuk

D harini (Cdr T»ik

CO, Uywn

Scnkn Oflicer ISih Frifite KttnneiikeriQCanvr)! Cdr. D.B. Mohindn) Unit - CO, Bunbpalam -

Unit - CO, D harini -

D.Sl

Siyi , I.*.. CO, TrirtHl

( U Cdr. S.V.

Cannm ore (L l Cdr. A.K. U . V.K. Kochlur)

Cdr K.K. Mukheiii)

J. CmcnD)

C i^ K.U Kukuni)

Mahidevui) (Cdr. Tuk lUuI) (Cdr, Ti»k Unit

•

UoH • CO. Baw a Cdr. CO, Karwar Cdr. H.F.

1LK.S. GbiiiiUu)

D u btih )

Tuk IMi I I

Tatk Unii 2.2

Task Unit 2 .J

Talk UnU 2.4

(Cdr, Tak Unh - CO,

DeOii (Cdr. T*dt Unit - CO, Delhi - KuAar, K iipan (Cdr. A.H.R.

R ojp u (Cdr. T«»k Unit - CO,

V ttw - Ci|H. P.J, MihUiw )

C ^ N. Kriihiuii, DSC)

Sinjuddin) O iukri (U Cdr. R.N.

Rajptu - C»pu l.K . Pori)

Bmlri) (Cdt. T iik Unit - CO.

r u lW - (Mr. R.S. Mklit)

364 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATCR

^

s

u

b

m

a

r

i

n

e

su c ce e d e d in giving her the sUp 1}^

p r o b a b i l i t y o f a s u b m a r i n e o p e r a t i n g in th e vicinity of Goa could, therefore, n o t b e r u l e c i o u t . A s w a s r e p o r t e d la te r , th e submarinedetectedwasaBritish s u b m a r i n e o n it s p a s s a g e to th e F a r E a s t w lrich w as keeping a tab on the d e v e l o p m e n t s i n t h e s e a a r e a o f f G o a .

I n t e l l i g e n c e r e p o r t s a ls o in d ic a te d th a t the Portuguese garrison on A n j a d i p i s l a n d h a d b e e n r e in f o r c e d . T h e re w e re also uncorifixm ed reports t h a t t h e e n t r a n c e t o M a r m a g a o a n d E n s e a d a d a A guada and theapproaches t o t h e l a n d i n g b e a c h e s o n A n ja d ip isla n d h a d been mined.

T h e T a s k F o r c e ' s C a r r i c u l m n V i t a e T h e d i s p l a c e m e n t , s p e e d , w e a p o n , package, h o r s e pow er and certa'

f e a t u r e s o f t h e s h ip s ta k in g p a r t in th e o p e ra tio n w ere.

T a b l e 1 2 .2 . C u r r i c u l u m V i t a e o f th e T ask F o r ce Air- Tor^

Brake/ Year of

'Name o f

Displace

Maocimum

Armament

craft

Shaft

amtttis^

the Ship

ment (tons)

Speed

Horse

toning

(K is .)

Power

5

«

3

40,000 1961

Vikrant

19,500

24.5

15x40 mm

72,500 1957

Mysore

10,040

31.5

9x6 inch

8x4 Inch

12x40 mm

72.000 1948

TDelhi

9,740

32

6x6 inch

8x4 inch

8x2li^

14x40 mm

40.000 1949

Rajput

2,424

30

4x4.7 inch

4x40 mm 4 Depth

Chiirge Throwers

Trishul

2,557

30+

2x4.5 inrJh

30,430 -i:'

4x40 mm 2 Limbo

Betxva

2,515

25

4x4.5 inch

12,380 I960

4x40 mm 1 Squid

Beas

2,515

25

I’ "

4x40 mm 1 ^ u id

(Antisubmarine)

Kuthar

1/456

27.8

2 Limbo

15,000 1959

(Antisubmarine)

3x40 mm

Kirpan

1,456

27.8

2 Umbo

15,000 1959

(Antisubmazine)

3x40 mm

___

Khukri

1/456

27.8

2 Umbo

15,000 1958

(Anlisxibmarine)

3x40 mm

t h

e

S U N SETS O N P O R T U G A L 'S ASLAN E M P IR E

/ 365

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Cauvery

1,925

19

4x4 inch

4,300

1943

-

~

4x40 mm 2DCT

Dharini

4,625

_

_

1960

-

-

—

Karwar

425

15

1x40 mm

1,250

1956

2x20 mm

'

Kakinada 425

15

1x40 mm

1,250

1956

2x20 mm

Canmnore 425

IS

1x40 mm

1,250

1956

2x20 mm

'

Bimlipalam 170

14

1x20 mm

550

1955

~

'

_

The tasks o f c a p tu r in g A n ja d ip I s la n d , e n f o r c in g a b lo c k a d e o f th e waters off G oa, n e u tra lis in g a n y o p p o s i t i o n f r o m G o a to o p e r a tio n s fro rn seawards and la n d in g a p a r t y o f N a v a l p e r s o n n e l to a d m in is te r th e p o r t o

^ jim (Goa) afte r th e P o r tu g u e s e s u r r e n d e r , w e r e a s s ig n e d to T a sk G ro u p 1-Task Group 2 w a s e n tr u s te d w i th b lo c k a d in g th e s e a a r e a s o f f D a m a n a n d providing n a v a l g u n f ir e s u p p o r t a n d l a n d l n g p a r t i e s f o r th e c a p ^ r e o Uiu, preventing P o r tu g u e s e w a r s h ip s f r o m a p p r o a c h in g B o m b a y a n d

>^aval air s u p p o r t f o r s e a r c h a n d s tr ik e , w h e n e v e r n e c e s s a r y - It x e

J^ e s w e e p e rs o f T a s k G r o u p 3 w e r e to s t a n d b y f o r s w e e p in g th e f ^ tr a n c e Panjim an d M a r m a g a o h a r b o u r s a f te r th e te r m in a tio n o f h o s tJifa e s . Tasic Group 4 w o u ld b e r e q u ir e d to e m b a r k p e r s o n n e l f o r th e t^ m p o r a iy a d ^ -

stration o f the c a p t ^ e d p o r t s , h a r b o u r s a n d te r r ito r y a n d to p r o v id e lo g is-c Support^ if re q u ire d b v o th e r s h ip s .

.

^

As m e n H o r ^ e a rlie r, p a tr o llin g o f th e se a a r e a o ff G o a m j

^ ^ « t i o n C h u tn e y h a d

ta k e n o v e r b y B e fra a

to rp

c o n tin u e d to m a in ta in e ffe ctiv e

airfield a n d

report o n th e m o v e m e n t o f s h ip s , o p e ra tio n s fro m D a b o lim au-tieia T h e in itial p la n s f o r t h e i\aval o p e r a H o n s

^ ^ d , n e u tr a lis a tio n o f th e

.

felt b y th e p la n n e rs

^ ° c k a d e o f t h e e n t i r e G o a n c o a s t .I t w a s , f h r / o a s t b ^ teri^ ^ an d

It w o u ld n o t r e a lly b e e sse n tia l to

^ g s n o t co n sid e re d

^ ore h o in b a rd m e n t b y sh ip s s h p i ^ l l ^ ^ d e r t a k e n e u tra lisa tio n o f c o a s t b ^ e s e a ry . It w a s , th e re fo re ,

th e land forces as n e ce s sa ry

tten es only w h en fired u p o n first a n d to

„^„eH ition.

o enable t h e m t o a c c o m p l i s h th e ir ta s

^

p rim a ry task for th e

^ -me capture of AnjaSip W and

„ r ig u .a ,e d

^ Ja v a lT a s k F o rc e a s th e P o r tu g u e s e p ro v o ca U ^

^^t o f th e K a rw a r

^ th is i s l a n d . It w a s

t h e i s l a n d a f t e r th e s u r r e n d e r o f t h e F o i -

^ e d P o lic e f o r th e o c c u p a b o n o f ^ e w a s s t i l l in P o r t u g u ^ e

366 /

BLUEPIUNTTOBLUEWA-reR

°P -'--«on s as Hn.. W

^

^

-

e

d

h

a

.

-

f h i ?

t a s k N a v ^ ^

o p e r a t io n s w as not avaO-

f u l l n a v a l c o n t r o l i s e s t a h l t ! ^ J H e a d q u a r t e r s f e l t t h a t 'it i5 necessary a f t e r H - H o u r , by p h v s i S n .

Captain (later V^ce Adm ll

personnd'

Officer of Trishul durincr fv, ^ ^-L- Kulkami, who was the Commardin^

tl"us job in spite of th F ®

^ion, recalls that 'the Navy had fakenon

•zander of OperaHn

Lieutenant General J.N. Chaudhuri, Com-

^ a v a l landinp nar+- ^

^ signal to the effect that the used

f o r the canh

^ 8 ® ^ * well-entrenched troops was not advisable.'

point of AniaH?^ o

^^^and, Trishul was to pass b e t w e e n the northern asnavieaHnr>ai?

at H-Hourkeeping as close to BingePoint

the Islanf^

'^as then to anchor in Binge B ay , covei-

opposition froriTli, • f ® o f o r s , and lower her boats while watching ^

weapons thp i

/r

-^ter one burst on the beaches with close

A motor boat with a

the landing partjl^

towing a whaler was to be used

provide eun^p*

northeast shore of the island at this

motor cutter

the landing party, if necessaiy, and toprovj

to expedite landing operations-

in extreme necessit^ f"<?ir^gparty were exhorted to use their weapo ment of aU Portu

^

is to be avoided at all

n^urs and to ensure

measures were adopted to

beganas they hoped

weren't alerted before

India and international odrf

powers would somehow P

_ the

military alternative.

pressure would force India to adando

P «P araK on s Begin

necessary to

t h

e

SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL’S ASIAN EMPIRE / 367

tion, training, maintenance and a m m u n itio n in g a c tiv itie s o f th e N a v a l T a s k Force. As Captain (later R ear A d m iral) D .S t. J. C a m e ro n , w h o v^as th e Commanding Officer of Mysore d u rin g th e o p e ra tio n an d H a g C a p ta in to the Flag Officer Com m anding the In d ia n F le e t (th e la tte r, a lo n g w ith h is staff, was embarked on the cru iser), ren u n isce s o n th e p re p a ra tio n s m a d e: As so frequently happen s, ru m o u rs w e re g o in g ro u n d th e sh ip s to th e effect that an operation ag ain st G o a w a s in th e o ffin g - th is m a y h a v e bewitriggeredoff by the fact that th e sh ip s co n c e rn e d w ere b e in g g iv e n undiie attention from the p o in t o f se a w o rth in e ss a n d b a ttle -re a d in e ss

?nd all this with no p ro jected cru ise o r ex e rcise s in sig h t.

Therefore, in order to q u a sh th e ru m o u rs an d a lso to la y a red herring for any possible w atch ers ash o re w h o m ig h t c o n v e y th e n ew s regarding the departure o f sh ip s on an u n sp ecified m issio n to a u th o rities in Goa, it w as decid ed to tak e the M ysore an d so m e o f the sh ip s concerned to sea for exercises co v erin g tw o d a y s; this w as sch ed u led

° ^ done a few days b efo re 'D m in u s 2'.

Accordingly, w ith ou t prior w arn in g, all le a v e w as can celled and ose ashore were recalled an d th e sh ip s p rep ared for dep artu re. T he

*™ps sai’pd out of B om b ay H arb o u r at 2130 h o u rs, fuUy da rkened. B c -

crcises were out off B o m b ay in p lain v isib ility o f w a tchers and p assin g

? P®- After spending tw o n igh ts at sea, the sh ip s retu rned to h arbou r

" Oie early hours o f the seco n d m orn in g an d rev erted to n orm al routine and leave.

'ri

exercise orders w ere issu ed and the ships readied fo r sea on

y n}mus 5'. O nce again, w ith ships darkened, w e left harbour at n ig h t opmg that the w atchers, if an y, w ou ld presum e that w e ha pro

^

®^®’'cises again.

On clearin gB om bay h arbour, D elhi w as detached and

roceed independently in execu tion o f her task in suppor o

s sd\eduled to com m ence operations for the

^ s o r e , w ith the rem aining ships in com pany,

^

.

jg

to arrive o ff G oa and Anjadip in the e a r l y hours o f D ecem b er 1 8 , eepmg w ell outside the shipping lanes.

BeasandCauvery

Shortly after m idnight o n D ecem ber 17/18, B

.

o f

d etach ed to p ro ceed to their patrol area o ff Goa m p

^ task assig n ed to them .

off Anjadip

Mysore, w ith Tris/juJ in com pany, proceed

f„Uv darkened,

l>efore first light on D ecem ber 18. p»ese

®

j^ours of the D-

^osed Anjadip Island by radar during the p

,^ g jg ian d h av in g

^^ay. No signs of the ship's presence in the viciruty

l^een detected w ere observed.

^ “ '-“ hpr.n t t o b l u e w a ie r

then to send

^

a nU tii-W

a i r r

c a

r a f . t lB in, ™

f n r " ° / S

-r '

u . -

. ‘

of f“te

* b

isl.n

a d

n w

witi i

h L

erEijtli

f o r c e .

^

^ k e e p in g w ith the directive to is

ao-ain cf'T ^ ^ ^ *^ a p p e a r , h o w e v e r , th a t this distracting action militated

? . .

^ o p e r a t i o n a s i t o b v io u s ly disclosed our presenceinihe JT u ty o f t h e islan / J a n d a le rte d th e personnel of the island to the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a la n d in g .

T h e F irst S alvo is Fired -P ortugal's Perfidy

C a p t a i n ( l a t e r V i c e A c im ir a l) K .L . Kulkami^ComniandingOfficetofTrislii'l recalls:

At d a y b r e a k T rishul ste a m e d in to Binge Bay and carried b o m b a r d m e n t o f t h e a re a a r o u n d th e b each . As our jgjrof

to u s e th e le a s tfo r c e , w e m a d e su re that the bom bardm ent^

^

h o n s e s , b a r r a c k s , th e tw o c h u rc h e s a n d oth er structures e x a m i n a t i o n s h o w e d t h a t e x c e p t in g f o r a few tiles fire, no

o f f f r o m th e r o o f o f th e n o r th e r n ch u rch by 40-mm d a m a g e w a s d o n e to a n y o th e r builciing). The f

„gf^nnel

_ « !ii__•«i___ ryinVfiirU^t 0 r , .-lall

e n t e r e d , w a s d e a t h ly s till w ith n o lig h ts o r m oveinn ° g j3;inial*

^ t e r t h e b o m b a r d m e n t T rishu/ w as m a n o e u v r e d to is la n d (R o u n d Isla n d ) w h ic h w as o ff th e southeast a n d lo w e r e d th e b o a ts w ith th e la n d in g p a rty led by ^

(ffl‘

R e a r A d m ir a l) A r u n A u d itto . T h e firs t w a v e w hich let

^

h o u r s la n d e d a t th e b e a c h w ith o u t a n y oppo®^^°^/-av^rthe'^*“‘J

r e t u r n e d to Triskul f o r th e s e co n d w a v e . T h is is w hen f la g a n r l m e n w it h r a is e d a r m s o n t h e n o r t h e m b e a c h .

w a v e , w h ic h le ft a t a b o u t 0 7 4 5 h o u rs, w as la n d in g w e saw ^

o n th e c h u r c h o n th e n o r th e a s t tip o f th e islan d . It was a fla g w a s h o is te d th a t th e se co n d e ch elo n o f the la n d in g p th e is la n d a n d w e r e fixed u p o n . I t w a s a b o u t 0800 hours jj^y

W h e n I s a w th e w h ite fla g I w a s h a p p y b u t im m ediat a tta c k e d m y se c o n d b o a t, I m o v e d the sh ip to the

°

gs vi^

a n d b o m b a rd e d th e isla n d w ith 4.5 in c h h ig h explosive

^ u te S -

a s w ith 4 0 -m n n B o fo r g u n s. T h e fire w as lifted after about «v®

I t w a s ra th e r d ifficu lt e v e n to b om b ard as I w as n o t absowr w h e th e r m y fire w o u ld h it m y lan d in g p arty , and therefore b ard nn en t h a d to b e e x tre m e ly accu rate. I directed m ost o f the

THE SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL’S ASIAN EMPIRE / 369

the woods behind thebuLldings o n th e e a s te rn b e a c h e s o n th e n o rth e rn side of the island. W e h a d b y n o w lan d ed th e en tire la n d in g pa rty o f 75

men and two officers and the b o a ts w e re to ld to lie o ff.

Mysore had m eanwhile b een en g a g in g o th e r e n e m y c o n c e n tra tio n s

^dimtallations w ith h er40-m m B o fo r g u n s an d se n t a la n d in g p a rty a sh o re

«

landed on the beach to a ct as a lin k b e tw e e n U e u te n a n t A u d itto 's Jandmg party and TrisAu/.

TTie Landing Party's Work-Up

la n d i^ ^ a riv ^ Auditto, w ho w a s the o ffice r-in -ch arg e o f the N av al tions,

w ith g lo iy d u rin g the lan d in g op era-

‘^onsontheislandXc^ . u |^°''^g“ e se g a rriso n and m op p in g-u p op era-landingphasp u

P’; ® ^ ® *'^ 8w ou n d ed b yP ortu g u esegu n fired u rin gth e the intematimi

3 grap h ic a cc o u n t o f the P o rtu g u ese b etray al o f

“'^'^upafion and

^ ® ir la st-d itch efforts to thw art the islan d 's

ovenvhelinedhJ^^'^ ^ c o n d it io n a l su rren d er w h en corn ered and fin ally two shins

firep ow er and clev er m an oeu vrin g on the p a rt of

^Warded the

landing p arties that co m b ed the island. H e w as later

^or having ' c o n ^ ^ M edal (N M ) for h is v alo u r and d ev otion to d u ty and determina^

lan d fightin g op eration s w ith im agination, v igou r

Auditto rem inisces:

N ovem ber 1961 w h en I, as a y o u n g Lieutenant, w as

<^hin,Ivv ^ n

T A S (Torpedo A ntisubm arine) C ourse at C o-

Scho^ c a lle d by C o m m a n d e r H .C. Tam eja, the O fficer-in-Charge, of

N av y w as organising a landing pla-

Gunno,

^

^ com m and and that I w as to rep ort to the

" ^ e r y school for further in stm ction s.

the Gi ^

w hen the platoon w as m ustered in the drill shed o f

Office^^^*^

C om m ander (later Rear Adm iral) A.P.S. Bindra,

Gunnery School, stated that the platoon was being

forth,:

® dem onstratton o f land-fighting to the public during the

N avy W eek. There was no m ention o f the im pending Goa

our w ork-up in eam est w h ich consisted mainly of field

TTie bulk o f the platoon co n sisted o f Seam an G unners-sailors j'^st p a sse d ou t o f the Boys Training Establishm erit and w ere Wo

a short gunnery, sm all arm s and parade

'^ e also h a d one dem olition sectio n o f TAS sailors w ho had s p e a a l^ ^

-

underwater weapons. It w as no easy task to get these young men.

370 / BLUEPRWrTOBLUEWATCR

ing. Neithir could

f

™

" , = « r e ^

“ ’'*

«i>,

tra in in g w h e re a s h e re w e

“ ' " I * "

grenades. In addition to the g ? o ? o ^ l ,^ " i “ ‘“ ^'

e q u ip p e d fo r a n y la n d o p e r a t i o n ^

they wereill-

I th e refo re , so u g h t an

in their blues.

V en d u ru th y (a N a v a l h ac

w ith the Commanding Officer of

R-N . B atra J o so rt o ? t

1 Vl« Admiral)

I stre s se d s p e c i f i c a l l v nn f ^

p roblem s. D u r i n g the discussions

w e a p o n s an d a sk e d fo r

actuaUy firing various

th ro w in g eren d p c a ^

°

S^ven confidence in

M y m in istrafin n cT .

u niform s, fielddressings.etc.

to ld t h a t p e r h a n c T

co n stru cted as a taleofwoeandlwas

w o u ld b e fminH

^^een to do the jo b and that someone else

i^ y ea rlierd p m

w as rein stated and Imustsaythatali

3s ag ain st ^^'^^‘^^^^^‘^^^^‘^e^ceptthatonlyonefielddfessing,

5°“''*

per P“ “ "-

.

o f all w eao n n c

trainingincludingpracticalfinJig

C o ch in and eifP

b each e s arou n d the N aval coast batfeiyat

as w ell as triaU

d em o litio n sectio n at the range at Alwaf

pJatoon w as reaHv

fro m sh ip s by scrambling nets,

deploym en t thn

°

deployed . S till there w as no official news

con n ection with^fi,

w ere rife ab o u t the use of theplato^^

q u e rie d m y w ife a ^ tn

i f

^ fact, the vegetable vend

O n D ecem ho i /r

I w ou ld b e le a v in g fo r Goa!

, , > ,i

C och in w ith a cerp^

P lato o n w as em barked on board

other ships of t h r ^ T ° ” ® send-off. T h e n e x t d a y the ship, alongw^^

indication ^

P °i« ed o ff K arw ar. This was the first de j

A njadip.

ahead, w h ich vyas to cao h ire the

m ander,R ear

'

D ecem ber 18, the Task

to Trishul to d ? s c S h ^ " r '

transferred b y j a c k s t a y fr o r r iM ^

^ ja d i p . I vkras called to^ lf

action fo r the assault and

,.j,i

-L. K ulkam i, and I wac k

o f the C om m anding Officer,

island together w ith the

photographs o

pographical features and i

Portugu ese garrison arid

c n T ^ ^

" “ m ber o f t '^ " ‘^'"arks. There w as fairly detailed constant surveillance

well as their likely dispos tiO*^

vpr„

d is c u s s i^ r T "'^ '" ‘^^®d from K arw ar Head-

ery httle opposition -3 5 to S f o r m e d that as there would

^ ortuguese m en as against my 75

™ H SU N S r.SO N P O R ™ O A L ’SA 5.A N EM Pm E /

«ould be best and easiest

as we would ^

“ rttost I argued

^icaH ons th.

landing in an open b o a t

, la n d in g o n a b each a b o u t t h r w

wouldbeheavilydefended.Isug^s

^

bring m an

kilometres to the so u th o f t t ^ ga

^ th is b e a c h w a

*men. of surprise

I 'eau and would, there-

sura>unded by the thickly w ooded central platea

fore, be difficult terrain.

atrreed to th is p la n s ta tin g

The Task F o rce C o m m a n d e r J ja d i l y

.^ ^ g e. it

that T, as the officer c o m m a n d m g th e p la to ,

^gach_

was, therefore, d ecid ed th a t ju s t

•

/ . 40_ u im B o fo r g u i^

softerung w ould b e carrie d o u t b y i^ m g

e n u th e m b e a c h in tw o

inunediately follow ed b y th e la n d in g a

sh ip 's c u tte r

waves. This w as n e c e ss ita te d b y th e fa c

carry in g ca p a c-

(boat) was available fo r tise an d h e n c e w i

jn th e first

ity, thp platoon w o u ld h a v e to b e sp lit in to

• ^j^jj^j^ander) N - K el-

wave and Senior C o m m issio n ed G u n n e r v a

D -anch w h o w a s m y

man, a Special D u ties O fficer o f th e

H a v in g w is h e d m e

second-in-com m and, w a s t o b e i n t h e s ^ o n

^ —jn a n d e r w a s ja c k -

and m y m en the b e st o f lu c k , the ^ a sk

jj^vited m e to dine

stayed back to the flagship . T h a t n ig h t m e L a p

with him and w e d iscu ssed o th er d etails o

^oard, on D e c e i ^ ^

H ands call, i.e., the tim e to w a k e up

_ h ou rs, and the

°

18 was at 0500 h o u rs, sururise b ein g a t

mortar w ell. 1

platoonw asm usteredintheship's an w u ^

especially the

to the irver\ and exp lain ed the tactical

P

^

an y oppositio

wave w hid;, w ou ld 'a n d

as it lan d »J-

„ f

thereafter give cov er to the second

^

w as

® *

O n d L c t io n s from t h e C a p a m , e a ^ ^ >

^

brandy as w e w aited in

gd to circle the

n o l h i 4 happened. T h e ship

w ith the rism g sun

broke and the b righ t b lu e tropi'

stiU nothing happened!

'THe Landing P a rt/s Moment of Truth

^uditto continues:

»n 7 l 5 h o u r s , t h a t

landw ithou t any resort to s

372 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

b ro a d d a y lig h t w ith th e a s s u ra n c e th a t 'n o th in g reaUy would haDoen a s th e g a rriso n h a d a lre a d y su rren d ere d /

I to o k ch a rg e o f th e firs t w a v e o f th e assau lt party from

Trishul

ca lled Rustum a n d w e w e n t p e a c e fu lly to w ard s the beach and I began to b e lie v e th a t th e 's u rre n d e r b u s in e s s ' w a s indeed true. We landed at the b e a ch , to o k p o s itio n a ro u n d th e b e a ch and the boats were sent back to b rin g the se co n d w a v e . F ifte e n rrunutes later, the second wave, u n d er th e c o m m a n d o f S e n io r C orru n ission ed Gunner N. Kebnan, set co u rse to ap p ro a ch th e b e a c h a t a b o u t 0745 hou rs. Suddenly all hell b ro k e lo o se as sp ray s o f m a ch in e -g u n b u llets opened up on the boat fro m P o rtu g u ese g u n -p o sts n e a r a p ill-b o x on the south hill top. Kelm an , w ith great p re sen ce o f m in d , con tin u ed towards the beach, zigzaggin g the b o a t to co u n te r th e a c cu ra cy o f the madiine-gunfiie.A few m in u tes later, b y th e tim e the b o a t b each ed , it had been riddled w ith b u llets. K elm an h a d b e e n w o u n d ed o n both his thighs - fortu n ately on ly flesh w o u n d s b u t all the sam e, seriously. A number o sailors w ere w nnndpd, so m e erie v o u sly , and a few succumbed to 6

injuries a little latter. T h e y o u n g S e a m a n G u n n er sailors were shnckefl into in activ ity a n d it took so m e fo rce h ilh a n d lin g b y m e to get themw of th e b o a t and to take cover. A little la te r so m e w h ite t r o o p s weres

“ gging near the w h ite flag.

field d ressin g I h ad to give mine

beach, w h ile I m u stered the force to m ove

^

W^re

b een d am aged and the

that the tih'

^nd so w e w ere literally cut off nonx V

that ^ s h i p s could render.

op eri^ ^ u 'n w -Ik

be e n silenced by

^

em p la ce m L to n th e h in

directed at the

n f ^ y lives or ekp

ith ad b een position ed . This, no do

|j

as

b o a t e ^ t ^ T T

o l

"

^oats Detore they hit the beach.

the

w o u n d e d S d to

^

K elm an in charge

0°'*'

boats had beenholedanrf

to the ship as soon as tea

westward, and thereby o,fK

?

surrounded from the rear, ••

forcing them to su rre n c £

° * various outlying p osts o f the enemy

into play. A grenadf

w eapons w as noW b ^ ^

! mer\acing m achine-gun post ena

THE SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL'S ASIAN EMPIRE / 373

notonly to take position on the u p p er reach es o f the rid g e b u ta lso to capture Ihreememy soldiers a t that p o st. W e p ro ceed ed n orth w ard s under cover o f 1

cross-fire from m achine-

2 e m h i l l t n n

3S u n d er v e iy accu rate sniper fire from the

the objective

®

B y a b o u tn o o n w e had alm ost reached

opeS area of ? h n A m ®

^

a ccu ra te fire frn

u-n

h ard ly any cover. The

p o sitio n s^ fn n T ^

200 feet higher than our

outright bv a h ^11 t ^ d ow n . T w o o f o u r m e n w ere w ounded and one killed

was ineffecHv ^ ®

w W ch p en erated h is helm et. T he two-inch m ortar forest.

^

lo catio n o f the en em y w as w ell concealed in the thick

t»move s w S I °

^ b etter v iew o f the area and reassess the tactices, I had

a rfiof j

y across ten yard s to g et behind a tree. Just as Ireached the tree saiior Com m °"-"

u p p er arm . It caused a deep flesh wound but, like

'^ebone. AsTh

G u n ner K elm an, I w as fortunate that it had missed

in the

^®lcl dressing, ha vin ggiven m ine to Kelman, on eo f the

^Jeeding

Passed m e his dressing w hich I used effectively to stem the

stage th at w e succeeded in establishing wireless contact told us

Trishul, which was by now circling the island, on

^ landing p arty from Mysore had also been inducted and

” iy opinion this was a wrong thing as we had no

in blueTiS*^®" 'v ith the oth er p arty and also the other party was dressed

“ntrain lj ® c l r e s s ort board Naval ships at that time), totally inform s

^ ^act hazard and consequently impede o ^ a c b o n . I

*

W

accordingly but as they w erenot in contact with the o tlw

n o th in g As it came to Ught later, ^

8un p„„f "^oved along the coast. In fact they went smack into ^

^ovfn ?‘

southern end of the Portuguese garrwon, “

coUap3^

^ Iw e-ahead form ation, and the first man got hit in his guts and

‘ c £ .S i v i n g d sar directions itom me,

bombardedhiU212andits

Th

with the ship and obtaining gun

establishing c o n u ttu ^ ^ *^ ^

thegarrisonand

fOrcP°^'vas providential as it enabled us to

Surrender of their

^^d as we went down, we came upon

thg “y ^ow it was about 16C0 ^

landing party who was now almost

(jp ,^ ° “^ded m an from the

jjg succumbed to his

Although we later took nw

3 7 4

/

B L U E P R I N T T O

B L U E W

A T E R

se v e re in ju rie s a fe w h o u rs la te r

a w h ifP 1

* ® “ ^^®^^°'^®*‘^ ® *’'^6adswithoneofthemwaving

nrJcn

f

A u d itto s P a rty w a s in stru c te d b y Trishul to take over the p so n ers o f w a r an d b rin g then\ o n b o a r d th e M ysorein boats to besentlatet cers an sailo rs w e re se n t to o th e r b e a ch e s also for taking charge of the s u r r e n

d e r i n

g P

o r t u g u e s e s o l d

i e r s .

A udito re co llects:

O m m en th en su rro u n d ed th e b a rra ck s area o f the Portuguese troops an d the ch u rch to th e n o rth , th e re b y rou n d in g up the Portuguese troops n u m b erin g 3 5 w h o a t this sta g e surrerxlered without any resistan ce. T h u s th e o p e ra tio n w a s su ccessfu U y concluded.

con^clusion o f th e first p h a se o f th e m opping-up operations^

ians U70

d i ^ g w h ich so m e m o re P o rtu g u ese troops and Goan ci Flae<?ta«^ apprehended, the In d ia n trico lo u r w as hoisted on top o

g

t e

f f a t 1 4 2 5 h

o u r s o n D

e c e m

b e r 1 8 .

.

said- ‘X

d atelined A p ril 1 1 ,1 9 6 4 a t Bom bay, the Indian

^ A " ® d « o r a t e d with the N>os«.

Vikrant off th

duty' at a ceremony on board the

N aval D o ck yard , B o m b ay , o n Frid ay, April 1 0 ,1 9 «

P'^ented by the President, w as fbr

u Ju tP n

V ice-A dn iiral tiS- S o ^

tion to dutv d-

Khukri w as hon ou red for

C a U e S ^ ; , ^ d u r i n g the G o a O perarion in D f

V

'^ d e rh e a v y

^ 75-stron g lan d in g party on

gpejv-*’^

jungle warfare

^-ieutenai\t A u d itto w ho had no ^

^ g o u i and

lan d fig htin g op eration s wit^^

^

said.

'^ < ^ e ^ /S ^ ^ J ^ a lB S .S o m a n ,w h o h a d b y m ^ '5 :'* '

lam verv ,

to U e u t e n a n t Auditto,re**

PORTUGAL’S ASIAN EMPIRE / 375

the sun SCTS on

displayed by you during th e A n j

v

proud of m e

aMIhe quaUties of lead ersh ip 5 ^ d B P ^ y « l

to the ultimate success of the Operation.

The c ita tio n fo r S e n i o r

'S e n i o r C o m ^ -

a w

a r d

e d t h

e A

s h

o k a C

h

a k r a C

l a s s n ( K

i r t i C

h

a

g e c o n d a s s a u l t b o a t

sioned gunner N. K elm an w a s in

t h

e b o a t w a s a t s o m e d i s -

during the landings o n D e c e m b e r 1 8 , 1 9 6 1 . W h

- - j^ y ja t e f ir e . A n u m b e r

tancefromthebeach, the e n e m y o p e n e d h e a ^ a

g b u U e t

of sailors in th e b o a t w e r e k i l le d a n d w o u n d e d .

^ Q u ^ d s , h e d i s p l a y ^

whidi w en t th r o u g h b o t h t h ig h s . D e s p i t e h i s c o n t in -

exemplary c o u ra g e , m ain tained d is c i p l i n e a r ^ c a ju m p e d a s h o r e

ued stead fastly to w a r d s t h e b e a c h . O n t o u c h i n g w a v e ,

encouraging

m e n a n d le d t h e m to t h e s u p p o

- ( jy i s e d to r e t u r n to

Soon a fte r la n d in g o n t h e I s l a n d , K e l m ^

c o n t in u e d to a s s i s t m

Trishui He, h o w e v e r , m a d e l ig h t o f h i s w o u n

^ v v h en o p e ^ a * * ^

con d u ct o f o p e r a tio n s th r o u g h o u t t h e day-

, tj^e Is la n d t h a t

had virtuaU y e n d e d a n d t h e N a t io n a l H a g w a s h o eventuaUy r e tu r n e d to Trishul f o r « ^ e d ic a l a t t ^ t t

, o u ts ta n d in g p e r s ^ '

T K o L .______1.

of leadership ana ou _ .^ ^ ii^ c o m -

P'«te disregard of b is p erso n al safety

fhe victory or

^

'“'oer his co n u ran d an d c o n t r ib u t ^

o ffic e r

The others d ecorated w ere C hij^

u va C3iakra)'‘

O fdi-

M o h a m m e d ,A .< .h o k a Q i a k r a a a s s f f l ^ ^ ^ ^ 5 n ^ p o s t h ^ ^ ^ y ^ j^

'^uelIayaselariMohandas,Ashoka

Bachan Singh

Qsthu-

« ' y S . a n a „ B « h , n S t a 8 h , O K l i n . O ' 2 ^ ^ k «

Sam ar, V i je n i a P al S ta g h

A »l»k> Chakra

^ u s ly ; and A ble Seaman Jaswant bing*

tShaurya Chakra).

Tncmictor Ali

of the fi«t

Chief P etty O fficer

tjng. H e was

deploy®^

®’^perienced m em ber in ^ j^ p e c e m b e r

wave,

^ave lo land in Anjadip

landing of

under heavy

into selected positions to

g from the

up the

^ rd b o a t was

“P

bs they *‘*J^ d % v e r

positions behind ® ^

led the

t^tfuew a hand

piompt

Mohammed

the

action. Ttus p

hill .gainst the e n e m y - l e a d i n g his men

a n d w

a s the fir«t » o

°

376 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

a c t io n d re w o ff m u c h o f th e fire o p e n e d o n th e second boat, reduced theii c a s u a ltie s a n d c o n tr ib u te d g r e a tly to th e su ccessfu l landing of the second w a v e .

A t a b o u t 1 5 0 0 h o u r s th e s a m e d a y , it w a s thought that a number of e n e m y s n ip e r s m ig h t b e c o n c e a le d in a g ro u p of houses close behind the b e a c h .T h e s e sn ip e rs c o u ld b e a se rio u s th re a t to ourmenandboatsengaged in e v a c u a tin g p ris o n e rs o n th e b e a c h . C h ie f P e tty O fficer Mohamm an th re e s a ilo rs c a rrie d o u t a s w ift a n d th o ro u g h search of these houses and c a p tu re d 1 2 a r m e d P o r tu g u e s e so ld ie rs w ith o u t firing ®

^ C h ie f P e tty O ffic e r A M o h a m m e d d isp la y e d a n d g re a t c o u ra g e a n d a b ility o n m a n y o cc a sio n s o n y»

p erso rw l r is k a n d in c o m p le te d is re g a rd o f h is safety.

.

O r ^ o f th e sa ilo rs w h o m a d e th e su p re m e sa cq fic e

^as

O p e ra tio n w a s O rd in a ry S e a m a n S a m u e l Ja y a se la n o

'

jg gun

c u t d o v m b y en e m y fire a fte r h e h a d silen ced sever p o sitio n s b y laxm ch in g a se rie s o f g re n a d e a tta ck s.

T h e c ita tio n fo r th e p o s tu m o u s a w a rd o f the

h im rea d s, 'T h e la n d in g s w e re m a d e in tw o w av

^ ggcond

1 9 6 1 . T lie first w a v e la n d e d w ith o u t o p p osition .

.^oncontinu'»

h o w e v e r, ca m e u n d er h e a v y fire an d stiff

fo r m o st o f th e d ay. A t o n e sta g e the a d v a n ce or

conceal®®^

h alted b y h e a v y a n d a cc u ra te fire fro m en em y

b u sh es and b eh in d ro ck s. O rd in ary Seaman M o han to ap p ro ach the h id d e n en e m y p o sitio n s an d silen ce i S

h

a

n

d

a

s s c r a w

l e d f e a r l e s s l y t o w

a r d s t h e

f i r e . O

n e a c h o c c a s s i o n o f t h

r o w

i n

g a h and -g ren ad e

f i r e b r e a k c o v e r a n d e x p o s e h

i m

s e l f t o h

e a v y a n d

5 ® ^

o n e s u c h o c c a s i o n w

l i i l e t h r o w

i n g a h

a n d

- ^

T

V

i i l e d

i n a c t i o n ' - ^

M

o h a n d a s s w

a s c a u g h t i n

t h e e n e m

y f i r e a n d w

a s k i u

j j i e x p ® ^ .

O

r d i n

a r y S e a m

e m

M

o h a n d a s s ,

t h o u g h a

e n c e d s a i l o r , d i s p l a y e d c o m

m

e n d a b l e c o u r a g e a n

d

d e v

t h e W

g h e s t o r d e r .

. r v S e a * ^

T,

O rd im ry S e a m a n B e ch a n S in g h ,O rd ip a

^gglso

^

c h

a

n

S

m

^

a n d O

r d i n

a r y S e a m

a n V

i j e n d r a P

a l S i n g h T o t n a ^ '

K

e^nacVed t h e Portugu ese ^

^

j,, thj

t o

m

w

h e r e t h e e n e r n y h ^ d o p e n e d f i r e o n t h e b o a t s t h a t l a n

d

^

a

i *

^

8

devotion *ko dutv of tv^ Viinv* »

^

v-ppoi^^S

THE SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL'S ASIAN EMPIRE / 377

r f

received the p o sth u m o u s aw ard o f the A sh oka C hakra

. l a s s C h a k r a ) wW le B a ch a n S in g h receiv ed the p osth u m ou s aw ard of Ashoka Chakra C lass III (Sh au ry a C h akra).

Able Seaman Ja sw an t S in g h B aw a, w as a m em b er o f the arm ed escort second w a v e o f the lan d in g party. To quote from the fw

H

^ (Shau iya C hakra) to h im

wounded- ' ”

su ccess o f the op eration during w hich h e was

^ ^ ^ w a s the Bren G u n n er in the bow s o f the m otorboat o f Trishul

during

conve)dng the second w ave to the beach

abou^ii

lan d in g on D ecem ber 18,1961. W hen the boats were sm a ll-beach, the en em y opened heavy and accurate

t h r o

Baw a w as on e o f the first to be w ounded and was shot

main^ H

ankle. D esp ite his w ound. Able Seam an Bawa re-

ene ^

and ev en w hile underheavyfire^ returned fire on the

a c c ^ ^ f ^ defended position s ashore. Bawa continued to provide

<!o^

j ^

effectiv e cov ering fire for the landing party until] the

second w ave had landed.

'

fire

* b rave deed did m u ch to upset the accuracy o f the enem y

^ / prevented excessiv e casualties in the boa ts and contributed to the

^u^essful landing o f the second w ave. H is devotion to duty and a

perform ance under heavy enem y fire are o f a high order

^ ■ in the finest traditions of the service.

laco ^

^ ^ cip ien ts o f M e n tio n s in D is p a tc h e s w e re C o m m a n d e r A .F . C o l-Whn\,

la n d in g p a r ty fromMysore, Surgeon L ieu ten an t T . S i u ^ o , Gun

^ M e m b e r o f th e m e d ic a l team o n b o a rd M ysore, C h ie f P e tty O ffic e r b

"ery Instructor P a r k a s h C h a n d , w h o w a s th e c o x s w a in o f th e m o to r-m an

s e c o n d w a v e o f th e la n d in g o p e ra tio n , and L ea d rn g P a tro J-W ay-g^J^ndar S in g h , w h o w a s a member of fh e la n d in g p a r ty in th e s e c o n d i,

C h e fP e ,,y O ffic e r P ra k a s h C ta n A c m e o / t t e a w a r i e ^ o ( a M » 0 ^

Wa<!r«

g r e a t p r e s e n c e o r II

w fa k in e s o ita b e a v o id in g a c t io n .

responsible for saving many U^es by

n ^ om en t th e P o r tu g u L e o p en e d fire, O ia n d x^calJs.

T .

w .^ ^ -w a v fr o m th e m o to r b o a ts o th a tth e e n e m y I s te e r e d m y m o to r w h a le r a

7 ^

d o d g in g th e buU ets by a l-

w o u ld h a v e tw o ta rg ets

^

^ su c ce s siv e b u n ts o f

te m a te ly s te e rin g to w ard s a n a a

y

378 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

b u lle ts . W h e n lr e a c h s h o r e ,Ila n d e d a llm e m b e r s of thepartysafelybut th e v e r y n e x t m o m e n t th e b o a t w a s rid d led w ith 11 bullets and was g ro u n d e d b y th e im p a c t o f th e b u rs t. I o rd e red the whaler crew to dear th e w h a le r b y p u s h in g it b u t sin c e th e y o u n g fellow s showed signs of n e r v e s , I ju m p e d o u t o f th e w h a le r , c le a re d an d refloated it and, after ju m p in g b a c k in to it, I ste e r e d it a w a y fro m th e beach. Meanwhile, the s h ip 's B o fo rs h a d o p e n e d u p a n d sile n c e d the enemy guns. 1 t t o n o tic e d th a t th e m o to r b o a t c o x s w a in e d b y P etty O fficer Nairhad g ro im d ed o n ro ck s a n d w a s flo o d e d u p to th e gunw ales. It d e a d a n d tw o w ov in d ed sa ilo rs . M ysore n o w sent a boat

.

ch a rg e o f C o m m iss io n e d B o a ts w a in C h a ra n jit Singh b e w ^

tw o o f u s, w e to o k th e d e a d a n d th e w o u n d e d back to e s p T h e C o m m i m i c a t i o n s T e a r n L a n d s

.

C o m m an d er (later C a p ta in ) A .F. C oU aco, a sp e cia list tio n s, w a s em b ark ed on M ysore as th e F le e t O p eratio n s o fr j^ r F leet. H e v o lu n te ered to le a d a c o m m u n ica tio n s team

^

Qjt to the

ash ore an d h a d a m a jo r ro le to p la y in p ro v id in g adequa ® ^^j^^antsof b eleag u ered lan d in g p arty fro m Trishul an d in m o p p in g up forces

thePortuguesegarrisonaftertheformalsurrenderofthe orw ^ ggrliet-^

F o r d isp laying raw gu ts in th e fa ce o f th e en em y , as m entio w as later aw ard ed a M e n tio n in D isp a tch es.

# thePortug^’®®®

Sin ce h e h a ile d fro m G o a , C oU aco k n ew a sirw ttering o ^^unicatiJ'8

lan gu age an d h en ce w a s co n sid ered th e rig h t p e r s o n for c

^

w ith Portugu ese and in terro gatin g th e p riso n ers o f w ar

^{tet

surrender, if required. D esp ite th e la p se o f o v er a quarter cen

7

operatioixs, CoUaco, n ow settled in C an ad a, v iv id ly recalls-ttic opP^^

^ t t i n g the scerie requires a rev iew o f th e preced in g

m g forces and a h o st of interlinking factors. P erh ap s an

tjcity o'

tio n m ay provide the read er w ith a gau ge to ju d g e the au this ru rrative of events that took p lace o v er 29 years

t- ^

(m e m b e r o f th e D ir e c t in g S t a f f ) a t

, ^

at W eUm gtonand h a d b e e n in charge o f the T actical S c h ^ ®

^

'■>

on board llw M J^ l,

THESUNSETSONPORTOGAL'SASIANEMPIRE / 379

CommunicaUonsOHicer.

. i„ ;,r f in a n d t h e n p r o v !d e s e a

TheH eefsobjecH vew astocaptureA n

p ^

s u p p o r t t o t h e A

r m

y i n

G

o a . A

n

j a d

i p

w

a s t o

“" “t

my .ecoilecH oa * a . a lo . o f .h e

f o r c e w

e r e i s s u e d b

y N

a v a l H

e a d

q u a r t e r s . T

p

j t o t j r o v i d e

s e n d t w

o l a n d i n g p a r t i e s a s h o r e a n

d

M ysore w a s s u p p

*

a l l n e c e s s a r y s u p p o r t i n

c l u

d

i n

g

f e

e

s u p p o r t -

e m

a i l i s l a n d .

F r o m

i t s n o r t h e r n e n d t o i t s s o u t h e r n b p ,

^

^ f , g a b o u t

isaboutakilom etreandhalf long. At its w idest pa

A jj^ eth eeast

4 0 0 m

e t r e s ; a n a r r o w

n

e c k i s a b o u t o n e - t h i r d w

a y

o

_

r o c k y i n l e t s

c o a s t a r e a b o u t t h r e e u s a b l e b e a c h e s b u t n o n e g r o u n d r i s e s

a n d c o v e s m

a k e t h e w

e s t s h o r e a s m

u

g

g

l e

r s '

i a

« . n

l a c e s w

i t h h

i g h

s h a r p l y f r o m

t h e s h o r e l i n

e t o a b o u t 2 0 0 f e e t .

a k i n d o f

grass; coconut trees dot the shore line. T h e w a t e r e

m

a i n l a n d

s t i n g i n g f i s h ( s e a u r c h

i n

s ) t h a t m

a k e s s w

i m

m

i n g

a l m

o s t i m

p o s s i b l e .

■

N

a v a l C o m m o n -

Shortly before the o p e r a t i o n , I h a d a t t e n a

^ e x -

w

e a l t h P l a n n i n g C

o n f e r e n c e a t S i n g a p o r e - P

. .

w

e r e c e r t a i n

c i s e s o f f T r i n c o m

a l e e G

E T ) . M

y

R

o y a l

t j ^ a n I r e a l l y d i d - 1

* l ^ t I k n e w

m

o r e a b o u t t h e f o r t h c o m

i n g

, n u e s t i o n e d . W h e n

w

a s n e v e r t r e a t e d b e t t e r , w

i n e d

a n d d m

e d

P j g e t « r a s

1

l e a r n e d f r o m

t h e m

t h a t

o n e

o f t h e

knew a l l a b o u t i t

p a t r o l l i n g o f f G

o a , I g a v e t h e m

t h e

m

y h o s t , b e c a u 2

n

x

e

m

o

r e

I s r n

n

e

d

k

n

o

w

i n

g

l y

, t h

e

m

o

r .

^

^

^

a B r i t i s h s u b m

a r i n e , h e a d i n g f o r t h e F a

^

V i a n o e n i n g o f f

a B

r i t i s h s u b m

a r i n e , h e a d i n g f o r

h a p p e n i n g o n

p r o v i d e i n t e l l i g e n c e a n d k e p t a n eye

^ . O

. o f t h e s u

b

m

a

r ^

w

h i l e o c c a s s i o n a l l y b e i n g

^

a

s o v e r a n d t a l k

and 1 m e t i n Cochin after the w h o l e o p e i r

^

i r

u n d e r s h i r t s

b e a c h u n d e r t h e

h i s g r e a t

t h

e l a n

d

i n

g

p

a r t y l a n

d

^

a w

a r d e d t h e

p o i n t w

i t h h i s m

e n .

a n t A

u d i t t o w

h o w

a s t o

c l i m

b e d t o a

P

.

n o i n t s o n e i t h e r

W 0 . k t t „ , < l a y . H e « 0 . a d 2 « S S ® h a d r ^ , d ^ ^ P ^ £ . 0 C K i m B

y t h i s t i m

e ,

a n d w

e r e

i s that t h e b o a t

s i d e o f o u r l a n d m

g

‘ ^ „ a r t y . A H

I c a n r e m

e m

u

T rish u rssecon d lan d m gp arty

380 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

w o u n d e d an d the dead to Mysore w a s awash

V P ^ H

v "

were

e ry d e m o ra lis e d . O n M ysore's b rid g e , I found the Admiral very w o r n e d as h e h a d n o n e w s fro m th e first landingp arty. TrishulMm

n e w s e ith e r a s th e la n d in g p a r ty 's w ire le ss h a d broken down. Wecould s ^ w h a t w a s le ft o f th e s e c o n d la n d in g p a rty (about 10 men and an o ffic e r) s till h e ld d o w n o n th e b e a c h . I su g g ested to the Admiral that I, b e in g a L o n g 'C ' (a c o m m im ic a tio n s sp e cia list), take a communication p a rty a sh o re to fin d o u t w h a t w a s w ro n g w ith Lieutenant Auditto’s p a rty a n d to e s ta b lis h a lin k w ith th e m an d w ith the ships. He relucta n tly a ^ e e d . O n th e q u a rte rd e c k , a v o lu n te er CorrununicationsTeam

- tw o w ire le s s o p e ra to rs w ith b a c k p a c k rad io s and two signals sailors w ith p o r ta b le A ld is sig n a llin g la m p s - w e n t ashore. As w e wereleaving th e sh ip , a S q u a d ro n L e a d e r (o f th e In d ian A ir Force), who was on b o a rd M ysore as th e D e fe n c e P u b lic Relatiorw O fficer covering me o p e ra tio n , a sk e d if h e co u ld co m e a lo n g and brin g a cameraman. - -

A d m iral a g reed an d h e a c co m p a n ie d us throughout the day.

H o w w e g o t a sh o re is a m y ste ry to m e. First the water then ro ck s - th e seco n d p arty se em ed to b e at a standstill. By this cro ss-fire fro m ab o v e se em ed to b e p eterin g ou t and one sailors n eed ed h elp . I ask ed S e n io r C om m issio n ed Gunner Ke I cou ld take the rem ain d er o f th e seco n d lan d in g party while e retu rned to the sh ip w ith the w o u n d ed . H e seem ed dazed by and glad to do so. T h e firin g h ad d ecreased b y n ow and c b n jm g to h igh er grou n d in sin g le file. O n ce on higher h ead ed n orth w est. I w as ah ead o f the co lu m n and k e e p in g ^

tou ch w ith b o th T rishul and Mysore. W e kn ew there were For 8"

soldiers around and w ere as alert as o u r lives d ep en d ed on it-

^

Trc.

u

along a rou gh n arrow path , ab ou t two

I

" e v e r used before an dlrej^

b T f h l T

so did th e Squ ad ron L ead er and a

n o t d iv e fast e n o ^ ^ o f

his pants anH ^

^

stom ach w h ich cam e ou t from , pjefel*

to the rieh t

*^®jn^pression o f b ein g a superficial

,^55 th®

p a S v^Se

side). A & m p {s to get Wm

Mysore had

^

and w o u n d e d ^ d w o r j j j l ? ® v

Katwar

to get in touch w ith T

^

possible.

a

betw een itan d T rishu l

®

U k . a g e s ,

w a s

^

THE SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL'S ASIAN EMPIRE / 381

lieamed later) kept m o a n in g s o ftly . A fte r a w h ile h e m o v e d fu r th e r to

the right. We cou ldn't se e h im . W e d id n 't s e e h im . W e d id n 't k n o w h e had fallen down the steep sid e a n d la y d y in g .

Portuguese C ap itu IaH o n

^

o f firin g fro m th e n o r th -w e s t o f th e

certain L ip h f

h e a d in g fo r th e n o rth -w e st. A t a

Thev asif 'h

to u ch w ith th e la n d in g p a rty a n d a c te d a s a vivid m pm r,«f r

^ o u g h u s, to g iv e th e m fire sut>Dort. It is a

Portuguese

saa firin g a w a y , th e

towards the nnT+^^^ n in ru n g in th e d ire ctio n o f the b u ild in g s an d Scenic h

se cto r, trees b e in g u p ro o ted b y Trishul's

soon after that^^h^

w ith d e a th a n d d ev a sta tio n . I t w a s a ll o v e r had ston

J

rea ch ed th e n o rth -e a ste rn co v er, the

^ d g iv en u n ^

L ieu ten an t A u d itto rep orted th at th e P o rtu g u ese

^0 Trishul and ^

p riso n ers o n the b each . H e retu rn ed

^ rv v a rb u td '

p ick ed u p R. S in g h w tw w as la ter tak en to

on the w ay. I lo o k ed a t m y w atch . It w as 1500 hou rs,

^boutfood W

®®dy in the m o rn in g and had n o t h ad o r w orried

with a fi

®

ju m p y - a y o u n g b o y com in g d o w n a co co n u t

^^'Jght h

^ cocon u t (for m e) alm o st g o t sh o t b y a sailo r w h o presence o

^ sniper. Trishul w as le ft to clean up and estab lish a S'^esesold”

^^3nd. U n fortu n ately sh e ran a g r o u n d . T h e P ortu -

to b

b rou g h t to Mysore and also taken to K arw ar. I w as Mea^ ^ K-^

A njadip but it w as n o t to be.

*3ken G

h eard that the A rm y w as doing v ery w ell and had

3lsohea°H

w ould b e read u n g the coast w ithin a day o r two. W e

*he Porh

Beas and Cauveryhad d ea h A/bnso de Albuquerque,

agrou ^ S u e s e frigate, a deadly blow and she lay there in theharbou r.

We

crew less less than ten m inutes after the fight had started.

into M arm agao H arbour and m ade sure n o Portuguese

j

w ere hiding below decks In the m erchant ships. I w as so

° “ ^ t at being aUve, I literally skipped on board these m erchantmen.

T h a t n ig h t. C o m m o d o re H -A. A gate, a n old C o m m an d in g O f f i c e w ho w as taking over as the first N aval O /ficer-in-Charge o f

“ berated Goa, gave m e the keys to a captured jeep

Nazareth (Com m ander Freddie Nazareth, Mysore s

^ d I w ent all the w ay inland to visit relatives. W e w ^ t o l d I n d i a n s a re c o m in g to b u m us aU', they asked us. T h e on ly thing

382 / blu epr in t TO BLUEWATER

.

m u c h le s s S c o tc h T h e v

h

^ i

reassurance and

m u c h ln d i a n a s w e w erP

y b e b e v e that they had becomeas

I n t e llie e n c e R p n n ! '

Portuguese subjects,

it w a s RhuU) w

P °^ *® ^ ^ < ^ ^ d icated that a Britishdestroyer(Ithink

s J e s w e i h i

to le a v e S in g ap o re and d ip Io4tic presin reco v p ri

^ p p lie d o n B rita in b y h e r old est ally, Portugal, tohelp g a p o r T

'^ ^ I 'e a r d that i?Ay/i had sailedfromSin-

G o v e rn m e n t o f India w as asked to make an

u n c e m e n t to th e h u n d re d o r so B ritish residents in Goa that they w e re a l ^ a f e a n d th a t th e y w e re fre e to le a v e G o a if, w h e n and how they thp ^

b ro a d c a s t. H o w e v e r, w h e n a request was received kt

e B ritish sh ip to e n te r G o a to em b a rk B ritish citizens, it was not a p p ro v e d . A s ig n a l c le a r ly sta te d th a t en try into Indian territorial w a te rs w o u ld b e c o n sid e re d to b e a n u n frien d ly act. The s h ? turned b a c k to S m g a p o re.

Mopping up on Anjadip

^ J a n u a r y 2 ,1 9 6 2 , a fte r th e N e w Y ear, A d m iral Som an and I the general

a real fir

the dark

History i

ou tsid e w orld th a 7 fiT ''“ ' ™ '^ ® v e r, ttiere w ere 'e p o r » ^ ^ - 7 ^ t e < J

* e s t o r y to b e kep t alive

figh tin g goin g on.

Anjadip, it

P assin g m erch an tm en could repo

™ent- W e e s ta b lis v S

em barrass the

.jflcel

h ad b een to the i s l a n d ^

objectiv es fo r m e to ^ c c o i n p ^ ^

®nd for all and. next n

" 'e r e , first, clean ing up o f Anja P

N ext day a N aval

life w as to b e lost.

^ [ 0>

y a N aval aircraft took m e to G o a, and a 70-toot

THE SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL'S ASIAN EMPIRE / 383

launch to Anjadip. T h e m o to r la u n c h re m in d e d m e o f th e co a sta l fo r c e s

dunng World W ar II. T h e g a rriso n w h ic h h a d b e e n in C O . TrishuVs

c o i ^ n d passed in to m in e. I a lso h a d o p e ra tio n a l c o m m a n d o f th e

mo or aunc • T^ere w as a re c e n tly -c a p h ire d p ris o n e r. H e a n d a n o th e r Hp

d ie rh a d tried to m a k e it b y s w im m in g to th e m a in la n d .

o t l i e r h a d ^ ^ T ? ^ ^ ^ e j^ a u s t e d , re c a p tu re d , o n th e b e a c h a n d th e

“ I "

p r is o n e r w e h a d ,

mand»H 4 t

^ a rro g a n c e h a d a ls o re co v e re d . H e d e-n n t m e T n ^ t « f

d irty fo o d d ish . H is d e m a n d w as

aboard thp mnf °i

^ sm a tte rin g o f E n g lish , so I took h im

around thp

^ lo u d -h a iJer an d w e cru ise d

give themselves u iT h -^

a d v ise d h is frie n d s h id in g in th e co v e s to

'these Indian '

P o rtu g u e se a d v ice w en t so m e th in g like

only Porhipi

<^ogs', at w h ich tim e I in terru p ted h im w ith the

go homr'^-

,

(w h ich rn y fath er w o u ld u se) 'V a m o sp ro casa^

fast. But

ov erb oard . H e sm arten ed

give themselves u^^^^

lin e-u p s o f P o rtu g u ese so ld iers w a itin g to

lights acroT s^!}^^^^^ th irty m en w ith au to m atic w eap on s and flash -

from the so

o f th e islan d so that n o b o d y sh ou ld cross o v er

We n e a 'l ^ v r

island. There w as n o sh o o tin g th at n ig h t

routg^

*

® b u n ch o f w ild pigs u sin g the w ell-gu ard ed

another cru ise around the island in the m otor lau n ch and

^®xt da

w arned ttiat I intended settin g fire to the islcind

^®ensh^t

obvious that w e had been w atched and could h ave

Outsh

T h eir objective w as to keep the p o t boiling w ith-

P o ssih ?°^ ® an y o f us. O ur objective w as to stop their show as fast as

®

save em barrassm ent. W hile w alking around the island, I

p

® across o iu m edical officer kneeling by the side o f the corpse o f a Ch •

soldier. O ur sailors dug a grave and I gave h im a soJem n

^ -^ stia n burial w ith m y prayers. M ost o f the h alf dozen houses we Ound w ere shacks and even the Church w as dilapidated and em pty.

_ N ext m o r n in g w e s ta r te d a t th e n o r th e r n m o s t p o in t a n d w ith th e p ris o n e r le a d in g th e w a y u s in g h is lo u d h a ile r , m e m b e rs o f th e g a rris o n I c o m b e d a t a r m 's le n g th e v e r y c o v e , e v e r y r o c k , e v e iy c r e v ic e , b u rn in g th e b r u s h b e h in d u s. T h e fla m e s , fa n n e d b y th e w in d , m a d e th e b u rn in g g r a s s a s p e c ta c u la r s ig h t. W h e re v e r th e p r is o n e r's v o ic e q u iv e re d , h e in a d v e r te n tly a le rte d u s o f p o s s ib le tro u b le . T h o u g h tfiere W ere s ig n s o f r e c e n t o c c u p a tio n th e re w a s n o o p p o s itio n . A t th e te n g e r o f th e tw o c a v e s a t th e s o u th e rn m o s t p o in t, th e re w a s ra fts a n d b ro k en o a rs , s o m e to m c lo th e s a n d a ll th e s ig n s o f a re c e n t p u li-o u t.

w as q u iet."

bu, t t .e T „ ^ ” ‘"°''a«nch,5 „

l> each a w

^ ® ^ aU a r m e d n a rtv

J

the Supply 0/ficerof

h a d s w ^ ^ ^ P tu re th e p r is o n e r s n

^ ^^S^phone to go near the

h o ic f w

f

^

landing parties

i s t e d th e n a tio n a l fla g a t

b y about UOOhouishad

^ e n a n c h o r e d in th e b L

poin t. Ilie%5or^andTrishii]

T,

" '^ t ^ r a n d o t h e r th m «

m o re personnel ashore witfi/sod

^ a d f o u n d t h a t th erp tLo

carried o u t a musterofthepeopfe

g e t t in g d a r k , s e n t a rp r r>

p e o p Je sh o rt and even thou^ if was

^ e r e c a s u a lt ie s . T h a t

sweeptheareaincasetheie

c a p t u r e d a ll th e p risn

<*6 th ree m en. Neogi landed and

t h e w o u n d e d w er^

t ° theMy5or^. Thedeadanc

W e re s e v e n d e a d 3nw^° ^^U ected a n d se n t to the Mysore. In all there

e n t ir e is la n d vva<! ir,

^ n u m b e r o f th em injured. By 1600 hours the

° n e p e r s o n m is s in o -*^ *^ ^ ° "^ ° ’' ^^^^ordingto the Portuguese, theyl^<

At a b o u t 17nn hT

•

r a l a n d C h ie f o f N a v a

^ lo n g w ith U eu ten m t (later Adiw-

s ^ d in s p e c t e d then;c>h^

J^ m d as^ m y Communication Offictf/

p o in t. O n th e J 9 t h

f^ ^ S ^ ^ ^ e n ts a n d w e n tri^ tu p to th e fla g S ^

h e ld in K a r w a r w h i S l

w ho gave their lives vvas

a to u c h in g sig h t worthl^^

® "tire K arw ar town -teaW

D u rin g thp

G o d si

ů - " ^ a r d m e n t the road leading from

lite ra lly b y t h o u s f n d ! * ^ ^ ^ ^ ® ^ ° ” ^ ® an in terestin g5igh f'i*^

" f t e r h e a rin th e i u > W ?

^ h o h ad com e to watch

I w a s o r d e r e d f ^ f /

.

o n b o a rd

* e 20th w h e r e on arrival^

^ t a r i . G eneral C a n d e th ^

fte r a d a y 's sta y , le ft f S

^^en w ent to Bombayan^'

T h e Task Fore r to retu rn the lan d in g party-

- - g a r d s t h e

‘e t r e a c h e iy o f th e

- g u e s e , th e ir v io la tio n o/ th e interr>^'

t h e SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL'S ASIAN EMPIRE / 385

tionalconventionandtheresuU aatheavylossoflife,A drxuralSom an

The first Iheard of the p ro p o se d op e ra tio n s w as

a

- 1 do not remember the d ate rAOW - to w h ich I h ad been

no idea what the m eeting w a s a b o u t an d w h en , w h J e

th .D efen ceM in ister'so ffice ,L ieu te n a n tG en era lC h a u d h u n a sk ^ ^ ^ ^

wnat were m y plans for the op eratio n , I said . W hat

_

seemed that he had b een asso ciated w ith the proposal e a rlie r

y

know, a few w eeks b efo re the op eration , there had b e ^ s

from Anjadip Island on ou r co astal sh ip p in g and,

° .

^^o

Defence M inister's v isits to Bom bay, w h en I had gone o

_

meet him, T had casu ally m en tion ed to h im that it w as ^ ou we put a stop to it b efo re the N a v y got t o t h e r rm ^

^

At th€ D efence M in ister's m eetin g I w as told that i w

sponsible to take A njadip, starting the

Army and

morning a f ter the s ta rt of the nightlanding

t troops were

we must take it by the sam e evening. W hen I asked w ^ fg^ding

being provided b y the A rm y for the lanc^g/

own resources,

parties would h ave to be provided by the Fleet fr

^

The date had already b een decided and w hen

'

g tro o p s on

much inform ation available as to the nunw er o

them, mostly

Aniadip; I w as told that there m ight be abou

^ p art

local Goans. I w as also inform ed that Delhi, w

NHQ orders to

of the fleet, w ould b e acting independen ^ ^

Having gone

support the A rm y for the action at

trained the Army

P 'ro u g h the amphibious operations course

j ^^5 some-

in such operations at M andapam

geemed to have b ^

'vhat taken aback by the w ay

° P ^ pt Commander, a spec'abs

planned w ithout the association of

g^jiors to play * e Arnty

in such operations, and that too

close to them am l^ d ,

role. O f c L s e , Anjadip was a

B u tld id m e n b ^

^

so there w asn o

should have been associated

to the then Chief of the N a v a l Staff that

with the plans earlier.

Pjggt t o 'p la / Army/

^

. i _-5

I c a lle d fo r v o lim te e rs fro m

a m o n g st _ y a l .

o f f i c e r s , a n d a s k e d t h e m

t o s e l w

everything e l s e

® ^ ^ t h

^ v in g p r e (e » n c e to

L a n d fig h tin g tra m m g w a s o g

ggting I h a d

^ h a d

o f f ic e r f a n d m e n , a t Cochm_ A t ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ U t^ e la std a y n o n e h a i n f o r m

a t i o n o n t r o o p s t r e n g t h o n A

n j

F

b e e n re c e iv e d .

^ I 8I->®PRmTTOBLUEWATBi

o p e ra tic n s o f f G o ; , ;,

•

a i f s s ^ s s s

« n c h ? r ^

C h u t n e y

a irrra ff *^1! ^ ^ a r m a g a o h a r b o u r A

Albuquerque was lying at

effprH

a p p e a re d overhp^H

an ti-aircraft fire against lAf

e ffe ch v e . It w as n h ,^ „ ..-,

°'^® "^® 3d.Thoughherfiring,;,nn«,rf^fnho;n.

i t w a s o b v i ^ r s i ;

^

m o u n t e d o n th e Albuauf>r

^ n u is a n c e . B e s id e s , the 4.7-inch

t ^ o p s w h e n t h e y e n t e ' d

a s e r io u s th re a t to Indian

■>

’^ '^ ^ i ^ e u t r a l is e d h o f ^

h e n c e th e s h ip need ed to be

,

A^^^querque w a s a fr

j s e r io u s dam age,

^ ’•w 4 .7 in c h g u n s , tw o 3 - t r P .‘^ ^ ^ '^ in g 1 ,7 8 8 to n s a n d w a s arm ed with h r ," ''

^ ® P th -c h a ro p

^ ^ 'a i r c r a f t g u n s , e ig h t 2 0 -m m antiaircrrft r>f o */ ^ ^ ° '^ ® '^ ° ^ 8 ,0 0 0 a ta <ina ^

tu r b in e s c o u ld d ev elo p a rf»aft

/O O O nautical m ile s . T h r s h - °

a n d s h e h a d a r a d iu s o f operabon

y e a r s o ld a n d d u e f o r rJo

^

^ 9 3 4 v in t a g e a n d h e n c e w as already

A d m i r a l G h a n d h i r e c a l l s I h ^ '* '^ " ^ ® -

^

'-aiis ttie su ccess o f h is T ask Group in these words^

J « e a r l y D e c e m b e r l 9 f i i n ^ .

h o n C h u tn e y . T h e t a s t 1 11

p u t o n p a tro l o f f Goa in O pe«-

■ te r r ito r ia l w a t^ rc °

Setwa w a s to r e m a in o u ts id e IhePof'

^querque, report its m

the P ortu gu ese frigate^/bff^^’*^

^ o u s S h i p s o f t h e ln d ia n

g a t h e r a n y o th e r in te U ig ^ ^

a v a c a te d h e r Dah-nJ ♦ ? '" y ‘-®'’^ ® a n d w e n td u r in g th is p e r io ‘^ ^

bnv I

befnrp

o^ ce at Bombay.

crnJ® ^

* e sh ip 's

^ ‘o G oa, Betwa had a serious

O rde'* ®Poxy resin.

^ad v ery sm a rtly plugged this

S d e ? h ® ''® " * - ^ s h i p '! y j!® ^ '^ ® ''® ^ « ^ e i v e d a b o u t t h r e e o r f o u r d a ^

T.J Kun ^ IT®'

secto r were gi

t,y C o m m a n d e r fla te r C om m od ore

" “ riflm e b ou n d aiy into

° P “ ‘ ^ol th n o r th e r n , Betrva to o k th e centre

the SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL'S ASIAN EMPIRE / 387

which was off Goa h arb o u r arid C a m m , w a s sector. The sMps w ere o rd ered to c a rry o u t a n x in c o o rd m a te d lin e a r On Saturday, D ecem b er 17, o rd e rs w e r e re c e iv e d t h ^ O p e r a h o n Vijay would be execu ted th e foU ow in g m o rn in g a t d a w n . T l ^ t n ig h t in

Behva, orders w ere issu ed to p re p a re fo r b a ttle a n d a ll o f f i c e r s ^

sailors were instructed to h a v e a b a th a n d p u t o n c le a n u n d erw ea r, is n«cessary because, if o n e re c e iv e s w o u n d s, th e re is le ss c h a n c e o infection wilfi clean u n d erw ear. A s B r f w f l h a d b e e n o n p a t r o l fo r so lo n g off Goa, I had acquired a P o rtu g u e s e d ic tio n a ry fro m a b o o k -se lle r in Bombay, in case I had to sen d a n y m e s s a g e to t h e P o rtu g u e se a u th o n ties. As it so h^pp«ned, w h e n I h a d to m a k e a sig n a l to tine Albuquerque,

I did this in English.

My Gunnery O fficer a t th a t tim e w a s U e u te n a n t (la ter V ice Adnural)R.p.SawhneyandheandIhaddiscussed in d e ta il th em eth o d of fighting the Albuquerque. W e h a d ag ree d th a t, a s t h e P o rtu g u ese s p open m ountings, it w o u l d b e b e s t to u se H E / V T (high exp losive O p) shells fitted w ith v a riab le t i m e (V T) or p ro x im ity fu ses w hic^ go off when they are a few f e e t a w ay fro m th e target) in 25 p er o f o w

an n am en t, as the shrapnel w o u ld h a v e th e b e st chance o f Wounding th e g u n c r e w s an d u p p er d eck persorm el. T h u s one

«^Xturret(theship'srearturret with twin 4 ^ -in c h g u n s )w a s lo a ^

W :th H E / V T s h e lls fo rth e fo U o w in g d a y 's a c tio n .A s a re s u lth ^ ^

of shrapnel gashes w ere seen all ov er th e Albuquerque after th p

tions were over.

.

•

^;,ii

lie ^

night b efore the operation , w e saw Goa

said

and m ake a sigruil to u s - it w as from the freedom g

us

they had b een w atch in g Betwa for the last few days and w

^ nm w ay.

m oving between A n ja^ p

(The A/onsodeA/&wqMer^«e had been ^

the Anjadip

M arm agao, carrying supplies

in Marmagao

prrison and on this morning was seen lymga^

harbouri

.

the Task Force Com-

D u rin g the co u rse o f the day,

A njad lp Island,

" ^ a e r , „ g o w a s c o n d a c U n g o p e « » o ^ - ^ " '

^

a c h

e r y o f t h e

steaming u p ^ 4

s e e t h e

o n o u r l a n d i n g p a r t i e s , ^

w

e c o u l d d i s

o f G

o a o n l y a t a d i s t a n c e o f 1 3 " l o

3 8 8 / B L U E P R I n t t o b l U E W A T H R

W h e n I r e c e ir p A T h c

m e a Portuguese frigate, please',

f i c h t i n p m a w

•

^^*^^®P®'T’lexedasthecaptureola

b f a v P iv ?

d iffic u lt especiaU y if it is manned and fought

o r a v e iy . B u t I h a d s e r v e d in tim a te ly w ith Adxniral Katari as his Fleet p e r a t io n s O f f i c e r a n d k n e w h is m in d perfectly. Within a few seconds o g e t t m g th is o r d e r , Betwa in c re a s e d speed to maximum and I made o n e s ig n a l to Beas a n d C au very. It read : 'Jo in me. My speed 23 knots-I n t e n d to c a p t u r e / d e s t r o y A lbuquerque'.

H a v in g m a d e th is sig n a l cind received acknowledgement, I headed f o r G o a h a r b o u r a t fu ll s p e e d . Beas w a s quite close to me,solord«rtii h e r to f o llo w m e a n d s h e s lid in a ste rn o f Betwa. As we were entering a n u n k n o w n h a r b o u r a n d g o in g a t h ig h speed and intended g u n d u e l v fith A lb u q u erq u e i n co n fin e d w a ters, I a sked my numbao ^

(s e c o n d in c o m m a n d ). L ie u te n a n t C om m an d er (later K h a ru ia , a s p e c ia lis t in N a v ig a tio n an d D irection and k e e p in g o ff ic e r (a n o ffic e r m a n n in g th e brkige) to j^ihe

b e a r in g s o n th e c h a r t o f G o a . T h e n K h an n a w ent on one w s h ip s b r id g e a n d th e o th e r o ffic e r on the oth er wing to ^

w e r e in s a fe n a v ig a tio n a l w a te rs th ro u g h o u t the b atu a la te r , a t a b o u t 1 2 1 5 h o u rs , a s s o o n as w e could seeA l

gfaran?®

t lv o u g h th e many merchant ships which were in the hat

,

o f a little o v e r 7 ,0 0 0 m e tre s , I m a d e a signal to her s u rre n d e r o r I o p e n fire '. T h is m e ssa g e w as m ade by an

re c e iv e d by/Ij'feut/Meri/ue.

M y g u n n e ry o ffice r, w h o w a s o n th e sh ip 's

f„rrets

lA

______ ,

, .

.

.

fwin

a t th e tim e , re p o rte d th a t h is m a in arm am en t (tw o

^

m e g u n s) w a s re a d y to en g a g e th e en em y. I told hnn

y/e ^

A l^ querque th ree m in u te s to su rrend er. D uring thJ5 p ce w e d a m essa g e b y Ught fro m Albuquerque to say 'W ait •

P

m m d n o t to w ait. A s so o n as the three

r

S

^

'O p e n fire !' O n ly those who

is an d Ta

®‘^®^ '°P ® n ^ *re 'o n a n e n e m y ca n k n o w h o

I th in t

b eat fa ster w h en I uttered th

g u n d i S j

b ro ad sid e w as a d irect h it on the

to

fflESUNSETSONPORTUCALSASIANEMPlRE / 389

hjidly 25 yards over the bow s o f

the HE/VT shells, was devastating a

r Conimander)

L b i t o f s h r a p n e l o v e r A l l . . q « ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

M aniRaw at,w how asm yN avigat

g^ells

Room and he reported th at o n

,

.^ ^ y o rx d ) A lbuquerque.

continuously straddling (fa llin g ji^ tsh o

.

j^ e th e h arb o u r w h ich

(Since the^lbucjuer^uehad

d a n g e r o f

had a large number of naerchant sl^ p s, th

g im e d a t th e P o rtu -

some of them being accid en tally h it b y

,

fig h tin g it o u t,

guesefrigate-Rafryerthancomingoutof th e h a r

a o o e a r e d to b e

the Albuquerque continued to fire at Beas and Betwa a n pp

trying to n\ove behind a clu ster o f sh ip s).

f ^ tn th e rio rth w ard

As W(3 were going v ery fa st, 1 h a d g o n e too ^

(arcs w ith in

and wanted to alter course to starboard to open m y

which guns can be fired), in o rd er to allo w m y g | ^

th at w e

target. But my executive O fficer, K h an n a, v e to e

alter co u rse

were moving ij\to sh allow er w a te r so th at m y slup

^

to port and again com e d o w n so u th w ard

,

battle was fought at a m ean ran g e o f ab o u t 6 ,00

^^e k ep t on

T h e w

h o l e b a ttle w ith Albwtjwerque-a n d i m

t h e m

e a n -

firing till the last - w as ab ou t 10 m in u tes in

o v e r fa ll o f

t i m e , h a d a l s o o p e n e d f i r e a n d t h e r e w a s s o m

e c o

s c e n e a n d

s h o t , b u t i t d i d n o t w

o

r r y u s . C auvery t o o

4_ i n c h s a l v o e s a n d

t o o k p a r t i n t h e e n g a g e m

e n t b

y

f i r i n g a n

u

e

o f r u n n m

g

i n f a c t d e l i v e r e d t h e c o u p d e g r a c e . A f t e r

e n o u g h , s h e h a d

b a t t l e , i t w

a s p l a i n l y o b v i o u s t h a t A

/ b « < ? “ ^ ^ * ^

« h e h o i s t e d a l a r g e , v e r y

b e e n v e r y b a d l y h i t , w

a s b

u r n

i n

g

a n d b e a c h e d h e r s e l f

largew hiteflag,shetum edbackintoG oaharbour

off the Dauna Paula jetty .

co fire w as g i v e n and, w i

W hen we saw this, the order of cea ^

^

b i n o c u t e , I d e a r ly s a w * e saU o rs °

f

L « e . '

a M a b a n d o n to g her. M s o o n a s

r « : e s s j . y

O t h e r t w

o s h i p s to w i t h d r a w

had b e e n d e s

N

a v a l H

e a d q u a r t e r s t o s a y t h a t

j > j a v a l

' v a s i x o w

l y i n g s u n k i n

G oa h a t o

^

m

e n - o f " ' ^ ® '

W

e h a d d e c e i v e d a f a i r

t h a t

H

e a d q u a r t e r s . F o r e x a m p l e , w

^ t i o n s , t h a t ®

a n d t i h a t

w

o u l d t r y t o i n t e r f e r e

°

' l 2

e

h

a

d

f o u r

G

u l f t o

w

a s i n

thB a r e a , t h a t t h e

G

o a

intelligence o n

a British frigate w as

^ s^o happened, only

evacuate British personnel- As it s

up at action staHom” but*?ereo^^

quarters and action lilnch w !l

f r o n t th e r e a ftP r

nothing happened on the

t h e n e x t d a y t h e TndJr.

*

th a t ended the battle of Goaand

At about

Betwa w a s o id e r e d tn r.

(December 18i

a r y , tlir o u p h w K ,v k

“ P n o rth to the iVlaharashtta-Goabouiri-

in t e ll ig e n c e to ld f h ^

Headquarters' duf

w a s ordproH ♦ •

th e r e w a s a P ortugu ese frigate and BfW

n o t h in ^ fVi

°^'^ ® ^^Sateandneu traIisethis.Iw entup ai»dcou kifin(i

l o a d i n g

^ w e l l- i U u m i n a t e d m e r c h a n t sh ip , prasmMb^

b e f o r p ^

n o r e . H o w e v e r , o n t h e r a d a r s c a n , w e sa w an object and i l l u

m

t n

: . ? ( r a d a r - a s s i s t e d ) f i r e o n i t , I thou ght I wouW

f

iUum inaH on s h o w e d n o th in g ^ '

e p o r t ^ t o N a v a l H e a d q u a r t e r s , w h o a s k e d m e to re h im to Bornbaj t h e v m ^ ^ s i d e o f t h e s t o r y i s t h a t , w h e n I f ir e d s ta r shell, th e p o ^

® ® ^ot th r o u g h o n th e te le p h o n e an d inform ed Bombay g u e s e i w d a n o t h e r f r i g a t e t h e r e , w h i c h w a s o p e n in g fireo " ^

-o n o w B r f ty a m o v e d n o r th w a r d f u lls p e e d towards B o m b a y .

n e x t

T a l w a r , c o m m a n d e d b y

C a p ^ i n ) P . N . M a t h u ; , „

W h p n

o rd e rs fo r O p e ra tio n V ija y to her.

a^ -

S

'^ h o w a s th e n in co m m an d o f Tir, a sk ed J

N a v a l a n c h o ra g e w h ere h e , as the

the

S i p ' s Sid

m

^

v

i ^

?

s

^

?

^

t e

r e

d

h a r b o u r . I W

* v v a s a

Aftp^T^ a cle a n d Betwa en jo y e d it thorou ghly.

, , .k V )^ ,

to g iv e

o f d a y s in B o m b ay , w e w ere o r d e r e d ^

C o m i ^ n d i n a o

re a c h in g G o a; I lan d ed and

lo o k in g a fte r h im t *

Panjim h osp ital and had

g ift fo r th e C om m n H °°

ch o co lates, flow ers and br

^

y ea rs y o u n g er an d I f^rf

^

a b ig b l n ^ K e a/,^1 '^k *^

P i e c e o f „ . , 3 h r a p ? . , . H r i * S : , t - ,

t h

e SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL'S ASIAN EMPIRE / 391

of his heart. This w as a b o u t th ree in ch e s in le n g th a n d it w a s ly in g o n his bedside table. I picked it up an d fo u n d it to b e as sh arp as a ra z o r blade. He could speak b ro k en E n g lish an d , w h e n I told h im w h o I w a s, he said to me, 'Y ou are F -1 3 9 ' an d I sa id , T e s '. H e w a s in d ica t o g , o f course the pennant n u m b er o f Betwa. T h e h e tu rn ed ro u n d a n d h e sa i ,

'Ihit you', 'Ih it y o u ' tw ice an d I told h im ,' l a m v e ry so rry , y o u d i nc^

hit me'. So he replied an d sa id , ' B u t w h y did y o u m ak e so m u c h smoke?' Then I had to tell h im th at I w a s g o in g at fu ll sp eed and ^ t the diesels of the T y p e 41 frig ate d id sm o k e rath er a lo t a t h ig h sp eed .

I asked him why he did not surrender and he sa id the Navy never surrenders, He aded that his orders from Lisbon were to sink the ship after fighting it out but the Governor General of Goa had nianded these and said that he was to defend the harbour and w en e situation was hopeless, to beach her and wreck the engines! he said ne haddonehis duty. With feelinghe added, 'Y ou know,in January (

;

Iwas to have sailed the ship back to Lisbon- you came one

soon!!' But my feelings were that we had gone in one mon

oo

. (Commander T.J. K unnenkeril, Commanding O fficer

^

‘^on^^anding O fficer of the Albuquerque

18 and

that

Indians w ou ld lau n ch the a t t a ^

on that day.

^ was waiting for the operations to

all signals

Mid his ship, besides try£ig to defend Goa, was

S^ly

the wireless station ashore had been put out o ® ^ ° ^ ^ tj^g end but g ^ o fth eo p era tio n .H ea d d ed th a th eh a d p Ja n n e

^

Qparations

to b^ach the Albuquerque soon after the

J^ause three of his g L s had jammed,

w?s now left

^ ^ t h a ta s n a v a lo f f £ « th e y h a d b o t h d o n e th e .r jo b s a n d itw a

°

politicians to do the rest.)

Vice A d m i r a l Ghandhi c o n t i n u e s :

IthenaskedhimifhewoiJdlikeariym^saseto^P^ the ship, on my

i n P o r t u g a l a n d , h a v i n g

a n d a s k e d h i m

t o pass t h e

wireless set, we caUed up Whitehau w /

n^ssage, which they did.

„,,„aue She had been badly battered

Ilaterwent andsaw

fjes burned for many ^ayj

from the funnel forward

as th

betwew d^fe^

the ship's plates were

in 10 feet of wat« o ^ e

(The Albuquerq^

hP,toor. The forward

northern shores of

burnt the quarterd^k had

392 / blu eprin t TO BLUEWATER

4.7 in A guns had been destroyed)

ing Officer of

A w a ti w h e n h e w a s thp rn rv ,

^

P re se n te d to Vice admiral M.P,

e m y , K h a d a k v a s la T h p c'li- >,

N ational Defence Acad-

m e a b o u t a m o n th

Albuquerque was given to

n J d Y n e O f ^ P r ^ A r

Camero^Conv

m e n t to thP

% s o r e . T h is I p re s e n te d , sh ortly before my retire

(T h

.

tra in in g e s ta b lis h m e n t at C ochin, Dromcharya.

H p r J . f f

d e c r e p it h u lk la y in M argam ao harbour as a

1969 Tr. T °[

oTn

re p a ire d an d refloated on Marcii 10,

rpcpa J

p ro p o s e d to c o n v e rt h er in to an oceanographic

...

^ P *^ °^ ® °P ® rated b y th e N a v y fo r the Indian National Comin t to r O c e a n R e s e a rc h (IN C O R ). It w a s la ter decidad to converthet o

a s ta tic a c c o m m o d a tio n sh ip fo r tw o reason s: first, the ships o c e a n g o in g ca p a b ilitie s h a d b e e n c o n sid e ra b ly reduced by her age»

^ ^ ° m a c h in e ry an d e q u ip m e n t a n d th e d am ages suffered during m e e n g a g e m e n t w ith Betwa, Beas an d Cauvery. h er short 'remaining m e a n d t h e e x c e s s iv e c o s t o f c o n v e r s io n ;a n d ,n e x t, the INCOR, which ftad ^ t i a l l y sh o w n s o m e in te re s t in th e sh ip had later decided to o ce a n o g ra p h ic re s e a rc h v e sse l fro m the USSR. It was soon e th a t th e sh ip 's c o n v e rsio n in to a sta tic accommodation ship

lior'i

^ e l y to b e cost-effective and, finally, Albuquerque,

theNavy's extremely accurate firepower, was sold

>^pbreakers fo r Rs. 7.71 lak h o n June 5 ,1 9 6 5 .;

^

> -•■>'5' by “ Minister - I ^

S

S

f ' " V I *

' “ W “ “ ‘S ' " 'C -

'^“* ’8

gathering. It goes as / 4 > w s : U iat

to liberatPT^^

ag a in st th e G o v e rn m e n t o f India

y

agreed to all

Krishna Menon, and he

W e t ° ^ r

e^ter Goa to liberate it

force to be used

b e ca u se h is co n scien ce

jge in

m y talk w ith so'mpn^ t

tell m e the D-Day, othe

being!

eorie, I w ill b lu rt it o u t'. A truly non-violent h

* e

a p arty o f officers and

- hurry but h id left

^ ^ ^ u ^ e s e h ad abandoned the sin?

^

n a v a l t r a d i ? o n ! a c c o r d S ° ' ^ o a rd ^ T h e b o d y w a s recovered and, It is to the credit o f thp M ^

^ f®w days later.

f r t h ^

precision firepow er, operate a s t f f

it sp eaks volum es jo

‘operate as they do from w eap on platform s that

raESUNSETSONPORTUGAUSASIANEMPIRE / 393

, M

„ d

y

a w

a n

d

, e s o

r . . o

W

g

h

- s p

e e d

z i g

z a g

m

a n

o

e u

^

^

^

^

operation. S.S. Ranger, a P a n a m a - r e g is t e r e d s ^ p D d -P an an ^ n ian ,w asan ch o red clo seto th e^ Ib «W ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

engaged by the Betwa and the B ea s fo llo w in g w h ic h ^

j ^hp R anker.

Slipped her cable, got under w a y an d p la c e d h e r s e lf Despite the high rate of fire of th e a rm a m e n t fitte d in th e In la n s P '

heat of the battle and the Ranger h a v in g b e e n p o s itio n e d in a n d

of fire, only or« or two rounds o f 4 .5 in c h a m m u n itio n h it th e K a n g

caused minor damage to the s h ip . T h e re w a s o n e s h e ll-h o le o n t h e p o si of her number two hold, on e sh e ll-h o le in a h a tc h w a y a n d s o m e s p u n te holes on the upper deck. T h e d a m a g e su f fe r e d b y th e s h ip w a s s o o n r e p a ir e locallyatGoa through th e sh ip 's a g e n ts in M a r m a g a o ,M u r g o g o a

«a Ltd., before she sailed for home. N o reparations were claimed b y me

™p's owners or agents.

’

Capture of Diu

^them om ingof D ecem ber 18, th e A rm y m a d e a n a tte m p t to e n te r D iu b u t

^countered stiff resistance fro m th e P o rtu g u e s e . T h e A ir F o r c e a n d th e

^“v y w e r e th e n a s lc e d to n e u tr a lis e a llw a r v e s s e ls in th e a r e a a n d s o ft^ u p defences. A s h a d b e e n p la n n ed e a rlier, Delhi a ^ iv e d

[e^

off D iu at 0 3 3 0 h o u rs o n th a t d a y , w a itm g fo r H -H o u ,

•' ^ hours, to com m en ce h e r o p eratio n s.

cer

A d m iral) N . K rish n a n w a s th e

i\avl •

M ech an ical T rairu n g E s t a b l i s h m e n t o f

e

^ " la ,m l961w h e n h e w a s a s k e d b y t h e N a v a l C h i e f t o t a k e o v e « o :^ ^

A d m iral K rish n a n 's reco rd ed rem m is

' V ^ t I w as adju sting m y self to the n ew task o f

coUege (m Shioajil things were graduaUy t o t i ^ u p ^ vvas a com plete o t h e r t w

o P o r t u g u e s e c o l o n i e s - D a m a n a m d a w a y , s h o u l d

^ d t t o n i s m t h a t a f o r e i g n p o w e r , t h o u s a n d s

.

o f I n d i a . It

h o l d o n t o t h e s e p o c k e t s i n

t h e i n d e p e n d e n

s u

y e a r s o f th e

^

a s a s i n c r e d i b l e a s it w a s i n t o l e r a b l e

- u

r m

o t h e r l a n d -

B

r i t i s h w

i t h d r a w

a l , w

e w

e r e t o l e r a t i n g t h i s

g

A tth em eetin gof theD efenceC orrm vitteeo

ca rd a t F atel had asked

the ten -y ear plan for the N av y 's d e v e lo p m e n t

jg o u t? ' I had

m e, 'W hat ab o u t Goa? C an tWs F l ^

c a n n o t o n ly take Goa

repUed on b eh a lf of m y A d m iral,

^

^5/

but fight the en tire P o rtu g u ese N avy if tn y

394 / blu eprin t TO BLUEWATER

TT • J ^ ° r / ” ^^^^^^'^®^®^^^3'^de>^tandfieryDefenceMinisterinV.K.

a b o u t it

lo o k e d a s th o u g h h e w as going to do something

A t a la te h o u r o n a c o ld D e c e m b e r n ig h t th e phone rang in Shivaji

■

(m y o ffic ia l r e s id e n c e a t L o n a v la ) an d it w as the Chief of the 1 Ja v a ! S ta ff, A d m ira l K a ta ri c a llin g fro m N ew D elhi, who asked me, r f o w s o o n c a n y o u ta k e o v e r c o m m a n d o f th e D elhi again?' 'I will be in c o m m a n d o f ^ e s h ip b y c o lo u rs to m o rro w ' ('co lo u rs' is thehoisting o f th e n a v a l er\sign o n b o a r d n a v a l sh ip s an d establishm ents at 0800

h o u rs e v e r y d a y ) I re p lie d .

L o o k , I w a n t y o u to g e t th e sh ip sto red , ammunitioned f e l l e d a n d b e r e a d y fo r se a w ith in tw o w eek s. C an do?' he M o st c e rta in ly . S ir ', I re p lie d . 'C o u ld I h a v e m y old team back, Sir , a sk e d .

Y e s , I sh a ll a sk th e C h ie f o f P e rso n n e l to g et o n w ith it',

^ e f sa id an d ra n g o ff. (C a p ta in K ris h n a n h a d earlier commanded tn De/tti fo r tw o a n d h a lf y e a rs fro m th e en d o f 1958).

It w illb e se e n th a t th ro u g h o u t th e co n v ersa tio n , therehad m en tio n e ith e r o f G o a o r m y m issio n . It w a s n o t necessary. I kne'iv h e k n ew th a t I k n ew .

, _

^ o

m

e v i r t u

a l l y i n

c r e d

i b

l e t h

i n

g

s h

a p

p

e n

e d

i n

t h

e n

e x

t s e v ^

D elhi a t 0700 h o u rs the next

^ t w h j l e N a v ig a to r, 'P o d g y ' N a d k a m i (la ter A dm iral J.G-O u e f o f t h . N a v a l S ta ff), 5 a s th ere a lo n g w ith m y E xecu d v e anticioaH

So p h er, to receiv e m e. T h e form er had tn

^

h ou rs Ih a d m o sto fm y cre w b a ck

u sed to an

^ ^’^borted th em w ith m o st o f the

jnbef

1971) 'B o v 4»'

alm o st ex a ctly ten y ears la ter (i.e., i n ^ '

b attle l^ e x a rH

®^P

op eration al and

cixculted WHp

^ p roced u res w ill be

allresp ects

o n eh tin d red p e tc

pg

borrow or steaL

have

^

L 1

you can do it.'

hundred and tw en ty hou rs and i

w ill appreciate

N aval p erson w ho r e a ^ ^

THE SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL’S ASIAN EMPIRE / 395

for instance, it takes a m in im u m o f th r e e d a y s to e m b a r k th e fu ll wartime outfit of artunu nition in a c r u is e r a n d w e d id it in le s s th a n twenty hours. In fact, the G u rm ery O ffic e r, L ie u t e n a n t C o m m a n d e r (laterCommander) J.S. D h in d sa, c a m e u p to m e a n d s a id , " C a p ta in , S ir , weare reaking every ru le in th e b o o k . E v e r y o n e is d e a d tire d . C a n w e

o n L T '

3 b it?' H e w a s q u ite rig h t, o f c o u r s e . M e n w e r e c a r r y in g to sf3r+^ ^

<^0’^

w h e re th e y w e r e fo r a b it o f r e s t o n ly

^ k n e w th a t i f w e s la c k e n e d th e

asm/nr nit-/

n ev er b e a b le to w o r k u p th e z e a l a n d e n th u s i-abouf,

^

D h in d sa 'W h a t th e h e ll a r e y o u w o rr ie d

court ni

f

g o e s w ro n g , n o n e o f u s w iU b e h e r e to fa c e

^ e d ia te lv ;,f r -f '

w o rry in g to m e a n d g e t o n w ith it'.

Officer Com

^ 5 ° th e

e ig h th d a y , I s e n t a sig n a l to th e F la g

A t t h e ^ f i

^

^

re s p e c ts fo r s e a ',

'vas to proceed «

n u ssio n o f D elhi w a s sp e lt o u t fo r m e. T h e sh ip Would

°

'd is ta n t su p p o r t' to o u r A rm y u n its

"Finland. la

cre e k se p a ra tin g D iu fr o m th e In d ia n

-• '^ t a n t su^

w h at e x a ctly the p la n n ers h a d in m in d w h e n ta lk in g a verv r f

‘

^>^wer w as v a g u e in th e ex trem e, 'W e do n o t

which

o f the sta te o f the d efen ces. D iu h a s a n airfield

is

op erate. T h e y are b ou n d to h a v e c o a s t b atter-

th ere is a su b m arin e threat. T h e y a lso h a v e

^ 6 s h o r ^ ° “ Oats. S o Delhi sh ou ld rem ain ab o u t 10 m iles a w a y fro m gencerep

dissolutely crazy. W h y d id n 't w e h a v e en o u g h in telli-theijnfo

. S ^ ^ '^ 'sd e fe n ce s?W e h a d h a d se v e ra ly e a rsto co U e cta U

from 0

regarding this p lace w h ich w as w ith in a sto n e's throw

to be

Ifth e re w e re s h o re b a tte rie s ,h o w w e re th e y g o in g b efore the arm y got across? H ad there been n o air

field?

to find ou t w h eth er tt^ere w ere airc ta ft a t the en em y air-awa :> T

earthly u se w ou ld I b e to the A rm y, skulking ten m iles

Q .,r •

perfectly obviou s that I could expect n o answ ers to these

stions about an im pending operation that had been planned in a

t w ooliy.headed arul haphazard m anner.

Incredibly, Vikrant our latest and new est acquisiton,

« o t

a l ^ g part in the operation but w as going to be deploy f

^ the middle of the ocean w here she would be s a fe ;

^

^ t s u p p o r t t o t h e A r m y ,I w a s t o jo i n Vikrant and Delhi w

tea party- w as o v ir, it was a relief to get back on board and set aDou the task of sailing.

396 / b l u e p r in t TO BLUEWATER

D iu H e a d to a w a ^ H ^ H o u r t h '

I arrived off

j - t a g Bombay

e c h o e s o ^ t h p ^ H ^

T h is m io h t h

d o s in g the ship at high speed,

c a r p f ,

I e x p e c t e d to rp e d o a tta c k . W e tracked the boats p c c

^

t h e m c o m e to w ith in fiv e m iles and then at H-Hour,

K ] ^ ^ i ^ '° f ’^"® ^^® '^^^*^^^'^™ inatingthem w ithstar-shells(theseare s e .Is „ xirst o v e r th e e n e m y w h ic h p ro d u c e brilliant flares that slowly

^ e s c e n d , in t h e m e a n w h ile illu m in a tin g the en em y ships) and identi-

- . e _ ti’£ m a s s h o r e p a tr o l c r a ft. O n b e in g challenged and called to s u r r e n d e r , th e tw o c r a ft s ta r te d m a k in g o ff tow ard s theharbourathigh s p e e d . I a c c o r d in g ly e n g a g e d th e m a n d sa n k on e alm ost immediately a n d o u t o f h a n d . T h e o th e r c ra ft tu rn e d tail an d raced away back to w a r d s h a r b o u r . W e h a d d ra w n firs t b lo o d .

.

S o o n w e c o u ld h e a r g u n fir e fr o m a sh o re and evidently the arnues w e r e in a c tio n a g a in s t e a c h o th e r. A s d a w n broke, I saw from d is ta n c e th a t th e is la n d w a s q u ite fla t a n d th e beaches open.

E a s te r n e n d , w h e r e o u r A r m y w a s to c ro s s, w as a high ground p e r c h e d o n to p w a s a s o lid ly buU t cita d e l fro m w here artU lery h a d o p e n e d fire to h o ld u p th e In d ian A rm y converging o a n d w a s o ffe rin g s tiff re s ista n c e .

hore-

F

a

i s o

n

O

f f i c e

r c o

m

m

u n

i c a t e d

w

i t h

h

i s c o u n t e r p

n\e b a tta lio n c o m m a n d e r re p o rte d th a t v e ry h eav y and

,

c o n f ^ g f r o m th e c ita d e l a n d th e A rm y 's attack wasfi^z*'"®

Its u n its w e re a lso su ffe rin g h e a v y ca su a lties.

„

j gjn

I d ^ id e d to c lo s e in. I sa id to th e L ia iso n O fficer, T e u .

shr.

^

^ a sk e d m y N a v ig a to r, 'P ilo t, h o w clo se can we S

a g ro u n d ? ' A fter c o n su ltin g the

en o u g h w a ter a b o u t a m ile fro m the t o w n a n d

‘o th e b e a ch and a m iJeaw ay . W e w J

g

e m e a n d to h ell w ith d ista n t su p p o rt'.

w

a

s

. " S

h

t d

a

y

l i g

h

t b

y

n

o

w

a

n

d

l h

a

d

a

g

r a

n

d

s

t a

n

d

V

I

:

Sirs rr

q M e imprcgnaW®

“ ’“ - g W y ' - “ 'V iable. T h ey

s o . . d « r s s ! h ? i ' r

' '

and^*

watch-tower in the ci tadel,

Officer t o i K t

*"

sures of the walled stie. There was obviously no point in

the SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL’S ASIAN EMPIRE / 397

rocky w a l l s . If we burst high-explosive shells among the defenaers, things were bound to happeri fast. I also war\ted to

retaliationfromshoredefer\ces. A few well-placed shells woul

e ®

best dissuasion.

,

Since there were no reply to my signal, we opened up with all our six guns. A broadside of six-inch guns makes a deafening roar and is terrifying at the receiving end.

^

The very first shots found their target and we saw the incredible spectacle of a whole big lighthouse being lifted clean into the air and disintegrating. I always have believed that if force had to be used, then there should be no pusillariunous or half-hearted measures and preponderant force, used to good effect, would produce the quickest results. In eleven broadsides, we sent some 66 six-inch high explosive shells in to help them make up their minds. Just fifteen minutes later, down came the Portuguese flag that had fluttered there, planted in our coimtry by Vasco da Gama some four and a half centuries ago. And mup went the white flag of surrender. I sent my boa t with two of my 0 ftcers ashore with aiiIr\diannational flag and they had the honour cm replacing the white flag with our national colours. Since the Army did not naove in till the next day, I decided to stay on and patrol the area.

w as re p o rte d to m e t h a t th e P o r t u g u e s e w e r e lik e ly , in s h e e r arising o u t o f fr u s tr a tio n , to b l o w u p th e a ir f ie ld in s ta U a tio n s . W e closed th e s h o re o ff th e a ir fie ld a n d s e t t h e ir b a r r a c k s n e a r b y o n fir e .

At about 1100 h ou rs th e sh ore p atrol craft that h ad P rev iou sly e|reated into harbour, b ro k e h arbo u r a n d set fire to h erself. In abou

" ^ u t e s tim e she blew up an d san k o ff the harbour entrance.

Sub-Lieutenant(laterCornmodore)S.Bhandoolawasth^^^^^

-c o m m a n d o f Delhi's l a n d in g p a r ty a t O iu a n d ^

o u e s e f i t a -

ho|Stir.g the Ind ian tricolour atop the flag staff on

i

th

rem inisces: 'T h e first thing that

^

action at

atjust before w e actually got into the op efation o

'

^.agualties

Anjadip had already taken place, and the first repor

^ejy on

s u ffe re d b y In d ia n N a v a l p e r s o n n e l l ^ d l ^ e c e i p t o f t h e n e w

s o f t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e •

w

h o l e s h ip 's c o * n -

“ 'g O f f i c e r , C a p ta in N . K r is h n a n ,e n n o u n c ^ to th sh ip 's co m p an y ju s t b efo re w e w en t m °

exp ected f ^ m

In ,em g e„= J reports regarfm g

rt . t D iu ,w h ld » v » .0

Portuguese had indicated that from

398 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

b e c a p t u r e d b y t h e I n d ia n A rm y , th e r e w o u ld b e very little, if any, res is t a n c e a n d th e A r m y w o u ld h a v e n o p ro b le m in crossing a small c r e e k a n d m a r c h in g in to th e fo r t to ta k e it over. It had also been r e p o r t e d th a t th e s m a ll c ita d e l, w h ic h w a s to b e captured by Delhi, was u iu n a n n e d a n d th a t a ll w e w o u ld h a v e to do w ou ld be to send a small la n d in g p a r ty a n d to h o is t th e In d ia n trico lo u r there.

W h ile th e In d ia n A rm y w a s in th e p ro ce ss of

t h e m a in fo rt to c a p tu r e it, w ith o u t a n y e x p e cte d '^ sista ^ e , m o v in g to w a r d s th e c ita d e l. V o lu n te e rs h a d b een as ^

^

la n d in g p a r ty , a n d a g a in s t th e tra d itio n a l indiscreet,

v o lim te e r , b e in g v e r y y o u n g , fuU o f e n th u sia sm an

^

0^

I h a d to , b u t o f c o u r s e , v o lu n te e r ! L ie u te n a n t b -

pgrtyand

G u im e r y O ffic e r , w a s t h e p la to o n c o m m a n d e r o f

,-^jnand.Out

I, th e o n ly o th e r o ffic e r in th e p a rty , w a s th e se co n jgndingps^

p la n w a s th a t Del/ii w o u ld go c lo s e to th e

w ere to land us

w o u ld g o a sh o re in tw o o r th re e b o a ts . T h e s e boa deserted'

a s m a ll b e a c h o n th e is le t. A s th e cita d e l w a s

. ashore and

th e sh ip w o u ld ju s t lie o ff w h ile th e lan d in g

h o is te d th e In d ia n r a t io n a l fla g o n th e flag sta

^

I t w a s o u r g u a rd ia n a n g e l th a t w a s p ro te c

^

cita“

p a rty b e c a u s e th e sh ip w a s s till h e a d in g so u

,^ jn to heavy

w h e n w e g o t a ca ll fro m th e A rm y th a t th e y h a

^

s itio n w h ile try in g to cro ss th e c re e k an d th ey tvvelve-p‘’'^'^^^„

th e cita d e l fro m w h e re th e y w e re b e in g sh ellad y .

^(yie

W h y I sa y th a t th is caU b y th e A rm y at th is p a rb c

^

g u ard ian an g el w a tc h in g o v e r u s w ill b e c o m e c a ev en ts of w h a t h a p p en ed la te r.

j (jovvn^i*^

A t th is m o m en t the la n d in g p a rty w a s told to s

to b®

ship w en t in to 'S ta te O n e ' for g u n n ery a ctio n . I also

*T ^ jn ch

J*

tu rre t o fficer o f Delhi’s 'A ' T u rret, i.e ., o n e o f the

'

aa:\d I ra n to clo se up at m y a ctio n statio n . T h e

clo sed in to v ery short ran ge o f the citad el cind then d i

po,

th e co ast an d conrunenced b o m b ard m en t of the c ita o *

of

g u ese a irfield in its c lo sev icin ity w ith a ll th ree tw in turr ^

arm am en t firing. I do b eliev e th at this bom bardm erit o

b y Delhi w as the first occasion w h e n a un it o f the I n d i a n

^^get-

shipborrxe w eap on s, after Ind ep en d en ce, at a n enemy/

W e d id a n u m b e to £ b o m b a rd m en tru n s,firstfirin g u ^

^

fo llo w e d b y b o m b a id m e n t o f th e a ir fie ld . W h ile airfield, orve of ttve targets selected w as the air traffic i.e./

However, inspite of concerted efforts by the sb c -in c h d ire ^ 'jjg d ,w e r o ta tin g s tr u c tu r e f r o m w h e r e gur\fire is d ir e c te d a n d c o n » ^

PORTUGAUS ASIAN EMPIRE / 3W

the SUN SETS ON

were imible to Wt it rinally, perhaps^wtog t o t tte

smll 10 be accurately

1 4 0 0 h o u r s ,beingordered to

d ,a -to c e a s e fiim g w a s g iv e n . AtabM U

report 'state of guns', A tu rre t

to c le a r th e g u n s m

loaded half-cocked' and I

^ ^ s i o n w a s g i v e r T a n d w g m

l i c a l c o

n

t r o

l i . e . , f r o

m

t h

e t u T

r e t i t s e l f _ P

e n

^

f i r e

d

b

o

t h

the turret locaUy aim ed at th e a ii tr a ffic c o n tr o l

barrels You can im agine our elatio n wher\,

•^V m m bline a n d th e n

sight,!saw6w to w erb ein g h it,so ariijg m to

e a ,

g lo rio u s

disappearing. I v iv id ly re m e m b e r th is a s o

V

moments of that action .

v,^«nV>ardment h a d

Scon after this, the A rm y re p o rte d th a t o ^ j ; ^ ; 5 ^ , , o s s e d neutralised aU resistan ce b y th e P o rtu g u e s e a n

A rm y

the creek. A w hite flag h a d b e e n h o is te d ^

^ P o r tu g u e s e

was proceeding to form aUy a c c e p t th e ® ^ ^ ®4 e ^ ta tiv e to w itn e s s fo rc e s a tD iu .n e Ih tw a sa sk e d to se n d a n a v a lre p

^ y jj^ d a ta sk

flie surrender cerem ony. O u r C a p ta in d e c id e d

fla e s ta ff in th e

to do which w as to h o is t th e In d ia n trico lo u r

r e p r e s e n t h im

citadel but that the landing party w o u l d first proce

that we

at the surrender cerem o n y an d th e rea fter re tu rn ° ,

^^5 m issio n

could then go so u th a n d carry o u t th e sm aU an d u n g la m of capturing an und efend ed fo rt.

u s an d this

Here again ou r gu ard ian angel w as

decision to go to the fo rt on ly after th e

arty. O n ce a g am

saved the lives o f aU o f u s w h o w ere in the

to o k

the reason w hy I say this w ill em erg e as I n a

place hereafter.

boats that carried us

The landing party p ro ceed ed ash ore

.. jg i A fter lan d in g w e

landed m at a lan d in g poin t v ery

.-^ory m ad e p ossib le b y the

n arch ed w ith our chests ou t, p ro u d o f ^

the A r m y ,h a v i^

ro lep \ ayed by ou tsh ip ,D elfii.W ^ d ^ s

made the s i ^ l th at ttxey w an ted

ou r surprise w h ^ w e

n i o n y .w o u l d r i r e a d y b e a t m e c ^ d d ^ ^

m a r c h e d in to th e fo r t to

to w a r d s *he c ita d e l.

s e e n - t h e y w e r e s till m a k in g th

h o is te d

and w e r e

the w hite flag w hich the

_ ^ a d la id d o w n th e 'ra

— '^ \v„»firsttoreacn uic^ *~-

Bhanaou*», - -

IndianN avy that w a s the first to

r a t th e fla g s W «

the Portuguese, m fact

the Ind ian tncolour at

d ianN avy,

m e. w h oh oistea

in the P ortu gu ese citadel.

^ | n e d T y

the f „ ™ „

hoisting the Indian f la e af

Caddie task of

surrendercerem onv atfhp

immediately after the

a n d , f r o m a p o in t ii^

; , ; ' ‘^“ ®^‘' ‘®^^P'^ouIdbeproceedingsouth

w o u ld p r o c e e d b v b o a t s to ■and'^nnTJ^

on which the

® small sandy beach on the islet

officer was v p rJ

Situated. On hearing this, the senior Portuguese

us to undprt P ' ^ 5

us that it would be inadvisablefot

that rnnhll ^ f

i^’ssion in the manner we had planned. He said

thprp WQ

'u °

intelligence, the fort was not deserted and that

bearh

Portuguese soldiers in it. He also told us that the

a n v 1

i n t e n d e d to l a n d b y b o a t s h a d b e e n m inedandthat w n n lH K o K i^ p a r t y e n d e a v o u r in g to ca p tu re the fort via the beach

^

- l a ^ b .o w n to smithereens. He o b v i o u s l y felt thatif this happened

*?

^ e n we asked him to convey to theseniof

that

ů

Portuguese forces a t Diu had surrendered a^

n n

^ ® ^ . ^ ‘^ a ls o n o to ffe r a n y r e s is ta n c e to u s ,h e s ta te d th a th e lw

™ " ^ c a t i o n fa c ilitie s w ith th e fo rt. It w as, therefore, decided a to o n o f th e In d ia n A r m y a lo n g vi^ith a Portuguese o ic thp

th e fo r t fr o m la n d w a rd s. B e f o r e this platoon en thP c »

^ ° * ^ g « e s e o ffic e r w o u ld v erb a lly tell those in the^or- .

b l o o ^ S ? ^ '

vvould b e n o ch an ce s o f any unnecess ry

a g a in w e o f D elhi w e re a sk e d to co n v e y to o u r Comn’^nt^S

t o r e n

d

e r a n

y a s s i s t a n c e , i f r e

q

u

^

’

w

S

^

H

"

t h a t t h e s e q u e n c e o f e v ^

p

r

o

c

^

/

f

n

“

T

*

i n

t h e d

e l a y i n

o u r l a ^ i d m

g

mission w L

us'So

w

e

w

e n t b

a c k t J

o

u

r ^

?

g

u

a r d

i a n

a n g e l w

a t c h i n g o

w

h

i l e t h

e

P

® h i p m

o

v e d

s o u t h t o l i e o f f

fcrt was eaken ov« by

^

o n

t h e f l a g s t a f f

^ ^ w

t h e I n

d

i a n

t r i c o

l o u r

L

j ^

heaved a sigh of relief that the m

t o t ^ U „ 3 3 - ,„ --;^ever,.,„a5perhapsalilfleprO T a“ ^^^

a v i c t o r i o u s action w

n

o

w

s e t c o u r s e f o r h o n ^ * ’

I n d i a r v A r m y X

S r ^ u T

w

e g o t a c a l l f o

r h e l p ft o ^

C o r m n i S S o ^ ^

*

e

t a s k o

f c a p t u n n g

a n d a U w

e r e a l l y h e a r r f ^

®

^ P

*

e

f o r t w

e r e v e i y ^

o n the sh ip w as that he needed som e he P

B e f o r e l n a r r a t e t h e n e x t p a r t ^

v o lv e d jn e e d to g iv e a d e a rp ic^

^

3 f e ^ h u n d r

y

saideailiet,thisfottw aslocatedona

oKthemainland.Betweentheislet a n d m e

I c k s of anarea of about 20 e q u a te

to w a d e

the fort from shoiew atds, it w a s lo

^ ^ a s o n ly a

across to it. At that tim e the w a te r a ro u n d th e t

k n e e - d e e p .

,

b e in s off w a t c h / i - e - / 0

H a v i r v g b e e r \ t h r o u g h a l o t t l ^

t _ a y

.

'

s o

m

e s l e e p

w

h

^

^

d u t y a t t h a t r t \ o m

e n t , I w

a s d

o

w

n

i n

m

y c a

®

m

e o

n

t h

e b

r i d

g

e

I w a s s h a k e n u p a n d t o l d t h a t t h e C

a p

t a m

f r i e n

d

, t h e

i n u n e d i a t e l y . W

h e n 1 g o t t o t h e b

r i d

g

e 1 w

a

c l e

a

r a s t o

y o u n g M

a j o r , h a d h

a d

s o m

e t r o

u b

l e

^

i ^

e

h

a d

t a k

e n

o

v e

r

whatexactlyhis problen[\ w a s . H o w e v e r , t n e i c K - ' . '

s e r i o

u

s . I t w

a

s

t h e f o r t m

a d e \ i s f e e l t h a t f l \ e p

r o

b

l e m

c o

u

l d

n

o

.

j ^

e

n

a n

d

t h a t

a s s u m

e d t h a t h e w

a s c u t o f f f r o

m

t h e s h

o r e a s

a s h

o

r e t o l o

o

k

h e p r o b a b l y n e e d e d s o m

e h e l p i n t h e f o r m

o

a

j . , ^ a s d

i r e c t e d

t o g e t

t o

i s o

m

e o

f h

i s m

e n

, w

i t h

w

h

o

m

h

e h

a d

l ( ^ t

w

h

a t e v e r a s s i s t a n

c e

> n to a w h a l e r a n d p r o c e e d t o t h e f o r t a n d r ^

c o

u

l d

g e t

w

a s r e q u i r e d . I t w

a s

c e r t a i n l y n o

t

w

o

u

l d

r e q

u

i r e t o b e

i n v o l v e d i n a n y k i n

d

o f a s i t u a t i o n i n

w

h

i c t \ w

arm ed.

.

. w h a l e r w H c h w a s

S o s tra ig h t f r o m th e b r i d g e 1 g o t

w ere o n d u t y a t ^

P lan ned b y th e d u ty w a t c h , i.e ., s a ilo r s

,

^ g r a l direction o f t h e

i n

o

n

\ e

n

t . T

h

e

b

o

a

t w

a

s l o

w

e

r e

d

, l w

a

s j ^

O

f f i c

e

r a s t h e c

o

x

^

a

i n

f o r t a n d o f f I w e n t . W i t h r a e w a s t h e d u t y P e t t y t h e w

h

a l e r .

of th e w h a le r a n d a c r e w o f f iv e

J .

J^ ^ je n t t o u s e a p o w e r o a

^ a u s e it w a s d a r k it w a s c o n s id e r e d

P

r e r o c k y , w

a s w

e k n e w

the waters betw een t h e s h y a

^

d i r e c t e d t o f e e l m

y w

a y v e r y c a t e f T

^ J

p a t h ,

what w e did. T o h elp u s to p ick o u t the

^ ^^ ^

P'® ’ rtouslv

2 0 -in cV ip ro jecto r w a s s w itc h e d o n ^

W e m o v e d v e r y c a u

^

c o u l d s 4 . i e s e a b . e a l * . g ° v « ^ “ ^ , ^ p „ , o , a U ^

tv a v lg a tin g to a v o i d o c c a s i o n s w e

to ^

r a n a g r o u n d tw ic e . O n e a d > o f

^

to fe e l

w a te r, p u s h th e b o a t c le a t ,

v v ith h is o a r in

^

to w a rd s th e f o r t u s in g o n e o .

w e c o u ld

h e w a s n o t

for d ee p e n o u g h w a t e t s t h r o u ^ w

^

a n d to ld u s

th a t

l e a c h e d t h e f o r t - T h e M a j o r c a m e t o t n e

4 0 2 / b l u e p r i n t T O B L U E W A 7 1 R

oner, he had the brUIiam idea nf wT®-

'^”'‘“S''«e soldicn p*.

making them wade across to the m ^ ^ “’8

»f mischief

guard of two a r m e ^ M l n

‘' S ’" *

“’™ *

chance to carrv nut a thornncyh

^

r

^

^ “

Portuguese whn “

search of the fort to ensure that all the

p r i s o n e r Th<>l ’ •

^

c a p tu re d and taken

i i n in a

11 ~ ''8 ^ '" ® P ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ S t h e m o n t h e s e r o c k s a n d n o t lo c k i n g t h e m

• 1 '

3 r o o m i n t h e f o r t w h i l e t h e s e a r c h w a s b ein g conducted

, .

c o n i p r e h e n s i o n ; b u t t h e n i t o f t e n h a p p e n s that the logic f o o t - s o l d i e r i s d i f f i c u l t f o r a s a i l o r to a p p r e c ia te !

^ y r w a y , th is ty p ic a l In fa n tr y O ffic e r p ro b ab ly knew little about tid e s . W h ile h e w a s c o n d u c tin g a se a rc h o f the fort, the tide was i ^ i n g a n d th e s u n w a s s e ttin g . W h e n h e h a d fin ish ed his seardiandhe o o k e d to w a r d s th e r o c k s to g iv e a sig n a l to h is men to bring the P o r tu g u e s e p r is o n e r s b a c k to th e fo r t, to h is h o rro r he found that there w e r e n o r o c k s a n d n o m e n . T h e y h a d ju s t d isap p eare d . In pani^j or p e r h a p s it is w r o n g fo r m e to u s e s u c h a w o rd , so sh all I say, with^aj^

c o n c e m , h e c a lle d u p th e sh ip a n d a s k e d u s to send help imniediafflty a s h e h a d l o s t a c o u p l e o f m e n a n d e le v e n P o r tu g u e s e prisoners wa H e th e n to ld m e tha t h e w a s se n d in g o n e o f his jaw an s vvi th e b o a t a n d th a t th is m a n w o u ld s w im o u t fro m the fort to the boa ■

r e q u e s te d u s to try a n d lo c a te h is m e n an d the P o rtu g u ese It d id n o t re q u ire a g e n iu s to a p p re c ia te w h at exactly

. j

p e n e d . W h e n th e tid e sta rte d to rise , th e m e n on the rocks

^ o r\ a s th e ir fe e t sta rte d g e ttin g w e t a n d h a d p ro m p tly wad d o u b t in m y m in d w a s o n ly w h e th e r in the p ro cess o f * i s c i o th e tw o ja w a n s , w h o w e re g u a rd in g th e P o rtu g u ese

^ v e b e ^ o v e rp o w e re d as th e y w e re ou tn u m b ered - In any j

A rm y ja w a n se n t b y th e M a jo r w ith us in th/

iaw an

^ w e n e a re d the sh o re w e sto p p ed

w e a o n ^ f f u ‘

^ a d e d ash o re. T h e thought

^

in the h a t ?

ja w a n s in ch arg e o f th e p rison ers of

X

e ^ t ^ i ‘' ‘" ^ ^ ' ^ g " “ « 'v a s v e r y m u c h in m y m in d .

th e n a m es o f

ja w a n w ith m e w hetl^^

gje

••iately aftcr°thi t o h T h ‘‘“ '“" “ shouted 'O Banta S i r g h ! '- ^

o n o s there w as no reply. It w as in th ese few second®

ON PORTUGAL'S ASIAN EMPIRE / 403

the sun sets

, reaUy knew fear, e x p e c t a g a ^ a n y m ora^^^^

then a man stood up b e h in d th e r o c l^

d e sc rib e d ! S u ffic e it

w e r e n o b o a t s i n t h e f o r t , h

a d

w

a d

e d

f

f r o

m

t h e

t h r o u g h o u t . V

e r y c l o s e t o

t h e p

o

i n

t w

h

e r e

y

i g c i ^ e d u

p

t h e

w a t e r t h e y h a d f o u n d a d

e s w

t e d

e v

e n

t h e n s t a n d i n g

P o r t u g u e s e p r i s o n e r s t h e r e . T

h

e s e c o n

d

s o

l d

i e r w

a s e v e n

g u a r d o u t s i d e t h e r o o

m

w

h

e r e t h e y w

e r e l o c k e

u p .

S o w

e w

e n t b a c k t o t h e f o r t a n

d

o

n

g e t t i n g c o

w

i t h

o u

t

was no w a y that we could g e t o u t o f t h e b o a t a n t h e w a y th e

g e lta g in to

w a t e i . S o 1 d e c i d e d t h a t w e

th is

s o l d i e r h a d c o m

e . B

u t w

h

e n

I w

a s a b o u t t o s t e p

—

v i n

e m

e o n

j a w a n r e f u s e d t o l e t m

e g e t m

y s e l f w

e t a n d i n

s

^

e

h i s s h o u l d e r s t o t h e p o i n t f r o

m

w

h

e r e w

e c o

u

g —

q m

e n t o

f f e a r

p o i n t 1 a m

t r y i n g t o m

a k e i s t h a t h a v i n

g

l i v e d

t .

.

t ^ P ^ a d b u i l d

t o g e t h e r , a s u

d

&

n

a n d v e r y s t r o n g f e e l i n g o f c o r r ^ a d e s m p

up b e tw e e n u s a n d th is w a s h i s w a y o f

t h a t a l l w

a s w e l l

Ir^ id e th e fo r t I m e t th e y o u n g M a jo r a r x l p r o fu s e ly

ashoreandthatheneednotworry.He w a s very

a g a i n m y

t h a r i k f u l . l b a d e h

i m

f a r e w

e l l a n d r e t u m

a d

°

i n s i s t e d o n c a r r y i n g

c o m

r a d e , t h e j a w

a n w

h

o h

a d

b e e n a s h o r e w

i

'

j j i 5 s u a d e

m e b a c k t o t h e b o a t a n d n o a m o u n t o f p r o te s g

^

ix>form ecl

him . I h a d o f c o u r s e i n t h e m e a n tim e c a

t h e m

t h a t a l l w

a s w

e l l .

.

j r o m

e . t h e o n l y d i f f e r ^ ^ ^ ®

W

e r e t u r n e d t o t h e s h i p t h e w

a y w

e

20- i n c h p r o j e c t o r , w

w as th a t th is tim e th e s tr o n g lig h t

w a s

h ad b e e n s u c h a h e lp o n o u r ° “ ' " a r d W e d v e r y h ^ r f t o t e U t h e s h i p o n o ^ a t a e ^ a ^ ^ . „ ^ , „ ^ a ^

l * u t . c o m

m

u n i c a t i o n s b e i n g w

h a t

^

^

g

h

a

d

r u n a g r o u n

i j a c k ,

m

e s s a g e t h r o u g h . A s a r e s u l t ,

f i v e t i m

e s o r ^

^

u

r

o n o u r w

a y t o t h e

operations.

A

n y w

a y w

e r e a c h e d t h e s ^

P

d u r i n g t h e

arrival back spelt the end ot our

to fD iu ,h ad b e en

404 / b l u e p r in t TO BLUEWATER

Lessons L eam t

S h r r i T t h Wependencem

w t u c h a ll t h r e e S e r v i c e s p a r t ic ip a t e d , tlie firs t h av in g been the Jumgadh p e r a o m n - - 4 7 . W h ile t h e O p e r a t io n w a s co n d u cted as planned and the P o r t u g u e s e s u r r e n d e r e d w it h in 4 0 h o u r s o f its com m encem ent, there were so n \ e m in o r la c u n a e w h ic h n e e d e d to b e lo o k e d into for improving the I 'la v y s o p e r a tio n a l e ff ic ie n c y . S o m e o f th e s e la cu n a e and the lessons leamt w e r e b r o u g h t o u t a t a d e b r ie f h e ld a fte r th e o p e ra tio n s, the more important o f th e m b e in g : th e in c a p a b ilit y o f th e N a v y to fit o u t a l a n d i n g party at short n o t ic e ; th e n e e d f o r la n d in g p a r tie s to b e a p p rise d o f t h e n a t u r e of the terrain o n w h ic h th e y w o u ld b e r e q u ir e d to la n d ; la c k o f adequate training espe*

c ia lly to o p e r a te u n d e r c o v e r o f d a r k n e s s ; req u irem en t for a pcrm^^t N a v a l c o n x m a n d o fo r c e ; s u ita b le la n d in g c ra ft sh o u ld have been us of

th e la n d in g o p e r a tio n s ; th e p la to o n d e sig n a te d fo r the capture of I s la n d s h o u ld h a v e la n d e d in o n e w a v e ; m o d e m w eap on s and s h o u ld b e p r o v id e d to la n d in g p a r tie s ; c u m b e rs o m e and out-nio a b le w ir e le s s c o m m u n ic a tio n s e ts s lo w e d up th e overrunning o g u e s e g a r r is o n o n A n j a d i p a n d th e s u b s e q u e n t b o m b a r d m e n t b e r e p la c e d ; th e e le m e n t o f s u rp ris e h a d b e e n j e o p a r d i s e d b y Ttr ^

c ir c le d th e is la n d a t c lo s e ra n g e a n d c a rrie d o u t a m in e detection s w d a y s b e fo r e th e c o m m e n c e m e n t o f th e o p e ra tio n ; a landing the

in c lu d e a m e d ic a l te a m fo r re n d e rin g firs t-a id an d for se rio u s ly w o u n d e d ; N a v a l a n d In d ia n A ir F o rc e aircraft sho jjjayinto

c le a rly d e fin e d se cto rs to fa c ilita te id e n tific a tio n an d shoul no la n e s u se d b y a i r c r a f t o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d o m e s t i c airlin es a s ^ r w h e n e v e r a irc ra ft fro m th e tw o S e rv ic e s are lik ely to o p e r a s

^

a re a , se p a ra te fly in g se cto rs sh o u ld b e a llo tte d to each

^ i z e aircra ft o f th e In d ia n N a v y en tered th e air d efen ce zone ov non

J i n n g tlie o p e ra tio n , it co u ld n o t b e id e n tified b y the Secto C e n tr e a s n o c o m m o n In te r r o g a tio n F r ie n d o r F o e (lF F )e q u ip n i^ close W

aircraft; sim ilarly , w h e n lA F aircra ft w ere

i, til'll

, the carrier im m ed iately scra m b led h e r com b at

p reciou s reso u rces b eca u se i n t e r - S e r v i c e

!

and o p eratio n al secto rs h a d n o t been

S

X

?

in tellig en ce led to th e s t r e n g t h of

f,ag

^

-n d to th e embarkauon of

tio n t h o u c h h - f i

I ^ i a n F leet on Mysore fo r c o n d u c t i n g

txon m ou gh Jus flagship w as V f W

. hipS <

u n d ereo in ffT if*^ **^ ®

Becennber 1 9 6 1 a large n u m b e r

S S e f S

N aval D ockyard a t Bonibay-^^ ^

needed to b e drydocked, so m e need ed replacem ent o ^

raESUNSnSONPORTUGAL'SASIANEMPIRE / 405

to l> an d ex ,»siv eiep ai,s to th eir g u n

« l , t o f t landing equipm ent an d so m e

' " X ^ e i U a n c e

mountings, essential repairs to P^oP^^sion e q u ip m e n t a e le m e n ts ,

divices used for detection an d tra ck in g o f ta rg e ts

, jo^ es

Besides rectifying these d efects, th e se sh ip s w e re re q m re d fuelandammunition,conduct trials o f m a c h in e ry an d e q u ip

jrtirxr

up the personnel to a high p itch o f o p e ra tio n a l e ffic ie n c y b y c o n exercises at sea off Bombay b efo re th e y c o u ld b e d e p lo y e d fo r th e ir a s s i ^

taslcs. In ti:\e normal course, this w o u ld h a v e ta k e n a t le a s t a c o u p months (four months in the case o f Delhi) b u t a s so o n a s it w a s ^ n o ^

the Navy was likely to go in to a ctio n b y th e m id d le o f D e c e m b e r

,

Naval Dockyard, the N aval S to re D e p o t, th e N a v a l A r m a m e n t teancilliarv organisations ro se to th e o c c a sio n a n d co m p le te e 3S

well before D-Day. A rem arkable fe a tu re o f th e ir fe a t w a s th a t o u t o f th e sixteen ships that vi'ere to co n stitu te th e N a v a l T a s k F o rc e , a s n w riy Jvelve - Vikrani, Mysore, Delhi, Cauvery, Rajput, Khukri, Kuthar, ^ 7 ^ " “ '

Dharini Beas ar,d Bimlivatam - w e re w ith the D o c k y a r d fo r repairs at the teg irm in g o f D e ce m b er 1961 b u t a ll

_

k

all stores and a m m u n itio n ennbarked b y ec

Jn a letter w r itte n to aU Naval C o m m a n d s , A d m ir a l R.D. K a t a r i, fh e

® of the Naval Staff, w r o t e o n J a n u a r y 2 , 1 9 6 2 :

^ ^ v e n o w h a d a c h a n c e to r e v ie w i n r e t r o s p e c t th e e v ^ t s

^

^tions leading up to the very successful role that m e

P^yed i n t S e r e c e n t o p e r a t i o n s . I t i s q u i t e c l e a r the operations would not have been possi

devoted, e ffo r ts a n d e x t r e m e ly h a r d w o r k P f T ' S v e l e a m t th a t s u c h

W

i t h g r e a t p l e a s u r e a n d s a t i s f a c t i o n t h a t I b e t h e y f r o m

® forts h a d c o m e f o r t h in a m p le m e a s u r e

*1“ Parts Distribution

sta ff, th e d o c k y a r d , th e N a v a l S to r e s , th e p a

* h e b arrack s and

Centre,thfiN avalArm am entStores,Organisabon,orm

train in g e s ta b lis h m e n ts .

, in m v opinion, epito-

1 w

o u l d l i k e t o q u o t e o n e e x a m

p l e w

^

h

i c h

w

a s i n

a n

« » i s e s t h e s p l e n d i d s p i r i t o f d e v o t i o n . I r c t e r t o p r e p a r e h e r

a d v a n c e d s t a t e o f a m

a j o r r e f i t w

h e n t h e

s h

K

v a s a b l e t o f i r e h e r

f o r o p e r a t i o n a l d u t i e s . I n

l e s s t h a n

o f f i c e r s a n d m

e n o f

^ > a i n a r m

a m

e n t w

i t h s u c c e s s . T h e c

r

^

^

, , a

i i v

b y t h o s e w

h o g o t h e r

t h e s h i p r e c e i v e d f o r t h i s m

u s t b e s h a r e d e q u a U

y o y

> ^ a d y i n

s u c h r e c o r d t i m

e .

y o u fo rth e e x c e llP n f r t

added, 'I think I have fhanktd

ju st in ca se I h ad n o t

^ ^ ty o u did in helping the ArmyatDiubul,

yo u rself

n 11 • ,

assure you that without the presenceol

have been much raote sticky/fc.

thanV«f

u i!

Lieutenant General Chaudhuri said, 'Ihave«m

rr»onf»raH

us all to the N avy eind Air Force whose acth*

coop erah on m ad e ou r task so m uch easier.

Casualties

casualties suffered by the two ships, M y sorem d TrishulM

given b e l ^ * * ^ garrison a t A n ja d ip and the Portuguese taken prisone Table 12-2- C asualties suffered at Anjadip

Of icers

Sailors

Casualties

Killed

7

W ounded

:

17

Total

2

1/

Wounded

f

Total

_ board the

body of one Portuguese sailor was

^pera^

when the ship was boarded af^

—

Portuguese

Goan

15

Total

8

to

at the Flagstaff Point

sacnhce for th«

of ^^e Indian N avy who ttiade the

regards ihe casualties

«°*^^Suese Possessions-

'

suffered by both sides on aU four fro^

T H E S U N S E T S O N P O R T U G A L ’S A SIA N EM PIRE / 407

Daman, Diu and A n jad ip Is la n d , th e fig u re s w e re ;

Indian Casualties

2 2 (plus one killed in an accident)

Wounded

54 (piu5 fjye injured in an acci

dent)

Total

76

Portuguese Casualties

Killed

3 0

Wounded

5 7

Total

g7

Prisoner o f War

P o r t u g u e s e s o

l d

i e r s

3,301

P o r t u g u e s e p

o

l i c e m

e n

9

G

o a n s o

l d

i e r s

1,508

G

o a n p

o

l i c e m

e n

268

C

i v i l i a n

p

e r s o n

n e l

8

-iQtal

5,094

At 1400hoursonDecember 19,1961, G e n e ra lM a n u e l.^ to r^ V a ssa lo

^S;lva, Coxnn,ander-in-Chief of the 'Independent T e m t o n a ^ o ^ ^ of P°rt^guese India', who was headquartered at Vasco f ^ a ^ ,

request h i a cease-fire to the Commander-in-Chief ‘’f ^f^j^gnttoyou, orces which read, 'According to the annexed

^ of Portuguese

powers given to me by the

J^ o u ifo tces from this

'-entral Government, I requestyou to cease fire betw

an cfficial s.,..m en , i«aed along witt.

reques. ^ ceasdirs.

General e Silva had said:

.

1 «fV farm flgao-fin alstron gholdofou r

H

a v i n

g

t h e d e f e n c e o f P e n i n s u l a

f o r c e s o f p o s i t i o n s

P

“

defend as a base the

Vasco da Gama

of nearby fi^Band

enem yandof*einevitableco^2 '2 ^^

yet been co n sid ere d the big

m y s e lf to

3

resources they

w ithou t g r e a t s a c r ^ c

his a p p r o a c h m a k e s

I decided w i *

th e

preserve, in

I

w

a n

t

t o

t o c e a s e f i r e

=f£.3==--iarcit?.-;

X G e n e ra l M annp^ a f ^^7 B rig ad ier K.S. Dhillon,General h ie f o f th e A rm e d F o rrp ?

f

V assalo e Sitva, CommareiH-

as the C o m m a r^°

state of India, offer in

e A rm ed F o rce s in Goai

unconditional surrender of

^

^

h o u rs o n D ecem ber 19,1961.'

'^ ^ c h h acfco m b in p ^

Se rv ices o f the Armed Forces

a h J / ^ ^ q u e fab ric o f

<^'stinctive sk ills in the three elements to

enHr '

® ^ o rced a d ra rn '*

v ic to ry w ith in a period of just a day anti

®^hre cou ntry.

d ra m a tic su rre n d e r w h ich earned kudos from the

”

*

*

"

8

“

P

a

- «

P

i e

c e

s

^ D ecem ber 22 C

o v er the naval adminjstf^

e r s t w h ? " ^ ^ '^ ‘ ‘^ ^ r e e C n

D am an an d Diu and was desigr^^

the sea a ° ^ g u e s e colnnv^'

re sp o n sib le fo r all land areas °

^ o rth a n d ^ *^®tween the p fra n i

isla n d s inclu ding

coast ^‘■^'veen the m p ’•?•

la titu d e o f U °4 3 ' N orth and 15 ^

•

t o

'^iew

D ecem b er 19, P rim e M in istef^ ^ ^

an oth er'

^^^erves atten tio n from

Se

^ ^ '^ 'c e s a n d th e ir c lo s e c o -o r d in a tio ii'

^

' " W

f t

M

i n i s t e r , com p lim e n te d

1 ] ;

“ f *

”

' ”

"

“

" d u

c t e d

w

i t h

^ ^ n a n d D iu a n ? ? ;'^ g ^ h e n t h p ^ ^ - P ® ’'*

Indian revolutio^

adom ^®‘*^ '^ d gav;o^ ‘^*®dthein^j3^ '^ " D efence Services iookove

to saV 'vVp’^f

w e f

fo r a 1 ? " o i^ ^ so il. W e w a ite d / o J «

Portugal

not V

of onr

f^^tlement, bu t w ere thenfo

j

®"ned a r .T '*

tS ® ^ ^ '^ y b o d ^ °-‘'® ' ” ®''®*terated t^ie Ind iajj* ^

a n d w e h a v e n o ta rt^ c k

^

a peacefm

t o

I n d

i a ' s

* " ‘ *

' ®

' «

e

n

t h

a

d

^

t 3

l i b e r a t i o n s i n c e a l l eHott^

the SUN SE-re ON PORTUGAL'S ASIAN EMPIRE / 409

m a report filed o n D e c e m b e r 19, 1961 (T te S la le s m n , D e c e m b e r 20, 1961) the Press Trust of In d ia said ;

Mr. Menon asked P o rtu g al and h e r f r i e r . *

of lodgir\g a com p lain t w ith th e U N a ll these day

Y

medicine that they p rescrib e for us.

„ f,,ir la te d either the

He told the n a tio n an d the w orld ,

jion/ i i i e UN had

s p i r i t o r t h e w

o r d

s o f t h e U

N

C h a r t e r in t a k m g

liv e d up to

decided that colon ies cou ld n o t survive.

this.'

W estern N a tio n 's F o r a R e a c t

enclaves was

^dia's arm ed action fo r th e liberation of

vvere still under

hailed by all an ti-colonial pow ers and

...gfiy and s e v e r e l y cnti-

foreign rule. The W estern countries,

aching the philosophy o

cised India's action b ecau se India had been p

.

led by

non-violence' to the rest of the w orld.

W estern

On D ecem ber 19, as h ad been e x ^

' gg^yj-jty Council

* e USA, introduced a resolution m

forces to

tidia's action and seeking the w ithd

sev en votes

held on D ecem ber 17. The

Union, thuS f ^ ^ f ^ f ^ a n c e and

four against but w as vetoed by

^ h o m were the

/

^^i^ygs

the NATO p o w e r s , t h e most v o c J

^ g g j^ d have th

^jjher

T u r k e y , t o r e v e r s e the c o u r s e of e y ^

o^er,

Lanka, the

delivered intact b ack to f ° f f o u ^ ^ o w e ? motion ^

410 / b l u e p r i n t TO BLUEWATIER

P r i m

^ S ® S a ' ° K ^ T h h ™

I n

d

i a

o

n

t h e

l i b

e r a t i o

n

o

f

^ n d t h e p e o p l e o f

o

f t h e P p r * r >

o

n

t h e l i b

e r a t i o

n

o

f t h e t h r e e e n c l a v e s , t h e G o v e r n m e n t m

e n

f t n

r o ^ ^ ^

^

p

u

b

l i c o

f C

h

i n

a

s a i d

t h a t t h e a c t i o n o f t h e I n d i a n G o v e m -

' G

o

a i s a

■ * ^ ' ^ ^ 5

r e f l e c t e d

t h e i u

? t d

e m

a n

d

o

f th e I n d i a n p e o p l e . I t s a i d ,

s a f p o i i a , - ^ ^

“

e n a b l e p

a r t o

f I n

d

i a

n

t e r r i t o r y . T

o o p p o s e c o l o n i a l i s m

a n d

p e o D

l P h i

i n

d

e p

e n

d

e n

c e a n

d

U

i e u

n

i t y o

f t h e i r c o u n t r y , the I n d i a n

w a t » p r > a

^

t i m

e b

e e n d e m

. a n d i n g t h e r e c o

v e r y o f G o a andhavc

8 f i n

a l e t o t h e s t r u g g l e .

.

.

N a tio m

P

e r m

a n

e n t R e p r e s e n t a t i v e a t t h e U n i l ^

lau n ch ed

anti-Indian onslaug

E x ceed in g ^ n y

n aH ons. ' F o r th is ', w ro te J h a i n a feature ^

8 ^ ^ ^ s B n ^ p u h lis h e d m T h e H in d u s ta n Times on February 14,1987, o n

G o v e rn m e n t. F ra g m e n ta ry n ew s was

K rish ru

a cco rd in g to w h ich th e D efen ce L jju '

R u e s p tr o o n c ^ K '- T ^ * e m p h a s i s in g i n h is s t a t e m e n t s that obliged to e n t p ^

^ nwing

the m ood of the

e l e m

e n t s o

f a b r i e f h e r e , but

h

e

a

d

l i i S

S

f

m

e m

b e r s a n

d

h

a v i n

g

r e a d t h e s c r e

^

J ^

a g g r e s s i o n I

p a p e r s a c c u s i n

g

I n

d

i a o f h

a v i n g

therefore, ^ 'b r J p

w o u ld b e to ta lly unconvincing-

.

''^as in fulfilmer,*

^ *^®^ended o u r a ctio n on the

^

^ e d g e pre-<iated th

co im try o f colon ial rule,

or

>JN C h . „ „ and w o u ld h av e to be

c o l o n i a l r u l e w

a s b

?

"

'

o r n o C

o

u

n

c i l . ' I a l s o

f fe e

^

^

' a

r e

d

a g g r e s s i o n , a n d c o

u l d

n o t t h ^ r e a f t e r ^ ^ .

^

P

p

r t o

f t h

e

A

f r o

- Z

^

a r g u m

e n t g a i n e d

t h e

^

G

o

a

i s s u e t o

a n d f r u s t r a t e d a U

S m

o v e to

,

' “ ^

l u

u

o

n

.

G

e n e r a l A

s s e m

b l y u n d

e r t h e ' u n i t i n g f o r

in Portugal again st Britain ^

Goa and D r . S a l a i r even t l « « t ^

« h o n s a s a p r o t e s t a g a i n s t B

r i t a i n ' s

THE SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL'S ASIAN EMPIRE / 411

J ^ t o the loss of the P o rtu g u ese lebensraum. A n e ffe c tiv e c o u n te r to h is

e War at Sea, w h o in a le tte r to The Times, L o n d o n said ;

toBdtai!!'saiH°

f r i e n d s t h a t t h e y d

i d

n o t r u

s h

H i t l e r a n d M

-

^

w

h

e n w

e s t o o d a l o n e a g a i n s t

b

a s e s o n t h p

^ ^ l

n e e d e d t h e u s e o

f t h e n

a v a l a n d a i r

- m

a n v D e n n i p ^ a ^ ? i , ^ ° '

“ 8 a l - f ' u r t h

e r m

o

r e , i t t o o k t w

o y e a r s o f p a t i e n t

S a l a z a r h p f n ^

'

a

*

p a t i e n t - n e g o t i a t i o n s w

i t h D

r

t o u s e b a s * ^ ^

s i g n e d a n a g r e e m

e n t p e r m

i t t i n g

c l e a r e d o f U

^

A

z o r e s , f r o

m

w

h

i c h

t h e C

e n t r a l A

t l a n t i c c o u l d b e

t h e P o r t

e v e n t h e n s o m

a n

y d i f f i c u l t i e s w

e r e p r o d u c e d

t h o s e f a c i l ’ K

^

^

^

^

G

o v e r n m

e n t r e g a r d i n g A

m

e r i c a n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n

b e c a m

e e f f

O

c t o b e r 1 9 4 3 , t h a t t h e a g r e e m

e n t

r e a l n e e d

^

s h e s t o o d b y t h e a l l i a n c e i n

o u

r t i m

e o f

o f 1940

'

s a v e d u s e n o r m

o u s s h i p p i n g l o s s e s - a f t e r t h e e n d at negligible risk to herself.

A x i s p o ^

* l ^ e n t i o n e d t h a t d

u r i n g W

o r l d W

a r I I , G

o a w

a s u s e d b y

^ l i e d s h i p n ^ ^ ^ ^

l o g i s t i c s u p p o r t a n d f o r t r a n s m

i t t i n g i n t e l l i g e n c e o n

' ^ ^ ' ’c h

a

n

t i i ^

^

^

t h e S o u t h A

s i a n t h e a t r e w

h i c h l e d t o t h e s i n k i n g o f s e v e r a l

* ^ n t r n e n

G

e r m

a n a n d J a p a n e s e s u b m

a r i n e s . T w

o G

e r m

a n m

e r -

a n d r e c e i v °

s p e c i a l l y f i t t e d w

i t h p o w

e r f u l t r a n s m

i t t e r s

t h e s e w

o i

G

e r m

a n p l a n t h a t o n d e c l a r a t i o n o f h o s t i l i t i e s I n d i a n s , k

h a r b o u r i n

o r d e r t o c a r r y o u t e s p i o n a g e f r o m t h e

O f f i c i a l i n

G

e r m

a n s h a d a l r e a d y p l a n t e d a ' m

o l e ' - a n I n d i a n

c o m e f n n

o f S h i p p i n g a n d T r a n s p o r t a t B o m b a y , w

h o u s e d t o

' ^ ° n v o x « .

u ^ ^ s g u l a r i y t o d e l i v e r i n f o r m

a t i o n o n m

o v e m

e n t s o f A

l l i e d

C o n j : „ V ^

® i n f o r m

a t i o n w

a s r e g u l a r l y d e l i v e r e d b y h i m t o t h e G e r m ^

i n t e r o l

P a n a j i . E v e n t u a l l y , a n i n t r e p i d b a n d of B r i t i s h t e r r i t o n a l s , W

e

^

c a l l e d t h e C a l c u t t a L i g h t B r i g a d e , a s s e m b l e d a

t ^

l c u

t t a

a n d

^ a l e a k y , a n c i e n t d r e d g e r t o G o a , e n t e r e d t h e h a r b o u r a n d , i t i P n

‘ o s i n g a h a i r o r d r o p o f b l o o d , d e s t r o y e d t h e t w o G

e r m

^ m

e r c h a n t -

3 > s o a n I t a l i a n s h i p w

h i c h w

a s t h e r e a t t h a t t i m

e . S o m

u c h f o r

T

T h is ^ a u ttIo / ™ i P ro fe s s o r J.K . G a lb ra ith d u rin g th e la tte r 's v is it to J ? * a in F e b r u a ry 1 9 8 7 a n d e n q u i r e d w h e th e r, fro m h in d sig h t, h is v ie w s o n a n d th e d e v e lo p m e n ts associated w ith its lib e ra tio n , I ^ d ^ d e r g o n e c h a n g e a f te r S S s e o f a little o v e r 2 5 y e a r s . P r o fe s s o r G a lb ra ith s a id : V f

i

a s f r e q u e n t l y h a p p e n e d , d i f f e r e d s o m e w

h a t

o f t h e S t a t e ' D e p a r t m e n t a t W

a s h i n g t o n a n d t h e I n d i a n

412 / blueprin t TO 5LUEWATER

la te r d is c o v e re d w a s a

r

®

Empire, as we

w ith S a la z a r

n - *

^

^

lik e to seek any alliance

p r e s s ^ f p o r ; . ?

^

A f r i c a n policy of

anachronicTT

h ! u

c ^ ^ e s s i o n s o n G o a , D am an and Diu, an

In d ian

s h o u ld h a v e p a s s e d to In d ia, and I urged the vpar fr>

to b e p a tie n t, a llo w six m o n th s, eight months, a mrvir^

p re ssu re to b e b ro u g h t to b e a r. W ell, m y policy was not anv-W a s h in g to n o r in N e w D elh i. N ew Delhi was

^

n^atter s e ttle d w h ic h is u nderstandable. Goa had

*^0 I^^dia, there was no questionaboutit.lt was an

in th

W a sh in g to n , as u su a l, w a s w o rried about the bases

fVio

a n c ie n t a llia n c e w ith P ortu g al. Som e officials j ■

°*' 8 ® ^3ll/ th e a b le s tm a n in th e S ta te D e p a r tm e n tu n d e t tpnrjcf

o n m y sid e b u t it w a s n 't en o u g h to carry the day. The m av

b rin g d ire c t p re ssu re to b e a r o n the Portugu^e'

I h Jv o • *

h a v e w o rk e d b u t th a t w as m y h op e at that time-

u s« ^ ph“. ;

d a v s an d I thu ik that history has

ju s tif^ d the co u rse th at w as ta k en there.

,

m o m in a

b lo o d sh e d (d u rin g G o a 's liberation). On the

m y a m w

n iilita ry a tta ch e s - m y n av al a t t a c h e an

their Indian r^ll^ '

Ihev

showed

^

the E m bassy a j which m

andhow iho ^ ®P ° > 6rit was around Goa, aroimdAe Goa reP

theyhad been told

w o u ld b e o v e r .

a n d g a v e th e ir e s tim a te th a t th e

j i

A fter th ey had finished^

troop s,w h n w o u M

P o rtu g al w as using

^

i t w

o u

l d

b e o v e r b y " a t e a f t e

^ 8 ^ v e m

y

m y r e p u t a t i o n a s a m ilita S

r

r> an alyst w as n ev er h igh er!

P o r t u g u e s e .

t r o o p s in G o a w e r e b o t h A f r ic a n a s w e l l as N

a H

o n s , t h e P

r o

S

s

^

^

s

a

i d

S

l ^

d ire ct p ressu re to b e a r o n D r ^ i

'^ ® "ted th e U n ite d N a tio n s t o b

^

and the P ortugu ese. H e said:

U n ion , an d w e * e ^ * e * ^ ^ i'^ j^ ° " '^ '^ 5h o u ld h a v e b e e n in t h e l n d ^

F ren ch E m p ire h ad g o n e

th e a g e of colonialism -

and Puerto Rico had e i t h ; r ^ : ^ ^ ^ f p o s s e s s i o n s in the P h iH p P ^

goneordrasticallyalteredandofcoursetJ’

THE S U N S E T S O N P O R T U G A L 'S A S I A N E M P I R E / 4 1 3

ffittmynolPortagal? So I was impressed with the fragility or the

.L

of course that was evident only

«i%ola whiAwOT a

peaceftilly in Mozambique

r e a h

u

n

d

r e

d

t i m

e s m

o

r e

m

i p

o

r t a

n

t t h

a n

G

o

a

.

^ 6 l i n j w

a s s y n i p a t h ^ ^ ! ! f ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ N

e

h

r u

, h

e s a i d

, ' M

y

i m

p

r e

s s i o

n

w

a

s t h

a t

f ^ f i e n t b u t h e w

a Q , 1

P

° ^

*

®

^

' ' *

6

w

i n

a

c e

r t a

i n

m

e

a

s u

r e

a

n

d

h

e

w

a

s

^ < ^ e d t h a t h e h a d r e a i i e s t p H f u

T

g

e n

e r a

l i m

p

a

t i e

n

c e

o

f I n

d

i a

. ' H

e

^ ^ t a ry o p t i o n b v s i v r v ,

G

o

v e

r n

m

e

n

t t o p

o

s t p

o

n

e

e

x

e

r c i s i n

g

.

^ P ® ^ ^ e f u l s o i u H n n

b

e c a u

s e h

e f e l t t h a t h

e

w

o

u

l d

b

e a b

l e t o

b u tlh a v p * !^ *

'M a y b e th e t h in g to d o w a s to

‘ p

I Was so m r.«*

e a lw a y s o p p o s e d th e u s e o f f o r c e w h e n e v e r is

a t th a t tim e a n d stiU a m .'

've»m"

operaHnr.

“P

discussion by expressingliis sat

,

aving been swift and decisive. 'The casualties

'^gal' peacpfi.i

wars being like the war between India

^'•velsD

quickly over.'

I f l e

P

o r t u g u

e s e C

r o

w

n

' w

e r e t h u s r e s t o r e d t o t h e i r

D u ^ t

,

a

n

d

s k

i l f u

l o

p

e

r a

t i o

n

l a

s t i n

g

l e

s s t h

a

n

4

0

h

o

u

r s a

n

d

P r e ^

t h e n

i i r „ e x c i s e d

b

y s c a l p

e l s t h a t h

a d

b e e n c a r e M l y

fro m th e way th e P o rtu g u e se went a b o u t

® th e e n c la v e s d e sp ite ad e q u a te p rio r

°

a s

t h e i r a w

a r e n

e s s o f th e reality o f t h e m

a r c h

o

f t i m

e ,

“

■ ® y W

e r e f i r m

b e l i e v e r s i n

e u t h a n a s i a .

13

THE BLUNTED SCIMITAR

The Navy's Trammels and Compulsions

_____ ^During the 1965 Indo-Pak War

M u ch h as b een w ritten o n In d o -P ak rela B o n s sin ce th e tw o

^

attam ed Independence in 1947. In a v ery recen t v o lu m e titied Pakistan - C risis of R elation sh ip ', ed ited b y Air C o n t m a n d o r c J

ingh. D irector, Ir\stitute for D efence Stu d ies an d A n aly ses, h e

^nns

^ m t r o d iic tio n 'If a single m ost dortm\ant ch aracteristic fi-gef

betw een Pakistan and India since 1947 w as to b e id en tified then t h e ^ ^

point to the m istru st and lack o f c o n f id ^ ^ ^

^ ' ' ^ ‘^vereign states, both highly sensitive to their separ m o d e m n a tio n states burdened

deeply shared, Vustovicallv lontr

and c u lt^

pTr^ob'oJ^rZ

T ^ P « ° P i « o f t h e t w o c o u n t r i k ^riany

transform ed into a durable political !w t ^

?^ tnU ty

V nncai system to govern it. T h e fragu«y

T H E B L U K IE D S C IM rr A R / « 5

hire. IWs 'troika' o f ru lin g

-

to Ii^dia b u t m the p ro cess

sustained itself on the

^ c o n f l i c t u a l relatio n sh ip w ith

acquired a vested in terest in p e rp e tu a tin g co m

b 1965 P akistan w a s in th e

co u n try 's larg ely

whichfelt that the tiin e w a s ^ p e to e x a c e ^

p u rp o se th e e a s i ^

ilUterate populaHon's a n ti-In d ia n

an d stag e a ^

course of action w as to w h ip u p a n ti-ln

Kashmir/ and second y,

operaUonto, fts O y . 'lib e ra te '

o f Ihe

m o r ^

humiliate India in 'J'.e ey es o f th e

im provin g

^

boosters that P ak istan at th is tim e h a

,

|Q<jed a n u c le a r devic ^ ^

economy, thp su pport of C h in a w h ic h a

o f m ilitary ai /

1 9 6 4 ,a s W e s s fu lfo r e ig n p o lic y b r m ^ g in ^ ^ b a c k i n g o f * 6

from capitalist and co m m u n ist co u n tn ,

Sm o-Pa

.

^

and, what proved to b e th e m o st P t o v o c a b v e ^ ’^J^

^tan to laun

Treaty signed in M a rch 1965! T h e stage

a major m ilitary ad v en tu re to hu trob ate m

•

K a c h c h h E p is o d e

claim ,

l^i^arly

■ n te 1 9 6 5 I r v d o - P a k c o n f U c t b e g a n w i m t h e ^ ^ ^ ^

^

of freedom and the accep tan ce by

betw een * e

^ p^jj Army

delinaaled ir\tem ational ^ ° " ^ J ^ 2 ic h h k n o w n as Kan) to the

« ^ rsh y e xp ar> sein th eR an n o fK ach ch h .g .ton m en ^ ^ ^ ^ ig ade sudd^^y brigade w as soon m oved from

'

^ p ril ^ p o l i c e Force ^ '' ^ g

Kachchh border in

Central ^^^^jarkot and c a p tu r ^ ^ ^

attacked a contingent of

s o u t h - w

e s t

a n d soon

at a patrolling post tb re er™ ^ 3S duty ^ c \ e s , a n d fore j^e

commander of the post.

vvitharmour

j3sk

vigokot

attacked once again, this

c a l l e d

s o o n occ^

3

contingent to w ithdraw to a ^ g i n d i a '^ - '^ ^ g K a n j a r k o t a Pakistan a r e a w a s t h e n t a k e n o v e r

y ^ ^ ^ y f o r v ^ ^ ^ j . j . i t , l e o c c p

a n d s e r v e d n o t i c e o n

t e r r i t o r y ^ ® , q 6 5 j t b e c a m e

P j ^ j y t e w h e n h e r

p a « „ r > „ . d U p u . e d ^ ' V , « ; ‘ !S n p .e .e

refused to com ply ^

attitude

^ jt to be

poUrisatior. of

Poreign

^

oi

ruled out any P°®

4 1 6 / B L U E P R I N T T O B L U E W A T E R

Pakistan then m oved an infantry division to the occupied area which, despite th ep iesen ceo f anlndianbrigade, attacked four Indian positions on April 24 forcing the Indian Army to withdraw. On April 25 and 26 they a t t a c k e d B i a r B e t ( t h e w o r d b e t i n K a c h c h i m e a n s a high g ro u n d as opposed t o t h e s w a m p y lo w - ly i n g a r e a s o f th e R a n n ) and o c cu p ie d most of^, th o u g h their a tta ck on V i g o k o t an d Sard ar Post was effective y r ^ ^ ^

This w as followed by an imdeclared truce but ° y ^ Ttarvoalrol in May 25, Pakistani forces once

c(£ue(i l»

Biar Bet which was soon repulsed. Sporadi

^

another m onth w hen, at the intervention of

® ^ and the Indian

H arold Wilson, the Pakistani President,

There was a

Prime Minister, Lai Bahadur Shastri, agreed o ^

conflict'o

short w elcom e respite though the Pakistan ^

^

pg^ce as a sig"

escalate to a fxill-fledged w ar and took the

i ^^.ggse-fiietohis'*'

of weakness and attributed Ayub's acceptance o

^

My

MP, Air

im p r e s s io n , 'W i t h th e b e n e fit o f h in d s ig h t, i j

the

ju d g e d 1 9 6 5 to b e th e rig h t y e a r to fo rc e i ^ g o f t h e l n d ?

t h a t h a d e lu d e d th e m in 1 9 4 7 -4 8 . T h e dis ICach

in A p r il-M a y 1 9 6 5 o v e r th e b o rd e r d is p u te m s te r e d th e ir c o n fid e n c e . T h e y to o k

after F^ndi

j ,e

rru litary w e a k n e s s p a r tic u la r ly s in c e it ca m e K^aslunirfo*^® «

d e a t h . B u t b e f o r e th a t th e w id e s p r e a d tr o u b le s of

lo s s o f a h o ly re lic fr o m t h e H a z r a tb a ls h r m e o re c e iv e *®

h a v e le d th e m to b e lie v e th e g ro u n d w a s rea y

^

a n a rtic le p u b lis h e d in 1 9 8 6 in

JJ^s'w arhad

M uslim , its e d ito r, M u sh a h id H iissa in , sta te d tna P e o n ’S

b y P a k is ta n to d iv e rt p u b lic a tte n tio n w ith in ^ ^ ^ .p ie c e tu rm o il th e c o u n try w a s g o in g th ro u g h . In h is pelM/

q fth el965W a r,p u b U sh ed m T h eH iT id u sta ttT im eS /

.hdul

^ fsc(^'

s a y s ,'A n o th e r article {in The M uslim ) b y rtineit'''®*^^^^l\li'5®

jo u rn a list, shows thatPresident Ayub's m o t i v e s in s (Ger'^^^^er®*

b a se an d u n in tellig en t. H e cites G e n e ra l M u sa 's M y

jjia t the

w a s the P a k A rm y C h ief d u rin g th e 1965 co n flict) to s ^

thoughtthe plan was u n w isean d h esh elv ed itforaj^ s general h a p p en ed ', say s A bdul A ziz. H e q u o tes N aw abzad a

^

a form er In fo rm atio n M in ister o f P ak istan , as telling

^

jjgS

w as su d d en ly started b y 'B h u tto , A ziz A h m ed

be

f o r e ig n a n d d e fe n c e secretaries) in the hope that th e r e j v

^ jio W

for P akistan , for w h ich the b lam ew o u ld b e la id on A y u h * ^ '

t h e B L U N T E D S C I M I T A R / 4 1 7

getpressedto quit and m ak e ro o m fo r y o u n g e r

tiays Ayub, W ashington's d a rlin g fo r o v e r a d e c a d e a s th e id e a l ^

( J )

leader for Third World co u n tries, a s la c k in g th e in te llig e n c e to s e e t h r o u g n the plot, Abdul Aziz lead s a n o th e r w itn e s s fo r w o r s e e v id e n c e a g a m s t Ayub, 'a retired offk:er o f the M in is try o f In o r m a tio n w h o in h is o icia capadty was close to P rim e M in iste r B h u tto / A z iz s a y s h e le a rn t fr o m t h ^

officerthat though Ayub h ad first tu rn ed d o w n th e 1965 w a r p la n , h e tu m e to it again, on Bhutto's ad v ice, as re lie f fr o m h is p o litic a l d ifficu ltie s fo llo w inghisnear-defeat by M iss (F atim a) Jin n a h in p re sid e n tia l e le c tio n s . B h u tto told Ayub, says the in form an t o f A z iz , 'G e n e ra l S a h ib . . ■ if th e n a tio n is switched towards India it w ill fo rg e t e v e ry th in g a n d y o u w ill b e th e h e ro of the hour.' In the ev en t A.yub d id n o t b e c o m e a h e ro ev e n fo r o n e h o ^ -

dul Aziz adds, Ayub w a n ted so m e g a in , a n d B h u tto w a n ted to

®

game. Bringing K ash m ir in to th e lim e lig h t w a s a se co n d a ry Praposiiion.'

Before going o n to the o th er P a k a cts o f p e rfid y d u rin g the m o n ^

the K a c h c b h i m b r o g l i o , it m u s t be m e n t i o n e d t h a t ^ u s t a s l ^ d

^ PPened when the K a s tm ir issu e h a d b een referred to the U N O m th e la t

^ ^ a n d India had lo st the P a k -o c c u p ie d a re a s o fK a s h m ir (P O K ), in * e

J i m of thepow ers that ru led In d ia d u rin g the seco n d h a lf

'

l^ ^ sp u teo v e rth eterrito ry in K ach ch h w as referred to

O n Fe'oruary 19, 1968, this tribunal

^ e t r e s o f Indian tenritory inK achchhtoPakistanoutof the 4

q

I S I k T

I u

A

n

d

w

i t h

t h i s d i s p e n s a t i o n t h e m

t e r n a t i o n a l b ^ ^ ^ ^

sudp^ ^

delineated an ew resu lting in

^ e r o f b e t s

th e area aw arded to

^y^gs

rem ainin g w ith India com p n sed

g

P

to Kashmir

^ w ^ ^ l^ a d s o o n s h ifte d to th e K a s h rn irv a lle y .B e m ^ ^ ^ ^ y ^ ^ the Pak

. '^®*"jstanhad also com m itted a

in the Kargil sector o

border and had launched several

with such attac^ .

In order to thw art Pak

areas o£Pak'<’« “P 2 ^

^'^‘5'witer-offensive had beenlaunched and

sig n ^ .

shrnir h a d b e e n c a p t u r e d . B u t w hen ®

^

5

giving

^

h^d relinquished aU

“''Pression that she w as not

; ^ad tempted thatcountry

®t^acks in case a w arw aslaunched.

xaith

® hid for Kashm ir once again a

j^ u l in his Confro

Thus, said L i e u t e n a n t General .

4 1 8 / B L U E P R IN T T O B L U E W A T E R

P akistan, 'P akistan h a d lu lle d u s in to a fa ls e sen se of security byoutwardlj ly i n g lo w a ft e r th e tr u c e o f K a c h c h h , h a v in g assessed our reaction and p in p o in t e d o u r w e a k n e s s e s in th is sh o rt co n flict of April-May 1965. While o u r h ig h c o m m a n d h a d r e m a in e d b lin d to this ruse and was oH-guard, a llo w in g o u r f o r c e s to r e la p s e In to p e a c e tim e postures, thePaWstanisweis s e c r e t ly p r e p a r in g to s tr ik e in K a s h m ir in A u gu st and take us y A n d t a k e u s b y s u r p r is e th e y d id w h e n 10,000

c a lle d t h e m 'f r e e d o m f ig h t e r s ' th o u g h in act

“ aLgin-washed

P a k A r m y o ffic e r s a n d m e n in s o m e k in d o f mufti

.

y j ^ B^eriDa

b a n d o f tr ib e s m e n fr o m th e N W F P tra in e d b y e ^ vagiuturi

w a r fa r e to w a g e a fehad fo r th e 'lib e r a tio n o f eu: ^

j^e 750-

'b r e t h r e n ' in th e 'I n d ia n - o c c u p ie d ' p a rt o f K asrunit k ilo m e tr e -lo n g c e a s e -fir e lin e o n A u g u st 5 ,1 9

•

The Force Levels

^nrising^^

n Army w as 800,000 c o m p ^ u r

A t th is tim e , th e s tr e n g th o f th e In d ia n A rm y iw erem o u n

d iv is ic n s (5f fu ll s tre n g th , ru n e o f w h ic h w e r e m o fighting

,-e

o f rp

eH

d n

urp

c H

e d ..

s h

t -

r p

e n

n r

g th^. It h a d a b o u t 1,000 arm ou re

x a

h eI S

ndian

in c lu d in g re s e r v e s , a n d a b o u t 2 ,3 0 0

.y ^ M lG 21, o“‘ °Lcfail

iia d a b o u t 9 0 0 a irc ra ft o f v a rio u s ty p e s includu\g ^ g y y h a d o n e a a b o u t 5 5 0 w e re c o m b a t a irc ra ft. I h e sm a ll

^ destroy®'^®'

c a rrie r, tw o c ru ise rs, th re e d e stro y e rs,

i j yVar D

m o d e m a n tia irc ra ft frig a te s , t h r e e frig a tes o

-g rs, nine

c o a s ta l

m in e s w e e p e rs,

tw o

i n

s h o r e rrune

f o u r

P f

d e fe n c e b o a ts , o n e l a n d i n g sh ip , o n e lan d in g era a n d a la rg e n u m b e r o f a u x ilia rie s

h a rb o u r

ab

j),

T h e stren g th o f th e P a k is ta n A rm y w a s 25U,

d iv isio n s o f full stre n g th an d a la rg e n u m b er

^ appf®

Razakars (d efen d ers o f th e fa ith ) an d o th er p wgnS/ ^ndi^

8 0 0 a rm o u red fig h tin g v eh icle s in d u din g m o d e m 1

_erior

u

stre n g th w a s less th a n In d ia 's tho u gh

Tr>e P a k ista n A ir F o rc e h a d ap p ro x im a tely 20 0 c f jghtefS

in clu d ed F -8 6 Sah re fig h ters, a sq u ad ro n

ofo^®

C an b erra b o m b e rs. T h e P a k i s t a n N a v y ' s Fleet consis (th e Ghazi w h ich w as su n k later b y the In d ian N av y

^

o ff V ish ak h ap atn am ), one l i g h t c r u i s e r , five destroyers/

tWO ® .(aft-

frig ates, eigh t co astal m in esw eep ers, fo u r patrol

d efen ce m o to r lau n ches an d a large n u m b er o f auxilia*^®

Fl6®^

At the begijnning o f M ay, th e sh ip s o f the Indian

isl»^ '^ ^ t'

carrying o u t rou tin e assign m en ts on both co asts and the r

aircraft carrier, Vikrant, along w ith so m e o f the oth er snip

T H E B L U N T E D S C IM IT A R / 4 1 9

Ranjit, Kutharand K irp a n -w a s a t C o c h in a w a itin g th e e m b a r k a tio n o f theSeahawkand AJize, sq u a d ro n s fr o m Garuda, th e N a v a l A ir sta tio n ; th e

Talmr was on p assage fro m B o m b a y to C o c h in , th e Brahmaputra w a s on patrol off Cochin, the Akshay w a s a t C a lc u tta , th e Jum na, Sukanya a n d A/aywereat V ishakhapatn am , theS/zarifl a n d Investigatorw etea\M adxA S

and the Seas was at P ort B lair. T h e o th e r sh ip s o f th e H e e t w e re i a v a rio u s stages of refit at the N av al D o ck y a rd , B o m b a y .

Regular m aritim e re co n n a issa n c e o f th e sea areas v ita l to th e se c u rity of Ae country by lA F aircra ft h a d re v e a le d th e fa c t th a t n e a rly a ll sh ip s

°

®

had b een p u t to sea a n d th e su b m a rin e Ghazi h a d b e e n posiHoned off the W estern C o a st o f In d ia. In fact, th e Ghazi h a d b e e n

^|® j5^'^f^® divingabout60 n a u tic a l m ile s w e s t o f D a m a n o n M a y 9 ,1 9 6 5

y

aircrat and w arsh ip s an d h a d b e e n sig h ted o f f M in ico y so o n

^

u n id en tified a ircra ft h a d also b een se en fly in g a t h ig h tudes over the A rab ian Sea o ff o u r W est C o a st an d the A n d a m a n a n d

o/ft ^ ^'^rids in the B ay o f B en g al b u t b y the tim e lAi* aircra ft o r sh ip s airc

d esp atch ed to th ese areas to c a n y o u t s e a r c h ^ , aU

how^ '

and the su b m arin e h ad d isap p eared . C on tin u ou s v ig il w as, ever, m aintained b y th e In d ian F leet o v er the en tire sea area o ff the

^ peninsula u ntil the 'th a w ' in Indo-Pak relation sh ip w ith a defacto

1965 w h ich w as sp o rad ically v iolated b y the F a k forces a th e la st su ch v io latio n tak in g p lace on Ju n e 15 w h en th ey j^ ad erjy attacked certain areas in the vicinity o f Sard ar P o st a n d V ig o k o t ca_^ ‘^''chh but w ere b eaten b ack after su ffering h eav y casu alties an d the P ^ e of a Pak A rm y M ajo r b y the Indian forces.

Sparring Begins

^

^

f '

t i o

n

e

d

earUer, i t w a s o n Ju n e 1 7 ,1 9 6 5 t h a t P rim e P®t P r e s i d e n t Ayub o f Pakistan at the C om m onw ealth Prune C o n f e r e n c e a t L o n d o n a n d t h e i n f o r m a i

d i s c u s s i o n s

appeared to have b een cordial enough to lead to a form al cease-fiie, w hicn

'vas signed on Ju n e 3 0 ,1 9 6 5 and m ade operative from

'

. ShriL.K. Jha, the noted d ip lo m a t ^ o n o ^ t ^ iv d serva^^^^ ^

'vho was the Principal Secretary to Prime M ^ t e r Sha

'vhen i n t e r v i e w e d on Septem tjer 11,1986, said, I w . s in v o lv e d w itt.

o f

w e r e g „ i d i n g O » w «

w e re

tee of theCabinet as well as t h e ^ r e t a n e

equaUy from an

viewed largely from the polirical point o f viewt>uteq

r

operational point of view.

4 2 0 / B L U E P R IN T T O B L U E W A T E R

N o w , fir s t o f a ll, th e a tte m p t o n o u r p a rt w as to keep the whole t h in g c o n fin e ^ / te r r ito r ia lly a s w e ll a s oth erw ise, to a local conflict, r a t h e r t h a n a llo w it to a s s u m e th e c h a ra c te r o f anIndo-Pak War. This w a s th e p r im e o b je c t iv e o f o u r p o lic y - it h a d been in the past also.

B u t a t th e s a m e tim e , w e h a d c o m e to realise that %hting on te r r a in c h o s e n b y th e e n e m y w o u ld a lw a y s leav e you at a ta g e . T h is c a m e o u t v e r y , v e r y v iv id ly d u rin g the Rann of Kachchh affa ir w h e n P a k is ta n h a d a ll th e lo g is itc ad v an tage and we a

tre m e n d o u s p r o b le m in g e ttin g m en,nTaterialandsupphesm ov g to th e fro n t. A t th a t v e r y tim e a p o litic a l d ecisio n had

.

w e w o u ld n 't fig h t w ith o u r h a n d s tie d b e h in d th eb ac

. ^| o

a p la n fo r o p e n in g a s e c o n d fro n t in th e P unjab y

,

^

L a h o re h a d b e e n d ra w n u p a n d p e rfe c te d . B u t it

^pgdthat

b e c a u s e a c e a s e -fiie c a m e in to e x iste n c e , a n d would

s o m e p e a c e fiil w a y o f re s o lv in g th e R a n n o f K a c jy to settle-b e e v o lv e d an d in fa c t it w e n t to a n interrw tiona o y

B u t e v e n w h e n th e re w a s th e sta te

j„j(,onweaHh

simple cease-fire without a n y formal ag reem en t, P rim e M irvisters' C o n fe re n c e w a s tak in g p lace in

^35

w e n t to L o n d o n a n d T w e n t w ith h im . A n d

^

should tl’®

c o n c e m - su p p o sin g th in g s h o tte d u p in our a se^ ^

gTtattg^

o p e ra tio n to m a rc h in to L a h o re b e lau n ch e d or m en t I h a d m a d e w ith S h ri Y .B . C h a v a n , w h o w as a

M in ister, w a s th a t i f su c h a c o n tin g e n cy arose, m essa g e in d icatin g th e d ate b y w h ich th e P rim e

b a c k b e ca u se w e w e re ab o u t to m o v e forw ar .

co n tin g en cy d id n o t arise.

^

a

In fa ct, I recall, an d it m ig h t b e u sefu l fo r the r ^

b e tw e e n P rim e M in ister S h astri an d P resid en t A yub j

m o n w ealth C o n fem ce sessio n . It w as a p riv ate m ee there. A yub said so m ew h at p atron isin gly. 'Y o u

tried to com m it aggression on oiK territory, our

kn ocks aiKi then they b eg a n to fle e .'T h e n S h a s triji said, you a te a G eneral. Ih a v e n o m ilitary kn ow led ge or

you think if I had to attackPakistan, I would choose a terrain ^ yjjj h ave no logistic su pport and you h a v e all the advantage •

^ul<J

think I w ou ld m ake su ch a m istake or a n y o fm y G e n e aUow m e to m ake that m istake?' A nd one cou ld see from

President Ayub that this ftiought startled him . B eca u se

ously b e h ad been led to believe, in m y ju d gem en t by the Indians h ad attacked in the R an n of K achchh. A nd he

of that view u ntil this question posed b y Shastriji and I couW

THE BLUNTED SCIMITAR / 421

visibly pause and n o t p u rsu e th e p o in t a n y fu rth e r.

The Navy^s D e p lo y m e n t

A large number o f the N a v y 's sh ip s w e re e ith e r u n d e rg o in g m a jo r a n d minor refit or were due fo r m a in te n a n c e a t th e v a rio u s re p a ir fa cilitie s a t Bombay and elsew here till th e tim e o f th e d e c la ra tiu n o f a ce a se -fire o n July 11965. Since they h a d h a d to b e h u rrie d ly b ro u g h t o u t fo r d ep lo y m en t at sea, it was now d ecid ed to u p d a te th e o p e ra tio n a l rea d in e ss o f a s m a n y ships as possible so th at, firs t, th e y c o u ld b e better p re p a red to m e e t an emergency and, next, to w o rk u p a ll th e se sh ip s as a b a la n ced task fo rce,

^specially in an tisu bm arin e w a rfa re as the F a k su b m arin e Ghazi w o u ld pose a serious threat to o u r F le e t sh ip s as w e ll as the m erch a n t m arm e. T h e ha

3t this tim e h a d n o su b m a rin e n o r an y p ractical ex p e rien ce in oling subm arine th reats e x c e p t fo r th e o ccasio n al exercises w ith the

'commonwealth navies.

Said Adm iral B.S. S o m an , w h o w a s the C h ief o f the N aval S ta ff at that

^ t e r the fizzle-ou t o f the K ach ch h affair fo r w h ich the Fleet ships had been hurriedly b ro u g h t o u tfro m their refitan d periodic

we had the H o b so n 's ch o ice o f either committing them back to ^

leht and n iainten an ce, o r o f continuing to

order to m ake h J l use of the (already projected)

^

J"®“ ^ g w i t h a R oy al N a v y s u b m a r i n e whicft w a s I^dia shortly. It h ad b een our experience in the past

of sim ulated train in g o n attack teachers

f^ y g fflc ie n t.

schools ashore can ever " ^ [ ^ t a r e e t hunting and It w as decided, therefore, * a t the

.

even if, during

packing opportunity w as too valuable t o ^ ^

**ie period, the s h i p s w ere not m a s good

P

hunting

as they sh ou ld b e, so long as their a n t j s u b ^ effective ar*I efficient, an d attacking equipm ent

perhaps had time

m m aking this decision, I had asses

till a b o u t N o v e m b e r 1 9 6 5 b e fo re t h m ^ f ^ ® ^ f p o i n t o u t th a t w h J e I n th e c o n te x t of

w i e ” S t i u t t o .h e

M y so re a n d th e a n t i s u b m a n n e f r ^

^ ^ ^ r i n e

to, a n lis u b m a r in e e x e r c i s e w i * t h e ^

„ v e r f u e

w a s p u t in to th e drydoc<‘J ‘> j J '" " J S Z

m aintenance, P ^ ^ ‘^ ^ .*h ^ „u ld nave endangered vai

m alfunctioning of which would na

/ b l u e p r i n t TO BLU BV A TER

- n s i d e ^ t o -

■ .

pSpratxiSls£~

1 Q ? c f

t h e a n

t i s i i h

m

^ E a s t C o a s t

1 9 6 5 a n

d

. a f t e r

n

o

r m

S

m

a

'

™

^

e a r l y S

e

p

t e

i

s f h

^

N

o

v e

m

b

e

r 1 9 6 5 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ V

b e e n o p e r a t i o n a l

s c h

e

d

u

l e

d

t o g e t r e a d

y .

^

w a s a l s o

t h

e

f i r s t p

a

i ^

^

o

f S

t e

s tocomn^^^^^

ou rcalcu lations. Mysoreand

c a r r ie d o u t s u c h n o r ^ ^ i

^

^^^rcises w ith thesubmarine

lim it e d a v a a a b I e r e s n n r ,^ « / !? 7° T ^ m a in te n a n ce as possible with the tlie A n d a m a n a n d M-

u ^

^ ^ I '^ P ^ t n a m , andweredepJojiedin

p e r io d ,

s m a lle r

fro m w h ere, during the monsoon

a c c o r d a n c e w ith th

a irc ra ft

a re w ithdraw n. This was in

w a s n e c e s s a r v ac

o p e ra tio n a l p ro g ram m e o f the ships and

unlcnovvxi n a tio n T’t f

re p o rts o f su rface and submarine (o/

- i c i d l e

th is area. It w as virtually in the

e x e r c is in g w ith

a n d b e fo re the second group of ships

n a n c e , th a ta llth o ® *}^^"^3rine h a d fin ish ed their periodic inainte-fo r a n y P a k is ta n

, P ^ ^ ad to b e d ep lo y ed to the WestCoas^^tocater

s ta te o f th e sh in

a c tiv ity . N eedless to say , therefore, t h e m a ^ '

'v a s b y n o m e ^ 'a T th

p ro p u lsio n system s were concert^j

w e fo rg o n e th e a n «

k ° P ^ ^ '

it p erh a p s could have been ha

th at th e anH<iiiK

.“ ^ m a rin e ex e rc ise . I h a v e no doubt, howev ,

sto o d

ca rrie d o u t w ith the submarm

P ro m

g o o d stead .

.

* ^ o w n th a t the P a t"^ f

P « o r to the end o f A u g u st,

n a n ce an d v ario n c *

f^®®t w as in K a ra ch i carrying out

g u st 1965, w h ile

th ro u g h o u t the m on ths o f July

h o m e port, Bom ha

C o a st. Being aw ay ftotn ^

m eag re m ain

sh ip s h ad to co n tin u e to m ake do ^ ‘th v

m an der

30.

'u j,D u t i t W ac

''^'-‘^•^^amirai) H.A. ^ a m *w / ^ ‘ -- -.ug

R e e t sh ip s w ere

f

Sep tem b er 1, I9 6 5 ^ a -

,

directives to t h ^ R lr ^ ® ^

to the W est C oast;

^

j

later.

° the H eet and C om m and s w ere issued two day

^ ' * ’« P a r a h « y S l . g ,

«

h a d a l r e a d v b

a p p a r e n t t o

p o U

t i c o - z n i i i t a r y o b se rv e rs that with

THE BLUNTED SCIMITAJ? / 423

thyam clouds having re c e d e d d u r in g th e la te r h a lf o f A u g u s t l 9 6 5 an d defencelinesalonfrthp-T

a s it w a s c o m m o n k n o w le d g e th a tP a k

ex

b o rd e r w e re b ein g re in fo rc e d , m a ssiv e

anny and th e a irfo rrp

a n d th e P ak fo rce s, e s p e c ia lly the

Kashmir and P u n ja b

in stra te g ic p o s itio n s in the

Air F o r c e a d 3 p f .T ^ '

th e b o rd e r. W h ile the In d ia n A rm y an d

^ a d v e n t u r e on fho

* m easxires to fo re sta ll a n y w ild lan d o r a ir

S o m a n

5

^ t ^ e P a k f o r c e s , th e N a v a l C h ief, V ice-A d m iral East Coast for

th e a u th o rities n o t to recall the H e e tfro m

the Government ^

^ th e A ra b ia n Sea fo rre a so n s b e stk n o w n

Pointinents in

several im p o rtan t ap-

^ p u ty Director

f

b e fo re h is retirem en t in 1981 an d w ho w as the

•J^arters in 1955°

the ran k o f C om m an d er a t N av al H ead-

^ 6ir fir^

o p eratio n s w ith their tanks in th eR a n n o fK a ch ch h w as will-Indieui territory and, w hat is m ore im portant, into

forces

the In d ian G overnm ent and the Indian Armed

a sudfi °

th ey w ou ld b e able to w ithstand the shocJc o f

^^sponse, I think, w as slow and probably

o p e r a t i

^act th at the A rm y thought it was only a side

n\ain

^

^

decoying our tank forces aw ay from the

® atreinto the G u jarat sector and they were n o t go in g to fall

j,

I

the Sum and substance o f the Indian response and one

uld take tw o view s on it: one, w e should have given them a fitting

J ^ w e r and if w e had done that, perhaps the September operation have materiali^Gd. Qntheotherhand, one can say that we

rt.

a

to their m anoeuvres and we kept our cool but

theoveraU e ffe c to fit w as that the P a k i s t a n i G eneralStaffthoughtthat the Indians had no fight left in them and thius they made a wrong assessm ent o f India's ability to fight and it was this wrong impression

'vhich fortified the haw ks in the PakA rm y to undertake muchlarger-scale operations in Septem ber 1965.

j

As the Deputy Director o f Personnel at Naval Headquarters at

that time, myjob was to make that our forces atsea were kept m ^

operaHonal state aU the time. The normal annual tum-around erf officers that took place in the N avy in March and Apnl o f every yrar had n o t been d o n e w ith a v ie w to n o t disturbing ^ e ^ J i p « o m p ^ «

(crews) which had been worked up (brought graduaUy into a state of

424 / blueprint TO BLUEW.'ATER

e ffic ie n c y ) to g e th e r fo r th e la s t 1 s rv,

.u

pomtments, both ashore and afloft^^rf

»».p.

W

T

‘ r '

anyTay^ “

i t p T O b a b l y ^ 'j u s ^ a '* ^ ^ i ^ ^ '^ “ wasover,werealisedihi

a g a in in th e i n t e r v L n r n ^ ^

u

“P

Junp a n d Ju Jy a n d it w ?

•

^

th e re a fte r th e w h o le th in g f l a r ^ 'u p

because very soon

N a v y w a s ^ n o t^ l^ n fT i? ^ * * l^ ^ f^ ®

th e op era don is that the Indian

en v isag e d b v Palf- ^

p ic tu re a s to the ex tent o f the operations

kn o w n ev en

''^ actio n to it. It h ad been quite well-

'v a s p Jan n in o

^he m ilita ry circ le s fo r so m e tim e that Pakistan

w ith a few «

o ffe n s iv e in th e Jam m u and Kashmir sector

h

r

N o rth e rn P u n ja b se cto r as weU.

d irectiv e w a ! k

P ^ ^ ^ t ^ h a t tim e th a t the Government of In<fia

Jam m u and R" - ^ P a k is ta n sta rte d a n y m ajo r operation in th^

the n laro rtf

reg io n , o u r re s p o n se w ou ld be to hit them baw

m ean an a ii ^

c h o o sin g in th e P u n jab sector which wouJ

o n lv th e A m «'^h'^^L^’^ * ^ ^ *® ^ ^ tu a tio n o f a n a l l - o u t war it was n w v o l v ^ ^ ^ ^

N a v y an d th e A ir F o rce as well that would

had g o n e ^ f K r x f

a ro u n d th e m id d le o f A u g u st

So m an , w ith w h o m l^

g iv e n h im m v v io

th e F le e t O p eratio n s Officcr, an

em barked J ^ ^ ® '^ '^ h ich w a s th a t th e In d ia n F leet at that ttfne w

'v ere b e in g c a r r w f r o u t i n e , that is to say , normal extf

®®"8al

w hich

the m o n so o n p eriod in the

. .

according to t h e p m ^ co m b in ed w ith a fe w goodwiU ^

forte

'v a s t i e d G r . a t C a £ . ° P ^ , "

th a ttim e , th e b u lk o f o u rs m ^

^ ^ o w e ^ k s ^ ';^ ,^ * - « t h i s f o r c e w a s t o b e r e c a U e d ,i t w

|heyw erelikeivto ^ ° " 8 e r to g et th em b ack to the W estCoast

^

ey, it w o tid

Il^ ereafter, h a v in g m ade such

^

necessary

o r 10 d ays for repleni-

*"8 force tiU aboj^

^^us th ese sh ip s w ou ld n o t become a gP

Admiral S o n ^ f ^ * 'r ® ® * '° f S e p t e m b e r .

^

of S taff C

^

% d b y ^

'

*^eneral T M

h ad been o v e f f u ^ ^ ,

‘*“ P o s i i ! r '^ ^ ° h a d s ,i i '! j- ^ u d h u r i , as the C h airxti^

jj,g

^

*he Indian

alteratio n s w ere ma^

giJed

Fleet, if the sh ip s w ere hurriedly

t h e BLUNTED SCIMITAR / 425

f t „

m

a

i c

u

t l a

a

n

d

s

e

n

l b

a

c

k

. o

B

o

m

b

a

y

, i l w

o

u

M

c

^

press and it w ould fo re w a rn th e P a k is ta n i

Armed Forces' k n o w led g e o f th e ir p la n s a n d h e

^ a s

would be severe - a cu rio u s lin e o f re a s o n in g b e c a u s K ash m ir

already planning the first a g g re ssiv e m o v e s in Ja m m u and and could not b e tin aw are th at w e w e re b o u n d to react.

I did not ttius q u ite se e th e lo g ic o f it b e c a i^ e

^

thp new s-

k n o w

l e d g e a n d i t w

a s s o m

e t h

i n

g b e i n g o p e n l y d is c u s s

papers. It was also c o m m o n k n o w led g e w h a t the P a k is ta n i

Government of Ind ia w o u ld b e in reg ard to p re v en tin g prim e

General Staff from m a k in g a n y ra sh d e c i s i o n to a t t a c

/ in n ro fo u r

Minister Shastri h ad rep eated a n u m b er o f tim es, on

e

Parliament a rv i ou tsid e, that t

h

®

^hlnk that

in Jarrunu and K ash m ir w o u ld b e v e ry severe. But

o

jgaction

the Pakistani G eneral S ta ff w as in a n y

/ I m p o s i t i o n o f the

would be a n d , w h a t is m ore, th ey w en t b y

o/Snrs o f P u n ja b

Indian Arm y and the In d ian A ir Force in the r e l^ a n ®

^

in a

and not b y that o f the Ind ian fleet b ecau se

ey

lirnited w ar the N av y w ou ld h av e a sm all pa

armoured

generally kr>own that the Ind ian

^°'^‘^®^ansferred inlarger

divisions, the f i g h t i n g f o r m a t i o n s ,e t c - h a d b ^ j^ ^ ^ ^ ^ p p g jt i o n num bers to P un jab. T h ey w ere in n od ou D tas

was and w hat our intentions w ere.

Committee was

But anyhow t h e C h a ir m a n o f the C h ie s

p je ,

able to p e r s u a d e V ice A d m ir a l

_ y c t 3 1 , 19 6 5 . A s H ^

h o w e v e r, c a lle d th e m b a c k r o u n d

around S e p t e n ^ e r

p re d ic te d , b y th e

re p a irs a n d

7, th e y n e e d e d a little m o r e tim e fo r

o th e r supplies and b y

m e n t a n d ta k in g o n a m m u m tio n o d ^ d

w ee k .

time they put to sea, the war h a d

^

T h e P ro s, C o n s an d P in p r ic k s

an o u t r i g h t victory

V V h ile a n a ly sin g th e c a u se so fIn c « a 's fa U ^ ^ 2 ^ ^ ^ ^

an d th e C h L m l n o f th e C h i e f s o f S ta ffC o im m ^ ^

Years mth the lAF,

an d th e A ir F o r c e , A ir C h ie f

'

IS fairly censorious of Genera

^ because it was la ter

said b y General C h a u ^

Kashnur.If so,necu

426 / blu eprin t TO BLUEWATER

p o ssib n if?

h e d is c u s s e d th e pros and cons of this

(C h av an ?

M in iste r an d the Defence Minsiter

1

c

^

n e c e s s a r y s a n c tio n w as obtained', though

in f

y 'O ^ 'v h a t is n o t c le a r . S o m e tim e later, the Air Chief was also o m e d w w h a t w a s g o in g o n . T h is w a s d on e through informal rro m w h ic h th e N a v a l C h ie f w a s excluded 'for theNav/s ro e d id n o t lo o k lik e b e in g a v e r y b ig o n e '. T o ensure security, the g e n e r a l a p p lie d th e 'n e e d to k n o w ' y a rd stic k so thoroughly that the e s o f S ta ff C o m m itte e a n d th e jo in t intelligence and planning s a w e re c o m p le te ly b y p a s s e d . N o c o n t i n g e n c y plans w ere drafted, n o r w e re th e th re e S e rv ic e s a s k e d to d e fin e the parts that they would have to play ir\ the event o f a war.

..

Gen C h a u d h u r i s p e a k s w ith sa tisfa ctio n o f t h e freedom wi w

^

c h

v i e

w

s w

e r e e x p

r e s s e d

at his informal meetings w i t h t h e

M in ister an d th e D e fe n c e M in iste e r, an d th e sp eed with whidi t h

r o u

g

h

c l e a

r l y f r o m

h i s s t a t e m

e n t s

nftv.

*

^

' ' '

° *

®

h

i i s i n

e

s s a s h

i s p

e r s o n

a l

a f f a i r , o r a t a n y r a

alo n e , w ith th e A ir F o rc e a s a p assiv e spectator an

th e b a s ic con cep ts

j| j,0

b etter

*hat g ro w s o u t o f the b elief

p e n d e n c e d

t h i s d i s e a s e c a n

b e t r a c e d t o p

o f a l l

C

h

i e

f w

a s a l s o C o n u n a n d e r ' i n

A rm ed Forces in In d ia.

c o - o p e r a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y a t t h e l e v e

= ^ t a f f C o m

n u t t e e ,

/ J

r C h i e f M

a r s h

a l L

a i s a y s ,

j

sh ow n th at n o m a tte r h o w able or

o u t *

G e n eral C h au d h u n >vas

Plaru^nT

- h e co u ld n o t ex p ect

Com m ittee, and

b e carried o u t th ro u g h the

N av y an d the A ir F o rfe m u st be tak^thei^

and

be given the op p o rtu n ity to contribute

three w

m igh t h a v e been ve^r

^'^ever, the wa^

suffered, L

A rm y perhaps

^

a turning point in m ilitary t h « J ^ »

THE BLUN TED SCIM ITAK / 4 2 7

prepare^ess, for it brought o u t the shortages and deficiencies to be madegood inorganisation and procedu res and in term s o f equipm ent and resources.

^ ^

the M o

been com m itting violations o f

of

the sum m er monehs o f 1965 and th=

week of

increased further during the first

crossing the

^ ^

num ber o f arm ed infiltrators

peaceful efforts

I^ s h m ir o n A u g u sts. In spite o f continued

IndianArmvhadr'f'"u

the situation soon aggravated and the

points of jfiggg j^^^®P^®'^®^^'^®^easuresinKasihmir to plug the entry

'vhichfailed^o^^^'-

w ith its subversive activities in Kashm ir

3ffack with a

objective, Pakistan launched a massive

^ a rn b S e c t

against India across the international border in the

‘^Armyand°^

tihe Pakistan Air Force supporting

^dian Air P

out strike m issions against Indian Army units. The

launch

^ d , therefore, to extend suitable air cover to the Army

®P3ce. SincpP^t^^^°^

prevent Pak aircraft from intruding into our air

^^3chi be'

^^^''^^®^®Jyt06^tendthewartotheArabianSeaasweil,

initiate

^^smain naval base, the Indian Naval authorities decided

Fleet

action to prepare against such an attack and ordered

■ ^ 'In d ia n F le e ,

A t t h i s H

Mavv ■ 7]®' ‘^o^equent to the Govemment's decision not to commit the Opera f-°

conflict and its stated desire not to allow the land and air

aj] aj_

escalate to a full-scale war, the Heet tvas in a dispersed state Were ^

country's seaboard. At VIshakhapatnam on the east coast

(2q

orily capital ships in an operational state, Alysorc (Captain, later M

Mehta), along witti the destroyer, Jianyt/ (Commander

kjj

three antisubmarine frigates of the 14th Frigate Squadron,

(Captain, later Vice Admiral, R-K.S. Ghandhi),Jiri>77fl« (Commander, rer Rear Admiral, D.S.Paintal) and Ji^utfiar(Commander, later Captain,

“ D . L a w

) , a n d t h e s e a w

a r d d e f e n c e b o a t , 4 / a y ( L i e u t e n a n t , l a t e r L i e u t e n -

C

o m

m

a n d e r , S . J . N

a g r a n i ) . T h e t w

o a n t i a i r c r a f t f n g a t e s , B m

A m

a p u / r a

^aptain,later Rear Admiral, KirpalSingh) and Beas (Commander R.N. Das

^upta), were at Calcutta. Bombay had the 'R' class destroyer, Rajput (Captain, laterCommodore, B.R. Kapoor), the frigate, Kistm {C om m ander J - N

. M

a i t r a ) , t h e c o n v e r t e d s u r v e y s h i p , ( C

o m

m

a n d e r C . G

. F r a n c i s ) ,

( a l l t h r e e o f W

o r l d W

a r n v i n t a g e ) a n d t h e h e l i c o p t e r - c a n y i n g s u r v e y s h i p .

428 / b l u e p r i n t TO BLU EW A TER

D arshak (C ap tain , la ter R e a r A d m iral, D .C . Kapoor) all of whirh G o 2 r i

essenUal repairs. The two Hunt class <16511,3

T '

C L. S ach d ev ), had been positioned.,

fx • *

n av al d efen ce w h ile the tw o minesweepers, Cammri

T

C o m m an d er B. D an iel) and

(LieutenantCommarrier

i-ii. Lam ba), w ere a t G oa.

F ive m ajo r ship s in clu d in g tw o cap ital ships, one general purpose gate, one an tiaircraft frig ate an d o n e d estroyer - ViJbanJ ('Captain,later V .A . K am ath ), D elhi (C ap tain , later Commodore, PC

rew s), Trishul (C ap tain , later C om m o d ore, Inder Singh), Betwa (Comm ander G N an d y Sin gh ) a n d R a m (C o m m a n d e r, la ter Captain, M.N.Mulla)

-w e re undergoing exten d ed refit at the N av al D o ck y a rd , Bombay-Tfliawr (C om m ander, later C on u n o d o re, V .A . D hareshw ar), the other general purpose frigate, had been carry in g out essential m aintenance in Bom ay d u r in g A ugust 1965 b u t h a d to b e h u rried ly boxed up and sent formves^

gating the presence o f p ossible e n e m y v e s s e l s i n the Kori C reeM ®

es south-w est o f the In d o-P ak bord er in the Rann of Kachchh, rs ugust 12, w hen she rem ained o n task for five days, and once aga August 24.

thp 7 ^ ^

Creek report turned out to be a 'red herring' and

sensorsw h

K ^ operational

west H r ,

required to carry out a b a r r i e r patrol off

advanrp°

Kathiaw ar C oast (30 t o 8 0 m i l e s w est of Okha)

^ gju

t'urriedlvbnmK

J'^ g ^ s e d as m erchant ships,

hadf^f

^ u p e S r

tow n and escaped, Talrvar,

nuisance

c o u

l d

h

a v e ea sily neu

^ g p a i r s

to her machinery

3 ° m iles aw ay, carrying

’R eiv ed a n v n !^ ” ^ d v u rtu ally becom e tors

C

O

j had t*’®

been

the> Pak N avy's in ten tio ^ a

ending.

^ '®tional,the Dwarka incident m ight have had a

Pakicf

ucpcto^®*'

^ptem ber i,

* m assive attack in the Chhann

return to

in the Bay o f Bengal were

^ -^ th a p a t n a ^ ^ - J ^ a y . Mysore,

K h u l i and

despatch.

S J e V

B o m h T ^ '

defects in her propulsion W'® bailed

All s h i 7 “^“ 7iBea5,w W chw ereinCalcutta,ab^^^^^^

fuel at Cochin o n Septem ber 5

t h

e

B L U N T E D S C IM IT A R

/ 429

exp ected to reach Bom bay b y S e p te m b e r 7 .

w e r e ^workinig

Seahawk aircraftof the No. 300 N ava

A ir

up'at Jamnagar and w erep laced

en em y . A llN a v a la ir

Force onSeptember 2 for offensive actio n

^

310 A lize an tisu b -

squadroas - the No, 300 Seahaw k fighter

squ ad ron and

I t e a t o a f ,s q u a d r o n , No. 550S e a h a w k a n d ^ e t « ^ f ’ „ e c o n n a is -

No. 551 Kiran jet trainer squadron -w e re rnade o p e seaports,

sance and antishipping roles and for the

o p e ra tio n a l, the

Since a large number o f ships w ere still to

.Q cp eed u p the re fit

N

a v a l D

o c k y a r d a u t h o r i t i e s a t B

o m

b a y w

e r e i n s t r u

r n

m

m

a n

d

s i n i -

.f W ta t, M M , B e tm ,R an a a n d T n shut w hile the N aval C o n m a n tiated local defence m easures for the ports in their a r e ^ -

jj^dicated

Intelligence on the disposition o f the

have been

ttiat the Pak submarine Ghazi w as at sea and w as i X

^

deployed off Bom bay for an tish ip p in g

^ ^ i n e t o i t s an ch o r-

IJGen proceeding to sea ev ery day fo r ex ercises an d re

3ge in the evening.

Rehim to th e A r e n a

K u th ar,

^ Septembers Ml/sore, accom panied by

_p ^ e r e was no lik ^

r e a c h e d C

o c h i n , r e f u e l l e d a n d s a i l e d f o r B

o m

b a y - -

^ iO A l i z e a n t i -

^

o o d

o f V i T c r a j i t b e i n g a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e o p e r a t i o i ^ /

t h e F l a g O

f f i c e r

^bmarine aircraft squadron was deployed

instructions had been

Commanding the In d ian fleet- Although s t ^ t

outside our

receivei. ;rom the Government not ^ see

Pak subma-

*®rritorial waters, all ships were directed to

whenever they were detected.

H

n n a l b o r d e r betw een

^

The Indi;,n A r m v crossed the

f o

r e s t a l l f u

i ^

r

P » l*ta „ i„ ,h e U h o r ^ S e c to r in P u n ja b o n S « p .e m ^ ^ ^

fakistani intrusions into Indian t e m t o r y ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ jjg jj Kal

^ t h i s area.T^e I n d i a n ^ F o r ^ a s a U o ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

l^'closeco-operation w ithout Army

jj^gsame

“^tallations and targets in

^je a signal at 1030

to aU

of the Naval Staff, cor\sequerUly

directive to its

* ^ jth Pakis*^”

<iay, based on an Army

that war had

neutraUsing any

r'aval units and f o r m a tionss

g^jjately adopted

issued by the

and all measures were to ®

navy. A

Indian intellig®^^

m

i s a d v e n t u r e o n t h e p a r t o

i n t e r c e p t e b y

^

g c u

t e

Pakistan Naval H ea^ u arte^ ^

naval

agencies, had o rd er^

Respon«rwhichapparenUy rei

i s s u e d t o t h e P a k u x i i

V k e a h

th e

G o v e r n m e n t o f fo n '’ ? ' ' ' ® “ “ " 8 lii S^SSSS S."X:7S ‘■•FSt

S

a c t io n a t ^

1 T

m

S t f o ^ ' r -

a c t i o n a n d t o d e f e n n

* ° co n / m e th em < il?

"

W h ile th^

^ ^ ® ^ e i v e s i f a n d w h

being prepared for

c le s p a t c lf ln ^ ^ T .

^ e H e e t

by Pak naval units,

Santa C rui' a-

®hips w ere on o afro i cc d

to Bombaywifh

W ith the

carry in g o u t anH«; k

AJizes from the

h u n tin g

o f the iVo D o?t;^ ^ ^ ^ '^ ^ search es ahead oftheFleet

p r o v J d y jp ,'^ ? ’

ships each at

^^g^enting its offensive

keep c ’ear ?

A l l J n r f ^ ° ^ ' C n d iin and Vishakhapatnam,

issupH *f-

^^kistani cnaQt

nierchant ships were ordered to

r e t a l i a f ^^*^

'd e te n tio n n f

^ ,

w a te r s . O rders were

b y p a l d ^ ^ ^ ^

d e te n tio n nf^r

m e r c h a n t sliip s in harbour in

S .

o f In dian m e r c h a n t sh ip s in Pakistani ports

,

O n th is d a v a ll

■

P ro c e e d e d ^ ^ ^ c o ^

le ft K a ra ch i h a r b o u r at 0900

a irc ra ff

^ ” ^ s s i v e a t ta r t^

e v e n in g , th e P akistan Air Force

d eD lo v I^ *'^ *'^ ® *'o ^ S ea h a M 1-° ^ Ja m n a g a r a i r f i e l d w h e r e , besides, Iaj*

a w ^ v l

300 squadron had beer.

W as s h .i” ^-

VaJsura, w as o n ly a few kilometres

iV aval

o n t h e n

b u t d id n o t s u ffe r an y damage-

> a d r o n U e 2 '° ^ '^ ® ^ “ ^ " " d i n g O ffic e r o f t h e ^ f P » l« S ’t h ^

P ii^ t

C o m m a n d e r (la te r R e a r Admiral) R -J'

! l a ! = r C a p t a M ) l N G h o s h a n ^ ^ "

an d

•continued h i s u f f e r e d f ° “ '

‘'=n«Se though several I "

"^ eh to f& i?'’° " '‘> Ia m n a S ^ .“®' ®'-^ damage. Pakistani B-57bo»»

.

^ " f* e I A F s ta tio n throughoot

t h e s n ^ l ^ ^ ^ w k air^

i r

a t d a w n .

^ d i n in p m p o 3 g

« f t o f th e N a v y h a d b e e n tak en to J f

o f a c t i o n

i s o n i^

t h e h i g h - p o w e r r a d a r i n s t ^ l l a

^ 0 n a u tic ^ Ir S ile s aw ay irom / arr^ ^ ^ ^ '

^

8

h

t

,

“ "*^ »"ock etsan d b o m b s,w ereb estsu i

S e p ? e r n ^ f ^ k s and o n e a.v

.

Goa

P 'a c e d u n d e r the

"'P^eparaKo^Tf

u ^

2 7 sortiesJ^ ’J

P®‘"®tional confJ^*^

B ad in w h en th®/

‘Control of the Western Air Coirun^^

TH E BLU N TED SCIM ITAR / 431

adopted the im m ediate state o f read in ess on S ep tem b er 5.

Jamnagar A tta ck e d

The strike on the Badin rad ai in sta lla tio n had b een scheduled to be launched at davm on Sep tem b ar 7 H o w ev er, as m entioned earlier, at 1920

hours the previous even in g, eig h t B -57 b o m bers o f the Pakistan A ir Force aimched a sustained all-iu gh t a tta ck o n Jam n ag ar during w hich one Bomber, while on a low ru n o v er the airfield w as shot dow n, seconds a ter dropping several bo m b s. In its h u rry to escape the ground flak it also ropped two seven shot U S -m ad e H oneycom b rocket launchers near the ea 3vvk aircraft parked on th e tarm ac. T hese have since been preserved souvenirs of the P ak a tta ck o n targets o f no m ilitary significance.

Since som e o f the g rou n d installation s including the air traffic control tower at Jam n ag ar h ad been dam aged and the air defence of ombay needed to be streng then ed im m ediately, the strike on Badin on eptember 7 w as abandoned and all nine aircraft returned to Bombay to J ' ° ' ' '

^

d

a w

n

- t o - d

u

s k

c o m

b

a t a i r p

a t r o l a n d o p e r a t i o n a l s o r t i e s u

n

h

i d

e

ndof the hostilities. N ightp atrollin gsortiesw ereprovid ed byA h zeaicra ombay, Jam nagar, G oa, C ochin and at som e places m

^

^^pportof th e A rm y o p e ra tio n s. T o qu o te a senior pilot of o n e of^^e quadrons, 'VVhile one o f our aircraft ^ a s s p ^ a U m g upwa

^disclosed tactical area in Punjab to a height o f °^ er 1 5 , 0 OT ^

the P akistanis to use

t j o n

a t t h

e a i r w

o r k

c r a f t w

a s b

e i n

g r u

s h

e d

t h

r o u

g h

a n

e m

e r g

e n

c y

i ^

p

w

a s b u s y

h a n g a r s a t B

o m

b

a y ;

w

h

i l e o n

e o f

o u

r

a p e n l i g h t t o r c h ,

a l e t t e r h

o m

e d

u

r i n g a s h o r t r e s p i t e ,

d efen ce

° t e l l h i s m o t h e r h o w p r o u d h e f e l t t o b e a n i n ^

aircraft b a t t e r i e s

a p p a r a h o s , h i s C

o c h

i n

c o u

n

t e r p a r t w

a s r e m

o v i n g

w

e r e

‘ 0 d e s p a t c h t h

e m

t o B om b ay fo r i m m e d i a t e r e p a

o t h e r s

a w

a i t i r ^ g th eir tu rn t o ta k e o f f a t t h e b r i e f i n g r e c o n n a i s s a n c e

t a k

i n

g o f f o n

a ' n

o - U

g h

t s ' r u

n

w

a y

a t

J

i t s e W

^

a n t i s u b m

a r i n e s o r t i e s .

T h e

o n , f l y i n g t h r o u g h d

^

k

d e b r i e f i n g

c o n

t i n

u

e d

c e a s e l e s s l y a n

s e a r c h f o r

t h e

« n d d

a w

S ,

d

a y a n

d

n i g h t , i n a

sleep y ,

i i e S

s p i r i t s w

e r e s k y - h i g h a n

d

a n y

o n

^

W

i n k s u n d e r a n

a i r c r a f t

'

n

y com prom ise o n * a t ^ ^ a ^ ^ ^

s i o n w

a s c l e a r a n d

w

r / v

e r c o u

l d

.

o A l y

d

i s c h

a r g e d

o u

r d

u

t i e s a s b

t e r r i t o

undertook s o m e

s e e m

e d , p

r e f e r r e d t o r e m

^

a s

, n^arka in w h i c h t h e

tim e t i ;e % a r e d choos^f^,^°;

kabaddi-type o f b o m b a r d m e

432 / b l u e p r i n t TO BLUEW ATER

issrsssrssrjs"-”*--

On Task

Mysore

operation al defects were rectified,

accomt>anipd h

C om m an d in g the Indian Fleet on boardand

b e fo re ^ P h ffa iirt,

R a m a n d Betwa, sailed out of Bombay

possible f t t V

c

d efen siv e p atrol outside the harbour as a

p o ssib lea tta ck o n B o m b a y that n ig h t h ad b een indicated byir^teUigence.

defenrp

naval aircraft had been pressed irUo service for the air

A lize's

at

W estem s e a b o a rd -s ix Seahawks and three

rernnna;oc

Liberator

and

Super-constellation maritime

searchp<!

Indian A ir F orce were also deployed for

Bom bav a

^

lim its o f coverage o f the A lize's in the sea areas off

M aharashtra and G ujarat.

, ,

C oast a r r iJlH ^ «

w hich had had a breakdown o n the East

which had

foUowed a day later by B r a h m a p u t r a and Beas-

O " S e p te m b e r ^ W h le on

hours about 45 milp

picked up a subm arine contact a

-

out, fo llo w p H ^

A n urgent attackhad been c a r ^

thereafter the

‘deliberate attack som e 25 minutes later but sc^

q u e n tiy c a ^ L T .'.^ ^ '

^ o s t T h e records a n d analysis

though no siens

that this m ay well have been a sub

after the attack A m

the subm arine w ere visible on the ^

t^ontact twice at Osnn^K

SSJalaveera, a l s o h a d a disappearing

^

miles west of the

^

hours tlie sam e day at a

^ a

submarine in the annr

thus confirm ing the pies

.

X h h i ? ? ® "

^ ^ "'b ay .

„ . of

Saurashtra in August

for barrier patrol off

{,elng

i m x n o b i S h i "^ '^ '^ ^ ‘^ h a d ta k e n re h ig e at O k h a a f t e r ^

managed to c a r r J

i n h

e r p r o p u l s i o n ^ ^ ^

wh-^

8 and r e a r t L l° ^ essential repairs and sailed h orn j-,y

^ ^ c h was on passage

"dom ing o f S e p t e r ^ b ^ ^

Port B l a i r \ ^ d ^ S w e t t e n h a m i n M a l a y s i a w a s d i r ^ ^

S h a r a i j t i

^ c o b a r I s l a n d

patrols in the sea areas

gnd

P fsons, including the sh ip 's creW an

THE BLUNTED SCIM ITAR / 433

w ere L n tem ed . T h e sh ip , w h ic h h a d arriv ed a fe w making u n o re d i^ w

P *^ ^ o se o f lo a d in g m a n g a n e se ore, h a d b e e n

^laviourwas susmri o’L

"

^

^

h a rb o u r and ev e n its cre w 's be-

intent, she could

a p p re cia te d th at i f the sh ip h ad an y evil

^nungba3i ^ ; ' L ^

^^e h a rb o u r to b lock the

thus bottle roThp !>

^

en tran ce channel and

'“ val instaJjflHr.no

S h e co u ld ev en d am ag e v ital h arb o u r and

Under the n"

co n sid era b le p o ten tial fo r sabotage,

modore (JatPr

j°*^ *^ °^ ^ *'o lo f the C o m m o d o re E a st C oast, C om -

w a s a s s ie r ^ d m iral) D. S t. J. C am ero n , a seaw ard d efen ceb o at, 7,000-ton P a k i ^ -

clo sely m o n ito rin g the activities o f the

Arbour imde

"^^^'chantman w h ich w as so on m ov ed to the outer thprlic«l>.if

kep t under surveillance

D u r in e T 'fi^

P akistan i crew ,

t^usbeen so ^

o f h ostilities, the ships o f the Indian Fleet had

"''th O p e r a e x p o s e d to P ak air, su rface and subsurface threats

^esides^

trjo n g to reach vantage points w ith f u l l d i s p a t c h .

'^“^ g w h ic h * ^

aw ay from the base ports fo r well over two months

^^®amine in *h

rnain bulk o f the Fleet liad been involved in s us tained

'"Squiring n ^

o f Bengal, m ost o f the ships had developed d e f e c t s

^ y s o r e ^

dockyard attention. To m ention som e of these d e f e c t s , reduced fr

boilers functioning, had h er m axim um s p e e d

d o is^

° ” ^31 ^ o t s to 18 knots, B r a h m a p u t r a , B e a s a n d B e t w a c o u l d o i d y hadbeen

their rated speed w as 25 knots, R a j p u t a n d R a t m , which Only

hurriedly brought out t o s e a , had

'^hatso

operational, B etz i^ a was a t sea without any trials and

undergone a long and extensive refit, a n d K h u k r i

• i n a r w ere unable to sail.

R aid o n D w ark a

to ^ ® ” ^oned earlier, ow ing to the embargo on the ships of

o f t h e l a t i h i d e o f P o r b a n d e r a n d the im m obilisatioriof

'• *«ratO kh ad u eto engine trouble, P a k ista n Naval forces sneak raid on Dwarka o n the night o f September 7/8.

“

P'°verbial blot on the Indian N avy's e s c u t c h e o n as such raids c o u l ^

been possible ifth e N a v y had b e e n permitted to operate accorfing plans w hich, at that time, were, first,

o u t s w a p s o f f

'^estcoastofP akistanto d i s r u p t t h e p o r t of Karachi and mflict v itald am ap port installaitons (as was done Jater in 1 9 7 1 ) , i f o r d e r e d , next, the

‘^ ® s tV H S S a ^ ta n n a v a lfo « e s ,./ .r r f^ .A th ir d p n >

^'ipport for the defence of the major ports on the west coast, and, fourth.

434 / BLUEPRIN T TO BLUEW ATER

p ro v is io n o f g e n e ra l c o v e r a n d p ro te c tio n to o u r m erchant ships in the A ra b ia n S e a , e s p e c ia lly th o s e p ly in g to a n d fro m the Persian Gulf and the R e d S e a . H a d th e In d ia n F le e t b e e n d e p lo y e d as it sh ou ld have been, ships o f th e P a k F le e t w o u ld n e v e r h a v e v e n tu re d o u t o f K arachi harbour (as h a p p e n e d in 1971) a n d a n a tta c k , o n ly fo r p ro p ag an d a purposes, on a te m p le to w n w ith n o d e fe n c e e s ta b lish rn e n t an d o f no strategic or tactical im p o rta n c e w o u ld n e v e r h a v e ta k e n p la c e . I t w as not surprising, th erefo re, th a t w h ile th e o n ly casu alt> ' o f th e atta ck on Dwarka by a P a k ista n i 'a r m a d a ' w a s a c o w w h ic h w a s g ra z in g o n the beach and whi^

'm a d e th e su p rem e sa crifice in d e fe n c e o f th e t e m p l e s ' . Pakistan derived co n sid erab le p ro p ag an d a le v e ra g e fro m th e in c id e n t w h ich was its very p u rp o se.

.

,

V ice-A d m ira l N . K ris h n a n w h o , a s th e F la g O fficer Cominanding^^

C h ief of the E a stern N a v a l C o m m a n d , c o v e re d h im se lf w ith glory u the 1971 In d o -P a k cor\flirt, h ad th is to s a y o n th e restrictioi^s impos th e N a v y d u rin g the 1965 o p e ra tio n s.

P erh ap s it w a s a p o litical d e c isio n n o t to u se th e N a v y in *e w a r^ ^ ^

w h en an en em y said , 'D elh i c h a lo ', th e H e e t's b e e n an u n am b ig u o u s 'K a ra c h i c h a lo '. I m a y b e w ron g, r

a w eap o n h on ed and read y an d th e p o l i t i c a l d ecisio n is n o t u se it again st a n en em y a t w a r, m y o n l y co n clu sio n m y Government has n ot enoughconfidence in that weapon to

n o tk n o w n . As itw a s , the P ak istan is bom barded D w a rta w

^ undefended p ort and g o t aw ay. O n e o f o u r frig ates,

-pvfcattle'

O kh a.Itisu rv fortu n ate that sh e co u ld n o t sally f o r * arid ®

E ven if there w as a m an d ate ag ain st th e N a v y participatin g

if

no G overnm ent w ould b lam e a m a n -o f-w a r goin g into ^

^

attacked. A n affron t to n u rn atio n al p restig e an d h o n o u r is n o j

^

w e c a m o t lau gh it aw ay b y saying, 'A ll the P akistan is did W

a cow • t-et us atleast erect a m em orial to the 'u n k n o w n coW W

w ith her hooves on in a battle a g a i n s t ttie Pakistan N avy-

■ ' 0 >-

ep ijo d e is best described in the w ord s o f

and visible from tho K

f

^ g h th o u se, v ery clo se to th

g p g B i

duty in the lighthouse w h i ^ L ° T ' At that time I w as on m

6

u u ie w n ich is ck)se to the A ir Force base.

t h e BLUNTED SCIMrTAR / 435

maintained from

^

^ as

I used to carry mess^ a e

^

During tihP

P ’ ?

lighthouse to the Air Force base.

*^D w arka tow n.

yet tobeestablishpH a t n ^ / w ^^ ''® ^ ^ ^ P “ *P ° rta s a n a v a Ib a s e w a s Indian N a w w o

? ?

H o w ev er, a smaU group o f cadets f r o m

* e town lih ralT h ®J'®^*^honed a t O kha, h av in g accom m odation in

^as statio n ed af

®

C om m an d er in charge o f the group

At this H

E u ro p ea n G u est H ouse,

police used 7 ^ ' the A ir F orce, H om e Guards and the JocaJ

stated, the '

^ ’^“ 'ts m r e g u Ja r p atrollin g on the beach. As already Was diffir .

sh ip s arrived at low tide in the evening and it

Matter wa^ ■

^*^^tify the n ation ality o f the vessel. H o w e v e r , t h e A

s ^iTunediately rep orted to the A ir Force base a t D t v a r k a .

s t a r t e d h o u r s , during high tide, the v e s s e l s suddenly than m ain tem ple o f CKvarka w hich lasted for more

^hich

D u rin g this period the ship f i r e d around 50 shells By(

'^dedsom e 5.25-in ch rounds f i r e d b y t h e P a k c r u i s e r B a b u r .

t®niDl

uriknow n reasons, m ost o f the shells f e l l between the awav

railw ay station , w hich i s around three k i l o m e t r e s thouoK

* e lighthouse. /There was no damage to any b u i l d i n g , sih t

®

so m e dam age to t h e R a i l w a y G u e s t H o u s e M a ?

railw ay station. The twentieth-century a v a l a r s o f

■ ^ u d o f Ghazru had failed in their mission.

N early aU the sheUs fell where the s o i l was s o f t and they g a i n e d unexploded. Theseshells w e r e la ter collected by the Home gu ard s, the local police and Air Force men and brought to the

^orcebase. O ut o f them about 35 to 4 0 w e r e u n e x p l o d e d b v e s h e l l s .

With ? 1 ? PaW stani navalauthorities must

N ^ ^ ^ ' ^ J e d g e o f t h e Indian G o v e r r ^ e n t ^

navah*

w e ^ ^ w a n o f T a / m r ' s p r e s e n c e a t

If encountered at sea.

^

f ^ t y o f s o m e l n d i a n n a v a l

a sneak r a i d so c l o s e t o

o u t e s s e n t i a l r e p a i r s o n t h e n i g h t o f

-

H

a d Talwar, w h i c h

n o r t h

o f

Dwarka,

b e e n

^ P t e m

b e r 7 / 8 , a t O kha,

s t e a m

e d o u t o f O

k h a a n d p u t p a i d

t o

, ^ ® ' ^ a t > o n a l , s h e c o u l d e a s u y '

T a lw a r's r a d a r - c o n t r o l l e d a u t o m a t i c

^ Pak Fleet's

^

^

' '

a t i i i g

t w

o r a p i d - f i r e g u n s , e a c h

c a p a b l e o f

f '

^

e r y

c o n t r o l s y s t e m

° P

. ^ g 4 3 . | n c h s h e l l s p e r m

i n u t e a n d h e r s p e e d

15 long-rangeWgh-exp

436 / BLU EPRIN T TO BLU EW ATER

of o v er 3 0 k n o ts w o u ld h a v e easily n eu tralised the threat from the Pak w arsh ip s all o f w h ic h vi^ere o f W o rld W ar II vintage and had inferior speed and firep ow er. R ecalls C o m m o d o re Y .P . M alik, w ho was serving onboard the T alw ar as a L ieu ten an t d u rin g the 1965 conflict, P rior to the o u tb reak o f h o stilities, Tfltoflr, a n e w l y acquired multip u rpose frigate, w as deployed o n barrier patrol off the Indo-Pak m aritim e bou n d ary . Thp b asic p u rp o se o f t h e p a t r o l was to detect the m ovem ent o f P akistan i N av al u nits and report it to t h e Indian Nava C om m and. It w as also in ten d ed to investigate Pakistani found fishing in o u r w aters to find o u t if an y o f them were

^

e sp io n a g eo rw ereo p era tin g a ssa b o teu rs. T h esh ip carried ou t F

trol on tw o occasions f o r a few days each,

second period th at th e sh ip d e v e lo p e d m ajor defects started running out o f feed w ater. She, therefore, enter harbour to rectify these d efects and to em bark feed

J!,bothby

deployment. The rectification of these defects was attendea the ship's staff and b y som e lo cal ship repair

assistance o f the Okha P ort A uthority. S o m e of t h e s e civ attended to this w ork o n b o ard w ere believed t o have e x r sympathies.

iHeadqu^^'

It w as at this juncture that a flash signal from Nava

ters w as received stating th atP ak istan had d e c l a r e d hosti I n d i a . O n receip t o f this sigr\al i m m e d i a t e s c r e e n i n g o on

working onboard w as started to p r e v e n t any a t t e m p t s rnout®*"'!

board. A l t h o u g h no orders w ere r e c e i v e d by the ship/

^

was inade to make the ship operational b y the ship's s t a r r -

a kmd of anxiety in the m hid of the ship's C on u tiand ^J

C j t a m (later Conmiodore) V . A . D hareshw ar, due to

aIw arw astheonlyfightingunitleftontheW estC oast,all

operational h a v i n g ju s t r e t ^ e ^ ^ a ja l^

of ste.m in g in the Bay o f 4 n g a l-

i n c o n u n u n i c a t i n g

th e n ig lS s d u e to anarnalous ^

could thus

conditionsprevailinginthata

h ad to be in v ariab ly

Close to th l’p a S i J ^ ^ ' ^ i d e r e d com promised and s ^ j of Navy.

'waters and totaUy isolated from

THE BLUNTED SCIM rrAR / 437

At about 1700 h o u rs o n S e p te m b e r 7, the

message on P ak istan N a v y b ro a d c a st ad c^ essed

o

call-signs. T h ereafter a re g u la r sig n a l traffic

g^ips

and the Pakistan N a v y b ro a d c a st w a s in tercep te -

/ n n n n ta s k fo r

were heardc o m m u n ic a tin g in p la in la u n g u a g e sa y in g , repetitions. 1 s h a U p a s s you by ligh t', this clearly

four Pakistani r u v a l sh ip s h ad b e e n p u t to sea.

P

(directions from w h ic h th e se sig n als w ere

at about

vessels in dicated th at th ey ^^^re d raw in g l e ^

^ ^ ^ ^ ^

1900hours, the b earin g s started d raw ing

^

about 2030

units were carryin g o u t p atrollin g ou tsid e

.

A t about

hours the in tercep t b ea rin g s o f th ese ships rapi ^ ^ j^gtations'w as 2200hours they w ere fou n d to b e a b ea m o f O kna.

^.oncluded that

sounded o n b o a rd th e Talwarat

ju n ctu re as i

the attack m ay w ell b e aim ed at the

harbour and engage

known to the en em y. H o w ev er, no effort to ® .

g^j^^ar due to the

these ships cou ld b e m ad e by C aptain

jj^jgrcept bearings

material state o f the ship. T o our

not the target of

continued to draw left and w e knew th a tu w

^.gceived a m e ssa ^

th e P a k H e e t. H o w ev er, an

was being

from the O kha P ort au thorities that J J l l c e on board c o n f ^ ^ e d ^

P a k i s t a n i n a v a l v e s s e l s . A f e w s e c o n d s

, 3 ^ 7 heard- The C u r i n g

as

s o » .d o f t e gun.

on

^

Officer also claim ed that the 4 3

ships due

effectively engage the fotu: Pakis ^

i n n o state to

o

weapon co n tro lfy s te m but the

^ choosing thezr

result, the four Pakistani units na

Headqua»>

8 a signal from Naval

O n the morning of

g^aate the

cficet oftheship/

ters directed the

by the P a k i s t a n i v e s s e l s . I/ 3C

P

p ro ceed ^ tactics used by * e

Lieutenant (later Captain) J - P ^ e ? t y and ^

3

^ p^arka

the possible dam age to tad

to

Pakistani warships. A ft^^P^sels had

.^aU, dxopp^

learnt that * e F a k » s t « J ^ J 5h ip s .^ ^ ^ ^ * e U g h t h o u s e ^ ^^^

D

w

a r k a d isgu ised as , 3 nautical

^ darkness ‘J” . j^ jf a n

anchor w ithin a ^ ^ ^ ,

g ^ v er^

I r w w S w S

opened fire at

^ d aii«

green flares ^

^ attacks.

=

The s S

hips £

§:S-“"S~"==-“

4 3 8 / b l u e p r i n t T O B L U E W A T E R

o f v r .

>»«>-

g

v a rio u s ra ilw a y w a g o n s . T h e air attack resulted in slight a m a g e to th e ra ilw a y e n g in e an d a sm all porrion of the roof of tlie a i w a y j u e s t H o u s e w a s b lo w n off. N o substantial damage was ca u se d b y th e sh ip s as D w a rk a to w n w as darkened at that moment an d m o s t o f th e sh e lls fro m th e sh ip s, w hich strangely failed to ex p lo d e , la n d ed in a n o p e n sp a ce o n the beach. Theonlycasualityof th is s h e llin g w a s a n o ld w o m a n w h o lo st a finger due to a hit by a sh rap n el.

T h e sh ip in th e m e a n tim e receiv ed orders to return to Bomhay.

H o w ev er, in th e m o rn in g , a n u m b e r o f telephone calls and a couplfi o f teleg ram s w ere re ce iv e d b y th e ship , w arnin g the ship that the Paiu stan i su b m arin e G/zazi w as w aitin g outside Okha harbour for a possib le a ttack o n th e Talw ar. T h ese caUs were obviously a hoax en gin eered b y the enem }^s d ep artu re so that a Pak submarine co ta k e u p a n a d v a n ta g e o u s p o s i t i o n f o r a p o s s i b l e attack on the s p -

ship left h arb ou r at ab o u t 1200 h ou rs and headed for arrival the sh ip jo in ed the r e s to f the F leet units and further opera o ff the co ast o f P ak istan w ere accord in g ly executed.

Pakistan's NauHcal Phantasmagoria

.

tiheP akistanPleetbasG dat K arach i n ev erstirred out of her

operations except for the 'K aU ddi-type' attack on

over

‘i'rfre h a d b een the K rishna tem ple known

^

p r o v id p H '^ ^ T f ^

o n the shores

proDaeanH

opporturuty to the P ak w ar machine

of fac?ad H

India a la G oebbels w h o believed

L false

credibility to a ll^ ^ a y ,

'if one were n iL ,■ ^ f iJ‘^ °“ *‘'^'^**®'^3"‘^esgodow ninam orecte (p r e tS iib W b

v

^

L

a

h

o

r

e

on

a i'd p u tto seato taVr ^ ^ ■ ® “ * o r ) t h e Fleet w as ready m .

ness in (the) case o f

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 8 ^ 'S ta te o fc o in ^

packed w ith miUtary K

® ^ 8 ^ 7 com plex war

o S S i

S o -

Ship*

p o u n d ir * ^ ^ ^ '

THE BLUNTED SCIMITAR / 439

carrying ou t th eir m a n y tasks. The N avy w as to guard the shores and keep the sealan es o f sh ip p in g free o f enem y interference. This was done w ith

grim d eterm in atio n and rem arkable efficiency. The

alertness,

efficien cy and high state o f preparedness was an

effective d eterren t to th e enem y. Five times our size, the Indian Navy ap p arently cou ld n o t venture beyond their safety limits.

According to stra y rep orts m an y o f the Indian Navy ships, duringthis period, m an aged to spend their tim e in repair docks or harbours -

refitting. This in a ctiv ity on the part o f the Indian Navy was even Questioned in th e Lok Sahha later w hen a m em ber acid ly enquired, t wa s th£ Indi an N avy doing w hen the Pa kis tan Navy bomba rded And so round the clock, Pakistan N avy ships churned the seas

and kept the w atch . T h e enem y hid him self out of our reach. Then our bold sailors added a d ash o f daringand advenhire to theotherwise S p e c t a c u l a r p atro llin g and sm ashed the fortress o f Dwarka (the tem ple w alls o f Dw arka m ust have been misconstrued by the Pak N avy as fortress w alls).

. .

Situated a Kttle over two hundred m iles south-west of K a ra ^ , the fortress o f Dwarka occupied a strategic p o sitio n -W i* p o w ^

radarinstallations the enem y kept watch

^ p m o v e m e n t s . It w as ofv alu e to

Hon to Jam nagar and Bom bay ag aistpossible a t t a c k j r ^

M oreover, it directed its o w n aircraft

of W .s ,P .to « „ . A f t e r

aircraft against Karachi, it was decided

during the

(O ther than an A ir Force observation P

.

jj^tallations and

o p e r a t i o n s ,D w a r k a h a d n o d e £ ^ c e e ^ a b l^ - t «

hence had no strategic or tacbcal

p

flashed t o the

It w as m idday on

l^ arJca V V i t h i n m i n u t e s thenews

P akistanN avalFlotilla

p e e r s ' m esses) and the lower

flashed through the

f l u r r y o f preparation. G r i z d ^

decks. There w as excitement a

seen strange lands, exercised

« = a a o r s ,w h o h a d s a U e d t h « ^ ^

perfectly well the task

W

i t h

m

i g h t y navies

the enemy who, by any

a s s i g n e d

t o

t h e m

.

f o r c e ,

c o n s i s t i n g o f a n a u c r a f t

standards, had

c a r r i e r

a h e a v y cnu5®r'

Q^garand n o f a l s e b r a v a d o . E v e r y f a c e

w as erim , e v e r y h earts

understood. Only one thought was

l a n d ^ a ^ ^ * ^ ” 'S l/ s S liin d : tocn ish theenem y w hohaddared u p p e r m

o s t in evecy

440 / b l u e p r i n t T O B LU E W A TE R

to d efile th e s a c re d la n d o f P ak istan .

d a rk n ig h t sh ip s tak in g p art in the operation closed s U v s

■ ^^'^P^'^^^^^Roon^'/thenervecentresofthe

al»oH T lu

c a n n e d . T h e ey es o f the navigating officers were

g m ed to theu: re s p e c tiv e ra d a r screen s. There was a low throbbing u m in all th e sh ip s, th e co n fid e n t h u m o f the mighty tiirbines.AIleyes w ere v i ^ a n t a ll ea rs in ten t. T h e rad ar screens were clear, reports w ere b e in g p a ssed to th e flag sh ip w h ere they were sift«d, filtered and

^ ally ev alu ated fo r d isse m in a tio n to the ships in corrrpariy. By 2200

h ou rs all w ere set to g o . N o w an d th en the air crackled by sharp orders p assed fro m the flag sh ip . T h e fleet raced towards its destinatioa A la m ^ r lead in g an d T ippu S ultan brin g in g up the rear. Precisely at m idiu ght aU guns w ere b ea rin g a t D w arka.

F ifteen n u n u tes p a st m id n ig h t th e guns boomed as if one trigger. T h e still air w as ren t b y deafening thunder. A red arne, a ttle sm oke an d th e m a jestic reco il o f 4.5-inch guns and then s e w o

hu rtle th rou gh th e air ev ery few secorvis to bring

A

au: w as filled w ith the a c r i d smeU

d then as the clock-h an d s m ov ed to 30 m inutes past

^

fire a n d a s ile n c e fe ll o v e r th e se a . Sm oke co

o v er Dwarka.

m oved into t h e i r n ew s t a t i o n s . The sky was and r i

N o r t h w a r d t h e f l e e t m ov ed ; silen /

^ d e f i a n t . Sw iftly a n d s i l e n t l y t h e g r e y h u l l s cut their

^

Pakistan

blow s delivered, the prou

brave sail

at their 'actio n -statio n s.' In that d a r

^ jj,

t r i u m

p h

Pakistan N a v y a c c o m p l i s h e d the

enemy

to the ground, it was

The shins

an d h is pride hurt, would coin

rem ained m ore alert and

at 'a c t i o n - s t a S

w atch for m any pal®

rose from th

- ^ e y w ere at'actio n -statio n s vv

stations' at n o o ^ ^ o ^ ' ‘^ " ^ 8

^ " * 0 gold. T h ey w e^ .

r e i ^ i ^

hours m scorching heat and

^ied

d u ^ * ^ n v t o s l e e p ° a ' f t ° ° ^ ^

w

h e n

a gentle

the day's fatigue. They

^

reacted, but w i t ?

® ^^8*® ®^ar to cheer them-

mentof^p^

a l r e a d

y s o u g h t t n

e P ^

as attacked on tK ^u° ^ follow in g m orning- t-p j.

on the high seas b y th iln d ia n

t h e BLUNTED SCIMITAR / 441

Pakistan N avy unit carried out a successful counterattack andsanJc 0 e enemy frigate, w orth about six crores of rupess. Pakistan N avy

^ carnage or casualities. This heroic action of the sailorsof 2vy IS yet another saga enacted during this war. It thus

aa ea another glorious chapter to the annals of their Service.

ac0d w ith an en em y w hich possessed a formidable striking r-e con sistin g o f m ost m od em warships and supported by a powerful aircraft carrier, the officers and men o f thePaJdstan Navy l^ y er ^altered in their arduous, hazardous and hair-raising tasks, fhp'

and selfless dedication to duty they carried out

ir assign m en t and successfully defended the coast.

Brahmaputra 'S u n k '

^ J s w ell-knovm , on Septem ber 22, in a panic reaction to the sighting of n aval ships near the Pakistan coast north-west of

MCfu, a Pak N aval unit opened fire and damaged a frigate before a ismg that the 'en em y ' ships, w hich managed to limp back to their home

^ r t'b e lo n g e d to Iran and not India. Despite the embarrassing fiasco, authorities lost no tim e in claiming that the Fak Navy had ack ed an ln d ian N a v a l u n i t a n d s u n k t h e a n t i a i r c r a f t f r i g a t e , B r a h m a p u -

The Indian N avy had, therefore, to parade all t h r e e antiaircraft

" ’gates o f the W hitby class, B r a h m a p u t r a , B e a s a n d B e t w a , to convince the World press that had flocked to Bombay that Pakistan's claim was Watantly false.

H ow ever, for having 'sunk' the B r a h m a p u t r a a n d 'razed the fortress at Dwarka to the ground', three 'heroes' of the Pak Navy were decorated

*oon after the operations were over. Tliey w ere Commander K K. M a a and Lieutenant A. Tasneem receiving the S i t a r a - i - J u r ' at (Star of VaJourj and Engine Room Artificer G. Nabi honoured with a T a m g h a - i - J u r ' a t (Medal of V alo u rl

. . .

j

Though Aziz B e e ' s saga reads veiy well and would impress the reader With th e f e c i h t o f Ws chimerical imagination, the fact that the raid on naval ope«tk>nUkp^Pea^l Ha

to this day, Pakistan

IndianNavywi^

a Single s h o t ' .

„

^

g ^ s r e p o r t from Cairo g a v e out the facts a b o u t O n

j j ^ u t r a - i t h a d b e e n r e a l i s e d thata case of mis taken the

e n c o u n t e r b e t w

e e n the n a v a l u n i t s o f Pakistan and identity had*

had b e e n damaged. This had i m m e d i a t e l y

Ira n in w h ic ^ by t h e P r e s i d e n t ofPakistan a n n o u n c i n g g a l l a n t r y awards

442 / BLU EPRIN T T O BLU EW A TER

to tt\e seco n d -m -co m m an d an d a n en g in e ro o m artificer of the Gkzi for h av m g su n k the B rahm apu tra. A s m en tio n ed earlier, the world press and n av al attach es o f all co u n tries a ccred ited to In d ia w ere invited to have a cu p o f tea o n b o ard th e Bra/zmflpMfrfl at the N av al Dockyard, Bombayby the F leet C om m and er, R ear A d m iral (later V ice A dm iral) B. A. Samson who told them . H ere y o u are o n b o ard a su n k en vessel. N ow you know that it h as n ot b eco m e a su b m arin e!'

Material Support

A s regards the operations in th e A rab ian S ea, it goes to the credit of the N av al D ockyard at B o m bay that it ro se to the occasion and by September 10, through its m agnificent efforts, rem o v ed n early all the major defects m the ships w hich had lim ped b ack fro m the East Coast b etw ^

Septem ber 7 and 9, after zm absence o f weU o v er tw o m onths. By the evening of Septem ber 10, w h en the F leet sailed o u t o f Bom bay for the first off^*^®

s w e ^ o f f the K athiaw ar coast, its m aterial state h ad i m p r o v e d considerab ly .^ e M y s o re h a d a llh e rfo u rb o ile rs op eration al, t h e TflZwor had rejoin^

^eH eet after her uneasy stay at Okha and a quick o v e r h a u l at Bombay the other ships were in far better shape after the e m e r g e n c y repairs.

Heet Operattons

^ of ^ptemberlOthe H eet, having regained about three^arters^i^^

M y s o r e , t h e t h r e e a n t i a i r c r a f t

S t i e

^^‘^ h Jp u tr a . Beas an d B etw a , the three

and Kuthar, the

the tanker

'R'class destroyers,

fotce

were also im dp a

recorm aissance aircraft o f the Indian

day

being linuted to one so^^

«^ u tes north, i.e

south of the latitude of 21

had also been DosiHn ^

® ^o^^^andar. A few Alizes and

_ pf

Bombay, werrto caJl^^^* Bombay which, besides the air de(^

antiaircraft strikes

searches at sea and to launch antis P ^

.

® "^ « a ft d id n o tM v e a n y s tr a te g ic c ^ ^ ^ fja S

tS

a n d w

a s ^

* ^

'

^

' '

a s k n o w

n t o h a v e b

^

ofB o^ ay . ThePalStery^

to be operating in the

D e r i

r

t h e BLUNTED SCIMITAR / 443

,„g „n g ereco ™ aissan ce aircraft o f

c a T a M ® ' -

range radar and hom ing equipm ent. The

a

cnf^rm m ilesand

provided from KarachibySabresw i*anoperati^ra

B-57 bombers w ith a n o p e ra h n g rad iu s o f 650 m iles, f

•

already exercised w ith th e P a k N a v y and had acquired adequat p

ence in combined and co -o rd in ated m aritim e operations.

Heets

A com parison o f the cap ab ilities a n d lim itahons

^

indicated that w h ile th e In d ian Fleet w as su p en or °

Hme were of

antiaircraft and an tish ip fire p o w er

radian H eethad

World War II vin tage w h ile n in e o u t o f the

° p

gj^ps had greater

beenacauired during the 1950s and early 1960s),

« ' t h o u g h s^me

advantage in torpedo fire POwer (42 t o r p ^ o tubes

of the Indian ships w ere eq u ip p ed w ith

miectiles in a pattern to

such as Squid and L im bo m ortars w hich f i r ^ F ° ) ^^^^g^tional depth-achieve a much higher probability of a ^ p j^pieet h a d an average charges l a u n c h e d b y d e p t h - c h a r g e throwers-averaged only 15

speed capability of ov er 22 knots w hile the Indi

^ bettermaritim e

knots, b i a u s e of h er su perior m aterial f

reconnaissance and strike capability than

r a n g e o f the B-57

It w as, h o w l e r , appreciated that

Sabres at K a r a ^

bombers w as 650 m i l e s , only a few of these

and au: s tn te

'^ere likely to b e com m itted to

t^e Fak Army. It w o^ ^ ,

at sea in view of the P A F's c o m ^ tm ^ *®

^ a range of 2M

thereforp ho

for t h e In d ian Fleet

P

K a ra ch i as possible

n o , I f e V t o b e v . . y

air

R e c o n n a i s s a n c e a i r c r a f t ” ‘ ’ ” ' i , ^ a i ' a i r e l e m e n t t o ^ v i d e a

^

i t s t a c t i c a l im portance,

f o ^

P

^

w

h o w

a s t h e H

a g

P l e a s u r e .

a d m

i r a l ) B . A .

'

v v h e n h e l e d t h e

R

e a r A

d m

i r a l

j ^ ^ i a n F l e e t ,

a n d d e s t r o y t h e P a k

' J f f i c e r C

o m

m

a n d i n g

j ^ f e s t e d w

a t e r s

Indian H e e t into the e n e m y

this basis I

444 / BLUEPRIN T TO BLUEW ATER

enable m e to m eet as m u ch as p o ssib le the tasks o f bringing the enemy to action , to afford p ro tectio n to o u r m a jo r ports on the WestCoastand to provid e cover to ou r m erch an t sh ip s fro m the Persian Gulf and the R ed Sea. B u t w ith the v ery lim ited availabiU ty of reconnajsmce aircraft, I h a d to revise m y p lan . T h e p ro blem really was to find the

^ ^ T d e c id e d to sail on the night of September 10/11

far n orth and n orth -w est as p o ssible, n o t forgetting

another Pak raid on one of the ports inSaurashtra.

^

jjjjie

find the enemy and I d e c id e d a ls o to remain at sea as

refuelling fro m the tarJcer,Shfl/ch'. T h is ship, havm g

^ . j^ggtsea

operational, w as partially d isabled an d could n ot

gtDiu

and so I planned for h er to sail i n d e p e n d e n t l y to f o r re fu e llin g th e F le e t o n S e p t e m b e r 13 and 14. In

^ t i n g

engine also packed up and she did n o t sail at a l ,

alsopa^k®^

period of stay at sea. R ajput, o n e o f the tw o destroye /

up and returned to Bom bay.

* ,• oc from

A

s r e g a r d

s a i r c o v e r , I d e c i d e d t o s t a g e t w o A l w

and to carry out searches n orth o f latitu d e 21 d e ^

arrange

north from 2000 hours on Septem ber 1 1 onw ards

q600

sbc to eight Seahaw ks to be available at J a m n a g a r

onSeptem ber 12 for launching strikes o n P ak s h ^ o

^^^^^ouW

up to a range of 150 m iles from Jam nagar. T h e 1 ^ viutesnort^-

carry out searches in areas south of 21 degrees 30

nrahntap^^^'

Flying my flag on board the M ysore and w itn

^ jailed

Beas, Behva, Khukri, Kirpan, K u th ar and Talw ar in lO/H- ^

of Bombay on our first sweep on the night

the morning of September 11, w ithin hours of our

Bombay, Beas reported an unidentified aircraft at a range This aircraft appeared to have been shadow ing ovir

,

evaluated as a 'snooper'. Two Seahaw k a i r c r a f t w ere s c r^

^ m b a y b u t could i^ot intercept the u n i d e n t i f i e d aircra disappeared by the time the Seahaw ks a r r i v e d on th position was thus likely to have been c o m p r o m i s e d .

^

Y

\0 ^

An M ize's search was l a u n c h e d from J a m n a g a r at a

t o

of September 11 and w itt*v h alf an h o u l

p»k

t h e BLUNTED SCIMITAR / 445

a t t e n u a t f o n b y l h e a t m o s p h e r e a n d m ulH ple at varying levels as a result of w h ich th esig n a

.

by

flagshT or any other ship of

Jamnagar. At m idnight the A ^ e

^

at Bom bay on

transmitted the report to th.e M antu ne Opera

g .^ ^ j

land line but e v e n the rebroadcast o f

2 . o^ving to the

Centre, Bom bay at 0200

^ o fS au rash traon th atn ig h t.

'anaprop'conditions still

t o o k o f f fro m Jam -

At 0300 hours on Septem ber 12

after carxy-

nagar, established w ireless contact w ith the nags, f

ingout a search., picked up a

t h e m

further

north of the R e e tb u t, n ot being able

^

^ t h i r d Alize was

because of lack o f e n d u ra n c e , retum e

airb o m eat0400h o u rso n S ep tem b erl2an d s

^ jj,eir own

success as by this tim e the Pak warships a

waters.

ofthese ships as when the

g^een V er/s flares for purposes

that the aircrar.

"ot respond w ith light signals, they had

o ff their

was not their ow n and hadthenqm c>dy

Jeamed towards t h e P a k i s t a n c o a s t a t ^ P ^ ^ e l n d i a n H ^ t ^

daybreak. Th.us 'an ap ro p 'co n d itio ^

° ^ S e p t e ^ ^ l 2

l»aul that was there for the asldng. By

Heet had b ^ J

'varsbips, whose p r e s e n c e withm 9

^

had disapp

and reported at 2030 hours the pre

the wireless me

g

The faUure o f th e flagship to '^ e n to fa s i« ^ ^ 5 ,'" '^ ^ ^ e e td id n o t aircraft a p p e a re d to be a r e - ^ 1916, the British

the G erm an

Battle of Jutland when,

i 'c a S n and

by

receive a similar signal on

spotter

jj,g purpose by th

High Seas Fleet from » ? h o ^ ^ been launched

incidents sep-

Lieutenant R u t l a n d , which

s i m

i l a r but

gP ^

aitcraft carrier, Engadine.

rtjceednorth with full d e s jw ^

arted by half a

then ordered to

northern Im uto

T liln d ia n R a e t-^ ® J.^ ,3 t

buthad to soon

search. Eight tjeatiaW

ggonsr

^ j success.

machinery

break d ow n and ^ *^

446 / BLUEPRINTTOBLUEWATCF

from the Fleet to limp back to Bom bay.

n o rth w a rd r^ n c e °L ^ n

remaining force proceeded

o f S eptem ber 13

till the early hours

arms bound for Pakistan

ships laden with

shins harJ fr. K f ^ t a n , SS Steel Vendor and SS Steel PntmtoT. "Hie ca p tu red in fVi ^

u rider th reat o f fire but could not be

b e e n maHo

^ a b s e n c e o f c le a ra n c e fro m h igher authorities as ithad thouph ;♦

^

In d ia n F leet w as not to seek action

Vendnr :>

to o p e n fire in self-defence. And so the Sled

'e sc n rto ,^ '\

I

P ro tra cto r co n tin u ed to cruise towards Karadii, thev roar.v. A

F leet a t a d istan ce o f only two cables, until

merrK=,rM. 1

n o rth ern lin u t o f the H eet's sweep when the

d isann o ^ A

b id d in g a d ieu to the Indian Pleet Conunander,

disappeared over the horizon!

ter 'somf°comM

13, Kutor picked

hunt. The cnnta/<»

^ Possible submarine and soon Khukri joined in

*™= the KuHnrh “t

intermittently until 1100 hours d u ti^ '

^‘v.bman^ X

r *

attacks with mil salvos fro m h e ^

action terminated

^°^*act was, however, lost and tlie

tor a fairly lone op • a

''^as assessed to be tracking atsev^

it may weU h a L 1!^ °

subsequent analysis led to the conclusion

Shins

°6en a submarine.

n o t'b e S e ° ^ ^ .^ ® g ^ 8 to nm short of fuel and the oiJy K t r p a n a L S u

' ^

ships of the 14th

afternoon of Septemh

w

e r e detached

^

antisubmatinesw^

returned to Bombay o n ^

uneventful night, the

9 n September 17

14.

,oooit

S h

an d K u th a r, with gunfire supP

o “

square milp<i

a thorough search of ^

September

a

8®»ral

/*hb was

Sea from Sep

to provide support foranuint^

t h

e

BLUNTED SCIMITAR / 447

KKhanl ships bringing vital defence c a r p

that Pakistan was aware of the nature of cargo m th

j?

,

shipping programme ar\d h en ce th ere w a s a d istin ct

^ n r p fro m

shipsl)einginterceptedandeithercapturedordestroyed. The s Bombay to Aden is 1650 rtules an d th u s th is s w ^ p w o u ld en p

tions far away from our shores b u t it w a s cor\sidered w e

. . .

capability of nurw hittled-dow n F leet. R ep o rts in d icatin g h e y sea-borne landings on the K ath iaw ar C o a st, h o w ev er,

. f f

sweep and the R e e t w as p ro m p tly sailed to in tercep t t l^

a

Kathiawar.

Recalls Admiral Samson,

I sailed in Mysore w ith Rajput, Ranjit, Beas, and Behm on jy

September 18. M y in tention w as to reach

s peed

as possible to counter the landings and so proceeded a

y

of 22 knots. I had to leave Beas behind to follow as she

,

That evening at about 2015 hou rs, whUe I

an aircraft contact w as picked up

renorting to the

attcraft was sighted by the Beas and w as

o f our ships

Karachi transn\ittmg station the position and disfw

faded

n^st accurately. T h e aircraft continued to sh adow

out at 2130 hours. I continued north till a ®

was evident

burned south-west. N o enem y ships

_,y on our coast. It

no landing w as being attem pted by

cancelled by the

is probable that the sea-boiive landing

coast was compro-

Pak Fleet w hen our presence near the

“

noised.

. cv ^ D S in the same arw

N evertheless, 1 continued to

f 2 0 th

onSepternber 20,21 and 22. On the

F.k stops

wireless transnnissionswhichwereo^ .enemy' on a

of

dicated that tliey had a

.,,}onswerepick®^ *^P

course at 10 knots. These

^ ere in

?:nn-finding

our ships aiK lw ew ereconvinc

^«ions but they

the enemy. However, it was n p ^

“’^C^^direcUon. Despite

equipment to gauge * ® ^ ^ ^ e c o n t in u e d » n ^ s ^^^^^eraI hours appeared to be northerly

jj,e enenjy-

thefact,how ever,thatw ec

^

con^

indicated that tt^

at our best speed,

‘^^"^tercepted

Bearing ^ n-W

contact they had was >

„ot be

was obvious that this

448 / b l u e p r i n t TO BLU EW A TER

probabUity was some merchant ship proceeding either out of incase

Kachchh. I, therefore, turned towards the Gulf

shins from

^ attemptmg to intprcept one of our metdiant

^

™

3rea. I found nothing and it was clear that this was an-

of 'anaprop' electromagnetic condition and that

se in ercepted messages were being transmitted by local patrol p s e s just outside Karachi Harbour. Thereafter, despite repeated g speed sweeps as far north as Mandvi, norontactofanyPaksWps

was gamed.

However, we continued to intercept Pak wireless transmissions

an it was clear that oux forces were being continuously shadowed throughout this particular operation. It was also cleat

nom these transmissions that aix strikes were on call for Pak surface ps. Unfortunately our Alizes or Seahawks could not operate from

September 12 asrepeated air a tta c k shadrendered the

tor maritime reconnaissance aircraft o

then^fh

' ‘^°'^«^ued to carry out recon n aissan ce sweeps of

surfaced

Arabian Sea but failed to pick up any Pa^

r S o r t L h ? .J

^

on two occasions our forces ^

force was

®” '® ^ ^ ® ® ^ sn ^ y a n d o n o n e o cca s io n th e p o sitio n o fo

^

language!

,

I had to detach the

further signal

short of fuel. M ean w h iJp Ih ad rec^ v

Mysore,

I altered course

e s c o r tth e m to s a fo J^ ^ tow ards th e cen tral A rab ian Sea to ^ ^

” yssiorv we receiv S i

few h o u rs o f o u r sailin g on o

Government'

from Naval Headquarters c o n v e y

September 23 and so

® cease-fire from 0330

■

jq

forestall any attemm -

Kathiawar Coas

area in a last-m in jl^ -r*"

to create niischief

ombay with the reeref Ik

propaganda value. I retuin

la iff ? ‘^^^a'^stan Naw^’^

missed an opportunity to

jjj

r nearly two weekJ^

battle despite waiting just outs

J-essonsLeamt

co „.d h .v .

Some of thes J

had been nl^

armour' of our Navy

chinks were:

and reinforced well

t h e BLU N TED S C IM rrA R / 449

a wide expanse was o f vital

^

P ^ p o m t i n g t h e e n e m y on su ch

reconnaissance efforts wpmf

fo r which the maritime

o/Adenhad to be

^

^ e G u lf

^3vy continued t n ' o n o r T

«

^^hile th e P a k

^°astatno time did

Pak C o ast and the K ath iaw ar

ships while at the

reco n n aissan ce aircraft d etect Pak

’^^remore or 1p<?c

P ak m aritim e recon naissance aircraft

absence of

sh ad o w in g our Fleet. In addition,

^*■3% hampered th

fo rn a v a l aircraft in Saurashtra c o n sid -

”®<^essarvnotnnl #

■

f operatiorrs. This was considered

^avalairrraft ^

the strike and search range for our

carrier bee ^

^or using them as d iv e r s io n a r y a ir fie ld s h a d

^ůld havebp

operate in th en o rth em waters when they

fuel, cJamaao ^^'^^’red to divert to these a irp o rts ow ing to lack o f Two

tactical reasons.

^^tpossibi

“a d e q u a te . A s is w ell know n, i t i s

telligence- ^

w o rth w h ile realistic operations i f t h e in-

accu

m a ch in e ry is n o t geared up t o p r o v i d e t i m e l y fa e in fo rm a tio n o n th e enem y,

the abs

o p e ra tio n s a t sea w e r e c o n s i d e r a b l y h a m p e r e d b y Fleet

o fre h 'a b le fleet tankers, esp ecially because the Indian req u ired to c a n y ou t sustained operations in the

merrh

'v a ters b u t w as also assigned the task o f e s c o r t i n g o u r cnant ships fro m the P ersian G u lf and the G u lf o f A den to our W est

^oast ports.

.

Four, an om alo u s e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c p r o p a g a t i o n concUtions had

^ P n v e d the In d ian F leet o f neu tralisin g the P a k F l e e t when it was of its 'd e p th ' and w ithin 9 0 m iles o f our area o f o p e r a t o r ^ W

^ e P a k sh ip s had identified our

* ^ S d e ^

° ^ ° % J i n i ^ g l o M h l ' l ! ^ b e e n u s e d . H s d

^

m

i n

u

r u

c a t i o n

s u c h a s v i s u a l s i g n a l l i n g jo ^ g { t tU l

‘ h a t b e e n d o n e , t h e F l e e t C

o m

m

a n d e r w

o t ^ ^ n o t h - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

^ o m in g o f S e p t e m b e r 1 2 t o

a n d

w h i c h b a d

e n p i c k e d u p a t

2 0 3 0 h

o u

«

P

a c t u a l l y r e c e i v e d .

d i s a p p e a r e d b y

t h e

d e p l o y s o m e w a r s h i p s i n t h e B a y o f F i v e , f a r f r o m

b e u i g

e a s t e r n s e a b o r d , t h e s t r e n g t h

B e n g a l for t h e defence o f o ^ g - u i r e m e n

t s o f even t h e W e s t C o a s t o f t h e F l e e t f e l l f a r

° ( ^

h

a

d

o n l y t w

o a n c i e n t e s c o r t d e s t r o y e r s

a s

a r e s u l t

o f w

h i c h C

o c n «

450 / BLU E PR IN T TO BLU EW A TER

w it h o b s o le te w e a p o n r y , o n e d iv in g te n d e r, o n e seaw ard defence boat a n d o n e c o a s ta l m in e s w e e p e r , viz.,G odavari, Gomati, Konkan,Abk\j a n d K akinda. G o a h a d o n ly o n e c o a s ta l m in esw eep ers, Canmmejoi t h e ir n a v a l d e fe n c e . T h e o n ly s h ip s a n d c ra ft av ailab le forthedefence o f th e E a s t C o a s t a n d th e A n d a m a n a n d N ico b a r Islands were two c o n v e r te d tra in in g frig a te s o f W o r ld W a r IIvintage,KtsfnflandTir,and th e se a w a rd d e fe n c e b o a t, A jay. H e n c e , h a d th e P ak N avy decided to d e p lo y a fe w o f th e ir w a r s h ip s o ff E a s t P ak istan , the Indian Fleet w o u ld h a v e b e e n h a rd p u t to c o n ta in th e m . T o q u o te A d m i r a l Soman,

'T h e d e p lo y m e n t o f th e m a in b u lk o f th e In d ia n Fleet on the C o a s t m e a n t th a t, h a d a g u n s h ip o r tw o o f th e P ak istan Navy slipp o u t i n t o t h e B a y o f B e n g a l a n d o p e r a t e d t h e r e r a i d i n g o u r p o r t s o r s e a l a n e s , w e w o u l d , i n t h e i n i t i a l s t a g e s , w i t h

o u

r s m

a l l f l e e t , h a v e ^

a b l e t o

d o n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n w h a t o p p o s i t i o n t h e c o a s t

^

w h e r e t h e y e x i s t e d , c o u l d o f f e r w i t h s u c h a s s i s t a n c e a s s l ^ s l i W

Kistna a n d T i r a n d o n e seaward defenceboat,v4/fli//c o u l d r e n d e r , o b v io u sly w o u ld n o t h a v e b e e n m u c h , in the ab sen ce of any linked to the coast battery guns. With our limited resources,

n o a lte rn a tiv e to th is b u t to a c c e p t th is sta te o f affairs, y/e

o n ce an y o f th e P a k ista n sh ip s sh o w e d its h a n d s o n the East o co u ld b rin g it to b o o k , su b je ct orUy to m aritim e r e c o n n a i s s a n c im fo rtu n a te ly w a s m o st in a d eq u a te .

^

f-ninaki*’8

A s reg ard s th e W e s t C o a st it w a s ap p reciated t h ^

o u t d ep lo y m en t w e m u st er\sure th at th e F le et C o m m a n d h a v e ad eq u ate sh ip s to d eal w ith the en tire P a k ista n Fleet ®

e v e n term s in g u n p o w e r, an d o n ly th e b a la n ce should e to give seaw ard p atro l an d d efen ce ca p a b ility to the j th®y

the W est C oast. T h ese sh ip s, w ith the c o a st b atteries,

^

w e r e m exister\ce, and the fo rtu ito u s availabiU ty o f

^ i z e s of the disencibarked sq u ad ron s on the carrier, were P ^gjty

the d efen ce for these p orts. I m u st em p h asise th at ports

of earn er a irc ra ftw a s a b o n u s ,a s fig h ter co v e r f o r the defence 0

stood at th at

time, essentially on Ai

com im tm ent.

had

antisubmarine training w ith a BriH s^^^.sencc

of asub^a'^-

.®®’^*’submarine capability o f our Fleet,

gjtioi'

o c o S Z ^ f ' " ' " S i n the IndianH eet put t h e Pak Fleet in a e v S ^ r l e ^ b J ^

psycholo^gical advantage-W

t h e BLUNTCD SCIMITAR /

A

s ir

to bomb the

t w a 'y ° h o m

establishment at Badm, o n ly j ^

vr.hpr 8 as had b e e n schedule ,

c .o w r a e s ,o n t e m o m m g o f S e p t e m b e r ^ s M

a ir c r a f t

war wouldhave been over m u c h

P-N - Farashar, o n e

losses would h a v e b e e n m in im ised . C o

^ ^ i i i s h e d p i l o t ^eek

of the pioneers of our n a v a l a v ia tio n

^in w n to s iz e w a s th u s lo s .

t a a U » o p p o t t m u t y t o c u t P a W s t a r . d o v m » «

30O

He 4 , 'A.

t a e of me 1965

(la.er R « r

Seahawk Squadron,

w ith

L ie u te n a

^rr- -o r w a s a t th e IA F

Admiial) R.V. S in g h as its C o m m a n d in g

P a k is ta n ^

Station at la m n a g a rfo r a rm a m e n t tra m m g

id e a l o p p o r t ^ ^

Force attacked th e a irfie ld . T h e N a v y

was d e p r i v ^

to prove the w o rth of n a v a l a v ia tio n

'p ^ v jc ta n . A c ro s s th e

of an opportunity to d e a l a n e ffe c tiv e b

_ ra d a r in s ta lla tio n a

border from Ja m n ag ar, P a k is ta n h a d its

^

a v a ila b le to a tta c

Badii\. H ght Seah aw k s o f th e 3 0 0 S q u a

,> j,^ v e h a d a

’

and destroy it on September 8 , 1 9 6 5 - We w

our aircrew

But it w as a w o rth w h ile targ et. ^

standing by and b rie fe d a n d re a d y w

.

<he attack w as d en ied b y h ig h e r a u lO--

jsj v y to

But the three crucial factors ^ t , far .^°J” ^ a t o u n d *

h

e

JJ^ore

^ its task effectively, b e c a m e v i r t u a l n ^

N a v y to

C o a s tin

t a e l neck, w ere/ firs., n o .

^Portant com ponents o f

Pakistan w as

latitu d e

^'igust 1965 w h en it w a s w ell-k n o w n th at

f r r io n against

w « ;s e c o „ d , c o n f i ^ g * e N a ; 2 ; ^ ° ^ N » v y . o s « ^

Porbandar, and third, n o* P®” T ^ !l^fchan t ships

Paknaval uruts and to cap tu re P a - -

declared!

'^onvetvance-aw arhad n o t been/orrr«i»y

T>« N.vy Supplements

^^insagai, an Alize ^

pUoting

^ a n c e and 1

d i s t i n c t i o n o f b e i n g select

which w as attached

* ^^0^5 duri*'8

rescendo, h

airfields and radar instaUatio

^

S s e n ^ e c and

when the

D-N- Bao, ««

O n S e p t e m b e r

w

i t h U

e u t e n a n t 0

SSSiB^£S?HS"S

ass^t ttie Indian Air Force in

urgenay required to

border so that the a “

®

W«1«k

s ^ e U la n c e u rtts which w ers d « . ? “

'’’® trouWesom.

their air stations of the imnpn’n-

^ our own aircraft and alerting

Commander ( i T J r ^

C o m m a n d er (A ir) o f n / m

R A J . Anderson, who was the

h a d n o t been cam ou flaooH (

that the au-craftoftheNavy

the In d ian

overiand andthal

a n A lize aircraft flnri T

^ ’^ ^ P o r c e w eren o t at allfamiliarwith

F u rth er,

the AliV

} w

m istak e it for an enemy aircraft,

reco n n aissan ce

^^^sically

an antisubmarine and

visibility^ esp ecialiv ro

P°°^ all-round

ex cep t fo r rockets hn

besid es, being an unarmed aiicrad,

target for en em v fi»h t

<^epth charges, it would be an easy

care, vigU ance arid

therefore, em phasised that extreme

co m p letion o f this m is s io ^ * w ou ld be required to ensure successful o f enem y rada? Q fflf

w anted us to solve was the pinpoint-

•■aids. The India A ir Fn

that w ere alertin g its air stations o io a ti^

lance units and retrain

to neutralise these surveil'

purpose it w as

d u rin g . itrikes. For this

the aegis o f a -

A lize w ould operate from Ainbals

C o n u S , S L ^ ‘=°” “ '’ <^“ «

Singh, W e s u a P f

ten mUes w ithin thp

from A m bala. T h e a i r c r a f t was t o fly

^ ta b lish the positions nf’i f " *®” ^tory along the W estern border and y them Was thatthe AHy ®”^y™dar stations. The m e th o d p to p o s ^

positions o f Pak ground

% atn ig h tan d would transmit*^

However,

‘^^tected.

had n ot donprr,

^

Force fighter squadrons, as

doreSinghw as a p p r S ^ 2 * ^ h ^ 8 h t - f l y in g . T h e r e f o r e ,^ Cofluno; n i g h r ^ S : ° ' « ^ " ^ v a I c r ! w b e i n g a b i ; tocopew if’

j^ ^ ^ ^ ^ to fin d th atlh ad d o ^ iT ^ ^

log-book, he was pleasant^

the A ir at that tin\e a n

^'^^^hours o f night-flyingfrom ^

had done less than'^i;

the sam e experience

rou teU l°'^ ‘’""fi" 8 w ?got^ .

of night-flying.

covered tW

®®t course for p”'?°” ®P^e-<leteniiinedtrianguJ3^

that day with du^ha "

Unfortunately, Pun/ab

^ t ha2e up to a height o f 300 feet Z d tM

TH E BLU N TED SCIM ITA R / 453

whole of Puiijab was observing a black-out during the war. With the inaps that we had and the strong winds drifting us off course, we realised that Lieutenant Commander Chowdhury, our Observer and

Navigator, had lost track of our position. Map reading was not possible due to dark-night conditions and total black-out. Within 20

niinutes of flying, I realised that we had already crossed the intema-

^nal boundary and had exposed ourselves to en em y radar detection,

^erefore, we were forced to turn in the approximate general

,

tionofPathankotarKlcontinuecIimbingparallel to thelhdo-Pak

within a fpw minutes, on climbing beyond 1,500feet, therear-

seat observer, Ueutenant D.N. Rao, detected the Lahore radar and hvo other radars from a bearing of the Sargodha-Peshaw ar area.

“ •fire w a s n o m e th o d o fp lo ttin g th e s e b e a r in g s a c c u r a te ly a s o u r ow n ircraft'sposition w a s n o t k n o w n . R ao then took their

^recorded

the distinctive features of the transmission).

seconds the enemy radar locked on theaircraft and commenced

^sessmenL Realising that Pakistan's F 104 Starfighte« were ^

air-to-air m issiles w ith n ig h t cap ab ility and

a i r c r a f t

purpose wniUd b e serv ed b y fu rth er con tin u ing the sortie, the a As w e ap p ro ach ed A m bala w e found tlw t

“j c l u ^ g

ru n w ay , h ad b een totally

100/eefc

^ r s h a l le r w as co n tin u in g to take m e d o ^ up

i s a w g p o s e -

h e said th at the ru n w ay w as one rn^e ahe

a i r w e x i

flares b ein g lit o n e b y one

t l a n

d e d , the airm en

com jxiencing fro m the ru nw ay

„ / ^ t h i n minutes o f t h e

extinguished these goose-neck

f j " ' a g a i n in total darkness.

a»«-raft rolling on the n m w ay , the airfid d ^

8^ t h e s a m e r o u t e a n d

W e took o ff at lOOOhours th en ext t w

^ Defence Com-

proceeded tow ards FaziUca

to keep ttie area clear of

n ^ e r provided a G nat com bat P ^ ^

did obtain eneniy

a U e n e m y f ig h t e r s - O n c lim b ir ^ o v e r F ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

the

f

radar t L S u s s i o n s

a n d

the bearing

Sargodha. W e w ere

*°® ^ m P tiine we were picked up y

V r tlir . a f e w s e c o n * .

a - -

enem y radar and m y

Were n ow steady and co

positively ^

along * e

thankotarea,w e

4 5 4 / B L U E PR IN T T O BLU EW A TER

b e a rin g c u t o n b o th the rad ar tran sm issio n s. It w as apparent to the rear rad ar o p e ra to r. L ie u te n a n t D .N . R a o , that the transmission fro m S a rg o d h a in d ica ted m o re th an o n e radar. H e quickly analysed arvd p o sitiv e ly estab lish ed th a t Sarg o d h a h a d m ore than one radar. As w e h a d co m p leted m ore th a n th ree h o u rs o f flying in th e area and h ad cro ssed th e tra ck sb e y o n d o u r in ten d ed area, w eset c o u rs e back towards Ambala.

A t this tim e, as w e w ere p ro ceed in g tow ards Ambala, we were ii\formed b y o u r groim d sta tio n at A m bala th at since Patha n o t recogrxize an A lize, sev eral lA F aircraft had been scramb th e P a th a n k o t A ir F o rce B ase an d w ere shortly going to assu red th at w e w ere n o t to w o rry , as A m bala had

^ j^iculat

th em that th e lA F w a s u sin g a n av al aircraft. At this p

^

m ov em en t, I saw a G n at figh ter, w ith its vmdercamage dovym, o n m y p o rt side and th e p ilo t w av in g to m e. Once ®'

^gge

the A lize as a friend ly aircraft, h e p ro m p tly hou sed his un an d flaps, pulled up fro m u nd ern eath in front o f us an P

back to his b ase. Later, o n landing, w e w ere told that

defence

cre a te d a p a n ica sw e h a d p e n e tra te d d eep in to theadjacen sector and the Air Force statior^ had gone o n the alert to s ^

the intruder. T h ey h ad launched the G nats for intercep

passing h ad reported the m atter to A m bala on the ^ ^ g ^ a t Air intruder to w arn th em o n the likely air-raid .lt w as at

gyalai^'

C om m ododre Randhir Singh, realising that it could be

craft, w arned all units in plain language to look out

gn

naval Alize aircraft w ith the m arking o f the Indian

^

Luckily f o r us, w e w ere intercepted by the controllings^*^

sqiiarJron and also the leader of the strike force- Otherwise

have been shot of the sky as very few A i r F o r c e officers na Alize b e f o r e .

r P a k r a d a ^

As the sortie w as very effective and thelocatiorw or

installations had been accurately indicated, A i r C o m m o d o r e Singh directed us to proceed to Palam for fu r th e r brietujS^g^i detectionofenemryradarsin other sectors. It is understood

on the locations given by us on these radar stations, the

ggftef

launched Canberra photo reconnaissance sorties and the

carried out strikes on these radars.

As we had started flying operatons late, i.e., after

tt\e conflict, on our return to Palam w e realised that the ceasef already been announced. T h e lA F , how ever, w an ted us to estaP> aU radar stations locatfni along fl-.e border without crossing V

border and creating any air violations. W e were requested to go

t h e B L U N T ® SCIM ITAR / « =

loAmbala and operate th ere * °

w e r e o r d e r e d

ilm rtb y th e lA P w e re s ta lfu n c tio iw g .

th e s e t o t r u c t i o n s , w e

fiomAmbala, Jodhpur an d

. ^ ^ r C o i r u n o d o r e R a n d h i

proceeded again to A m bala

s ta tio n s , tw o a t a n d a r o u n d

Singh.Wesoonlocated fiv e enemy ra d a r St

^ time w e w e r e

Lahore and three aroiind th e S a r g o c ^ a

1 i:_p c s u c h as a ltitu d e s

required to operate at the ceilin g h e ig h ts o

op eration a t

betweei^ 19^00 and 21,000 feet. It w a s a v e r y

h e a d q u a r te r s

this period except for one re p o rt th a t ca m e o

in u c h

th a t th e

that we had inadvertantly clo s e d th e

o r

Pakistanis had lo d g ed a p r o te s t.

c a t A m b a la , w e fle w

'On su ccessfu l c o m p le tio n o f t h e s e s o e

_

prom Jo d h p u r

over and landed at Jod h p u r,

al^’f'a m a te r

th a t

wettew all along the Jaisalmer area and c o ^ i ^

attacked b y

the radar station lo c a te d a t B a d in , w h i

.

fo r a fe w d a y s

Hunters of the lA F , th o u g h s u c c e s s fu lly

^ A t th is tim e ,

during the co n flict, h a d a g a in b e c o itie °P ®

a fir e in th e r e ^

during one of our so rties o v e r Ja is a lm e r ,

t j^ r e f o r e , re tu rn e d

cockpit w hich d a m a g ed o u r ra d a r

th e radar d e te c to r,

to Palam and p ro ce e d e d to

J^ ic e a b le , te s t-flo w ii ^

W ithin a d ay th e se t - w a s m a d e f ^

r e t u

r n e d

to

a

cleared and so w e to o k o ff in th e s a m e

^

to Ja m n a g a r ^

>>y nigh,. W e w ere now

e s t a b l i s h p o s i t i v e l y t h

a t t h e B

a d

m

Tadar i n s t a l l a t i o n

F c r a t h

e r

"Petation,! and a L lo cate any

atound K arach i. T h e lA F Station C o i ^ n ^

h e t h o u ^

reluctant to send n a v a l aircra ft ° ^ g W h s e a s , th at o tif

there w ere to b e a n y 'in cid en ts o

that en v iro n -

would sw allow th e ev id en ce. W ,

c o m fo r t ^ le i

an d

i n s t e a d o f b e i n g

e n e m y ^

p e n e t r a t e ^

s e a .

I s w e n o r x n a U y d o f o r r a d a

4 5 6 / B L U E PR IN T T O BLU E W A TE R

p o in te d th e e n em y ra d a r statior\s in o n e sortie, and dropped a

'm a rk e r' w ith in 100 y a rd s o f th e targ et. T h e targets could have been e a sily d estro y ed b y th e In d ia n A ir F o rc e u sin g bom bs and rockets. It w o u ld h a v e b e e n c o s t-e ffe c tiv e an d v e ry su ccessfu l. W ith my experien ce o f o v er 2 0 0 h o u rs o f ru gh t-flyin g , this exercise could have been easily carried o u t a t n ig h t w ith rrunim um d anger to the aircraft.

T o sim\ u p , in less th an 15 d ay s o f flying operations over tota y ur\familiar territo ry , an u ivarm ed n a v a l aircraft h ad done ^

n ig h t-fly in g in th e fa c e o f g rav e d an g er and h ad accm ate y oca eig h t P a k rad ar station s fo r th e lA F . B u t these e x p lo it o

® ^

N a v a l u n it in th e W estp m S ecto r rem ain ed uiureported an

.

b ecau se th e lA F sign als specialist accom p an y in g our o ffered to carry all th e reco rd s p ertain in g to the sorties th e A lizes to A ir H eadqixarters and N a v a l H eadqua e reason s n o t k n o w n , 'fa iled ' to do so .'

C r a m p in g t h e N a v y 's S t y l e

^

A dnural B S . Som an feels that the N av y should h av e been ope^'

deploy its ship s w ell in tim e after b ein g refu rbished

that

tio n sa t sea a s itw a s apparent aa early as the f i r s t w eek was

a m ajor a r m ^ conflict w ith P akistan w as im m in en t and tra preparing for a ms^or n aval offensive in s u p p o r t o f its p invasion of K ashm ir anH ‘the other n o rth em states contiguous H e recalls.

After the In d o -C h ii«se conflict, th e defence o f

N icobar Islands w as left entirely to m e. The arm y refused

^ gaUors

a platoon there and w e had to raise our ow n land fo^^® . So m k h a k i uniform to m an the various stations in

troul’^® ^

d\eiuivy w as concerned, as soon as P akistan

isla^^^

Kachchh, I had felt that m y first priority w ould

® ji^dones*^

because while talking to various peo p le during m y visit

as the Fleet Com m ander a few years earlier and subsequ

managed to send C aptain (later V ice Adm iral) V .E .C

Jakarta as the N aval Attache and having been briefed on

developments, I felt a little nervous about these islands-

because w hen the Army refused to send any units for their

(lO

I had taken on the responsibility of doing so w ith sailors

experience in land-fighting. But I had also placed Mysore major ships in the area till the very last m inute. It was 0 *“ ^ * yVeSt w arhad started and I was permitted to bring the R e e t back to tne

-fflE b l u n t e d SCIMITAR / 457

aasithatlbrought the

Iw a n te d to e n s \ irre th a tn o o p p o rtu iu ty w a s^

o r o v e d i t s e l f l d o

anything at the sam e tim e. W h e th e r e v e n tu

y

P

b e e n k e e p -

nol know but prior to th at S o e k a m o w a s rep o

less order from the 'h ig h e r a u th o r itie s

t h e s e sh ip s

the latitude of P o rb a n d a r. N o th in g e ls e c o iild b e f ^ o v e to w a r d s

except to try aiid see th a t t h e P a k is t a ii i s h ip s d id n o

^

the Andaman an d

N ic o b a r I s la n d s to h o ld

Indonesians.

n

f «

m

e

I n d o n e s ia n

I also h ad so m e in te llig e n c e o n th e p r e s e n c

^ g r f a k e n b y th e

ships at K arachi a n d k n e w th a t a n y o p e r a tio n

^

n e ith e r b e

combined n av al fo rc e s o f P a k s ita n a n d

^ m o s t lik e ly

Against the In d ian F le e t n o r th e In d ia n m a i ^ a m - . , j w a s q u ite

to be for the cap tu re o f th e A n d a m a n a n d N ic o b a r

’

weU

convinced in m y m in d th a t th e In d o n e s ia ii N a v ^

p re se n t o n th ese

that only a sm all fo rce o f s a ilo rs in khaki

" ^ - n b a r Isla n d d esp ite

islands, could m ake a n attem p t to cap tu re the N i

the then pretty poor state of In d o n esia's ^ ® '^ « h a s i z e I may be repeating m y self b u t I

m ost w as that even a f t ^

single aspect of the op eration th at u p set m e

week

entire H eet w as m ade o p e r a t i v e o ff ^

unw ise geo-

September 1965, n ot m u ch cou ld b e done b

graphical lim itations im posed on the

the N a v y ^

As to the details of the constram ts plac^^

is generaay

I did about it, I can perhaps expand so

^

known akeady.

.

. , file -igned ^ Y ^ f^ ^ ^ 's e c te ta rv and

O ne m orning I r e c e i v ^ a fU ^

„erate north of

then Additional D e fen ce

i ^ 'v f a v y is

-°^riate offens*''®

Ambassador to N ep al) sa^^g/

j to take or

offensive

the latitu d e of P o rb an d at,

a b o

the V e (^ ^

acBon by the F ak fo .c « - “ ’

and - o W ^

Chavan, were out of

n rder and was s e ^ S ^

^

that 1 could not accept t ^

the very

t h a t e v ^ ^

as soon as he returned w l ^ ^ Y d t h a t h e v ^ s ^ ^ l ^ o v e r ^ ^ f t , r W hen

C h in e se d e b a c le m l9 « / be better

^ him for

as such it

I was rnost gta

trouble. 1 said

« 8 / b l u e p r in t TO BLUEWATER

adversely

pubUc w ould go d o ™ tiif rfri

, ? ™ " but the Navy's imagein tta

carrier being iS t h e X c t S ' ” " ' " “ “ ° " ^ d “ ’^'actoftheai,c,a(l N a v v fo r fhp

r ^

responsibilities assigned to the

p o s s ib le anH

A n d a m a n an d N icobar Islands from a

GovpmTYi

f'

a tta c k fro m Indonesia which, in the

ODprati

^ s o rd e r o f p rio ritie s, w a s m ore c-ucial than navaJ

o p e ra tio n s a g a in s t P a k ista n .

a s su re d h im th a t I w a s fu lly a w a re o f these implicatitsis of the 3i^d re sp o n sib ilitie s. Mysore had already beende-p o y e d m th a t a re a a n d aU th a t I w a s a s k in g fo r w as to leave the Navy o p a n a n d d o w h a t itcein in a n a c tiv e m an n er instead of remaining

^ s s i v e . F in a lly th e D e fe n ce M in ister said th^t even the Prime ter, S h r iL a l B a h a d u r S h a stri, did n o t w an t the conflict to escalate a sea a n d th a t w a s th at. I req u ested h im fo r perm ission to see the I ' ^ e M in iste r so th at I co u ld co n v in ce h im o f w hat I felt strongly a b o u t a n d h e rea d ily agreed .

I

d o n o t n o w rem em b er w h eth er th ere w as any one else in * e ro o m w h e n I called o n th e P rim e M in ister. H e started by saying h e rem em b ered m y late fa th er (w ho w a s a colleague of Gandhiji a u ^ g the C h a m p a ra n stru g g le) an d th at h e w as glad to see nnenow a s t h

e N

a v

a l C

h i e f . I t o

l d

h

i m

t h

a t a t this particular m o m e n t I w a s n o

at a ll g lad to b e th e N av al C hief, w h at w ith t h e G ovem m ^t o r d e r m g m e n o t t o d o w h a t l h o n estly consid ered was m y duty ai^

o f co u rse th at o f the N avy . C h av an m u st h av e already spoken to ^

a b o u tm y ta lk w ith h im , a s S h r iS h a s tr ib r o u g h tu p the s a m e two points a

rio t b e e n s tre n g th e n e d s in c e th e S in o -In d ian co

^

A n d a m a n a n d N ic o b a r area w ere ntio

m

p

o

r t a

n

t t l ^

i n

th e A r a b i a n S e a . I t o l d h i m t h a t i t w a s w r o n

g

m

p

r ^

in a

o n e a rm o f th e D e fe n c e S e rv ic e s to p a s ^ ^ e a c b h

a v e h

a d

t h e f r e e d

o m

t o a c t o f f e n s i v

y

u t > t h

n

o

t t J i t e o

f f m

o

r e t h

a n

i t c o u

l d

c h e w

. W

h

e n

h

e b

r o

u

^

u n d esirab ility o f a n y escalatio n o f th e w a ra t

o f w h a th a p p e n e d to G e ^ n a n y o n a few o cca sio ^

th e y k e p t th eir f l e e t s ^

I

u s e d L i r n a v y f u U y , from the start of

m u c h th e r e s to ffc T w

h a v e b een

to b e an n oyed aSri

this p o ssib ility . O n t ^ s h e ^ e " "

w h eth er h e h ad a n v n v ” ^ '

n o ch o ic e '. I then asked

o f the A rm ed

ces m ean in g the P r e s id ^ t. H e s m i l e d and politely

S C IM IT A R / 4 5 9

t h e b u

said, 'N o ,y o u d o n o th a v e to s e e h im '.

Vice Admiral N.P. D atta h o ld s th e sa m e v ie w . H e s a y s ,

^ ^

Another constraint imposed on the Navy, wWch

latitude of

later, was that we w ere told n o t to

o u r n a v a l f o r c e

Porbandarinthe A rabian se a . T h e m a in o je

a n d w a s th e

operating at sea at that tim e s h o u ld ^ ^ y ® p ^ ^ sta n c o m i n g b y sea.

interdiction o f s u p p lie s a n d r e in fo r c e m e n ts

m ilita ry

Pakistan knew as w ell as w e k n e w th a t a ll h e r o i '

go a v e ry

purchases had to reach P a k ista n v ia th e p o r o

^ s ig n ifica n t

useful attempt on the p a rt o f th e N a v y o

th ese su p p lies

contribution to the w ar effo rt w o u ld b e to

Ivlakran C o a st

and we could only do so if w e o p era ted rig h t ^ P

so b eca u se

west of KarachL At that tim e w e w e re in a P°®^

W e st P a k ista n s

Palustan's air force w as alread y fuUy

not h ave an y air-

'vestem andeasiem frontiers. S eco n d ly , th e

o p eratio n s - th ey

craft especially trained o r eq u ip p ed fo r

|

cap ab ility at that

^ d minimal m aritim e recormaissance an d

operation for us

- and so it really w o u ld h av e b een qu i ®

, operations

artificial lim it p laced o n th e In d ian

cou ld acw aU y ^

prevented it fro m c o n tr ib u tin g m u ch m w e ^

. to sea b ad

However, the very fact th at the In d ian

planning to

posed a natural restriction o n n eu tral CO

^he p^^t °

‘0 Karachi. It w as a r\atural

ffected areas-

the

companies n ot to send tankers to w ^ ^ ^

situation

If the Navy had interdicted

the P^kist .-^gevveaks

'vord 'go', Le., from

became critical two

critical

regarding oil and munitions whi

vvould have

garlier-

after the commencement

for p e a ^

Weneadteand*eywouWhavY»«^,,heP3VN3j^^^

A tth e s a m e tim e ,in o rd e tto g ^ ^ ^

ou trefinen c

tankers comiivg to

the

^

Kg Ihe war as a Capla-- ■» “ 1

tW 1™*“;

sionno. to u « *eNavy.

« S

It w as a

Navy c o u l d a l l o w

460 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

R e e t in th e A n d a m a n Is la n d s a n d B a y o f Bengal area. It is surprising th a t w h e n o p e ra tio n s h a d a lre a d y sta rted in Jam m u and Kashmir, o u r s h ip s w e r e le is u re ly s te a m in g fro m P o rt Blair to Calcuttal It was o n ly a t th e la s t m o m e n t th a t th e M y so re w as diverted from near S a n d h e a d s to V is h a k h a p a tn a m w h ile th e Brahm aputra and one of her s is te r s h ip s w e r e a llo w e d to p ro ce e d u p the H ooghly to Calcutta.

F o u r o r fiv e v a lu a b le d a y s w e r e u n n ecessa rily w asted in the process.

W e th e n m a d e a d a s h fo r B o m b a y .

A lso , fo r s o m e in e x p lic a b le re a s o n w e w ere not p ro c e e d n o rth o f a c e rta in a re a , p resu m a b ly because e

,

c o u ld n o t p ro v id e a n y co v e r to u s. P a k ista n N a ^ i D w a r k a a n d g o t a w a y w ith it, b u t its o th e r claim B rah m ap u tra ca u se d

a cu te e m b a r r a s s m ^ t to m e a

C a p ta in . H e re ce iv e d a g a lla n try aw ard w itti

^ t in Bombay

p a ra d e d th e th ree B 's - B rahm apu tra, Beas and h a rb o u r fo r th e b e n e fit o f a ll th e N a v a l A ttaches!

L .K . J h a R e m i n i s c e s

.

^

E v e n S h r iL .K . Jh a w a s co n sid erab ly c ir c u m s p e c t w h i l e ^ ^ ^ * ^

factors that p r e v e n t e d t h e G o v e r r u n e n t fr o m committing fie said/

scale o p eratio n s in stead o f co n fin in g it to a co astal deten A s it h ap p en ed , th e R aim o f K a c h c h h went fo r am icable^t^^^ ^

th e p a p e r p lan for th e o p eration w as f o r t u n a t e l y w or started

fu ll detail ev en at that tim e. T h en , w h en the co cai*'®

K ash m ir, rather in the Jam m u area o f K ash m ir and

ei

the

in to o\ir territory w b ere our tanks could

, ^^etnm a. ^

b rid ges w ere tu jt s tr o i^ enough, there w as a r ^

o f

tbe Ai*

M arshal ( l ^ r Air C hief M arshal) A rjan Singh, the

Staff/

S ta ff, a n d G e n e ra l T .N .C h au d h u ri, tlve C h ie f o f the present at a m eeting to discuss things w here w e all

a sk e d h im w h e th e r h e co u ld tak e o n th e P a k tan k s

. policy

there w as a great deal o f hesitation, again on the

k ee p in g th e co n flict a s n a rro w -b ased a s p o ssib le an d in n o

^^j,gre

thp A k F orce. W h eth er to b r in g in t h e A ir F o rce w as a a v ery cru cial d ecisio n w as in v o lv ed b u t there seem ed to altern ativ e. A ija n agreed to take the P ak tan k s o n a t v ery sno ^

w ith o u t an y p rio r p rep aration and ev en in the late a f t e r n o o n -

h e w as ab le to em p loy h is A ir F o rce to a tta ck the tanks. B u t s b ein g thought as a lo ca l batUe. B u t w e realised that the terrauiw w e w e re flg h tin g w as one w herp w e w ere m u ch m o re vulnera

t h e B LU N TED SC IM rrA J? / 461

notaUowthe thinp<; tn

I ^

d e cjsio n th at w e w o u ld

meantime - e v e r s w i

A d m iral S o m a n h a d in the

ingatthe leash caxn-

o f the A ir F orce - been strain-

fonsideration w h ' h ^ '

actio n '. B u t again th esam e

going into i^ u ^

3 ^“ train t - on u sin g the A ir F orce

another front o ff

felt th a tif w e n o w opened u p

wn

w i

o iJ

uH

l

d no lonoe I,

it w o u ld

ia b

Beco m e a m ajo r engagem ent and

taken that thp ^ ^ ^ f la tte r o f lo calised conflict. So the d e c is io nw _ a

_ s

_

the Nav

m arch to Lahore w ould be la u n c h e d b u t

Arm

b e involved. A nd then the new s that the

cam^

cro ssed the W agah border and was heading for

Was ^

^^dio and P resident A yub w ent on the air.

*^*^Sht th f

stro n g and an g iy broadcast. A dm iralSom an

barred sin «

opening o f the Lahore front m eant that a no-holds-

^^thatw ^

com e and he, 1 think relayed the signal on the

^terbec ^

'v ar w ithP akistan. This had to be countermanded

*‘®alised rtf

w ant to go to that stage so soon. But still we

^^ted j^ ^ ^ ,* ® ^ a v y h a d the capability and if the events so necessi-u sgj/^

think there w ould have been too Jong a hesitation to

fore

*^6 feeling w as strong that if w ecouki contain the Pakistani

the ^ ^ *^ ^ °^ d th e m o n la n d , th en p e r h a p s itw o u ld b e w is er n o t to g e t jj . .^ ''y involved. I knew that the N avy was not h a p p y w ith this

>sion because they were very anxious to go into action.

I

m u st add h ere th at there w as that fateful evening - 1 r e m e m b e r t Very clearly - w h en the P akistan is bom b«d Am ritsar. As that new s

'^^meShastriji ran g m e up to say, 'L et us inform the various am bas-fa d o r s -th e m o st im p o rtan t ones - that this is a very m a j o r c l ^ e thesituation/ W e w e r e f i g h t i n g i n K a s h m i r i n s p i t e o f now Am ritsar had been attacked and t h a t

fowl^ds

totaUy lo f c o u r s e knew that our forces w erepoised to m ove towards

^ r e a t t l Z ^ 5 ^ ' O ne factor was t h e i n c l e m - ^ ^ ^

^ t ev en in g I ran g up ^ ^ ^ ^ . ^ ^ Y ^ e n d f o ^ f ^ o f t h e am bassadors S h riB alraj K apoor, and askedlum to

h avp ahearf at th is h o u r o f

and BIk ,’o mL.. Ha said,

wl».

the nig h t w ho is going to

to T en d / o rtS m . I s e n t f o r h ^

w as h ap p en ingan d so I m ysetf ^

^ a s John Freeman, B r i t i s h

p e o p l e l p e r s o n a n y ^ w w ^ . ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Bowles, the American C om m issioner,

I

being involved if

* ^

r‘?serve n o f

c e a s e fir e w a

conflict got

ta k e n - i f a n y th in

a deri^^ ® ^ o u n c e d . So the Navy

cu s ^ ’^‘V o w n ju d f '

‘^^cision w a s

* ° <^epIoy the Navy was

sed - n n e o f th e r

^^'^olveitprem aturely

"^^^fexnent o v e ^ lr

be

actually c J-

J ^ 'j a b i s in P a k i s t a n ^ f ? ^ '^ a s m u c h acco u n t was that the

bi

n o t w

th e SindK-

® phenom enon with

^ ^ f e r e n t th in g

® P °W e r g a m e to » f i ? “

B h u tto w as in the way

‘d , Ic a n 'tr e c a U t ?

area b ein

w o u ld h av e definitely

to E u

stated i ^ ® * "

targ et though, as I

o f

'e rm s . It m ay well have

r e s t ^ ^ S S in d . S o ^

®^^ng it wou^d

th at Sind was not

bp

ap art frn

W ell h a v p l f t h a t India was

- ^“ °w e d to b e c o m

e g e c x e r a Z

ad d ition al factor of

^ ^ ^ o n e s i ; H

w a r should not

jo i „ i „

A tta c h e a t

V i c e - a ^ ” '®

t h e Ba ®

w ith Paictstan o t

I " d i a n E ^ ' ' J A d m i , a , v ' ^ B » y . ^ a n d s w h i c h i t h a d been Indone.1

^

Jakarta at i h. , ' ^“ ' t h e N a v a l

“ E lu d ed fK ^ cortfiict

J ^ ^ a ^ e d i t s c

h o w e v e r

o f S ? ^’^‘e n d ^ ^ P p o r t fo r P a k is ta n in the

' ® ° t ‘h e ,ew h en ^ ,^ ® ^ „ ^ b m a x ^ ^ ^ e B ?^ ^ ^ a s s is ta n c e which

,o K a ra ch i, she,

* ^ d e d a n d stay ed on

T H E B L U N TE D SC IM ITA R / 463

till the T a sh k e n t a g r e e m e n t w a s sig n e d .

noTA/or

r e la tio n s im p ro v e d a fte r a n e w reg im e gain ed in In d o n e s ia in th e w a k e o f a n a b o rtiv e co u p d'etat.

shorti

o f o u r G o v e rn m e n t p riv a te ly v isited In d on esia S h astr"-\ ^ ^ ^

co m n Y e n ce m e n t o f th e co n flict. H e claim ed th at

^ g iv e n th e n o d to th e v is it, its p u rp o se bein g to persuad e anned^^*^'

‘

sid es in th e co n flict. H e said that h e w as

Presid

better o f re c o g n itio n sign ed by the Indonesian

vUJf 1

S^'ariHng h im w h a t m a y b e d escribed as privileged statu s to J^donesia^ m e e t p e o p le , e tc ., freely.

0 the

- f

. n o w h e r e . T h e In d o n esi an P resid ent ignored hi m, as did in

im p o r t a n c e , a n d h e w a s q u ite u n a b le to in flu en ce ev en ts Is ft a fte r a fe w d a y s' stay.

W e la t e r le a r n t, f r o m p r iv a te so u rc e s , th a t w h e n d ecid in g to g iv e g e n tle m a n th e c o ld s h o u ld e r , th e P resid en t h ad rem ark ed that PC

b e e n o f s o m e h e lp earlier, h e h a d also filled h is

£

m u c h p r e c io u s m e ta l - w h ic h w a s co m p en sa tio n en ou gh ytus s e r v ic e s ! T r u e ? F a ls e ? I d o n o t k n o w , b u t I w o n d er w h at sto ry e m is s a r y h a d to te ll w h e n h e retu rn e d fro m h is fu tile v isit in 1965.

D u r in g th e c o n flic t w ith P a k ista n th ere w ere also rep orts ab o u t s h ip p in g o f tw o In d o n e sia n m issile b o ats in a P ak v essel called

^ n w a r B a k s h a n d th e d e s p a tc h o f a co m p a n y o f In d o n esian M arines

• th e ir P T 7 6 a m p h ib io u s tan k s to E ast P akistan .

Blunted Scim itar

J 'v a s a n e m b itte r e d A d m ira l S o m a n w h o , after the 1965 op eration s w ere s a ?

c riticise d b y the p ress for n o t h av in g gon e into action ,

‘a w h i l e a d d re s s in g se n io r o fficers o f the N av y , N o tw ith s ta n d in g our in itial d isad v an tag e o f the lo cation o n th e E a s t C o a s t a t th e tim e o f t h e co m m en cem en t o f the u ndeclared w a r, a n d th e m a te ria llim ita tio n s o f the sh ip s

e x e r c is e s a w a y fro m b ase, t h e H e e t , w ith th e h e lp o f the v alian t e ffo i^

o f th e d o ck y a rd , to o k the in itiative to seek the en em y ^ d b > f S j;* ™

b a ttle . A lth o u g h this w as n o t ach iev ed , I am sure it had placed itseW

in a p o s itio n to co n tain the en em y in h is w aters if h e had ven tu red out; w

h i c h

, I k n

o w

, w

a s a l l t h a t w

a s e x p e c t e d o f th e F l ^ t .

It is in d e e d a great pity that the role assign ed to the N av y w as m a in ly a d efen siv e one. H isto ry h as p r o v e d o v er and ov er agam ^ t at se a , m ore th a n perhaps on lan d and in the air, offen ce is the b est fo rm o f d efen ce. In the days o f old, w h en there w as n o w ireless

464 / BLU EPR IN T T O BLU EW A TER

co m m u n ica tio n . N e lso n s co u ld p u t tlieir telescopes to their blind eyes an d get aw a y w ith it as h ero es o n to p oftheirrespectivecoluinns.lt in d eed to o k co u rag e to pu t th e telesco p e to the blind eye and win lau rels! B u t it tak es eq u al, if n o t greater, courag*? (peihaps of a d ifferen t kind) to p lay the teth ered r o l e a n d cm b the o ff^ iv e spirit o f a figh tin g fo rce in th e g reater m tio n a l interest as claimed by the au thorities.

, „

T h e Im p lications o f a w ar at sea did n ot seem to havebew y

u n d ersto od in the G o v ern m en t ag encies at m any levels, bu w som e o f these agencies talked g libly o f b l o c k a d e , contraband conn v seiz’m g en em y m erch ant ship s and attack in g enem y wars ps and their ports w ith o u t a p ro p er form al declaration o ^

w ondered w hether they realised that an y such action o ^ e

w

i t h

o u

t t h

e d

e c l a r a t i o n

o

f a

w

a r w

a s lia b le t o b e b ran

a F

especially if any neutral ships b ecam e involved.

control

T h e need for a 'reth in k ' o n the qu estion o f operation

of m aritim e recon ru issance h ad also beco m e apparent.

is vital for the N avy in planning its operations andexec

W hile the Air Force, w ith their m eagre resources

covef

w ith other com m itm ents, valiantly tried to give the

agreed uporv it w as disconcerting to com prehend

^

operatioi's

1 3 3 lakh square m iles of coverage required for

e

actually

undertaken by the Fleet, a bare one lakh square

^

by

b e covered. This too w as achieved in 24 sorties o f

jjy 60

lA F w ith its Liberators and S u p e r c o n s te lla tio n s ,

^ect

sorties of 160 flying hours o f the A lizes. This m e a n t

ships' erulurance, linuted as it w as due to the lack

®

tar\ker, had to be devoted to se a r c h in g for en em y sh ip /

a chance contact, w hich w as a terrible was te, q u ite

iittffectiveness, p a rtic u la rly w ith our m eagre sh ip resour

•

As regards his irubility to obtain G overnm ent approval °5^^jonS/

rectifying the inadequacies in the N avy's si^e, operational levels of sophisticatloi\ of weapons, w eapon control systefi^/^ ^^y other equipment because of the low priority assigned to

forO'^®^

its expansion plans, despite vigorous efforts having been ma

thiee years. Admiral Som an said.

When I canie to Naval Headquarters, I tliought

continue the good work o f my p r e d e c e s s o r # , w h i c h w a s top Navy forw ar, should it ever come. I had not bargained to hav^^^^^g w ithno enerrvy to fight with in peace, e m e rg e n cy or war. I

TH E BLUNTED SCIMITAK / 465

leamt that the D efen ce Ser\'ices are alw ays a t w ar, fighting for their existence. In peace tim e th ey m u st figh t w ith their Governm ent, and in war for their G overrunent.

I

must adm it fran k ly th at th estren g th o f the n avy andits material state was appreciably lo w er in 1965 than w h a tit w as threeyears earlier due mainly to the devil o f 'n o o r lo w p rio rity 'o n the one hand, and the lotion's foreign exch an ge d ifficulties on the other. We could m ake no c ims on the indigenous production on account of overridin g priorities for the A rm y and the A i r F o r c e a n d were required to get what w e n eed ed fro m ab ro a d . But w h e n w e sought foreign e x c h ^ g e the p u rp ose, it w a s n o t a v a ila b le d ue to the sam e A n n y priorities for im porting their hardware, which was furthw

aggravated by the tight situationof this commodity. It vexy mu

«m mds m e o f the m ythological story o f Trishanku who even today betw een H eaven and Hell!

Warfare

.

trade w arfare, in co n fo rm ity w ith h erp o licy in o th M fi^ / ^

J j ^otiniHate any w ar-like measures m the sphere o f ^ P P - « « -

^^J'ever, w hen Pakistan started impoundinglndian

a regular declaration o f war,

On Septem ber 6, 1965 Pakistanstart^

p r ^ - s b y ^

V e «

ships which happened t o be in Pa _

Mead w e i g h t tons) of

were concerned, Pakistan held 13,980

India

s h i p p i n g tonnage with 2,407 tons of

tons of

30,058 DWT of Pakistani ^hippxng toi^g^^-^^^^.'Sdian^

»^tani export cargo for other countnes. In a

^ Karachi

a

Khatau Pasa and Nimaya Sagar,w

a possibility

“ ^ird sailing vessel, Siddiqui. was

Pakistan. There were

v«seltoom ighthav.

*^0 sailing vessels, Al Kazak and

waslyingsub-

'vhich had earlier been operati^

second one was not

"^rged in Mangalore since May

»Jfficer at Chittagong issued ^

contrabandorwarrfm^on^

I«)noraskinghimtounslup any

gj^gls are liable to

of

ship with

warning

" " “f ^ / S e n c e coming u n d e r the head o

condemnation b y a prize court of any o

4 6 6 / b l u e p r i n t TO BLUEW ATER

r i a t n e S r i r

textile p ro d u cts, tobacco articles and matl

j j .

^

^'^^'^sruent o r th eir p ro d u ctio n , manufacture or use.'

Hnincr

T

w ith n o o p tio n b u t to take sim ilar measures. Butin

d ecid ed to avoid the procedures

nf

°

^ ^ rin g a reg u lar w ar. Thu s, instead of issuing a list

1

cor\sidered as co n trab an d o f w ar, they issued a notification er

e C u sto m s A ct o n S ep tem b er 14 p roh ibiting the entry into India o certam classes of goods if in ten d ed to b e carried to Pakistan. The list of

^

i^^clude a n y o f t h e it e m s o f 'c o n d it io n a l contraband'like (w a, teed, forage, etc., in clu d ed in the P akistan i list. W h i l e Pakistan had oa e articles like scu lp tu res, fertilizers, books, p ersw a l effects, etc., w m ch can n ot, b y any stretch o f im agin ation, be treated as contraband, a a t^ken care to avoid off-load ing su ch articles.

HaH fo

offloading o f cargoes fro m n eutral ships, while Pakistan

^ d o f f l o a d r f 2 4 ,I 8 7 .o m o f Indian cargo fro m l9 n e u lr a lv e s « k > d ia h > off-loaded 9,789 ions o f Pakistani cargo fro m 23 neutral vessels. p »

over w h ich Indian had no c o n t r o l ; first,

w ith T ^

^ V geographical position, aU ships com ing

TnH a

b o th co u n tries firs t w e n t to K a ra c h i b efo re com ing t o ^

C h f L l

the East first w en^°

v e s s e lfiT p a V ^

before com ing to India, and out o f t h e 19 neu

reached tbp u c ' ®“ '^ ® '® ^ P ak istan ip o rtso n S ep tem b ar 6 a n d ll m u c h la r o p ^ ^ y ^ ® P ^ ® *^ b erl4;n e x t , In d ia 's v o lu m e o f o v e rse a s trade w « a b o u t

t h e r a ^

P a ^ t a T w

n

U S A a n d

h e n c e

it w a s ^ i n e v i t a b l e

India h a d ; t h i r d

®

I'^ a n tity 'o f I n d i a n im p o rt c a r g o

'bottom s'" InHia'

Pakistani cargo was carried on n

■"d a n ^ e ,S ^ . f ,

'" « P O « a n d i m p o r t , was

w ^ r e o w n e lby India while Pa>®«”

■Mre r a n c e m J ^

' “ “ " h . the t o d i a n a u t h o r i t . c s v « «

Pakistani hands th^ ° “* ^ i r * 8 India-bound cargo from

t a p o r S S ™ , ^ " oft-loading Pakistan-bound cargo because o ^

complications in v o lw ^ * ^

uncertainty o f ownership and other g

As a , 2 „ r ^ i , ” “ ‘^ 8 P»klstan-bound c a r ^ .

,

th e blu n ted SaMITAR / 467

considering th e dis^H

«onand our much Jarge^trad^

o f India's geographical posi-

w addition to thp

.

f a d i a n S ° r f " ' ' ° " ^ ‘'

had detained

" ^aJcjstanj im p o rt

^

a n d l n d i a b a d s e i z e d 7 , 4 0 0 t o n s

Thus 21,443 ton«

p

^

P ° ^ -

®ns off-loaded fro m p I l

^ ^ " s t a n i cargo w a s d e t a i n e d b y I n d i a - 4 , 2 3 8

^°aded from Indian vp=

d etain ed at Indian p o r t s , 7 , 4 1 6 t o n s o f f -

"'Neutral vessels •

p o rts and 9,789 tons o f f - l o a d e d f r o m

^ Wed by Pa ifigi-

p o rts, w h i l e 3 2 , 3 9 4 t o n s o f I n d i a n c a r g o w a s

^^‘ aJcistani portc

o f f - l o a d e d f r o m I n d i a n v e s s e l s d e t a i n e d

' 0 0 to n s o f f - l o a d e d f r o m P a k v e s s e l s B a g h - e - K a r a c h i ton s o f f - l o a d e d from 19 n e u t r a l v e s s e l s i n P a k i s t a n i w a t e r ^ ^ ^ p o r t b e t w e e n W e s t B e n g a l a n d A s s a m , P°rthad|i3jtpH

and p rivate c o m p a n i e s o p e r a t i n g s u c h t r a n s -

;^ ^ ^ f l a t s o f f h

Operations on S e p t e m b e r 5 , 1 9 6 5 , n i n e t e e n s t e a m e r s

^ ^ a t s o f n ■

S team N avigation C o m p a n y a n d 2 2 s t e a m e r s a n d

"^^^fea,

c o m p a n i e s w e r e i m p o u n d e d in the t h e n E a s t P a k i s t a n A /oj

o th er cargo w orth Rs. 5 c r o r e .

tra ^

p erson n el o f Indian s h i p s , s a i l i n g vessels a n d i n l a n d

^*alci5( g ^ ^ P o r t w ere interned in P a k i s t a n while India had i n t e r n e d 4 , 7 4 7

In

from Pakistani ships and inland water t r a n s p o r t .

I n d o - P a k i s t a n i M a r i t i m e C o n f l i c t , 1 9 6 5 - A L e g a l discus . '

^ ^ lya P. Sharm a, an au th o ri^ on international Jaw, while

and t h ^ ^ *^®^egal status o f the 1965 conflict between India and Pakistan Says th^ i t e r ' s seizin g Indian ships a n d o f f - l o a d i n g I n d i a n c a r g o a s p r i z e , P ak istan 's action was a flagrant vioJationof the tenets of inter-

'''orld*^*

regu latin g the freedom o f navigation and the free f l o w o f

^ 3d e and com m erce. H e says,

A cts o f seizing Indian ships and cargoes and institution o f p r i z e p r o

feed in g s are, by anym easure,theexerciseofbelJigerentrightsw hich, in the absence o f a formal state of war, could not legally be resortedto P ak istan . . . . I f s h e had declared war on India, it would have made h er i p s o f a c t o a violator o f public order under the UN C h a r t e r . And i f P akistan chose not to decla re war, a s it act uallyhappened, her coercive activitieso/ the nature and sea Je, in the present case, would be i l J e ^

• . - the nature o f hostilities did not j u s t i f y escalation b y P aJ^ tan to the point o f issuing orders o f contraband of war, seizing s^p s cargoes, establishment of prize courts and their continuation after ceasefire.

t h e p k-

'^ " W c t io n s o n ''® /‘^ * ' ' ° ' a n u n r o n ^ ^ ' ' y - d « p i t e h t t a ^ ^

“« « the

" ? J “ i t t e d i , s e ^ ^ ; ? ' ' ® P ' ° y C , t ^ ^ " " ‘’' y ' o n g p e r S

=“ »>

*‘ ^='te8 y o f th e

c o n flic t e , e d i '™ P ° ^ ^ ^ b y C

0 0 ^ “ ‘' “ P i"

'® q u ir e d s iz e “ ° " ‘ ‘® s in p , e v p “ , 'y - ® « i d e s , h a d , W ^

'»'i

“ '^ ''a is s a n c e l -

P ' ^ ' ^ H i n e t r

'"“ ' “ **

° f a s e c o n d

a i d a d d i t ^ =‘f q u i« H o n o f s u b m , ^’'^ = "‘'" 8 to the 1 9 6 0 s , th e N ia

B a y o f T? v e s s e ls a / ^ ^ '"'^ ritim ere-

i n l 9 7 i w K

e a s il 1

^ o t c o n H r , I f

^^uia's Cii

state nf ”

f

3s was done

Q uest fo r

In d ia n N

® e 't-re lia n ce a n ^ * ° ^ * ® 1960 s ) re n

between

r e U a n c J ° ^ ^

^ c e a n against a

tj^

p o s s ib le ^

^ y ^ l N a v v f

continued

o n

a t th e f a i r ° ^

a s In d ra

d efen ce was neither

a e

a

■

^

ta s k f

^*^ & apore in i

learned to

-

a n y neiohK^^*^^®

e n o ii» K ~‘ ‘f '^ ^ P ^ d e n t India devel-

W e f f

a n d

c o u n t iy

superiority

a

.

n a v ie s to h

a s tn

®f*'at«gic arc from Suez to

I ^ ,? * ^ * S o v ie t b lo r

mufi ,

‘cooperation with

^ « v y a s s ^ '^ ^ ^ '^ ^ ^ e s in ^ n v

^ ^^e Indian Ocean

th e

T o som eextent, the

P a v js 'l? ^ E ffected K y f ^ a v y . Its d e v X n ^

• tan i Or C h in e s e !,

s trin e e n « ^

p ro g ra m m e was con-

T h e p o a f ^

P °® tures.

'

to n o ap p aren t extent by

r^ '^ ite

'PSi* co C ^ w S T lil

p j i a l d e f e n c r * ° ^ ^ u e n c e '^W7? ® ^ a v 3^s g rea ter keenness

" ^ r n a l co sts ® *'®^t to ta iif'

th e

an d m obility and

'^er th e n ex tfn u ^ ^ ^ '^ 0 0 ,0 0 0 /» ^ ° ''e m m e n t 's offer o f a

-^ ^ years o f th e

6 2 ,6 7 0 ,0 0 0 ) to cover the

-n stru c tio n o f th ree Leander

THE BLUNTED SCIMITAR / 469

accep ted in N ovem ber 1964 w ith plans

vessd b v ^ 9^ ^

^ m id-1966 and to com plete the first

modem rip

the G overrunent o f India for the loan of

USA. Hen

g ates w as turned down by both the UK and

thePetyacIass^^

accep ted a So v iet offer o f antisubmarine vessels of

(rf India

signed in 1965. Inaddition, the Government

arm by in

lo n g -stan d in g proposal for setting up a subma-

again, a World W

a training submarine from the UK. Once

requirement of

^ "f^odel subm arine was offered to India against the

®8f6ementw

and hence was not acceptable. An

^

s u b m a ^ ^ ^ conclu ded w ith the Soviet Union for the supply o f four

'^“’I ' p l e t i o n ^ ^ ^ ^ d e f e n c e b o a t s a n d tw o m in e s w e e p e r s w e re n e a rin g

^^quadron ? ( ? ^ ^ ^ s i o n h a d b e e n ta k e n to a c q u ire a ta n k e r f o r th e F le e t;

°^^ered,

a ir c r a f t a n d s o m e A lo u e tte HI h e lic o p te rs h a d b e e n a f

o p e r a t i o n a l b a s e s a n d m a in te n a n c e fa c ilitie s b e g a n to b e and P

(in c lu d in g a n a ir sta tio n a t D ab o lim ), V ishakhap at-

^'^obar r>_

®^air w i t h p r o v is io n fo r d e v e lo p in g a n a v a l b a s e in th e T ? l — u p o f is la n d s a s w eU .

^av n f

e x p a n s i o n o f th e H e e t , c r e a tio n o f a se co n d F le e t fo r

®^PboLrt

® ® « g a l in d ig e n is a t io n o f th e c o n s tru c tio n o f w arsW p s an d

'^ ^ a p o n sy s te n n s a n d e q u ip m e n t, c re a tio n o f a su b m a rin e a tm .

Of a

surface-to-surface and surface-to-air m issiles, estab lish m m t Of the V

of tra in in g a n d o p e ra tio n a l n a v a l b ases, au gm eritation and fire p o w e r o f the fleet a ir a rm a n d a cq u isitio n o f lo r^ -

re co n n a iss a n c e a ircraft during the years that follow ed * e Conco ^ '^ a k c o r \ f b c t (a 'w a r th a tn ev er w a s' so far as the Indian N av y w as co n sid e ra b ly en h an ced the N a v y 's th ree-d im en sio n al

^Urin

r e a c h a n d le th a lity w h ic h w a s a m p ly d em o n stra ted 8 th e 1 9 7 1 o p e r a tio n s a g a in s t th e P a k N av y .

^ ^ ^ e tr o s p e c t

4 7 0 / B L U E PR IN T T O BLU EW A TER

su p p lie s o f fu e l an d m u n itio n s o f w a r to P a k ista n fro m the West. Because o f ^ e e im p o rta n t d eleterio u s fa c to rs - th e lim ited task o f coastal defence m tiie ^ a b i a n S ea fo rced o n the N a v y , a w h o le w eek after the Pak land o ffe D s iv e h a d b e e n lau n ch ed , th e co n sid e ra b ly deficien t material state of th e sh ip s ca u sed b y th e F le e t's p ro lo n g ed d ep lo y m en t in the Bay of Bengal an d th e em b arg o o n its area o f o p era tio n s - th e ro le o f the service had been red u ced to th ia to fa c o a st g u ard re su ltin g in co n sid era b le post-war public and m ed ia v itu p erativ e

a ccu sa tio n s

o f

non-perform ance, parasite

ex isten ce, fair-w eath er p ro p en sity , good w U l-cru ise addiction, etc., rebo u n d in g to the d iscred it o f the -Service.

F ro m th ese p ag es it w o u ld also b e ap p aren t that far from being unw U ling to tak e o n th e task (fo m u d a b le b u t w ell w ithin its capabUities) o f co n tain in g th e en em y at sea, the In d ian N a v y had been ' s t r a i n i n g at the leash to go into actio n fro m the v ery b eg in n in g bu t had been rendered hors d e com bat e v e n b efo re th e corru nencem ent o f th« operations by, fust, the p rep on en ce o f the C h airm an o f the C hiefs o f S ta ff C om m ittee on naval strategic planning and, later, by the au th o rities them selves. What was gained by assign ing su ch a 'te th ered ' ro le to th e N av y and thus preventing It fro m carrying out its tasks, for w h ich it had b een Ivm ing its weapons an skills for years, has rem ained in d iscern ible to this day

14

CHARTJNG THE OCEANS

^ U n d are sva^

o f the co u n try d e m a n d that its co a st an d the seas

^^^yavailahi

su rveyed and that accurate nautical charts are

_^ctisig thei

^'^'®‘^^*3<^’n gn avigation . Navigatorsneedcharts/orcon-

^On. I^autirai

shortest and safest route, in most suitable direc-

arvi

are also required for port development schemes, coast

°^®^” ograp h ic research,

centujj-g

unkn ow n depths has been the mission of hydrographers for

he*

^ * ev ery hidden danger lurking benea th the surface o f the sea

aricj ^

an d navigation made safer. All information laboriously

the fo ^ ^ ^ c a U y collected by the surveyor is continuously published in

^ v ig a tio n a l charts and nautical publications available for

^*■8, so that they m ay sail the seas with confidence.

of ^ y^^'Ographic charting, i.e., charting o f lakes, rivers and seas is the art

®ncG o f compiling and producing charts of the water-covered areas of

j ' ®3rth's surface, whereas hydrography itself is the science dealing with

. ^ w aters o f the earth's surface, including the description of their

Physical features and conditions. Hydrographic charting thus involves the

'^*al task ofp rap a ring charts showingpositions oflakes, rivers and seas, the

contours o f the seabed, thepositions of shallows, deeps and reefs and thedi-

'e ctio n and volum e of currents, whereas hydrography is confined to a

Scientific description o f the position, volume, configuration, motion and

condition o f all the waters of the earth. The word chart, as is known, has been

derived from the French CAarte and the Latin Charta, meanir^ a card.

The Indian Hydrographic Department is as old as the Mavy itself. It has

its roots deep into the past. It is one of the oldest surveyingand mapping or-

S^^isationsofthe

■ ^ « S a V ™

P a S " ■ ^ ' 8 « » » C „”' ' * ' “ 4

r “' '^ *7 , M ca,"® *’ '* * •’Ml chaBi^“ ’ ‘ " ' '^ “ . ™ »te k " * * '* ''

of IhTfad^JJT" *’^‘*’* 8 '^ ?'*' cf >lw Jn<fiw

« ' 1 8 0 6 . H e s u ^ ^ ° l ® “ ^ e y j n g . R o s s c ^

C a n t o n P r o v i n r ^ ? ^ * ^ ® ^ ® ’'® c e H s la n r l

®” *’®‘^® “ ^ e y s in (h e C h in a s c a s

a p o itio n

o f Form n/

j B ®

* '

t o s c i e n t i f i r a

^ ^ p p i n e s u - j - j f ? ^ ^ ' " ® 0'tf'e S tr a i(s o fM a la c c j a n d C

S

^ ^

veys thoiioK

oftfin verified h

O" trigonometric conhol. His

O b s e rv a tio n s . T T ,e « su^

sl»Ow Surnrk- *

the sciell!2'

^8°' withinferiorinstu-

T i n ^

a c c u r a c y a n d a H m K ° ^ ^ 5'< l'^ o g ra p h y w a s in its in t o T , tt» e e a r ly f i f t i p . i l

,

‘ ‘ ® ‘ 'o n to d e ta il

which un^

pioneer in«Kif'* British Hydrographic Departma't

a n c ili

® rto o lt r e s p o i\s ib iiih t

th e s c ie n c e o f h yd ro g rap h y'

P « b H c a t i o n s ~ ^ ^

P r o d u c tio n o f n a u tic a l charts and

^ T i H m

' “ 's a tis fa c tn r t7

^;^®ters. E x p e rie n c e s h o w e d that th^

H v d r n

o f th e

k e e p in g in v ie w th e overall

t f t c h x u ^ f ^

O fific e in In d ia fn *

^ e r e fo r e , d e c id e d to establish the

e s t a b & h ^ ,

th e s e taslcs. T h is o ffice is »

a S *

* " o b t a ? ^ „ " ! > : j! “ ‘^ 'n 'e p r o x im iv o f

^

Naval H ^*’ " '“ ' °" '**P«aaon't** ‘ ’‘P ^ ^ c e d cartograptuc o

Tune 0 1 19«^

O ffic e w a

*nfw«ediate requ irem en '

»• Birpur, W uadun^

2 9 ,1 9 5 7 .

^ P>^esent lo c a tio n o n R aipujr R o a d , Dehradun

CHARTING THE OCEANS /

Meanwhile, the Hydrographic

of 1950 was known as the Marine Survey of Ind-a and

and thedesignation to Tlie Chief Hydrographer.

Govem-

drographer was redesignated as The Chief

working for the

ment of India, as the H ydrographic Branch ^^^ j'^^^^tjono/nautical Navybutwas also the solenational authority or

/^g^ounby-

charts and publications essential for the dev ?

^955 with the

Naval Hydrographic Department was fully

^ ^

StafOI-

appointnfient of Captain (later Admiral an

Cursetji as Chief Hydrographer to the Government 0

Acquisition of S u rveyin g Ships/E^'^*P®'

raphic history is

n.emostJan,ous name of a Survey

Ilaloftheshiplni'esfi:gfl(or-Thefif*s^^_^.^,5urveyii^^'

a ^^iver class Frigate K w fcn '/earn ed 0

-n y je W /th e task tha J

dependence period. However/ k ^ P

the

revision o f s u rv e y s o f th e e n tire In

j j j ^ o r ports ^ converted to

^ n a u t i c a l m ile s , s e v e ra l major

minesweep^^'

(1300

requirement of shipping,

m

« n y out surveying duties ^™ "^gshipa"‘^)%„0 ,ons), 'atef tons) was converted into a

^ » a t c

^ sun'ey^S*’“E?wair-

in place of R o iiftto i

Imum, was also

L „ . b u i W

and 2^2

vem berl5,1956.T T iefirstIn*^^„for220ffi^^^ B„ed

conditioned a n d w ith acco

^ g s , t h r ^

j p h o to g r ^ ^ ^ '’

then

W ith tw o 35 feet

sounders fo r sou nding ^ ^^giotxed

The t e < ^ ^ “

yjng service

r e c o n x ^ i s s a n c e , w a s

‘„ - 2

Since no

in

ig S O s .p e ^ ln p ro f'C -e n O ^

In order to

' ®‘ - ' ' ® * ' n t t o b l u e w a i e r

ihp

o d was san s

ctioned i

and l

esta i

b lis p

h ^ ^

s® sHydlrogra' phic

& D,rect.onal School, V'<!„i“ ^ r t f ^ ‘; ; . * ^ P « ' ^ = « o f t e l 4 v i p 6 S

21,1961. T h e n ™ !,? :,'™

™ "™ »csd funftioAg

1959 and rose to 32 in 1965

surveying offices was 19 in 1954,

^ a r t o g r a p h i c T r a i n m g

p erso n n el fo r the

d ifficu lt to get trained technical

situaH on, o n e C h ief I n s t r n r D e h r a d u n . To overcome Ihe w n H y d ro grap h ic O fficer

''" ^ ° ''° ^ “ ^teered to become a Civil-

H yd rograp hic D epartm pnf

trained fo r a year at the British

as the first P rin cip al C ivil m ^

to India in 1956,he was appointed

tw o surveyors w ere

O fficer (PCHO). The services of

pointed as C ivilian

Su rv ey o f India in 1 9 5 7 and ap-

^ the sam e m odel as

H ydrographic A ssistants wo”

% d r o g r a p h ic Departm ent. Three Civil

at D ehradun in fho

^ recru ited in 1959 and w ere imparted train-

surveying ships iiv the

o f n au tical charts and on board the

1965 a total o f n in e civiHan m

surveys. On December 31,

graphic Assistants were

Officers and civilian Hydro-

the Naval Hydrographic Office, Dehradun.

O j-g a n is a tio n flH o r^ "^ ® ^ m e m b e r o f the Intern ational Hydro-

't s Headquarters

ofhydrographers,

standardise navigationaJ

(M onteC arlo). The M Oendeavours

rn A ’? ^ ^ '® " " ° ^ « i e w o r S ^ ^ ’^^^"dpublicationsonacom nionform at^

7th

‘^o^erences evem

charts without doubts or ambigui^^-

International HydrogranlZ

C aptain J. Cursetji attended the

fK r

Chief Conference

i n 1957

the distinction o f holding

B

(a) Rear Admiral D r v

«

- 1 9 7 2 t o 1 9 8 2

■

■

J > i r e c t o r , I n t e m

a t i o n a l H

y d r o g r a p h i c

W Rear Admiral P.L.P,

.

aser. President D irector C om m ittee, Interna*

CHARTING THE OCEANS / 475

tional Hydrographic Bureau - 1982-87.

Hydrographic Surveys

Hydrographic surveys for th e pu rpose o f charting Indian an d adjoining wafers include areas n o t only in the coastal beJt along peninsular In < but also the waters in and around the Laccadives and the Andainan andNicobar group of islands.

.

During the period 1950-65 about 5000 Square Sea Miles of sounctogs about 1500 miles o f co astlin in c were carried out by the sui^eyingships operating around the Indian peninsula. The foUowingis t ^ chronologic f of hydrographic surveys carried out during this period.

1953-52

(a) Gulf o f K achchh

- Mandvi and Ranwara shoals

^952-53

.

(a) Gulf o f Kachchh

- M andvi to Navinar

Gujarat C oast

.

Creek

(c) Maharashbra CoasI

- Karanja Island

W) O H .a C „ ,» ,

-

(0 ss:s :::

(g) Bom bay H arbour

.

(h) A n d am an Island

'

1953-54

.

,

(a) G ujarat C oast

'

1954-55

(a) Port of Bom bay

(b) A pproaches to ^ m b a y _ g tin ston e Harbour

(c) Andam an Islands

o ^ e a t B a y

(d) Ar^daman Islands

' R o n g aieay

1955-56

Southem& Northern portion

(a) Port of Bombay

^

(b) Tuticorin R o a d ste a d & Harbour

(c) Por\dlcherry

(d ) A p p ro ad h es to Madras

(e ) M a d ra s R o a d s te a d

4 7 6 / B L U E P R IN T T O B L U E W a TER

(f) A n d a m a n Is la n d s

(g ) N ic o b a r Is la n d s

- S te w a rt Sound, Maya Bundar

(h ) G u lf o f C a m b a y

- N a n co w ry H a rb o u r

- Gopnath Point to Southern Portion

1956-57

(a ) G u l f o f K a c h c h h

N a v in a r to Tekra

(b ) G u ja ra t C o a s t

A p p ro ach es to Godia Creek

(c) K e ra la C o a s t

B ey p o re R oads

(d ) K e ra la C o a s t

B ad ag ara Roads

(e) K e ra la C o a s t

A zh ik al R oads

(f) Tam U N a d u C o a s t

C u d d alore

(g ) A n d h ra C o a s t

K istn a p a tn a m Road

(K rish n ap atn am Road)

(h) A n d h ra C o a st

N ag a p a tn a m (Nagappatinam)

(i) A n d h ra C o a s t

C ocan ad a (Kakinada)

(j) A p p ro ach es to

V iz a g a p a tn a m

_ (Vishakhapa tnam)

(k) V iz a g a p a tn a m (V ish akha patnam ) Harbour

U) A n d am an Islands

M id d le Strait to Shoal Bay

1957-58

(a) G u lfo fK a c h c h h

- K an kav ati R iver to Asar Mata

(b) A n d am an Islands

- P ort C om w allis

1958-59

(a) G u lfo fK a c h c h h

Su ltan p u r to K anak av ati River

(b) K erala C oast

A Jlep p ey R o ad

(c) P ort o f C ochin

E m ak u lam Channel

(d) P ort o f C ochin

Sou thern A p p roaches

(e) A pproaches to C ochin

( 0 A ndhra C oast

i) Roads

MasuHpatnam (Machilipatna'"-

(g) A ndam an Islands

Port M eadow s

1959-60

(a) G ujarat C oast

Tadgaon

(b) G ujarat C oast

W ausi Borsi

Tarapur

Belekeri Roads

m ^ " ^ t a k a C o ast

H onavar

2 ,^ " ^ » a k a C o a s t

Lalcshdvveep

Karwar

(h) A ndhra C oast

M inicoy Islands

Bimlipatnam to Agra Rock

CHARTING THE OCEANS / 477

1960-61

(a) Gulf o f K achchh

- P ortofO k ha

(b) Kerala C oast

- Cannanore

(c) GuJf o f M annar

- Sathusamudram Canal

(d) Gulf of M annar

- Sathusamudram Project

(e) Kerala C oast

- Vilinjam

(fl Palk Strait

- Middle Channel

to Kundagol Channel

(-0 Andhra C oast

- Vadarevu Roadstead

W Andaman Islands

- Coco Channel

0) G arN icobar

- Saw ai Bay

C arN icobar

- M alacca Anchorage

0) Lakshdweep

- Androth Island

1361-62

‘

(a) G ulf o f Kachchh

- Approaches to Okha

(b) Karnataka Coast

- Coondapur Koadstead

(c) Maharashtra Coast

- Port Dabhol

1962-63

(a) Maharashtra Coast

- Jaigarh Harbour

(h) Approaches to Mormugao andPanjim

(c) Mormugao and Panjim

(d) Tam il N adu Coast

- Kolachel

(e) Masulipatnam

(f) Krishnapatnam

1963-64

(a) Lakshadweep

- KiJtan bland

(b) G u lf o f Kachchh

-

Rozi

1964-65

- Approaches to Bhavnagar

(a) Gujarat Coast

- Gulf of Cam bay-Southern Portion

(b) Gujarat Coast

- Srivardhan to Bankot

(c) M aharashtra Coast

- Nindakara to Quilon

(d) Kerala Coast

- Jackson Creek

(e) Andaman Islands

- BattiMalv

(f) Nicobar Islands

vfahiirashtra Coast

- Ratnagiri

Diu Head to C

^ i ) U t t l e A ^ u i a m a

478 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEW ATER

T h e first n avig atio n al ch art o f E lp h in sto n e h arbou r and Approaches w as pu blished b y the N aval H y d ro grap h ic O ffice o n ja n u a ry 15,1959 based on d ata collected b y our ships in th e A n d am an s; 28 other navigational charts w ere published untill 1965.

The H ydrographic D ep artm en t o f th e In d ian N avy essentially serves the needs o f m ariners and defence b u t in no less a m easure, the interests of agencies engaged in the exp loration and exp loitatio n of the marine resources in our ocean zone. As tim e goes o n, the responsibilities of surveyors w ill increase w ith the developing em p h asis o n oceanographic science.

Personnel engaged on survey duties in variably spend nearly eight months of the year at sea, w orking on m any o ccasion s in u nhabitable environments for long periods. Theirs is a sp ecialisation requiring considerable pcrsever-ence and dedication in an unobtrusive m anner.

The three arms of the Indian N avy, the surface, the naval air and subm arine are quite w ell know n; the fourth, 'hyd rograp hic dim ension' though as old as the N avy itself, keeps a low profile b u t a continuous silent activity of the silent service.

15

NAVY'S VARIEGATED

p e a c e t im e a c t iv it ie s

"odw ill Visits, Exercises, Rescue at Sea

p .

Aid to

'

^ ^^thoriHes, Disaster Relief, Events

Reviews of the Fleet and Adventure

—

__________ Activities______________

sea has always been a r e w a r d i n g e x p e r i e n c e f o r t h e N a v y ' s m a r i n e r s nip

'"^negafed p e a c e t i m e r o l e s a t s e a i n c l u d e c r o s s i n g - t h e - l i n e ceremo-with L o r d Varuna h o l d i n g c o u r t o n t h e s h i p ' s q u a r t e r d e c k , k e e p i n e

'gii on t h e h i g h s e a s a s t h e c o u n t r y ' s o f f - s h o r e s e n t i n e l s , rushing to the

^ s c u e o f v e s s e l s i n d i s t r e s s o r t h e i r c r e w s o r p a s s e n g e r s , S g h t i n g a s h i n

°o ard fire a t s e a , c o n d u c t i n g s e a r c h a n d r e s c u e o p e r a t i o n s f o r p i l o t s o f it c h e d a i r c r a f t o r s u r v i v o r s o f n a t u r a l d i s a s t e r s , c o l l i s i o n s or sinJdncr p a y i n g g oo d w ill v i s i t s t o f o r a g n c o u n t r i e s , p a r t i c i p a t i n g in e x e r c i s e r nr actuaJ o r a t i o n s , a c c e p t m g t h e c h a l l e n g e o f t h e c a p r i c i o u s o c e a n s Z n dJing the k a l e i d o s c o p e h ^ n e l e m e n t c o n d u c t i n g oceanographic^'

search and many

o/shjp-bome activities. T h e s e often Jead t o

in ter«tin g ev «n £.an d d e v e Jo p m en tsw h ich w o u id b earrecap ifS n an d

Showing the Flag

^ l e taking c a r t ir,

•

Chinese ports a' c * '

®**^3mesp Camhrvi-

'

'''^®^^3nd,Indone-

^ ^ ^ i t e r r l L n e 3 n ^ l p

^ th e

and

‘^ n i i s e s ^ d e l .

European nn^fs in , 1 w

Asian,

dets' and M i d i

Nafi(,nai DpS

a

* e other

o f thie o t ^ r tv^n

C a d e ^ ^ a n c J M M I " ” °

fighting e f f i o ^

to lifp at sea

exposing Cadets

A w o S S , ° ' ^ “''» 'p e « o n n e T

^ “ " P ™ ' ' " *

sea-going and

^ »S *caU v ^ ^ '® !“ “ P “P “ ' « ^ c o n c e T * * ° fo re ig n p o rts w o u ld not be out S o n s an d

^ “'e'^reaHonal

thatthesevisils

N a v a l O f /

™ >=P«d t h » „

“ >« o ffice rs an d m en, Recep-

’'=1 O ffcce, av ers,

' « ™ d o u b te d ly a r e b u t, a s a senior Indiin

Few

J e m s d l ^

o M ? ‘f„“r . '

“ " N a v a l ,

£ P m X 'f T ' ^ “ io p>^s'^.‘t a 'S ™ ''"' P^'^O""®' >«ve to impose on that a SnJt^ **“ sein the cou^tri). ™.™*''®P“ f“ e “^ourcounliyanti

' » ' i r s « £ ' “?> ''“ i*. ™ S !^ ^ „ ™ -'« l« ‘«oexaggerationtosay ourm issvi ^

im pact as it does on a very much

moKv”f

over a w,i,pu

*^oes as m u ch good or more as

enaMp^

these m issions

m atterhow devoted

°

“ Staply that those citi«ns

personnel

^'*ions that our^^^^

number of lectures,

with a hr^

from

can pu t up. Our naval

f ssets of th ena«

° “ tlook, thus aw!f-

richer fo r the experience

i^to foreign ^

There is also an •

the q u a lity o f the human

5

th o s| ^ afJ® '‘®; t enables o u r

S " ‘*

certain circnm st-

to b eco m e familiar

"Nationals in th,

'v h ere

usefu l under

confidence in

visited, t h ^ v ^ f

^ ^ eab Je sectio n s o f Indian

to Visitors

a se n se o f pride and

STv^”i?

’^ « P P e r

^^ombasa, when Delhi was

S ntIemensaid,Tsjo 3^ him if hf ^ . J f ^ g h t perhaps be feeling be o f any help. The old

^ 6 being on a little bit o f India-

™ H N A V r s V A R I E G A T H .P M C E n M E .C n ™ s / .

Naval Rev^w

^

Coronation

dealt wiA in detail later in this r h f ^ '

^erePrime Minister Ja w S a r ia ,M ^ r c ? “ "^ '

AjWankar, the th en

Adm,ra](Jater Admiral)

“ *

Vice

G°^*e hdian Navy

erstwhile Comwrnider-in-

‘^ o m p an y to v isiao rS ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ® ^ p ro v id in g an op p ortu n ity to the ship's on the h o st co n n w

' t

create a favourable impres-

one such v i < ; i r ! K ^ p erso n n el as w ell as the general pubUc.

.’^^^CommanHer /i^V

® training squ adron com p rised the K istm ,

5'gcadets u n d ;; " ' '“ ' f - ^ n ^ o d o r e ) V./.A. V alladares in com m and, can y-Mehta a s h

the H r, with Com m ander flaferCommodoreJ

®arobaza fiafe ^ '^ " ^ ^ f ^ d i n g o f f ic e r a n d LieutenantCom m ander V .E C

'^en to Afusr t t

as the E xecu tive O fficer, carrying m idship-

Iran , K u w ait and S au di A rabia.Barboza recalls,

their^]^^^^'

merchant vessels visiting Muscat painted

}^g ,

P® ^ 3m es on the bare, rocky slopes o f thehills surrounding the

scr

W ithin a short time of our arrival, our high-spirited trainees

other

up the hills to paint their ships' names higher than all the

.

The Sultan o f Muscat's palace overlooked the harbour. Having

Observed the care and courtesy shown towards the citizens of his

‘^fanate w hen our ships were open to visitors, he made an im

P rom ptu decision to visit our ship, bestowing a rare honour on us.

' ^ e n sign in g ou r visitor's bookhepointed to thesurroundingname-

<^overed h ills and said. T h e y are m y visitor's book.'

grew anxious

When

there were no a r r a n ^ f l ^ /inaJly returned, nearer the micinight hour, the Commanding CW

protocol call had smoothly, almost

they blithely r e c o ^

^^^^gfgg party, foUowed by a dinnerparty,

imperceptibly/ tf /pjksy, easy-paced conviviality,

all c o n d u c t e d Y^f-^g^-in-Charge returned the call the next day. He

U ie

officer, bearing all the marks of the weafhet-bea ten

/ “‘•u e p e i n t i d b l u e w a t i r

^ y m o m m ( a r i l y ,f o r t t ,e r e w e r e r c t o z r '^ ‘^^-®“ ®“ “^ P “ ® ^

» d deportm ent

'' ■ y fevourably. H s <tes

sio n al k n o w led g e wouIH h

^

se lf-a s s u ra n c e and sound profes-

fe lt th at the ca lib re o f th^

P ° ^

Abadan, and

^ o u ld th a n th o se o f thp

o ffic e rs , c a s t in a b etter professional

the n a v y Ira n w as develc^ ii^ g

p re sa g e d a good future for

fal (then Commander) R n

^ d i a n n a v y , Delhi, w as acquired, Admi-

: . on d -in -com m an d).

ap p o in ted h erfirstE x ecu tiv eO fficer

s experience o f preD arino fv.

P e n n e y d o w n m em o ry lane and relates

> « ' V.SI1 to a „

'shakeK iow n - o n m e and, later,

^ ^ p ' s band to ma^ P ^ g r a m m e , th e m o s t am u sin g item was to o ff for u ,c

h ™ 10 th e qu a rte rd e c k w ith the guard wd

but

Chief

^*e., h o is tin g the N aval ensig^

c o i ^ n

sm art

P ereira, w as a good musician

G u nnp'^^^^^® ‘^tenantnat

frustrations en-

to a n am ,°"

<^ouldn<!f^'®*' ®

b a n d to do t h e i r act smart^-

turned

j/®®‘^(®^ceptm usicofcourse)andthis

l .

^ "

d T

b v

e ^

er .fr

S o

v m

'^ I

n

^ d

d ii»a , . r

v . i"

s ^

it _

e ^

d e a r A dm iral T

M ountbatten, r r

ee

cc

een

nctl

yy

n

^ P ortsm ou th H arbour. P e r ^

had to be nia*

'^” 'l>ered

"musical scores for the vano

however, the

Lord M

®^®o show n the number

‘* ® '« i b y P e 4 " '' ® W , U , “ “^ M M o u n t b a t t e «

apology to

Lo^.^boysi

R«/cBnWnnwbeautifully

®**®f/hlsreniv

®’'p Jain in g the reason for

«PJy was Tleasedon'tworryyourseif'

THE N AVY’S VARIEGATED PEACETIME ACHVTTIES / 483

sir, the Lord hasri't a n o te o f m usic in his head!' I cannot believ t r u e , b u t i t w a s a g r e a t c o m f o r t a t t h e tim e !

-/^nit/hprause

One incident in Vishakhapatnam is worth r e l a t o g i f o r J ^ ^ ^ ^

it was provoked by a section of people who sh o iJ

and also, hopefuUy, the action we took had a satata^

at least for a while. One morning on wWch

visitors, the crowds on the jetty got out of hand

j„

totallydUorderlyscramblebyUiwersitysl^S|^^^

their hand q u ite e a rly in th e

P j There

manh^llyfora w h i l e l o n g e r b u t t h e y w e r e f i ^ ^ a l W

was real d an g er o f p eo p le, w om en and

to have

pushed into th e w a te r fro m the edge ol^ x _ L fc e them back. While recourse t o p la y in g w a te r h o s e s at the people

union leaders

this w as su cce ssfu l, it provoked a 8^‘^|‘P ° T . g g n i e d prudent at that perhaps, to h u rl ab u ses and footw ear a^

vociferous of the stu-

stage to h a u l in th e b row s (g a n g w a y ).

. j n the process,he fourjd

d e r \ t s , i n h i s f r e n z y , t r i e d

t o h o ld th e

°

brow! H e w a s d ^

him self h an g in g in m id-air on

^ a s troubling him-

assisted o n b o a rd and asked to

change from the vio

was too scare d ev en to reply - ^

^

earlier! After the cro

fist-sh a k in g b e llig e re n t fighter

^giieved man-

us

dispersed, w e p u t h im ashore, ®

^

the

another

H ,e follow ing

th=y

W ith ap olog ies and a reque

agreed, p

f^e ship and

o p p o rL u ty to go

T e l S r e d , w a

sem bled ou tsid e

dki this, and I

order. Nor

ou t ag ain in sm gle We.

^ g i v e s in s u ^ . jtation for Captam

college students conduc

^

^ 3S the ^ .^ ^ stheu n ivetsity

H.N.S. Brow n, Delhi

students. H e a ^ e e d ,p

»u„roro-

from the premises-

^ the Indian Navy w ^ a r tin

n ah on Review of m ^^jutiander,

gxperience of tne

N. KrishM n, th f"

Indian Navy

rhieen Elizabeth H's

was

f iS a n d in June 1953.

Itisa p a rt*’*

484 / B L U E P R IN T T O B L U E W A T E R

every n ow and then. S o o n after h er co ro n atio n as the Queen of Englan d , Q u een E lizab eth 11 d ecid ed o n su ch a review to be held at Spithiead, P o rtsm o u th . A m assed th ere w o u ld be the warsbips of R o y al N a w and som e selected m erch an tm en . The Comn\onwea cou ntries w o u ld also co n trib u te th eir share

sending som e u n its fro m th eir resp ectiv e n av ies.

w ealth cou ntries in clu d in g , th is tim e, su rp rising y,

'

C h a tte ijU s fte C o n u n a n d in g O fficer, w as * e obvious sorts from the In d ian F leet w ere to b e the destroyer,

] '

m ander (later Adirviral) S.M -N an d a in co m m a n d , an

y

(The author w as then serving on b o a rd the D elhi).

Suez

After a brief fuelling h alt at A den and passage

p^jtsmouth

C aral and further halts at Malta and Gibraltar, w e m a e i

had

w ith )ust tw o days to spare b efo re the R ev iew . A va already gathered there w ith ships o f variou s

of Het

dravm up line upon line. The R eview w o u ld b e in

^jgtvveen the

M ajesty the Q ueen and the D u ke o f Edinbu rgh

colum ns reviewing each ship w ith the sh ip 's com pany

j yacht/

the decks and superstructure and cheering th em as the

Surprise, passed by. H aving h ad the tim e to do so,

^^jgtedhy

assembled there w ere gleam mg. A fter our long

heavy seas, w hich v^e had encountered in tiie Bay o f Bisc J '

gyery

have looked like w hat the cat had brought in - bu t not

man-jack on board, including officers, the C ap tain and ^ ^ g jn a n y fell to with a vengeance and sonr\had the Indian trio outs

of the rest.

t h e Conf'

O n the morning of the Review , the Q ueen i n v i t e d

The

m ^ w e a lth Captains to a sherry party o n board the Roya

vvhil®^

Queen looked as though she had stepped out of a fairy

Prmce Philip was inhis element with the N avy, bu t

^ * 0 be

was the eye-catch«r and stunning, especially as she seemed

somewhat of a temper. B u t she was pleasant e n o u g h to u conversation.

of

sVups on review k>oked sp ick and span. B u t

^

w o n d S S . ^ ^ '

^ e n m o d e m S o v iet cru iser Sv^ ^

that time that this ship

d

fost narbmger of the Soviet decision to cease to be a 'lan d anin«^

•n» Review went OH with puncBlious perfection, w ith ship

NAVY'S v a r i e g a t e d PEACETIME ACTTVmES / 485

THE

superstructure) a n d th e s a ilo r s ' 'h u rra ..s rendm g

Yacht slowly steam ed past betw een the

t h e I n d i a n trio sailed

O n co m p letio n o f th eatten d an tcere

Fleet for

eastwards once m ore, this tim e to jom

C om m and er-in-

w here Lord Louis M ountbarten was the Comm

exercises

Chief.

nd of Vice Admiral

The visit of D elhi to A u stralia under

in some Austra-

Barboza (then a C ap tain ) ev o k e d

Battle of the River

liins who h ad se rv e d o n b o a rd the

a ship's beU tha

Plate and a v isit to N ew Z ealan d revealed m eexj

^ e ck e d in a storm off

h a d b e en -a sta sh o rew h en a n a n cien tT a m i s

y^^inural Barboza:

^ New Zealand C oast a few millennia ago-

Perth, the capital o f W estern

Swan River, n ot far from the

of gardens and la

and uncrow ded city, with a rnu P

, buildings-

^ ^as

air „( ™ a e m planning in

Apart from the thousands

open to the pubUc, there '^®’'®^ghtlyoldge«^® '^"tation. On being or in groups. One

jsonally to make a

p h o to ^ p h o

and requested to m eet me p

gpped a

the

ushered into m y

Exeter, taker' nettle of

the battle-scarred British c

Graf^P^'

fhat he

the cruiser Achilles, in the nudj^ °

batU esl^^^g{

l^ined thathe

.o u g h t b e t w e e n m e G e ^ l^ 'd V V o r f ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

cruiser squadron

gcuon photogr

^harf

h a d r e t r i e v e d t h i s h i s t o n c a

. , a r e . p f ^

^

^

^

s o r r . e i n

a , which w e b e ^

them

short

oatsid«

486 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

W h en th ey d isem barked , w ith lin g erin g handshakes and rtdsly ey es,

tr e m ^ u s ly san g A u ld U n g Syne, to the accom p a™ *,. .i

“ ’' " m e n 1 visited th e D o n j o n

at

p rised to se e , d is p la y e d p r o m m m tly

8 d iscovered that it was

‘ S £ r i ‘s ,“. r : r = ;

- • «

ere d b y th e M a o ris fro m a v e s s e l

j . ^,0 official record of

a n d K a s h ia . T h e c u r a to r's w rite -u p sa id : m e r e

^ y h av ecom e

th e w re c k h a v in g ta k e n p la c e in m o d e m tim e

^

ash o re ab o u t th e tim e o f C o o k , o r e v e n e a rlie ■

^^40^ was

the w re c k w a s p e rio d ic a lly b u rie d in th e sa

'

in

exp o sed o n th ree o c ca sio n s. A b o lt fro m

^ ^^tvvas compos^

D o m in io n M u se u m a n d a n a n a ly sis of it sh o w

-

^sed

o f M u n tz m eta l, 60 p er c e n t c o p p e r an d 4 U ^ ^vengala^"'®^^

sh eath in g sh ip s in the o ld en d a y s. T h is c o u l d De a

-

ship \ised in T a m il N a d u in a n c i e n t d a y s.

T h ere w ere occasior\s w h e n g o o d w ill v isits w ere

countries to sow the seed s o f d isco n ten t in o u r m eri or g^jout

®

iruiulge in u nscru p u lou s activ ities. A diru ral K a ta n

j l S taff

W

¥ i

¥ t

i h

vi i

un

ji

i w

vi e

f ceck

r s

sj o

f m

lliy taldng o

uv

e

V r

C

L asa th e C

h

i-e

--f-

^ fHe dO» ^

an incident occu rred w h ich g en erated flu tte r i n ,

®

Extern al A ffairs M inistry, a 'N a v a l' in cid e n t m iscl i Q\ji

..................

b y our _

good friend and n ei ^g hbour, the P eo p les' .

__

( _

^hi -na

fl i-

/

^

w as a

a rtar\

n g

e e

e d

d

t th

h a

at t M

M y

u s

s o

o r

r e

< w

? o

w u

m lid

l p

H a

n y

a a

va g

« o

r o

o d

o w ill vii s

s i

^ t ^

V '.J j^ g h a *

suc-h

-- N

--- a

--v

- a

-- l- v

-- i sit since Independence. S h e w

-- a

--s

- to

. -oriVt^“ .. . d

01

N anking. E n io u te she called at H o n g K o n g - a ca ll o i fuelling. T o enter H on g K ong, she h a d to p ass w i t ^

the «

^ e coastline of the C hinese m ain lan d , b u t w ell

m tem ationally accepted three-m ile territo rial lim it-

u j j t y 3*

lirrut dem and by som e countries w as stiU o f d ou btfu l v

^gct ^

pom t in history. But, neither this fact n or the m ore i « ' P ° * L i r c O ^

^ e M y s o r e w a s o n t h e p o in t o f p a y in g a g o o d w illv is it t o J^ jp ln d ^

deterred the Chinese frnm lodging a forrruil p ro test a g a ^

c h ^

w arship v i^ atm g th eir t e r r i t o S w a t e r s . A fter so m e o fv isitsb etw een S h riS u b im a lD u tt,th eF o reig n S ecre ta ry ,a ^ lercfV

and m uch ponng over charts, it w as decided to sen d a su»ta

THE NAVY'S VARffiGATED PEACETIME ACTIVmES / 487

T '

"Ot see the rep ly that was sent, but

outright rejection that was deserved. I

inp v f

f -e s ire to avoid unpJeasantnesson theeveoftheforthcom -

miVi-

^ x f

M ysore to Chinese ports must have weighed with the

on fh

^®''®^thJess, the e/fronteiy o f making such a flim sy protest w o d

^^ceiving a goodwill visit is difficu lt to credit. Did w e, I

.

then as a sign o f the estrangement that was building up

t country against India? I f we did, would we have been better prepared to m eet the physical aggression that country p eijjetrated on s in 1962? In retrospect, one carinot escape the conviction that we s oiild have been forewarned. Even as far back as a d eca d e ag o at least person in the Government had serious misgivings about China's

^ fides in the m atter o f her declared friendship towards us. TTiat

'vas Sardar VaUabhbhai Patel. Also as I mentioned earlier, there was reason to believe that we were aware, though indirectly, about her activities in Aksai Chin. Was our apparent inaction at that time, and subsequent to it, delibera te or were we just too helpless to do anything about it?

N ot bein g satisfied with this perfidy, the Chinese did their best to sow , su btly and insidiously, seeds o f discontent am ong the visiting sailors. O n the very d ayofh erarriv aJ in Shanghai, the C hinese au thonties sen t cases o f beer on board the Mysore specifically m eant fo r the Indian sailors. They m ight or might not have known, though I choose to believe that they did, that oursailors were not permitted to drink on board. T he C aptain n ataiaU yaccepted the gift an d pu t it aw ay, intend

ing to issu e it to the sailors on appropriate occasions lik e organised picnics and the like. The veiy next day, however, when our sailors landed on shore leave, they were met by Chinese sailors who put their arms around the shoulders of their 'Indian bret^en a n ^ a n ^ to know if they liked the beer. The response naturally was, 'VW ^beer?

■ nieC hinesepatientlyexplainedtothem fhattheyhadpre^^cas^

N a^ es, attempting, o f course, to show the C hinese as being enlightened in this matter. It would have been surprising

?T“ ^ t s o m e o f our sailors were not contaminated by these ideas,and several months to repair the damage, slight as it was, caused

**

propaga” *^-1 had no illusions that, in our Navy, the oflicer-

^ **relationshipand the practical leadership exercised by our officers

* * ^ id e a l. Indeed, I feel that they called for a great deal of overhauling

4S8 / b l u e p r in t t o b l u e w a t e r

revision o f attitudes is called fo r an d T

Pa«ems

^ ^ o p e is tak in e place

Honmg the TacHcal Skills

As ixi the rest thp

a'!

ta

« “ >- * 6 sword.am,o(U»

p o ssih ll

m ade ava M^hf^r

regular exercises, with

* o s e o f '( ^

and su b m a^

* e purpose, and, whenever

iL ___

®^^^^OnwpAlfK

^

of foreign navi'p<:. p^npri’allv

P a k i c f . XT

^ W h ic h ^h;r^e 7

J o i n t E x e r c is e s h eld ott

o S m J ! r - = ' ‘ ‘" '* = n N a t / a n ^ :r

Eypnc

exercises wpro tk o

A ustralian N avy took part. The

^Wine T

^ubmarinp

^ °**eg e Exercises, Antisubmarine

Force

"measure E x e rc isS a

Exerri^

Exercises off p '

Exercises w ith the Indian Air

S f ^ - S ^ P ^ o f t h e N a v v l

^ ear Bom bay and Tactical

deDlovr!!^ territorial waters whp ^

country's presence

* e

pccasion dem anded such as the

areas in

^et-.'/een thp

^ D ecem ber 1959, forpatroJJing

Indian «7 ^ ''^cinity o f Kolak villa

Portuguese-controlled

canturin

^’^ -‘Ocalfishermp

D am an to indicate the extent of

G o i n j ^ l l "

boats.

°P^eventPortuguesevesseIsfrom

pitch-dark nights wi«h the

a s ^ s e x T ""

« i r is o l^

and then dianging the

M v s o rp f^

by Admira

extrem ely hazardous operation

early three decades ago H e r ^ ° ^ * ^ h e n he w as in conunand of During one n f the lET

w

a s ' s t A . C h a k r a ^ v S r ^ , * ^ "

“ " d e r the com m an d of

s tT L

at 2? iS * ® i^ i'^ ® '‘^ 'v ith a screen o f destroyers

^ f n ^ ' ^ P o s i t i o r o f the d lS ,

operaHon. At one

starboaS*% *^°^® *

ship wa

ordered to be ch an g^

I s u d d ^

It S

; from the port side to tl^

enly noticed on the radar scln 11" " ^ *

®^ps

darkened-

t a ship was approaching veO'

THE NAVY'S VARJEGATCD PEACETIME ACTTVniES / 489

to be switched nn

M ysore. I ordered navigation Ugfits

beingconnedfrom”th‘r

larboard. The Hogue, w h ich w as

guide. The H o^ p

° ‘'^ "^ estraig h tin to th eM y s(jr^ ,w h o w asth e

avoidingaction Bofh hn

I J’adn't taken

noise and tearinrr e 4^

‘

^ resounding

% sore had a o °

B oth ships w ere brought to a standstill. T he

t’ows}and

^0 ^‘epeak fforward part o f a ship's

(crushed

^ f

forw ard o f the bridge was stovein

Harbour

?u

^ w rite-off. W e steam ed into T rin com alee

and the h o g u e w as towed there stem first.

"aviea^^n

the ensuing court martial that a defect in the

^ d had ’ H

board th eH o ^ g h a d given an in correct p ictu re

Mysore

niajor collision. The C o m m an d in g O fficer o f the

therefore, exonerated. Hogue's damages were beyond

^’ut

'econom ical repairs'and the ship had to b e w r itte n o ff

g}^ . ® ^ o y sl N avy transferred her entire ship's company to another P in order to enable them to complete their sea time.

retired as the F lag O fficer Commanding-

in 2953' ' -“ Stem N aval Command in 1970, was witness to anothercoU ision He I-

^

^ Com m ander, when he was the Commanding O fficer o f Rana.

-^capitulates the incident in his vivid reminiscence.

Staff College exercises o f f the Mangalore C oast in 1953 w ere

"»arred by a collision between the cruiser Delhi and the 'R' class destroyer R am .

Collisions a re ma de in heaven - mos t o f them anyway. It is seldom that ju st one rash or stupid act of a single person can be blamed. For a reaUy good collision, en-ors of judgement have to coincide with varying decrees of other factors suchasmisunderstandings,incorrectradar p ictu re s, signalling errors o r m aterial b re a k d o w n , to m e n fa o n j^ t a few . T here is som ething definitely preordained. The Delht-Ram mci-in

is known a» singte line rf.ead,

? h ^ h speed, the 'attacking' ships Ranjit, R am and Delhi W orpTthe tar J f w h e n ,a t a b o u t 6, 000yards range, the De/A/, who was r Oi^cer, ordered, 'Act independentJy'. This w as quite unex-attacking in close formation it is normal for the fomta-p e c t e d . w n a

the Senior Officer until the time torpedoes are

^ ^ ‘^ f h e f ir s t i n thechainofm istakeshad been made. As a long-time

“ in torpedo tactics in the Antisubmarine School, I knew that

ih ^ ^ ^ e cta ctio n fo r the R am at thatjuncture would be to close rapidly

»oabm ,t3,000yardso(H ..t

•h eatlack w S d ?„ ! ^ ‘ “ * ® * ’''/ r t a h e a ^ S "

you tur^gli

As i f

t S

~

R an iit l

^ u c k v c o in ;-^

^

a sig-

boaid tn r

torpedo tubes reh-;,-

f^owever, cursing the

^ate to

I n o t i c e d ^

mv saJv

/

so Icontinupw

^

‘°°

j ^ ° 3

°*T*®‘^oes.

®^” 'y s'^ g to sta rb o a irfa n d / ired

^ d someone s h o u tS ^ S °

I heard a Vhoosh'fromastem

bow virtuaUy on top of

^

the Delhi's

^

that I had only a few

!!i

(behind) my funnel. It was

v o r i ^ T ^ ^ astem on bof h

would be cut in

Saved

putting the helm hard to

UD a ' ,

stems came tn

action, the bows swung apart.

C(Su

^3ter m a s t h / ^ resoimding crash sending

had

'''^ ch liad the Staff r n

^

sa tisfa c to ry glancing

the D elhi h^A

officers cheeringi What

'w h ,^ l/ ° r

fired at fh^ ' ' ^ ‘^ " o t sw u ng at all but had steered Thisnf^v. ^ ^ ^ ^ ‘■dwasherf^^^^* by angling the torpedoes. The ed eeh

®ngUng

bein g fired ju st astern o f me-

un gu al aJ^d to my knowl-

i n f o r m r .

to u se th is

In d ia n N a v y before. If the

sbips s h o ^ have been

her last d a y .S o th e ^ " ;^ ^ " s tm is ta k e .L u c k a y fo r th e 2?«naitvvas In 1955 th e Ih d i

fa te f u l c h a in o f even ts.

board

^ying fte flae

^ "« °/ ,^ « « A d m ira lS irS t.J.R .J.T y rw h itto n

nostalgia: ^

Admiral Same

o f Captain (Jater V i«

o n r e c a lls th e c r u is e w ith consid erable

^

first foreign r •

* e Indian

Admiral Tynvlutt *

officers or sailors e v ^ 'i!

never had anything to d

®r before. One can well imagine his

the NAVrs VARIEGATCD PEACFHME ACTTVlTffiS / 491

2ft"sai]mgfrom Bombay

A cou

™ s unaWe lo rejoin.

Admiral anH^T°"

later, first thing in the m orning b e fo r e the (Godavari C n J

2 2 nd D estroy er S qu ad ron

the port

which had been placed on the screen on

destroyer s

ordered b y D22 (Senior Officer of the

^sternof th

speed in line ahead,

it Was tnn ^

‘

^ nianoeuvre o r d e re d b y him . A g o o d manoeuvre

^ s h i n ,'u^^®^^^^*^2 2 hadcutitratherfineandinsteadofbringing cables (a cable is a distance o f 2 0 0 yards) astern o f the ted the

^ horror - as indeed to ours - that he had commit-

^ Was

d estroyer Squadron on a collision course with the Delhi.

franti ^ '^ ^ S im n y se a cabinw hen th eO fficerofth e W atchcalledme j ^3lly on the voicepipe, 'Sir, sir, 22 Ds—22D S... /Irushed up to the tea

thereon the port bow, some three cables (600yards) aw ay,

-

* ^ 8 dow n at high s p e e d , was the 22nd IDS inline abreast, and it was one o f these ships would run into the sid e o f the Delhi, unless

''

som ething immediately - but what?

i realised there was little I could do ex cep t to ord er 'stop all

®*^gines, full speed astern, close all w atertight doors' an d w aited fo r What seemed to be the inevitable.' Fortunately, D22 d id something at the very last moment. Hie two leading ships turned hard-a-port and just cleared the Delhi ah ead , but the last ship realising that this m a

noeuvre wouldbedisastrous, turned hard to starboard and though ^

™ay seem unbeh'evable, went down our port side at a distance which appeared to be no more than 6 to 10 feet!!

I believe thatm osto/usonthe bridge ha d s topped brea thing and,

looking back I recollect how calm and still everything was on the bridge Later w e h e a r d o f the hilarious chaos in the officers'bathroom on the port side aft. The scuttles (port-holes w ere open and there were several officers memly soaping themselv^ under the showers w h ^

to their amazement, they suddenly saw the grey hull of a s^p w J^

oastl All of them scrambled out as they were - wet, soapy and naked -

k n d ran upon the deck Itis a pitya photograph of them at thatmoment

^liiSraliyrw hitt - and indeed, all of us - were somewhat shaken and he probably wondered about the capability of our Heet. He had, days earlier, when the Ranjit and the Rajput had collided, re-

492 / BLU EPR IN T T O BLU EW A TER

m ark ed , 'Y o u ca n n o t m ak e a n o m e le tte w ith o u t cracking eggs';howev er, after tV>e seco n d in cid en t, w e w e re all agreed that if this went on, th ere w o u ld b e v ery few e g g s le ft in th e b ask et! Perhaps th^ did us all a lo t o f g oo d an d b y the tim e w e reach ed C yp ru s, the Fleet had settled dow n and had becom e business like and efficient. Nevertheless,

T y rw h itt w as still an xio u s h o w w e w o u ld p erform J

w ith the M ed iterran ean F leet, w h ich w e did at

. j^ote

At the en d of several w e e k s' in ten siv e exercises, the

th.an satisfied , thie In d ian F leet h a v in g receiv ed m any kuaos C om m an d er-in -C h ief, M ed iterran ean .

T h e Jo in t E xercises h eld a t T rin co m alee also

in

tn the C om m o n w ealth navies to h o ld reg attas an d sp o t

, .j.gjGhandW

w hich the In d ian n av al p ersonn el g enerally excelled , ice relates h is experience o f the 1958 Jo in t E xercises;

Vi'rtl

In 1958, Cauvery h a d an extrem ely g ood w h aler

^

a'champio^

nr the other, w as totally m a m e d b y S ik h sailors.

^gver

crpw, v/ith w hich I had challenged all and sxindry an

down

let m e dow n. W e w o n the annual pu lling (row ing) rega

that year also.

.

m alee there

D uring the Join t Exercises that y ear at Trinco

' Qantbia,

British cruiser, w hose nam e I forget n ow , b u t

gxercisesa^

same classas the Mysore, which w as also present for flew th efla g o f R ear A dm iral A. C h a k r a v a r t i , w i^ C a p ^ ^ j^ a n d e f-in com m and arvd Com m ander K aw as N an av ati as

^j^glee

Gambia challenged M ysore to a w h aler race i^ ^ ’^‘^Jranavati one of the week«\ds w hen all ships w ere in harbouJ-

^

goO

that Mysore's team w as n ot a patch o n Cauvery's; so 1^

i^ysor^ on

organiser,h e a<sked m e to transfer m y crew w ith m y ° j^ysoi^

loan. So, as far as everyone else w as co n c e rn e d , it w as

^

versus the Gambia's. O n tlve day of the race, C om m an ® ^

who was then the Commanding Officer of the ri>“, and g

torboa

W t

BI ,to

\

\J fIol

Wl

IIow

AJ

W th

U. e

I m

C il o

L s

U t

d lexciting race.

g oractic®^*-'

u

The race was duly flagged off and b o th boats

.guards

parallelthrou ghou ttherace,bu tslow lyw e re co n v e rg in g ^

\jO^

other and, after about three quarters o f the distnace,

they

collided. M y Sikh sailors were irate because, I think,

^^jjsed

were slightly ahead and the Britishers had p u rp o se y

collision. To one man, th e entire boat's crew got u p , use

abusive language on the Britishers, got out their oars -

belabouring the British crew.

t h e NAVYS v a r ie g a t e d p e a c e t im e AC77V/HES / 493

ingby us, the baTue o f o^ars^^bpr^

h o w lin g a n d shouf-

started to retaliate

^

had

'owed away

hoatZ C a u v ^

separated. I thereafter

Isaid, 'A ll rieh t^ n n w

upset and, in o r d e r to ca lm them down,

Sunday, even i f ^

f challenge the G am h a to an oth erracen ext

Cauvefy's b o a t'

Jetting the cat out o f the bag that it w as

separated t b J r

though w e k ep t the boats w ell

Britishprc

saiJors w ere very sp o rtin g and invited

sm^li

Matter w e re stu n n e d th a tit was

But th ^

h 3 d to f i g h t s o h a r d to b e a t .

bitte

o ccasio n s w hen s p o r t in g events le d to c o n s id e r-

conside

v ic to ry w as n o t a c c e p te d w i t h g r a c e a n d d e fe a t w a s

''^hen t h % ^ o r s e then an in su lt to the cou ntry's flag. S u c h w a s th e case

N a w t ^

"i® ^ ^ ^ ^ 3 'T *e3 n ^ w o n a h o ck ey m a tch a g a in sfth eln d ia n a jjo 3

th rou gh a so litary goal w hich should not h ave been

®

g a v e the im pression to aJJ present th a t th e y h a d a v e n g e d

g

. ®_®atin th e K a sh m irw a r. C om m ander H ugh G antzer, who was

.

D e l h i at that period and has since d is tin g u is h e d h im s e lfa s a

., ^ ^ ^ ^ i t e r o f n a t i o n a l re p u te , d e s c rib e s th e e p is o d e , 'E v e r y y e a r a fte r

® W onsoons, ships o f the Royal Navy, the P a k is ta n Navy, th e R o y a l

®y*onN avy and th eIh d ian N av y used to m eetin Trincomalee. There,

* ^ e r th e w a tc h fu l e y e o f a B ritis h A d m ir a l w e e x e rc is e d f o r a w e e k .

g o t to k n o w e a c h o th e r 's s tre n g th s a n d w e a k n e s s e s , m a tc h e d o u r

Performance a g a in s t o u r n e ig h b o u r 's a n d th o s e o f th e R o y a l N a v y a n d

r e n e w e d o ld a c q u a in ta n c e s . F ig h tin g m e n g e n e r a lly h a v e a s tra n g e

e m p a th y th a t c r o s s e s in te rn a tio n a l b o rd e rs. O r ra th e r, th a t is th e

th e o ry . But e v e n well-established theories erode with time.

T h e e x e r c is e s c o n c lu d e d w ith o u ta n y m ish a p s or fia y ^ tempers a n d a ll w e h a d to lo o k fo rw a rd to w a s th e J E T h o c k e y m a t ^ J ^ usual we were p itte d a e a in s t P a k ista n . A n d , a s u su a l, w e ^ e c t e d to w in.

I re r^ e m b e r th a t it w a s a s u ltiy e v e n in g o n t h e ^ g r o u n d s : o u r

b o v s / n T f^ P a k s h a d tu rn e d o u t in fu ll fo rce . T h e re w e re a fe w o y s a n d th e P a

a n d a s ca tte rin g o f B riton s. B u t,

^ t h u s i a s t s

th e re w as te n s io n in th e a ir .F e r h a p s lt w as the f t - o m t h e v e . y b e ^ &

so m e th in g else. I t certa in ly

th u n d e r y

F ro m th e v e ry b eg in n in g th e P a k s p la y e d a

w a s n ‘

th e R o y a l N a v y r e fe r e e ju s t sto o d a n d sw e a te d in

^

an d trou sera le a v in g m o s t o f th e w o rk to his C eylo n ese

c o u n te i^ a rt^ ^ m o v e d to w a rd s h a lftim e a n d n o g o a l h ad b een scored .

494 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEW ATER

W e began to get bored.

And then, quite unexpectedly, o n e o f th e P aks rushed forward w ith the ball alm ost glued to h is stick.

Terence Duckworth, our star play er, w a s tak en by surprise and rushed the Pak player.

The m an had ju st crossed the h a lf lin e w h en h e saw Duckworth bearing down on him . H e stopped, lo o k ed aroun d for a team mate to pass the ball to and finding no one, took an alm ig h ty sw ipe that sent the baU racing dow n the field tow ards our goal.

Terence Duckworth, am used at the m an 's panicked reacHon, turned round and called out. 'L eav e it!' h e yelled.

The back stepped aside, grinning, lettin g the ball roll past,

ball's speed fell over the u n ev en field and w e watched it tnckle slowly towards our goal.

Gracefully, and w ith m ock courtesy, our goalie m oved out and

bowed the ball in, showing his contem p t for the player who had shot f r o m o u ts id e t h e 'D '.

its force abnost spent, rolled very, v ery slowly into the

We fiUed the aix w ith our derisive lau ghter but our laughter t ^ e d to abject dismay w hen the soccer-trained R oyal N avy referee blew a shnll, sharp, goal!

^

describe w hat happened after that. The P a ^

w m t wild and their players jam m ed the goalm ou th for the rest of the fn

^'^^‘i^ 'th av e slid a greased n eedle betw een them. And we,

spirit o f sportsm en that w e w ere, refu sed to

ei^ e the referee's obviously ignoreint d ecision (1 d id say tiw'

have changed, didn't I?).

P a k s ^ ^ ’"“ '^ ® "l^ * ‘^^'^®"°'^“ '^ e tro o p e d b a c k tO O u rs h ip s b u t^

co m ^ w A®*! , “

procession through the streets of W

our ships w ith their boats,

W a ,^ g t^ o u ^ th eirlo u d h ailers,h u rled th ech o icestP u n jab i searchlights lanced out and crissnrrossed ^

f ?

^

w anted to lower boats and tackle the Pakistanis-

saw ^ m approaching and I knew that they m eant business.

Admiral) Pritam Singh

t^dbeforethem .H ew asdiessed inshorts andashirtandhis halt

tied m a knot at the top o f his head.

™

VARIEGATO PEACEm,B ACTBTOES / 495

»S, A S

J l t a r r * ' "

” m y o ffice said.- 'H ie y a reh u m iliatin g

m en, listen ed to th e y o w lin e u i-

=temen'. H ep au sed s n S t a / * '

'D ogs d o n o t h u i L -

^ mo K, I will

j

®

the Hme com es to flg h f as

S-mteta

s ^ m e f a c ^ v ° f h

the P akistan i C o m m o d o r e a p o lo g is e d ,

faWsfani ship, the

^

the law

i

^

^ e ir officers beiow decfo and

in cid ^ ;

“ ■

again,

'v a s n ever repeated, b u t JE T w as n e v e r th e s a m e 3 ri too r e c a lls the u nsavou iy incident:

^‘OniaIee^h°°^-

* victory procession through the streets o f Trin-

during thfl

slogans and b ea tin g dru m s. But m o r e w as to fo llo w

bo »

w hen the Pak sailors w ent q u ite b erserk. T h ey to o k to

^thvah^

circled our ships shouting lewd slog an s and hu rlin g uses in choicest Punjabi at ev e r y b o d y fro m the In dian Prixrte fQcL

^ovvnwards. A t the sam e tim e, the P ak sh ip s to o k to firing

^rid Very's lights (coJoured flares p rojected from a p istol) an d searchlights into the sky. The C o m m o d o re o f the Pakistan

^ U ad ro n , a Royal N avy Officer on loan , w as ash o re an d discreetly

*®Pt out o f the picture. What the senior Fakistaru O fficer, C aptain Khan, was up to during aU this nobody knew. Kumour had it

* ^ t aU Pak officers were fo rcib ly con fin ed to their cabins w hile the Sailors ran wild. But the biggest qu estion o f all, a question w hich m e British A d m ira lty sh o u Jd h a v e a s Jce d b u ta p p a re n tly d id n o tw ^ w J^ f the C o m m an d er-in -C h ief o f the British H e e t, a Vice A d s ^ a o f A e

J^oyal N a w was doing during all those deplorable, u n disaphn ed g o ^ K S ^ n ^ o C om m an d er w orth his salt w o u U p ^ t such un-si^m gs-on. X\0

an choraee un d er his com m and.

authorised d e m o ^ T o n ^ ^

N e x t m o i ^ g l c a U ^ o n ^ ^ ^ di5ci|fine and d e co n m i could be en-also t o l ^ m ^

^ consider very seriously whether

forced, I n d ^

y

exercises. The astonishing thing

it w o u ld take p

to a t least express appreciation o f the

was t h a t i t a i a ^ ^

showed in the face o f such vulgar provoca-

re5i t r a m t ^ both F3«» Captain Mahindroo snd 1 had fo exercise

over some veiy angry Indian sailors who were

496 / b l u e p r in t TO BLUEWATER

“ ppo

“ here (hey sol off'

expected, given the know n nrn

^ ^ r i d le d exuberance was to be

India w henever poss’^ 'e anH

P akistan to score a point off

to the

instances and several mnrp

^

profession of tl\e sea tnni-

who followed the

^’rotherhood of the sea fra

^ Ju stifiab le p rid e in the fact that the

colour. But the bitter

barriers o f nationality, race or

T '^ e r in g as to flout evpn

tow ards us was so over

♦hp official attitude th

^

h on o u red tradition. Whatever

^‘^putationformaturitv^Tf *

com e out o f the incident with any

nation as a whnlo

m erely a reflectio n o f the malady of the

0‘=

also of if its successive leaders.

C o itu tio d o rsK JK San"

cruiser took part in in in f^ r^ ^ ^ '^ ^ ® ^ ‘^ 0 "^ a n d o fM y s o re in l9 6 3 when the recalls:

ercises w ith the other com m on w eal th navies. He

monwealth n a v i e s ^ ^

^

in jo in t e x e rc is e s with other com-

C a p ta in N .K ris h n a n i r

c o m p r is e d the Vikranl (wi^

Samson, Flag Offirpr r

^ying the flag o f R e a r Admiral B.A.

som eo f our is tr o v p r c

* e Indian Fleet), the Mysore

^leet, consisting of the

and s u p p l y s h i p s . The British

destroyers, frigates anri

their aircraft carrier, with sojne

Malacca Strait.

” '®^y®^t’m arin es,m etu satth een trancetoth e

Greyer, T h l H a ? O f f i i * r r ^

p lann ed b y A d m iral Sir Desmond

staff. As is normal ! h „ ° ” ^ ® ^ ^ i"g -in -C h ief, F a r E a s t e r n Fleet and and 'Red ' Forces. The B lu f

planned to be betw een the 'Blue

J i p s and was under th

consisted o f the British and Indian

flying his flag in tfie

R ear Adm iral B.A. Samson,

(^ ru o r Officer of th e Fn

®

Force com prised the

s tr o y e r s as e s c o r ts

o

® rnissile cruiser, with two

C>ia«a and Ratia tiie lattp^^ British submarine. The d e s tr o y e r s vver m ^ d e r (later

com m and o f L ie u t e n a n t C o rn -

sWp, Khukri, in the 1971 m

g a lla n t ly w e n t down within

s h a d o w t h e c n n v o y (th e R l

P a k is ta n . I got the s u b m a r in e

and th e n n n to S iia p o r e “^ ° «

forces was a b o u t ^ h o u i.

a llo tte d for th e se p aratio n of the

the Mysore, with

evening at about 1 9 0 0 hours and

'l^ tro y ers initially set course alm ost due north'

WENAVVSVARIEGAT^DPEACEnMEACTTVmES / 497

repiare an Aus^tra'lIaJf

to p r o c e e d to AustraUa to

sistersh ip o f the V ikrani) a

su n k b y M elbourne (a

an d th esu b m arin e T h l i ^

th a t d a y . I w a s th en l e a w ith th e R a m

^w oreported a m a n o , '

n ig h t, a ta b o u t2 0 0 0 1 io u rs, the

searchfor the r n i s s i n c m ' ^ u

^o^^tindependentlyand

thereafter I w a s n n « ^

a ls o o r d e r e d n o t to try to rejoin m e

'vouldnothavpK

°^‘’° ^ ^ “ ^oyersandfortunate]yso,asthey

I sen t /n r m

^

m ain tain the sp eed I h a d in m ind.

^■G. Dastida ?

Officer, Com m ander (Jater Rear A d m ir a l)

Engine Ron

a f E n g i n e e r and o th e r e n g in e e r o fficers a n d

tainedsDef>H^YQ^^^*^^*^^ ^ questioned 'D usty' on the m a x im u m sus-

asied mp

convenientlygivem e. Affersom ehesifation,he

for the

speed I desired. M y r e p ly w as s h o rt a n d c u rt - 28 knots

^ K in rf

hours or sol H e re a d ily ag re e d a n d I then w a rn e d the

vifiila^t

Artificers manning the throttles to be extra a le rt and darlf "

M y s o re w o u ld be steaming at high speed, co m p letely

-

-^ e d and w ithout radar cover,

aji

^

morning, we were almost beyo nd Rangoon. I then

^ *’ed course to south-east with the in te n tio n o f in tercepting the

early next morning. I was rec e iv in g excellently accurate re-

^ r t s from m y submarine, indicating the positio n , course a n d speed o f

the convoy. M y naviga tor then was Lieutenant C o m m an d er (la ter Vice

■Admiral) I.J.S. Khurana. I apprised Indeijit about my intention to

attack the convoy atabout 0300hours the fo llo w in g m orning. W ith h is

" ’agic touch, In d e rjit w o rk e d out, alm o st to within 50 yards, the

position where we w o u ld intercept the 'e n e m y ' c o n v o y I reduced

speed to 20 knots when I reckoned that we were about 30 m iles aw ay

from the convoy's anticipated position.

. . i,

A / terab riefin terv al.Io n iered lh em v ig atm rad arlo tesm l.

rurtner to lu Know,

ogme direction as the convoy and to

place the

By the time we achieved this, we were

^ v e my

^ ^ m the Blue Force! The

hardly eight to ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ .^ ^ ,^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ .g j^ jg ^ j ,^.jhinseconds,her Mysorcwasat

indicate gun-fire. Concuirently, I signaDed the

projectors t

ja^kScatchard,popularlyIcnow nin theR oyalN avy

'Intend toletofftheenem yIightly,usingsix-inch

®’tl!^am ^tinpreferencetornissife^

^

J t e c a short whUe, Admira I Sea tchard signalled to the forces that both the Vikrant and the Victorious and had badly damaged and the

498 / b l u e p r in t TO BLU EW A TER

switched on

N e x t d a y ,r e l .J S S p ° ' ' ° ' ™ « ' i * « h « r s h i p , .

™iphanllydisplayni»mockm sO°

Dockyard, Singapore,tri-

excuses wefe pufforS^b

Desmond Dreyer presided. Some

Victorious Admiral n ^

” ™®"^®‘^^(-Air)oftheW*nw/andtlie

•G enUem aTllZ,!

'*>e« excuses, said,

M ysore with a ll fho ^ ®*'®sted in excuses. Why could you not find the ar^wer to that h t

surveillance available to you?' There was no

of the Bay of Bpnoa^*^^ *o look for a lone cruiser in that vast expanse The same

^

looking for a needle in a haystack!

*^e, 'Tellme whaf

f '

^ cocktail party. Admiral Scatchard asked

Blue Force

the port quarter, because the

from somewherp

would try to bring in an attack

w henever I havp

t n

I repU ed, 'S ir, I am a shikari and

____

.

to ro llo w a

___ T _____ 1______ 1____ mv

quarters, because thaf

m ounded tiger, I particularly guard my

I have orvly foUoivoH tv,

norm ally tigers bring hom e an attack-

a

W

waVthP r '1 ° Tiger from JP S!

^

It did prove that a Trf

C om m onw ealth Join t Exercises of

force, whether a r m ^

^ ’^^Pe^^ient cruiser could be a formidabie

'

w ith missUes o r w ith conventional weapons'-

dignitaries on Board

f a ^ a ^ e t h ^ n S v e ^ ^ ^ T - f d i g n i t a r i e s visit naval ships ^

witness exercises and nf>i

^

m em bers o f the naval fra ternity/

important occasions T h u I

f

‘‘e^i e w the fleet or take passage o

board to see their haloed ho ° P™'^*des unique opportunity to the men In May 1950 »>,«£:

close quarters.

^bhbhai Patel who w aslln

M inister o f India, Sardar Valj

^ tn a 'o n J u ly i2 1991 x

,

the nation's highest award'Bhf

Admiral Sir ph

Secretary ShriV. Shankar and

Navy had m o s tr e lu c S .T r

^

Commanctar-in-Chief of 0 "

against aU c o n v ^ o J T ^ ^

accom m odate la d i» onboard for

sea was quiet, restful and enjoyable for the Sardar who

TH E N A V Y S V A RIEG A TED PEA CETIM E ACTIVITIES / 499

passed through con sid erable ten sio n in the w ak e o f

Pact and the East B en gal refu g ee crisis. T h e Sard ar ev

interest ir\ an exercise at sea in w h ic h tw o d e s tr o ^ r s ^

also took part. D uring the day the p arty u sed to

(later

A s t h e s h i p p a s s e d G o a ,t h e S a r d a r a s k e d t h e t h ^ B n cniiser

to be elevated to A dm iral Sir G eoffrey Barnard)

he could

and the Indian naval squ adron, to take * e ship «

B am ardhow long

andhedid. W h e n t h e y w e r e j u s t opposite G oa, ne

j u g c g i d a m atter of

if would take to effect a lan d in g on G oanese ^ r e s ^

to contend

a few hours describing the guns and

„ou to do it at once/

with. Sardar turned to h im and said: T w ish Ic o

, passage on

In January 1951, P rim e M inister

TrmnaeartoKandla.Kecalls

boardRfl;puf, e s c o t t & d h y R a m a n d Ranjtt, f r o m P

CtfBcer o f the

Admiral R.D. K atari w ho w as at that tim e the t,

^jput,

h d to undertake was to

Almost the first task that the

ftom

transport Prime Minister ^ f ^ ,^ g .I a y iiig

Port for the

Among h is party w e re

social w orker). VVetn

^

andM ridula Sarabhai

the ground that ®

^ny o f it-

the latter from m aking the

she

o f

dinarily taken to sea in ®

the same

the only

W h a t 4 s m o r e , s h e w o u l d ^ ^ t ^ ^ ^ ^

U «

course, w as out of the

C a P « > ^ J ^ d a t e d in (Coin-

suitable for a V.I.P-

had to

occupy mine and

mahder, later A d r ^ a ^

about

^

ii^ the third ship.

below decks in the ^ ^ ^ 5 5 the

and their

made the quick

j e s t e r ,

'1^

jhe bo»*» *°

anchored, the P "

f^ore in

function '^“‘^^howseeined to

tourage were sent

in v it^ ° * f ^ ^ i , w h o s o ^ ^

O fficers, who were a^,jjand.

re tu m b e fo r e j^ e y

^ a sa k

*l^ L ^ k eu sto th esc a u !

flv e m is s e d t^

J» « ;f^ V o rta v a il-b le J^ ^ .‘f ^ ^

ashore

t h e r e w a ^ ^ e j . w a y . a e j ^ ^ . I a d y s o f ^ '

andang^*astaH onw ag

ShesP®**^

500 / B L U E P R IN T T O B L U E W A T E R

c o m b in a tio n o f p e r s u a s io n a n d b lu s te r , com m andeered it; ar\d with a

'h o p in ,b o y s ', ju m p e d a b o a rd , a n d o ff w e w en t. T h e ceremony was half w a y th ro u g h w h e n w e a rriv e d a t G an d h id h a m and, on its conclusion, w e re tu rn e d to o u r sh ip s to s e t sail fo r B o m bay. H ow the contretemps w a s e x p la in e d a w a y an d w h e th e r it sa tisfied M ndu laji, we were nevei In M a rch 1954 D r R a je n d ra P ra sa d to o k passage on board^Deili^

th e flag sh ip , to th e A ndarrw ns a n d w a s esco rte d b y the three destjoye o f the 2 2 n d D estro y er S q u a d ro n , G odavari, G orm ti arid

^

Q u een E liz a b e th , o n b o a rd h e r R o y a l Y ach t,

fro m C olo m b o to A d en b y R ajp u t an d R a m in A p n l 19

w ith so m e ship s o f th e R o y a l N a v y an d P ak istan N avy.

yueo-

G odavari, G om ati an d G an ga also cerem orually

^

g few

Slav P resid en t, M arsh al Jo se p h B ro z T ito 's Y ach t, the

>

Y u g o slav N a v y d estroy ers in to B o m b ay o n D e c ^ r the Yugoslav three destroyers later e sco rted th e P resid en t's Y a m t a

guntia-1*'

destroyers to C alcu tta to em bark th e M arsh al

the

January 1955, M arsh al T ito , w h o h a d retu rned to In d i^ jjarb o u i by C aleb at C och in and w as fo rm ally esco rted out o f Co

,

fjaval

Jum na, Bom bay a n d M adras. A d m iral Sir M ark

fr m the Gale^ a*

C hief, w h o accom panied the M arsh al, disem barked °

escorting

the fairw ay b u oy outside C o ch in H arbou r and the

.-Qjtpatt in

ships, after firing a gun salute to the Y ugoslav Pres

. '

a fontuil farew ell steam -past w h en the M arshal took

Cauvery had the h onour o f carrying the Presid

Qoda'0‘^'

Lakshadw eep Islands in February 1956 and w as escor

and Ganga.

. pj^peror of

During the visit of H is Im perial M ajesty H aile

E

f t u

o p

i a , t o I n

d

i a i n

O

c t o b

e r l 9 5 6 , R

f l ; p

w

t a n

d

i ? a n

; j ^

e s c o r t e d

_

.

ptiit*®

ship to Bom bay. This w as follow ed b y the visit of Zhou

.y ^ g h is

Miiuster of the People's Republic of C hina, to the H eet at Bomtiay short tout of the country in D ecem ber 1956.

at tha*

Rem inisces Adm iral K atari w ho w as the H eet Com m a

time;

D ^ g m y tim e of com m and of the Fleet, I had

the

t a m

i n g t w

o f o r e i g n d

i g n i t a r i e s . T

h

e c o n

t r a s t i n

t h e i r s ty s

impact they m ade o n u s was quite rem arkable. The first

jonchO^

lai whom , along w ithh is entourage, I w as told to entertain

period

board the flagship inBom bay. It w ill be recalled that this wa s

of the m uch-m ade-of fraternal relatioi\s betw een our

Whether it was to illustrate this in action, or the pervasive

THE NAVY'S V a r i e g a t e d PEACETIME A c n v m E S / so i Ihit any warship exu des, or the fact th at C h ou w as naturaUy a gregarious person I w o uld n't know , but from the m om ent he s te p p e d on teard, he set the tone for inform ality. W ithin a few m inutes on board, was in anim ated con versation in fluent English with the young ficers. The official interpreter w as ignored. Every so often, lo u d

^ f a w s of laughter em an ated from the group where Chou En-lai h e ld

stage with his w itticism s and sallies. So m uch so that M r s . R a ja n

^ehru, the wife of ou r A m bassad or to China, R .K . Nehru who was ac-the party, thought it necessary to take m e aside to suggest

t ^ did som ething to restrain m y young officers and make them

^derstand that they w ere entertaining a very im portantHead of Government. I reassured her that m y officers could be relied upon not to

exceed the bounds of propriety and decorum. I also a d d e d th a t th e y,

Chou En-lai included, appeared to be enjoying themselves and suggested that it w as best to leave them alone. I believe * a t the

occasion turned out tobeanoutstandingsuccess.Icertainlyfound him

‘0 be one o f the easiest o f high dignitaries to entertain.

.

Ishouldm entionthatafew w eeksearaer,w e

®

"^ ita ry dolegationheaded by a G eneral (I

th em selv es and ap-

a day's exercises at sea o f f C ochin. T h ey g^en those

Plauded loudly every item of exercise that we earned o u t even

'vhich ! th o u gh t were indifferently

Russian d ig n ita ry .

The other V.I.P. I had to

t on board the flagship

^‘arshal Zukhov. H e was to

a strain as the earlier

Cochin. This turned out to

an d lam clearin m ^ d th at

occasion with Chou En-lai was a p

'

|,e a n i y ^

U was not of m y -ald n g . I - s p « t ^ ^ ^ ^

Cochin, he had developed a '‘^P^^^^'epdon in the same

receive either the official or P ° K “^ ^ h c h e v who

had been accorded to

i understood

^

car

only a little while

“^ ‘S ^ lo c a te d limou-

day, when he w as

^

in place o/the

thelrapplause

w h ic h h e i^ is t ^ o "

^ d s a s w id e ly e n * ^

he stepped on

b o a r d ,h e v u tu a U y .- ^

m an d ed to kn^vv

1 f^do so. but he could

the t e m p t a ^ masons which

the d i s c u s s i o n , I looked

plain

A ccept then,. A*®*"®* “ ® h j f S r a g e and was standing behind hitn, a

5 0 2 / B L U E P R IN T T O B L U E W A T E R

c o u ld re p ly , Z u k h o v ch ip p e d in w ith , 'M y staff thii\k as I do'. The d is c m s io n w a s o b v io u s ly re a c h in g a p o in t o f exasperation to both s id e s b u t th e c lim a x c a m e w h e n Z u ld io v m ad e the provocative observ a tio n th a t w e w e re b u y in g th e ca rrier a t ih e behest o f the British and to p le a s e th e m . T h a t w a s to o m u c h to a ccep t, and I w as provoked into s a y in g . 'M a rs h a l Z u k h o v , y o u a re a ren ov m ed m ilitary leader and one o f R u s s ia 's h e ro e s in th e la s t w a r. I, th erefo re, consider it a great honour th a t y o u s h o u ld h a v e d eig n ed to d iscu ss m ilitary matters which hvim ble m e . B u t y o u m u s t co n ce d e th a t I w o u ld advise my government in a m arm er th a t I fe e l is b e s t fo r m y co u n try an d i lot at thebehest of any fo re ig n p o w er/ T h a t, reg retta b ly b ro u g h t the conversation to w a b m p t h a lt. Z u k h o v m arch ed straig h t to h is p lace at tlie dinner ta ' e (th e d in n e r its e lf w a s n o t q u ite read y to b e served ). The meal wasa nwr s ile n t a ffa ir w ith th e silen ce o f ten sio n . Im m ed iately after b e g g e d to b e p u t ash o re, n o t ev en w aitin g to participate in the cus o a ry e x d ta n g e o f g ifts. H e le ft h is s ta ff to d o th e necessary

‘ jj,

W h e n it w a s all o v er, w e all, in clu d in g ou r M ilitary A a M o sco w , B rig ad ier N an av ati, sa t d o w n to h old the ineviia m o rtem . N an av ati related h o w the ^farshal. throughout ms o offtm siv ely critical o f ev ery th in g h e saw and offered advice o th in g u n d er tlve su n , fro m ag ricu ltu re and an im al husbandly tri 3I p ro d u ctio n . Nai^avati co n clu d ed b y sa5W g that he was g^t

so m e oi\e h ad th e co u rage to let Z ukh ov k n o w tha t h e could n to g et aw ay w ith su ch offen siv e b eh av io u r all the time P resid en t T ito o f Y u g oslavia paid an oth er state visit to w the

1959. H e arrived at M adras o n board h is yach t C aleb, escort r^jputr

Y ugoslav d estroyers Split and Lovecen, and six Indian destroyer®'

R anjit, R a m , G odavari, G om ati and Ganga.

,

Earl M ou n tbatten o f Burm a, the then A dm iral o f the Fleet o

N avy , paid a v isit to the Indian Fleet at Bom bay and boa rded Vikran

h is stay in India in A pril-M ay 1963.

.

T h e th en Vice-Prewident o f India, Dr. Z a k i r H u s s a i n ,e m b a r K e a

at C ochin on M arch 2 4,1964 for a cruise to the Lakshadweep Islari

•

the visit, h e returned to C ochLi and disem barked on M arch 29.

^ ^

Rear A dndralS.G .K annarkar takes us back to the early 1 9 5 0 s W

I n d ^ Fleet, conunanded by R ear Adntiral G . Barnard, w as on a ^

cruise to the m ajor ports o f East Africa and he w a* commanding During an Eaat A frican cruise in the sum m er o f 1951, Adm iral w as m ade an honorary m em ber o f nunrwrous European

declined all the m emberships infom ung the clubs that if his ^

VARIEGATED PEACETIME A C n v m E S / 503

t h e NAVY’S

to

officers were w e lc o n « d at th ese

accept their in vitation s; o t h ^ i s e h e w a s

K enyatta cam e up.

At a conversaHon in N airo b i th e n a m e o J

,

,

train

A t m y r e q u e s t a s p e c ia lf e s t c l a s s c o m p a ^ ^ '^ ^ ^ ^ ^ jj^ y g jj^ a y a l to bringMr K enyatta to M o m b a s a . I w as pie

to M o m b a sa

Gunner on board the D e lh i, a n E n g lis h m a n , o

.

K e n y a tta .

S.aaon,alor,gwithoneof.r,yIndlanofficers,torecelve;omo^ y

This caused som e co n stern atio n at the

- - h liv e d in m y cabin

T S m alw ays rem em ber the

boarded the flag sh ip .H e said:

/saUors rem ovingpaintfrom

cmiserit w as as p art o f the

for aU y o u r kindness.

a s h ip 's s id e w ith a b lu n tin s tr u m e n t).T h a n K y

^ ^p^^w atic

Knowledge o f protocol and skiU

negotiations or

prudence are u seh il tools during

^ a s h o r e an d a f l o a t ^ ^

s*ons with foreigners and cerem oru als a b r ^ protected with are occasions w hen national p re sti^ ^ ^ ^ diplomatic ® *^ ^ ^ y ^ A d m iral obsequious m em bers of the

, ^j^g^ocal

(later

proved they kow tow to the w h » ^

Saigon

° observance o f

R K 5. Ghandhi recaUs an in ^ ^ ^ ^ j

that

Commodore) D.R. Mehta po^*®Xonouf being brough

protocol and prevented any

j^colour:

bedecked the ship's forecastle, th

n r ,w ith

cruise to

wd

. 1

“ T ^ ~nfe<-

got a rousing

P tcsi"*^ '

on !« » "*-

Bie Viem>”

b®

whi*^

5 0 4 / B L U E P R IN T T O B L U E W A T E R

thereafter proceed to the bridge of the Cauvery and then come back to the Captain's cabin in the Tir.

Com m ander Mehta then said that President Diem would sitin the arm ed chair in his cabin and that other persons would sit on the settee and other chairs and thathe would open a bottle of champagne todtink to th e P r e s id e n t 's h e a lth . W h e n C o m m a n d e r M ehta mentioned that we w o u ld aU b e s itt in g d o w n , th e V ie tn a m e s e P rotocol Officer was quite h o r r if ie d a n d s a id th a t, in th e p re s e n c e o f P r e s id ^ t Diem, w o u ld h a v e to s ta n d . C o m m a n d e r M e h ta s ta te d quite f i m ^

h is c a b in a n d th a t P r e s id e n t D ie m w o u ld sit, adding

•

m a n d e r M e h ta , w o u ld s it o n th e c h a ir n e x t to D iem and C o m m a n d e r G h a n d h i, h is b r o th e r o ffice r, w o u ld sit on tm o ^

a n d , if th e o th e rs w is h e d to s ta n d , th e y co u ld do so, tm C o m ir ia n d in g O ffic e r s w o u ld s it d o w n .

Mphta and spoke

O u r A m b a ssa d o r tried to p ersu ad e C o m m an d er

the

to h i m i n H in d i a n d p le a d e d , 'P le a s e a g re e w ith P r o to c o l O ffic e r .' T h is o n ly m a d e C o m m a n d e r M

a gggted

r e s o lv e th a t th e tw o C onru nanding O fficers w o u l p

jjgh that he

s a id to th e A m b a ss a d o r a n d th e P ro to c o l O fficer m c o u ld n o t s h ift h is sta n d .

rinn and

W h e re u p o n I trie d to h a v e a

sit

C o m m a n d e r M eh ta in G u ja ra ti a n d said , 'A ll

,^ .j.} ( s ;h e tum ^

a n d I w iU sta n d .' I m u s t g iv e co n u n a n d e r M ehta English^ said/

ro u n d to m e q u ite s h a rp ly an d, o n ce ag ain

'N o b o th y o u an d I w ill sit. T h e re are p la ces fo r other o b u t if th ey w is h to stan d , th ey co u ld sta n d .'

, everythifi

O n th e ap p o in ted d ay . P resid en t D ie m a m v e

w e n t o ff lik e clo ck w o rk , in clu d in g th e fa ct

^

rhampaS^®

M eh ta an d I sa t o n eith er side o f D iem an d

pj. and othe^*

w h ilst o u r A m bassad or, the V ietn am ese P ro tocol Q n ic sto o d w atch in g u s.

Ambassado’'

I a m n o t v ery su re w h eth er this w as reported b y oitf

to th e M iiu stry o f E xtern al A f fa irs,b u t I certainly did n ot n m ore ab o u t it.

-V)year®

N o w , lo o kin g b a ck at things w h ich happened about

quite

I a m m ore th an h ap p y that C om m ander M ehta took this fir*"

correct stand.

R escu e a t S ea

O ne of the tasks tradiHonally assignated to the N avy is the rescue passengers and crew in tim es of natural disasters, collisions, s

t h e N A V Y S VARIEGATED P E A C E n M E A C U V m E S / 505

disabiUty due to e n g in e fa ilu re ,

epidem ics and other

assistance to civ il a u th o ritie s d u rin g

,

^

Singapore

calarmties. In 1 9 5 2 , Tir re n d e re d

P ort T ru st Tug »

vessel.In Ju lyl958K sin a,alon gw im ^ eC

American tanker which had

sent to the assistance of Caney, a 10,700

,

300 miles south o

been disabled due to a m ajor electncal breax

M

■

■ -an-c •’'"viH.ri to the civil autton lif^';^frt«i

Ihe aid an a assistance

rocovery o t hsnernwn

period included air and sea search or

.

^ 1954,

0 5 4 to

adrift off the K erala C oast after a f

islands in

medical team o n board Rana to

^ broken out in th ^ e ^

^

conibat an epidem ic o f dysentry w

,

organisatio^ living opera-

m nning the C ochin Port offices f ^ . ^ S a m s conducted

workers' strike in 1954. ll-e

Cochin

of

tioTO to repair submarine

undertook “ { ‘S c is io n n in n e l of

the nuclear pow er station at B

jj^pectionof thele

Galathia inTu ticorin, c a m ^ out

the Navy m ov^

the Bhakra D am and

1 9 5 8 . m the

assistance to

16 lakh from the sea off M a n ^

^ ^^^glcotta

Bengal, Madras, Bombay

of

aground

the port authorities d. ^ 8

.„^(P»«,W d^^^^

"irfttiegro""^'

An American tanker,

^ugu^*

W to the scene of

the

in the L ak sh ad w ^ P

cochin,

^ ^ 3 7 officers an

exercisinginthevionity

^ g g n tjrtc

yvhose*^'

ing and succeeded iriT®®

to

t ship/

27, I960 and

stricken tanker

o t a

gomhay ® "^ons of freshwater.

Dharini rushed t o ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ i^ f e r r in g 12«

j Krnken down

.,,dingtra*“ ., rM/eswhicn'^j

ueht »

chinery had

/Atlantic

j

vvas

O n M ay 1

6

,

,

«

*

’

r»«<«

about 85 miles off X n ^ o n th l^ j^ tt»e Arabian

^

Bombay

of

S u re d m e n *® J Bombay-

..faculty in

rushed to

^ victi**^' ^eRatta and

which wasin

j ^

were then tr

\ ^ in to w by ^ j® .

an ®^8^®p(jiately sailed

5 0 6 / B L U E P R IN T T O B L U E W A T E R

nxunber of visitors stranded in the islands.

A P a k is ta n m e rc h a n t sh ip , Chittagong City, w h ile on passage in tht A ra b ia n S e a , h a d a n o u tb re a k o f fire o n b o a rd o n M arch 22,1962. Tir, which w a s in th e v ic in ity , ru sh e d to th e sh ip in d istress, w en t alongside and b ro u g h t th e fire u n d e r co n tro l. In Ju n e 1962 Beas w a s rushed from Cochin to r e s c u e fis h e rm e n c a u g h t in a s to rm o ff th e K era la C o a st and in August 1962

Abhay an d Hathi sailed fro m C o ch in an d lo cated a m issing fishing craft off C o la ch e l.

A m o to r v e s se l, M V G reta, w h ic h w a s ad rift in th e Arabian Sea after lo siiv g h e rp ro p e lle rs, w a s to w e d to B o m b a y b y KistJW o n jan u ary 5,1963.

Iiu lia n sh ip , In dian P ion eer, w h ic h h a d ru n ag rotin d at the entrance o V ish a k h a p a tn a m H a rb o u r, so u g h t n a v a l assista n ce and a diving team sw ceed ed in re flo a tin g h e r after lo ca tin g an d p a tch in g up three holes m sW p 's s h a ft tu n n el.

c„rritri

F o u r ship s o f th e In d ia n N a v y , T ir, C au very, Subhadra and a ssisted b y lA F m aritim e a ircraft fro m P u n e, carried o u t a thoroug ®

^

for p o ssib le su rv iv o rs fro m a U ruted A rab A irlines C o m et lych

w h ich h a d crash ed o ff M ad h Islan d o n Ju ly 27, 1963. The sear co m m en ced o n Ju ly 2 8 w a s co n sid erably h am p ered b y severe w eath er b u t n o su rvivo r or d ebris o f the airlin er cou ld b e located q „

2 w h e n several dead bo d ies w ere p ick ed up and brou g h t to Bo A ugust 4, m em bers o f the d ip lom atic corps and press em barked o n K irpan, p roceed ed to the site o f ^ e aircrash and conduc last rites of th e d eceased.

.

M agar, in coUaboration w ith lA F aircraft, carried out a

^ e n ,

area o ff K akinada for the recovery o f 75 fish in g b o ats and 450 fis

^

w ho h ad b een reported m issing after a severe cyclon e, and resc _

numberof fishermen.Kfl/pufandlnoesti^aforlocatedthewreckageoia

C ub aircraft w h ich h ad crashed at sea o ff the M aharashtra Coast an ^

body o f one o f the occupants o f the aircraft w as recovered and Bom bay. A fter a tidal w ave had w ashed aw ay the rail link

dapam andD hanushkodiandinuixdated tlve area in December 1964,

^

and Shards picked up a total o f 1453 persons stranded at Dhanushkodi

'h e m to M andapam during the period from D ecem ber 24 to

The N aval Fleet carried out three rescue operations during 1965-

rescued a m otor launch belonging to the Custom s departm ent which

®

distress betw eenPorto N ovo and Cuddalore on August 28; Beas, during"®

passage from Bom bay to M adras, rescued the crew of the G reek ship/

before the later sank at sea on July 11,1965; Dharini and K arwar rescued crew o f MflnrfW w hich was indistressandhadbeached inK ola B a y n e a r Goa-

THE NAVY’S VARIEGATED PEACETIME ACnvmES / 507

Aid to C iv il A u th o r itie s

In July 1960 the Indian N avy, along with the Army and the ^ Force, undertook the m ain tenan ce of essential services during a Central Govern ment employees strike; N aval personnel assisted in marining the unpor an shoreinstallationsandD ei/ii,i?/2n/ f^ an d i?fl«flstood by atC aIcu tta nng

strike.

„

.

In 1964, N aval personnel m anned the ports and

Marmagao, V ishakhapatnam and Cochin

at Manga-

strike between M ay and July. During June 1964 Inv ^

dredged

lore to assist the civil authorities inradioactive tracer studie

outer channel.

,r masters

Calcutta Port

In January 1965, w hen the assistant harbour makers

«mck work, n officers of * e Navy

f X

t A o u t ^ u s

Conumssioners in piloting and berthing ship

Vice Admiral V.E.C. Barboza,

During the Brirish regime, the Lighthouse o n j ^ c y ^ Ceylon

kshadweep Group was

^ ^ a s adm inistered by theCoII^-

h o u se S e r v ic e , th o u g h th e is la n d i

^ ^ ^ g p g r ig y s b e t w ^

to r o f M alabar in B ritish ln d ia . P ost

^ ^ decision to tra^^a

Governments of India and ^ ^ ^ ^ i n d i a a n d T i r w a s d ^ t ^

a U re sp o n sib ility fo rth e lig h ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

p a r tic ip a te in th e h a n d m g o

the time of

tellir^g me that - e r y

*^p's

house had to pay a made in the sh^ oddiyenough/

pacing i., A

Fnvy

owners informed

into the Bntisn

the money so earned w

hiie,

poUti^l^'ov'Jrtones

ftheTrrbutmy

Baiboza recalls three

. r i n j i i n y c o j n n ^ * ^ y l ^ i t to

“ 8 / b l u e p r i n t T O BLU EW A TER

W

im

w

s

a

s

n ets o u t. O n o u r a p p ro a ch f t e v iT -

/” °^®'^*^^'vlerswiththeii

t^nm ese v essels

f u -" '

apprahension

.

O n an oth er o c c a s L f w h ^

^

p icked up an S O S m essag e frnm ' 'o

^ Lakshadw eep waters, we

City. Sh e h a d a fire o n b n f rH ^ ^ P ak istan i m erch an t ship Chittagong

= bou , 300 m ilesT o S . ™

secu ring alon gsid e h er w o n *

f ‘

^^^scue and, after

strenu ou s effort bv inv'rro

t*

abo u t tw elve hours of

J e ad jacent m ach in ery sv7cp<i

J

^

^olds carrying coir; and

the crew to operate

and suffocating for

^ g lis h m a n , w as the s n ' t « ^

m in u tes. T h e ship 's master, an

C harles Laughton. W h t^ \

u

o f the w ellk n o w n British actor

legal aspects o f the rp«!r,

co m e o n board to discuss the

Preventedhimf^omnpt>^,^•^^•

say in g that his corpulence

W ooden rungs) frnm h i f ck-^

the Ja c o b 's lad d er (a rope ladder with

told us that the M astPr h h

^ ^ e r, h is P akistani Chief Officer

contented himself with mm

visited the scen e o f the fire and had

he finally signed the sf anH

. §

*he Bridge or in his cabin. However,

should have received a on

‘^°<^*^ments con cern ing the rescue (we

hut none ever cam e our w^y)

salvage m on ey for the rescue,

Sri Lankan cadets on b o ir d « h

also in 1962. W e had a few

s o S

Nava" H e a rt^

opportunity to h o ld meeti n g

" .^dministra tivP

D efence Minishy to

with the news

'^oundpH^**°" ® formal visit to India);

^ the uniform of a

was sn l v

embroid0 | ^

a dab hand

®

He anna

* e Tir dressed

at cooking.

PP

enjoyed a reputation for

THE N A V Y 'S V A R IE G A T E D P E A C E T IM E A C TTV rriES / 509

Diving A ssistance

In September 1959, on an u rg en t re q u e st m a d e b y th e G o v ern m en t o f Punjab, the Navy rushed a team o f o n e o ffice r an d six d iv e rts to the Bhakra Dam to carry out a su rvey o f th e a p p ro a ch e s to the tu nn el w h ere cem en t Wocks were being dropped to seal the d iv ersio n tu nnel and to salv ag e a 7 3 -

londraft tube gate from the left povv e r p lan t. T h e task w as com p leted by the

■'“'ing team by Septem ber 3 0 ,1959.

A diving team consisting of one officer and six divers w as transported

® ^^^icobar onboard Investigator in April 1960 for carrying out a

“

formations n ear the M alacca Jetty at C ar N icobar. After the i^ h a l

^"^ey,-coral reefs in the area w ere blasted to render approaches s ^ f e f o r

"^vigatioa During 1960 diving team s w ere also sent to the Tungabhadra

^ Bhakra Dam s sev eral lim es to su rvey and salvage u n d en valer eqw p-oear blocked tunnels an d operate underw ater

^ M ay

‘^ • diving team co m p risin g o n e officer and five d - ®

™"*rabad to clear an u n d e rw a te r o b stru ctio n in the Tungabhadra Dam m

'^'Tiataka.

. ,

h

During 1961 diving team s w ere deputed to the

Dams'

Dams for providing assistance in the

( ^*''3ter machinery. These teanns also render

d r y d o c k

of the steel sheet piles of the ^ ’^^^^ggsenge'rs of a bus which R in d e d re m o v a l o f a n obstructiO T to th

| j

o / a p m -s lo d t

• V in T a r rtl N a d u , d e silta tio n o f «>e

" f ^ r obstacles In the n a v -

J“^ d gate at Hirakud, demoUtJon of^denva

buil l>y

gable channel of the river Ganga

and clearance of the s

anga Brahmaputra W ater T raiw ^

Bhakra Dam

‘^epenstock bulkhead gates a t ^ ^

ided to

^ the

During 1963 diving "^^ ifiS p eT tion and clearance

•^administration for

Authority fo*'“ ®*'

“

i^pection.

;pinwayapro„,to th e W ^ ^ d D ^ .

P

to the British tanker, B nttsn j

E ven ts a t S ea

, a * e r slowlyandyiel<^P^“ ^*°,^onicarion

The old

?m e . So

as exemplified m e

a c o n s i d e r a b l e I

P

during the tw

procedure

Admiral Barboza,

following

5 1 0 / B L U E P R IN T T O B L U E W A T E R

I jo in e d th e R a jp u t as h e r E x e c u tiv e O ffic e r after the Staff Course - the th ird E x e c u tiv e O ffic e r 's assignm er\t in a b o u t six years. The three Rs (R a jp u t, R an a a n d B jin jit) w e r e se n t to e sco rt President Tito's yacht G a leh fo r a p a rt o f its p a s s a g e a cro ss th e In d ia n O cean en route to south E a s t A « a . W h e n , a fte r m a k in g th e ren d ez v o u s, w e sped past the yaAt to ta k e u p s c re e n in g s ta tio n s a h e a d o f h er, th e President and his wife sto o d o n a n o p e n d e c k an d w a v e d to u s, th o u g h th e w eather was wet a n d sq u a lly a n d th e sea liv e ly . W e a sk e d th e C ap tain o f G alel to signa ch a n g e s in h is co u rse an d sp e e d so th a t th e screen in g ships could a jus th e ir p o sitio n s a cco rd in g ly . H e co m p lied , an d w e w ere pleasan y p rise d to see th a t h e d id so em p lo y in g a cod e u sed by Albed envoy C orru n od o res in th e S e co n d W o rld W ar.

T h e re w e re so m e m in o r co llisio n s too cau sin g

A d m iral "Barboza recalls the ep iso d e o f 'c a tte d ' an ch ors o n boar a

ca ttin g b e in g a n a u tic a l term for raisin g the an ch or to the ca h o riz o n ta lb e a m o n e a c h s id e o fa s h ip 's b o w s ,u s e d fo rra is in g a n c an ch o rs.

T h e M y so re h a sh a d h e rsh a re o f m ishap s as w ell,b o th m in o r W h ile a p articu larly m ajo r catastro p h e is described often, to d w ell o n one m in or one, esp ecially since it h as hum orous an d relates to ou r sojou rn in th e M editerranean,

Debu, th en o u i F irst Lieuter\ant and F orecastle O fficer as a Cotrvmander, u sed to com plain b itterly about the n eed for c anchor. 7 u st becau se N elson catted the an ch o r', h e w oul

'm u st w e keep o n doin

m g so?r' O

U n ce the catted

a anchor - ^11 today

dam aged the

the Mysore's bovt

bow s - she p robably carries that scar

and C ap tain N anda w

as convinced that t

fhis w as one J Nelsonia

tio n w h ich w e could dispense w ith.

It wa;5 Prim e M inister N ehru w ho, after visiting the Fleet and w itnessed opetatioris at sea,had said that a naval ship is a virtual com prisingpersonnelftom different educational, cultural, so cio-eco Im guistic, religious aiKi ethnic backgrounds f i ^ t as one m an, Uv gether. Man-mai\agement and expertise in hum an relations, therefore, stitute som e of the m ost essential attributes of N aval p e rs o n rte l V ice Aximiral K nshnanhad a different kind o f experience in hurna lations w henhe w as flve Com m anding O fficer of Vikrant in 1963- H e reca •

After a week of intense flying exercises off Cochin, we anchored near

t h e N A V Y 'S V A RIEG A TED PEACETIME ACTTVmES / 511

the fairway b o u y , fo r re st an d m ain ten an ce and I acceded to th engineer officers' req u est to sh u t d o w n steam .

Early n ext m o rn in g I w as d oin g

m y cabin and

the carrier's signal co m m u n ica tio n office

, , ,

_ larcish echo

rather agitatedly said , 'S ir, o u r radar

. heading towards

which is m oving too fa st fo r a m erch ant s p

, 'Tvventy m iles,

us.' I asked, 'W h a t is th e ra n g e?', to w h ich he repliea,

/

and closing in fast.'

rshios in the area at that

I knew that there w ere n one o f

f^ ^ » h to f a pre-em ptive

time. Alw ays at th e b a ck o f m y m ind

told the of-

attack by Pakistan and I was not going °

^ j

be up in a

ficer, 'Ring the a larm for action

stiip was partially

the time I got u p , a silhouette

Pakistani cruiser Bab^_

visible and I could m ake out that it

-

^

Without steam even to raise tl^ an

steam to be raised vn

bad no in tention that it should be

. party standing by to *

the u tm ost d e s p a tc h and had the cable

jn ch o r. I s e n . for

la te r A d m ir a l, R .H .T a h ilia r u ),

/There is a d ^ e n t

.

gj^craft)

you for a free take-off?'

^^Aijze (Vil^ant's

>go to it'/1

abready into the w i n ^ d the

and

visual sig-

can ju st about do it. H a v e ^ > ^ « ;^ ^ e r

tfi^ was - C a ^

said, 'g et tw o Alizes ready!

nailing distance. 1

was with me

®

Ahsan later

t a i n S y e d M o h a m m a d J ^ ^ ^ ;;^ !^ wim

1940s w hen he

Com m ander-^

his ^

r o s e t o th e r a n k o £ A d ^ » ;:^ ,,o f E a s t P a ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

Navyandservedas

^ r e a d , f^^h,have

I signalled a m e s s ^ ^ ,^ g ^ p l y cam ^ ^

3t tny o

are ready for yo>

Thought w«U

bound for Colo

■ ,

he turn

lifter side

Cordial greetings Sy

^ong others, witness

^ e m b ^

Vice A dm iralN .F.g«t,:S'^'usa^^^^^^

a Royal Navy

ETsr-s."— ■ *

nesia a*«*

5 1 2 / B L U E P R IN T TO B LU E W A TE R

N a v y in th e M a la c c a S tra it. R e a r A d m ira l B .S. S o m an w as in command o f th e In d ia n F le e t. H is o p p o site n u m b er w as th e fam ous and much-lik e d B ritis h F la g O ffic e r, A d m iral M ich a el L e Fenu. I had known Le F e n u sin c e 1953 w h e n I w a s F la g L ieu ten an t to the then Indian Nav/s C -in -C a n d C h ie f o f N a v a l S ta ff, A d m iral Sir M ark Pizey, and he was N a v a l A ss is ta n t to th e F irs t Sea L o rd , Admiral Mcgregor. W e had spent tw o w e e k s to g e th e r v isitin g n a v a l estab lish m en ts and 'shooting tigers w ith o u r ca m era s in b etw een . W h en ev er in th e m ood , Le Fg™

b ro k e in to v erse. H e w a s o b v io u sly h a p p y w ith h is Indian visit an g o t a th ree-p ag e letter o f th an k s, all in v erse. W h en the two Heets met at sea, he sent for me in his helicopter. When taken to ihe flag n y o u ca n im ag in e m y su rp rise w h en I saw h im , sittin g in a q u itely k n ittin g aw ay! H e exp lain ed h e w as doing so on oc a d v ice, to so o th e h is n erv es after h is recen t illness! W ell or

,

a h a rd task m aster an d, therefore, y ou ca n in iag in e our jo y w en, a end o f th e exercises, w e received a signal w h ich en d ed b y s a j^ g -

W e in the F ar E astern F leet say, one and all,

T h a t S o m an 's R e e t is o n the ball.

A n in teresting experience during the sum m er

w as a collision w ith a giant w h ale on Ju ly 1 5 ,1 9 6 3 w hen My in volved in a strange encounter w ith this 50-foo t sea-nfiamma got trapped across the ship 's bow s w ith its head to port an starboard. Sailors in the m ess-decks b ecam e aw are o f

Py®!^”„astte

to the thum ping o n th e ship 's side and crow ded on the ship

fjge

to w itness the strange sight. T h e w hale w^as firm ly held and bro only w h en the engines w ere reversed and the w ay w as taken o ship.

V ice Admiral S.H. Sarm a, w ho retired as the Flag Officer

ing-in-Chvi£ of the Eastern N aval Com m and, is intensely aware o

'brotherhocxi of the sea' w hich could bring together seafarers

ports are often separated by the vast expzmse o f the oceans eind who oft represpnt. countries of different political, ethnic, religious, linguistic ari cultural hues W hite sailing back from England as the first C o m m a n d in g O fficer (in the rank of Commander) of Khukri, an antisubm arine frigate, UJ

1958, Admiral Sarma had an experience of this universal brotherhood o seafarers. H e dpscribes his chance encounter w ith a naval officer fror*^

Salazar's Portugal, the country that had refused to grant freedom to Goa: W hile taking the Khukri to India from England, after acceptance, we

THE N A V Y S V A R IE G A T E D P E A C E T IM E A C T IV IT IE S / 513

put into Gilbraltar fo r fu el. W h ile se cu rin g th e sh ip a lo n g sid e o u r allotted berth, w e o b serv ed tha t th e re w a s a P o rtu g u e s e frig a te alrea dy alongsidea berth at rig h t a n g les to m in e. A t th a t tim e In d ia d id n o t have diplomatic relations w ith P o rtu g a l. It w a s w ith a certain a m o u n t o f surprise, therefore, th a t I h e a rd m y 'O ffic e r o f th e D a y ' (th e d u ty o fficer in harbour) that a n o fficer fro m th e P o rtu g u ese sh ip w ish ed to see m e.

Inmy cabin the P o rtu g u ese o ffice r said , 'S ir, my ca p ta in w an ts to k n o w who is more im p ortan t, y o u o r h im ? If y ou are m o re im p o rtan t, h e w iii come and see y o u .' H e ev id en tly m ea n t w h o w as m ore senior. I h ad already observed h is C a p ta in th rou g h bin o cu lars, also a Commader me but m u ch older. I rep lied , 'Y o u r C ap tain is m ore im portant, I

'vJI go and see h im '. W h en I m et h im , I thanked the Portuguese com -

for his co u rtesy - and he discoursed a t length on the brottter-hood of the sea w h ich cu ts across dip lom atic barriers. A n ice old sea-with w h om it w as g ood to spend a forenoon.

f i c p ,5 ^ ° ^ o > ‘e K .K .S a n ja n a w h o, a sa C aptain w as t h e C o n ^ ^ g O f -

® 'o f% s o re d u rin g l9 6 3 -6 4 ,re liv e sh Isd a y s o n b o a rd a sth e C a p ta m ^ *

directing operations b efo re and during the jo in t exercises o f f Trm-w ith the other C o m m o n w ealth navies:

Was in 1963 w h en the M ysore, after a fairly

'and th en ce to

econd w eek of Ju ly for Singapore,

at Colom bo to s h o w

Calcutta. O n o u r re tu m p a ssa g e , theMyso -

pgkistan N avy's ship

R eflag . At the entrance to

^ y b e r and, in accordance w ith n o ^ a i ^

Officers. Immediately

titles and the n a m e s o fre s p e c tiv e c o i^

g

in

on securing in Colom bo Harbour,

C o m n ^ ^

keeping w ith the best

^ c e i v ^ the Captain o f the

the young handsome

perhaps, not

After that, w e

feet and said, 'Sir, y ° ^ ^ d e r y o u b e fb r e th e p a r t

thathe

of thesaUors whoservedtmdery^^^

had a very long < ^ * ^ ^ ^ a tio n sailo« in ^ ^ o f f i c e r . W enatura^

was one of my

ji^ed, s a d ^

514 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

is * e Uysoref ( i t was the

presence

during the 1965 Indo-Pak conflict had reduced the PakNav/s Heetto

the state of a fleet-in-being)

Transfer by jackstay, i.e.,

ship to an o th er at sea by a ro p e stru n g e

f^pnturies for women are

parallel co u rse, had been a

j .

g^cept during visits on

generaUy n ot perniitted o n b oard n av a

P ,. ^ jjg s'd ay 'atsea.Itw as

c e re m o n ia lo rp riv a te o cc a sio n sin h a rb o u ro ro gndvirtuaUyhang-ii\ 1959 that the first 'JiH' took off from the M y s o r e at s gUded across the 150 feet of sp ace o v e r a frothing sea ro

ugppened in

recapitulate the m om en tous even t, an e x -M y s o re a n re

/

pgjades!

the days w hen C om e Septem ber w as the top all of them

C am e Septem ber 1959 and a bevy of beautiful you n g

Q^-jun - found

naval w ives and lady plotters from the T actical Sc

p^y gt

themselves or\ board the good ship M y s o re , for w h at is 5 Nagarka*^'

Sea'. Am ongst them w as young M eena, w ife of C o m m an ae - Vjool- As ther\ the Officer-in-Charge of the N avigation and Direction

of the exercises, a jackstay transfer betw een the M y s o re

-Qujtiinto

soon ordered. Rakesh .Sharma m ay have been the first Indian °

jiad

outer space, with S a ly u t as his vehicle, but M eena N a g a rw r, jjQunce

decided, way back in 1959, that she w ould be the first

rope®'

across the waves in a bosun's chair, a w ooden seat s u s p e n d s

^gy

used at sea for transferring m en and m aterial from ship to ship ^ .

g^t-

are under way. So, braving ominous forecasts from the Cassan roundingher,shesetoff jauntilyfrom theM ysoreto theDe/W-It was

reached there that her travails actuaUy began, for the Captain

U'one other than the swashbuckling Kxishnan) refused to rem n i b t’ P

r “ ' “ P ' ™ " edict from Rear Admiral A tilm d .. Quilciavera, “

VinViVi-

threatening dire consequences, before Meena

^

Mysore.' The waves of the Arabian Sea w e r e n e v e r

In d ia n Z S fcI^ ^ ^ "

^ « e that it w as during the Sin^

patroUinB in thp w t

landing ship, M a g a r, had been deplo/® ^^

C^'ineseorforeijmvaf^i*” ^^*^-*® Andaman and Nicobar

reaching Port Blair descrih^*^^

the ship but several reports k P

prowling in the waters

* Chir\ese-looking' ship that had been seen

attempts to apprehend the iiSuH

^^*nds. The M a g a r m ade sever

togetaprecisedescriptionoflh^fr

^

^ u A

reported the sighting w e r e

the islanders who had

•nent these isUnders stepped ^

”***^*ar^ding ship. But the n'T*'

«pped on bo„d they realised ,hat the sighting

THE NAVY'S VARIEGATED PEACETIME ACTIVmES / 515

leports they had been ma king were o f the Magar i tself for in their reckoning

^landingship was indeed 'Chinese-looking' wha t with its 'aquiline'bows imvedand thehugeflat bow-doors fitted in front, which w ere peculiar to i ^gsMps, presenting a snub-nosed visageUt was another instance o f thelines o fth esp ec-

of the F le e t

R

e v

i e w

^President o f India, took the salute at the first

t/ie occa ^

President a t Bombay on October 10,1953. Presen t

^^aMenon

Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Defence Minister,

^^vesseJs ^'f^^^^^^^^^^^^^kPizey,ChiefoItheNavalStaff. Thirty

nrl

^

Review and included 25 warships, seven yard

Shi

ship.

^yhis

took part in a Review o f the Fleet at Bombay

' y ^ s ^ j

^^^^partin th^

the Shah o f Iran on March 6,1956. The ships that

'^^partii,

■

.

-

Bowh

included Delhi, Cauvery, Rana, Ranjit, Shakti, Gomati,

3lJo_

-

Madras, Bassein, and Bimlipatam and Shore Pa trol Craft No.

i964,S ]iri Y.B. Chavan, D efence M mister, took the salute

^■^^/Vvho

. ^ ^ ^ t at Bombay in lieu o f the President. Dr.S.Radhakrish-

^®rchanf

^disposed. A total of 52 vessels incIudingSl warships, nine

rev'

12 yard craft took part in the Review. DrRadhakrishnan

revved the Fleet in February 1966.

^ ^ ^ n t u r e A ctivities

to the m o u n tain s m a y so und a far cry but those /rom the Na vy

^ c i n

o p p o rtu n ity to climb in the Himalayas have found the same

^non and ch allenge in the m o u n tain s as is experienced a t h i ^ seas.

ocean s, mighty mountains make a man realise his insigruficance

Sp

iJ'J'iverse. A nd it is due to thisidentityof spirit o f adventure that

^ adogs h a v e found them seJves quite a t home on the mountains and have

^3ved the h azard s o f m ountains in the same way as they would face the

^^Singseas.

Oiptain M S. Kohli of the IN and an internationally renowned mountaineer records in his book, Mountainetring in Ir.dia,

Although man's contact with the mountains is as old as the seas,

somehownot m a n y Indian JVa vai personnel have been able to venture

to the Himalayas. I was perhaps the first Naval Officer selected for a

516 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

m a jo r In d ia n e x p e d itio n . It w a s to S a se r K an g ri (7,672 m) in 1956. It was a g re a t e x p e d itio n w ith N a n d u Ja y a l as lead er, and a band of strong in stru cto rs of H im alay an M ou n taineering Institute. Although we faUed o n th e m a in p e a k , w e su cce e d e d in clim b in g a satellite peak, Sakang (6,948 m ). T h e fo llo w in g y e a r L t C d r. Jy o ti R a w a t w as selected for the N an d a D e v i E x p e d itio n an d m a n a g ed to reach a form idable height to 7,470 m . T h e e x p e d itio n failed b u t Jy o ti p ro v ed th at N aval Officers ate as ca p a b le as o th ers in tack lin g th e h ig h m ou n tains. In 1958, Lt. PP-M eh ta jo in e d C o l K u m ar an d su cceed ed in reach in g the top of Tris (7,120 m ).

.

O n e o f th e m o s t glorious years in th e h isto ry o f N aval m o u ^ m eerin g w a s 1959. T h is year C dr. J.T .M . A tk in so n w h o w as cominanding K is t m su b m itted h is plan s to the N av al H eadquarters for an ® ^

E x p ed itio n to the 6,861 m h ig h N and a K o t. I happened to p o sted o n h is ship. T h e exp ed itio n w as ap p ro v ed b y the Nava qu arters b u t u n fo rtu n ately at the last m in u te Joh n A tldnson te o p ted o u t of th e expedition. O f h is p ro p o sed team m em bers, I

^

only one w h o h ad done the B asic and A dvance C ourses and was a to take over the leadership.

,

Lookin g b ack over the years, I recall w ith a great s ^ e

clim bing this difficult and challengir\gpeak. A fter a gruelling ef surrunit w as reached b y C hief Y eom an o f Sigrials, K-P- Sharma m yself.

.

Besides m e, there h ave b een a few other N av al Officers wrw t to m oiin tain eerin g .ln 1961 Lt. (later V ice A dm iral) V.S. S h e k h a w a C hief Y eom an of Signals, K .P. Sharm a, join ed m e on an e x p e d iti

^

Annapurna HI, K.P. Sharm a also joined the expedition to Everes N anda Khat.

K ohli's crow ing achievem ent was leading a team o f 18 intrepid ers to scale the Everest in 1965. N ine of them w ere put atop t h e highest pG ^

and the story of this spectacular Indian Clim b is stirringly narrated book. Nine Atop Everest. Paying her tribute to this achievem ent, S h r i ^

Indira Gandhi has recorded in her preface, 'The record o f Corruiw r^^

K ohli's expedition win find special m ention in history. It was a ofplarm ing,organisation,team w ork,individualeffortandleadership -5

Lai Bahadur Shastri in his tribute has also recorded, 'Th e Indian E veres expedition has created mountaineering history by this r e c o r d - b r e a k n g achievement. Climbing Everest even once is a great distinction, doing so four times in a row is a spectacular trium ph'.

The irulomitable spirit of adventure of personnel of the Indian Navy has also taken them to the icy continent of Antarctica. The achievem ents or

TH E N A V Y S VARIEGATED PEACETIME A c n v m E S / 517

Lieutenant i ® Bow ers o f the R o y al Indian M arine who accompanied Captain Scott o n h is ex p ed itio n to the A ntarctica in l910h av eb een reco rd ed in an earlier chapter. T h e first In d ian also to s e t f o o t in A ntarctia was

^utenant R am C h aran o f th e Indian N avy, a sp ec ia lis t in M eteo rolog y , ww accompanied an A u stralian expedition to th e S o u th P o le in 1960. A fter rehiming to India, R a m C h aran prepared a valuable rep o r t on his expedi-

*1/ but in 1961 h e w as tragically killed in a road accident.

Defence Services Staff College

One of the prestigious professional courses conducted for officers o f the Services is the D efence Services Staff College course (for officers o f the of Major and its equivalent in the N avy and th e Air Force) at W elling ton, a picturesque h ill-station in Tam il Nadu. One of the better features o f

% course is a series o f w eekly talks by renowned

^ e r s , social w orkers and professionals on a vanety of

®nsiderably enlarge the intellectual horizon o f the s tu d ^ t o ffic

•

,^ eem in en tv iato rfto th eC o lleg ein l957w as^ ^ ^

Q.

w ho was accom panied by the then

the couise in

Kamaraj N adar. Vice Admiral Barboza, who undenvent tfte c

^7/ reminisces;

After Tir, I did m y Staff Course

by the

visited the coUege during a

Nadar. Among other

C hief M inister o f Tamil

s id e n t D iscussion on a

things, the Prime Minister

to have given the

Second W orld War cam pai^-

g^^gs teachingthestud^

Minister

fight the next war

s?oJce

address us after

know ledge, quoting

^ the need to

w id e s w e e p ^ o n g March'.

f ^ g i n a t i o a innovation

by his 5 '“ ' ^ “ ,nd ll'O'

fo n M ld in M "' ““ * “5 S T

5 1 8 / B L U E P R IN T T O B LU E W A TC ’

o u r fu n c tio n . T h e s ta rc h y porr\p a n d p a ro d ica l rituals of the mess fu n c tio n , so d e v o id o f a n y h o m e -g ro w n flav o u r, doubtless left Shri K a m a ra j co ld , b u t h e h a d th e g ra ce to m a k e h is indifference seem ben ig n . W h e n th e p ro ce e d in g s d rew to a clo se, the Com m andant rose s tiffly , ra is e d h is g la ss to th e P rim e M in iste r a n d com m enced a rather o ff-k e y re n d e rin g o f He's a Jolly Good Fellow, w h ich the rest of those a s se m b le d jo in e d in d u tifu lly . K a m a ra jji ro se to h is feet w ith the rest of u s. A n d as th e sw ellin g ch o ru s e ch o e d fro m th e rafters, he hung hie h e a d a n d v isib ly sigh ed .

T h re e y ea rs earlier, th e au th o r w a s also d o in g a course at the same in stitu tio n w h e n D r. B .R . A m b ed k ar, th e a rch itect o f ou r ^ o n s titu ^ n d ressed th e C o lleg e. T h is w a s in 1954 an d tw o y ears b efo re Dr.

la s t a ct o f'r e v o lt' w h e n h e fou nd h is p e a c e in the Bu d d ha and w hich was m o n th s b e fo re h e p a sse d in to h isto ry . D r. A m bed kar w as n ot in h e a lth an d h a d to b e h elp ed to the ro stru m b y o u r B r i t i s h C o m m a n d a n , d istin g u ish ed G en eral L en taig n e. D r. A m bedkar h a d m ad e a m e n t after h e resig n ed fro m N ehru 's C abin et that the C on stitu tion b e b u rn t! A B ritish M ajo r w ho w as also d oin g the sam e course, em b o ld en ed to ask D r. A m bedkar at the end o f h is illum inating ta /

w h y h e h ad co m e to su ch a n u nthinkable co n clu sion and so A m bed kar th im dered b ack in h is pow erfu l voice: 'O n e m akes a gods to liv e in, b u t w h en the devil usurps it, it has to be destroy

■

m eaning w as clear to \is aU!

. ^ ooO.

D r. A m bedkar w as posthu m ou sly aw arded the B harat Ratna m ^

Oceanographic Research

In recogrution o f the im portance o f oceanographic research in the Iridia^^

O cean, th eln d ian N av y took part as a m ajor participant in the In te r n a tic^'

O ceanographic Expedition in the Indian O cean held from 1962 to 1964-m ain task allocated to India w ithin the fram ew ork o f this expedition wer®

the p articip ation by Kistna, w hich had been specially fitted out for o c e a n o graphic research to the extent of six m onths in each of the three years. Th®

facilities m ade available b y the Indiaui N avy included provision o f assis tance for radio com m unication to the vessels taking part in the expedition, provision of shore facilities to oceanographic vessels w ithin Indian ports, provision of facilities in N aval laboratories at Bom bay and Cochin, making available N aval scientists for participation in research w ork, both a s h o re and afloat, arui provision of training facilities for scientists required for the expedition.

Indian responsibilities, within the overall framework of the e x p e d i

THE NAVY’S VARIEGATED PEACETIME ACUVmES / 519

tion, lay in the w aters near the coast of India, both East and West, and m tensiye investigations on the continental shelf and supeijacent waters, e outer lim its o f the area of Indian responsibility were the Arabian Sea c

degrees longtitude as the western boundary

and the Sum atra C oast along with the Andaman and Nicobar Island as the eastern boundary. Som e cruises were made to the latitude of 12 degrees south and to the East Coast of Africa where some important oceanic currents originate and which have a bearing on the circulation of sea water along India's N orth-W est Coast.

The Indian programme included observations and calculations of the energy flux betw een the ocean and the atmosphere. Studies were also made of the solar, sky and atmosphere radiations, air pressure, temperature and hum idity at the deck level, surface temperature of the sun, near-surface ocean currents, waves swell, tide, rainfall, evaporation profiles of wet and dry bulb thermometers and winds above the sea surface.

A total of 20 ships took part in the three-year expedition and, besides India, the other countries representated were Australia, France, Indoensia, Israel, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Pakistan, South Africa, Britain, the USA, theU SSR, W est Germany and Zanzibar. India was represented by four ships

- Kistna which was fitted out with the requisite scientific instruments and equipment to cope with the requirements o f the various tasks allocated to India, Research Vessel Varuna, the survey vessel of the Indo-Norwegion Proiect in Kerala, Bangada, a fisheries vessel, and ConcA, a research vessel o f th e K erala iTniversitv. The first scientific cruise by the Kistm was inaugur a t e d b y Frofessur I limTfi^-un Kabir, Minis ter o/Scientific Research and CuJ-tural ^ a i r s on October 9, 1962 at Bombay. Twenty scientists w ere embarked on the ship wWch collected much valuable data on various aspects of oceanographic research.

The Kaleidoscopic M aritiine A m bience

challenges

o f the characteristics

a n d b r a v e r y , o f t e n m t ^ p e « ^ t ,

nosed by fulfilment, gloty

^t^tude that a sailor acquires over the

520 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

I k n o w n o t i t , a im in g a fa n cy , I rig h tly divine T h a t th o u h a s t a p u rp o se jo y fu l, a co u ra g e blam eless, T h y p o rt a s s u re d in a h a p p ie r la n d th an m ine.

B u t fo r all I h a v e g iv e n th ee, b e a u ty en o u g h is thine.

A n d th o u , asla n t w ith trim tack le an d shrou d in g.

F r o m th e p ro u d n o stril cu rv e of a p ro w 's line In th e offing sca tte re st fo am , th y w h ite sails crow ding.

16

NAVAL BATTLE HONOURS

T h e a w a rd o f Battle H on ours to ships is intended to foster esprit de corps a m o n g their officers an d ships^ com panies, w ho are thereby encouraged to

tak e a p erso n al interest in the w ar time exploits, n o t only o f their present

ship b u t also o f those o f the sam e n am e w h ic h distinguished themselves in

th e p a st.

Till less than forty years ago. Battle H onours w ere d isp lay ed on Royal N a v y ships on the au th ority o f the C om m anding Officer. H ow ever, in 1954, rules for their aw ard w ere codified and Battle H onours then in use were regu larised w ith a few exceptions; certain fleet action BattleH onours were om itted fro m the official list which was published in A dm iralty Fleet Order 2 5 6 5 / 5 4 Theearliestaction ofw h ich su fficien tw askn ow n an d w ascon sid -

« e d w orthy ol inclusion « « 'ARMADA' lOTI Tfe earilosl acBon comm em o ra te d in the British A rm y is Tan gier 1 6 6 2 -1 ^ -

^ h e actio n an d cam p aig n sm en tio n ed in th eA d m ir^ ^

1 i f

a scroll mounted in a suitable position in the ships which are d i s p l a y ^ on a

^

o / the Battle Honours awarded is to be

eligible for these H

^

should contain a Record o f

record ed in Foho 1

incidents, merito-

S erv ice o f all ships or u

important enough to be ranked as

riou s in

of space also precludes eveiy thing from being

Battle Honours-

several incidents are often compressed

included on the s ^ P ^ 'B 3„,eH on ou rin a manner sinular to that adopted into a single,

^hjch appear on a K egim ^tal Colour.

fT d e te ri^ g ^ ^ '^ ^ ^ e ^ g e n e ra lly a w a rd e d fo rsu cce ssfu lw a r Battle Honours n

5 2 2 / B L U E P R IN T T O BLUEW AT1ER

ic e w h ic h in clu d es, s i i ^ g or c a p h ire o f a n en em y warship, smking of

^ e m y m e rch a n t sh ip s in e sco rted co n v o y , en g ag em en ts w ith enemy light fo rces w h e n b o th sid es o ften in cu rred lo sses an d operations which resulted in th e m o re or less co m p lete fru stratio n o f the en em y 's intention at the time, alth o u g h n o w a rsh ip s m a y h av e b e e n sun k.

T h e q u alificatio n en titlin g a sh ip to a p articu lar Battle Honour is that sh e w as p resen t d u rin g the a ctio n - th e ex ten t o f h er participation is im m aterial. In th e days o f sail, p h y sical or v isu a l co n tact w ith the enemy was sin e qua n on: b u t in the w ars o f the 20th cen tu ry radio communication etc.

e i^ b le d p atro ls and sco u tin g grou p s to o p erate effectiv ely at much greater d istan ces and lon g ran ge ship m issiles h a v e ch an ged the picture altogether.

T h e w o rd 'p re se n t', th erefore, is tak en to m e a n p resen ce at sea under the d irect orders of the senior officer co n tro llin g the O peration.

If a ship is renamed at any time, she will assume the Battle Honours which go with her new name, and wUl no longer be entitled to those previously awarded under the old name.

T h e selectio n o f B attle H onou rs for the 1914-18 W ar w as based on the aw ard of clasps w ith th e B ritish W ar M edal. The R o yal Indian N avy did not receive an y aw ards for the 1914-18 W ar and th ose aw arded for tiie 1939-45

W ar and prom ulgated v ide APO 2565/54 are given below :

____________________ Battle H onour

Bengal (IN)

'H ok oku M aru' 1942

Burm a 1945

Bom bay (IN)

Burm a 1945

Cauvery (IN)

A tlantic 1943-4

Burm a 1944-5

Delhi (IN)

A tlantic 1940

N orth Africa 1942

Sicily 1943

Salem o 1943

Ar\zio 1944

South France 1944

Adriatic 1944

Godavari (IN)

A tlantic 1943

Burma 1945

Jumna (IN)

Atlantic 1941

Sicily 1943

Burma 1944-5

Kistna (IN)

Atlantic 1943

n a v a l BATTLE HONOURS / S23

Burma 1944-5

Konkan (IN)

AtJantic 1942

Burma 1944-5

M adras (IN)

St. Lucia 1796

Egypt 1801

R ajpu tam (IN)

AtJantic 1942

Burma 1945

Rohilkhand (IN)

Burma 1945

Sutlej (IN)

Sicily 1943

Burma 1945

The follow ing two post-Independence Operations undertaken by the Indian N avy until 1 9 ^ entitled them to the award of Battle Honours; Kistna

Combined Operations onOctober 1947

Naval Force

Cauvery

Kathiawar Coast

Commander;

Jamuna

(Junagadh Operations)

Commander

R.D.Katari

Vikrant

Operation Vijay

Etecember 1961 Naval Force

M ysore

(Liberation of

Commander:

Delhi

Goa, Daman and Diu)

Rear Admiral

B£. Soman

Trishul

Betwa

B eas&

Cauvery

■ -------------

5 2 4 / B L U E P R IN T T O B L U E W A T E R

LIST OF SHIPS

(COMMISSIONED UNTIL 1965)

N o . Name o f Ships (ex Name o f ships)

Commissioned

Decommissioned

1 . Gomati (HMS Lamerton)

Apr 24,1953

May 31,1972

2. Godavari (HMS Bedale)

Apr 27,1953

Aug 31,1976

3 . Ganga (HMS Chidding-Fold)

May 26,1953

Jul 31,1972

4 . Shakti

Jan 2 0,1954

Dec 3 1 ,1 9 6 7

5. Bassein (HMS Littleham)

Jun 15,1955

Jul 31,1976

6 . Bimlipatnam (HMS Hildersham)

Jun 15,1956

Dec 31,1972

7 . Kakinada (HMS Durweston)

Aug 17,1956

Jun 30,1979

8 . CannanoTe (HMS Whitton)

Aug 21,1956

Mar 31,1981

9. Kanoar (HMS Overton)

Aug 28,1956

Mar 31,1981

1 0 . Cuddalore (HMS Wennington)

Aug 30,1956

Jun 30,1979

1 1 . Savitri

Aug 20,1957

Jun 15,1974

1 2 . Sharayu

Aug 20,1957

Jun 15,1974

1 3 . Suvama

Aug 20,1957

Jun 15,1974

1 4 . M y so re (HMS Nigeria)

Aug 29,1957

Aug 30,1985

1 5 . Subhadra

Oct 20,1957

Jun 15,1974

1 6 . Brahmaputra

Mar 28,1958

Jun 3 0 ,1 9 8 6

1 7 . Khukri

Jul 16,1958

sunk 09, Dec 1971

1 8 . Dharini (SB Hermine)

Apr 02,1959

Dec 3 1 ,1 9 7 5

1 9 . Kirpan

Jul 0 1 ,19S9

Transferred to

20. Kuthar

Jul 15,1959

C oastguard on

2 1 . Sukanya

Aug 18,1978

22. Sharda

Dec 05,1959

Jun 15,1974

in

1

Dec 05,1959

A grou n d ed

2 3 . Trishul

1967

2 4 . Talwar

Jan 10,1960

2 5 . Beas

Apr 26,1960

O ct 3 0 ,1 9 8 5

2 6 . Ajay

May 24,1960

Sep 21, I960

Transferred to

27. Betum

Bangladesh

2 8 . Vikrant (HMS Hercules)

i3ec 06, I960

2 9 . Abhay

Mar 04,1961

3 0 . Akshay

Nov 11,1961

Jun 30,1980

Jan 08,1962

Transferred to

3 1 . Darshak

Bangladesh

Dec 2B, 1964

Ian 15,1990

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T he E con om ist - Ju ly 1 8 ,1 9 8 7 , London.

T h e US N aval In stitu te P roceedin gs, U S N av al In stitu te, USA.

V illler, A lan, T he In dian O cean, M u seu m Press Ltd., London, 1952.

W ad ia, R u tto n jee A rdeshir, The Bom bay D ockyard an d The Wadia Builders, N ev ille N . W adia for M essrs N o w ro sjee W adia and Sons (Pvt)

■'

B o m b ay , 1983.

.

W alk er, C om m and er G.E., R IN V R , H istorical Background o f the KJN, Naval H ead qu arters (India), N ew D elhi, 1945.

W estern N av al C om m and , D iary o f Events, - IN S D elhi, -1948-78-W e ste m N av al C om m and , M ysore M em orabilia, 1957-85.

W h itew ay R.S., The R ise o f Portuguese P ow er in India 1497-1550, Jai^

P rakashan, Patna, 1979.

Y ust, W alter (ed). Encyclopaedia Britannica, Encyclopaedia B rita ru u ca Lt /

London, 1957.

Reminiscences

Adm iral B.S. Som an

Air C hief M arshal A ijan Singh, DFC

A d m iral S.M . N an d a P V S M , A V SM

A d m iral R .H . T ah ilian i P V SM , A V SM

A d m iral Sir Jo h n T reach er K C B , FElA.eS, R oy al N a v y V ice A d m iral B. A. S am so n P V SM

V ice A d m iral N . K rish n an P V SM , D SC (by kind cou rtesy - M rs Sita K rishnan)

V ice A dm iral K .L. K u lk am i P V SM

V ice A d m iral V.A . K am ath P V SM

BIBLIOGRAPHY / 529

Vice Admiral M .R. Schunker PVSM, AVSM

Vice Admiral M .P. A w ati PVSM, VrC

Vice Admiral S.H . Sarm a PVSM

Vice Admiral R.K.S. Ghandhi PVSM, VrC

Vice Admiral N .P. Datta PVSM, AVSM

Vice Admiral V.E.C. Barboza PVSM, AVSM & Bar

Vice Admiral S.P. G ovil PVSM, AVSM

Rear Adm iral K.R. Nair PVSM

Rear Adm iral P.S. Mahindroo PVSM

Rear Adm iral D .S tJ. Cameron

Rear Adm iral Kirpal Singh AVSM

Rear Adm iral O.P. Sharma AVSM, VSM

Rear Adm iral M.N. Vasudeva VSM

Rear Adm iral R.V . Singh AVSM

Rear Adrrural A. Auditto AVSM, NM

Rear Adm iral S. Ram sagar AVSM, ViC.

Rear Adm iral D.W. Kirke, OBE, Koyal Navy

Commodore G. Douglas AVSM,

Com m odore K.K. Sanjana AVSM

Com m odore D.R. Mehta PVSM

Com m odore B.K. Dang

Commodore J. Chatterjee AV1>m

Commodore T.J. Kunnenkenl Av

Com m odore Y.P. Malik

Com m odore S. Bhandoo

Captain A.F. Collaco

Captain B.D. Law AVSM

Captain M.S. Kohli A

Com m ander P .N .F a r a s W ''

Commander Hugh Gan

Chand

C hief P etty Officer

Prof J.K . Galbraith

Shri L.K. Jha

Home Guards

S h r iC S .Jh a

,

Shri M.V. KamatJ’

ShriKD.Kadawala,

INDEX

Anglo-American War, 259

Acharya, C om m odore B.R., 131/137,

Angre,Kanhoji,deathof,lfi

139,169, 171

/JxlieU bm d,349,350.^ 2,36U 5,

Administrative Staff College, 271

capturing of, 341;

Admiralty, position, 61;

casualties suffered at, 406,

views on naval requirements of

mopping up on, 382^4

India and Pakistan, 64-67

Admiralty Fleet Order, 521

Agate, Com m odore H.A., 381;

118, 206;

as N aval Officer Incharge Goa, 4U8

Agha, Capt. J.P , 437

Ahluwalia, Lt. B.S., 398,400

Ahmed, N azir, 416

j s i l

Ahsan, Capt. M oham m ad Syau,

Aibara, Com m ander R-,

„

Air Sea Rescue Squadron,

Albuquerque, Afonso de,

470,505,5^^i_«anisation

capitulation of, 386-89

ArmedForcesReorg

Alexander, 183,253

Commit^'

^6

All, H aider, 18

ci,er,4l 6

Ali, N awabzada Gen S

310/l/fze anti subm an^

squadron, 1 4 1 / '

Allen, Charles, 261

Ambedkar, Dr., 51

197

j^tkinson, ca w j^^iterranean,

American Civil

American Kevoluaonar^dence, 95-

A tJanf^r^ 118-20

^

American War of Indf'

o'la.arch Centre, 266

yyochinle^*^

A n S d , Ram

Anderson, LtR^AJv^^p.C.,-^®

Andrews, Commod

532 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

C lau d e, 3 1 ,2 8 9

C h ak ra III, aw ard ed to, 375-77

A u ditto, R ear A dm iral A iu n , 230,

Bay of Bengal, 1 7 ,3 6 , 40, 57, 64,127,

2 4 0 ,3 6 8 -6 9 ,3 7 7 ,3 8 1 -8 2 ;

234, 241, 419, 428-29, 433,460,469,

N aosen a M edal to, 369;

498

recollects h is land fighting opera

B ay of B iscay, 2 4 7

tions, 369-70

Beatty, Vice A dm iral Sir David, 102

A u stralian N aval A ir Arm , 147

Beg, A ziz, 438, 441

A u stralian N avy, 231;

Bethena, C om m an d er A.S., 130

durir\g W orld W ar II, 125

Beverid ge, H enry, 340

A viation pioneers, 161-79

B hagat, Lt. G en., 286

A w ati, V ice Adm iral M .P , 7 3 ,9 1 ,1 6 0 ,

Bhandari, Rear A dm iral C.L., 242

2 8 7 ,3 9 2

Bhandari, Lt. H .C ., 145

A yub, President, 419, 461

Bhandoola, C om m od ore S., 397 ,399

A yyangar, Sir G opalasw am y, 150,

Bhat, C om m an d er A.S., 86

499

Bhide, Lt. Y ashw ant, 161

A ziz, A bdul, 416-17

Bhushan, C om m and er V., 79

Bhutto, Prim e M inister, 41 7 ,4 2 0

B ag h d ad P a ct, 54, 55

Bhutto, Sir Shah N aw az, 32

Bakshi, L t. M .M , 130

Bindra, Rear A dm iral A.P.S., 369

B ailance, R ear A dm iral F .A ., 285

Binge Bay, 368

B allard Pier, 7 6 ,1 5 5 ,2 6 7 -6 9

Black, A dm iral Sir Jerem y, 82

Ball, G eorge, 354

Blackett, P.M.S., 129

B arbarosa, Khairoddin, 3

Bliss, E.W ., 195

Barboza, Vice A dm iral V .E.C ., 6 8 ,7 1 ,

Blue Force, 498

8 7 ,8 8 ,1 4 0 ,3 9 0 , 4 5 6 ,4 6 2 ,4 8 6 ,5 0 7 ,

Bombay D ockyard, description of,

517;

258-59;

recalls visit of Delhi to Australia,

evolution of, 262;

485-86;

ships built in, 259-60;

visits Dominion M useum , 486;

task assigned to, 264

visit to Iran, Kuw ait, M uscat and

Bombay Port Trust, 269

Saudi Arabia - a mem oir, 481-82

Boone, Charles, 1 5 ,1 6

Barnard, Rear Adm iral G., 8 7 ,2 8 1 ,

Bourne, William, 184

502;

Bowles, Chester, 461

aim of, 284-85 Batra, Vice Admiral

Bowrey, Thomas, 255

R.N., 6 8 ,3 7 0

Braganza Dr. Tristo, 344

Battle of: Cape Engano, 117;

Bridges, Robert, 519

Jutland, 102;

Britain's Fleet Arm , 106

M idway, 11 3 ,2 1 2 ;

Brittsh Admiralty, 9 8 ,9 9 ,1 2 9 ,1 8 2 ,

N avarino, 260;

190-91

Philippine, Sea, 212;

British, carrier during Suez W ar, 123,

River Plate, 266, 485;

124;

'

Samar, 117;

Eastern Fleet, 115;

Sibuyan Sea, 116;

Grand Fleet, 102

Surigai, 116;

British Hydrographic Department

Trafalgar, 185

(Admiralty), 472

Bawa, Able Seaman Jaswant, Ashok

BriHsh Military U w , punishment.

INDEX / 533

311-12

Chatterji, Admiral A.K., 69, 163,270

British N aval Act, 315

484

'

British N aval Code, 318

Chaudhuri, Lt. Gen. J.N., 242,348-49,

British N aval Discipline Act, 1 8 6 ,314359,366,424-26

'

1 5 ,3 1 7

Chaudhiy, Tridib, 356

British W ar Model, 522

Chavan, Y.B., 241-42,244,420,457,

British W ar Office, 182

515

Brown, Lt. Com m ander, E.M., 121

Chawla, Capt. I; 299

Brown C apt H.N.S., 5 9 ,2 8 1 ,2 8 3 , 483

Chetty Shanmukham, 314

Broz President Marshal Joseph, 500

Chevalier, Maurice, 438

Buch, Dr. K.P., 272,503

Chiefs of Staff Committee, 206,289;

Bulganin, 501

report on Size and Composition of

Blinker, Ellsworth, 354

Post V/ar Forces in India, 37-38

Burling, W ing Commander, 105

Child, Sir John, 14

Bushnell, David, 185,1 9 4

Chinese Navy, 57

Chitale, Commander SCM, 79

Cabral, Pedro Alvarez, 339-40

Chopra, Pran, 416

Cameron, Rear Admiral D.St. J., 367,

Chopra, Vice Admiral S.C., 137

3 9 2 ,4 3 3

’

Chou-En-lai, 501;

Campbell, Capt. D.R.F., 121 ,188

visits Rajput and Ranjit, 500

Canadian Navy, 125

Chowdhuiy, Commander Dilip, 452,

Candeth, L t Gen. K.P., 359,384

453

Cape of Good Hope, 262,338,340 ,377

Christian I, King, 354

Cariappa, Gen. K.M., 290

Churchill, Winston (Prime Minister),

Carlill Admiral Sir Stephen, 79,172,

181, 206

281, 283,299;

Clive, Col. Robert, 16

A Sailor Remembers, a book by, 282

Collaco, Commander A.F., 377,378

Carnatic War, 17

College of Naval Air Warfare, 128

Carrier Controlled Approach (CCA),

Columbus, 336

Colvilhao, Joao Peres de, 337

174

Commonwealth Navies, exerdses to

Carrier, Superiority of at Sea, 94-97

sharpen the tactical skills of, 488-92

Carver, Capt. R.H.P-, 146,147,161,

Commonwealth Prime Ministers'

168

Conference of London, 419-20

Communication Squadron, 128

Conti, Nicalo, 254

Cordington, Admiral, 260

492.^14

i n l a n d e r T., 130-

Coronation Naval Review, Indian

Chakravarh, U-

Navy ships participated in, 481

31,134 135,138

Creasy, Vice Admiral Sir George, 62

Cripps, Lady, 149

Cripps, Sir Stafford, 149

Cruz, Lt. Commander G.C.D., 130

Culley, L t, 104

Curtiss, Glenn, 97, 98

C haran,

14,354

Czarist Russia, 101

Chattel®®'

534 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

D a d ra , N a g a r H aveli, liberation of,

D irecto rate of W eap on s and Training,

.3 4 6

2 8 8

'

D a m a n , division of, 3 4 2 ;

Diu, 3 4 2 ;

■history of, 3 4 3 ;

ca p tu re of, activities leading to,

rebellion in, 346

3 9 3 -4 0 3 ;

D ang, C om m od o re B.K., 8 5 , 2 1 9 , 2 3 0 trad e v/ith A rabia, 343

3 1 , 2 4 4 -4 6 ,2 9 2 ;

D oenitz, A d m iral K arl, 210

joins Dolphin 232

D ou ghty, T h om os H ., 197

D aniel, L t. C om m an d er B., 428

D ouglas, C om m an d er G eorge, 134,

D as G up ta, C om m an d er R .N ., 4 2 7

161;

D assault B regu et A viation, Fran ce,

ach ievem ents of, 165-68;

140

D istinguished Flying Cross

D astidar, R ear A dm iral A.G., 497

aw ard ed to, 165;

D att, Sqn. C dr., L .C ., 135

view s about the selection of

D atta, Vice A dm iral N ar Pati, 361,

Vikrant, 167-68

4 2 3 ,4 5 9 ,5 1 1

Drebel, C ornelius Van, 184

D aw son, Admirsil O scar Stanley, 178

D rew , C om m od ore H ., 1 4 0 ,2 8 1

D ayalR ajeshw ar, 76

D reyer, A dm iral Sir D esm ond, 498

D ebgupta, C om m ander S.R., 138

D 'Souza, C om m and er P., 79

Defence budget, 1 9 9 1 -9 2 ,3 0 7 -0 8

Duggal, C om m odore V.P., 174

Defence Corrmuttee of the Cabinet,

Duke of Edinburgh, 135, 484

236;

D unning, W ing C om m ander, 103

approval of, to plan for N avy

D utt Subimal, 486

developm ent, 393

Defence Minister Com m ittee (Navy),

Fam es, C om m ander T.R., 150

129

E ast India C om pany 260, 472;

Defence Service Staff College, 292;

N avy in India, changes in, 4

courses conducted in, 517;

Edm onds, W ing C om m ander, 102

dignitaries visited the, 517-18

Elizabeth II, Queen, 483-84, 500

D epuy, Rene Jean, 3 2 9 ,3 3 3

Ellison, Com m odore H .B., 281

Desai, Morarji, 2 9 1 ,3 0 4

Ely Eugene, 9 7 ,9 8

Desmond, Adm iral Sir, 496

Ellyson, T.G., 100

Destroyer Squadron 2 2 ,6 7 ,4 9 1

Engineer, Air M arshal A.M ., 359

Dev, Rear Adm iral Krishan, 1 7 4 ,2 8 4

Em akulam Charmel, 134

Dhareshwar, Com m odore V. A., 428,

Europe's Quest for Sea route to India,

436-37

336-38

Dhillon, C om m ander A.S., 142

DhiUon, Brig. K.S., 408

F a H ie n ,7 , 254

Dhindsa, Conunander J.S., 395

Farragut, Admiral David, 194

Diaz, Bartholmew de, 337-38

Pazal Abu], 310

Dickinson, Rear Admiral N.V., 69,

28 1 ,2 8 5

Diem, President, 504

Dighe, Lt. Comm ander, S.S., 77

Directorate of N aval Training and

Education, 288

air stations for, 144-46.

INDEX / 535

birth of, 129

Ghosh, Rear Admiral Arvindam, 141;

Fleet Aircraft Requirement Units

death of, 149

(FRUs), 4 4 ,1 2 8

Ghosh, Capt. M.M., 139,169,430

Fleet Requirem ent Squadron 771,131

Gleng, Capt. J.E.M. 281

Fleet R equirem ent Unit, 1 2 8 ,1 3 3 ,135

Global Carrier Club, 124-25

3 6 , 148;

Goa, Army Task Force to liberate,

officers com m anded, 138-39

349;

Flotilla, C apt. Inshore, 78

capture oi34QA\-,

Francis, C om m ander C.G., 427

history of, 342-43;

Fraser, Rear Adm iral F.E., 474

liberation case before United

Nations, 347;

French Fleet, 17

struggle to liberate, 344-48,359

French N avy, 100

Goa, Daman and Diu, Liberation of,

French, Reeir Admiral G.A., 281

action plans for, 359-62

Frigate Squadron, 14th, 442,447;

Goa National Congress, 357;

15 th, 85;

formation of, 344

16th, 442

Godfrey, Vice Admiral JJJ., 38,2»1

Fulton, Robert, 186

Goldrick, Lt Commander James, 61,

85

„

Gagarin, Yuri, 169

Gombat Claude, 190

Galbraith, Prof. J.K., 353;

G o m e s , C o m m o d o re L , /

efforts to have peaceful solution

Goodhart Commander

Goord, Commander A B n a n , 22

Goa problem, 353;

. n i-j

view s of on Goa liberation,

Gopinath, Capt K., 8

Gandhi, Smt. I n d i r a , 481

r - - f o f I n d i a A c t l 9 I 9 ,3 1 4 ;

Gandhi, M a h a t m a , 344,3 5

^

G „ g a B ra h m a p u tt.W a K r Transport

Gowf ^vte Admiral S.P., 78

Board, 509

Garret, G e o r g e , 188

Grand Fleet,

^ ^ 84

G a i s i d e , C a p t . R . M . 281

G aruda-First I n d i a n N a v

S t a t i o n , 1 3 4 ^ 5 ,1 4 5

Gate, D r G.E., 271

.

G aur, Sir Hari

the

Geneva Convention on

Sea, 325

G e o r g e , C o m

n .

German F

l

^

t

, 102-03

German

roafit

.

German

Ghandhi, Vice ^ ^ 4;

„fA{bns<>

286,386,427,^0^.^,atfc,nof4/*'

Anhui, 2K

describes the

^36.137,145

recalls

G

h o s h C o m « n “ ^

5 3 6 / B L U E P R IN T T O B L U E W A T E R

H in d u stan Ship yard Vishakapatnam ,

In d ian H y d ro g ra p h ic Department,

86, 264

471

H ip p alu s, 7

In d ian M ilitary L aw , 313

H iroshim a, 120

In d ia n N atio n al W ar Memorial

H iu en-Tsang, 254

C o m m ittee, 289

H udson river, 188

Indian Naval Air Squadron 300,140;

H ughes, A dm iral Sir Edw ard, 18

310,1 4 1

H unt, C ap t A.H.F., 281

In d ian N a v a l R eserve (INR), 277

H ussain, M ushahid, The M uslim a

In d ian N a v a l R eserve Forces (Disci

book edited by, 416

p lin e) A ct 1 9 3 9 ,3 1 5

H ussain, Vice President Zakir, 502

In d ian N aval Squadron, 222

H ydrographic Survey, purpose of,

In d ian N a v a l V olunteer Reserve

'

475-78

(IN V R), 2 7 7

H ydrographic Training Unit, set up

In d ian N a v y , acquisition plan for the

of, 4 7 4

refu rb ish m en t of, 51-57;

ad v e n tu re activities of, 515-17;

In d ia , a rm e d a ctio n b y , in P o rtu g u e se

after W orld W ar, 5 3 -5 4 ;

e n cla v e , w o rld o p in io n ab ou t, 4 0 9 a w a rd s for, 27 7 ; 1 3 ;

British officer's contribution to,

co a stlin e of, 3 3 1 ;

2 8 1 -5 8 ;

failu re to ach iev e v icto ry in In d o-

b u d get allocation for, 2 2 6 ,3 0 5 ;

P a k W a r, ca u se s, 4 2 5 -2 7 ;

ca rto g ra p h ic training for, 474;

m aritim e h isto ry of, p eriod s in, 4;

deficiencies that cau se failure of,

m aritim e p a st, an an aly sis, 2-6;

w a r at sea, 448-51;

N a v a l p lan , 62-63

d ep loym ent on the W est Coast,

In d ian A ir F o rce, 4 2 9 ,4 5 4 ;

421-22;

b u d g e t allocation for, 3 0 6 ;

developm ent, after Indo-Pak Waf/

flying train in g, officers selected for,

468-^9;

1 3 0 ;

diving assistance p rovid ed by, to

p ro b lem s of, 4 5 2

Civil authorities, 5 09;

In d ian Air F o rce Ctinberras, 387

expansion plan for, 4 6 -4 9 ,1 2 7 -2 8 ;

In d ian Air 'Force Flying Instructors

factors w hich prevented the, to full

School, 137

scale operation d u rin g Indo-Pak

Indian A rm y, 429

W ar 460-62;

Indian A rm y, budget allocation for,

Fleet A rm for, 132;

306;

Fleet British officers w ho headed

C ross L ah ore sector, 429;

the, after independence, 283;

role of, capturing Diu, 397-98;

forces strength of 62;

strength, 418

funds for 132;

Indian Central Reserve Police Force,

interservices courses for, 292-94;

415

landing party, activities of during

Indian Fleet objectives, 379-80;

Goa Operation, 369-78;

operations, 442-48;

Operation Cfpttney, 351;

visit the part of M editerranean,

^ P a k i s t a n N avy, a comparison.

490-91

INDEX / 537

performance in 1965 operations,

236,259,285,333,337;

factors which effected, 463-^5

features of, 2;

personnel structure of, 276^80;

islands in, 2'3;

phasing out British presence, 280

resources of, 333

88;

Indonesia, roJe of, in Indo-Pak War,

plans for expansion of, 41-45;

402-63

preparations to meet Pakistan

Indonesian Marines, 461

Challenge 422-25;

Indonesian Navy, 457

proposed strength of, 55-57;

Indo-PaJc Conflict, 94;

reorganisation of, 22;

beginning of, 415;

quest for new ships, 60-64;

and Indonesia, role o i 462-63

recommendations for the develop

Indo-Portuguese Trade, 339-40

ment of, 48-49;

Inigo-Jones Commodore HJ?., 281

International Court of Justice, 331

requirements of 228-29;

International Hydrographic Organ

resource allocation for, 305-06;

rescue operations carried out by

isation (IHO), 474

International Oceanographic expedi

504-06;

tion, 518

revised plan of, 51;

Internationa! Seabed Authonty, 333

role of 40-41;

Inter-Service Defence Delegation to

role o f in oceanographic research,

USSR, 241-44

518-19;

Inter-Service Pre-Cadet College

schools and courses, 296;

nSPCC), 289

services during striJce period, 5 -

Inter-Service Wing PSW), 289;

08'

aim of, 289-90

ships dignitaries visited the, 498

Inter War Years, 105-09

fubm arines for, criteria

2^ -35;

surveying ship equipn^en

/

JaoD, King, 338

three H unt class destroyers for, 67

Japan, 98/124

,

v is e ls in th e re v i^ p la "^ ^ 7 ;

Vikrant joins

87,

watchfulness, role play

/

J e l l i c o e , Lord, IM

JesseJ,

Crown, restora-

56

.

„ i i n e ) A ct 1934,

Indian Navy (Disaplme^A

314-15

at Karwar Coast,

Indian Navy Ships,

350-51;

in Coronation

participaBon

Fleet,

Review of

Sino-PaJ^

483;

to counter

performance

232

Axis, 57-58

Indian

Indian ocean,

5 3 8 / B L U E P R I N T T O B L U E W A T E R

Jo in t E xercise o f Trincom alee (JET)

K au l, Lt. G en. B.M ., Confrontation

135;

'

with Pakistan, a book by, 417

C om m onw ealth N avies partici

K av ic, L o m e ]., India's Quest for

p ated in, 488;

Security: Defence Policies 1947-65; a

hockey, 493;

b ook by, 468

in cid ent betw een India and

K eir, Maj. G en. Sir William, 20

Pakistan, 495-96

K elm an , C o m m an d er N., 371-73;

Join t Service W ing QSW), 289, 290

A sh ok C h ak ra aw ard ed to, 375

Ju dge advocate functions, 313

K erm edy, P resid en t John P., comm en ts ab ou t Jaw ah arlal Nehru, 409

Kabaddi type attack on Dwarka,438

K en y atta-Jom o , 503

K abir, Prof. H um ayun, 519

K eyston , D r. J.E., 271

Kadaw ala, Platoon Com m ander K.D.,

K h an , C a p t A kram , 495

4 3 4 ^ 5

K h an , A yu b, 4 1 6 -1 7

"

Kafur, M alik, 343

K h er, S arasw ati, 68

Kakkar, Mrs. 83

Khilji, Sultan A Jauddin, 343

K a m a lh , V ice A d m ira l V .A ., 5 0 ,8 5 ,

K h ru sh ch ev, N ikita, 50 1 ;

2 9 1 , 3 5 5 , 4 2 8 ;

m essag e to N eh ru , 410

v ie w s of ab o u t Vikrant, 160-61

K h u ran a, Vice A dm iral LJ.S., 497

K a p a d ia , R e a r A d m ira l H .D ., 1 3 1 ;

K idw ai M .K., 70

co n trib u tio n to N a v a l aviation, 139

K irke, R ear A d m iral D .W ., 147-48,

K a p o o r, Balraj, 461

178

K a p o o r, C o m m a n d e r D .C . 8 6, 4 28,

K ochrekar, R ajaram A lm aram , 350

448, 474

Kohli, C apt. M.S., 515

K ap o o r, R e a r A d m iral G.S., 6 0 ,6 8

Kohli, C om m and er, S.N., 3 1 ,6 0 ,6 8 ,

K a p o o r S im d ari, 69

69, 75, 78, 9 3 ,2 1 7 ,2 4 4 ;

K arb h ari, C ap t. D ara, 379

experience of, as com m ander of

K arm a rk a r, R ear A d m iral, S.G., 502

Mysore^ 488-89

K ash m ir issue, 417-18

Kon-Tiki expedition, 249

K atari, A d m iral R.D ., 3 3 ,5 9 , 76, 84,

K orean W ar, 1 2 2 ,1 2 3 ,1 3 3 ,1 3 6

1 5 6 ,1 5 9 ,1 6 8 ,2 2 1 ,2 2 5 ,2 8 3 , 2 8 5 ,3 5 9 ,

Kori C reek report, 428

3 8 4 ,3 8 8 ,3 9 4 ,4 9 9 ;

Krishnan, C om m odore, K.K., 496

as an executive officer Delhi, 482

Krishnan, Vice A dm iral N ., 2 7 ,6 9 ,

8 3;

1 6 3 ,3 5 3 ,3 9 7 ,5 1 0 ;

com m ents G overnm ent’s budgetdescribes e x p e rie n c e a t C o ron atio n ary policies, 304;

Review of the Royal N aval Fleet,

experience at Indian port, 482-83;

483-85

foreign dignitaries entertained by,

K ulkam i, Vice Adm iral K.L., 366, 369500-501;

70

letter to N aval C om m anders, 405

Kulshreshtha, Lt. Com m ander S.K.,

06;

80

recalls an incident during JET, 495

Kumar, Col., 516

96;

Kunnenkerill Comm odore T I 371

visits Chirui, 486-S8

386

K athiaw ar coast, 447

K a tju ,K N .,1 5 0

Lake, Simon, 189-90

INDEX / 539

Lakshdvveep, 331

U l M r C h ief M arshal P .C J 6 3 , 416, MgWmeambience,characterisHcsof,

426;

% Years with LAP, a book by, 416, Margaret, Princess, 484

Marie-Davy, EM, 197

L am ba, Lt. C om m ander IS., 428

M.AN. (Mardiinesfabrik Augsberg

i ^ b e u f . Max, 189

Nwinberg AGJ, 148

Marsh, Commodore, RLH,

L aw Lt. C o m m ander B.D., 134-36

15]

Mathur, Capt. P M , 390

1 3 7 ,1 3 9 , 1 5 2 , 154,161, 176-77,179,

MavJankar, G.V., 481

Mayor, Lord, 83

Law Com m ission, 326

McCluer Capt. John, 472

L aw of the Sea Conference, 325

McGregor, Admiral Sir Rohderik

Lenta igne, Lt Gen Joe, 292

135,512

L iberation of Goa, 179

McMilian, Harold, 356

Lim aye, M adhu, 356

NcNeil Lady, 81

L ohia D r Ram M anohar, 345

McNeil, Sir James, 81

L on d o n N aval Conference of 1930,

Megasthenes, 254

203

Mehta, Commodore D.R., 427,481,

L ong N avigation and Direction

492,503-04

C ourse, 292

Mel, Admiral, Royace de, 508

L ongm ore, Lt., 99

Menon, Commander, C.R., 131

Luce, A dm iral Sir David, 240,243

Menon, Rear Admiral O . , 232

Menon, Lt Commander, P.K.K., 137,

M acA rthur, Gen Douglas, 116,323,

142-43

213

Menon, V.K. Krishna, 59, 76,79,90,

M ahadevan Commander, S.V., 387

152,166,268-69.304,347,356,394,

M ahan, Admiral, A.T., 35

408,410,515

Mahindroo, Rear Admirai P.S., 1 5 0

Milan, Lt. R.J., 230

Miles, Vice Admiral Sir, Geoffrey,

5 2 , 1 5 5 , 1 7 7 , 4 9 4 , 4 9 5

M aitra Commander J.N., 427

281, 499

Misra, Commander, N.C., 378

M akran Coast, 459

Mitchell, Commander, C.C, 122

Malhotra, Gen. O.P., 292

, Mohammed, All, 376;

Malik, Commodore, Y.P., 436;

Ashok Chakra Class II to, 375

describes Pakistan's attack on

Mobenjodaro, 253

D w a r k a , 4 3 6 -3 8

Mookeiji, Rear Admiral, P.K. 268

Malviya, Pandit Madan Mohan, 3 14

Moolagavkar, Air Chief Marshal H .,

Maniben, 498

292

Manuel, King, 338

Mansergh, Admiral Sir Maunce

Mountbatten, Earl, 129

Mounfbatten, LadyEdivina, 70,13S

James, 68

MountbaHen, Admiral Lord Luis, 69,

Marakkars, AIj, U

70,75,90,135,239,280,482

Mountbatten, Lady Pamela, 70

Mountbatten, Viceroy Viscount, 38

India, 4;

Mount Deli, 339

during Hindu period'®

540 / BLUEPRINT TO BLUEWATER

M o u ss e l B a y , 338

N a v a l C o m m o n v ^ ea lth P lanning

M o z a m b iq u e , 343

C o n fe re n c e a t S in g a p o re , 329

M u d a lia r, C o m m a n d e r V .S.P ., 131,

N a v a l D e fe n c e o f th e C o m m o n 145

w e a lth , 223

M u d h o lk a r V ice A d m iral B.G ., 171

N a v a l D e v e lo p m e n t P lan cuts in, 50

M u g h a l A d m iralty , 310

51

M u k e rji, E n g . Su b . Lt. D .N ., 23

N a v a l D iscipline A ct 1 8 6 6 ,3 1 3

M u k h e rji, C o m m an d e r H .K ., 130

N a v a l Fleet, setu p of, to face Pak

M u lla, C ap t., M .N ., 428, 496^

attack , 427-29

M u sa , G en ., 416

N aval F o rce s (M iscellaneous Provi

M u stin , C o m m an d er H .C ,, 100

sions) A ct 1 9 5 0 ,3 1 5

N a v a l h a rd w a re , sources, 90-92

N a b i, E n g in e R o o m A rtificer G., 441

N av al H yd ro g rap h ic School, 474

N a d k a m i, Su b Lt. J.G ., (later A dm iral

N av al Jet Flight, 137

and C h ief of the N aval Staff), 68,

N aval L aw s, British m odel of, 311;

394

d u rin g A k b ar's reign, 310;

N ag ark ar M eena, 514

du rin g A u ran g zeb 's rule, 310;

N agarkar, C om m ander W .S., 514

du rin g C h an d rag u p ta's period;

N ag aran i, C om m ander, S.J., 427

evolution of, 311

N agasaki, 120

N aval O peration O rder, 361

N a ir R e a r A d m ira l K.R., related

N aval Police an d Regulating School,

in cid en t as C o m m a n d e r of Rana,

301

4 8 9 -9 0

N aval P ow er, essentials for the

N a n a v a ti B rig ., 5 0 2

grow th of, 3 5 -3 7

N a n a v a ti, C o m m an d er, K.M ., 75, 492

N aval Store O rganisation and Spare

Nar\da D evi E xp ed ition , 516

Parts Distribution Centre, 27

N a n d a , A d m iral S.M ., 69, 75, 241-42,

N aval Task Force grou p s, 362;

26 8 , 4 8 4 , 492, 499

O rganisation of, 364;

N a ra y a n , Lt. C om m an d er V.V., 145

task entrusted w ith, 361-62,3 6 5

N ational D efence A cad em y (N D A),

N aval W arfare, history of, 96

4 80;

N avy A ct 1 9 5 7 ,3 1 3 ,3 1 5 -1 8

shifting of, to K hadakvasla, 291

N azareth, C om m ander Freddie, 381

N A TO , 6 6 ,2 3 2 ,3 2 7 ,3 5 2 ,3 5 4 ,3 6 6 , 409

N azareth, Lt. C om m ander J.V., 131

N av al A ircraft Inspection Service, 145

Neguib, Gen M oham med, 69

N aval Air Squadrons, 137, 429-30, 550

N ehru, B.K., 354

N aval Air Stations, purpose to set up,

Nehru, P t.M otilal, 314

122

Nehru, Jawaharlal, 5 0 ,5 9 , 6 2 ,8 9 , 92,

N aval Air Technical School (NATS),

1 2 9 ,1 5 6 , 260, 2 6 6 ,3 4 7 ,3 5 3 ,3 5 5 ,

145

3 5 7 -5 8 ,4 1 3 ,4 1 6 , 4 8 1 ,5 1 0 ,5 1 5 ,5 1 7 ;

N aval A greem ent Limitation Treaty,

on board Rajput, 499-500;

1 0 5 -0 6 ,1 0 8

letter of, regarding defence expen

N aval Battle H onours, 521-22

diture, 302-03;

N aval C hart Depot, {Angre), 474

statement in Lok Sabha, 350;

N aval Chem ical and Metallurgical

visits Vikrant, 159-60

Laboratory, (NCM L), 271;

Nehru-Liaquat Pact, 87

achievem ents of, 272

Nehru-Nasser, Tito Charisma, 75

INDEX / 541

Nehru, Mrs Rajan, 501

134-135,139,141

Nehru, R.K., 501

Pardo, Arvid, 328,332

Nelson, Lord, 19, 464

Parry, Admiral Sir Edward, 61-62,81

Neogi, Commander M.N., 384

172,281-82,296,481,498

Newnham, Capt.

281

Parsons, Sir Charles, 252

Niazi, Commander, K.R., 441

Patel, Sardar Valiabhbhai, 89,393,

Nimitz, Admiral C.W., 114

487;

Nogueiria, Dr. Franco, 353

on board Delhi, 498-99

Norweigian Coast, 102

Paulo-Da-Gama, 9,338

Nott, Commodore, M.H. St. L., 33,

Pavamana, Commander N., 131

220,223, 281, 287

Pearl Harbour, 211;

Nowrojee Jamshedjee, 260

attack on. 111

Pedro, Dom, 337

OerlJkon anti-aircraft gun, 76

Pereira, Vice Admiral J.T.G., 68

Oilphant, Capt. Hugh, 191

Pereira, Chief Band master, 482

Okha Home Guards, 434

Persian Gulf, 336,444,449,356

OJcha Port Authority, 436-37

Philip, King, of Spain, 95

Operation Chutney, 365,386

Philip, Prince, 484

Operation Response, 428

Philips, Admiral Sir Tom, 112

Operation Vijay, 348,366, 386-87,390;

Pilcher Committee, 315

lessons from, 404-06;

Pinto, Air Marshal E. W., 359

Pinto's rebellion, 1787 ,344

officers controlling, 359

Pitt William (Prime Minister), 187

Operational Flying Training School,

Pizey, Vice Admiral Sir Mark, SO, 51,

128

145,281-82, 299,500,512,515

Operational and Technical Personnel,

Pizey, Lady, 78

.

, --o

infrastructure of, 129^1

Plymouth, Commander in Cruet, bo

Orr-Ewing, Ian, 151-52

Pocock, Admiral, 17

Porto Novo, 506

Painta], Rear Admiral D.S., 378,427

Portugal, demonstration in, against

Paiva, Alfanso dc, 337

Britain, 410-11;

Pakistan Air Force, 427, 443,451;

forces, intelligence regarding, 362-

attack on Jamnagar, 431-32;

P o S g u e s e , Govemmentappeai to

InJnationalCourtofJus^ce,346

probJem, world opinion about, 3S/-

!ol'diers, belligeren t acts

349^0;

surrender on condidons of, 381

Prasad, Dr. Rajendra (President), 135,

145'

on board Df/Ai 500;

1'^°'

K

2,10,35,37,

takes salute of first Review of the

Pr«rT™ ifo/lndia, report about

Portugal, 409

b)''

1 1 Com m ander P.N., 130/

542 / b l u e p r i n t TO BLUEWATER

P.T. boats, 196-99

Ptolemy, 254

G albraith, 411;

Pultney, Admiral Sir, 260

at the sea, a book by, 411

Punchhi, Commander K.K., 137

Koss, C apt Daniel, 472

^°y'8^i'=e Admiral M.K., 131,135, 14],

Q u e e n 's R eg u lation s for the Royal

Navy, 311

Royal Aero Club, 98

Royal A ir Force, 104,286

Royal A ustralian Navy, 61,64 239

R ad h ak rish n an D r. S., 515

240

'

R ai, L ala L ajp at, 314

R oyal C anadian Navy, 146,224

R ain a, G en. T.N ., 292

Royal Ceylon Navy, 67

R ajag o p al, C om m ander, N., 77

Royal Flying Corps, (RFC), 99,103

R ajk h ow a, C om m odore, P.C., 130

Royal Indian Army, 273;

R ajw ad e, Sm t. U sha, 80

plans for the development of 39-40

R am ach and ran , Lt. C.P., 131

Royal Indian M arine, 258,517

R am an ath an , Com m ander P.K., 232

Royal Indian N avy (RIN), 126-27,219,

R am das, A dm iral L., 291, 384

221-22,224, 231, 258,272,280-81,

R am nath Rear A dm iral K.R., 244

2 8 7 ,3 1 4 ;

R am sagar, R ear A dm iral S., 451

appointm ents in, during 1958,275

Ranald, C apt. H. C., 134,140;

76;

first C h ief of N aval Aviation, 129,

cra ftssh ip sa n d vessels for, 45-46; ,

130,140

division of, 55;

R an e rebellion 1912, 344

officers strength in, 275;

Rcmjit, L t Com m ander B.S., 130,145

post created in, 276-77;

Rao, C om m ander D.N., 451, 453-54

problem s faced by, 273-74;

Rao, P.V.R., 457

ships and crafts allocated at the

R asu lk h an ji, Sir M a h a b a t K han, 3 2

time of partition, 32;

R a v in d ra n a th , C o m m o d o re V., 138

tasks and responsibilities, 37;

R a w a t, L t. C o m m a n d e r Jyoti, 516

strength of, 39

R a w a t, C o m m a n d e r M ani, 8 4 ,3 8 9

Royal Indian Naval Reserve (RINR)/

R e d F o rc e , 496

24

R ed Sea, 8 , 2 1 ,2 2 , 2 5 5 ,3 3 6 , 434, 444

Royal Indian Navy Volimteers

R eilly, C o m m a n d e r C .M ., 5 0 7

Reserve (RINVR), 24,231

R eo rg a n isa tio n C om m ittee on the

Royal Naval Aircraft Repair Yard,

F a ilu re of th e R oyal In d ian N avy,

149

38

Royal Naval Air Service, 104,140

R eview o f the Fleet, dignitaries

Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS),

p re se n t a t the tim e of, 5 1 5 ;

rank structure of, 99

ships p a rticip a te d in, 515

Royal Naval Air Station, 98 , 130,144

R iv e r P late V eteran 's A ssociation, 485

Royal Naval College, 289

R iv er S team N avigation C om p an y,

Royal Naval Scientific Service, 271

4 6 7

Royal Navy, 53, 65, 84, 98,100,104,

R om anoffs of R ussia, 73

105, 1 2 0 ,1 2 4 ,130,132,136,146,178,

R oosevelt, President, 204

182, 190-92, 221, 224-25, 231, 245,

Roskill, C ap t. S.N ., m eets J.K.

259, 272, 282, 285, 495;

INDEX / 543

bases, 126;

Sea Otter, 140

Ktablishment for basic training, 288-

Seaton, Capt., 20

Seaward Defence Boat Squadron,

losses suffered by, 121;

322nd, 79-80

Naval law in, evoJurion of, 313

SEATO, 55

Royal Navy; Fleet Arm, 134;

Sedorovich, Gen., 245

Gunnery School, 78;

Selassie, Haille (Emperor of Ethopia),

Submarine Service, 181-82;

135,500

Tactical School, Malta, 78

Selkirk, Lord, 72,75

Royal Pakistan Navy, 280;

Sethi, Admiral, S.L., 77

Ships and Crafts allocated to, at the

Shah, Yusuf Adil, 341,343

time of partition, 32

Shankar, Vice Admiral Daya, 267

Royal Yacht, 484-85

Shankar, V., 498

Rutland, Flight Lt., 102 ,445

Sharma,KP., 516

Sharma, Rear Admiral O.P., 329

Sachdev, Capt. C .L, 428

Sharma, Rakesh., 514

Sagar,SubhadraBai,347

Sharma, Suiya P., The Indo Pakistani

Saini, Commander, G.S., 86

Maritime Conflict -1965 - a legal

Salazar, D r, 410-12

Appraisal, a book by, 467

Samant, Commander, M.N.R., 232,

Shastri, Lai Bahadur, 419,425,458,

246

516;

Sambhaji, 16

conversation with President Ayub,

Samson, Lt., 99

420-21

Samson, Rear Admiral, B.A., 442-43,

Shea, Commodore G.M., 130

447 ,496

Shekhawat, Vice Admiral V.S., 232

Sandhu, Lt. Col. H.S., 242

Sheriff, Capt., 260

San Diego Bay, 98

Sheth, G.L., 244-45

Sanghmitra, Princess, 5

Shinwell, E., 65,66

Sanjana, Commodore K.K., 69,81-82,

Ships, evolution of249,252;

of India 200BC, 254;

148;

of Indian Peninsula, 252-57;

experience of Commander of

o f Vedic period, 253

Mysore, 513-34

Shivaji Mara tha Fleet, 15

Santayana, George, 94

Shivaji's Naval doctrine, 248

Sarabhai, Miss., 499

Shri H ad, Smt. Beryl, 80

Shri Hari, Air ^ o x n m o d o r t V icto r, 80

SaOTa Vice Admiral S.H., 80,532

Shrikhande, Commander M.S.,

Scalchatd,Adinu«l-«7-®S

V a s s « J « ,

S d ,o o lo fN a v a H ^ » S « P l'y “ ''

MS., 73

460

Scott, C apt 23,53/

5 4 4 / B L U E P R IN T T O B L U E W A T E R

Sin gh , C om m and er Gautam , 174

Subram aniam , Lt., Commander KS

Sin gh , C om m ander Lt. N andy, 428

2 3 0 ,2 4 6

'

Sin gh , C om m odore Inder, 69, 71, 428

Subm arines, acquisition of, 238;

Sin gh , C om m odore Inderjit, 232

British, 214;

Sin gh , Iqbal, 78

developm ent of, 186-88;

Sin gh , Air C om m odore Jasjit, 414

developed during Inter-War years,

Singh, C om m ander Joginder, 131

204;

Sin gh , Rear A dm iral Kirpal, 427, 459

dom inance during World War II,

482

215-18;

S in g h , A ir C o m m o d o re R an d h ir, 452

em ergence of during World War I,

454

200-03;

Sin g h , M ah araja R an jit, 3

F Class, for Indian Navy, 244-45;

Sin g h , R ear A d m iral R.V ., 4 3 0 ^ 5

features of, 19 3 ,1 9 7 ,2 0 0 ;

S in g h , R ear A d m iral Satyind ra, 69,

French, 190;

73-74, 76, 8 2 ,8 3 , 84, 87, 9 1 ,1 3 5 ,1 5 6 ,

G erm an, 203;

1 6 4 ,1 7 6 ,3 6 2 ,3 8 1 -8 4 , 420-21, 495,

need of, 227-28;

5 0 3 ,5 1 6

nuclear 217;

S in g h , C om m and er S.K., 232

personnel training, approval to,

Sin g h , Lt. T ig er Joginder, 161

230;

Sin gh , Lt. C om m and er Y.N ., 1 3 1 ,135,

proposal for acquisition of, 223-25;

152;

purchase, negotiation with British

ach ievem en ts of, 161-64

authorities for, 239-41;

S irJiji, G en M aharaj Rajendra, 50

r e q u ir e m e n t a fte r in d ep en d en ce,

Sino-Indian C onflict, 57

221-23;

Sin o-P ak Protocol Treaty, 415

role of, during World War II, 204

Sivam ani, Rear A dm iral P.P.I., 80

15;

Slattery, Rear A dm iral M .S., 134

types for Indian Navy, 235-38

Sm ith, Elliot, 249

Subm arine Arm, 246-47

Sodhi, R ear Adm iral J.M .S., 232

Subm arine Squadron, First, 246-48

Sodhi, Com m odore S.S., 80

Suez Canal, 22 ,8 2

Sokhi, Com m ander R.S., 130-31

Suez War, 123

Som an A dm iral B.S., 2 4 0 ,3 5 9 ,3 6 1 ,

Sultan, Tipu, 18

3 7 0 ,3 7 4 ,3 8 2 ,4 2 1 -2 4 ,4 2 9 -3 0 ,4 5 6 ,

Sumatra Coast, 519

463-64,473;

Sv/an River, 485

description of Anjadip events by

Swanson, Commander C.R., 99

384^6

SWATH, 94

SONAR, 222

Sourabaya Naval Base Java, 115

Tahiliani, Admiral R.H., 152,161,1^6/

South East Asia Treaty Organisation

511;

(SEA T O ),54,55

achievements of, 168-74;

Soviet Navy, 246,484

French experience of, 173-74

Spanish American War, 195

TaJwar, Commander L., 232

Spanish Armada, 182

Tameem, Lt. A., 441

Spniance, Admiral Raymond A., 213

T elles,C ap tP .I.,452

Stephen, L t J., 145

Territorial Sea Convention 1958,331

INDEX / 545

Thames River, 184

N avy, 9 8 ,1 0 1 ,1 0 4 - 0 7 ,1 1 7 ,1 2 4 ,1 9 0 ,

Thapar, Gen. P.N ., 359

199;

Thima3^ a , Gen. K.S., 167

7th fleet, 116;

Thukral, C om m odore, D.N., 232

Submarines, perform ance of, 211

Tito, M arshal (President), 1 3 5 ,5 0 0 ;

13;

visits India, 502

Third Fleet, 116

Tomar, O rdinary Seaman Vijendra

USSR Subm arines for Indian N avy,

Pal, Ashok Chakra Class II to, 375

89-90

Torpedo, evolution of, 193-97;

origin of the w ord, 194

Valladares, C om m odore V.J.A., 481

Torpedo Anti subm arine School, 298

Varthem a, 259

99

Vasco-da-G am a, 9 ,1 0

Torpedo School, 288

Vasudeva, A dm iral M.N., 230, 232,

Trade W arfare, 465-67

2 4 6 -i7

Transfer by Jackstay, 514

Vats, C om m ander, J.N., 130

Transport Squadron, 128

VerghesG, C om m ander P.M., 86

Treacher, Adm iral Sir John, 1 4 2 ,1 5 4 ,

Verm a, Lt. Gen., Shiv D., 292

1 5 8 ,1 6 1 ;

Vickers A rm strong Shipyard> 83

mem oirs of, 174;

Vijayas, Sri., 7

view s of about Com m ander Y.N.

Vincent, Earl St - The First Sea Lord,

Singh, 164-65

190

Treaty of Versailles, 203

Vinci, Leonardo da, 183

Trials in courts m artial and Civil

Vishwanathan, 3 8 4

Courts, a com parison, 318-21

V /ST O L - m ode of launching aircraft,

Tyabji, Capt. N.S., 148

9 6 ,1 7 9

Tyagi, M ahavir, 144

Tyrewhitt Rear Admiral Sir St

W adhaw an, C om m odore M .P., 138,

285, 490

1 4 2 ^

W adia, Lowjee N usserwanjee, 19

Unified Inter Services Code, need of

W adia, Nowrojee Jamshedjee, 262

322-23

Walker, Patrick Gorden (First Lord of

Uniform Code Committee, 322

Admiralty), 6 3 ,6 6 ;

United Nations, 1 2 3 ,3 2 6 ,3 8 2 ;

letters, 63-64

Charter, 3 5 3 ,4 0 9 -1 0 ,4 6 7 ;

Warships, evolution of, 94

General Assembly, 356;

Washington N aval Limitation

Goa liberation case before, 347;

Conference, 203

Security Council, 409;

Watson, Admiral, 16

Trusteeship Council, 347

Watson, Capt. F. W., 240

United Nations Conferences on the

Wavell, Viscount, 38

Law of the Sea, 326-32

WECORS, Project, sanction to, 270

U.S., Arm y, 98;

Wellesly, Commodore, 262

battleship disaster, 95;

West Coast, 360, 444 ,449

Carrier during Korean W ar, 123-24;

West German N avy, 140

Fleet, 114-16;

Whitehead, Robert, 194

Naval Force, 211;

Wilkins, John, 184

naval strategy of, 21;

Wilson, Lt Comm ander W.J., 27

5 4 6 / B L U E P R IN T T O B L U E W A T E R

W o rld W ar 1 ,2 2 ,9 5 ,1 0 4 ,1 8 1 - 8 2 ,215233, 246, 263, 265,286-87,325,382, 1 6 ,3 1 4 ;

^ 11,436, 443, 469, 485,510,517;

carriers m, 101-04;

A ustralian Navy during, 125;

em erg en ce of su bm arines during,

evolution of carrier strategy tactics,

200-03

109-17 .

W o rld W ar H, 4 2 ,6 7 ,8 4 ,8 9 ,9 0 ,9 4 ,9 5 ,

Yalu river, 123

1 0 7 -0 8 ,1 2 6 ,1 3 4 ,1 4 6 ,1 4 9 ,1 7 8 ,1 8 1 ,

1 9 5 ,1 9 8 ,1 9 9 ,2 0 6 , 214-16,220-22,

Zukhov, M arshal, 501-02

Index to Ships - Crafts - Vessels

Ahay, Indian N avy, Seaw ard Defence

Bimlipatnam, Indian Navy, Inshore

Boat, 450

Minesweeper, 77,266

Aboukir, British, Cruiser, 200

Bismark, German Navy, Battleship,

Achilles British, Criiiser, 485

110

Africa^ British Battleship, 99

Blackburn Skua, British Monoplan

Ajay, Indian Navy, Seaward Defence

Dive Bomber, 106

Boat, 8 5 ,8 6 ,4 2 7 ,4 3 3 ,4 5 0

Bonaventure, Canadian Carrier, 152

Akbar, Indian Navy, steam Frigate,

Brahmaputra, Indian Navy, Frigate,

288

81, 83, 427-28, 433, 442, 444, 460

Akshay, Indian Navy, Seaward

Brisbane, Australian, Cruiser, 108

D efence Boat, 85,86

British Industry British, Tanker, 509

Albatross, Australian, Seaplane

Carrier, 108

Cannanore, Indian Navy

Afijnso-de-Albuquerque, Portuguese,

Minesweeper, 77,266

W arship, 381

Cauvery, Royal Indian Navy, Frigate,

Al Razak, Pakistan, Sailing Vessel, 465

2 6 6 ,3 6 2 ,3 8 1 ,3 8 7 ,3 8 9 ,5 0 0

Anwar Baksh, Pakistani Merchantship,

Charles Marter French, Battleship, 190

463

Chittagong City, Pakistan, Merchant

Ark Royal, British, Aircraft carrier, 99,

Ship, 508

102,109-11,124

Cornwallis, Bombay Marine Frigate,

Asia, Indian Navy Ship, 260

259

Astute British Submarine, 421

Courageous, British Battle Cruiser,

Audacity, BrlHsh Escort Carrier, 118

105-06

Cressy, British Cruiser, 200

Bagh-e-Karachi, Pakistan Merchant

Cuddalore, Indian Navy, Coastal

Ship, 467

Minesweeper, 266

Bassein, Bombay Marine, 266

Bcffs, Indian Navy Frigate, 41,81,351,

Dacca, Pakistan, Tanker, 442

362,365,381,386, 391,419,427,

Darshak, Indian Navy, Survey Sfiip,

428, 432-33,442, 444

86-87, 427, 473

Betwa, Indian Navy Frigate, 41,81,84,

Delhi, Indian Navy, Cruiser, 56, 68,

350,362,365,381, 386-87,390-91,

72,76,110, 160, 265-66, 268,352,

428,429,433, 447,448,460

393,395,398-99, 400, 429, 481, 484,

INDEX / 54 7

4 9 1 ,5 0 7

Hawker Nimrod, British, Biplane

Dharini, Indian N avy Repair Ship,

Fighter, 106

86 ,3 5 2 ,5 0 5

Hercules, British, Aircraft Carrier, 146,

Diana, Bombay, Marine,W arship, 496149

97

Hermes, British, Aircraft Carrier, 99,

Durweston, Royal Navy,

110,112

Minesweeper, 77

Hogue, British, Cruiser, 200, 488-89

Hugh Lindsay, Bombay M arine Steam

Eagle, British, W arship, 1 0 5 ,1 1 0 ,1 9 4

Ship, 2 0 ,2 6 2

Empress, British, Merchant Ship, 99,

Huntington, US Cruiser, 104

101

Engadine, British, M erchant Ship, 99,

Illustrious, British, Aircraft Carrier,

10 1 ,1 0 3

1 0 6 ,1 1 0 ,1 1 5

Enterprise, American, Aircraft Carrier,

Indian Pioneer, Indian N avy Ship, 506

1 0 6 ,1 2 4

Investigator, Indian N avy, Survey

Exeter, British, Cruiser, 485

Ship, 5 1 ,4 7 3 ,5 0 9

Fairey Swordfish, British, Torpedo-

Jumnia, Royal Indian Navy, Frigate,

C arrying biplane, 106

473

Formidable, British Aircraft Carrier,

106

Kakinada, Indian Navy, Coastal

Foudroyani, British, Training Ship, 261

M inesweeper, 2 6 6 ,4 2 8 , 450

Foudre, British Torpedo-Boat Carrier,

Karwar, Indian Navy, Coastal

100

Minesweeper, 77, 2 6 6 ,3 5 2

Fulton, American, Steam Warship,

Khatau Para, Indian Sailing Vessel,

186

465

Khukri, Indian Navy, Frigate, 8 0,82,

Gcdeb, Marshal Tito's Yacht, 500,502,

8 3 ,2 2 6 ,3 5 2 , 362, 427, 429, 43 3 ,4 4 2 ,

510

4 4 4 ,4 4 6 ,4 7 3 ,5 1 2

Ganga, Indian N avy Destroyer, 5 6,67,

Kirpan, Indian Navy, Frigate, 80,226,

6 9 ,7 1 ,2 6 6 ,2 8 5 ,4 8 8 ,5 0 2

3 6 2 .4 1 9 .4 2 7 .4 4 2 , 444, 446

Ganges, Royal Indian Marine, 260

Kistna, Royal Indian Navy, Sloop/

Ghazi, Pakistani Submarine, 421, 429,

Frigate, 5 6 ,3 5 2 , 4 2 7 ,450, 481, 505,

4 4 1 -4 2 ,4 3 8 ,4 6 9

518-19

Glorious, British, Battle Cruiser, 106

Konkan, Indian Navy, Fleet

Gloster Sea Gladiator, British Biplane

Minesweeper, 26 6 ,4 5 2

Fighter, 106

Kuthar, Indian Navy, Frigate, 80,226,

Godavari, Indian Navy, Destroyer,

3 5 2 .3 6 2 .4 2 7 .4 3 3 .4 4 2 , 444,446

5 6 .7 1 .2 6 4 .2 6 6 , 285, 428,450,4fi8,

hingley, American, Aircraft Carrier,

502

106

Gomati, Indian Navy, Destroyer, 56,

Leonor, Philippine, Ship, 465

6 7 .6 9 .7 1 .2 6 6 , 285, 4 2 8 ,4 8 8 ,5 0 2

Lexington, US Aircraft Carrier, 106

Grafspee, German, Pocket Battleship,

London, British Warship, 99

110,485

Lavecem, Yugoslav Destroyer, 502

Gustavxede. French, Submarine, 190

5 4 8 / B L U E P R IN T T O B L U E W A T ER

Magar, Indian N avy, Landing Ship,

SavUri, Indian Navy, Patrol Boat, 79

514

Seattle, US Cruiser, 100,104

Maharishi, Indian M erchant Ship, 505

Sharda, Indian Navy Seaward

Malabar, Bom bay Marine, W arship,

Defence Boat, 79

260

Split, Yugoslav, Destroyer, 502

Minden, Royal Navy Ship, 261

Steel Protractor, Indian, Merchant

Mysore, Indian Navy, Cruiser, 73, 76,

Ship, 446

159, 2 6 8 ,3 5 2 ,3 6 1 ,3 6 6 -6 7 ,3 6 9 ,3 7 0 ,

Subhadra, Indian Navy, Seaward

374, 3 7 7 -79,384, 406-07, 421, 433,

Defence Boat, 79

442, 446, 450, 458,486-88, 496, 497;

Suknnya, Iiidian Navy, Seaward

Defence Boat, 79,80

Nautilus, Am erican, Subm arine Boat,

Sutlej, Indian Navy, Survey Ship, 51,

1 8 6 ,1 8 7

427

Suvarna, Indian Navy, Seaward

Ocean, Royal Navy, Carrier, 121

Defence Boat, 79

Osiender, British W arship, 13

Sverdlov, Soviet Cruiser, 260

Overion, Royal Navy, Coastal

Swallow, Bombay, Marine, Warship,

M inesw eeper, 77

260

Prince Henry o f Prussia, German

Talwar, Indian Navy, Frigate, 85,352,

M erchant Ship, 18

428, 4 3 5 ^ 8 ,4 4 2

Prince of Wales, British, Battleship, 112

Tir, Indian Navy, Frigate, 51, 68,450,

481,503-04, 506-07

Queen Elizabeth, British, Battleship, 72,

Trincomalee, British, Ship, 261

81

Trishul, Indian Navy, Frigate, 8 5 ,3666 8 ,370,3 7 3 ,3 7 6 ,3 7 8 -7 9 ,3 8 1 -8 2

Rajput, Indian Navy, Destroyer, 51,

5 6 ,2 6 6 ,3 5 0 -5 1 ,4 2 7 ,4 3 2 ,4 9 1

Victorious, British Aircraft Carrier,

Rana, Indian Navy, Destroyer, 51,56,

109,154, 496-97

2 6 6 ,4 2 8 ,432-;33,489 ,4 9 8 ,5 0 2 ,5 0 5 ,

Victory, British Warship, 251,261

510

Vikrant, Indian Navy, Aircraft

Ranger, American, Aircraft Carrier,

Carrier, 8 4 ,8 7,137, 140, 141,143,

106

146,151-55,159-60,178,199,236,

Ranjit, Indian Navy, Destroyer, 56,

268,352,362,418,421-22,428-29

68 ,2 6 6 ,4 2 7 , 429, 4 3 2 ^ 3 ,442,446,

496,510

4 4 7 ,4 9 1 ,4 9 9 ,5 0 2 ,5 0 7 ,5 1 0

Repulse, British Cruiser, 112

Wandal, Caspian Steamer, 252

Rohilkhand, Indian Navy

Wennington, Royal Navy, Coastal

Minesweeper, 473

Minesweeper, 77

Sabarm ati, Indian Steamship, 349-50

Sao Gabriel, Portuguese Ship, 9,10,

Yamato, Japanese, Battleship, 120

338

Yorklown, US Aircraft Carrier, 106

S ara to g a,V S , Carrier, 106,115

Zulfiijuar, Pakistan, Navy, Frigate, ssg

Table of Contents

Apart from the thousands

Foreword

Preface

Acknowledgements

Abbreoiations

A PEEP IN TO OU R M ARITIM E P A S T -

A M ARITIM E RESURRECTION GETS UN DER W A Y -

GLOBAL PARAM OUN TCY

TH E NAVY GROW S W IN GS -

RUN SILENT RUN DEEP -

TH E NAVY ACQUIRES TH E THIRD D IM E N SIO N -

REINFORCING TH E CAISSON -

TH E M EN BEHIND TH E M ACHINES

OF FUNDS AND FINANCES

DISCIPLINE A T S E A -

TH E SUN SETS ON PORTUGAL'S ASIAN EMPIRE -

THE BLUNTED SC IM ITA R-

CHARTING TH E OCEANS

TH E N AVY'S VARIEGATED PEACETIME ACTTVITIES -

NAVAL BATTLE HONOURS

Bibliography

Index