Prior to the Second World War, Britain's Royal Navy was responsible for the overall maritime defence of India. For this purpose, the Royal Navy maintained:

- a Fleet based at Trincomalee in Ceylon.
- a Fleet at Singapore.
- a Squadron at Bahrein.

The Royal Indian Navy (RIN) was responsible for coastal defence only. It had one naval base at Bombay and training establishments scattered in many regions of India.

In September 1939, when the Second World War started, the Royal Indian Navy had only five sloops, one trawler, one survey ship and one patrol craft. It had 114 officers and 1732 ratings (sailors were called ratings). All the six rating training schools were concentrated inside the Naval Dockyard in Bombay - Gunnery, Seamanship, Signals, Anti-submarine, Boys Training Establishment (BTE) and Mechanical Training Establishment (MTE). There were no rating training schools for Torpedo, Electrical or Radar. Officers went to Britain for basic and advanced training in all disciplines. Eighty percent of rating recruits came from the Punjab and from the Bombay Presidency - mainly Konkan, and of them, seventy five percent were Muslim and nine percent Hindu.

During the war, the Royal Indian Navy underwent a phenomenal expansion. Thirty one small vessels were immediately requisitioned to serve as minesweepers and patrol craft until newly built ships could enter service. The first Basset class trawler built in Garden Reach Workshop Calcutta entered service in 1941 - it was followed by five more. The first Bangor class fleet minesweeper built in India entered service in 1943. Six new sloops came from Britain and were named after Indian rivers. Bathurst class minesweepers came from Australia. Numerous minor vessels like motor minesweepers, harbour defence motor launches and landing craft came from Britain, America and Australia. The naval base and Naval Dockyard at Bombay were modernised. Three new branches were created - Electrical, Education and Medical.

In 1945 when the war ended, the Navy had seven sloops, four anti submarine frigates, eight corvettes, fourteen minesweepers, sixteen trawlers, one survey ship, two depot ships, thirty auxiliary vessels, one hundred and fifty landing craft, two hundred harbour craft and forty five harbour defence launches. The number of personnel had risen to 3014 officers and 27,433 ratings, most of whom served in shore establishments. The recruiting pattern had changed noticably - there was a large increase from the Madras and Bengal Presidencies and a steep decline in recruitment from the Bombay Presidency and the Punjab. The intake of Hindus had risen to forty two percent and that of Muslims had fallen to thirty five percent. Several new naval base establishments and training establishments had come up all along the West and East coasts

British Strategic Perceptions in 1944

As Britain gradually reconciled itself to the inevitability of India becoming independent, the Commander in Chief India assessed that the vital strategic interests of the British Commonwealth in the Indian Ocean were:

(a) Oil supplies,
(b) Control of the eastern and western approaches to India.
(c) Air communications to Iraq, Ceylon, Burma and Malaya.
(d) Control of the seas and the island territories.

In his view, should India be unfriendly or liable to be influenced by a power such as Russia, China or Japan hostile to the British Commonwealth, Britain's strategic position in the Indian Ocean would become untenable and British communications with New Zealand and Australia most insecure.

The Plans for the Navy's Development in 1944/45.

As the Second World War neared completion, three separate studies emerged sequentially on the future development of the Navy.

The Godfrey Plan of 1944.

This plan was prepared in April 1944 by Vice Admiral Godfrey, the Commander in Chief of the Royal Indian Navy, for submission to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. It had two phases. Phase I proposed the replacement of inefficient ships by modern frigates and sloops, acquisition of eight destroyers and training of personnel by 1947 to man a cruiser. Phase II envisaged the acquisition of aircraft carriers and submarines with associated training and maintenance facilities.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee Report of 1944 on The Size and Composition of the Post War Forces in India.

This report assumed the only threat to be from Russia, that independant India would continue to remain in the British Commonwealth and that reinforcements would arrive from Britain and other parts of the British Empire to help India defend her frontiers.

The Committee viewed the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) as a `Dominion Navy', responsible:

(a) Primarily for the safety of Indian and `Empire shipping in the sea areas contiguous to India's coastline, their approaches and the trade routes in the Indian Ocean.

(b) Secondly for the combined operational training of the Indian Army's specialist amphibious formations, providing escort and assault ships and craft for landing these formations on hostile shores, for which a nucleus force of assault ships and craft and a training organisation was to be maintained.

(c) Thirdly, in conjunction with the Air Force, the Navy was to ensure the timely neutralisation of any foreign invading force attempting a landing on the shores of India. It was therefore essential for the RIN to have an adequate air component for seaward reconnaissance and for air strikes in support of surface forces.

For these tasks, the Committee recommended a naval force of one Cruiser Squadron (3 cruisers), one Destroyer Flotila (8 destroyers), one Training Flotilla (8 Sloops), one General Duty Flotilla (8 frigates) and flotillas of minesweepers, motor torpedo boats and harbour defence launches, alongwith survey ships, assault ships and a depot ship for repairs.

Committee for Planning the Requirement of the Armed Forces 1945.

After the cessation of hostilities in August 1945, the Government appointed a Committee to plan the requirements of India's Armed Forces, based on the Chiefs of Staff Committee Report of 1944. The gist of this Committee's Report was that by the end of the War, Japan would have been completely subdued, the principal foreign powers in the East would be the USSR, the USA and China and that India would be responsible for maintaining sufficient forces to overcome a minor power and to hold out against a major power until Imperial Forces could arrive. It did not take into account an independent India after the War. It did anticipate that India would be a member of the British Commonwealth. Since no one part of the Commonwealth could, in peace or war, be self-sufficient or independent of supplies from other parts, the economy and defence of each nation of the Commonwealth would therefore, largely depend on the use of the sea and air routes and ports. While the main responsibility for keeping open these sea and air communications would rest with the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force under the orders of the British Government, each component part of the Commonwealth would need to be prepared to bear its share. India, in common with other countries of the Empire, would, therefore, need to maintain naval and air forces as necessary to ensure the defence of her bases and the security of shipping within her coastal waters from submarine, mining and air attack and to assist in the protection of trade in the ocean shipping routes.

Russia was viewed as the only major power likely to seriously threaten India. Aggression by Russia was therefore taken as the basis for estimating the forces which India would require for her defence against a major power. It was not possible to forecast the strength of the forces which Russia might be able to bring to bear against India. The scale of attack would depend on conditions which would change from time to time. As these conditions changed, the scale of enemy attack would need to be reviewed and defensive measures brought up-to-date.

So long as India was connected with Great Britain, either as a Dominion or by a treaty guaranteeing assistance, hostilities between Russia and India could only be either the cause of or the result of a war between Great Britain and the USSR. Such a war would, inevitably, sooner or later, develop into another world conflict. While India's contribution to a war of this nature would depend very largely on the defence policy of the British Empire as a whole, India was likely to bear the first brunt of such an attack and would need therefore, to be prepared at all times to defend her frontiers until Imperial reinforcements arrived.

The principal responsibility of India's Navy after the war would be the safety of Indian and Empire shipping in the ports of India and their approaches; India would also wish to take her share in the protection of this shipping on the trade routes within the Indian Ocean. It would be an important task of India's Navy to provide facilities for the combined operational training of the Army formations maintained in the country and to provide a share of the escorts, assault shipping and craft required to land these formations on a hostile shore, should this prove necessary. This implied the maintenance in peace of a nucleus force of assault shipping and craft and appropriate training organisations, as well as personnel possessing an expert knowledge of amphibious operations. In addition, the Navy, in conjunction with the Air Force, would need to be prepared to take its share in intercepting and attacking any foreign invading force which might attempt a landing on Indian shores.

The Army would be responsible for coastal defence and the Air Force for seaward reconnaissance, shipping protection and co-operation with the RIN. Naval units might be required to proceed at short notice to ports in occupied countries in case disturbances arose and to patrol the river approaches to such ports. As regards superpower aggression on Afghanistan, sufficient aircraft would need to be available to prevent the Afghans from being overawed by the Russian air strength on their border.

Naval forces to counter these threats, could not be quickly improvised in times of war. The main task of the Navy in peace, in common with the other Services, would be prepare for war but since the full strength of the naval force might be needed immediately on the outbreak of war and a long period was required both for the construction of warships and the training of naval personnel, naval forces, and air forces to co-operate with them, would need to be maintained in peace at a high standard of preparedness.

While for purposes of local defence, a number of small ships would need to be maintained, a proportion of large ships would also be necessary. The provision of such ships would produce a balanced naval force, form an added incentive to recruitment and increased pride in the service, besides assisting considerably in the training of personnel which could not be adequately carried out in small ships. In addition, great importance was attached to the formation of an adequate air component for seaward reconnaissance and a striking force and also to the maintenance of modern coast defences and material for local seaward defences such as booms, mines, nets and indicator loops.

The establishment of industries within India would tend to make her economy and prosperity more dependent on the security of her export trade and so maintain, and possibly increase, the importance of her ports and overseas communications. Therefore, India needed to maintain adequate naval forces and ensure that the ports on which she was dependent were kept up-to-date in accordance with modern requirements. The coastal trade of India was not only an essential part of her peace and war economy but was also an important factor in her transportation system. The requisitioning of the majority of her coastal steamers at the beginning of the present war for naval purposes had greatly increased the congestion on the railways. It was, therefore, important that encouragement be given to the development of the coastal trade and the shipbuilding industry, that sufficient naval force be maintained to avoid being obliged to requisition mercantile shipping immediately on the outbreak of war.

THE WANSBOROUGH JONES REPORT OF 1946

In 1946, an Interim Government was formed under Prime Minister Nehru. India's Independence was clearly foreseeable. The Prime Minister commissioned a British adviser, Mr Wansborough Jones, to recommend the scientific and organisational measures required to make India a self supporting defence entity. The Jones report outlined four basic roles for the Indian Armed Forces:

(a) To secure the land frontier against raids from border tribes or attack from a second class army.

(b) To support civil power.

(c) To provide a small expeditionary force capable of protecting India's regional interests.

(d) Within available financial resources, to develop a force capable of taking the field in a first class war.

POST INDEPENDENCE PLAN FOR
"THE REORGANISATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIAN NAVY"

After partition in August 1947, the RIN comprised:

-Four Sloops (KISTNA, CAUVERY, JUMNA, SUTLEJ),
-Two frigates (KUKRI, TIR)
-One Corvette (ASSAM)
- Twelve coastal minesweepers (ORISSA, DECCAN, BIJNOR, KUMAON
KHYBER, ROHILKHAND, CARNATIC, RAJPUTANA, KONKAN, BENGAL,BOMBAY, MADRAS). After the cyclone which hit Bombay in 1948, only KONKAN, BOMBAY, BENGAL and MADRAS remained in service. The remainder were so severely damaged that they had to be sold as scrap.

- One survey ship (INVESTIGATOR)

- Four trawlers, four motor minesweepers, one motor launch,four harbour defence motor launches and landing craft.

(a) To safeguard Indian shipping.

(b) To ensure that supplies could reach and leave by sea in all circumstances.

(c) To prevent an enemy landing on India's shores.

(d) To support the Army in sea borne operations.

The minimum force recommended was two aircraft carriers, three cruisers, eight destroyers, four submarines and miscellaneous small ships to be built up in 10 years. The plan envisaged gradual development of the Navy to form two fleets, each to be built around a light fleet carrier.

The plan clearly reflected the Indian Navy's aspiration for regional pre-eminence. Apart from several seminal recommendations to remedy the after-effects of the partition of the Navy, like shortages of manpower, constructing new training establishments, disposing of old ships and acquiring immediate replacements.

At the end of 1947, based on the above, a ten year plan for the expansion of the Navy was submitted to the Government and was approved in principle by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet in 1948 but without financial commitment.

THE PROFESSOR BLACKETT REPORT

Whilst these proposals were being discussed, Prime Minister Nehru in 1948 sought the advice of Professor PMS Blackett. He was a renowned British physicist who had pioneered naval operational research in the British Navy during the Second World War. Professor Blackett was asked to prepare a report outlining the measures necessary for India to become near self sufficient in defence production over a period of seven years.

Whereas previous studies had assumed that in the event of hostilities, the British and Commonwealth Navies would assist India, Prof Blackett's basic premise was that a newly independant India would wish to stand unaided where defence was concerned. In his view a Third World War was unlikely - the immediate need was to plan and prepare for a small scale war. Professor Blackett's report on how best India should meet her defence needs within available scientific, financial and industrial resources highlighted that:

(a) India was economically weak. To become self sufficient, a strong economy and industrial base was essential.

(b) The import of sophisticated defence equipment, though inescapable, had to be minimised to conserve foreign exchange for industrialisation and for improving agriculture, on which future rise in defence expenditure would be based.

(c) Front line platforms which depended upon state of the art technology for optimum performance during combat, like fighter aircraft, heavy tanks and aircraft carrier task forces, could not be afforded in the quantities required to confront a major power. The major powers were, in any case, unlikely to be drawn into a regional conflict as between India and Pakistan. On the other hand, both the USA and Britain had large stockpiles of weapons and material rendered surplus after World War II which did not require optimum performance in order to be effective.

(d) If India bought these surplus stocks, if India avoided expensive high performance weapons and chose low performance systems relevant to local scenarios, then self sufficiency was possible.

(e) The import of a new and improved weapon system should only be considered if its performance was so markedly superior to its predecessor as to justify the initial cost by reduced running and maintenance costs or to provide training schools with single models to keep the services in touch with weapon developments.

(f) In the long run, self sufficiency would create freedom of choice in foreign policy rather than strategic isolation.

Prof Blackett made specific recommendations regarding the compositon of the three services. In his view, the Indian Navy's missions were:

(a) Protection of coastal shipping against mining, submarines, surface and air attack, with the capability to respond in kind.

(b) Escorting and protecting a small number of ocean convoys between Aden and Singapore but no further (merchant shipping was important for the development of trade and a valuable national asset).

(c) Co-operation with the Army and the Air Force in repelling landing operations and advances along coastlines, and to be able to undertake similar operations against the enemy.

(Note: In his book on "Naval Aviation", Admiral Chatterji, states that as a result of several meetings with Prof Blackett, Government accepted in principle the proposal to acquire light fleet carriers. It was envisaged that the first carrier would be purchased in 1955 and the second two years later).

DEVELOPMENTS 1948 TO 1952

In 1948, Vice Admiral Sir Edward Parry succeeded Rear Admiral Hall as Commander in Chief and Chief of the Naval Staff of the Royal Indian Navy. He was able to tell the British Admiralty that India's Ministry of Defence did not want the Indian Navy to be just an adjunct of the British Navy but to be a real Navy capable of carrying out major operations of naval warfare (" Sea Power and Indian Security" by Rahul Roy Choudhary, Page 29).

In September 1948, a 69 ship Navy was proposed. However, because of budgetary constraints, the Navy had to recast its requirements. In October 1948, a revised plan proposed a 49 ship Navy.

In December 1948, another revised plan spelt out the `The Role of the Navy' and proposed a smaller 47 ship Navy comprising two aircraft carriers, three cruisers, eight escort destroyers, four fleet destroyers (British Battle Class/Weapon Class), four submarines, four A/A frigates, two A/S frigates, six fleet minesweepers, one  LST, one survey vessel, five motor launches, seven minor landing craft and two squadrons of aircraft per carrier (one each for fighter and strike and one for SAR).

In 1949, Government approved only those proposals of the 10 year naval plan which related to the recruitment and training of personnel. The expansion of the Fleet, though restricted to one aircraft carrier, frigates, a survey ship and a landing ship, did not exclude submarines.

This setback was compounded by the difference in opinion between the Indian naval planners in Delhi and the British Admiralty. When Admiral Parry forcefully pressed the Admiralty to meet his plan requirements, the Admiralty told him that the primary function of the Indian Navy was the protection of the coastline and harbours of India and to perform specific functions in the defence of the British Commonwealth.

In 1951, Vice Admiral Sir Mark Pizey succeeded Vice Admiral Parry as the Chief of the Naval Staff. Since the Government was unable to afford large scale naval expansion and the British were not willing to give India what it wanted, Admiral Parry's plan had to be shelved. Instead, Admiral Pizey proposed a 10 year replacement program. It was carefully phrased to minimize opposition, both from the Government of India and the British Navy.

THE ARMED FORCES REORGANISATION COMMITTEE - 1952

In 1952, this Committee was constituted to reduce the expenditure on the Indian Armed Forces during the period 1952/53 to 1954/55. The Committee recommended that two cruisers be acquired in addition to INS DELHI. In due course MYSORE was commissioned in 1957. The acquisition of the aircraft carrier was deferred. It was eventually sanctioned in 1956.

The number of ships to be acquired during this period were reduced. Since destroyers were not readily available, the newest available frigates were ordered from Britain.

(Note: For details of developments during this period, see "No Easy Answers" by Goldrich and "Sea Power and Indian Security" by Rahul Roy Choudhary.)

DEVELOPMENTS 1954 TO 1962

In 1954, agreements were signed for the acquisition from Britain of eight new frigates (3 anti aircraft, 2 first rate anti submarine, 3 second rate anti submarine) and 6 minesweepers (4 coastals and 2 inshores).

As part of the Naval Replacement Programme, the Government also sanctioned two Fleet tankers. A second hand tanker had been purchased from Italy in 1953 and commissioned as SHAKTI in 1954. The Government sanction stipulated that the second tanker should be built in India.

In 1956, Vice Admiral Sir Stephen Carlill took over as Chief of the Naval Staff. By this time, Pakistan had joined CENTO and SEATO and had been promised substantial naval assistance. America committed to directly supply two destroyers and eight minesweepers and pay Britain for refurbishing and supplying a cruiser and four destroyers. Naval Headquarters, already preoccupied with pressing the case for the aircraft carrier, found itself compelled to propose:

(a) the acquisition of three destroyers from Britain to match Pakistan's acquisitions and

(b) the outright purchase of the three Hunt class destroyers which were on loan from the British Navy since 1952.

In April 1956 Government approved the development of combatant naval aviation. The light fleet carrier HMS HERCULES was purchased from the British Navy.

In 1957, the Navy proposed to the Government the retention of existing ships in commission. If approved, this together with the new acquisitions under construction in Britain would double the number of ships in the Fleet and enable it to cope with the increased size of the Pakistan Navy.

In 1958, the Government:

(a) Agreed to NHQ's proposal to keep the existing ships in commission till 1962/63 or expiry of life, whichever was earlier.

(b) Approved the outright purchase of the three Hunt Class destroyers that were on loan from Britain.

(c) Agreed in principle to the acquisition from Britain of three new destroyers in lieu of three of the six second rate A/S Type 14 frigates of the KHUKRI Class proposed in 1950. These destroyers were required to provide the aircraft carrier with anti submarine protection and at night act as VIKRANT's escorts in the event of surface action.

(a) The Navy floated informal inquiries to the British Admiralty regarding the availability of three Daring or Later Battle Class destroyers.

(b) Since the Bombay Dockyard would not be able to berth the envisaged size of the Fleet, the Navy proposed the setting up of a major naval base at Visakhapatnam and made plans for the immediate construction there of a 1120-foot jetty and a workshop.

(c) To establish a presence in the A & N Islands and to keep an eye on naval activity in the Bay of Bengal, the Navy proposed to Government the positioning of a Resident Naval Officer (RNO) at Port Blair.

(d) The Navy decided to dispose off the old minesweepers which were occupying precious alongside berths. RAJPUTANA, ROHILKHAND and two LCTs had already been disposed of in 1956. Action was now taken to dispose of BOMBAY, MADRAS and BENGAL. Only KONKAN was retained as a general-purpose vessel.

In 1958, Vice Admiral RD Katari took over as the first Indian Chief of Naval Staff. By this time, the first of the eight new frigates of Admiral Pizey's naval replacement plan had started commissioning and the aircraft carrier was being modernised. The Navy re-started its case for a submarine arm.

In 1959, Britain indicated that neither Daring nor Later Battle Class destroyers were available. The Navy then proposed to Government the acquisition from Britain of three Early Battle Class destroyers which were older than those earlier requested.

In pursuance of the decision to relieve the congestion of ships at Bombay and to ease the growing workload on the Naval Dockyard at Bombay, the Navy proposed to Government the basing of some ships at Cochin, Visakhapatnam and Calcutta.

In April 1960, Government acquired Mazagon Docks Ltd (MDL) and asked it to prepare a preliminary report on the facilities required to modernise MDL for building frigates. In November 1960, Government approved in principle that three frigates should be built in India.

The Navy's efforts to get the second fleet tanker built in India did not bear fruit. Government sanctioned the acquisition of a new Fleet Tanker to replace the old second hand tanker SHAKTI.

In January 1961, MDL submitted its preliminary report. Government deputed a team to discuss with the Admiralty, the collaborating shipbuilders and the armament suppliers the steps to be taken to execute the Frigate Project expeditiously and economically. The team recommended construction of three Leander class frigates in collaboration with Britain.

In December 1961, the Portuguese were evicted from Goa. The airfield at Dabolim was taken over by the Navy. In Delhi, there was difference of opinion between the Ministries whether Goa should be developed solely as a mercantile port or whether the Navy's requirement to have a naval base half way between Bombay and Cochin could be accommodated. This discussion continued until 1963.

Frigate Project

By 1962, in response to global enquiries, Sweden and Holland had also submitted proposals to build frigates in India. In mid 1962, a team led by the DCNS visited Sweden, Holland and Britain to make a final techno-economic assessment of the British proposal vis a vis the others. The team recommended the British Leander frigate. In view of the difficult financial position and the shortage of foreign exchange, the final decision awaited the negotiation of credit on soft terms.

When China attacked in the end of 1962, the age profile of the Navy's ships was as follows:

(a) Acquisitions After 1947. One aircraft carrier, two cruisers, six destroyers, one tanker and one stores ship, all of which were second hand. The new acquisitions were eight frigates, four coastal minesweepers and two inshore minesweepers.

(b) Old Ships Pre 1947. Six frigates and one LST.

DEVELOPMENTS 1963 TO 1965

After the military reverses during China's attacks in end 1962, India sought defence assistance from America, Britain and the Commonwealth. These countries asked for details of specific assistance. These details were sent. The requirements were phased in the form of a five-year plan and led to the formulation of the 1964 - 69 Defence Plan.

Meanwhile the American President and the British Prime Minister, who had met at Nassau in the Bahamas in December 1962, had decided that:

(a) America would not supply "lethal" equipment to India, except for equipping the Army's mountain divisions on the Indo Chinese border.

(b) Britain, the 'traditional supplier', would deal with the Navy's requirements.

(c) The envisaged aid to India of $120 million would be shared equally between America and Britain.

Immediately after China's attack:

(a) The first RNO Port Blair was appointed in November 1962.

(b) Government accorded sanction for the construction of the new 1120 foot wharf at Visakhapatnam.

The year 1963 was a major milestone in Indian naval planning. The Government initiated an exhaustive review of defence requirements. China was viewed as the primary threat. The Government decided that the Army's strength should be raised to 825,000 men and the Air Force's strength to 45 squadrons. The resources required to achieve this meant that the Navy could not be strengthened. Whereas the Navy had proposed a force level of 130 ships, the Defence Plan for the Navy envisaged "a phased programme for replacement of over-aged ships".

During 1963:

(a) With a view to take up the construction of frigates in India, a team of officers headed by the DCNS visited Britain and Sweden to evaluate their offers of collaboration.

(b) The responsibility for Seaward Defence was entrusted to the Navy. The Coast Batteries which till then were manned by the Army were taken over by the Navy.

(c) The Navy was asked to garrison the A&N islands. INS JARAWA was commissioned as a naval establishment. A naval garrison was stationed at Port Blair and provided with vessels for moving between the islands.

(d) It was decided to set up at Visakhapatnam, the full fledged Naval Base and Dockyard which had been proposed in 1957.

(e) It was decided to develop Goa as a naval base. INS GOMANTAK was commissioned as a naval establishment. The Naval Air Station Daboim's facilities were updated to make them capable of operating jet aircraft.

By early 1964, the Defence Plan 1964-69 had crystallised. The requirements of the Plan were discussed by the Defence Minister's Delegations during their visits to America in May 1964, to Russia in August 1964 and to Britain in November 1964. Neither America, Britain nor Russia perceived any threat to India from China's Navy. In their view, India's priority was to contain China on India's land borders by strengthening the Army and the Air Force. Russia however was willing to meet the Navy's needs.

In his book "Indian Navy's Submarine Arm", Admiral Chatterji states:

"From the Soviet point of view, India's naval shopping list no doubt came at a propitious time. Following the victory of the Chinese in the eastern Himalayas and Peking's sharp attacks on Soviet foreign policy in the Indian Ocean, Moscow's geo-strategic analysis of Southeast Asia welcomed a powerful Indian Navy that would associate and cooperate with the Soviet Navy to contain China in the region. Whatever may be the reasons for the Soviet Union's prompt and positive responses to India's Naval requirements, it was certainly very helpful and timely in making up the various deficiencies in the Indian Fleet".<

By 1965, collaboration agreements had been concluded with Vickers Yarrow of Britain for the indigenous construction of three Leander class frigates. Britain offered a special defence credit of 4.7 million pounds to cover the external cost of the Frigate Project for the first four years, as well as for the expansion of Mazagon Docks Ltd.

Negotiations were also finalised for the Navy's tanker to be built by a public sector shipping line in a foreign shipyard and on completion, for the tanker to be chartered to the Navy.

When the Rann of Kutch incident occurred in April 1965 the position regarding the Navy's requirements was:

(a) America had said that Britain should deal with the Navy's needs.

(b) The British Navy had expressed its inability to spare either the type of destroyers or the type of submarines which the Navy wanted. British shipbuilders were willing to build a new Oberon class submarine which India wanted. India's suggestion for soft credit, as had been extended for the Frigate Project was being reconsidered by the British Government.

(c) Russia had offered a variety of ships and submarines to meet the Navy's needs.

In May 1965, soon after the Rann of Kutch incident, a series of events occurred with startling rapidity.

(a) In April, Pakistan intruded into Kutch.

(b) In May, Britain informed India that they were unable to extend financial assistance for an Oberon class submarine to be built in a Britain shipyard.

(c) In June, there was an increase in Indonesian intrusions into the Nicobar Islands. The Navy recommended to the Government an immediate increase in naval presence in the Bay of Bengal to deter further intrusions.

(d) The refusal of British credit to build the Oberon class submarine and the need for increased naval presence in the A & N islands combined to precipitate the decision to accept the Russian offer of ships and submarines which they had made in September 1964.

(e) In September 1965, an agreement was signed for the acquisition from Russia of four submarines, a submarine depot ship, five Petya class submarine chasers, two Landing Ships Tank Medium and five patrol boats, all for deployment in the Bay of Bengal and the A & N Islands.

"I have a specially soft spot in my heart for the Indian Navy, having done so very much for it from the time I was the Supreme Allied Commander and had most of the Navy serving under me from 1943 to 1946 until I was Viceroy and then Governor General, when I took a great personal part in the division and reconstitution of the Navy.

"Ever since then I have been instrumental in getting almost all of the requirements of the Indian Navy met by the British Government, including the two cruisers, the aircraft carrier, the destroyers, the organisations for building the frigates at Bombay etc.

"I had even managed to get more favourable terms for the construction of a British submarine but alas it all took so long that this particular transaction fell through".

AN OVERVIEW OF THE NAVY'S GROWTH 1947 TO 1965

Viewed in retrospect, even though the allocations to the Navy were low, it was possible to gradually build up a modest force, using the sterling balances built up during World War II. Despite the disinclination to increase defence expenditure and even after meeting the pressing needs of the Army and Air Force, the Navy's percentage share of the defence budget rose from 4 per cent in 1950/51 to 9 per cent in 1956/57 and 12 per cent in 1959/60. From 1961 onwards, the Navy's allocation steadily declined to 4% in 1964/65, mainly because of the over-riding need to swiftly modernise the Army and Air Force after the Chinese aggression of 1962.

It is also interesting to note how the long awaited approval for the Submarine Arm resulted not only from a curious combination of several geopolitical and economic factors but also as part of a much larger decision to start acquiring the Navy's requirements from Russia.

As can be seen from the following table of ship acquisitions between 1947 and 1965, the Navy's growth was moderate, slow and steady, with new construction ships from the UK replacing those of World War II vintage and with indigenous construction gradually acquiring momentum.