CHAPTER 8
THE EVOLUTION OF THE NAVY'S PLAN OF OPERATIONS
When the military crackdown occurred in East Pakistan on 25 March 1971, the Eastern Naval Command deployed a few ships on patrol across the sea lane to Chittagong and Khulna. Soon thereafter, in April 1971, Ceylon requested India's help to quell an imminent leftist uprising. It was suspected that North Korean merchant ships were ferrying arms to the insurgents. The Navy reacted swiftly and silently. Ships of the Western Fleet patrolled Ceylon's west coast remaining out of sight. A frigate entered Colombo harbour to act as communication link. Ships from Visakhapatnam patrolled Ceylon's east coast, also remaining out of sight. After a few weeks, the crisis blew over and ships returned to their base ports. This was the Navy's first ever deployment in support of foreign policy to assist neighbours in distress. Its successful outcome made a significant impact in the Ministries of Defence and External Affairs.
From the naval side however, the ships which had participated in this operation needed several weeks in harbour to catch up on their maintenance which had been planned for the first half of 1971. In his book "No Way But Surrender" Vice Admiral Krishnan states: (Page 17)
"Our ships were in a fairly bad way, as they had to do a considerable amount of steaming at high speeds in connection with the operations off Ceylon in response to that Government's appeal for help. To get them all operational in the time available would need an all out effort".
In May, Naval Headquarters started formulating the tasks to be assigned to the Western and Eastern Naval Commands and deciding the allocation of forces. These tasks had to derive from the capabilities and limitations of the ships, submarines and aircraft at that point in time. The Navy's success in December 1971 was the outcome of the altogether unexpected way in which these tasks eventually synthesised.
In so far as the Navy's role was concerned, Admiral Nanda recalls that in the meetings of the Chiefs of Staff with the Prime Minister, discussions mainly centred on the Army and the Air Force. After each meeting, the Prime Minister would politely ask the Naval Chief whether he had anything to say and Admiral Nanda would say no. To him, this was a clear indication that not even the Prime Minister expected the Navy to make any significant contribution to the forthcoming operations. Admiral Nanda resolved that the Navy had to prove its mettle this time.
Admiral Nanda recalls that when he asked his staff in Naval Headquarters what the Pakistan Navy was likely to do, the reply was that they would not seek action on the high seas but would remain under Pakistan Air Force air cover for the defence of Karachi, which was West Pakistan's only sea port. When he asked them what the Western Fleet should do, the reply was that it should deploy for the defence of Saurashtra and Bombay to prevent a hit and run raid of the kind that took place on Dwarka in 1965. In Admiral Nanda's view, such defensive deployment of our Navy was not acceptable. He was determined that the Navy's frustration in 1965 at not having achieved anything significant should not recur.
The basic concept that emerged was straightforward: to take the offensive, attack Karachi, entice the Pakistan fleet to battle - and cut the sea line of communication between West and East Pakistan.
Since June 1970, the aircraft carrier VIKRANT had been lying immobilised in Bombay due to serious cracks and leaks that had developed in the water drum of A1 boiler. Subsequent radiographic examination revealed that the water drums of the remaining three boilers also had a large number of internal fatigue cracks and fissures at each of the circumferential rivetted joints that were beyond repair by welding. It was clear that long term repairs to VIKRANT's boilers were not feasible indigenously. Orders were placed in Britain for the supply of four new water drums. Naval Headquarters directed that the boilers were not to be used till further orders. A1 boiler was blanked off.
Eventually, on 26 Feb 71, the ship made a `cold move' from the Ballard Pier Extension to the anchorage. The objective was to flash up each boiler at reduced steam pressure and try out the main and flight deck machinery which had been lying idle for seven months. The boilers were first flashed up on 1 Mar 71 and `Basin Trials' upto 40 RPM (ahead and astern) were carried out, after securing the ship to E1 Buoy. Fast pullout catapult trials were also completed on the same day. The catapult steam supply modification in the forward machinery room was tried out and found to be fully satisfactory. As events were to prove later in the 1971 war, without this modification the Seahawks could not have been launched at 160 RPM. The ship proceeded to sea for Preliminary Sea Trials on 18 Mar 71 and returned on 20 Mar 71. She went to sea again on 26 Apr, returning the next day.
As a result of these sea trials, it was considered technically feasible to operate the boilers at 400 psi pressure thereby restricting the ships speed to 14 knots, maximum revolutions 120 ahead and 60 revolutions astern.
In May 1971, when Naval Headquarters started working on the concept of operations, the first problem that needed deciding was what to do with VIKRANT. Admiral Nanda recalls:
"When the circumstances became clear that we may have to go to war, there was a feeling that we should leave VIKRANT in Bombay harbour. I said "No, because during the 1965 war also, VIKRANT was sitting in Bombay harbour and did not go out to sea. If in the 1971 war the same thing happens, VIKRANT would be called a white elephant and Naval Aviation would be written off. VIKRANT has to be seen as being operational, even if we do not fly the aircraft.
"There has been this fear, and probably rightly so, that if the VIKRANT gets torpedoed or if VIKRANT sinks, the Navy and India will lose a lot of prestige. Therefore to send VIKRANT to sea was a difficult decision for anybody to take. One had to take cognisance of the facts. These were that VIKRANT's boiler had a crack and therefore the speed of the ship was restricted. That the ship may not be in a position to fly aircraft or operate the catapult. Then I asked the question "If we operate on three boilers, what will happen ?" The answer given was that "we may not be able to catapult the aircraft." So knowing the decision had been taken not to fly aircraft, I asked "Are we able to at least steam? Not at the speed required for catapulting aircraft, but at steaming speed ?" And I got the staff to agree that she could steam. So I said "Alright, let her steam". We sent the VIKRANT out from Bombay.
In his book, Vice Admiral Krishnan states: (Page 8 et seq)
"There were many in the service, some of them very senior officers, who considered VIKRANT a liability in any war with Pakistan. They argued that deployment of the VIKRANT involved certain inherent risks, especially from underwater threats, so considerable escort effort would be required. Many doubted her exact role in a war with Pakistan. Some even went to the extent of suggesting that the VIKRANT should take no part in the war but should be tucked away inside Cochin. I am not suggesting that the pessimists did not have sufficient grounds for their misgivings. There was an overwhelming body of professional opinion that considered that steaming the VIKRANT in her current state was not a risk worth taking.
"Secondly, in any war at sea, VIKRANT would obviously be the most worthwhile target for the enemy. The three Daphne class submarines, newly acquired by Pakistan from France and fully operational, posed a great potential threat to the carrier. The sophistication of their detection capability as well as the homing devices of their torpedoes were such that once the ship was picked up and the screen of escorts pierced, the VIKRANT would stand in mortal danger. Even as many as six escorts would not guarantee any complete immunity to the carrier.
"Morale and psychological factors weighed just as heavily in the minds of all of us. If VIKRANT were to be sunk, it would represent a victory of the first magnitude to the enemy, just as it would represent a national disaster to us. VIKRANT was the core round which our Fleet was built and her loss would be something too terrible to contemplate. Ever since we had acquired the carrier, she had come in for severe criticism and much controversy, invariably to her detriment. But we were not concerned at public criticism alone. Obviously as professional men in positions of responsibility, we would not send any ship into battle unless we were satisfied that it would be worth our while to do so."
A characteristic of Admiral Nanda's style of leadership was that whenever he was confronted with a vexed problem, he would go down to where the ships were, sit down with those he considered knowledgeable about the problem, listen carefully to all views, ask basic commonsense questions and gradually evolve workable solutions, making it clear that the responsibility for the final decision would be his. He would then go back to Naval Headquarters, discuss the suggested solutions with the Naval Staff and quantify the risks and the benefits on a commonsense basis. This helped to arrive at a consensus in the formulation of which each one felt that his concerns had been considered, that as much care as possible had to be taken to minimise the risks and that should things go wrong, then everyone knew that no single individual could be blamed. In May 1971, Admiral Nanda personally chaired numerous discussions on the VIKRANT problem.
After careful consideration at all levels, it was decided to auxiliary steam the remaining three boilers for 500 hours and thereafter take a further set of radiographs to study the behaviour of the cracks. This trial proved encouraging as there was no evidence of any deterioration. In June 1971, it was decided to carry out sea trials. To allay the watchkeepers' fears of the boilers bursting, heavy safety harnesses of steel were designed and strapped over the water drums of the remaining three boilers. As a further precautionary measure, observation windows were fitted to detect traces of steam leaks that could occur in the initial stages of rupturing. To balance the forcing rates of the forward boiler and minimise the pressure fluctuations when launching aircraft, a modification had been carried out on the main steam range that enabled the two boilers aft to be cross connected to the catapult steam accumulator. By end June, it was clear that the sea trials had been successful. As a measure of abundant precaution, Naval Headquarters restricted VIKRANT's speed to 14 knots.
THE EVOLUTION OF PLANS IN EASTERN NAVAL COMMAND
In his book, Admiral Krishnan states: (Page 7)
"On 10 June, Admiral Nanda asked me to meet him at Bangalore where he was the chief guest at an Air Force ceremonial parade. We talked at length on the tasks ahead. All our discussions stemmed from one overriding thought, a firm conviction, bordering on an obsession, that should war come, the Navy should throw everything it had into battle and our entire strategy from the very onset of hostilities should be one of bold offensive. We must scrap, erase and wipe off from our minds any ideas of a defensive posture, we must seek action, taking any risks that were necessary and destroy the enemy in his ports and at sea. There was never any difference of opinion between us over the fact that it would be a calculated risk well worth taking in putting our only aircraft carrier to fullest use in the war. It was the pleasantest of surprises when Nanda told me that VIKRANT would be assigned to the Eastern Naval Command and deployed in the Eastern theatre, along with two gun ships of the BRAHMAPUTRA class, two ships of the Petya class and one submarine. With this was conceived the entity of an `Eastern Fleet."
"The aircraft carrier INS VIKRANT and INS BRAHMAPUTRA and INS BEAS were transferred from the Western Fleet to the East Coast. The main naval battles and activity would take place in the North Arabian Sea. At the time, I felt that this depletion in the Western Command's Fleet strength and fire power was not justified and I vehemently protested in writing to my Chief of the Naval Staff."
In his book, Vice Admiral Krishnan has elaborated the thought process which led to his concept of operations which Naval Headquarters later approved. In brief, it was to strangle the Pakistan Army's supply line from West Pakistan to the East Pakistan ports of Chittagong, Cox's Bazar and the Chalna-Khulna-Mongla river port complex. This was to be achieved by attacking these ports from seaward, apprehension/destruction of Pakistan merchant ships and amphibious landings if required. Any movements out of East Bengal by sea would be prevented.
His detailed analysis was as follows: (Pages 19, 26 et seq)
"The aim is `To destroy the enemy's maritime forces deployed in support of his military operations in East Bengal and to deny all sustenance from reaching the enemy from the sea. This aim would involve keeping under the most careful surveillance the area of a triangle with a base of 270 miles and two sides of 165 and 225 miles, involving 18,000 square miles. Apart from actual surveillance, each merchant ship in this area would have to be challenged, identified and boarded. If neutral and carrying contraband, the ship would have to be escorted to the nearest Indian port. If Pakistani, she would be boarded, captured and taken in as a war prize. Ships that refused to stop would have to be forced to do so. The main task would be the isolation of Chittagong. This would mean physical attack on this port from the sea and the air. The responsibility for this, it had been agreed with the Army and Air Force would be, in the main, that of the Navy".
"The forces allotted to me to carry out the tasks were pitifully limited. The VIKRANT would naturally be the core, the nucleus round which the Eastern Fleet (yet to be formed) would revolve. The surface ships allotted to me were BRAHMAPUTRA, BEAS, KAMORTA and KAVARATTI. One fleet submarine, KHANDERI was also to be mine. I felt that they were quite inadequate to fulfil the tasks ahead and also that we would be under-insuring the safety of the VIKRANT.
"The problem of VIKRANT's security was a serious one and brought forth several headaches. By very careful appreciation of the submarine threat, we had come to the definite conclusion that the enemy was bound to deploy the submarine GHAZI against us in the Bay of Bengal with the sole aim of destroying our aircraft carrier VIKRANT. The threat from the GHAZI was a considerable one. Apart from the lethal advantage at the pre-emptive stage, VIKRANT's approximate position would become known once she commenced operating aircraft in the vicinity of the East Bengal coast. Of the four surface ships available, one ( the KAVARATTI ) had no sonar and unless the other three were continually in close company with VIKRANT ( within a radius of 5 to 10 miles ), the carrier would be completely vulnerable to attack from the GHAZI, which could take up her position surreptitiously and, at leisure await her opportunity. Even assuming that no operational defects developed, it would still be necessary to withdraw ships from the area of operations for fuelling. The basic problem was that if reasonable anti submarine protection had to be provided to VIKRANT and the escort ships had be in close company for this purpose, then how were 18,000 square miles to be kept under surveillance? We had decided to commit the entire striking power of VIKRANT's aircraft to offensive operations against enemy ships and installations and could not, therefore, afford the luxury of aerial surveillance.
"Having appreciated Pakistan's difficulties and having assessed our own, we decided that in preparing our plan, we would rely much more on deception and other measures against the GHAZI and ignore the air threat, in the hope that Pakistani aircraft would be fully committed against our Air Force and the land battle, and would be chary of operations over the sea."
THE OPERATIONAL PLAN OF EASTERN NAVAL COMMAND
The following tasks emerged from this analysis: (ibid Page 28)
(a) Attack from the sea on Chittagong harbour.
(b) Attack from the sea on harbours at Cox's Bazar, Chalna, Khulna and Mongla.
(c) Destruction of enemy shipping off the ports and on the seas.
(d) Subsequent and similar offensive actions on opportunity targets.
(e) Diversionary or real amphibious landings.
The submarine, KHANDERI, was planned to be deployed across the shipping lane from south of Ceylon to Chittagong. It would be tasked to attack Pakistani naval ships and merchant ships and provide intelligence of Pakistani maritime forces.
The three Landing Ships, the old MAGAR and the two new ones, GHARIAL and GULDAR from Russia, were formed into a logistic squadron and tasked for general support duties until required for an amphibious landing.
The old British destroyer, RAJPUT, which had been de-commissioned and sent to Visakhapatnam for disposal, had been rejuvenated locally to impart basic seamanship training to newly recruited sailors. She was made seaworthy and tasked for general patrol duties
Of the three Russian P class patrol boats, INS PANVEL, was fitted with two 40mm guns and deployed for offensive patrols in the riverine approaches to the Khulna-Mongla-Chalna river port complex. PULICAT and PANAJI were tasked for local patrols, together with the seaward defence boat, AKSHAY.
In July, FOCINCEAST proceeded to New Delhi with his analysis and plan for detailed discussions. By and large, all his submissions found favour. The Chief of the Naval Staff gave him the go ahead to implement the plan should the need arise. He was also authorised to commence a dialogue with his opposite numbers in the Eastern theatre, the GOCINC, Eastern Command and the AOCINC, Eastern Air Command.
VIKRANT'S PASSAGE TO THE EAST COAST
On 23 July VIKRANT sailed in company with the Western Fleet to Cochin. Lieutenant Commander (later Vice Admiral) B Bhushan was the Senior Engineer of VIKRANT. He recalls:
"Even our eventual sailing for Cochin was not without some `hiccups'. Shortly after leaving harbour, we found that one of our boiler feed water tanks was contaminated and as a consequence, we were very short of usable feed water. A `council of war' was held. The Commander (E) asked me whether we should go on, or ask the Command to go back to harbour. I reported that our seawater distilling plants were finally producing clear water and unless something drastic happened, we should be able to build up our feed water reserves in due course. It was decided to go ahead and take a final decision after a few hours. The rest, of course, is history."
After an intensive shake down en route, VIKRANT carried out Seaking landing trials before entering Cochin on 26 July. She sailed on 28 Jul for radar and communication trials, on completion of which she departed for Madras, escorted by BRAHMAPUTRA and BEAS.
At the very outset, a short sea trial off Madras proved that a speed of 16 knots at maximum revolutions 140 could be maintained for short periods, without causing undue strain on the three boilers. This restored confidence in the ship's machinery, which was operating under limitations.
Admiral Nanda recalls:-
"Next the question arose, was VIKRANT capable of flying? So I spoke to Vice Admiral Krishnan and told him I am going to come and see VIKRANT and I would like him to accompany me on board. We had a long discussion on board between Captain Parkash the Commanding Officer of the VIKRANT (Capt S Prakash), FOCINCEAST (Admiral Krishnan) and myself."
Captain (later Vice Admiral) S Parkash recalls:-
"A very serious discussion took place regarding the role of VIKRANT if hostilities were to take place. I told CNS and the C in C that "My biggest concern is that we have an aircraft carrier and we cannot fly any aircraft. I have got the most dedicated aircrew on board. Can you imagine their morale if I were to just sit in Madras or show off some time at sea. How do we tackle this situation?" They said "Well, you are restricted in speed. Try and make the best of it". So I said "I have done that already. Whenever the fresh breeze in the afternoon starts giving me an extra 10 knots, I do carry out rollers with Alizes. To start with, what I want is permission for them to hook on and finally to embark the Alize Squadron, so that at least in a given period during a day, I can carry out flying which will make all the difference to the morale of the ship. Can I make a signal to Naval Headquarters asking approval to hook on an Alize"? I distinctly remember CNS' reply "Parkash, who in Naval Headquarters is going to give you permission to embark an Alize with your speed restriction? If you think you can hook an Alize on board, let me know, then I will give you permission to embark". The conversation stopped there. He flew back to Delhi.
"At this point of time, it was evident that some semblance of flying operations was possible only if two factors could be resolved:
(a) Steam the second forward boiler at full load to achieve a higher speed.
(b) Accept launch and recovery of aircraft under marginal speed conditions.
"Commander (E) (later Vice Admiral) BR Chowdhury, who had earlier done two stints on board the VIKRANT, was my Engineer Officer. With his past experience and professional competence, his contribution to decision-making at this crucial juncture was important. In his view:
(a) The behaviour of the machinery on passage from Bombay to Madras had given Engine Room personnel considerable confidence to steam the three boilers de-unitised. This alone was the deciding factor to use the remaining three boilers to full load capacity, so as to build up speed to operate aircraft under marginal conditions.
(b) The second and more important factor was whether flying operations should be risked under marginal conditions? This would call for extraordinary skills on the part of the pilots as a matter of routine.
"The embarked aircrew were well experienced and the willingness of the pilots, in this instance, was overwhelming and exemplary. Their professional excellence and resolution to go to war was indeed contagious and creditable. Thus the overall risks involved were calculated and a decision was taken eventually to hook an Alize aircraft on board. This was successful. In due course, NHQ signalled approval to embark more Alizes and later the Seahawk squadron".
Between August and October, the Captain of VIKRANT worked up his group of ships. At first, a few of the slower Alize aircraft landed and were launched. Then Seahawk fighter aircraft were landed and launched. Slowly but surely all aircraft were worked up for operational tasks.
In mid September, FOCINCEAST embarked in VIKRANT off Visakhapatnam. His book states: (Page 31)
"I took the ships out to sea and took them through a gruelling pace culminating in a simulated fleet attack on Visakhapatnam. But I was far from satisfied either with the efficiency attained by the fleet working as a whole or with the defences of Visakhapatnam. There was a lot of leeway to be made up, so even more intensive programmes were drawn up."
On 24 September, Naval Headquarters issued its Operational Directive giving FOCINCEAST the following tasks:
-Destruction of enemy forces and shipping
-Strike enemy ports and bases and, where possible, provide support to ground forces
-Deny access to East Bengal of ships of all nations, by contraband control and/or blockade when ordered
-Secure own ports and bases, including the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
Rear Admiral SH Sarma was appointed FOCEF designate and arrived Visakhapatnam on 14 October.
In mid October, Naval Headquarters signalled that Pakistan may launch a pre-emptive attack. All ships interrupted their maintenance and came to immediate readiness. The alarm receded. After further work up in October, ships participated in the second phase of tactical exercises, culminating in a mock attack on Visakhapatnam during the night of 26/27 October. VIKRANT returned to Madras to resume maintenance.
The Eastern Fleet was formally constituted on 1 November 1971. On 6 November, the Chief of the Naval Staff embarked for a day's exercises. All ships sailed from Madras on 13 November and assembled in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The intention was that in the final stages, when hostilities were imminent, the Fleet, and especially the VIKRANT, would be secreted away at a remote anchorage, with no means of communication with the outside world, where ships could complete their readiness. Concurrently, deception messages started being originated to give everybody the impression that VIKRANT was still operating between Madras and Visakhapatnam. The submarine, KHANDERI, was sailed for her patrol area in mid November with orders to return to harbour on 14 December.
The other measures taken to sustain operations in remote waters were:
(a) The ballast tanks of the old World War II landing ship MAGAR were modified to carry furnace fuel oil to supply to VIKRANT in distant anchorages.
(b) VIKRANT provided her escorts with fuel, water, bread and workshop facilities.
On 21 November, Indian and Pakistan troops clashed at Bayra in East Pakistan. On 22 November, FOC-IN-C EAST proceeded to Delhi, where all the Commanders in Chief of the Army, Navy and Air Force briefed the three Service Chiefs and the Defence Minister on their Command's plan for war. That night President Yahya Khan of Pakistan announced that he would be away fighting a war in the next ten days. On 23 November, a state of Emergency was declared in Pakistan. On 2 December, the Eastern Fleet sailed towards its patrol area in anticipation of Pakistani preemptive attack.
THE EVOLUTION OF PLANS IN WESTERN NAVAL COMMAND
In his book "We Dared", Admiral Kohli states: (Page 100)
"The objectives of the 1971 action as defined by the Chiefs of Staff and by each respective Service Chief was to gain as much ground as possible in the East, to neutralise the Pakistani forces there to the extent we could, and to establish a base, as it were, for a possible State of Bangladesh. In the West, the objective was to hold the Pakistani forces. It was realized that the war could not go on indefinitely, not so much because of limitations of manpower or aircraft but because the UN Security Council and other influential bodies were bound to intervene. It was realized that any territories that might be gained in the West would, most likely, as earlier, have to be handed back to Pakistan at the end of the fighting."
The assessment of the naval threat in the West was straightforward. It was not expected that the Pakistan Navy would deploy its destroyers or frigates in East Pakistan because they would get bottled up. The Pakistan Fleet would therefore be deployed in defence of Karachi and the Makran coast.It was not expected that it would venture outside of the air cover provided by the Pakistan Air Force. Of their four submarines, (the older but recently refitted, American loaned GHAZI and three new French Daphne class submarines HANGOR, SHUSHUK and MANGRO), only the bigger GHAZI had the endurance to reach the Bay of Bengal and operate there. The smaller Daphne class submarines were expected to be deployed offensively, off Bombay, off the Saurashtra coast and against the Indian Fleet if they could find it.
Comparative Strengths of Opposing Naval Forces
In his book, Admiral Kohli states: (Page 33)
"On a comparative basis the Pakistani surface units were no more modern than ours. The fire power of their destroyers could be considered to be marginally superior to ours.
"Where the Pakistan Navy scored over the Indian Navy was in their submarine arm. The French Daphne class of submarines are the most modern conventional submarines with sensors and armament which are far superior to not only our submarines but also our anti-submarine frigates."
THE OPERATIONAL PLAN OF WESTERN NAVAL COMMAND
The gist of Admiral Kohli's plan, as recoreded in his book was as follows: (Pages 36 et seq)
"The main thrust of the Western Naval Command Plan was to engage and destroy as many Pakistani main naval units as possible. Their destruction would deny the Pakistan Navy any chance to interfere with our trade or to mount any bombardment attacks on our homeland. If the search for their units meant approaching Karachi where they would be on patrol, we would have to take the risk.
"The second and complementary aim was to attack Karachi and to carry out a bombardment of Gwadar and Pasni and along the coast up to Karachi to create panic in the minds of the coastal populations and weaken confidence in their Navy and Government. A blockade of Karachi was to be instituted to prevent petroleum and petroleum products and other essential supplies needed in war from reaching Karachi.
"The Western Fleet was given a broad directive to seek and destroy enemy warships, protect our merchant shipping, deny sealanes to enemy shipping and render ineffective the maritime line of communication between West Pakistan and East Pakistan to prevent any reinforcements from reaching the beleaguered Pakistani forces at that end.
"A submarine patrol was to be instituted off Karachi to sink their warships and merchant ships proceeding to Karachi.
"Elaborate plans were made to deal with the threat from the Pakistani midget submarines and chariots, which could be carried on board merchant ships, warships or large dhows and be released in the vicinity of Bombay harbour. Liaison was established with police, fishermen and port authorities to report any such activity. The water around our ships in the stream was floodlit to enable sentries on board to see any approaching underwater craft carrying limpet mines. To deter chariots, special two-pound charges were dropped frequently by harbour patrol boats and craft.
"To destroy the enemy's main units and harbour installations, it was intended to launch an operation to attack Karachi from Bombay on the first day of a war. The Fleet would then launch their attack with missile boats on the second day from a south-westerly direction. After observing the outcome of these attacks, a third attack would be launched from Bombay.
"The plan provided for `War Stations' for different naval forces to which they were to proceed in time for effective offensive action as and when hostilities became imminent.
"The Western Fleet comprised the cruiser MYSORE, the 15th Frigate Squadron TRISHUL and TALWAR, the 14th Frigate Squadron KHUKRI, KUTHAR and KIRPAN, BETWA (an anti aircraft frigate) KADMATT (a Russian Petya), RANJIT (an old destroyer) DEEPAK (a tanker), SAGARDEEP (a requisitioned lighthouse tender) and two missile boats VIJETA and VINASH.
"The special task group for the missile attacks on Karachi comprised KILTAN and KATCHALL (Russian Petyas) and four missile boats. TIR (a training frigate), DARSHAK, INVESTIGATOR and SUTLEJ (survey ships) were utilised for towing missile boats to and from Saurashtra. CAUVERY and KISTNA (training frigates) were used for coastal patrol.
"All the smaller patrol craft, seaward defence boats and requisitioned dhows were used for harbour patrols and limited seaward patrol.
"Three Super Constellations were available for maritime reconnaissance. Surveillance of the coastal belt would be carried out by two IL-14 aircraft operating from Santa Cruz. The medium-range surveillance would be carried out by the Navy using Alize aircraft.
Offensive Utilisation of Missile Boats
"For the defence of Bombay and other major ports, the small Russian Osa class missile boats would by their mere presence deter the enemy from embarking on an attack. These boats had started arriving from Russia in Calcutta in early 1971 and had to be towed to Bombay.
"The idea of towing these boats to Karachi first found expression among the young officers who were involved in towing of these boats to Bombay. An important aspect which needed experiment and research was the maximum speed at which then boats could be towed. A new `necklace' and towing pendant were tried out for towing fully laden boats with full fuel, armament and personnel. The Dockyard manufactured strengthened elbows on the rear struts to divide the towing strain over a wider area. Also deeply discussed was whether the propellers should be free or secured during the tow and the effect this would have on the engines.
"An advance base with fuelling facilities was set up at Okha, for use before hostilities commenced, to deter another exploit by Pakistan like the 1965 bombardment of Dwarka. It was accepted however that on commencement of hostilities, Okha would be bombed and become untenable as an advance base. A dockyard tanker, POSHAK, was therefore positioned on the Saurashtra coast near Diu as a mobile fuelling facility.
"Karachi was defended by shore based military aircraft. It was essential therefore to minimise the possibilities of the boats being attacked from the air. It was planned that the attacking force would arrive 150 miles from Karachi at sunset, go in at maximum speed during darkness, carry out the attack, withdraw at maximum speed and be 150 miles away at dawn. Darkness would make it difficult for enemy aircraft to see and attack the force.
"There were grave risks in sending the fragile boats to the heavily defended port of Karachi. Even if the element of surprise prevented the detection of these boats on the approach and whilst launching their missiles, they would most certainly be subjected to air and perhaps surface attack in the withdrawal phase. One has to imagine the dilemma of the Commander-in-Chief in Bombay. On the one hand was the tremendous danger to young naval officers and sailors and to many crores worth of ships; on the other the Navy had to show its mettle. A calculated risk had to be taken. But some losses had to be accepted. All these factors were very carefully weighed."
These apprehensions surfaced during the final presentation of operational plans in New Delhi.
23 NOVEMBER PRESENTATION IN DELHI OF OPERATIONAL PLANS
On 23 November, all the Commanders in Chief of the three services made a presentation of their operational plans to the Chiefs of Staff in New Delhi. The Defence Minister and Defence Secretary were also present. These presentations enabled each CinC to know what the others were planning to do and tie up the loose ends.
In his book Admiral Kohli states: (Page 38)
"A special feature of the preparatory stages was that, for the first time ever, the Chiefs of Staff of the three Services jointly examined in the minutes detail the plans of the various Commands of the three Services. Like the other Commanders-in-Chief, I made my presentation which was subjected to detailed scrutiny, and some very searching questions were asked about the legal aspects of blockade and contraband control and the effect it would have on neutral and friendly merchant ships and their countries. Also discussed at length was the grave risk attached to sending small boats right into the allegedly impregnable defences of Karachi."
The fallout of this presentation was serious.
In his book "Sailing and Soldiering in Defence of India", Cdr SD Sinha has reproduced an interview in which the CNS Admiral Nanda states: (Page 229 et seq)
"We had decided that in the event of a war, we would use the missile boats for carrying out an attack on Karachi harbour. There were, however, a lot of misgivings about this plan as it was felt by C-in-C Western Naval Command, who was assigned this task, that Karachi was a very heavily defended port with all ships of the Pakistani Navy patrolling outside the harbour, as well as availability of Pakistan air cover
from the two airfields of Drigh Road and Malir, from where Pakistani aircraft could attack our forces. They also had 16 inch gun batteries at Manora and Sandspit, which could blast our ships out of the water. He also felt that Pakistan had superiority in gun power with their destroyers acquired from the British Navy and that it would be a suicidal attempt on our part to try and attack Karachi. These views were expressed by C-in-C West at a presentation of Cs-in-C of all the three services at Delhi.
"I was taken aback at this performance. After the presentation, I called him and my Vice Chief and FOCINCEAST to my office and informed him that I felt it was unfair on him and the men under his Command to burden them with this responsibility if he did not believe in the success of this plan. And I said that I was going to see the Defence Minister and request him to relieve him of his Command. He replied "I have only given my views and I will of course carry out the orders given to me". I was a bit uneasy about this and felt that he was trying to evade responsibility.
"After this meeting in Delhi, I was a bit worried about how things were going to work out. So I decided to go to Bombay at very short notice and called a meeting of all Commanding Officers in the Navy Office. I informed them that in the event of a conflict with Pakistan over Bangladesh, we had plans to launch an attack on Karachi. I also said that there were some misgivings in the minds of certain people about the advisability of this attack. I told them that if any Commanding Officer had any misgivings about these plans, I would be quite happy to relieve them of their Command. I told them that I wanted every ship to be ready and out for the operations, especially in view of the escalation after two of our aircraft were attacked by Pakistan on the eastern border."
In retrospect, it is to the credit of both Admirals that they let this acrimony subside. But it did affect the conduct of operations during the war on two occasions:
- When Naval Headquarters intervened on 6 Dec to cancel a missile attack when forces were well on their way towards their targets and
- In prodding Western Naval Command to do something about the submarine off Bombay.
OPERATIONAL PLAN OF SOUTHERN NAVAL AREA
Four tasks were given to the Flag Officer Commanding Southern Naval Area (FOCSOUTH).
- The destruction of enemy warships encountered in his area.
- The interception of Pakistani merchant shipping transiting his area, either interwing or bound to and from ports in East Asia and China.
- Contraband Control.
- Defence of the ports of Cochin and Goa.
For these tasks FOCSOUTH was allocated AMBA (submarine depot ship), GODAVARI and GANGA (old destroyers), CAUVERY (old frigate) KONKAN (an old coastal minesweeper), HATHI (a tug) and BASSEIN (an inshore minesweeper).
FOCSOUTH's plan was to deploy:
(a) AMBA on patrol east off Ceylon.
(b) GODAVARI and GANGA across the route between Colombo and the 8 and 9 Degree Channels.
(c) CAUVERY and BASSEIN off Goa.
(d) KONKAN and HATHI off Cochin.
When NHQ signalled the likelihood of a pre-emptive Pakistan strike on 14 October, three Alizes anti submarine recce aircraft and four Seaking anti submarine helicopters were moved up to Bombay.
On 3 December, AMBA, GODAVARI and GANGA sailed for their initial patrol positions.
THE NAVAL ELEMENT OF THE MUKTI BAHINI
In his book Lt Gen Jacob states:
"On the request of the Provisional Government of Bangladesh, the Govermment of India directed the Army to provide assistance to the Mukti Bahini who controlled areas of East Pakistan contiguous to our borders (Page 90). The decision made at the end of March 1971 to help the Mukti Bahini was confirmed publicly later by the Minister of External Affairs. On 29 July, in a statement to the Parliament, he said,
"The Parliament had unanimously adopted a resolution pledging sympathy and support, and we are pursuing that resolution in the best possible manner and we are doing everything possible to lend support to the freedom fighters." (Page 42)
"We had visualised training some 8000 guerillas in the border areas. Recruits were to be given three months training. An additional period of specialised training would be required for leaders. Once trained, these guerillas would penetrate deep into East Pakistan to form cells and function in the manner that guerilla forces throughout history have done." (Page 90)
"Some 400 naval commandos and frogmen were trained. They were effective in attacking port facilities. Together with a Mukti Bahini gunboat mounting a Bofors 40mm gun, they captured, sank or damaged some 15 Pakistani ships, 11 coasters, 7 gunboats, 11 barges, 2 tankers and 19 river craft. These were, in fact, the most significant achievements of the Mukti Bahini.
"Since the Mukti Bahini later would need more craft to convert into gunboats in the event of full scale hostilities, we approached the West Bengal Government for assistance. They were most helpful and gave us two craft on loan, MV Palash from the Calcutta Port Trust, and MV Padma. Our workshops reinforced the decks and mounted Bofors L/60 anti-aircraft guns on them. Crews for these were to be found from amongst Bengali naval personnel of the Pakistani Navy. Commander Samant of the Indian Navy, an outstanding submariner, was assigned to assist. The Task Force was, in the event of war, to operate directly under the orders of Fort William and not Eastern Naval Command. Later when operations commenced, these two gunboats operated with considerable success." (Page 91)
Vice Admiral MK Roy was the Director of Naval Intelligence in 1971. In his book "War in the Indian Ocean", he has given some details of Mukti Bahini frogmen and their achievements. (Page 151) The nucleus of riverine frogmen was initially built around a hard core of Bengali sailors who had deserted from Pakistan's third, new, French, Daphne class submarine, the MANGRO. They escaped from the submarine in France, proceeded to Spain and thence to East Bengal. The initial eight submariners were reinforced by twelve dismissed sailors and three merchant seamen. This nucleus of twenty four persons having a naval background was later joined by a large number of university students. Chittagong provided 130 , the Khulna/Chalna region 100, Narayanganj 40 and 30 each came from Chandpur and Daudkhandi. These students were highly motivated educated youth. They were given rigourous training. They were required to swim 12 miles in complete darkness, breathing through a reed while manoeuvring neutrally buoyant limpet mines, attach the mines and swim away before the mines exploded.
The frogmen concentrated on attacking ports, inland harbours, ferries, pontoons, buoyage and all types of vessels. Their aims were:
- to neutralise the main seaports of Chittagong on the Karnaphuli River and Chalna, Mangla, Khulna on the Pussur River so as to prevent supplies to support the Army being brought in by sea.
- to stop traditional exports of jute, tea, coir and
- to disrupt inland waterway systems and the river ports of Narayanganj, Daudkhandi, Chandpur and Barisal.
It was planned that co-ordinated attacks would be carried every month, commencing 15 August 1971, depending on the state of tide and moonrise/ moonset. The frogmen carried minimum arms and used bamboo/papaya reeds when floating downstream under the surface. Their dress was lungis and banians so as to merge with the local populace near their targets. High quality frogman equipment like fins, wrist compasses and goggles were provided from abroad by non resident East Bengalis. The frogmen chosen for each target generally belonged to that particular area and hence were familiar with the local terrain, the local people and the estuarine characteristics. They carried out four major attacks before the operations started in December:
| Month | Shipping Sunk | Tonnage Damaged | Frogmen | Targets Damaged |
| August | 16000 | 14000 | 176 | Chittagong, Chalna/Khulna Narayanganj, Chandpur, Barisal |
| September | 6000 | 17000 | 160 | Chittagong, Chalna/Khulna Chandpur, Barisal |
| October | 8000 | 16000 | 150 | Chittagong, Narayanganj Nagarbari, Barisal |
| November | 20000 | 18000 | 172 | Mining of Pussur River entrance, Chittagong, Khulna, Mongla, Narayanganj, Alashpur, Chandpur,Tarorhat, Mahanpur,Bhadur Ghat, Barisal |
Overall, the frogmen of the Mukti Bahini sank or crippled over one lakh tons of shipping, immobilised jetties and wharves and blocked navigable channels.
In his book "Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership" written after the 1971 war, Maj Gen Fazal Muqeem Khan states:
"Ships were attacked in Chittagong and Chalna harbours by trained frogmen. They were daring attacks. At Chalna, in three consecutive attacks on alternate nights between September 18 and 22, frogmen armed with limpet mines damaged or destroyed SS Lightning, SS Teviot Biock, SS AC Murtaza, SS Imtiaz Baksh, Oil tanker Sibtadinga, one barge and two flats Barges were set on fire, blocking the export of jute.
"By mid November, the strategic and tactical mobility of the Eastern Command had been reduced to the minimum due to extensive guerilla activities in the rear and numerous road bridges, ferries, river-craft and ships, which were the sole means of transport for shifting troops and logistics from one place to another and from one geographical compartment to another across river obstacles".
From June 1971 onwards, Pakistani Army formations started moving up all along the Indo Pakistan border. In July 1971, it seemed prudent that although vigourous diplomatic efforts for a political settlement should continue, preparations should also be made to meet any Pakistani aggression. In August 1971, the President of Pakistan, General Yahya Khan, announced that India and Pakistan were very close to war.
Until mid 1971, the Mukti Bahini had not been able to prevent the Pakistani Army from regaining control in East Pakistan. Nor had it been able to establish even a tenuous authority on the East Pakistan - West Bengal border. During the monsoon months that followed, however, the Mukti Bahini were able to launch successful sabotage campaigns directed at strategic facilities like bridges, power stations, communication systems, and ships in harbour.
In his book Lt Gen Jacob states:
"The Army Headquarters operation instruction, based on the earlier discussions in Calcutta, was issued on 16 August. Based on this instruction, additional moves and deployments were ordered with provisional objectives and thrust lines. Confirmatory orders, based on war games, were to be issued later. (Page 74)
"By September, the operations of the Mukti Bahini were beginning to have an effect on the morale of the Pakistan Army. Raids and ambushes were carried out and culverts and bridges blown up". (Page 87)
The expansion of Mukti Bahini activity alarmed Pakistan that it was a prelude to Indian military intervention to establish a "liberated zone" in which a Bangladeshi Government would be established on Bangladeshi soil. In September 1971, the Pakistani Government ordered mobilisation of reserves. India was uncertain whether Pakistan intended to attack in the West and brought its armed forces to immediate readiness.
From October onwards, skirmishes steadily increased. However the Mukti Bahini forces rarely held their ground when the Pakistani Army counterattacked. On occasions the Pakistani Army chased the Mukti Bahini into Indian territory to destroy the Mukti Bahini camps. And on one occasion, the Indian Army chased the Pakistani Army back across the border and thereafter withdrew. This limited Indian support of the Mukti Bahini totally perplexed Pakistan about Indian objectives. Did India have only a limited objective of establishing Mukti Bahini control over a section of East Pakistan? Or was India's objective to invade East Pakistan and help establish an independent Bangladesh?
On the Indian side, at that stage, the objective was limited to assisting the Mukti Bahini to liberate a part of East Pakistan where the refugees could be sent from India to exist peacefully under a Bangladeshi Government.
In October, Pakistan intensified its preparations for war. The skirmishes between Indian and Pakistan troops in the East became more serious. Tension rose so high that a pre-emptive Pakistani attack was thought imminent and both the Western and Eastern Fleets sailed out of harbour. By end October, Pakistan had concentrated infantry divisions and tanks on the Jammu border. In the East, heavy artillery exchanges were taking place in Agartala and Tripura.
The first military engagement between the two armies took place near Kamalpur on 30/31 October when Indian troops silenced Pakistani guns which had been shelling across the border. A similar engagement took place near Belonia on 11 November where there were heavy casualties on both sides. The confrontation reached a new peak of intensity on 21 Nov in the Bayra sector opposite Jessore.
Lt Gen Jacob's book states: (Page 86 et seq)
"At the beginning of October, preparatory moves of the formations started in accordance with the outline tasks given to them. It was important that realistic training be given on the type of terrain on which the formations and units would be fighting. We had a pretty good idea by now of Pakistani tactics and techniques employed against the liberation forces. We had also noted the construction of defences around the main towns and the approaches to them. We trained the units to bypass the main centres of resistance and to use subsidiary approaches: movement was to be the key to the conduct of successful operations.'
"The Pakistan Army's will to fight, particularly of the rank and file, progressively eroded as the effectiveness of the Mukti Bahini raids increased. The raids led to reprisals. Pakistan artillery started shelling the Mukti Bahini. Some of our border posts came under artillery fire. In November, it was decided to allow our troops to go into East Pakistan up to a depth of ten miles to silence these guns. We took advantage of these instructions to secure specific areas to improve our offensive posture.
"On 20 November, our infantry launched a preliminary operation in the area of Bayra. The Pakistan Air Force reacted but ended up losing three of its aircraft. Our infantry was supported by tanks. A Pakistani squadron of tanks charged over open ground to be met by concentrated tank and recoilless fire. In this battle at Bayra, the Pakistanis lost 14 tanks, 3 aircraft and a large number of men. (Page 73)
"General Yahya Khan, the President, and General Hamid the Army Chief felt that India's move on 21 November was a limited action, that had India wanted an excuse for war, it had already existed for several months, that Pakistan would not benefit by declaring war and that Pakistani's strategy had been to avoid war and contain India diplomatically. The other view held by the rest of the officer corps was to declare war as a matter of pride, prudence and necessity".
On 23 November, Pakistan declared a national emergency and the Pakistan Navy assumed control of Pakistani merchant shipping. Very soon thereafter, FOCINCWEST was given control of Indian merchant shipping. All Indian ships were recalled from the Gulf and all merchant shipping directed not to approach the Pakistan coast.
The Pakistan Navy announced closure of Karachi port and warned merchant shipping not to approach within 75 miles of Karachi during the dark hours.
In Pakistan, events had acquired their own momentum. The Story of the Pakistan Navy states (P 334):
"A plan for a counter offensive in the West was presented to the President of Pakistan on 30 November 1971 and the high command decided to initiate operations in the West on 3 December. Pre-emptive strikes were carried out by the Pakistan Air Force at several Indian air bases along the western border and on 3 December, Pakistan Army units launched operations in Poonch and Chhamb sectors with the objective of capturing important tactical features.
The overall objective of Pakistan's offensive plan in the West was three fold:
(a) Take pressure off the beleaguered Pakistani forces in the eastern theatre.
(b) Occupy sufficient territory in the west for possible bargaining after cease fire; and
(c) Intensify diplomatic pressure on the United Nations to make a decisive move in view of the blatant Indian attack in East Pakistan."
In their book "War and Secession", Sissen and Rose state that: (Page 230)
"Pakistan's decision to declare war derived from the military command's sensitivity to the adverse publicity Pakistan was receiving in the Western press, the incident in Boyra had not evoked an international response to force India to desist and the pressure within Pakistan to react forcefully to India's aggression.On 30 November, the D Day for declaring war on India was fixed as 2 Dec. This date was postponed to 3 December for additional preparations."
There is reason to believe that misinformation by Indian intelligence agencies was able to precipitate Pakistan's decision to launch a pre-emptive attack on 3 December. This helped the Indian Air Force to minimise damage to aircraft at the forward airfields and for the Western Fleet to avoid a pre-emptive attack by midget submarines in Bombay Harbour.
Lt Gen Jaocb's book states: (Page 48)
"Our Signal Intelligence Unit was capable of limited code breaking. Even though they had only little success with critical Army codes, they were able to break the Naval code. We intercepted signals from the submarine GHAZI, off Ceylon and on her entering the Bay of Bengal. These were passed on to the Navy, both in Delhi and Visakhapatnam.
"On 1 December, we intercepted a message from West to East Pakistan advising them of the warning sent to all Pakistani merchant shipping not to enter the Bay of Bengal. We passed this on to the three Service Headquarters, Army, Navy and Air Force, as also an intercept warning civil aircraft not to fly near the Indian borders."
When Pakistan initiated the war on 3 December 1971.
(a) Cruiser BABUR and minesweeper MUHAFIZ were at the anchorage.
(b) Tanker DACCA was at Manora anchorage.
(c) Destroyer SHAHJAHAN and two coastal minesweepers were in harbour preparing for passage to East Pakistan. Arrangements had beeneen made for them to refuel at Colombo.
(d) Destroyer BADR and the two ex Royal Saudi Navy fast Jaguar class patrol craft SADAQAT and RIFAQAT were in harbour.
(e) Destroyer ALAMGIR was under repair and frigate TUGHRIL was under refit.
(f) Destroyer KHAIBAR and frigate TIPPU SULTAN were 80 miles southwest of Karachi.
(g) Destroyer JAHANGIR was on patrol 60 miles south of Karachi.
(h) Frigate ZULFIQAR was on the inner patrol 30 miles south of Karachi.