The ensuing account of naval operations in the Western Naval Command has been reconstructed from several sources. Admiral Kohli was the Flag Officer Commanding in Chief, Western Naval Command in 1971. His book "We Dared - Maritime Operations in the 1971 Indo Pak War" was published in 1989. The Pakistan Navy's account is contained in the "The Story of the Pakistan Navy 1947 to 1972" published in 1991. The present account is based on the above sources and on discussions with the main participants. The thought process which preceded each major operation has been correlated with what actually transpired and the reasons for its success or failure. The evolution of the plans which preceded these operation has been discussed in the chapter on the "Evolution of the Navy's Plan of Operations." The operations have been discussed under the following headings.

- The First Missile Attack on Karachi.

- Western Fleet Operations and the Second Missile Attack on Karachi.

- Anti Submarine Hunter Killer Operations and the Loss of the KHUKRI.

- Submarine Operations.

- Loss of Alize 203.

- Trade Warfare.

- Defence of Bombay.

- A Retrospect of Operations in Western Naval Command.

THE FIRST MISSILE ATTACK ON KARACHI

Event Before the Attack

Vice Admiral (later Admiral) Kohli, was the Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Naval Command (FOCINCWEST). In his book "We Dared", he states: (Page 45 et seq).

"After Pakistan proclaimed a National Emergency on 23 November, three missile boats were placed at Okha to carry out patrols. They gained very valuable experience of the area and the waters around and in the vicinity of Okha and also proved the facilities provided at the advance base there.

"As the Fleet would be operating not far from Karachi, a demarcating line was established which neither the ships of the Fleet nor the missile boats would cross. This would prevent any unfortunate incidents of own forces engaging each other.

"The Pakistani authorities had warned all merchant ships bound for Karachi not to approach the harbour to within 75 miles between sunset and dawn. This meant that any unit picked up on the radar within that distance was most likely to be a Pakistani naval vessel on patrol.

"The Karachi strike group consisted of two Petyas and four missile boats armed with four missiles each. One of the four boats was to remain on patrol off Dwarka in order to provide cover for the force on its way back. The Petyas were intended to provide communication and control and, with their better radar, give indication of suitable targets. In the event of an emergency, they could take a boat in tow and, if necessary give fuel.

"After arriving at a certain point south of Karachi, the Task Group Commander in the Petya was to release the missile boats to proceed at maximum speed towards Karachi; the Squadron Commander embarked in one of the boats would allocate targets and the boats thereafter would act independently keeping in touch with the Squadron Commander. The Petyas would follow at a slower speed, but stay not too far away from the rendezvous. Naval Headquarters and Headquarters Western Naval Command were to listen in on Pakistani wireless circuits and pass the relevant intelligence to the force.

"The plan had been to strike Karachi with a composite force on the very day that Pakistan carried out their first act of war. The Pakistanis attacked our airfields on the evening of 3 December 1971. Since it was not possible for our forces to attack Karachi the same evening, it was decided to launch the operation on the following day, i.e. the night 4/5 December."

THE ATTACK

The Task Group's approach to Karachi was by and large uneventful. Despite some confusion, contacts detected en route were eventually analysed as undeserving of missile attack.

When 70 miles south of Karachi, a target was detected to the northwest at a range of 45 miles. It was classified as a warship. A second target was detected to the northeast at a range of 42 miles, heading for Karachi. Both targets were tracked and missiles prepared for launch.

The contact to the northwest was engaged by missile boat NIRGHAT with two missiles. The target sank. It was later learnt that this was the Pakistan Navy destroyer KHAIBAR.

The contact to the northeast was engaged by missile boat NIPAT with two missiles. The target sank. It was learnt later that this was a merchant ship MV VENUS CHALLENGER.

A third contact appeared to the North. It was engaged by missile boat VEER with one missile. The target sank. It was learnt later that this was the Pakistan Navy coastal minesweeper MUHAFIZ.

At this stage of the attack, when there were no contacts on radar, what should have happened was that all ships of the Task Group should have continued to close Karachi and, from the predetermined point promulgated by KILTAN, each missile boat should have fired one more missile at Karachi. This did not happen. Missile boat NIRGHAT mistook anti aircraft tracer shells and reported sighting aircraft. Fear of Pakistani air attack sharply increased. KILTAN's accurate anti aircraft radar also mistook as aircraft the shells being fired from Karachi's gun defences. It took some time for this confusion to clear.

Meanwhile K 25, the Commander of the missile boats, told missile boat NIPAT, in which he was embarked, to fire one of his two remaining missiles towards Karachi which NIPAT did. K 25 then issued the order for the boats to withdraw. Due to a fade out in communications, the Commander of the Task Group in KILTAN did not receive this withdrawal signal. He continued to close Karachi. When he arrived at the predetermined point, 20 miles south of Karachi he found himself all alone. Except for missile boat VEER, everybody else had turned round and was headed back towards Saurashtra at full speed. Due to a machinery problem, VEER had reduced speed to effect repairs.

When KILTAN turned round to head for home, VEER mistook KILTAN for a Pakistani warship and almost fired a missile at her. Fortunately communications and identity were reestablished and a catastrophe averted.

In due course, ships of the Task Group arrived on the Saurashtra Coast in ones and twos, refuelled on 5 December and arrived in Bombay on 6 December.

EVENTS AFTER THE ATTACK

In Bombay, there was elation at the Task Group's unprecedented achievement. At the professional level however, there was disquiet as to the reasons for not bombarding the Karachi installations with missiles. The Commander of the the Task Group, Cdr (later Commodore) KP Gopal Rao was the Commanding Officer of the Petya KILTAN. The Commander of the Missile Boat Squadron (K 25) was Cdr (later Commodore) BB Yadav, embarked in missile boat NIPAT. FOCINCWEST received differing accounts from them. He directed both of them to put up an agreed report. They were not able to agree. The disagreement hinged on who was in command of the attack, particularly after all contacts had been sunk.

K 25's stand was as follows:

- In the process of attacking KHAIBAR, NIRGHAT had fallen back by several miles, whilst KILTAN, NIPAT and VEER sped towards Karachi. KATCHALL, the second Petya, was with NIRGHAT to provide protection from air attack.

- NIPAT had raced ahead to attack VENUS CHALLENGER while VEER had fallen back.

- After VEER had fired at MUHAFIZ, he decided to fire missiles at the Karachi installations.

- At this stage, he found that NIPAT was closest to Karachi. So he told NIPAT to fire both his missiles. One missile failed prelaunch checks. NIPAT fired the other missile towards Karachi.

- NIRGHAT had started reporting that aircraft were visual and KILTAN had promulgated Air Raid Warning Red.

- Taking into account the likely confusion between friendlies due to the dispersal of own forces and the possible development of air and surface threat, K 25 decided to withdraw.

The CO KILTAN's stand was that K 25 was not authorised to order withdrawal. This was his prerogative as the Commander of the Task Group in KILTAN.

In an article in the Indian Defence Review of July 1990, Commodore Gopal Rao has described the sequence of events as he saw it. In it he stated:

"The rendezvous with KATCHALL and missile boats NIRGHAT and VEER was effected off Dwarka on the afternoon of 4 December 1971. Clarifications on the points raised by the Commanding Officers of the ships were given and the Task Group sailed from Dwarka PM 4 December to carry out Operation Trident. KILTAN and KATCHALL were in the vanguard and the three missile boats stationed slightly in the rear. This formation was maintained throughout the approach towards Karachi. At about 1800 hrs, 4 December 1971, when we were 150 miles from Karachi, course was altered northward to head towards Karachi.

"Three incidents of interest occurred during our approach towards Karachi. The first one was at about 1810 hrs on 4 December 1971, when KILTAN"s radar picked up a surface contact on a northwesterly bearing at a range of 45 miles. This contact, which was classified as a warship was doing a speed of 24 knots and steering a north westerly course, heading towards Cape Monze, situated to the west of Karachi, oblivious of our presence. The reason for the presence of this Pak warship in this area was to become clear only after the war. The second incident occurred at about 1945 hrs when KILTAN's radar picked up a reconnaissance aircraft and I immediately altered the course of the Task Group westwards and succeeded in misleading the aircraft. The reconnaissance aircraft's message to Karachi "Firm Contact, Course 270. Speed 20" was intercepted by our shore authorities. At about 1900 hrs, when my radar scan was clear of aircraft echoes, I altered course northward again. The third incident occurred at about 2000 hrs, when a surface contact was picked up on KILTAN's radar on a northeasterly bearing at a range of 25 miles. This contact then increased its speed to 24 knots and started steering an intercepting course. I verified from my Navigation and Gunnery radars that this was not a spurious echo. When the contact closed to 15 miles, I altered course of my Group to westward and did not permit the contact to close upon us further. After a while, the contact reduced its speed considerably and its radar echo started becoming smaller and smaller until it finally disappeared. At about 2014 hrs I altered course again northward and increased the speed of the formation to 28 knots. Because of the westerly alteration of courses on two occasions the Pak warship heading northwest towards Cape Monze increased its distance and the contact was lost on our radar. She was picked up again only at about 2300 hrs, 4 December 1971 at a range of 40 miles when she was nearing Cape Monze.

The Attack

"The Task Group in formation was heading northward at high speed and was about 70 miles to the south of Karachi at 2150 hrs. Soon after, KILTAN detected a target to the northwest at a range of 45 miles, which was classified as a warship on patrol. A second target was detected to the northeast, at a range of 42 miles and classified as a large unidentified ship, proceeding in shallower waters at 16 knots towards Karachi. Pakistan had issued a warning that no merchant ships should approach closer than 75 miles from the Pakistan coast at night. All the ships of the Task Group were ordered to switch on their radars and acquire the targets. After the missile boats confirmed that they had acquired the targets, I designated the enemy warship to the northwest to NIRGHAT and the unidentified large ship to the northeast to NIPAT at about 2200 hrs and ordered them to proceed for the attacks. Both the missile boats hauled out of the formation and proceeded at higher speeds towards their respective targets.

"The Pak destroyer PNS KHAIBER was patrolling the southwest approaches to Karachi and only at about 2215 hrs was she able to appreciate that an enemy force was approaching Karachi. She then altered course and increased speed to intercept us, the rate of closing was about 60 knots. At about 2240 hrs when KHAIBER was within range, NIRGHAT fired her first missile. KHAIBER opened fire with her close range anti-aircraft guns but did not succeed in preventing the missile from hitting her. Her boiler room was hit and her speed came down to eight knots.

"I ordered a second missile to be fired at her and after the second hit, her speed came down to zero and dense smoke started rising from the ship. She sank after about 45 minutes, approximately 35 miles south-southwest of Karachi. She had mistaken this to be an air attack and reported accordingly to Maritime Operations Room (MOR) Karachi, which perhaps resulted in the anti-aircraft guns in Karachi opening fire for a few minutes. The trajectories of these tracer shells were seen by us from seaward. KHAIBER's VHF transmission to Karachi in plain language was picked up by our shore wireless stations due to anomalous propagation.

"The other large unidentified ship to the northeast was completely darkened and was proceeding at 16 knots. At about 2300 hrs, NIPAT was able to get her within range and fired the first missile which scored a hit. A second missile was fired soon after and when this hit the ship, I saw a huge flash going up to about twice the height of the ship. My inference at that time was that ammunition had exploded on board. The ship was seen on radar to have broken into two and she sank in less than eight minutes, about 26 miles south of Karachi. After the war, it was reliably learnt from merchant shipping circles and from Pakistan Navy officers who went over to Bangladesh, as well as from Military Attaches of foreign embassies in Pakistan that this ship had been carrying a near full load of US ammunition from Saigon, for the Pak Army and the Pak Air Force. Lloyds Register of Shipping, London, gave the name of the ship as MV VENUS CHALLENGER, a ship chartered by Pakistan, which had sailed from Saigon, called at Singapore en route and was due to arrive at Karachi at 0130 hrs, on 5 December 1971. In addition to the ship's crew, the ship was reported to have had on board a small number of Pakistan naval officers and sailors for communication and ordnance duties.

"The Pak warship which I had detected at 1810 hrs on 4 December 1971, had obviously come down to rendezvous MV VENUS CHALLENGER and after satisfying herself that all was safe, she headed northwest at high speed towards Cape Monze.

"During their attacks, the missile boats NIRGHAT and NIPAT had moved ahead of the force by four to five miles. On completion of the attacks, they rejoined the force, which took them just about five minutes, as the rate of closing during the rejoining maneuver was 60 knots. This is the correct doctrine to be followed to prevent being fired at by ships of the own force.

"PNS SHAHJAHAN, a destroyer, was now ordered by MOR, Karachi, to proceed to the assistance of KHAIBER. But she regretted her inability to do so, due to engine problems. Then PNS MUHAFIZ, an ocean going mine sweeper was detailed and she was approaching my Task Group from right ahead. I designated this target to missile boat VEER. The speed of advance of the Task Group was 28 knots and VEER was not able to do more than 29 knots at this time due to a minor engine problem. Since PNS MUHAFIZ had come well within the missile range, I ordered VEER to fire the missile at the Pak warship from inside the formation. VEER was just abaft my port beam when she fired the missile at about 2320 hrs. PNS MUHAFIZ was set on fire by this missile hit and was seen burning fiercely for over 70 minutes, and finally sank in that position, about 19 miles to the south of Karachi.

"At about 2325 hrs, NIRGHAT reported sighting a reconnaissance aircraft on top of her. No contact was seen in my warning radar nor were my visual lookouts able to spot any aircraft. I informed this to the Task Group and asked NIRGHAT whether he was still in visual contact with the reconnaissance aircraft and he replied in the affirmative. I then ordered the Task Group to assume first degree of anti-aircraft readiness. We had already been briefed about the lack of capability of Pak Sabre jets to carry out night attacks by radar as well as considerable decrease in accuracy in attacks at night by visual aim. This was one of the calculated risks that we were required to take in the achievement of our aim and this risk was warranted. Moreover, KILTAN and KATCHALL had excellent anti-aircraft capability with their fully automatic 76.2 mm guns. I was now required, as per the Operations Orders, to navigate the Group to a predetermined position which was a further nine to ten miles ahead. Immediately on arrival at this position, I was to order the missile boats to fire on shore targets.

"The reported presence of a reconnaissance aircraft in the area caused undue concern in the mind of the Missile Boat Commander and the manifestation of this were two serious violations of the Operations Orders. One was that he fired a missile without orders at about 2330 hrs, towards the shore from a wrong position and in a wrong direction. I saw this missile travel to the westward of Karachi and hit the sea. When asked on VHF the reasons for firing this missile, there was no answer. Just then my navigating officer, requested me to come over to the display of the navigation radar in connection with the navigation to the predetermined position.

"It was reported to me that all the other ships of the group had disappeared from the radar display.

"I altered the range scale of the navigation radar from 24 miles to 12 miles scale and noticed four small echoes about seven miles to the south of my ship. After repeated calls on VHF for about five minutes, the Missile Boat Commander replied that he was heading for the withdrawal point and at that moment, they were 12 miles to the south of KILTAN. The rate of opening between KILTAN and the other four ships was 60 knots i.e. a mile a minute. KATCHALL had also joined the missile boats in the ignominious retreat. KILTAN had not kept watch on VHF on the missile boat net as any spare capacity in communications was required to search and intercept enemy transmissions. This unauthorised withdrawal was the second and more serious violation of the Operations Orders by the Missile Boat Commander. If he was so obsessed by the need to withdraw, the only legitimate course of action open to him was to suggest that to me as the Task Group Commander. He had no authority whatsoever to withdraw on his own.

"Even if the reconnaissance aircraft were present, there was no necessity to flee from the area, as it would not have made much of a difference to the strike aircraft whether the ships were 20 miles or 40 miles from the coast, as the reconnaissance aircraft would be able to home the strike aircraft on to its target. In actual fact, as shown on KILTAN's warning radar display, there was no reconnaissance aircraft airborne at all. Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan states that when the shore authorities in Karachi saw the glow from the burning MUHAFIZ, they sent a patrol boat to investigate. Had there been any reconnaissance aircraft airborne, it would have reported the incidents of dense smoke emanating from KHAIBER and the fiercely burning MUHAFIZ to MOR Karachi.

"After arrival in the predetermined position, KILTAN turned around at about 2355 hrs, 4 December 1971, and I saw the near perfect blackout in Karachi remaining intact.

"The other ships of the group were now about 16 miles to the south of KILTAN. After having performed the difficult task of transporting the missiles to the vicinity of Karachi and having sunk the enemy warships which tried to intercept us, we could have easily fired at least three missiles on shore targets. This excellent opportunity was wasted. At about 0100 hrs on 5 December, I sent the message `Angar' to the C-in-C signifying the completion of Operation Trident.

"Meanwhile, I had ascertained that KATCHALL, NIRGHAT and NIPAT were together but not in contact with VEER. At about 0045 hrs, 5 December 1971, I gained radar contact with VEER at a range of 12 miles to the south of myself and established contact with her. VEER was able to do a speed of only 16 knots and her Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) Withdrawal Point was 0115 hrs. I informed her that I was to her north and my ETA Withdrawal Point was 0200 hrs. I then passed the information about VEER to KATCHALL and the other two missile boats and directed them to proceed as per the withdrawal plan given in the Operations Orders. Due to the panic caused by the hasty withdrawal, VEER mistook KILTAN for an enemy warship and got a missile ready to fire at her. Fortunately, at that time VEER's engines were repaired and she was able to regain her maximum speed. The Commanding Officer of VEER therefore decided not to fire the missile. This was revealed to me by the Commanding Officer of VEER, after my return to Bombay. After she regained her speed, VEER was also directed to proceed as per the withdrawal plan given in the Operations Orders.

"During the withdrawal phase, one gas turbine engine of KILTAN failed at about 0045 hrs. The second gas turbine engine also failed at about 0130 hrs. KILTAN was now running on her main diesel engine and her speed came down to 13 knots. KILTAN finally arrived at Mangrol at about 1800 hrs on 5 December 1971. All the other ships of the Task Group had already arrived there.

"After completion of refuelling when I wanted to sail the Task Group to Bombay, KILTAN's diesel engine failed to start and she became immobile. I therefore detached KATCHALL and the three missile boats to proceed to Bombay, where they arrived on the evening of 6 December 1971. KILTAN stayed overnight at Mangrol and after getting one gas turbine engine operational by the morning of 6 December 1971 arrived in Bombay on the night of 7 December 1971.

"I called on the C-in-C on the afternoon of 8 December 1971 narrated the details of the Operation to him and handed over my report of the Operation. I also brought to his notice the serious violations of the Operations Order committed by K 25, due to which an excellent opportunity for attacking shore targets in Karachi was wasted.

"The Admiral stated that he was pleased that the primary task of sinking enemy warships had been accomplished. Since this was the first major operation undertaken by the Indian Navy since Independence, he would rather condone the lapse of failing to attack shore targets in Karachi; any inquiry would attract adverse publicity to the Navy."

In his book, Admiral Kohli states: (Page 54).

"It is quite obvious that a serious command and control problem engulfed the Trident force and could have led to serious difficulties:

(a) The escorts and boats had not worked together as a Task Group. There was no combined briefing. Understanding of each other by Commanding Officers which is born out of intimate knowledge of each other and their reactions under different conditions of stress was lacking.

(b) The limited Action Information Organisation facilities in the missile boats did not allow an adequate picture to be built up for the Command. This imposes a great burden on control of escorts and missile boats. The facilities for such command and control on Petyas were limited. But also the existing facilities were not used to best advantage.

(c) There were also some communication lapses. Those units who lost touch on VHF did not automatically come up on H/F resulting in loss of communication between ships of the force.

(d) Identification Friend or Foe between different types of ships, and the compatibility of code numbers was not checked prior to commencement of the operation. It was subsequently established that they were different. In my opinion, it was just as well that the attack was broken off by K 25.

(e) Had the command and control by CTG been more close and a plot maintained of friendlies and enemy contacts, it might have been possible to achieve an even greater victory than was achieved."

THE PAKISTAN NAVY'S ACCOUNT

The First Missile Attack

"The Story of the Pakistan Navy" has given a detailed account of the first missile attack on Karachi as seen from their end. (Page 344 et seq).

"On the morning of 4 December, the three ships joined the flotilla and at 0700 KHAIBAR was despatched for the outer patrol. She arrived at the western edge of the patrol area at 1030 and commenced her patrol; the day remained uneventful. After darkness had set in, KHAIBAR intercepted an HF radio transmission at 1905 emanating from a south-easterly direction. This radio transmission could well have originated from the missile force.

"The attacking force was first picked up by the surveillance radar on Manora at 2010, more than two hours before the attack, at the range of 75 miles to the south (bearing 165 degrees) of Karachi and tracked. Detection of the missile force more than an hour before it detected KHAIBAR and MUHAFIZ-which was not until 2130-by our shore radar station was a creditable performance. No better warning could be expected in the circumstances. The radar contact obtained by the shore station was reported to Maritime Headquarters as an unidentified contact approaching Karachi on a northerly course (345 degrees) at speed 20 knots.

"Another radar contact was detected at 2040 by the tracker radar at a range of 101 miles south of Karachi on a northerly course. Long ranges are possible under conditions of anomalous propagation of radio waves prevalent in winter months in this area. These radar detections led to the issue of a signal by NHQ at 2158 to ships at sea warning them of the presence of two groups of surface contacts approaching Karachi from the south. KHAIBAR was ordered to investigate these contacts but she never received the message.

"In KHAIBAR, a bright light was observed approaching from her starboard beam at 2245 when she was on a course of 125 degrees and her speed was 20 knots. Action stations were sounded immediately and the approaching missile thought to be an aircraft was engaged by Bofor guns. The first impression of the Commanding Officer, soon after arrival on the bridge, was that the bright white light was a flare dropped by an aircraft. But observing the speed of approach, he appreciated it to be an aircraft.

"The deadly missile struck KHAIBAR on the starboard side, below the aft galley in the Electricians messdeck at about 2245. The ship immediately lost propulsion and power and was plunged into darkness. A huge flame shot up in Number One Boiler Room and thick black smoke poured out of the funnel. When the fire was observed spreading towards the torpedo tubes, a sailor was sent to train the torpedo tubes and jettison the torpedoes. But the torpedo tubes were jammed in the fore and aft position and could not be moved.

"After the ship was hit, a message was immediately sent by hand of the Yeoman to the Radio Office for transmission to MHQ by means of the emergency transmitter. The voice pipe between the bridge and the Radio Office had been damaged and could not be used to pass the message. The message read: "Enemy aircraft attacked ship in position 020 FF 20. No 1 Boiler hit. Ship stopped". The transmission of this message in total darkness and prevailing chaos, reflects creditably on the part of the staff. It was unfortunate that the position of the ship indicated in the message was incorrect ; this caused considerable hardship to ship's survivors later.

"It was after evaluation of the extensive damage, for the first time appreciated that the ship was hit by a missile. But no attempt was made to amend the previous signal to avoid delaying its transmission.

"A few minutes later, another missile was seen approaching the ship at about 2249 and was engaged by Bofors. The second missile, a few moments after it was sighted, hit No 2 Boiler Room on the starboard side. The ship, which till then had been on an even keel, began to list to port. The ship's boats were shattered by the explosion. At 2300, it was decided to abandon ship when the list to port had become dangerous and the ship had become enveloped in uncontrollable fires. By 2315, it had been abandoned by all those who could leave the ship. More explosions, possibly of bursting of ammunition, continued to rock the ship as men jumped overboard from the sinking ship. The ship went down at about 2320 stern first with a heavy list to port.

"MUHAFIZ had sailed on the evening of 4 December to relieve ZULFIQAR on the inner patrol in compliance with orders from the Task Force Commander. She arrived at her patrol area at 2245, just in time to witness the missile attack on KHAIBAR and to become a victim of the next. The trajectories of the two missiles fired at KHAIBAR were observed on board from MUHAFIZ plunging into the outer patrol area to her south. The wavering white lights, when first observed by the Commanding Officer, were thought to be star shells but later evaluated as aircraft-impressions which were very similar to those of Commanding Officer PNS KHAIBAR. It appears that none of those who saw the missiles that night recognised them as such.

"As MUHAFIZ altered course southward, the glow of light from the burning wreck of KHAIBAR could be seen on the horizon. Action stations were closed up as the ship headed towards the scene of action. She was on course 210 degrees, speed 9 knots, when at 2305, the third white light was observed heading straight for the ship. The fast approaching missile hit MUHAFIZ on the port side abaft the bridge. Upon being hit, the ship (which was of wooden construction) disintegrated instantly and some crew members were thrown into the water. The ship's instantaneous collapse gave no time for the transmission of a distress message. The ship's debris continued to burn for quite sometime while the survivors floated around the burning remains.

"The Indian Navy's first missile attack on 4 December code-named Trident, was apparently planned well in advance and carefully rehearsed. It was based on the assumption that units of the PN Fleet would be on patrol some distance from Karachi at the outbreak of hostilities, and the assumption happened to be correct. The missile attack force consisted of two Petya class frigates, IN Ships TIR and KILTAN, and three Osa class missile boats, IN Ships NIPAT, NIRGHAT and VIR. The Trident force operated directly under the command of Vice Admiral Kohli, FOCINCWEST while the rest of the Western Fleet was placed separately under the command of FOCWEF. After topping up with fuel off Diu, the Trident force headed towards Dwarka keeping close to land in shallow waters to avoid PN submarines. Arriving off Dwarka, 150 miles from Karachi, the missile boats began their final approach on a direct route to Karachi at their maximum speed of 32 knots. A fourth missile boat was left at Dwarka to cover the withdrawal of the attacking force on its return passage.

"INS NIPAT's radar apparently picked up two contacts, presumably KHAIBAR and MUHAFIZ, at 2130 at a range of about 40 miles, when the force was approximately 50 miles south of Karachi. NIPAT fired two missiles at KHAIBAR. INS NIRGHAT engaged MUHAFIZ from a range of about 20 miles. The missiles fired at Karachi harbour at 2330 were also from NIPAT. The oil installations had also been subjected to an aerial attack earlier in the day at 0830 when two oil tanks at Keamari had caught fire. The glow from the fire helped NIPAT as it approached Karachi harbour. Of the missiles fired by the Trident force, two hit KHAIBAR and one hit MUHAFIZ.

"Having launched their attacks, the Indian missile boats turned and headed for the R/V position off the coast of Mangrol where the tanker Poshak was waiting to refuel them. At this time TIPPU SULTAN, which was about 40 miles ahead of the formation picked up three radar contacts at a range of 49 miles. TIPPU SULTAN was on her Karachi bound passage to effect repairs to her main evaporator that had developed some defect the preceding day. FOFPAK on board BABUR on learning of the contacts by TIPPU SULTAN could do no more than take evasive action and move his force further inshore.

"Following their attack, two of the missile boats, VIR and NIPAT, suffered some mechanical failure. VIR was virtually disabled but managed to move at slow speed after effecting emergency repairs at sea. It is estimated that she went nearly 100 miles off her intended track in the process and NIPAT was also forced to reduce speed. By 0130, the latter could not have gone too far from Karachi and advantage could have been taken of the vulnerability of the two boats had the information available at MHQ been more precise.

"The missiles more than once had been mistaken for approaching aircraft. In fact, the attention of the controlling authorities ashore was distracted towards the threat of an aerial attack once too often to the extent that all warnings of a surface attack given by the tracker radar on Manora ware largely ignored or not given due weightage. Tracker radar was a good radar set loaned by SUPARCO to the Navy. Its performance was extremely good. It was installed in PNS Qasim near the entrance of the harbour.

"After the attack INS TIR (actually KATCHALL not TIR) and INS KILTAN, the two supporting Petyas, had been monitoring our signal traffic and were able to pick up MHQ message ordering SHAHJAHAN to assist KHAIBAR. This broadcast in plain language enabled the Indian Navy to announce the sinking of KHAIBAR the very next day. Fortunately, SHAHJAHAN was recalled and thus was saved. The Indian estimates of damage to SHAHJAHAN and sinking of two minesweepers and a merchant ship were exaggerated versions of the result of their missile attack.

"The rescue operation launched to locate and recover survivors of KHAIBAR was a somewhat disjointed and haphazard effort. The incorrect position of KHAIBAR indicated in her last signal also contributed towards the late recovery of survivors. The search effort was, therefore, centered on a position which was more than 20 miles away from the location where the ship had sunk. The location of survivors of MUHAFIZ was by chance.

"The credit for the rescue of survivors of KHAIBAR and MUHAFIZ goes to the gunboat SADAQAT whose single handed efforts saved many lives. It would be recalled that this boat, sent from Saudi Arabia and manned by a PN crew, was operating under the direct control of MHQ and had been employed on miscellaneous tasks. On the night of 4 December, soon after the attack on KHAIBAR, COMATRON in SADAQAT was ordered to proceed and look for KHAIBAR's survivors.

"Soon after leaving harbour at about midnight, the Commanding Officer observed over the horizon a glow of light to the south-west. The light emanated from the burning remains of MUHAFIZ, but the fate of MUHAFIZ was not known to anyone at this time. He thought he had succeeded in locating KHAIBAR and steered for what he thought was the burning wreck of KHAIBAR.

"It was upon the recovery of survivors that it was for the first time learnt that MUHAFIZ had been sunk. The information was passed promptly to MHQ, and must have come as a shock for those who were busy organising the search for KHAIBAR and attempting to untangle the confused picture in the Headquarters. After an unsuccessful attempt to locate KHAIBAR's survivors, the ship returned to harbour early on the morning of 5 December.

"ZULFIQAR joined the search effort at 0830 on 5 December, when she was on her way to join the Task Force having completed the inner patrol. At this time the Commanding Officer, having missed the original message, for the first time learnt the ship was required to conduct a search, but the message received merely stated that SHAHJAHAN was to join the Task Force while MADADGAR and ZULFIQAR were to continue the search. The Commanding Officer, not knowing the position or the purpose of search, joined MADADGAR which was seen emerging from the south of Churna Island at this time. Thus until the afternoon of 5 December, MADADGAR and ZULFIQAR had made no headway in the search for KHAIBAR's survivors.

"COMATRON was again ordered to proceed out at 1000 to make a second attempt to locate KHAIBAR and her survivors. A fresh search centre was chosen by COMATRON and the search bore fruit when one of KHAIBAR's life rafts with survivors on it was sighted at 1555. By 1745 on the evening of 5 December, the survivors were recovered. When it became dark, the ship set course for harbour and on the way back picked up 4 more survivors.

"In the meantime, a concerted search effort was mounted at 1425 when MHQ ordered COMKAR to `conduct a thorough search for survivors of KHAIBAR'. A search force under the tactical command of COMMINRON in MUNSIF was despatch to the area. MADADGAR and ZULFIQAR joined MUNSIF for this search effort. An expanding square search based on a new search datum was commenced by the search force on arrival in the area towards the evening. This attempt was abandoned at 1913, when the search force was ordered to withdraw towards the coast, as a reaction to a false alarm of a missile attack. By this time the search had, in any case, become redundant as KHAIBAR's survivors had been picked up by the gunboat SADAQAT a few hours earlier.

"With the primacy of the missile threat recognised, a reappraisal of defence measures against this threat was done. It was obvious that the missile boats must be tackled at their base or during transit before they could launch their missiles. It was equally clear that this task could not be accomplished without the support of the PAF. The Navy had initially found it difficult to get firm commitments from the Air Force due to their involvement in Army operations. Once convinced of the necessity, after the missile attack on 4 December, the PAF responded by carrying out bombing raids over Okha harbour-the forward base of missile boats. In one such attack, the fuelling facilities for missile boats at Okha were destroyed. The strikes would have been more effective had not the Indians, anticipating our reaction, dispersed the missile boats to less prominent locations along their coast.

"In the early hours of 6 December, a false alarm of a missile attack was raised by the circulation of a number of reports indicating the presence of missile boats in the area west of Cape Monze. MHQ asked the PAF to carry out an air strike on a ship which had been identified as a missile boat by Naval observers flown on a Fokker Friendship aircraft for this specific task. ZULFIQAR was informed by MHQ that a PAF sortie was on its way to attack a missile boat in the area. Shortly afterwards, at 0640, an aircraft appeared and strafed ZULFIQAR. The attack was broken off only when the ship's frantic efforts to get herself identified as a friendly unit succeeded. There was a loss of lives and some were injured. The ship sustained minor damage on the upper deck and returned to harbour to effect repairs and land casualties."

In RETROSPECT

Viewed in retrospect, it is doubtful whether the first missile attack on Karachi could have achieved any more than it did because:

(a) The planning for such operations will always be highly classified, Earmarking forces beforehand and working them up for their tasks is likely to breach security. It is also not practical. Unforeseeable defects cause earmarked forces to fall out at the last minute, as happened in the subsequent attacks on Karachi when TALWAR on 6 December and KADMATT on 8 December fell out.

(b) The dispersal of friendly forces was unavoidable. When NIRGHAT found that KHAIBAR was approaching her at high speed, NIRGHAT had to reverse course to gain time to complete pre launch missile checks. In so doing she dropped miles astern of the other ships who were racing towards Karachi at high speed. NIRGHAT could never have caught up and arrived at the predetermined point during the time available.

Imponderables like these are unavoidable in naval operations. Overcoming them will depend on the reactions of the man on the spot.

As to who set the oil tanks on fire on 4 December, "The Story of the Pakistan Navy" clearly states that it was the Indian Air Force.

In its account of the first missile attack on 4 December, it states: (Page 347).

"The oil installations had also been subjected to an aerial attack earlier in the day at 0830, when two oil tanks at Keamari had caught fire."

In its account of the second missile attack on 8 December, it states: (Page 352).

"The first missile flew over the ships at the anchorage, crossed Manora Island and crashed into an oil tank at the Keamari oil farm. There was a huge explosion and flames shot up so high that Qamar House-a multi-story building in the city- was clearly visible. The fire caused by the air attack on 4 December had been put out only a day earlier after three days of concerted efforts. Fires once again raged in the oil farm after a short lived respite of a day. A distressing sight no doubt for everyone, but particularly for those who had risked their lives in a tenacious battle against the oil farm fires earlier."

WESTERN FLEET OPERATIONS AND THE SECOND MISSILE ATTACK ON KARACHI

In his book Admiral Kohli states: (Pages 58 et seq).

"The Western Fleet sailed on 2 December 1971 to operate in their assigned exercise area. For the Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet (FOCWEF) to have complete freedom of movement to carry out the directive given to him and with the possibility that a task force from Bombay may be employed on a special operation, a line was indicated which the Fleet and the Special Task Force would not cross, to prevent interference with each other.

"Two missile boats had been allotted to the Fleet which were to be in tow by ships of the Fleet. These boats would be released to carry out their attacks either on enemy surface units at sea or on ships in or near the harbour of Karachi, the main port of Pakistan. Any missiles left over after the destruction of enemy units were to be directed to the neutralization of shore targets.

"The material state of our ships, including the flagship MYSORE was a source of some worry to us all. Within 72 hours of sailing on 2 December, KUTHAR had a major blow-up in the engine room and some personnel were injured. She had to be taken in tow by KIRPAN to return to Bombay escorted by KHUKRI. VIJETA, a missile boat with the Fleet, also suffered a breakdown on the day after sailing from Bombay and had to be towed back by SAGARDEEP. Throughout the period the Fleet was at sea, there were machinery breakdowns which reduced the speed of the Fleet. Fortunately, the ships engine room crews rose magnificently to each occasion and repairs were expeditiously completed. It can well be imagined that the material state of ships of the Fleet was uppermost in the mind of FOCWEF and he had to take this important factor into account when embarking upon an operation.

"There is no doubt that Pakistani submarines were lurking in the North Arabian Sea. During the first few days, a number of ships of our Fleet picked up sonar contacts. They prosecuted these contacts, but were unable to collect any evidence of actual damage to a submarine, though in at least two instances, the attacking ships felt very strongly that they were hunting a confirmed submarine.

"On the afternoon of 3 December, the Fleet observed reconnaissance aircraft circling around it, taking good care to remain out of gun range. Whilst the ships were tracking the aircraft, the Fleet received the signal that hostilities with Pakistan had commenced.

"It was evident that the submarine contacts which had been prosecuted the previous night and the snooper aircraft reports would give the enemy a reasonably accurate position of the Fleet. FOCWEF decided to split the force into two divergent groups under cover of darkness to shake off the snooper. This was successfully achieved by midnight. As it happened, this split had taken the Fleet so far south that the first simultaneous attack on Karachi and the Makran ports had to be postponed.

"On 5 December, the Fleet regrouped, refuelled and replenished. On the night of 5/6 December, FOCWEF detached two groups of ships - one group to attack Karachi and the other group to attack the Makran ports. Due to a last minute defect TALWAR had to drop out of the Karachi strike group.

"On the afternoon of 6 December, quite inexplicably and for reasons not known to us in Bombay at that time, Naval Headquarters (NHQ) decided to assume control of operations. NHQ made a signal at about 1600 hours cancelling the attack on Karachi scheduled for the night of 6/7 December. Later the Fleet was ordered to rendezvous (R/V) TIR off Saurashtra to pick up a second missile boat VIDYUT. The various groups of Fleet ships which were well on their way to their targets had to continue to steam at high speed to make this distant R/V in time. Meanwhile TIR repeatedly broke wireless silence to report her position and Pakistani aircraft. She could well have become the target of shore based Pakistani fighter bombers."

REASONS FOR CANCELLATION OF THE ATTACK OF NIGHT 6/7 DECEMBER

Even after Admiral Kohli's book was published in 1989, nobody was able to clarify who in NHQ authorised the cancellation of this attack. The only clarification available was that it was felt necessary that the Fleet should have an extra missile boat for the attack. Recently it has been possible to clarify this grey area.

After the first missile attack on night 4/5 December, the Pakistan Navy intensified its aerial surveillance of the approaches to Karachi. "The Story of the Pakistan Navy" states: (Page 349).

"After the first missile attack, a mixed bag of a dozen civilian aircraft were lined up at Karachi civil airport where a Fleet Air Arm was set up immediately, manned by civilian volunteer crews from PIA and the Flying Club. There was no problem in operating 3 or 4 light aircraft during the day, in their respective sectors on an arc 200 miles from Karachi, covering the entire area from Jamnagar to the Makran Coast. At night, two radar fitted aircraft at a time covered the same arc. Thus from the afternoon of 5 December, it was difficult for a missile boat to approach within 200 miles of Karachi undetected."

On the morning of 6 December, NHQ had intercepted the Pakistan Navy's signals of the Pakistan Air Force strafing one of its own warships, the Pakistani frigate ZULFIQAR. This caused considerable concern in the mind of the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Nanda. He assessed that it would not be prudent to expose the Karachi group to such a high probability of attack by an alert enemy. Karachi had already been attacked on night 4/5 December and could again be attacked later. He therefore cancelled the attack which the Fleet had already launched on Karachi and the Makran ports.

The situation on the 7th morning was that the various groups of Fleet ships had assembled at the R/V. But TIR and VIDYUT had not reached the R/V. Had the enemy been D/fing the signals made by TIR during the night and had the Pakistan Air Force launched an air strike to attack the TIR group, there was a possibility that this strike might by chance find the Fleet and attack it instead of TIR. Indeed, after intercepting a Pakistani transmission, FOCINCWEST signalled TIR to "prepare to repel air attack" and the Indian Air Force swiftly sent aircraft to protect the TIR group from air attack. At this stage, the missile boat VIDYUT, which TIR was towing to hand over to the Fleet, started reporting defects which required her to return to Bombay. In Admiral Kohli's words "Things had not gone too well and NHQ reinstated control of maritime operations on the western seaboard to FOCINCWEST." (Page 60).

These events confirmed FOCWEF's assessment that after the first missile attack on night 4/5 December, the Pakistan Navy was keeping the approaches to Karachi from Saurashtra under close surveillance so as to detect the approach of our missile boats. He therefore decided to launch the second missile attack from west-southwest and altered the Fleet's course westward. On the 7th, FOCWEF had to break wireless silence more than once in an exchange of signals with FOCINCWEST regarding the second missile attack.

Admiral Kohli's book states: (Page 60).

"FOCINCWEST ordered FOCWEF to execute Operation Python- the attack on Karachi - during the night 7/8 December if feasible. The forces to be used were left to the discretion of FOCWEF. In another message, the C-in-C directed FOCWEF to press home the attack as the enemy forces were in disarray. FOCWEF reported inability due to weather conditions. The weather improved on 8 December and the Fleet planned the next attack on Karachi on the night of 8/9 December."

On 8 December, FOCWEF split his force into three groups:

(a) The fast frigates of the 15th Frigate Squadron, TRISHUL and TALWAR to escort missile boat VINASH for the second missile attack on Karachi.

(b) The cruiser MYSORE accompanied by BETWA and RANJIT to raid Makran.

(C) The tanker DEEPAK, accompanied by KADMATT to continue contraband control. KADMATT had dropped out of the Karachi strike group due to a last minute defect.

THE SECOND MISSILE ATTACK ON KARACHI

FOCWEF's primary concern now was to distract the Pakistan Navy's attention towards the MYSORE group so as to reduce the probability of the Karachi group being detected during approach and withdrawal.

TRISHUL, TALWAR and VINASH set course for Karachi at high speed. En route, electronic emissions were detected on a Pakistan Naval frequency which was being monitored. It was appreciated that a vessel was reporting the presence of the group to Karachi. The vessel was soon sighted. TALWAR was told to sink the vessel which she did and rejoined.

During the approach to Karachi, TRISHUL's electronic surveillance reported that the radar at Karachi had stopped rotating and was pointed directly at the group, a sure sign that the group had been detected. At 2300, the group arrived off Karachi and on radar detected a group of ships. FOCWEF had already told the CO of TRISHUL that VINASH should fire all four missiles. VINASH proceeded to do so:

- The first missile homed on to the oil tanks at Keamari and started a huge fire.

- The second and third missiles homed on to merchant ships. It was subsequently learnt that the British vessel HARMATTON had been damaged and the Panamanian vessel GULF STAR had sunk.

- The fourth missile homed on to the Pakistan Navy's tanker DACCA which had been camouflaged and anchored amidst the merchant ships because, laden with oil, she could not seek safety inside Karachi port as the other Pakistan Naval ships had done.

It had been pre-arranged that the Indian Air Force would attack Karachi's airfields at Masroor and Drigh Road at the same time as the second missile attack. It so happened that the TRISHUL group arrived off Karachi and carried out its attack before the prearranged time. The air attack commenced soon thereafter. The anti aircraft guns at Karachi opened fire as the TRISHUL group withdrew unobserved. Post war intelligence indicated that Karachi's guns set fire to a Greek ship ZOE which Lloyds List of 10 December stated as "set ablaze and sunk".

During the withdrawal, VINASH reported defects and had to stop. However before the need arose to take her in tow, VINASH repaired her defect and the group continued its withdrawal at high speed. They R/V'd the Fleet on 9 December.

THE PAKISTAN NAVY'S ACCOUNT OF THE SECOND MISSILE ATTACK

The Second Missile Attack (Page 350 et seq).

"The second missile attack code named `Python' was planned and executed under the direction of Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet from his flagship INS MYSORE. The Western Fleet sailed out of Bombay on 2 December, just one day before the commencement of hostilities and was detected moving north towards Karachi by the submarine HANGOR. Two missile boats had been taken in tow. The fleet maneuvered to take up a position to launch a missile attack.

"The first missile attack having been handled directly by the FOCINCWEST, the Fleet Commander was tasked to launch the second missile attack on the following day. But in a bid to shake off our submarines and reconnaissance aircraft, the Indian Fleet moved so far south that the attack was no longer feasible on schedule. This shows the extent to which Indian plans were foiled by our submarines and meagre reconnaissance effort by a few requisitioned civil aircraft.

"An attack planned for the night of 6 December was also aborted, when Indian Naval Headquarters cancelled it after assuming direct control over fleet operations. Weather conditions, which were unsuitable for missile boat operations, precluded an attack on the night of 7 December. During this period, when the missile attack was postponed several times, the Pakistan fleet was at sea. Deeply conscious of the missile threat, FOFPAK continued to manoeuvre his fleet, mostly in an anti-submarine formation, along the coast.

"After much discussion and debate, the decision to recall the surface ships back to harbour was taken sometime on 7 December and by the afternoon of 8 December, all major surface units except DACCA had entered harbour. DACCA was at Manora anchorage and remained there as its entry into harbour was precluded by its deep draft and tidal conditions in harbour. The men on board watched the ships steam into harbour with a growing feeling of uneasiness.

"DACCA had performed admirably its basic role of keeping the ships topped up with fuel, rations and other stores necessary for the sustenance of the fleet at sea during its operations. She had been out at sea since 10 November carrying out underway replenishment of ships at sea as and when required. When her services were not required, she lay at anchor. Having camouflaged herself as a merchant ship a day earlier, the ship happened to be at Manora anchorage on the fateful night of 8 December.

"This missile attack was carried out by a single missile boat VINASH, supported by two frigates TRISHUL and TALWAR of the 15th Frigate Squadron, under the command of F-15 on board TRISHUL. The Indian Fleet appears to have remained well to the south, while the missile attack unit was detached to sortie out towards Karachi from a southwesterly direction.

"On the way to Karachi, one of the escorting frigates INS TALWAR engaged and sank a ship, which was believed to be a Pakistani patrol craft suspected of having reported the position of the approaching force. Since none of our patrol craft, or for that matter any other warship, was engaged or sunk that night, it can be surmised that the victim of this attack must have been a civilian craft. It appears that the unfortunate vessel was mercilessly pounded with shells from the frigate's guns until she caught fire and sank.

"The missile boat VINASH closed Karachi to a range of 12 miles and fired four missiles in succession at four different ships chosen at random by the Unit Commander from the cluster of about a dozen ships at Manora anchorage. DACCA was unfortunate enough to be one of them.

"The first missile flew over the ships at the anchorage, crossed Manora Island and crashed into an oil tank at the Keamari oil farm. There was a huge explosion and flames shot up so high that Qamar House-a multi-story building in the city- was clearly visible. The fire caused by the air attack on 4 December had been put out only a day earlier after three days of concerted efforts. Fires once again raged in the oil farm after a short lived respite of a day. A distressing sight no doubt for everyone, but particularly for those who had risked their lives in a tenacious battle against the oil farm fires earlier.

"The other three missiles homed on ships at Manora anchorage. The British-owned merchant vessel HARMATTAN, SS GULF STAR flying the Panama flag, and PNS DACCA were hit by a missile each. The HARMATTAN sank immediately, but GULF STAR survived. PNS DACCA's miraculous survival after absorbing a missile hit in an oil tank can be attributed to the courage and vigilance of the Commanding Officer and crew. Timely operation of the steam smothering system by engine room personnel after the missile hit the ship certainly averted a major explosion that could have been fatal for the ship. A first hand account of this missile attack is given from a special report submitted by PNS DACCA.

`At about 2245, a pale light was seen travelling towards Manora, parallel to Manora breakwater and when it was abreast of AA School, it turned right and directly hit the oil tank which immediately burst into flames. A little later, another light was seen travelling from the same direction and hit the ship anchored very close to the breakwater; the ship sank immediately. At that moment action stations was sounded and in no time the ship had manned her guns and was ready to engage the target. In the meantime, a third light was seen travelling towards another ship at the southern corner of the anchorage, she caught fire immediately. A little later, a bright light was seen coming up from behind the horizon gaining height on port bow (ship was lying 280-100 degrees). It appeared stationary for sometime, and then rushed steeply towards the ship. It was engaged by port guns. It hit on the port side piercing No 7 port FFO tank just above the water line. It ripped open the cargo and jungle decks. The motor boat and spare fuel hoses caught fire immediately. Abandon ship was piped immediately. A number of officers and men jumped overboard and only eight officers and 37 CPOs and sailors stayed.'

"The Commanding Officer stayed on board and, with the help of those who had not abandoned ship, brought the fire on the upper deck under control. He has maintained that the hasty and controversial order to abandon ship, cancelled soon afterwards, was given without his approval. His presence of mind in a moment of crisis saved the ship, and deprived the Indian Navy of the satisfaction of having sunk a warship of the Pakistan Navy in the second missile attack. As matters stood, their score was only one defenceless merchant ship sunk and another damaged.

"It is surprising though that while the missile threat was uppermost in everyone's mind, the missiles when first observed on board DACCA, were mistaken for aircraft flying with search lights switched on to locate their targets. The reaction of many others who saw the missiles in the air that night was no different.

"There was an air strike at Karachi by IAF just about the time the Indian Navy launched the missile attack; but there is no positive evidence of damage to the harbour due to the air strike, which was in all probability directed at PAF air bases in Karachi. There were reports of bombs having been dropped in Bihar and Agra Taj colonies near Mauripur. The chance attack by IAF at about the same time as the missile attack had led to a controversy between the IAF and the Indian Navy for claiming credit for the damage to oil tanks at Keamari. In all probability this missile had strayed away from its target and locked on to the strong echo of the oil tank.

"The approaching missile was sighted by lookouts on Manora Island and reported to COMKAR who passed the information on to Air Defence Sector Operation Centre, Korangi. Not a single shot was fired as the missile whizzed past over harbour defenses and plunged into the oil tank. Perceived, by those who saw it, to be an aircraft, it was not engaged because of the gun restrictions in force. It was nearly six minutes after the missile hit the tank that a tremendous barrage of fire was let loose by anti aircraft guns in harbour at 2248, when air raid warning red was promulgated and gun restrictions lifted. No aircraft were actually sighted over the harbour. There were more blasts as other tanks exploded in the spreading fires. Starshells, which looked liked missiles, fired by PNS Himalaya at this time further confused the picture. The harbour reverberated with the sound of guns and blasts as innumerable shells were pumped into the air.

"On the evening of 8 December at about 1800, a radar-fitted Cessna on patrol reported sighting Osa boats just leaving Jamnagar and heading towards Karachi. The C-in-C, PAF was contacted on the direct telephone and asked to strike the Osas from the air. The C-in-C PN also had a word with him to emphasis the urgency. The Air Marshal regretted his inability as according to him "No air effort was available".

"The circumstances surrounding the sudden disappearance of the merchant vessel VENUS CHALLENGER from the high seas have remained somewhat of a mystery. It is certain though that the ship was sunk in one of the two missile attacks at Karachi. The ship, loaded with a cargo of rice, had sailed for East Pakistan from the United States on 10 September. Arriving off Chittagong in late November, she was diverted to Karachi where she was expected in the first week of December. Thereafter, the ship could not be traced until the identification of her wreck by a team of naval divers 26 miles to the south of Karachi a few days after the war.

"If the objective of the attack, as claimed by the Indian Navy, was to destroy the Pakistan Navy, not much contribution was made by the second missile attack towards that goal. True, PNS DACCA was damaged by a chance hit, but she was repaired in less than a month and continues to serve the Navy till today. On the other hand, if the objective was to scare away merchant ships, the unscrupulous method adopted for this purpose is without precedence.

"The provisions of international law and conventions that forbid attack on merchant ships without warning were blatantly violated. No effort at maintaining even a semblance of legal propriety was made by declaration of a blockade or a war zone before embarking on a callous slaughter of merchantmen and their crew by those who claim to have taken up arms to champion the cause of the oppressed. For it was well known to the Indians that missiles hurled blindly at ships at Manora anchorage were bound to take a toll of neutral merchant ships.

"MUNSIF which was anchored in the vicinity of DACCA at Manora anchorage proceeded to assist DACCA and picked up some of her survivors. Other personnel of DACCA and those of merchant ships were recovered by auxiliary craft promptly despatched to the scene by COMKAR. MADADGAR was sent to assist DACCA but by the time she arrived there past midnight, the fire had been put out and the situation was under control. By the evening of 9 December, DACCA's power had been restored and she moved to a position close inshore off Buleji Point, anchored and remained there until she was towed back to harbour on 19 December.

"There followed in the wake of the second missile attack yet another controversial decision: orders were issued at 1400 on 9 December to ships at Karachi to reduce their ammunition outfit.

"After the return of the ships to harbour on 8 December, their vulnerability in the port remained a topic of continuing debate. In the early hours of 9 December, only a few hours after the missile attack, dockyard workshops and buildings were severely damaged in a low level attack - facilitated, no doubt, by the light emitted by the huge flames of the fire at the oil farm - by an IAF bomber. Under these circumstances anxiety about the catastrophic consequences of an explosion in a ship fully loaded with ammunition was only natural.

"The decision to reduce the ammunition outfit, not withstanding the logic behind it, continues to be questioned by many. The adverse effect on morale of men, who were inclined to see it as a step to limit the surface ships operational role, was immediate. Not accepted by most as a necessary rational step, the decision remained a controversial issue.

"It was perhaps in consideration of the morale factor and to avoid the impression that the fleet was immobilised that a strategy of high speed probes was introduced. This required random sorties of short duration to be carried out at high speed by designated ships. Destroyers and frigates were employed in this manner until the end of the war."

THE MYSORE GROUP'S RAID ON THE MAKRAN COAST

At the same time that the TRISHUL group had been detached to attack Karachi, FOCWEF had detached the MYSORE group to bombard Jiwani. On the evening of 8 December, 75 miles south of Jiwani, the MYSORE group, encountered a merchant ship who, on seeing the MYSORE group reversed course towards Karachi and was heard calling Karachi on a frequency being monitored. The ship was signalled to stop but she did not comply. MYSORE fired a broadside ahead of her and she stopped. RANJIT was sent to investigate and reported that it was the Pakistani merchant ship MADHUMATI registered in Karachi who had over - painted her name to read ADAMANT to masquerade as a neutral ship registered in Manila. The ship was boarded and apprehended.

FOCWEF assessed that the MADHUMATI's call to Karachi would have distracted attention from the TRISHUL group headed for Karachi. This was confirmed when, soon after sunset, BETWA reported a slow moving aircraft circling with lights on but staying out of gun range. FOCWEF told CO MYSORE that there was no need to bombard Jiwani. The MYSORE group withdrew with MADHUMATI and headed for the R/V where all groups were to rejoin on 9 December.

All groups rejoined on the 9th evening and were replenished. By the 10th morning, the Fleet had been steaming at high speed for 8 days and cumulative defects were beginning to reduce the speeds that ships could sustain. FOCWEF decided that the Fleet should return to Bombay, effect repairs, pick up two missile boats and return to the operational area.

To outflank the enemy submarines deployed off Bombay, FOCWEF maintained absolute wireless silence, made landfall well south of Bombay and proceeded up the coast inside the 10 fathom line, through waters too shallow for submarines to operate. The ruse succeeded and the Fleet arrived safely at Bombay on 13 December. By the time the ships were ready to sail again, the Pakistan Army in the East had surrendered on 16 December and West Pakistan had accepted India's unilateral offer of ceasefire on 17 December.

AFTER THE WAR

After the war there were differing views about the raid on the Makran Coast. One view, held by high quarters in NHQ, was that FOCWEF should have let the MYSORE group bombard Jiwani so as to give ships companies a feeling of having played a part in the war and the satisfaction of having fired their guns in anger.

Another view has been stated by Admiral Kohli himself in his book:

"The Pakistani naval raid at Dwarka in 1965 left the officers and men of the Indian Navy infuriated and somewhat humiliated. I was then the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff and I vowed to myself that if ever there was another round involving naval forces and I was in any kind of a position of responsibility, I would go to the farthest extremes to teach the enemy a lesson and to avenge this dastardly act.

By not bombarding Gwadar and Makran, the Fleet robbed itself of the glory and the kudos which would justifiably have been theirs, and denied me the satisfaction of avenging the bombardment of Dwarka in 1965 by the Pakistan Task Force."

As regards the first view, Makran would have been bombarded if NHQ had not cancelled the attack on 6 December because of apprehensions that the Karachi group would be exposed to too high a risk of air attack.

As regards the second view, FOCWEF had no enthusiasm whatsoever for bombarding worthless targets on the Makran Coast. Even at the planning stage, the sole purpose of such bombardments was "to repeatedly provoke the Pakistan Flotilla to come out and fight." After the success of the first missile attack, the purpose of bombardment changed "to enhance the success of the second missile attack by distracting attention towards the bombarding group." In FOCWEF's view, the capture of the MADHUMATI close off the Makran coast, soon after MADHUMATI transmitted her message to Karachi, achieved this purpose. Had there been no MADHUMATI, the MYSORE group would have bombarded Jiwani to divert attention from the Karachi group but not to avenge Dwarka or to give ships companies the satisfaction of firing guns in anger.

The second missile attack had unexpected results. As is evident from the Pakistan Navy's account, the hit on one oil tank set several adjacent oil tanks on fire. The ships of the Pakistan Flotilla who had withdrawn into harbour the previous day were told to reduce their outfits of ammunition so as to minimize explosion damage in case of being hit. Most significant of all, the neutral merchant ships who had witnessed the two missile attacks started seeking assurance of safe passage from the Government of India before sailing out of Karachi. Since no neutral shipping was heading for Karachi either, the Western Fleet, despite its limited resources, had achieved a de facto blockade without it having been declared. With the Pakistani Flotilla in harbour, the Western Fleet controlled the approaches to West Pakistan from 9 December onwards.

SINKING OF THE KHUKRI

In his comparative assessment of Naval Forces, FOCINCWEST had accepted that the Pakistan Navy's latest Daphne class submarines were far superior to not only our submarines but also our surface ships. Accordingly all naval ships coming to or departing from Bombay hugged the shallow waters of the coast north and south of Bombay and altered landwards/seawards at random so that enemy submarines could never predict where to wait for targets.

Immediately after Pakistan attacked on 3 December, systematic attempts were commenced to interfere with the Pakistan Navy's shore to submarine broadcast. This yielded a series of D/F positions of Pakistani submarines transmitting messages to Karachi. Progressively these D/F positions helped to confirm that one submarine was moving northwards from off Bombay towards Diu. Since Diu was the assembly area for ships to be deployed for missile attacks on Karachi, this submarine threat started causing concern. However all the anti submarine frigates were away with the Western Fleet and no ships were immediately available to deal with this submarine.

The 14th Frigate Squadron KHUKRI, KUTHAR and KIRPAN had sailed with the Western Fleet on 2 December. KUTHAR suffered a boiler explosion on PM 4 December. FOCWEF detached KIRPAN to tow KUTHAR back to Bombay escorted by Captain F 14 in KHUKRI. Enroute to Bombay, at midday on 5 Dec, KHUKRI carried out an attack on a submarine, recorded the entire attack and explosions on tape and signalled that she considered the submarine destroyed. The 14 FS arrived Bombay on AM 6 December and KUTHAR was taken in hand for repairs.

FOCINCWEST decided to deploy the 14 FS along with the Navy's latest Seaking anti submarine helicopters operating from Bombay to eliminate the submarine threat off Diu. The Seaking helicopters were to operate in the southern sector of the search area closer to Bombay and thereby have longer time on task. The frigates were to operate in the northern sector of the search area, closer to Diu Head.

THE HUNTER KILLER OPERATION

In his book, Admiral Kohli states:

"Where the Pakistan Navy scored over the Indian Navy was in their submarine arm. The French Daphne class submarines were the most modern conventional submarines, with sensors and armament far superior to not only our submarine but also our anti submarine frigates. This is how the KHUKRI was detected by a Daphne much before the frigate became aware of the submarine's presence." (Page 33).

"It was appreciated that the Pakistan Navy would have deployed at least two Daphne class submarines to cover focal points on the likely sea lanes used by Indian ships for passage to and from Bombay port or any attacking force transiting between Bombay and Karachi. While the destruction of hostile ships would have been the primary mission of enemy submarines operating off the West Coast of India, they would also provide early warning of Indian warship movements. (Page 75).

"As expected there were sonar contacts and reports of occasional sightings of periscopes by Indian ships and maritime reconnaissance aircraft. There were subsequently confirmed sighting reports of an enemy submarine in the area west of Diu Head. D/F bearings obtained of a submarine which had transmitted a wireless message to Karachi also confirmed the position. This submarine was a potential threat to our shipping and it was decided by the Western Naval Command to eliminate this threat. The 14th anti submarine squadron comprising KHUKRI (F14), KIRPAN and KUTHAR was the only force available for the task, together with some Seakings." (Page 75).

"Urgent operational orders for a hunt were prepared in consultation with Captain MN Mulla, Senior Officer of the Squadron, requiring the squadron to sail on 8 December for the last known position of the submarine. KUTHAR's problems were too serious to permit early readiness of the ship for sea. After considering the gravity of the situation and in consultation with F 14, who accepted decreased A/S capability of the two ships, KHUKRI and KIRPAN were sailed for the hunt."(Page 75).

SINKING OF THE KHUKRI

"The Story of the Pakistan Navy" has recounted the events as seen from the submarine HANGOR which sank the KHUKRI.

HANGOR had sailed from Karachi on 22 November for a patrol off the Saurashtra coast. On 1 December, she was ordered to shift to the area off Bombay to relieve her sister submarine MANGRO who was completing her patrol.

On 2 December, HANGOR sighted the Western Fleet which was on its way to its patrol area. HANGOR reported this to Karachi and continued her patrol off Bombay. She was unable to find good warship targets. Thereafter "The Story of the Pakistan Navy" states: (Page 357 et seq).

"In an effort to locate the evasive enemy, HANGOR extended her patrol northwards to investigate some radio transmissions that she had intercepted on her sensors. In the early hours of the morning of 9 December, when she was off the Kathiawar coast, two contacts were picked up on her

passive sonar on a north-easterly bearing. They were easily identified as warships by their sonar transmissions; radar indicated a range of 6 to 8 miles. A pursuit of the enemy began.

"When the first attempt to intercept the ships failed, the submarine began snorkelling to gain speed. HANGOR, however, failed to attract the attention of the ships and contact was lost as the range increased. By the evening of 9 December, she was able to make out the pattern of their movement by tracking them with the aid of her sensors. The ships were carrying out a rectangular anti-submarine search.

"Forecasting their movement along this search pattern, the submarine succeeded by 1900 in taking up a tactically advantageous position on the path of the patrolling frigates. The range of the ships, which were moving at a speed of 12 knots, began to close. The crucial moment which the submarine had patiently worked for since the early hours of the morning had arrived. HANGOR was finally in a position to launch an attack.

"At 1915, she went to action stations. Fifteen minutes later, she came up to periscope depth, but could see nothing in the dark night when the range of the ships indicated by her periscope radar was only 9800 meters. The ships were completely darkened. The Commanding Officer decided to go down to 55 metres depth and make a sonar approach for the final phase of the attack. Unaware of the submarine's presence, the frigates continued on their track. At 1957, HANGOR fired a down-the-throat shot with a homing torpedo at the northerly ship from a depth of 40 metres. The torpedo was tracked but no explosion was heard. This was not the time to brood over the situation. The control team sprang into action and fired a second torpedo. After five tense minutes, a tremendous explosion was heard at 2019 hours. The torpedo had found its mark. The other enemy frigate came straight for the submarine. HANGOR fired a third torpedo and turned away at maximum speed. A distant explosion was heard subsequently.

"Moving west towards deeper waters, where she would be less vulnerable, the submarine passed very close to the scene of action and heard distinctly the noise of explosions emanating from the burning wreck. Later she came up to periscope depth and took a last look. In the dark, nothing could be seen except a faint glow on the horizon near the scene of action.

"In an extremely vulnerable position in enemy controlled shallow waters where no help could reach her, the task that lay ahead of HANGOR was to evade her pursuers in the hunt that followed-the first signs of which came when a number of underwater explosions were heard just about half an hour after the attack. For the next four days, HANGOR braved the might of the Western Fleet. All their anti-submarine assets-frigates, Seaking helicopters and Alize aircraft- were thrown into the chase that followed. A hunter killer (anti-submarine) operation fully supported by IAF reconnaissance aircraft based ashore in the area, was put into effect.

"The first priority of HANGOR after the attack was to get into deeper waters and put as much distance between her and the position from which the torpedoes were fired, the datum (reference point) for the search by enemy units. Having successfully done that, she began her journey back home. For four days and nights, she was harassed by the enemy. The dimensions of the enemy anti-submarine effort can be gauged from the fact that about 150 underwater projectiles were fired in this period. Only on one occasion were the explosions close enough to shake the submarine.

"The Commanding Officer was naturally keen to pass the information of this successful attack to Naval Headquarters. The submarine had to come up as it cannot transmit radio messages while submerged. She took the risk of being fixed by enemy direction finding stations ashore while transmitting the message. Enemy aircraft were overhead soon after the message was sent. Intense air activity throughout the day forced the submarine to run silent and run deep, reducing her speed of advance to 1.5 knots.

"There were, of course, many close calls during the passage back to Karachi. The Indian Navy called off the futile hunt on the evening of 13 December. There were claims by some of their units to have sunk the submarine, but she arrived unharmed at Karachi on 18 December.

"In this spectacular action which took place about 30 miles south of Diu off the Indian Kathiawar coast, KHUKRI, the ship of the Squadron Commander of the 14th Frigate Squadron, was sunk within two minutes after receiving a hit in the magazine where explosives were stowed. 18 officers and 176 sailors including the Commanding Officer, who deliberately stayed back on the sinking ship, lost their lives. This came as a shattering blow to the Indian Navy, deflating in one stroke the exuberance generated by highly exaggerated success stories of the missile attacks at ships off Karachi."

The Pakistan Naval Historical Review of March 1979 contained an article by a French naval officer, Cdr Courau. It states:

"At the beginning on the afternoon of the 8th, there had been only two radar echoes, detected twice in the same formation at an interval of one hour; this was enough to class them as warships on a south-easterly course. The hunt began.

"Since the sighting, the enemy had continued to change course, which gave the hunter some problems. On the evening of the 8th the enemy was on a north-westerly course, then on the morning of the 9th, they changed to a north-easterly course, then to a south-easterly course about noon.

"HANGOR now realised that the enemy ships had been on a course that described a rectangle. Then at 1900 the ships set a course to the north west. At 1915 the CO estimated their mean course and dived to attack. He altered course on the frigate on the western side (KIRPAN) at very slow speed in order to present the smallest silhouette to the enemy's sonar. He decided not to hurry the moment of firing, but to wait for the moment the enemy would be on target judged to be at 2000.

"At 2013, a sharp order broke the silence - "Fire". Everyone was tense. The torpedo left the tube and was heard moving towards the target, but then they heard it passing under without exploding.

"There was no time to criticise this failure. The frigate on the eastern side (KHUKRI) passed in her turn at a range of about 5000 meres. There was just time to set the range and at 2017 a second torpedo was fired. A loud explosion was heard.

"KIRPAN returned to pick up survivors and her course brought her in line with the submarine which promptly fired a third torpedo but the frigate was prepared for the attack and left at high speed. After 8 or 10 minutes a very clear explosion was heard followed by the stopping of the KIRPAN's machinery. HANGOR considered that he had hit the frigate, but he decided to abandon the attack and made for deep water. KIRPAN had a badly damaged stern and was unable to steam, she was finally towed into Bombay.

"There followed three days of depth charge attacks by Shackeltons, Alizes and escorts. The submarine suffered 156 depth charges, most of which were a long way off. Every time the submarine used the schnorkel, it was spotted by aircraft, but the escorts led to the position by the aircraft never made contact. Finally the HANGOR managed to escape and carry on her mission."

In 1997, the Public Relations Directorate of Pakistan Naval Headquarters published "Sentinels of the Sea - The Pakistan Navy 1947-1997". It contains an article by Rear Admiral RA Qadri, who was the Electrical Officer of HANGOR. The following excerpts describe the attack on KHUKRI as seen from HANGOR.

"After having obtained a perfect (fire control) solution, HANGOR commenced the attack at 1957 by firing one homing torpedo, "down the throat" at the more northerly target, which was INS KIRPAN. The torpedo ran true and it was tracked on sonar all the way as it acquired "lock on" to the target and passed under it (as it was supposed to do). However, the newly acquired torpedoes, whose test facilities had not yet been set up, failed to explode and kept going. Until the time that the torpedo was fired, neither of the two frigates had any inkling of being under attack. However, the moment the torpedo passed under INS KIRPAN, she suddenly woke up, realised she was under attack and turned away at maximum speed. HANGOR had struck first, but had failed to hit hard. The new torpedo had let it down.

"The advantage had now shifted completely in favour of the enemy. If the enemy had kept their cool, it is difficult to say what would have been the final outcome. Perhaps, this article would not have been written in such detail. But one thing is sure - the fate of INS KHUKRI would still have been what it was.

"As KIRPAN turned away and ran, KHUKRI, which was to its south, now knowing the direction from which the torpedo had come, increased speed and came straight for an attack on HANGOR.

"It was now HANGOR's turn to keep it's cool and this, the submarine did well. As KHUKRI came in for the attack, HANGOR's attack team calmly shifted target to KHUKRI, obtained a quick solution and fired the second torpedo at it. This quick shot was mostly meant to spoil the attack by KHUKRI. However loss of nerve by KHUKRI's Commanding Officer on hearing the oncoming torpedo, made him try to turn away from it. This greatly helped to "pull" the torpedo towards the frigate. As soon as the torpedo acquired "lock on", it went straight for the target, passed under it and when it was directly under the keel it exploded, breaking the keel of INS KHUKRI which sank in a matter of two minutes, with all hands on board. There were no survivors. There was simply no time for the myth of the "CO nonchalantly lighting a cigarette as the ship sank under him" to be enacted.

"The sinking of KHUKRI had now made the balance of advantage even between HANGOR and KIRPAN and the action had not yet finished.

"Seeing its sister ship sink in such a short time must have been a nerve-shattering experience for the KIRPAN's Commanding Officer, for he came charging in for an emergency attack, fired off a pattern of depth charges, hoping to scare HANGOR into breaking off its attack. But when he found that HANGOR was not intimidated and instead had fired the third torpedo at KIRPAN, he broke off the attack just as quickly and ran "hell for leather" in panic trying to outrun the torpedo locked on to the frigate's tail. That was the last seen (actually heard) of her.

"What followed this action was a massive anti-submarine effort by the Indian Navy, in the form of Operation Falcon to hunt down and kill just one submarine, PNS/M HANGOR. The operation continued for four days till the night of 13 December.

"A number of anti submarine charges were fired, on what the HUK groups thought was HANGOR. In the submarine itself, 24 salvoes (each of three charges) on 10 December and 12 salvoes on 12 December were registered. The latter depth charging took place after the Indian Navy's shore stations had taken cross bearings on HANGOR's radio message to Naval Headquarters regarding the action.

"Throughout these four days, HANGOR remained completely aware of the huge effort underway (though the details of Operation Falcon as such were known only after the war). It is a measure of HANGOR's efficiency that in spite of leaving the action area with a highly depleted battery, and with such a massive hunt for her in progress, she managed not only to recharge her batteries but was able to successfully lay a false trail for the HUK groups to follow. How successful the false trail was, can be judged from the fact that of the more than 36 salvoes fired, none came anywhere near the submarine; only two slightly shook the submarine. Most, being far away, could just be heard on sonar."

Admiral Kohli's book states: (Page 76).

"While in the process of hunting, the enemy submarine with her superior sonar facility, obtained contact of KHUKRI before her own detection by the ship and struck KHUKRI by a salvo of three torpedoes in quick succession. The ship sank in a matter of minutes at 2055 on 9 December, taking down with her 18 officers and 176 men including the Commanding Officer, Captain MN Mulla. It was a serious blow in an encounter in which the superior underwater destruction capability and its allied weapons systems of a modern submarine turned the scales and thus the hunter became the victim. A subsequent technical enquiry also revealed certain failings and non compliance on the part of KHUKRI's A/S Team with the laid down A/S doctrine."

KIRPAN, who was searching for the submarine together with KHUKRI, reported detecting torpedoes going past her at the time KHUKRI was torpedoed. She took vigorous evasive action and fired mortars on the torpedo bearing. After a few salvos, her mortars went non operational. KIRPAN now faced a dilemma - should she rescue KHUKRI's survivors - either by going amidst them on a dark night or should she lower her boats to rescue survivors. Both actions would require KIRPAN to stop and this would make her an easy target for the submarine, if it chose to attack KIRPAN. Or should KIRPAN leave the area, repair her mortars and return to the area with an additional ship to rescue the survivors and start hunting the submarine? This however would give the submarine time to get away from the scene of the sinking and consequently greatly enlarge the area to be searched. The CO of KIRPAN decided to withdraw from the scene and return later.

Admiral Kohli's book states: (Page 77).

"There was some controversy about KIRPAN withdrawing from the scene of the sinking instead of picking up survivors. She had heard the hydrophonic effect of more torpedoes and she had defective mortars. In the circumstances she took the wisest course. After meeting with KATCHALL, she returned to the scene in her company to carry on with the hunt."

On receiving KIRPAN's signals reporting the sinking of KHUKRI, FOCINCWEST rushed rescue forces to the scene. By the time KATCHALL and KIRPAN returned the next morning, only 6 officers and 61 sailors had survived to be rescued.

FOCINCWEST cancelled the third missile attack on Karachi which was to be have been carried out on the 10th night and deployed forces to hunt the submarine.

ANTI SUBMARINE OPERATION FALCON

Admiral Kohli's book states: (Page 77).

"A massive hunt was launched for the killer submarine with all available A/S ships, Seakings and Alizes.

"The Alizes laid a barrier of sonobuoys and the Seakings continued to operate from Diu until the passage became so long that time on the job was much reduced. The IAF mounted sustained maritime reconnaissance searches in search of the submarine. For the next four days, all forces were engaged in relentless and coordinated activity. Ships reported successful attacks on all four days. The submarine was slowly making its way towards Karachi where air cover would prevent further attacks and save her. It was evaluated by those taking part in the hunt that the submarine was certainly severely damaged and that her arrival in Karachi was problematic. The hunt was terminated reluctantly on the evening of 13 December as our forces were approaching within range of shore based Pakistani aircraft."

AFTER THE WAR

After the war, there was considerable debate on:

(a) Whether two ships were a viable enough force to send on an anti Daphne Hunter Killer mission without anti submarine air effort in direct support.

(b) Whether KHUKRI's doing so low a speed was related to the experimental Sonar 170 modification.

(c) Whether the Seakings could have been utilised more offensively.

(d) Whether KIRPAN was justified in withdrawing from the scene after KHUKRI's sinking instead of immediately rescuing KHUKRI's survivors.

(e) Why Operation FALCON was unable to locate the Pakistani submarine.

Since the action of the Commanding Officer of the KHUKRI going down with his ships had seized the nation's attention, each of these issues bacame sensitive and controversial, because they called into question:

(a) The very prudence of FOCINCWEST having launched the operation, moreso as he himself was later to admit in his book "We Dared" that:

(i) "The French Daphne class submarines were the most modern conventional submarine, with sensors and armament far superior not only to our submarines but also to our anti submarine frigates.

(ii) "In consultation with F 14, who accepted decreased anti submarine capability of the two ships, KHUKRI and KIRPAN were sailed for the hunt."

(b) The imprudent actions of the CO KHUKRI in a known very high submarine probability area.

(c) The glaring inadequacies in lifesaving equipment.

Notwithstanding these sensitivities, intensive enquiries were initiated.

POST WAR INQUIRIES ON THE LOSS OF THE KHUKRI

The consensus was that in war, it is unacceptable to let an enemy submarine threaten you on your doorstep - it has to be hunted.

Were the two frigates and Seakings deployed on 8 December adequate to cope with a Daphne class submarine?

It emerged that the Seaking helicopters, which were the Navy's latest and best anti submarine system, could have been better utilised operating from Diu but they were considered to be defenceless if attacked by Pakistani aircraft. However, available Super Connie maritime recce aircraft and Alize anti submarine aircraft should have been utilised in support of the operation from the moment it started on 8 December.

It emerged that with the assistance of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in Bombay, a secret but promising experiment had been initiated to increase the range at which ships sonars could detect submarines. The modification equipment had been tried at sea, results were promising but further improvements were needed. These were completed after the Western Fleet sailed on 2 December. After the 14 FS returned to Bombay, approval was given by Admiral Kohli for the modification kit to be embarked in KHUKRI when she sailed on 8 December. Throughout the search on 8 and 9 December, when the modification equipment was connected up to KHUKRI's sonar, the CO of KHUKRI had detailed discussions on the pros and cons of doing slow speed to increase detection range vis a vis doing higher speed and decreasing detection range. A conscious decision was taken by him to do slow speed. In this connection, Admiral Kohli's book states: (Page 40).

"It is of the utmost importance that any new sensors which have a direct bearing and importance on the safety of the ship should not be experimented with during war, when the ships are engaged in active operations, especially so if this experimentation would place restrictions on the speed and movement of the ship."

It emerged that this too was a conscious decision. The background noise generated by the noise maker to distract a torpedo's homing head was so high that it swamped the sonar which was trying to detect a weak submarine echo.

Could more lives have been saved?

It emerged that in the few minutes that it took the ship to sink, not many could jump into the sea. Of those that did, not many had lifejackets. Due to the shock of explosion, neither did all life rafts get released or inflated nor were those that did inflate made full use of.

Follow up action was initiated on diverse fronts:

(a) An Anti Submarine Warfare Seminar exposed, for the first time in the Navy's history, the sharp and serious differences in opinion on how to cope with a modern silent submarine having long range homing torpedoes. The basic issues were whether to sidestep a submarine or confront it? Whether to do slow silent speed against passive homing torpedoes? Or whether to do high speeds to outrun the torpedoes?

(b) The pre 1971, fatalistic acceptance of insuperable hydrological limitations in anti submarine efficiency was rooted out.

(c) The causes of poor sonar performance in the waters off the Indian coast were pinpointed and remedies identified.

(d) Longer range sonars and anti submarine weapons were inducted, as also electrically controlled noise makers which could be remotely switched on to decoy homing torpedoes.

(e) A Tactics Committee was constituted to formulate tactics for the Navy's unique mix of Russian, Western and indigenous sensors and weapons. Systematic effort began to keep up with the rapid advances taking place in submarine and anti submarine warfare, sonars, anti submarine torpedoes and rockets, torpedo homing mechanisms and torpedo decoys and integrate all this into a simple effective anti submarine doctrine.

(f) A new computer aided Tactical Teacher was installed at Bombay. In due course, this was augmented by a Tactical Evaluation Group.

(g) Major tactical exercises and debriefs were organised under NHQ's direct supervision to root out the ignorance of anti submarine tactics resulting from the lack of knowledge of own sonar and weapon capabilities and annual transfer of ASW officers and sonar operators. These helped to gradually standardise tactical doctrines and enhance operator efficiency.

The most important lesson that was learnt from the loss of the KHUKRI was that longer range sonars and longer range weapons had to be inducted if ships were to have a fighting chance against modern submarines and their long range homing torpedoes.

Immediate action was taken to improve the anti submarine capability of the Leander Class frigates then under construction in Mazagon Docks at Bombay. The significant improvements which were achieved have been described in the chapter dealing with the Leander Project.

In retrospect, KHUKRI's tragic loss did not go in vain.

SUBMARINE OPERATIONS

Western Naval Command was allocated two submarines KURSURA and KARANJ operating directly under FOCINCWEST. Since the approaches to Karachi and the Makran Coast were going to be transited by the Western Fleet and by the submarines, waiting stations and submarine havens were established. To exclude any possibility of mistaken identity, two precautions were taken:

(a) Corridors were demarcated which were not to be crossed.

(b) Submarines were required to positively identify a target before attack.

KURSURA's Patrol

Admiral Kohli's book states: (Page 82).

"KURSURA was deployed on patrol during the precautionary stage, before the outbreak of hostilities. The aims of the patrol were:

(a) To attack and sink all Pakistani warships.

(b) To sink all merchant shipping sighted/detected when specifically ordered.

(c) Patrol and surveillance.

"A waiting station and two patrol areas were established. The submarine was to proceed to her waiting station prior to the commencement of hostilities and move into her patrol area only after receiving a signal `Commence hostilities with Pakistan'. She sailed from base port on 13 November 1971 and arrived in her waiting station in the forenoon of 18 November. She stayed on patrol in her waiting station till 25 November. Thereafter, she was shifted to another area where she remained till 30 November. On 30 November, she was ordered to R/V KARANJ at sea to pass necessary information and instructions which she did and thereafter she entered Bombay on 4 December.

"She encountered a number of tankers in her waiting station, and two or three commercial aircraft daily on international routes. She had fair weather throughout."

KARANJ's Patrol

Admiral Kohli's book states: (Page 82).

"KARANJ, with orders similar to KURSURA, sailed on 30 November 1971 for her patrol. She effected R/V with KURSURA at sea on 2 December 1971 and thereafter proceeded to her waiting station which she entered at 1600 hrs on 3 December. The same night, she received information that hostilities with Pakistan had broken out. She was, however, ordered to remain in her waiting station. On 5 December at 0145 hrs she received orders to move to her patrol area which she entered on the morning of 6 December. On transit she received news of the Fleet's bombardment of Karachi and the sinking of two PN warships. Morale on board was high.

"The Commanding Officer, traversed the entire patrol area assigned to the submarine. His deductions at the end of it were:

(a) Upto 8 December. Ships were using the normal shipping route traversing the route east of Ormara by night. Air recce was `moderate' east of Ormara and `slight' west of it. Warship activity was `slight'.

(b) On the night of 8/9 December. Hectic aerial recce and warship activity to the west, north-west and south-west of Cape Monze. Radio Pakistan announced a hunt for an Indian submarine off their coast.

(c) 9/10 December and thereafter. All shipping traffic moved inside the 10 to 15 fathom line along the Makran coast. Warship activity frequent in Sonmiani Bay and off Ormara but close to the coast. Intense aerial recce east and south of Ormara from Monze and following the same route while approaching from the south.

(d) 11 to 14 December. No shipping activity west of Ormara. Intense aerial activity east of Ormara and moderate to the west. Some warship activity possible near Ormara.

On the evening of 14 December, the submarine was directed to withdraw from her patrol and she returned to base port on 20 December 1971.

"KARANJ thus became the longest deployed naval unit during the 1971 Indo-Pak conflict. She had been out from 30 November to 20 December 1971. On four different occasions during this patrol, the submarine almost released her weapons on merchantmen. The requirement to positively identify these precluded any firings."

IN RETROSPECT

In Admiral Kohli's words: (Page 80).

"The stipulation of "positive identification" prior to attacking any enemy ships deprived our submarines of any real action. The correct line of action would have been to have declared `War Zones' and sink any ship transiting through these, after a suitable warning period. Only the submarines could have achieved this with impunity in enemy waters."

LOSS OF ALIZE 203

Immediately after KHUKRI sank, two Alizes were sent from Santa Cruz at short notice to operate from Jamnagar on 10 December and assist in anti submarine operations.

On the afternoon of 10 December, reports were received from Okha of suspicious warship and air activity near Jakhau on the Indo-Pak border. FOCINCWEST decided to recce the area. One of the two Alizes at Jamnagar was directed to carry out a low level recce of the area before returning to Bombay. Air Force Canberra aircraft were tasked to be ready at Poona to attack whatever the Alize reported.

The Alize did not arrive at Bombay that evening. Pakistan Radio announced that an Indian Navy Alize has been shot down "near Karachi." Pakistani records state that Pakistan Air Force Starfighters returning from a raid on Okha chanced to encounter the Alize and shot it down with an air to air missile.

TRADE WARFARE

In his book, Admiral Kohli states:

"Towards the third week of November 1971, Pakistan declared a National Emergency and the Pakistan Navy assumed control of Pakistani merchant shipping. Very soon thereafter, FOCINCWEST was given control of Indian merchant shipping. The first action taken was to recall all Indian ships from the Gulf and direct all merchant shipping not to approach the Pakistan coast.

"The Pakistan Navy also announced the closure of Karachi port and merchant shipping was warned not to approach within 75 miles of Karachi during the dark hours". (Page 58).

"During the operations of the Fleet, a number of merchant ships and dhows were intercepted and examined for contraband. Thus a Swedish ship and a dhow on 6 December and a Panamanian ship on 7 December were sent to Bombay under the charge of a boarding party. On 9 December, a large dhow was apprehended carrying Rs 60 lakh worth of gold which was not in the manifest; the crew of the dhow were all Pakistani nationals. On 9 December, the MYSORE group raiding the Makran coast apprehended the Pakistani merchant ship MADHUMATI. On 10 December, the ATHENIAN was apprehended." (Page 65).

In Admiral Kohli's words: (Page viii)

"It was very satisfying to note that foreign neutral merchant ships and their representatives approached the Indian Government and the Navy for grace to leave Karachi in safety during those three hectic weeks. They had seen the devastation that had been wrought by the attack of the Indian Fleet. The Indian Navy was truly in command of the waters in the North Arabian Sea during those fateful days."

DEFENCE OF BOMBAY

Admiral Kohli's book states: (Page 85).

"Contingency plans were made for the defence of all the major ports on the West Coast but special emphasis had to be directed towards Bombay harbour because it was our main port, and the home of the Western Fleet and the premier dockyard of our Navy. It was appreciated that the enemy would deploy two submarines off Bombay in order to pick up our main naval units. They would also employ their Midgets and Chariots to indulge in sabotage inside the harbour. There was also a possibility that their ships or submarines may lay mines in the approaches to Bombay harbour. Provision had to be made for all these forms of threats. Any air raid attacks by the Pakistan Air Force would be dealt with by our Air Force and by the anti-aircraft fire from our ships and shore batteries located at different strategic points.

"Patrols were organised by surface ships inside the harbour and upto 20 miles at sea. Air reconnaissance was instituted upto 60 miles at sea. Missile boats were at immediate notice to proceed to sea and deal with any attempt by enemy naval units which approached Bombay harbour to carry out any bombardment. Our 6 inch shore batteries were brought to immediate readiness also.

"Merchant ships were warned not to approach Bombay harbour to within 40 miles between dusk and dawn; it was hoped that this measure would ensure that any radar echoes obtained during the night could only be that of an enemy ship.

"The harbour patrols were ordered to explode two-pound charges (especially made for the occasion) ever so often to scare away any Midgets or Chariots. All ships anchored in the stream were made to illuminate the water around the ship so that patrols on board would be able to visually apprehend any danger to their ship.

"Close liaison was established and maintained with the police and the Home Guards; they were shown photographs of Midgets and Chariots and frogmen and given detailed instructions on how to deal with personnel landed by such craft to carry out sabotage.

"Plans to lay minefields off Bombay harbour and arrangements for swept channels were progressed and mines prepared for this purpose.

"Fishing boats and vessels were mobilized and their cooperation enlisted. They were encouraged to go out to sea and report any suspicious movements. Fishermen were familiarised with silhouettes of Pakistani warships and submarines and also Midget submarines and frogmen.

"Close and constant liaison was established with the port authorities and the Port Advisory Committee to undertake necessary measures for important port installations and merchant ships in harbour to come under the umbrella of the overall defensive measures instituted by the Navy for the defence of Bombay.

"Additional batteries ashore were installed - two 4" guns at Okha, two 40/60s at Jamnagar, one 40/60 at Valsura. At Bombay, the existing batteries were augmented by putting two additional 40/60 guns each at Colaba Point and Worli. Three additional 40/60 guns were installed at Oyster Rock and Middle Ground. Four 40/60 guns were installed at critical points in the Naval Dockyard.

"The War Watching Organisation was instituted: suitable temporary telephone lines were installed so that watchers at lighthouses and other promontory points would report enemy warships or suspicious vessels as soon as they were sighted.

"We had acquired one dozen fishing trawlers from the trade and these were fitted out for carrying out harbour patrols and limited seaward patrols. Naval personnel were appointed to them and the existing crews were signed on for limited naval service.

"Our seaward resources of ships and crafts were augmented by two Alizes, four Seakings and two Alouettes. The Alizes were deployed on seaward patrols of 60 miles from Bombay.

Various other security measures were also instituted:

(a) Screening of antecedents of officers and crews of Indian merchant ships to prevent vital information from leaking out.

(b) Naval publications withheld from coastal vessels.

(c) Adoption of strict security measures against possible use of dhows and neutral ships for landing of saboteurs and for towing Midgets from Pakistan.

(d) Supervision on the steering of foreign ships in harbours.

(e) Guarding of sensitive points and vital installations in harbours.

(f) Control of W/T and signal stations and lighthouses to avoid their misuse.

(g) Tightening of restrictions on landing of Chinese and Pakistani nationals from neutral ships calling at Indian ports."

A RETROSPECT OF OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN NAVAL COMMAND

Of the three threats posed by the Pakistan Navy, the surface warship threat was contained by the missile attacks on Karachi. These confined the Pakistan flotilla inside Karachi harbour to escape further losses.

The submarine threat was more serious. Despite the known limitations in anti submarine capability, the question was whether.

- to do something i.e. hunt and kill the submarine or

- do nothinhing i.e. let the submarine look for its targets while ships got on with other missions.

In retrospect, it is clear that even if all available air effort and three or more ships had been deployed to hunt the submarine, the submarine torpedoes could not have missed KHUKRI doing so low a speed. If air effort had been better managed, it could have driven the submarine away from the Diu area and thereby reduce the threat to the missile forces assembling at Diu. The loss of the KHUKRI was a serious blow. But it did lead to extensive improvements in anti submarine capability.

The air threat too was serious. But no one could have anticipated that the Pakistan Air Force would be so slow in responding to the requests of the Pakistan Navy. The chapter on the "Analysis of the Pakistan navy's Accounts of the 1971 War" discusses the causes for this lack of support.

In Admiral Kohli's words: (Page 64).

"Our Fleet was lucky to have got away without any air attacks by shore based aircraft from Pakistani territory. However enemy attacks on naval shore targets did take place. From 5 December onwards, Okha received concentrated attention by the Pakistan Air Force aircraft and was bombed almost every day. Our special oil fuel tank was blown up in the very early stages of the war and our use of Okha as an advance base came to an end."

In spite of the material state of ships being so poor, ships companies managed to achieve almost continuous high speed operations for a full seven days after 2 December.

By 9 December, after the second missile attack on Karachi, the Navy had achieved maritime dominance of the approaches to Karachi.