The volume of the Navy's history 1965 to 1975 was made possible by the unstinted help extended by each of the participants interviewed. It is clear from their recollections that there were successes and reverses, tensions and disagreements. Factions lobbied for their positions and sometimes went too far in one direction. The right solution had to evolve through experimentation. Yet there is no doubt that these were only arguments over ways and means to reach the same end - a strong and modern Navy. This end was achieved by the combined efforts of several people.

The Leander Frigate Project was the achievement of Defence Minister Krishna Menon, exceptional civil servants like Mr HC Sarin and Mr NM Sen and Admirals Nanda and Samson - the first two Managing Directors of Mazagaon Docks. The notable progress in achieving indigenisation in these frigates was the achievement of Commodore Paradkar and his team.

The bold decision to replace the obsolescent British radars and fire control systems by modern Dutch equivalents from the second Leander onwards, well before the first Leander had even been completed, was a result of the forceful advocacy of Admiral Ramnath. It gave Bharat Electronics the opportunity to leapfrog into the indigenous production of digital electronic systems. And it built up the confidence of the Navy's constructors like Shri Parmanandan and Captain Mohan Ram and electronic specialists like Admiral Baxi to innovate the interfaces in future frigates and corvettes for the Indian Navy's unique mix of Russian, western and indigenous systems.

In the 1971 war, the Navy's achievements in the Bay of Bengal sprung from Admiral Nanda's insistence that VIKRANT be seen out at sea and Captain Parkash's courage in letting his eager pilots push to the extreme, the safety limits for launching and recovering aircraft in the low wind conditions in the northern part of the Bay of Bengal. To Admiral Sarma and his Eastern Fleet, and the Navy's intrepid minesweepers, belongs the credit of fulfilling so many tasks with so few ships, culminating in the reopening of the port of Chitgong within weeks of the cease fire.

The Navy's achievements in the Arabian Sea evolved from the initial decision to acquire the missile boats, the credit for which belongs to Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram. Admiral Krishnan and Additional Secretary DR Kohli. The success of the missile boat attacks on Karachi, which played such a decisive role in the Navy's victory in 1971 evolved from Admiral Kuruvila's acceptance of the advice to use missile boats offensively. The tactic to use these frail, essentially defensive, small boats as part of the Fleet's spearhead was entirely unconventional, not believed possible and therefore doubly effective. In this part of the epilogue, I can share my feeling of fulfillment at having helped to mutate these fragile but lethal craft into offensive vessels.

As Captain of TIR in April 1971, jointly with Commander Yadav, the Senior Officer of the Missile Boat Squadron, we conducted trials when towing a missile boat from Visakhapatnam to Bombay using large nylon tow ropes at speeds of 14 knots in moderately rough sea conditions.

I was eager to prove that this could be done because their fragile hulls and limited endurance made it impossible for missile boats to sail in distant waters on their own. Towing missile boats safely and successfully was crucial to being able to get them within striking distance of enemy targets. By the time TIR and NASHAK arrived in Bombay, we had mastered the procedures for towing these boats for long hours, sliding hot food and refreshments to them over the tow ropes since their engines were switched off to conserve fuel and engine hours, releasing the missile boats within minutes to motor independently and take them quickly back in tow when required.

In May 1971, I was appointed as the Fleet Operations Officer on the staff of Admiral Kuruvila who was Commanding the Western Fleet. The need to prepare for hostilities was being discussed. I told Admiral Kuruvila of how we had towed a missile boat from Visakhapatnam to Bombay and suggested that taking missile boats in tow with the Fleet would decisively tilt the scales in any encounter between the opposing Fleets. The analogy I used to explain the concept was that this would be similar to a falcon being released to pounce on its prey. He directed Commander Yadav and me to put up a proposal in writing. Given below is an excerpt from that proposal which he forwarded to Admiral Kohli, the FOCINC WEST in June 1971:

"I have no doubt whatsoever that the correct utilisation of the missile boats is to use them offensively, two at a time, in company with the Fleet. If I have these boats with me at sea, as your Fleet Commander I can guarantee total victory once contact has been made with enemy surface units, regard less of his superiority in speed and gun power".

Admiral Kohli responded enthusiastically and immediately ordered a series of trials to ascertain the effects of towing on the boats' hull and machinery. In Naval Headquarters, Admiral Nanda who had already resolved that the Navy should take the offensive. also responded positively to the offensive utilisation of missile boats. In the ensuing months, plans crystallised for the deployment of missile boats. Some boats were to be deployed off Saurashtra to deter hit and run raids and, when ordered, to launch attacks towards Karachi escorted by fast ships of the Fleet. Some boats were to be taken in tow by the Fleet. The end result was that during the war, missile attacks were successfully launched towards Karachi from two widely separated directions, the first from south and the other from the south west. During both missile attacks, the timing and precision of the air attacks by the Air Force was impeccable and splendid. By sheer chance, on both occasions the naval group arrived off Karachi a little earlier than the pre-arranged time for the coordinated attack. This left the Pakistan side completely perplexed whether the havoc was being wrought by the Indian Navy or the Indian Air Force.

The achievement of Admiral Kuruvila and his Western Fleet in dominating the approaches to Karachi within a week of hostilities, despite the poor material state of his ships and repeated breakdowns at sea, is well known. I would like to place on record my appreciation of this big heated and courageous man who took the advice of his young advisers and implemented it so successfully.

The success of the first series of Russian acquisitions was the result of the detailed discussions held by Additional Secretary Sheth's Delegation in 1965 and the painstaking resolution of problems by Additional Secretary Mukherjee's Delegation in 1971. The second series of Russian acquisitions owes its success to the prodigious efforts of Admiral Barboza and his professional Delegation of 1975.

Admiral Bindra's far reaching Reorganisation of Naval Training in 1974 succeeded because of the whole-heated support, it received from Admirals Kamath and Kohli.

Captain (later Admiral) Dawson's single minded dedication to successfully demonstrate during his command of NILGIRI, the great potential of her electronic warfare equipment became the spring board for the Navy's leap frog into this intricate area of naval warfare.

The transfer to the Navy of the control of Maritime Reconnaissance was the outcome of the sustained efforts of Admiral Tahiliani and Captain Puri.

The sound foundations of the Submarine Arm were laid by the highly capable young submariners who manned the first eight submarines, some of whom like Admirals Auditto and Sodhi became Flag Officers Submarines, and Admirals Shekhawat and Ganesh who rose to became Fleet Commanders and Commanders in Chief. Admiral Shekhawat became Chief of the Naval Staff in 1993.

The decade 1965-1975 was a crucial one in that it not only established the Navy's credibility in the eyes of the nation but also sowed the seeds for the transition to a deep sea Navy. The foundations built in these ten years have been considerably augmented in the ensuing years. Future volumes will record the acquisition of the kashin class guided missile frigates, the strengthening of the GRSE as the outcome of the Navy's commitment to DRDO's Integrated Guided Missile Development programme.

All these achievements were sustained by the commitment with which the Navy's officers and sailors carried out their duties. Most of them were too young then to know what inspired the vision of their elders. It is my hope that this volume has helped them to know what was done and why.