After the Rann of Kutch incident in May 1965, the US had suspended all military and economic aid both to India and to Pakistan. In July 1965, the Soviet Union offered economic and other assistance to Pakistan, in an endeavour to entice Pakistan away from its dependence on the US and on China.

In November 1965, in preparation for the Pakistan Foreign Ministers delegation to Moscow to prepare for the later discussions at Tashkent, Pak NHQ put in a requirement for six submarines, eight missile boats, twelve motor torpedo boats, maritime reconnaissance aircraft, mines and torpedoes.

In June 1966, a Pakistan naval delegation visited the Soviet naval bases in Odessa and Sevastopol in the Black Sea. They were shown a submarine, an anti submarine vessel, a missile boat, a Landing Ship Tank (LST) and a motor torpedo boat. Neither mines nor maritime reconnaissance aircraft were offered or shown.

In May 1968, a two ship Soviet naval squadron visited Karachi. It was the first ever visit of Soviet warships to Pakistan. Discussions centred on the Soviet side being able to help modernise the ships of the Pakistan fleet. The Pakistan Government also formally requested for a feasibly study of fitting Soviet surface to surface missile on the Pakistan Navy's destroyers.

In July 1968, a high powered Pakistani delegation to Moscow was offered six missile boats and associated support infrastructure. However the Pakistan Navy's assessment was that the smallness of the missile boat would denigrate its effectiveness in rough seas, because the vertical accelerations likely to be experienced during the monsoon months would exceed the safety limits for missile firing. They therefore asked the Soviet side to either give a larger 800 ton missile boat or, if that was not possible, to study the feasibility of fitting missiles on the existing ships. In early 1969, a Soviet team studied the problem. In due course, the Soviet side informed the Pakistan Navy that they had no plans for building larger missile boats nor was it feasible to install the missile boat rockets in the existing ships of the Pakistan Navy; they advised the Pakistan Navy to go in for the missile boats which had already been offered.

"The Story of the Pakistan Navy" states: (Page 288)

`After the Russian `verdict', there was much soul searching in NHQ. Lengthy discussions eventually produced a consensus that it would not be in our interest to opt for the Osa Class missile boats. Apart from the obvious limitations of weather, there were other considerations too. Unlike the Indian Navy in time of war, the Pakistan Navy missile boats would have to look for targets in an area 500 miles or more away from their base. The range, endurance and anti-aircraft defence of Osa class boats were woefully inadequate for such operations.

`In any future conflict, Pakistan expected the main threat to emanate from Indian submarines and missile boats. The Osas would be almost irrelevant in countering the same. At best, they would give a fifty percent chance in a missile boat vs missile boat encounter, hardly worthwhile when you can destroy such a boat with impunity and at will from the air. (CNS questioned the validity of this statement as the Navy had no aircraft). Against submarines, the Osas had no role to play whatsoever. There was also the over-riding fear that having provided the missile boats, the Government, strapped for finances as it was, would be unwilling to approve the replacement of the aging and obsolete destroyers of the PN Fleet. If that happened, the PN would be reduced to being a coastal navy which would be effective only at certain times of the year.

`With due regard for all relevant factors, a case was prepared for replacing three old destroyers with Type 21 frigates to be obtained from the UK without actually rejecting the offer of the missile boats. The implication was that the Navy's primary requirement was replacement of its aged surface ships. The missile boats, if the government wished to buy them, should be in addition and not in lieu. Admiral Ahsan, while he was the Commander-in-Chief, personally took the file to President Ayub Khan. "The President," he later said "would agree to missile boats only and nothing else."

In March 1969 the Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Grechko, led a large military delegation to Pakistan. Admiral Smirnov, the Commander of the Soviet far Eastern Fleet based at Vladivostok, visited Karachi and held discussions with the Pakistan Naval Chief. "The Story of the Pakistan Navy" states: (Page 286 et seq)

`Admiral Ahsan's impressions of the Soviet policy objective in regard to Pakistan at the time were recorded, and some of them were valid for many years thereafter. Briefly, the main points were:

(a) The Russians aimed to replace Chinese and western influence in Pakistan.

(b) Normalisation of relations could be encouraged without a serious attempt to solve the Kashmir dispute to avoid a common Indo-Pak outlook.

(c) The Indo-Soviet interest inhibited Soviet actions to resolve the Kashmir dispute on terms unfavourable to India.

(d) The stoppage of US military aid had created a problem. A Russian offer of military assistance could be irresistible if the terms were attractive.

(e) Military aid was the quickest and most effective means of gaining and developing powerful influence.

(f) The Soviets hoped to gain influence in the formation of Pakistan's foreign policy by a generous supply of military aid.

(g) The Russians hoped to create within Pakistan's Armed Force, a cadre of personnel oriented towards Russia.

(h) Gain a secure foothold on the littoral of the Indian Ocean which has a vast potential for furthering Soviet interests, and in providing enormous dispersal for maritime units in war'.

Subsequent discussions culminated in an understanding to supply Soviet military equipment to Pakistan. In preparation for the Navy acquiring missile boats, personnel were selected and given Russian language courses. And then suddenly in July 1969, a shift in policy at the political level altered the whole course of events. Although some Russian equipment was delivered to the Army and the Air Force, the chapter on naval assistance from the Soviet Union was abruptly closed.

This brief interaction between the Soviet side and the Pakistan Navy, when viewed in the context of Indo Soviet naval relations, pinpoints three aspects relevant to the events in the 1971 war:

(a) In 1966, after their mediation at Tashkent, the Soviet side offered and showed to the Pakistan Navy the same ships and submarines as they had done to the Indian Navy in 1964.

(b) Whereas the Indian Navy showed no interest in the Soviet missile boat offer in 1964 and contracted for their acquisition only in 1969, the Pakistan Navy's acquaintance with the capabilities of these boats started as early as October 1965 when due to the distance involved, the Indonesian Navy's Soviet supplied "missile boats arrived in Pakistan waters after the cease fire and then stayed on till such time as the chances of hostilities had receded". The Pakistan Navy then had detailed interaction with the Soviet side between 1966 and 1969 regarding the capabilities and limitations of the missile boats. And again in May 1971, Pakistan's C-in-C Navy visited Egypt where he was given a comprehensive briefing on the Soviet Osa and Komar Class missile boats acquired by the Egyptian Navy. All this interaction would have confirmed Pakistan naval assumptions that the missile boats were meant solely for harbour defence. This would explain the total surprise achieved during the Indian Navy's first missile action off Karachi on night 4/5 December when three ships were sunk.

(c) During their interaction with the Pakistan Navy, the Soviet side frankly reiterated that "Indo Soviet interest inhibited Soviet actions to resolve the Kashmir dispute on terms unfavourable to India". Indeed when India protested to the Soviet Union about the impending military sales to Pakistan, the Soviet side told India that weaning Pakistan away from the US and China was as much in India's interest as that of the Soviet Union.

(d) The further development of a Soviet Pakistan military relationship is likely to have been constrained as much by US pressure as by the start in 1969 of discussions on the Indo Soviet Treaty of Friendship which was eventually signed in August 1971.

In the early 1960's, the Pakistan Navy seems to have decided that in view of its inability to obtain budgetary priority for warship acquisitions, it was preferable to concentrate on building up its underwater offensive capability. This started with the acquisition on lease of an American ocean going submarine. It was to be followed by the acquisition from France of Daphne class submarines for coastal operations and from Italy of midget submarines (X craft) and chariots.

The primary targets for the Daphne class submarines were the large units of the Indian Navy - the aircraft carrier VIKRANT and the cruisers MYSORE and DELHI. The primary tasks of the X craft and the chariots were to incapacitate ships of the Indian Navy in harbour.

The GHAZI.

In 1963, the US Government approved the transfer of a submarine to the Pakistan Navy on a four year lease. The US Navy's 2500 ton submarine DIABLO, after an extensive overhaul and conversion to "Fleet Snorkel" configuration, was transferred on 1 June 1964 as part of the US Military Assistance Programme. It was renamed as PNS GHAZI (SS 479) and arrived in Karachi in September 1964.

In the September 1965 Indo Pakistan war, GHAZI was deployed off Bombay with specific orders to attack only the heavy units of the Indian Navy. No encounter occurred. GHAZI's records state that she fired four torpedoes at an Indian frigate INS BRAHMAPUTRA and scored three hits. However BRAHMAPUTRA suffered no such hits.

Thereafter GHAZI's primary role was the ASW training of the Pakistani surface flotilla and the training of submarine personnel to man the new Daphne class submarines being acquired from France.

In end 1967 the Pakistan Navy applied to the US to renew GHAZI's lease. This was duly approved.

Between 1966 and 1968, GHAZI's material state deteriorated. She was due for refit but there were no facilities in Karachi. This was aggravated by the US embargo on spares for American supplied equipment. Arrangements were made for GHAZI to be overhauled in Turkey. With the Suez canal having closed in 1967, a short refit in Karachi made GHAZI seaworthy enough to undertake the long voyage to Turkey via the Cape of Good Hope. GHAZI sailed for Turkey on 6 March 1968 and arrived back in Karachi on 2 April 1970. Until November 1971, when her next refit was due, GHAZI was operational.

Daphne Class French Submarines.

In 1963, the French Government agreed in principle to build three Daphne class submarines for the Pakistan Navy. However it was not until after the 1965 war, that the French Government agreed to give a loan. The deal for three Daphnes was signed on 25 February 1966.

The first Daphne, HANGOR, was commissioned on 1 December 1969, the second, SHUSHUK on 12 January 1970 and the third, MANGRO on 5 August 1970. HANGOR and SHUSHUK arrived in Karachi on 20 December. MANGRO arrived a few months later.

X Craft, Chariots and the Special Services Unit (SSU).

In end 1965, a contract was signed with an Italian company for the acquisition of:

(a) Six X craft (midget submarines), armed with a conventional torpedo.

(b) Six chariots armed with limpet mines.

These craft were to be manned by a newly raised, elite frogman commando unit named the Special Service Unit.

By April 1968 the construction/assembly of these craft for the SSU had reached an advanced stage. However major problems had already been experienced. The torpedo contracted for was incompatible with the X craft. Nor did the X craft design permit it to carry a torpedo. These X craft (midget submarines) were eventually commissioned without a torpedo capability. The SSU establishment was commissioned as PNS Iqbal.

Because of its elite status, SSU facilities had been accorded higher priority than the new Daphne submarine in the allocation of waterfront space for their slipway jetties, hangars and working spaces.

After March 1971, SSG (Navy) personnel were sent to East Pakistan to support Army operations. They returned to West Pakistan in September 1971 to man the X craft and chariots for which they had been trained.

Until the war started in December 1971, the problem of providing a mother ship for the support and conveyance of these underwater craft had not been solved.

THE PAKISTAN NAVY'S SURFACE SHIPS

    The high cost of the Daphne submarine programme and its supporting infrastructure had seriously depleted the naval budget. The cessation of the US Navy's supply of spares after the 1965 war affected the material state of the four US supplied minesweepers and the fleet tanker DACCA.

In 1966,four British, Brooke Marine, fast patrol boats were commissioned (RAJSHAHI, SYLLHET, JESSORE and COMILLA) and based in East Pakistan.

By 1968, material failures in the ex Royal Navy destroyers led to serious unreliability. In August 1968 TUGHRIL suffered a boiler explosion and was never fully operational thereafter. In August 1971, BADR's bows sheared off in rough monsoon weather in the Arabian Sea. ALAMGIR had serious defects.

Attempts to acquire new frigates from Britain and France to replace the ageing ships proved fruitless. After March 1971, the urgent need to augment patrol craft in East Pakistan was met by the transfer of two German built, Royal Saudi Arabian Navy fast patrol craft to the Pakistan Navy. These were commissioned as PNS SADAQAT and RIFAQAT. Their modification for riverine service in East Pakistan completed in May 1971, by which time the monsoon precluded their passage. They were reconverted to the fast patrol craft role and retained at Karachi.

1969 and 1970 had been busy years for the Navy. The first series of Soviet acquisitions had arrived. These were :

- Five Petya class submarine chasers (KAMORTA, KADMATT, KILTAN, KAVARATTI and KATCHALL)

- Four submarines (KALVERI, KHANDERI, KARANJ and KURSURA)

- Submarine depot ship AMBA - Submarine rescue vessel NISTAR

- Two Polish built landing ships LST (M)s (GHARIAL and GULDAR)

- Five Police patrol boats (PANVEL, PULICAT, PANAJI, PAMBAN and PURI)

In the preceding years, several major decisions had been taken which were later to affect operations in the 1971 War.

To minimise the cost of training in the Soviet Union, the crews of the ships and the submarines had been split into batches, according to the duration of their training abroad. Those batches which went for the longest duration came back well trained in the Soviet practice of austere equipment usage, with first line maintenance being carried out on board by the operators who used the equipment. The knowledge of the batches who went abroad for shorter periods depended on the duration of their training. The shorter their training, the less they absorbed. After arrival in India, personnel who had undergone the longest training were the first to be transferred out because they had been longest in the ship. They took their knowledge with them. This continuous bleeding of the expertise acquired at high cost in time and money, resulted in the inefficient use of Soviet weapons.

The West and the Soviet Union had been engaged in a Cold War since 1947. Until 1965, naval acquisitions were primarily from Britain. In 1964, contracts had been signed for British collaboration in the indigenous construction in Mazagon Docks Bombay of their latest Leander class frigates. In 1965 contracts had been signed for naval acquisitions from the Soviet Union. To ensure that India continued to get the best possible naval equipment from both sources, the Navy had to reassure each side that it could be trusted to safeguard the other sides naval technology. Two major decisions had therefore to be taken:

(a) To safeguard the security of information, the knowledge of all Soviet acquisitions was strictly controlled on a `Need to Know' basis. Soviet equipment handbooks had security classifications which differed from those of the Indian Navy. The Navy was chary of downgrading these Soviet classifications. As a result the Navy as a whole got to know very little about the new concepts which had arrived in the Soviet acquisitions. Tactically, operationally and technically, the Navy started over-utilising the Soviet ships which had been carefully designed only for essential usage. As a result, considerable wear and tear had taken place in the Soviet acquisitions by the end of 1971 when the war broke out.

(b) It was decided to physically segregate all the Soviet acquisitions by basing them on the East coast in Visakhapatnam and set up entirely new facilities comprising:

(i) A new submarine base together with associated submarine headquarters, berthing pens, battery charging facilities and shore accommodation for submarine crews.

(ii) Officers and sailors of all branches who would be manning Soviet ships and submarines would be given `type training' (training appropriate to the type of vessel they would be going to) in a new Integrated Type Training Establishment, the ITTE, (later named INS Satavahana). The Soviet side would install in the ITTE, as per Soviet training practice, full suites of working and sectionalised weapons, systems and machinery, de-partmentwise for all the Soviet ships and submarines supplied to India.

(iii) A new Naval Dockyard would be built at Visakhapatnam to maintain, repair and refit all Soviet ships and submarines.

(iv) A new Combined Equipment Depot would be set up to stock the spare parts and spare machinery of all Soviet acquisitions.

(v) A Torpedo Preparation Workshop for the new torpedoes in Soviet ships and submarines.

(vi) An enlarged Naval Armament Depot to stock, maintain and repair the new Soviet munitions.

The Navy had inherited from the British Navy, the concept of periodic transfer of officers and sailors between ships and shore establishments. Ever since the partition of the Navy in 1947, there had been a constant need to increase the number of officers and sailors and give them sufficient sea time so as to be able to man the steady inflow of new acquisitions. Whereas this had worked satisfactorily for the old World War II acquisitions like DELHI, MYSORE, the RAJPUT class destroyers, the GODAVARI class destroyer escorts and the old frigates, it proved totally unsuitable for the eight new post war frigates from Britain which brought entirely new technologies and concepts into service between 1958 and 1960.

The three new anti aircraft frigates, BRAHMAPUTRA, BEAS and BETWA, were wholly diesel propelled, with controllable pitch propellers, and had the latest available radars, sonars, fire control systems and weapons. The two new anti submarine frigates, TRISHUL and TALWAR, (designated first rate because they had back up systems and machinery to cater for battle damage) also had new sonars, radars, fire control systems and weapons, some of which were the same as in the anti aircraft frigates. The three new anti submarine frigates, KHUKRI, KUTHAR and KIRPAN had anti submarine systems identical to the `first rate' TRISHUL and TALWAR but were designated second rate because to minimise cost, they had been fitted with only one of everything and therefore had no back up in case of battle damage. All these eight frigates operated on 440 volt 60 hertz AC power generation. There was no source of this shore supply at any port in India to meet the ships' power requirements when in harbour for maintenance. Ships generators had to be kept running all the time. This led to deferring their overhaul routines, which led to breakdowns at critical moments. The maintenance, repair and refit facilities for these ships had been slow in coming up in the Bombay Dockyard and had generally lowered the material fitness of these frigates for war.

In 1970-71, the Navy's latest acquisitions being inducted were:

(a) Eight Soviet missile boats which were at various stages of acceptance and delivery (NASHAK, NIPAT, NIRGHAT, NIRBHIK, VINASH, VEER, VIJETA and VIDYUT). These boats were being loaded on board heavy lift merchant ships in the Black Sea and unloaded in Calcutta which was the only port in India having a 200 ton crane. To conserve their engine hours, the boats were then being towed to Bombay, where they were to be based, and where their surface to surface missile preparation facility called the Technical Position (later named INS Tunir), was being set up. A large contingent of officers and sailors were undergoing training in the Soviet naval base at Vladivostok.

(b) Six British Seaking anti submarine helicopters, equipped with a dunking sonar which could be lowered to various depths, and armed with British MK 44 anti submarine homing torpedo. After acceptance trials in UK, these helicopters were utilised to train Indian aircrew. The first batch returned to Cochin in Apr 71. On arrival, all access to the Seakings and their documentation was restricted on a `Need to Know' basis. The second batch, after tactical training at the British Naval Air Station at Culdrose, reported directly to Bombay in Oct 71 two months before the war started.

The Chiefs of Staff were General S H J F Manekshaw, Admiral S M Nanda and Air Chief Marshal P C Lal.

General Manekshaw was the Chief of the Army Staff and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Lt Gen JFR Jacob, the Chief of Staff, Eastern Army Headquarters in 1971, published his memoirs "Birth of a Nation" in 1997.

Admiral Nanda was the Chief of the Naval Staff. Admiral SN Kohli, the Flag Officer Commanding in Chief, Western Naval Command in 1971, published his memoirs titled " We Dared - Maritime Operations in the 1971 Indo Pak War". Vice Admiral N Krishnan, the Flag Officer Commanding in Chief, Eastern Naval Command in !971, published his memoirs titled " No Way But Surrender - An Account of the Indo Pakistan War in the Bay of Bengal 1971". Vice Admiral V A Kamath was the Flag Officer Commanding Southern Naval Area in 1971. Vice Admiral E C Kuruvilla was the Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet. Vice Admiral S H Sarma was the Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet.

On the political side, Mrs Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister. Mr Jagjivan Ram was the Defence Minister. Mr Chavan was the Finance Minister ( he had earlier been Defence Minister from 1962 to 1969 ). Mr Swaran Singh was the Foreign Minister. Mr DP Dhar headed the Foreign Policy Planning Committee. Professor PN Dhar took over as Secretary to the Prime Minister in September 1971 from Mr PN Haksar.

On the civil service side, Mr K B Lall was the Defence Secretary, Mr Govind Narain was the Home Secretary (and subsequently Defence Secretary after Mr Lall) and Mr S K Mukherji was the Additional Defence Secretary.

The recollections of Vice Admiral M K Roy, the Director of Naval Intelligence in 1971 have been published in his book " War in the Indian Ocean " published in 1996.

Air Chief Marshal Lal took over as Chief of the Air Staff in July 1969. His memoirs " My Years with the I A F " provide invaluable insights into the evolution of plans in 1971 and the higher direction of war.

After the partition of India in 1947, the eastern part of Bengal had become East Pakistan. Its Bengali speaking Muslim people became the majority of the population of all Pakistan. However it had the smaller land area and, from the very beginning, always had less political, military and economic clout. The feeling of neglect by the Urdu speaking Punjabi rulers, more than a thousand miles away in Karachi and Rawalpindi, led to growing tension between the two parts of Pakistan. As early as 1969, the Pakistan Navy started preparing plans for East Pakistan and generally ensure the operational availability of whatever was available there. Chinese mines, held in stock were also to be transferred to Chittagong.

General elections in 1970 gave the eastern based Awami League an absolute majority in the National Assembly and committed it to a programme of autonomy. The military rulers and political parties in West Pakistan could not countenance this. After unsuccessful negotiations, the Awami League leader was arrested and imprisoned. A ruthless military crackdown began on 25 March 1971.

The authorities declared martial law and unleashed severe repression to suppress the agitation. Within months, the flood of refugees fleeing into India from East Pakistan swelled to several millions. This massive influx into the border districts of West Bengal created severe inflammatory complications-communal, demographic and of revenge. It became impossible for India to cope with such a vast refugee problem. The Indian Government initiated immediate diplomatic action to apprise world opinion of the atrocities being perpetrated in East Pakistan, to mobilise pressure to persuade Pakistan to stop the genocide and to create conditions for the refugees to go back. Initial responses were tardy. Eventually the international media's poignant accounts of the genocide awakened the conscience of the world. But attention focussed more on mobilising humanitarian relief than on creating the political conditions for the refugees to return. The ensuing months witnessed considerable diplomatic activity but achieved little to meet India's basic requirement that the refugees must go back. During this period, three developments took place gradually.

The first was that groups of refugees coalesced in the refugee camps, thirsting for revenge against the West Pakistani troops who had despoiled their womenfolk and destroyed their homes. These groups came to be called the 'Mukti Bahini' - the freedom fighters - whose aim became to liberate East Bengal from the tyranny of West Pakistan and declare their homeland, Bangladesh, as an independant state. The core of the military wing were East Bengali officers and soldiers who had either deserted or been retrenched from the Pakistan Army for suspected disloyalty. The core of the naval wing were East Bengali officers and sailors who had deserted or whose services had been dispensed with. Both wings operated from their camps in India. In the months prior to December, their guerrilla activity caused considerable dislocation by damaging power stations, bridges, communication systems, port facilities and shipping.

The second development was the evolution of contingency plans in the Indian Armed Forces for countering a military attack by Pakistan and consideration of whether and when a military operation could be mounted in the East to help the emergence of Bangladesh and thereby enable the refugees to go back. As regards the latter, no military activity could be envisaged in East Pakistan until the end of the year, well after the monsoon wetness had dried out. As regards the former, it was expected that, as in 1965, Pakistan would initiate hostilities with a preemptive attack in the West. Pakistan's strategic concept had always been that the defence of East Pakistan lay not in the East but in posing a threat on India's border in the west.

The third development was the change in geopolitical alignments. To resolve its stalemate in Vietnam, the US decided in 1971 to establish links with China. Pakistan, who was not only a CENTO and SEATO ally of America but also had close relations with China, helped the US to establish links with China. In gratitude, the US stance in the latter half of 1971 was pronouncedly pro Pakistan and anti India. To counter balance this US tilt, India concluded in August 1971, a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union which had been under discussion since 1969.

    After the hijacking and public burning of the Indian Airlines F 27 aircraft in January 1971, India banned all Pakistan International Airlines flights between West and East Pakistan from overflying India. Thereafter communications and military reinforcements were either by sea or, if by air, via Ceylon.

The political crisis in East Pakistan climaxed on the night of 25/26 March 1971 with the imposition of military rule. On 27 March, the Prime Minister met the Defence Minister and the Chiefs of Staff. The Prime Minister asked for and was given an appreciation of the military situation in East Pakistan Air Chief Marshal PC Lal's memoirs state: (Page 152)

"While the military build up in the Eastern Wing was significant, there appeared to be no immediate danger to India from that quarter. All we could do was to wait and see how matters developed".

In April, the refugees started flooding into the border districts of West Bengal, bringing with them harrowing tales of massacre, rape and plunder. This steadily increasing influx created a serious risk of communal riots, Air Chief Marshal PC Lal's memoirs state: (ibid)

"Public opinion in India at that time was divided as to the action to be taken. While everyone condemned the manner in which the Pakistan Government was persecuting its own nationals, there were some who thought India should take advantage of the disturbances in East Pakistan to neutralise that area militarily. Obviously such a measure would have amounted to interference in the domestic officers of another country and our Government did not give any support to it. The official attitude was that the Pakistanis should themselves find a political solution to their dispute. But that gave way to concern and eventually alarm, with the increasing persecution of Bengalis, both Hindu and Muslim, who came pouring into India, seeking sanctuary".

Shri KB Lall, the Defence Secretary in 1971, recalls:

"The basic problem with East Pakistan was the vast flood of refugees entering India. Both Hindus and Muslims were fleeing from Pakistani atrocities. The demographic composition of the border districts was getting altered to the extent of the majority being of foreign origin. This was viewed as dangerous in the long run for our territorial integrity. The problem was two fold:

(a) Humanitarian.

(b) Facilitating the repatriation of refugees for safeguarding our territorial integrity.

"The Prime Minister was under popular pressure to use force to secure the repatriation of refugees to their country in safety and dignity. The Service Chiefs and the Ministry of Defence said they were completely unprepared for military intervention in East Pakistan because their attention had all along been focussed on the frontier with West Pakistan. If it was felt that military intervention could become unavoidable, the Defence Forces would need time to ensure that such intervention was effective and successful. In any case, no military operations were feasible during the monsoons. Hard information would also be needed of East Pakistan's rivers, bridges and roads to ensure the success of military intervention".

Lt Gen Jacob's memoirs state: (Page 35 et seq)

"At the beginning of April, the Army Chief called me on telephone to say that the Government required Eastern Command to move immediately into East Pakistan. I protested that this was impractical (because troops who had earlier been trained for mountain operations would require to be retrained for riverine operations. There were large, wide, tidal rivers, there was no bridging equipment and the coming monsoons would make access to unbridged rivers extremely difficult).

`General Manekshaw then asked by what date we would be ready. Provided we got bridging and suitable weapons and equipment, I said, we could be ready earliest by 15 November. This would leave adequate time after the monsoon for the terrain to become passable. Manekshaw, upset and impatient, replied that he would get back to me.

`Gen Manekshaw called again the next day, sounding very agitated, to say that senior bureaucrats in the Government were accusing the Army of being over cautious, if not cowardly. He said we should reconsider. I reiterated my views and suggested that he could, if he so wished, tell the Government that it was Eastern Command who were dragging their feet. This led to an outburst of invective. Even so, it is to the credit of Gen Manekshaw that he had the courage to uphold our stand and inform Prime Minister Indira Gandhi accordingly."

General Manekshaw, in an interview to the naval magazine "Quarterdeck 1996" stated:

"Sometime in April, there was a cabinet meeting to which I was summoned. Smt Gandhi was terribly angry and terribly upset because refugees were pouring into West Bengal, into Assam and into Tripura. She said to me `Look at this - so many are coming in - there is a telegram from the Chief Minister of Assam, a telegram from ..........., what are you doing about it ?'

I said "Nothing. What has it to do with me ?"

She said `Can't you do something ? Why don't you do something ? I want you to march in !'

I said `That means war' and she said `I don't mind if it is war'.

So I sat down and I said `Have you read the Bible?'

Sardar Swaran Singh said `What has the Bible got to do with it ?'

`In the first book, the first chapter, the first paragraph of the Bible, God said "Let there be light and there was light" - so you feel that "Let there be war and there is war". Are you ready ? I certainly am not ready.'

Then I said, `I will tell you what is happening. It is now the end of April. In a few days time, 15 to 20 days time, the monsoon will break and in East Pakistan when it rains, the rivers become like oceans. If you stand on one side you can't see the other. I would be confined to the roads. The Air Force would not be able to support me and the Pakistanis would thrash me - that's one.

`Secondly my armoured division is in the Babina area, another division is in the Secunderabad area. We are now harvesting. I will require every vehicle, every truck, all the road space, all the railway space to move my soldiers and you will not be able to move your crops and I turned to Shri Fakruddin Ali Ahmed, the Agriculture Minister and said `if there is a famine in India, they will blame you. I won't be there to take the blame'. Then I turned around and said `My armoured division which is supposed to be my strike force has got twelve tanks which are operational out of the whole lot'.

YB Chavan asked, `Sam, why only twelve ?'

`I said `Sir, because you are the Finance Minister. I have been asking, been pleading, for months. You said you have got no money that's why.'

`Then I said "Prime Minister, if in 1962, your father had asked me as the Army Chief and not Gen Thapar and your father had said "Throw the Chinese out", I would have turned around and told him "Look, these are the problems". Now I am telling you what the problems are. If you still want me to go ahead, Prime Minister, I guarantee you 100 percent defeat. Now, you give me your orders.'

Then Jagjivan Ram said `Sam, maan jao na'.

I said `I have given my professional view, now the Government must take a decision'.

The Prime Minister didn't say anything. She was red in the face and said "Achccha, cabinet char baje milenge'. Everybody walked out. I being the juniormost, was the last to leave and I smiled at her.

`Chief, sit down'.

So I said `Prime Minister, before you open your mouth, do you want me to send in my resignation on the grounds of mental health or physical ?'

She said `Oh, sit down Sam. Everything you told me is true ?'

`Yes. Look its my job to fight. It is my job to fight to win. Are you ready ? Have you internally got everything ready ? Internationally, have you got everything ready ? I don't think so. I know what you want, but I must do it in my own time and I guarantee you 100 percent success. But I want to make it quite clear. There must be one Commander. I don't mind, I will work under the BSF, the CRPF, under anybody you like. But I will not have a Soviet telling me what to do and I must have one political master who will give me instructions, I don't want the refugee ministry, home ministry, defence ministry all telling me. Now, make up your mind'.

She said "All right Sam, nobody will interfere, you will be in command."

`Thank you. I guarantee you accomplishment'.

In response to a query about "the other two Chiefs, where did they come in ?", Gen Manekshaw said'.

`They were not in on the initial meeting. I had to brief them. I had to tell them about it."

From the foregoing, it emerges that by end April 1971, the political decision had been taken to prepare for military intervention in East Pakistan in the end of 1971, in case a satisfactory political situation had not been found by then.

Another critical factor in the timing of military operations in East Pakistan was whether the Chinese would intervene. Most of the Himalayan passes would be impossible to cross in December and January. Even in 1962, the Chinese had declared a unilateral cease fire and withdrawn before the passes became snowbound. As events developed in 1971, the timing of intervention gradually narrowed down to end November - early December 1971.

THE PAKISTAN NAVY'S PERCEPTIONS AND PLANS

"The Story of the Pakistan Navy" states: (Pages 329 et seq)

`The political deadlock over the transfer of power from the Martial Law administration to an elected government developed into full fledged insurgency in East Pakistan in early 1971. The insurgency had India's full moral and material support from the outset. It was India's strategic aim to exploit Pakistan's predicament and the growing discontent in the eastern wing to its own advantage, and cut Pakistan to size.

`In March 1971, the Government directed that all East Pakistan defence personnel were to be segregated and taken off active duties. The Pakistan Navy lost a third of its personnel, the worst affected being engine room, electrical and domestic branches. This led to numerous desertions, including those from the elite SSG group.

`India made the political decision as early as April 1971 to provide assistance to the irregulars of the Mukti Bahini who were operating frequently from bases across the border against the Pakistani forces. India was directly involved both in providing intensive training to volunteers of Mukti Bahini and in launching a campaign of sabotage against strategic facilities and installations such as power stations, communication systems and ships in Chittagong harbour.

`The success of Pakistan's counter-plans hinged largely on reinforcements and resupply of the eastern theatre of war by sea which could only be accomplished by a strong Navy capable of breaking India's naval blockade. The possible effects of a blockade of Pakistan's seaports by the Indian Navy had all along been vigorously brought to the notice of the Government. However, such a force had not been developed although plans for a two-flotilla Navy (one each based in the two wings) had been put up to the Government as early as 1949. The plans unfortunately had become victim of seemingly endless bureaucratic indifference and of vague concepts such as "the defence of East Pakistan lies in the West" and "a short, sharp war" which stood in the way of the Pakistan Navy's expansion and reorganisation from the early fifties.

`The Navy continued to be accorded a lower priority, and the fleet was allowed to degenerate into a shrinking force quite incapable of taking on the task of providing protection to the sea lines of communication between the two wings. The addition of three Daphne class submarines to the fleet in the late sixties was the only redeeming feature. However, their limited endurance confined them to duties in the Arabian Sea. The Navy particularly lacked an air reconnaissance capability which was to prove a significant factor in the outcome of the 1971 war.

`The mission of the Navy in the event of a war was visualised as a very limited one:

(a) Seaward defence of the ports of Karachi, Chittagong and Chalna.

(b) Limited protection of the shipping traffic from the Persian Gulf to West Pakistan.

`The entire sea-going fleet (with the exception of the submarines), under the command of the Flotilla Commander, was required to maintain maritime superiority in waters of interest to West Pakistan. The submarines were under the direct control of NHQ. In the east, only four gun boats were available for operations against the Indian carrier group in the Bay of Bengal when the war started. Thus the Indians enjoyed preponderance in the Bay.

`As the crisis deepened, the shortfall in the Pakistan Navy's manpower and operational capacity could be clearly seen as a major limiting factor. The situation became critical when Bengali personnel belonging to East Pakistan had to be assigned duties which would not place the fighting capacity of the Navy in jeopardy, and the Service was depleted by over 30 percent of its strength to all intents and purposes. The technical cadres were particularly adversely affected.

`Keeping in view the state of the fleet, even in its limited role, the Pakistan Navy was confronted with serious handicaps. Firstly, there was the preponderant strength of the Indian Fleet to reckon with. Secondly, there was virtually no defence against a possible missile attack from India's Osa boats. Thirdly, heavy reliance had to be placed on air support which in fact was not available, and in any case identifying the Osa boats from the air at great height, especially at night, was an insurmountable proposition. It was envisaged that a conventional attack on Karachi harbour would draw the fleet out into deeper waters, making it vulnerable to interception by the enemy.

`About three months before the actual outbreak of hostilities on 15 September 1971, NHQ issued an emergency directive to the fleet placing it at a high level of operational preparedness. This meant ensuring availability of the maximum number of fighting units and putting them on high alert to go to war. The dockyard at Karachi was called upon on to provide round-the-clock refit/repair facility and mobile repair parties were detailed to provide on-the-spot repair service to ships in anchorages outside Karachi harbour. The floating dock was positioned outside Karachi to ure availability of alternative repair facilities'.

THE INDIAN ARMY'S PLAN TO CAPTURE KHULNA AND CHITTAGONG

In his book, Lt Gen Jacob states: (Page 65 et seq)

"At the beginning of August, Gen Manekshaw, accompanied by the Director of Military Operations, Maj Gen KK Singh, came to Fort William to discuss the draft operation instruction sent a few days earlier. The aim stated therein was to take as much territory as possible, with the ports of Khulna and Chittagong as prime objectives. Dacca was not even mentioned. This implied liberating large enough areas for setting up a free Bangladesh Government.

"At the meeting, held in the operations room, Manekshaw, KK Singh, Arora and I were present. Sam Manekshaw let his DMO do all the talking. KK Singh spelt out the objectives, maintaining that if we captured Khulna and Chittagong, what he termed the entry ports, the war would come to an end. Further, Khulna was the key and the 'weight' of our main attack should be directed at Khulna. The Hardinge bridge was also to be secured. Both Manekshaw and Arora nodded approvingly but I was flabbergasted. I got up to explain that in the event of hostilities, we should utilise our naval superiority and have an effective naval blockade in place. Next, Khulna was only a minor port; the main anchorage lay several miles downstream, at Mangla/Chalna. Cargoes for Khulna were off-loaded into light river craft for transportation to Khulna. There were several tidal rivers, unbridged, between our border and Khulna. The terrain restricted manoeuvre as, intersected by several subsidiary water channels, it narrowed down considerably. As far as Chittagong was concerned, it was well east of the main centre of gravity, almost peripheral.

"I maintained that the geopolitical heart of East Pakistan was Dacca and that if we wanted to ensure control of East Pakistan, it was imperative that we capture Dacca. At this stage Gen Manekshaw intervened saying 'Sweetie' (an expression he used to precede a mild or harsh rebuke), 'don't you see that if we take Khulna and Chittagong, Dacca will automatically fall?' I said I did not and reiterated that Dacca should be the key objective. There were further exchanges between the DMO and myself. Dacca, both Manekshaw and Singh maintained, was not a priority and no troops were being allotted for its capture. Arora agreed with them and maintained this view till 30 November. Eventually Manekshaw said he was prepared to make one change, namely that he would delete the word 'weight' in connection with the main thrust to Khulna. The meeting then ended."

During my discussions with Lt Gen Jacob, I enquired whether the Army's plan envisaged any participation by the Navy in the taking of the ports of Khulna and Chittagong. He said that no naval participation was envisaged - these ports were to be taken by the Army. In his book, General Jacob stages: (Page 62)

"I had earlier asked the FOC in C Eastern Naval Command, Vice Admiral Krishnan, whether we could use his landing craft to ferry troops across the River Meghna. Krishnan and Commander Dabir, who had brought one of them (the GULDAR) to Calcutta in June, stated that the landing craft, of Russian origin, were unsuitable because of their draught. The question of crossing the River Meghna had to be shelved and we shifted our attention to the possibility of obtaining additional helicopters."