The partition of India in 1947 was the outcome of attitudes whose historical origins went back several centuries. Starting in the 8th century, the Hindu kingdoms of India were subjugated by Muslim invaders, first from Afghanistan and then by the Mughals from Central Asia. The British East India Company stepped in as Mughal power declined. After the first Indian struggle for independence in 1857, two things happened. Britain formally took over the governance of India from the East India Company. And the British started depending more on the Hindus who for many years had been availing of English education and had been exposed to Western thought. The Muslims, having ruled India for several centuries, started resenting this rise in Hindu status. As the movement for freedom from British rule gathered headway, fears of Hindu economic domination led the Muslims to demand separate Hindu and Muslim electorates. Over time, this led to the Muslim League's demand for a separate Muslim state, to be called Pakistan, comprising the Muslim majority provinces of Baluchistan, Sind, West Punjab, the Northwest Frontier province and East Bengal. The Muslim League, led by Mr Jinnah, was able to mobilise the Muslim middle class. He played on their fears of Hindu domination and they followed him.

    On the other hand, the Congress leaders of India's freedom movement, both Hindu and Muslim, were determined that independent India must be a secular state, where the pull of religion did not intrude into matters of governance. The Congress party, led by Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Nehru, Sardar Patel, Netaji Bose, Maulana Azad, Frontier Gandhi Abdul Ghaffar Khan and innumerable other Hindu and Muslim nationalist leaders fervently believed in a composite Hindu Muslim culture and staunchly opposed the partition of India into two homelands. They were unable to allay the insecurity which the Muslim League played upon. When the Muslim League leaders were asked what would happen to the millions of Muslims who would remain in India in the provinces in which they were in a minority, their answer was that "they would have to manage". To Indian leaders, this "two nation theory" was impractical and repugnant. The history of India's freedom struggle until 1947 is a record of the failure of innumerable efforts to achieve Hindu Muslim political unity.

In April 1947, Rear Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten was appointed as the last Viceroy of India to hand over power by mid 1948. After assessing the situation, he concluded that partition could not be avoided and the handing over would have to be preponed. He presented to the Congress and the Muslim League a plan to partition the country into India and Pakistan. The boundaries of the two countries would be demarcated by a commission. The Princely States could stay free or join either country. Power would be transferred on the basis of 'Dominion Status' and thereafter either Government could withdraw from the British Commonwealth if it wished. With rioting spreading beyond control, the date for the end of British rule and the transfer of power was proponed by nearly a year to two months hence, on 15 August 1947.

Despite serious differences of opinion on the concept and the timing, the partition plan was accepted by both parties. The enormous violence of the Hindu Muslim riots and the loss of life and property that followed when millions of families migrated from one side to the other left deep scars of mutual suspicion in both countries.

The 567 rulers of the Princely States were advised to accede either to India or to Pakistan. 559 states acceded to India. 5 states acceded to Pakistan. Three states were undecided - Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir:

- The Muslim ruler of Hindu majority Junagadh, a small state on the Saurashtra coast, first acceded to Pakistan. The population objected. The ruler changed his mind and acceded to India. The Navy's role in this operation is recorded in the history of the Navy for the period 1945 to 1950 "Under Two Ensigns".

- The Muslim ruler of Hindu majority Hyderabad,a land locked state in the centre of India, wanted to remain free. However the anti Hindu terrorist violence unleashed by the Razakars, an extremist Muslim organisation dedicated to maintaining the supremacy of Muslim power in the Deccan, led to a swift police action by India to restore law and order. The Nizam accepted Hyderabad becoming a part of India.

- The third state, Muslim majority Kashmir, not only became the cause of the 1947, 1965 and 1971 Indo Pakistan wars but also the cockpit for international geo-politics. Like the Nizam of Hyderabad, the Maharaja of Kashmir wanted to remain free. This was not to Pakistan's liking. Pakistan sent into Kashmir tribesmen, followed by irregular forces, to take over Kashmir. The tribesmen entered Kashmir in October 1947 and within days had advanced to the outskirts of Srinagar. The Maharaja sought India's assistance to repel the raiders. India insisted that this could only be done after his state had formally acceded to India. This was done. The first Indian troops reached Srinagar on 27 October and the raiders were pushed back. Pakistan then sent in its regular forces in civilian clothes. They too were pushed back.

On 1 January 1948, India referred the Kashmir issue to the United Nations, stating that despite the ruler and the people having acceded to India, the Government of India, to keep the matter above board, would hold a plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the people after law and order had been re-established in the entire state. The Security Council, particularly America and Britain, instead of recognising that Pakistan's aggression had created a warlike situation, passed a resolution calling on both sides to ease the tension. A few days later the Security Council passed another resolution to create a United Nations Commission to exercise a mediatory role and investigate the facts.

India was dismayed at the America and British attitude, as was the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, at their deliberate refusal to recognise India's transparently sincere intentions, despite the communal holocaust of partition. In later years, this American and British attitude of equating India and Pakistan, despite repeated aggression by Pakistan, became the basis of Anglo-American policy. Proposals for arms aid were assessed, not on the criterion of need but on not disturbing the military balance in the Asian sub-continent.

The Government of India told the Indian Army to clear the Pakistanis up to a point which could be militarily defensible. The Army strongly pressed for advancing farther. The Government felt that "going farther would have embroiled Indian forces unnecessarily in an area and terrain which was unfavourable, geographically as well as population wise". (Distant Neighbours by Kuldip Nayar Page 71)

The United Nations Commission arrived in July 1948. Pakistan admitted that it had sent in three brigades of troops. The Commission made various suggestions. Negotiations followed. The UN resolution stipulated that the very first step was Pakistani withdrawal of its forces from the areas it had occupied in Kashmir. The second step was to restore the jurisdiction of the Srinagar government over the whole of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. A plebiscite was to be held only after these two conditions were fulfilled. A cease fire came into effect on 1 January 1949, one year after India's initial complaint to the UN. By this time, Indian troops had pushed the Pakistanis back to a cease fire line, (CFL) across which Indian and Pakistani troops faced each other to prevent intrusions.

Prior to the cease fire, India insisted upon and obtained three safeguards :

- The administration of the territory held by Pakistan (which Pakistan called Azad Kashmir ) would not mean loss of sovereignty for the Kashmir Government over these territories nor recognition of the Government of Azad Kashmir.

- India would maintain its forces, not only to ensure law and order, but also to defend the state against external aggression.

- Pakistan, having no locus standi, would play no role in holding the plebiscite. In subsequent years, no plebiscite could be held because Pakistan declined to vacate the part of Kashmir territory which it had forcibly occupied in 1947.

In 1950, the Kashmir State Constituent Assembly was convened. Pakistan threatened a 'jehad' (holy war). Forces of both sides advanced to the borders. Pandit Nehru made it clear that an attack on Kashmir would mean an attack on India and would invite retaliation. Fifteen years later, in 1965, that warning was made good. Meanwhile various proposals continued to be made by the U N Commission and by others to resolve the deadlock but to no avail.

In 1949, the Communist Government of Mr Mao Tse Tung assumed power in China. The American supported Kuomintang forces under General Chiang Kai Shek fled to Taiwan (earlier called Formosa). In end 1950, Chinese troops intervened on the side of the North Koreans and inflicted reverses on the United Nations forces in Korea leading to an armistice. India sent a substantial military force to keep the peace.

The Korean war compelled America to take a wider view of the Cold War which had been going on with Communist Russia since the end of the Second World War. America started putting together a chain of military alliances, stretching eastwards from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean to encircle the southern flank of the Russian and Chinese landmass and contain the spread of communism.

The gist of America's geo-strategic perception of Asia at that time was that with China under communist domination and Communist Russia on India's northern border, India had become the pivotal state in non-communist Asia. If India went communist, for all practical purposes, all of Asia would be lost. President Truman approved his National Security Council's recommendation for military and economic aid to India. India received Sherman tanks for the Army and C 119 Packet military transport aircraft for the Air Force. No naval aid was either sought or offered. Even though tanks and aeroplanes were being purchased, India was not in favour of strategic linkages. In Pandit Nehru's view, it was better for India to keep aloof from power alignments and military alliances than to take sides, either with America or the Communist bloc. More was to be gained for the cause of peace by facilitating better mutual understanding.

Until the early 1950s, Russia found it difficult to understand how India could be independent while still remaining in the British Commonwealth. It viewed India's non alignment as tilted towards the Western "imperialist" bloc rather than towards the "socialist" bloc of Russia and China. When India refused to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan (preferring to sign a separate treaty giving up reparations), Russia began to understand India's independent foreign policy. After 1952, when it first exercised its veto in the Security Council, Russia's support of India's stand on Kashmir became firm.

The NATO alliance was formed in 1949 followed by CENTO, SEATO and ANZUS. America invited India to join some of these alliances. When India declined to do so, America invited Pakistan. Pakistan responded favourably to joining a Middle East defence pact, in return for extensive military and economic aid. India pointed out to Pakistan that with American arms increasing Pakistani fighting potential, it would be ridiculous to talk of the demilitarisation of Kashmir as the first step to hold a plebiscite.

Until the early 1950's, all of India's core defence requirements like tanks, field artillery, cruisers, destroyers and frigates, bombers and fighter aircraft were being acquired from Britain. In step with their better understanding of Indian policy, the Russians started making overtures to displace Britain as the prime source for India's defence needs. Mr PVR Rao (later Defence Secretary from 1962 to 1967) was the Deputy High Commissioner in London. He recalls:

"When the Air Force had come to England in 1952 to negotiate for the Canberra bombers, I remember the Soviet Military Attache asking me "why don't you approach us for assistance, rather than approach America and Britain?"

"I also recall Prime Minister Nehru's talk to senior Indian High Commission officials in 1952 "It is all very well that Russia and China are making many overtures to us, but with America and Britain also, you never know which way these things will turn. We should be equally distant from both, just to safeguard all our interests."

In 1953, Pakistan joined the American sponsored four nation Baghdad Pact-Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan. The US-Pakistan Military Defence Agreement was signed in May 1954. This was followed by Pakistan joining the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) comprising the Philipines, Thailand and Pakistan. America informed India of its decision to provide military aid to Pakistan. India protested. America replied that it was willing to give the same arms to India. India declined. America did however give assurances that it would not permit American arms to be used against India. American President Eisenhower wrote to Prime Minister Nehru that " --- I am confirming publicly that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is misused and directed against another in aggression, I will undertake immediately, in accordance with my constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without the UN to thwart such aggression."

In 1954, Pandit Nehru visited America. He found the American Government deeply involved in their Cold War with Russia and not at all interested in transfering the technological assistance which India was seeking for developing her heavy industry. When he visited Russia in 1955, he found there a much greater willingness to help India. In 1956, when the First Secretary of the Russian Communist Party, Mr Krushchev visited India, he stated categorically that Russia considered Kashmir an integral part of India. From then onwards, the relationship between India and Russia started becoming extensive. Russia stood by India steadfastly, using its veto in the Security Council to counter American supported pro-Pakistan resolutions on Kashmir. Also from 1956 onwards, Russia started extending credits on favourable terms for India's industrial development, particularly for huge projects like the Steel Plant at Bhilai and the Heavy Engineering Corporation at Ranchi.

The mid 1950s marked a high point in India's policy of non- alignment. The Conference of Afro Asian Nations at Bandung in Indonesia, the Panchsheel Declaration and slogans of India - China friendship signalled to the developing world India's model for socio-economic development, without getting embroiled in Cold War military alliances as a precondition for aid.

By 1958, these slogans had worn thin. India and China had started to drift apart. Indian and Chinese patrols clashed in the northern Himalayas, in Aksai Chin, an area which India regarded as its own and which China found vital to control because it connected Sinkiang with Tibet. Pakistan seized the opportunity to exploit to its advantage, the widening rift between India and China. Acting on the principle that your enemy's enemy is your friend, Pakistan requested China to demarcate the border between the two countries, part of which lay in the territory of Kashmir under Pakistani occupation. China did not respond.

In 1958, there was an anti western coup in Iraq. Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact and it was renamed as the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO).

Between 1955 and 1959, the Pakistan Navy received American assistance for: (Story of the Pakistan Navy, Pages 184 et sea)

- Acquiring eight American Navy coastal minesweepers as grant aid

- Acquiring one cruiser and five destroyers from the British Navy's reserve fleet, which were modernised in Britain with American support

- Building a new naval armament depot and a new naval stores depot

- Acquisition by the Pakistan Air Force of a squadron of twenty, twin engined Albatross aircraft for anti submarine patrols

- Jetties and wharves

- Ammunition and stores

Early in 1959, under the auspices of SEATO, America signed with Pakistan a bilateral agreement of cooperation for security and defence. Later it became known that this agreement was accompanied by a secret commitment specifically assuring Pakistan of American help if attacked by India. It was this secret commitment that Pakistan invoked and in response to which America sent a naval task force with the nuclear carrier ENTERPRISE into the Indian Ocean in the 1971 Indo Pakistan war. Pursuant to this agreement, America started using Peshawar for spying on Russia. U 2 spy planes started taking off from the Peshawar Air Force base and electronic listening posts were set up for monitoring Russia's missile tests and other electronic transmissions.

In Indonesia, the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) had grown in strength and established strong linkages with Russia and China. In the years after the Bandung Conference of 1955, Indonesia had distanced itself from India, and moved closer to Pakistan. Between 1959 and 1964, the Indonesian Navy had acquired on enormous fleet from Russia. It comprised one heavy cruiser, eighteen destroyers and frigates, twelve submarines, sixty seven corvettes and motor torpedo boats, twelve missile boats, twenty one minesweepers, eleven landing ships, six landing craft, four transport ships and four oilers.

In 1960, Mr Kennedy became the American President. American policy changed significantly. Instead of depending on military bases and alliances, America decided to help economically strong, free and neutral nations to contain Communism. This increased India's significance in American policy and decreased that of Pakistan. The border dispute between India and China and America's own difficulties with China over Taiwan made it pragmatic for America to join hands with India in dealing with China. 1960 was also the year that the tussle was developing between Communist Russia and Communist China on the ideological leadership of the International Communist Movement. Anticipating that President Kennedy may provide arms to India, Pakistan sought and obtained assurances from America in 1961 that `if and when arms aid was given to India, Pakistan would be consulted'.

Sensing these shifts in geo-political alignments, Pakistan sought to improve relations with other countries. In 1960, Pakistan accepted Russia's offer for oil prospecting. President Nasser of Egypt was invited to Pakistan. Along with Iran and Turkey, Pakistan formed the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD). Outwardly it was an alliance for economic and cultural cooperation. Years later, both Iran and Turkey gave Pakistan arms which it used to fight India.

In 1961, Pakistan repeated its earlier suggestion to China seeking demarcation of borders. Within weeks of the Indo China conflict in 1962, Pakistan conceded China's territorial claims in the Hunza area. In an agreement signed in 1963, Pakistan gave away to China 2200 square miles of Pakistani Occupied Kashmir bordering Sinkiang. In return, China helped to build the Karakoram Highway from Sinkiang into Pakistan.

In 1961, under Defence Minister Krishna Menon's determined drive for self reliance, an agreement was signed with Russia for the manufacture in India of Russia's latest fighter aircraft, the MIG 21. The Air Force became the first of India's armed forces to go in for Russian acquisitions. Two other major self reliance projects were the indigenous manufacture of frigates for the Navy and tanks for the Army.

When China attacked India in October 1962, India appealed to Russia, America, Britain and the Commonwealth for military aid. The immediate response was positive. A strengthened India on China's southwest border suited their interests. It could help lessen the pressure China was exerting on Taiwan, an American protege. It could help lessen China's pressure on Britain in Malaya. And it could help distract China from the pressure it was exerting on Russia's eastern border. Russia agreed to meet India's needs and to deliver before the due dates, the equipment for which contracts had already been signed (See "Stalin to Gorbachov" by TN Kaul. Page 46).

Soon after India's request for military assistance, President Kennedy of America and Prime Minister Macmillan of Britain happened to meet at Nassau in the Bahamas. It was agreed that the West need not be over-generous in their response as it would disturb the military balance with Pakistan. Of the total aid of 120 million dollars promised initially, 60 million each would be given by America and Britain. Emergency aid of light arms, ammunition and winter clothing was airlifted to India.

When China resumed its attack in November 1962 and advanced into Assam, India asked America to intervene militarily with air support. By the time China declared a unilateral cease fire on 22 November, America had despatched to the Bay of Bengal a naval task force which included the nuclear powered aircraft carrier ENTERPRISE. By a curious coincidence, the same aircraft carrier was sent to the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 Indo Pakistan War as a gesture of support to Pakistan.

Of the military assistance of non-lethal items such as spares for transport aircraft, communication, engineering and medical equipment and some light infantry weapons for mountain divisions, about half was delivered by mid 1965. The remainder was stopped when war broke out in September 1965.

Whilst responding to India's request for military assistance, America and Britain insisted on the pre-conditions of restarting discussions to solve the Kashmir problem, of making a formal declaration that the arms received would not be used against Pakistan and of inspection by American military officers that the arms given would only go to the forces facing the Chinese. The Indo Pakistan talks broke down in May 1963. Apart from the earlier basic differences, India was unwilling to agree to the boundary agreement between China and Pakistan over areas of illegally occupied Kashmir.

After China's attack in 1962, the Indonesian Communist Party's pro-China line further soured Indonesian relations with India. The growing size of Indonesia's Russian supplied fleet bolstered the Indonesian Navy's confidence. Bellicosity increased - claims were voiced to the Nicobar Island chain. Intrusions increased in the southernmost island, Great Nicobar, which was a mere 90 miles from the northern tip of Sumatra. Statements were made that the Indian Ocean should be renamed as the Indonesian Ocean.

From 1963 onwards, Pakistan increased its violations of the cease fire line in Kashmir. A perception grew in Pakistan that India would become too strong as a result of the major decisions being taken in India's Defence Plan 1964 - 69 and that it was best to settle scores with India sooner rather than later.

Politically India continued its measures to integrate Kashmir into the Indian mainstream. Kashmir's representatives in the Indian Parliament, hitherto nominated, would be elected by the people. The President of India was empowered to extend President's rule to Kashmir, as he could in the other states of India,in the event of a breakdown of the constitutional machinery.

Between 1959 and 1965, America gave the Pakistan Navy a floating dock, (1961) a fleet tanker, DACCA(1963) and a submarine, GHAZI (1964) along with equipment for training establishments and the dockyard (Story of the Pakistan Navy, Pages 204, 208, 209).

In May 1964, Prime Minister Nehru died. He was succeeded by Mr Lal Bahadur Shastri. Pakistan intensified its anti India campaign and decided that 1965 was the right year to force a settlement of the Kashmir issue that had eluded them in 1947-48.

During 1964, delegations headed by Defence Minister Chavan held discussions with America, Russia and Britain regarding assistance for India's Defence Plan 1964-69. America could not offer what India wanted. Russia offered the Army and Navy what they sought. The Army contracted for light tanks and artillery. The Navy did not want to strain its connections with the British Navy and waited for the outcome of discussions with Britain.

The Defence Minister's delegation visited Britian in end 1964. It found that Britain's decision to reduce the size of its Navy precluded it from meeting the Navy's immediate requirements of ships and submarines. However, negotiations were concluded for British collaboration in the construction in Bombay of the British Navy's latest design of Leander class frigates.

In end 1964, Britain's economy was under serious strain. A major review of defence and foreign policy had concluded that Britain could neither afford its overseas defence commitments nor the size of its Navy. It was mutually agreed that the burden of Cold War naval deployment in the Indian Ocean should be borne by America. In due course, the British withdrew from Gan in Addu Atoll and America established its presence in Diego Garcia. Likewise, the American Navy gradually replaced the British Navy's presence in Bahrein in the Persian Gulf.

By 1965, there were sharp differences in Britain about Indian Ocean policy. In one view, Britain's economic difficulties and the conclusions of the strategic defence review carried out in 1964 required that Britain withdraw from the Indian Ocean and concentrate on Europe. The opposite view was that in view of China's nuclear explosion in 1964, Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia in the east and Egypt's `subversion' of Aden and the Persian Gulf in the west, Britain should not withdraw from the Indian Ocean, because it would leave friends and allies in the lurch. Even though Indonesia and Egypt were not overtly communist, the British viewed their actions as serving communist objectives. In their view, the security of the Indian sub-continent was central to Indian Ocean Policy and it would not avail to stand fast on the Himalaya, if the western and eastern flanks of the area were turned. (Note: Letter to the London Times 29 Apr 65 by Sir Olaf Caroe and others).

In May 1965, Pakistan intruded into the Rann of Kutch. At the same time, there was a marked increase in intrusions in the Nicobar Islands. The Navy recommended an immediate increase in naval presence in the Bay of Bengal. This precipitated the decision to accept the ships and submarines which Russia had offered to the Defence Minister's delegation in 1964 and to base them in Visakhapatnam.

Within a brief period of four years between 1961 and 1965, the geopolitical and economic compulsions of America and Britain had led India's Air Force, Army and Navy to accept Russia's generous offers of its latest conventional defence systems on extremely favourable financial terms. The 1956 Rupee-Ruble Trade Agreement was extended also to defence sales from 1965 onwards.

During the 1965 war, Indonesia's stance was markedly pro-Pakistan. There was an increase in the sightings of unidentified submarines and aircraft in the Andaman and Nicobar islands. In response to Pakistan's request for assistance, the Indonesian Navy sent two submarines and two missile boats to Karachi. The Indonesian Naval Chief even volunteered to distract India by making moves to take over islands in the Nicobars (For details see "The First Round" by Air Marshal Asghar Khan, Page 45). It was this vulnerability in August 1965 that impelled Naval Headquarters to keep the Indian Fleet in the Bay of Bengal for as long as possible, so as to deter adventurist Indonesian naval moves.

After the 1965 Indo Pakistan War, Russia's mediation at Tashkent helped to negotiate the postwar settlement. From 1966 onwards, Russia tried to wean Pakistan away from American and Chinese influence by offering defence assistance and economic aid. By 1969, it was clear that this had not succeeded. In the same year, discussions started on what in August 1971 was to become the Indo Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation (Note: for details see "War and Secession" by Sisson and Rose, Page 197). Russia offered to sign a similar treaty with Pakistan provided they got out of CENTO, SEATO and the American Military Assistance Programme. Pakistan rejected the offer (See "My Years with the IAF" by Air Chief Marshal PC Lal page 333).

In the 1960's, America's naval policy in the Indian Ocean had many ingredients. The foremost was to deter Russia from interrupting the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf countries to America and Europe. Politically, this entailed American support of Iran to counter Russian influence in Iraq. It entailed maintaining a naval presence in the Persian Gulf, and wherever possible, in the countries on the rim of the Indian Ocean, not only to secure the sea lines of communication which criss-crossed the Indian Ocean but also to inject military force from seaward when required. By 1968, the American Navy had effected the necessary adjustments in its global naval deployments. In 1968, Britain announced its intention to withdraw from East of Suez by 1971 and generated debate on "the Vacuum in the Indian Ocean". Russia's naval presence in the Indian Ocean increased to keep pace with the American naval presence.

America felt that Russia was articulating anxiety to forestall American naval deployment. The Russians on the other hand, felt that the establishing of communication facilities in Diego Garcia and in Northwest Cape in Australia could be interpreted clearly as reflecting an intention to deploy submarines in the Indian Ocean whose ballistic missiles were targeted on Russia.

Fears of a naval vacuum in the Indian Ocean were soon overtaken by fears of the militarisation of the Indian Ocean. America neither denied nor acknowledged the deployment of submarine launched ballistic missiles. The Russian Navy started showing its flag in the Indian Ocean, partly to fill the naval vacuum, partly to counter the American Navy and partly to demonstrate to the littoral states that the Russian Navy was a force to contend with. Since Russia lacked naval bases in the Indian Ocean, an anchorage was developed off Socotra near the Gulf of Aden. Overall, there was a steady increase in the presence of American and Russian naval ships.

In 1969, American President Nixon's "Twin Pillar" strategy entrusted the security of the Persian Gulf region to the monarchies in Iran and Saudi Arabia. America started heavily arming both countries under the Nixon Doctrine. In 1970, the Russians became active in the Dhofar rebellion in Oman, which was a Persian Gulf choke-point. These moves towards militarisation of the Indian Ocean triggered countermoves to make the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace. And both these moves and countermoves had to take into account the overall American hyper-sensitivity regarding West Asian oil supplies.

In 1971, the Indo Soviet Friendship Treaty and Russia's veto in the Security Council during the Indo Pakistan war helped India to liberate Bangladesh so that ten million refugees could return to their homes. America made its gesture of support to Pakistan by sending the ENTERPRISE carrier group into the Bay of Bengal. The Russian Navy, in an equally reassuring gesture of support to India, shadowed the American Navy's task force into the Indian Ocean. After the 1971 war, the Russian Navy worked alongside the Indian Navy to clear the mines laid by the Pakistan Navy in the approaches to Chittagong harbour.

In 1971 also, the concept of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace crystallised in the UN. The original idea of the Non Aligned Movement was that the Great Powers should not enhance their military presence in the Indian Ocean area. The UN's 1971 resolution for an Indian Ocean Peace Zone was very specific about the scope of the Zone. The Indian Ocean covered not only the ocean, but also its natural extensions like the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf etc. It did not include the adjacent land mass. The main thrust of the resolution was directed against Great Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean. It did not try to find a solution to the politics of the littoral. Nor did it make the acceptance of the Zone of Peace by the Great Powers conditional upon reciprocal obligation by the littoral and hinterland states. However, since this did not suit the Cold War interests of the two super powers, the UN's Adhoc Committee attempted to reverse the priorities. The Great Powers were able to divert attention from their own obligations by demanding that the regional powers should themselves accept de-nuclearisation first. And, as usual, they were able to manipulate regional dissensions and rivalries to stall the convening of a Zone of Peace Conference.

In 1972, Iraq nationalised her oil companies. The Iraqi Navy established a naval base and positioned Russian supplied missile boats at Umm Qasr at the head of the Persian Gulf in the Shatt-el-Arab, not far from the Iranian oil fields of Abadan. America commenced the construction of naval facilities on Diego Gracia to support a carrier task force for 30 days. Three submarine pens were to be constructed for the attack submarines which accompany a carrier battle group. The runways were to be lengthened to operate B 52 strategic bombers. America indicated that it did not intend to employ nuclear weapons on these B-52's nor deploy submarine launched ballistic missiles from Diego Garcia.

In 1973, the Arab Israeli war persuaded the OPEC states to use oil pricing as a weapon against the West to offset the continued economic, political and military arms support for Israel. They raised the price of oil. The results were many and diverse. The nations of the West reacted with hysteria to start with, but soon turned it to advantage. There was a massive increase in wealth for the OPEC states, who then significantly increased their military expenditures and arms purchases. The Western banks, faced with mounting deposits of petro dollars, increased their lending to non OPEC Third World countries. This credit boom offered an excellent opportunity to upgrade defence equipment, particularly as Western suppliers were increasingly keen to export state of the art weapons and equipment to offset domestic economic decline and balance of payment difficulties, both of which were being aggravated by rising oil prices. Concurrently, extensive plans were initiated for oil substitutes and diversification of oil supplies. The number of new producers increased. Soon supply exceeded demand, prices fell and the crisis shifted from the consumers to the producers.

In 1973 also, America decided to create a Quick Reaction Force to deal with crises in the Persian Gulf. The Russian Navy symbolised its presence when it helped to clear mines in the Red Sea. In 1974, Russian influence started building up in Somalia and the Russian Navy helped in clearing the Suez Canal of mines.

Pakistan's naval relationship with China started in September 1970 when the C-in-C Navy first visited there. By this time, unrest was brewing in East Pakistan and China agreed to strengthen the Navy in East Pakistan by supplying small shallow craft for riverine patrols. The patrol craft could not be delivered until after the establishment of Bangladesh, when the contract was amended. In subsequent years, China supplied the Pakistan Navy with hydrofoil torpedo boats, gunboats, missile boats and large patrol craft. (Story of the Pakistan Navy Page 302).

In the years after the 1971 war, the Pakistan Navy acquired one more Daphne class submarine, two Agosta class submarines and Atlantic maritime patrol aircraft from France, frigates and anti submarine Seaking helicopters from Britain and destroyers on loan from America.